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Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Chapter 6
Nuclear Power
Chapter collaborators:
Since its discovery in the 20th Century, nuclear energy
has straddled a line between great potential and catastrophic
danger. On one hand, nuclear energy presents the possibility
of a long-term energy source that could release us from the
dependency on fossil fuels. On the other hand, Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, the Cold War, Chernobyl, and Fukushima
remind us of the destructive potential and dangers of nuclear
energy.
Meerin Amin (WF ’12)
Stephen Bell (WF ’12)
Matt Berthinet (WF ’13)
Brian Dorwin (WF ’13)
Craig Harasimowicz (WF ’14)
Jake Husain (WF ’14)
Lea Ko (WF ’13)
Tim Stewart (WF ’12)
Doug Winn (WF ’14)
Ben Winikoff (WF ’15)
Ben Zich (WF ’14)
Nuclear energy is energy from the core, or nucleus, of
an atom. US EIA, “Nuclear Explained.” Enormous energy
is stored in the bonds that hold the nucleus together, which is
released when the bonds are broken in nuclear fission. When
the energy is released, nuclear energy can be used to make electricity. Energy can also be
released when nuclei bond together in nuclear fusions – as happens in the sun and the hydrogen
bomb.
According to the energy “input/output” chart (below), nuclear power as of 2013
constitutes about 8.4% of total U.S. primary energy.
See EIA, “U.S. Energy Flow – 2013”
Page 1 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power In this chapter, you will learn about:
•
The shift from military uses of nuclear energy to peaceful ones
o The production of electricity through the use of nuclear energy
o The origin and rise of nuclear power, both domestically and internationally
•
The worldwide growth of nuclear waste
o The growth of nuclear power in Europe and Asia
o The current status of nuclear power in the United States
•
The construction, licensing and operation of American nuclear power plants
o The process for building new nuclear power plants and reactors in the United States
o The current licensing process for nuclear reactors
•
The options and remedies for the disposal of nuclear waste
o The status of the Yucca mountain nuclear waste storage site
o The proposals for storage of high-radiation nuclear waste
Page 2 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Chapter 6 – Nuclear Energy
6.1
Early Development of Nuclear Power
6.1.1 Atomic Bomb
6.1.2 First Generation of Nuclear Power Plants
6.1.3 Energy Shocks of 1979
6.2
Worldwide Growth of Nuclear Power
6.2.1 Nuclear Power in Europe
6.2.2 Nuclear Power in Asia
6.3
Existing U.S. Nuclear Power Plants
6.4
Building New Nuclear Reactors in the United States
6.4.1 Rebirth of US nuclear power industry
6.4.2 Role of State Law
6.4.3 Federal Licensing Procedure
6.4.4 Obstacles to the Domestic Proliferation of Nuclear Power
6.5
Disposal of Nuclear Waste
6.5.1 Low-Level Radioactive Waste
6.5.2 High-Level Radioactive Waste
Sources:
• FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT Chapter 13, 9961096 (3rd ed. 2010).
• LAUREN SCHROEDER, OIL AND GAS LAW: A LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE (2012).
Page 3 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power 6.1. Early Development of Nuclear Power
Nuclear power comes in two forms: nuclear fusion and nuclear fission. US EIA, “Nuclear
Explained.” In nuclear fusion, energy is released when atoms are combined or fused together to form a
larger atom. The earth derives almost of all of its energy from nuclear fusions produced by the sun.
While the hydrogen bomb uses nuclear fusion, scientists have been unable to harness it for consumption.
Nuclear fission, on the other hand, has been developed for peaceful use. In nuclear fission, atoms are split
apart to form smaller atoms, releasing tremendous amounts of energy. Nuclear power plants use this
energy to produce electricity.
