Performance related pay: is it the answer to improve performance in the public sector? Dr. Monica Franco-Santos Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Business Performance, Cranfield School of Management monica.franco@cranfield.ac.uk Overview Background and trends Impact of Performance Related Pay A ‘new’ approach Twenty years ago… Base pay (increments based on service) Promotions In the late eighties and early nineties… At present … Base pay (competencies, job roles, etc.) Promotions Performance Related Pay (PRP) PRP definition Variable pay based on specific behaviours, outputs or outcomes These behaviours, outputs or outcomes can be individual, team or organisational based Performance measures Variable pay OECD PRP report (2005) 66% of OECD countries have implemented PRP or are in the process of doing so Gap between the existence of the so called PRP scheme and its concrete functioning There is no single model of PRP across OECD member countries OECD PRP report (2005) However, common trends are: PRP policies have spread from management level to cover many different categories of staff Increase in the use of group performance schemes Standardised PRP schemes have evolved into more decentralised systems Increased diversity of the criteria against which performance is assessed (outputs, competencies) OECD PRP report (2005) Performance appraisals are less standardised, formalised and detailed than ten years ago The use of performance targets within PRP are more widespread The size of performance payments is a modest percentage of the base salary: – <10% ABS for employees – 20% ABS for managers OECD PRP report (2005) UK Data… (CIPD, 2006) Main reason for using PRP To improve civil servant’s motivation and accountability as a way to improve overall government performance Impact PRP is an attractive idea but its implementation is complex and its impact ambivalent … and this is so in both private and public sectors Impact Research suggest that: PRP is unlikely to motivate a substantial majority of staff, irrespective of its design Job content and career development prospects are the strongest incentives for public employees The success or failure of PRP is substantially influenced by contextual factors Impact: Why? Main PRP assumptions … Individual and team outputs contribute to organisational performance Individuals are mainly motivated by money Managers can and will make fair assessments of their subordinates Organisations can accurately measure individual, team or organisation outputs Impact: A paradox… The paradox is that despite these negative impact results, government and public interest in PRP is still increasing … Reasons why… The overall principle behind PRP is strongly supported by politicians, civil servants and citizens. “good performance should be rewarded” Transferability of private sector practices to public sector settings “It is typical for a government to follow private sector examples and buy pokes without looking inside to see if there’s really a good pig in there” (Ingraham, 1993) Benefits of PRP… PRP as a catalyst for other org. changes In those organisations in which there are: – High levels of managerial discretion in HRM – High levels of trust – Common and shared values and objectives between executives and employees – Consensus about the measures of both individual and organisational success – Enough financial resources available the processes that accompany PRP have made organisational changes possible and positive Benefits of PRP… Example of key transformations due to PRP… Effective appraisal and goal setting Clarification of tasks Acquisition of new skills Improved employee-manager dialogue More teamwork, Increased flexibility in work performance …. CULTURAL CHANGE Benefits of PRP… “It appears that it is NOT through the financial incentives it provides that PRP can contribute to improving performance, but rather through its secondary effects, that is the changes to work and management organisation needed to implement it.” (OECD, 2005) An ‘new’ approach… Performance Related Rewards Total Rewards Extrinsic Rewards Non-monetary (Recognition) Monetary Direct Compensation Base Pay Incentives Intrinsic Rewards (self-motivation) Indirect Compensation (Benefits) Protection programs Employee services (American Compensation Association,1999) Performance Related Rewards Agency 1 • Intrinsic • Extrinsic (base pay, recognition) Agency 2 • Intrinsic • Extrinsic (skill base pay, bonus based on outcome measures a,b,c) Conclusions Performance related pay: is just an answer to improve performance in the public sector … it is NOT the holy grail Final remarks… Ask what public organisations need, not what private organisations do. Find examples of success and failure in the public sector. Learn from them! Ask if threshold conditions for success are going to be present for implementation. Mostly… enough funding Explore the fits of PRP with other initiatives that are also taking place PRP is not a technical add-on. Final remarks… Look carefully at other reward elements that can promote good performance Recognition plans Intrinsic rewards Use previous research or execute new research in which to base managerial decisions regarding the design of PRP OECD (2005) Milkovich & Wigor (1991) Future research needed! New PERFORMANCE RELATED REWARDS (PRR) designs Understanding of how contextual factors affect the impact of PRR Practical tools for implementation of PRR practices Strategies that would lessen the number of dysfunctional behaviours produced by PRP Q&A References Christopher, H. and Hood, C. (2006), 'Gaming in Targetworld The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services.', Public Administration Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 515-521. Durant, R.F., Kramer, R., Perry, J.L., Mesch, D. and Paarlberg, L. (2006), 'Motivating Employees in a New Governance Era The Performance Paradigm Revisited.', Public Administration Review, Vol. 66, No. 4, pp. 505-514. OECD (2005), Performance Related Pay for Goverment Employees , OECD Press, Milkovich, G. and Wigor, A. (1991) Pay for Performance Evaluating Performance Appraisal and Merit Pay, National Academic Press, Washington, DC. Ingraham, P.W. (1993), 'Of Pigs in Pokes and Policy Diffusion Another Look at Pay-for-Performance', Public Administration Review, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 348-356. Perry, J.L. and Petrakis, B.A. (1988), 'Can Pay for Performance Succed in Government?', Public Personnel Management, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 359-367. Susseles, E.R. and Magid, M. (2005), 'Pay for Performance in the Public Sector', Benefits & Compensation Digest, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 32-35.