Our basic scientific knowledge regarding the physics of nuclear energy dates to the end of the
19th century. World-Nuclear.org, "Outline History of Nuclear Energy". The birth of nuclear energy
begins with the 1895-96 discovery of radiation. For the next 40 years, scientists gained a rudimentary
knowledge of radiation and, in the process, the nature of an atom. The scientific turning point occurred in
1938-39 when Lise Meitner and Otto Frisch, working under Niels Bohr, theorized that bombarding an
atom with an accelerated proton – and the resultant nuclear fission -- could produce an energy release of
around 200 million electron volts. This realization led to world-wide research into the energy-release
potential of nuclear fission.
6.1.1
Atomic Bomb
Nuclear energy took center stage during World War II, when the United States invented the
atomic bomb. Near the end of the war, U.S. forces used this newly-discovered weapon on the Japanese
cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These events made clear the terrible human, environmental and political
issues associated with nuclear energy.
In the aftermath of World War II, the United States decided to encourage the spread of peaceful
uses of nuclear energy. President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” program, transferred nuclear
technology from the military to private companies specialized in power plant construction. Around the
same time, Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), 42 USC § 2011 et seq., which
encouraged the private development of nuclear power as regulated by what is now the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).
6.1.2
First Generation of Nuclear Power Plants
The world’s first commercial nuclear power plant, Calder Hall in Windscale, England, was
opened in 1956. BBC, "1956: Queen Switches on Nuclear Power". The first commercial nuclear power
plant in America was completed in 1957 in Shippingport, Pennsylvania. By the early 1960s, about three
dozen small nuclear plants had been built around the world. With more plants and improvements in
technology, optimism grew that electricity prices would fall drastically. Power companies in the United
States, Japan, Sweden, Britain, France, Germany, and Canada joined the nuclear movement, building
almost 300 nuclear plants between 1965 and 1975. Pride in American innovation and fears of dependence
on foreign oil made nuclear power popular with the American public. But as people learned of the longterm effects of radiation sickness on the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, doubts began about the
safety of nuclear power.
Page 4 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Despite growing concerns among citizens and scientists, the Atomic Energy Commission (the
predecessor to the NRC) was slow to confront issues of reactor safety, thermal pollution, and nuclear
waste. NRC.gov, "A Short History of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1999". Congress responded by creating
the NRC in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, a fully independent regulatory body spun off from
the AEC. While the NRC moved slowly (the regulations only applied to new power plants) on regulatory
changes to reactor safety and licensing, the agency strengthened regulations regarding transportation and
safeguarding of nuclear materials in response to growing national apprehension about nuclear sabotage.
6.1.3
Energy Shocks of 1979
Two events in 1979 harmed the American nuclear power industry and led to increased NRC
regulation and monitoring of the nuclear industry. The first was the 1979 oil shock, which reduced the
U.S. oil supplies and raised the price of electricity. See Wikipedia, “1979 Energy Crisis.” As Americans
consumed les electricity, many companies cancelled construction of planned nuclear projects.
The second and more significant event was the accident at Metropolitan Edison’s Three Mile
Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. See Wikipedia, “Three Mile Island Accident.”
In what was described as the nation’s worst nuclear accident, a small non-nuclear malfunction caused
radioactive water to be discharged from the power plant. In In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613 (3d. Cir.
1999), citizens sued the Three Miles Island utility company alleging they suffered neoplasms as a result
of the radiation released from the company’s plant. However, the complaint was dismissed when the
NRC’s Special Inquiry Group eventually concluded that the quantity of radioactive materials contained in
the water released into the Susquehanna River was not significant. Despite this conclusion, public support
for nuclear power fell dramatically.
These two events slowed the growth of the nuclear energy industry in the United States.
Investment in the nuclear industry dwindled as the price of electricity rose, and utilities became reluctant
to build new (and expensive) nuclear power plants because of the risk regulators might disallow the
recovery of new plants costs. In response to Three Mile Island, the NRC crafted new regulations centered
on “human factors” and mandated nuclear plant operator training, testing, and licensing and restrictions
on work hours and overtime. NRC.gov, "A Short History of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1999". The NRC
also commissioned several studies to analyze the effects of “small breaks and transients,” such as those
that happened at Three Mile Island, and crafted updated emergency preparedness plans for both nuclear
plants and communities surrounding the plants.
This concern led to a series of conflicts between utilities and nearby local governments that
sought to “sandbag” plants under construction by refusing to participate in the evacuation planning
process. In response, the NRC adopted the “realism doctrine” and concluded that the Commission could
assume that each local government would really cooperate in the utility’s evacuation plan if an emergency
arose, even if the local government claimed that it wouldn’t. This regulation was upheld in
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States, 856 F.2d 378 (1st Cir. 1988). But the regulatory effort
came to late to reassure the public about nuclear power; interest in building new plants had disappeared.
Page 5 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power 6.1.4
Liability for Non-Military Nuclear Accidents in the United States
Nuclear power plants carry risks unlike those of conventional power plants. To address the
potentially stultifying liability concerns, Congress passed Price-Anderson Act in 1957 to limit the liability
for non-military nuclear accidents. NRC.gov, "A Short History of Nuclear Regulation, 1946-1999". The
Act indemnifies the US commercial nuclear industry from nuclear accidents, while providing a means of
compensation to people adversely affected by a nuclear incident. The Act provides for $12.6 billion (the
current amount) in no-fault, industry-funded insurance coverage, with any amount in excess of $12.6
billion covered either by a Congressional mandate to retroactively increase the share covered by the
nuclear industry or by having the federal government cover any overage.
To date, only $151 million has been paid out of the Price-Anderson fund, all from the primary
insurance. Of this total, $71 million went to cover the Three Mile Island incident and $65 million to
cover various liabilities incurred by operation of federal nuclear facilities. Wikipedia.org, "PriceAnderson Nuclear Industries Indemnity Act". Congress extended these protections until the end of 2025
in the Energy Policy Act of 2005.
6.2
Worldwide Growth of Nuclear Power
As of 2014, thirty countries worldwide operated 437 nuclear reactors used to generate electricity.
Nuclear power plants provided 12.3% of the world’s electricity production in 2012, and thirteen countries
rely on nuclear power to generate at least one-quarter of their total electricity. Nuclear Energy Institute
(NEI). Some countries that do not have their own nuclear plants still rely significantly on nuclear power
by importing it – such as, Italy 10% and Denmark 8%. World Nuclear Association.
Source: World Nuclear Association.
Most of the current nuclear power facilities were built between 1970-1990, with the construction
of new facilities slowing significantly since then. IAEA. Nonetheless, nuclear electricity production has
trended upward over this same period. A main reason has been the improved performance of existing
plants. For instance in the United States, the load factor (ratio of actual output over potential capacity
Page 6 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power output) has improved from 56% in 1980 to 66% in 1990 to around 87% today. Although the United States
leads the world in load factor, other countries are not far behind. One quarter of the world’s reactors have
load factors of more than 90%, and nearly two thirds do better than 75%. World Nuclear Association.
Operational Reactors by Age. As the following chart shows, most nuclear power plants in the world are
more than 20 year old, with many more than 35 years old.
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency.
Leveling off of nuclear power production. Nuclear power production, which grew rapidly from 1970 to
1990, has tapered off in the last 20 years. And its share of total electric production has fallen from a high
of 17% to its current 12% of total power production worldwide.
Source: World Nuclear Association.
Page 7 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Most of the current growth in the nuclear power industry is occurring in Asia, where support for nuclear
energy had been strong – at least until the nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan. According to the 2013
Agency projections for 2030, the world’s nuclear power generation capacity is expected to grow by 17%
in the low case and by 94% in the high case. IAEA.
Reactors Under Construction in 2014
Country
# Reactors
Total Net
Capacity (MW)
27
10
6
5
5
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
26756
8382
3907
6370
5633
1325
630
880
1900
2690
25
1109
1245
1600
1630
CHINA
RUSSIA
INDIA
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
UNITED STATES
JAPAN
PAKISTAN
SLOVAKIA
UKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
ARGENTINA
BELARUS
BRAZIL
FINLAND
FRANCE
Source: International Atomic Energy Agency.
6.2.1
International Atomic Energy Agency
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- an organization within the United Nations -was established to promote safe, secure, and peaceful nuclear technology. The IAEA began as the world’s
“Atom’s for Peace” organization in 1957 in response to the great expectations and deep fears about
nuclear energy. President Eisenhower highlighted these ideas in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly
on December 8, 1953. See Atom’s for Peace Speech. In October 1956, 81 nations unanimously approved
the IAEA Statute, the organization’s charter, which focuses on three primary areas – nuclear verification
and security, safety, and technology transfer. See IAEA Statute.
The influence and stature of the IAEA has gone through cycles of ebb and flow sometimes due to
events outside the IAEA’s control. The political and technical climate in the years following its formation
prevented the IAEA from accomplishing much of its mandate. In the 1960s the nuclear climate continued
to change with concerns over nuclear weaponry due to the Cuban missile crisis and France and China
acquiring nuclear weapons. Originally the safeguards prescribed in the IAEA’s Statute were designed to
cover individual nuclear plants or fuel supplies so the IAEA was poorly setup to deter nuclear
proliferation.
Page 8 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Recognizing the limits of the IAEA, the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) was
opened for signature in 1968, and acceded to by almost all of the key industrial countries and by the vast
majority of developing countries – a broad recognition in the international community of the dangers of
the spread of nuclear weapons. Then after the oil crisis of 1973, the IAEA’s function became distinctly
more important as nuclear energy became more attractive in many countries. However, by the 1980s
demand for new nuclear power plants plummeted, falling to essentially zero after the Chernobyl accident
in 1986.
The importance of the IAEA came to the front again in 1991 when Iraq’s clandestine weapon
program was discovered. This event caused some to doubts about the efficacy of the IAEA’s safeguards,
but also served as a catalyst for a political consensus to strengthen them. In addition, the NPT violations
by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Three Mile Island accidents also highlighted the
importance of IAEA’s role in the international community. Paradoxically, when all has gone well with
nuclear energy and technology the governments of countries with advanced nuclear industries tend to
keep the IAEA at a distance, but when matters go badly these same countries are often quick to agree to a
more extensive role for the organization. Today, it is now widely accepted that the role of the IAEA has
grown to include dealing with some of the problems associated with military nuclear activities despite this
area being outside of the IAEA’s statutory scope. History of the IAEA: The First Forty Years
6.2.2
Nuclear Power in Europe
Currently, there are 194 nuclear reactors in operation in Europe—almost twice as many as in the
United States. Seven European countries obtain more than 40% of their electricity from nuclear power,
with France at 76%.
Capacity Factors Revisited
Nuclear expansion in Europe was quelled
temporarily after the 1986 Chernobyl accident in
Ukraine. In what is described as one of the worst
nuclear power plant disasters in history, large
amounts of radiation were released into the
atmosphere, eventually causing the deaths of 70
people (30 of whom died quickly), and forcing the
Soviet government to evacuate 3,000 square miles,
much of which is still contaminated today. See
World Nuclear Association, “Chernobyl Accident
1986.”
How much of the capacity of nuclear power plants is
being used, compared to other power-generating
sources? A study by the UK’s Department of Energy
and Climate Change provides an answer for the UK
(2007-2011):
Combined cycle gas turbine station
Nuclear power plants
Coal fired power plants
Hydroelectric power stations
Wind power plants
Photovoltaic power stations
61.9%
60.1%
42.2%
35.4%
27.1%
8.3%
While Chernobyl remains in the minds of
Source: Wikipedia
certain countries—such as Germany, which has
decided to close all nuclear plants by 2020—it has not stopped nuclear expansion. A 2005 report by the
United Nations estimated that four to six thousand people living in the immediate area of Chernobyl may
eventually develop terminal cancer when other groups had projected the number to be as much as 93,000,
leading people to believe that the that long-term effects of the accident are not as bad as once thought.
Wikipedia: Chernobyl. Furthermore, countries such as Finland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, and the Slovak
Page 9 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Republic have new nuclear power plants under construction. These countries continue to train nuclear
scientists and engineers in order to produce additional nuclear energy.
6.2.2
Nuclear Power in Asia
While nuclear energy remains prevalent in Europe, the boom in new nuclear plants has come
from Asia. As of 2014, China led the world in the number of nuclear plants under construction, with 27,
while Russia has ten, India has six and South Korea has five. China is engaged in the world’s most rapid
expansion of nuclear power, expecting to build about 50 new nuclear reactors by 2020. Before the
Fukushima disaster in 2011, Japan had proposed 8 new nuclear reactors by 2020.
While the demand for nuclear energy in Asia has increased, the six big nuclear manufacturing
firms—GE, Westinghouse, Areva, Toshiba, Hitachi, and Mistsubishi Heavy Industries—are having a
difficult time finding a place in the Asian markets. They find themselves competing with firms backed by
national governments, which are able to provide fixed prices and security in a high-liability industry. The
“Big Six” often lose to lower state-backed bids.
In other parts of Asia the demand for nuclear power has vanished, the most notable case being
Japan. In March 2011, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Japan creating a tsunami that
caused considerable damage to the country. The earthquake itself caused the main island of Japan to
move a few meters east and dropped the local coastline half a meter. The ensuing tsunami proved to be
even more devastating as it inundated about 350 square
miles, destroying infrastructure and killing over 19,000
people. World Nuclear Association.
Eleven nuclear reactors at four nuclear power plants
in the region were operating at the time and all shut down
automatically when the earthquake hit. Inspections afterward
revealed that the reactors were very robust seismically and
that no damage resulted from the earthquake itself. The real
damage occurred from the tsunami, which knocked out the
power needed to run the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
systems at the plants. At eight of the eleven reactors, power
from the grid or backup generators kicked in to run the
pumps, which were able to achieve a ‘cold shutdown’ of the
reactors within about four days. However, at Fukushima
Daiichi a 15-meter tsunami wave had flooded the area and
disabled back-up generators as well as the heat exchangers,
which dumped reactor waste heat into the sea. As a result the
three reactors at this site effectively lost the ability to
maintain proper reactor cooling and water circulation
functions.
Major fuel melting ensued in all three of the Fukushima units, most of which was contained
within the structures -- except for some volatile fission materials vented to cool the reactor. Additional
Page 10 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power releases of fission material occurred when the containment was breached, causing water used to cool the
reactors to leak. Eventually, workers were able control the situation and the facility reached “cold
shutdown condition” in mid December, some nine months after the crisis began. World Nuclear
Association.
The incident at Fukushima increased fear among the Japanese public and caused the government
to evacuate over 100,000 people to avoid the negative effects of radiation exposure. To date there have
been no “official” fatalities tied directly to the nuclear accident, though many people are still suffering the
effects from having to evacuate their homes. The government has proceeded cautiously in allowing
people to return home.
Source: World Nuclear Association
Not surprisingly Japanese public sentiment against nuclear energy has risen drastically since this
incident. This has created tension in the government, which must balance the country’s energy needs with
limited national energy resources. Japan relies on imports to meet the majority of its energy requirements,
and of the amount of power generated internally 30% had come from nuclear sources. Nuclear generation
was expected to grow to 41% by 2017 and 50% by 2030 before the Fukushima incident, but since then
the government has had to change its position. In October 2011 the government published a White Paper
confirming that “Japan’s dependency on nuclear energy will be reduced as much as possible in the
medium-range and long-range future.” World Nuclear Association.
The debate in Japan on nuclear power continues. In September 2012 the Japanese government
announced a new policy goal to phase out all nuclear power plants by 2040, then five days later the
government backpedalled and refused to give full cabinet approval to the plan. See WSJ, “Japan
Backtracks on Nuclear-Free Plan”. In addition, a new report issued by the utility in charge of the
Fukushima plant admitted that human errors contributed significantly to the accident. See WSJ, “Japan
Utility Says Nuclear Crisis Was Avoidable”.
Page 11 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power 6.3
Status of Existing U.S. Nuclear Power Plants
While reliance on nuclear power has grown globally, it has waned in the United States – until
very recently. In the 1990s, as U.S. natural gas production and gas-fired power plants increased, many
critics came to believe that nuclear power had become obsolete. Investors did not see nuclear power
plants as a good investment. It did not appear that the technology could compete on an economic basis
against alternative energies. State legislatures even began taking protective measures to insulate utilities
from the “stranded costs” that they had invested in nuclear power.
Despite the general pessimism, nuclear power began to grow more cost-efficient. Operating
efficiency, which had been about 70% during the 1990s, increased to over 90% by 2004. Capacity at
existing plants increased as well, given that nuclear plants can produce baseload power, by operating
continuously and without interruption. As all these facts became more apparent, operators began seeking
license extensions on their existing plants.
Despite increased reliance on existing nuclear power plants, growth in the industry has remained
cautious. As of 2010, only one new reactor was under construction, at Watts Bar, Tennessee – a project
that first broke ground in 1973. Furthermore, the Fukushima disaster reactor in Japan brought longstanding fears about nuclear power back to the forefront of popular opinion. Voice of America, “US
Nuclear Renaissance Further Crippled by Japan Crisis.” In response to the incident, President Obama
requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission conduct an investigation into the safety of
existing U.S. reactors. Voice of America, “US Nuclear Renaissance Further Crippled by Japan Crisis.”
Public anxiety, regulatory hurdles, and industry stagnation have also contributed to a brain drain
in the sector. Nuclear engineers tend to be older workers and relatively few engineering students decide to
go into the field.
6.4
New Nuclear Reactors in the United States
The future for nuclear power in the United States, however, may be looking up. Although reactor
construction in the United States has ceased since 1977, there are signs there may be a new generation of
nuclear reactors and a U.S. renaissance in nuclear power. President Obama, for example, has pledged to
build a “new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants,” by tripling the value of loans for new
nuclear plants the government is offering to guarantee.
6.4.1
Rebirth of US nuclear industry
The NRC is currently considering applications for licenses for 26 new reactors – though most are
applications for additional reactors at existing plants, not for new plants. In 2012, the NRC announced the
approval of two nuclear reactors at an existing nuclear power plant in Georgia – the first approval in 30
years. NPR, “US regulators approve first nuclear plants in generation”. The first of the $14 billion
reactors will become operational in 2016, the second in 2017.
The recent push for reactor construction may be attributed to two interconnected movements.
First, some proponents of green technology view safe nuclear power as a desirable alternative to fossil
fuels and some renewable energies. They point out that life cycle emissions at nuclear plants are often
Page 12 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power lower than wind, solar, hydro, and natural gas power plants. Although the nuclear energy chain produces
waste, the byproducts are carefully controlled and not released into the environment.
The second motivation to increase nuclear energy generation involves state sovereignty and the
desire for the United States to achieve energy independence. PBS, “French Nuclear Power”. Although
approximately 86% of uranium now comes from foreign sources, the United States has significant
uranium reserves and is officially the ninth largest uranium producer in the world. See NWTRB,
“Uranium Facts”; Science & Technology, “How One Equation Changed the World.” In fact, until 1980,
the United States was the global leader in uranium production. US uranium mining slowed down during
the 1970s and 1980s when the price of uranium plummeted. But as prices have risen, uranium mines
(mostly in the western United States) have begun to reopen and ramp up production. NTRWB,
“Uranium”
Source: Wikipedia
In general, the federal government supports nuclear development. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
committed $18.5 billion in loan commitments to fund so-called Section 638 “Standby Support for Certain
Nuclear Plant Delays.” See Energy Policy Act of 2005. The program guarantees financing to new reactor
projects while they undergo the complicated and lengthy approval process. This ensures the plant owners
remain solvent until the plant comes online and begins producing revenue.
Page 13 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power 6.4.2
Role of State Law
Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Federal government possesses the exclusive authority to
regulate the workplace safety of nuclear facilities. 42 USC § 2011 et seq. However, plants must comply
with state laws that are not safety-related. See, e.g., Connecticut Coalition against Millstone v.
Connecticut Siting council, 286 Conn. 57, 942 A.2d 345 (2008). While states are often inclined to assert
influence in addressing safety concerns over nuclear power plants, federal law may preempt state laws
regarding nuclear power safety.
In 1983, the Supreme Court held that, while states retain authority over “questions of need,
reliability, cost, and other related State concerns,” federal preemption under the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA) prevents states from regulating nuclear power for the purposes of radiological safety. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205
(1983). As the Court pointed out, Congress intended “that the federal government should regulate the
radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and operation of a nuclear plant, but that the states
retain their traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions
of need, reliability, cost, and other related state concerns.” Thus, state laws and regulatory decisions
concerning nuclear power plants must be based on non-safety grounds.
Nonetheless, state law related to nuclear plant safety is not entirely preempted. The Supreme
Court has held that a state’s award of punitive damages as a consequence of a radiological leak from a
nuclear facility is not preempted by the AEA. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 464 US 238 (1984); see also
Cong. Research Service, “State Authority to Regulate Nuclear Power (2011)”. The Court has also held
that a state claim by an employee of a nuclear power plant for intentional infliction of emotional distress
is not preempted by the AEA. English v. General Electric Co. 496 US 72 (1990).
6.4.3 Federal Licensing Procedure
Nuclear plant licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has recently undergone
significant changes. Before 2008, all nuclear plants were licensed under a two-step approval process. 10
C.F.R. § 50 (Part 50). Power plant owners would first obtain a construction permit and next obtain an
operating license, with interested parties challenging each step. Owners disliked the process because
litigants could reopen issues in the licensing phase that were already addressed in the permitting phase.
Parties challenging plant approval countered that that the law was skewed in favor of the owners, given
gaps in pre-construction information about the plants.
In response to pressure from both sides, the NRC adopted a new (optional) licensing procedure in
the Energy Policy Act of 1992. 10 C.F.R. § 52 (Part 52). The new regulation combines the old process
into a single step and adds two additional requirements: Early Site Permit (ESP), Design Certification
(DC), and Combined Operating License (COL). Environmental and safety issues are thus pushed to the
front of the process. These changes reflect a move toward procedural efficiency by streamlining the
hearing process through the greater use of informal hearings. The new framework has helped potential
projects gain traction.
Page 14 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Early Site Permits (ESPs). The first step in the streamlined licensing procedure requires the NRC to,
among other things, conduct safety and environmental inquiries into new plant applications. The agency
must write a Safety Analysis Report and Environmental Impact Statement. If NRC decides to issue the
permit, it is valid for not less than 10 and not more than 20 years – though renewable for another 10 to 20
years. World News Organization Parties with standing can challenge the permit, and the NRC’s Atomic
Safety & Licensing Board’s decisions are appealable to circuit courts. The permit does not commit an
applicant to building a project.
By issuing an ESP, NRC certifies that the site satisfies the criteria in those evaluation areas. If
the company later chooses to pursue construction, the ESP becomes part of the combined construction
and operation license (COL) application, which requires a separate review and approval. The NRC's
review of the ESP application is expected to take three years. The goal of the ESP process is to resolve
licensing issues related to siting before an applicant commits resources to construction. Therefore,
whenever an ESP holder subsequently applies for a COL, it can rely on an already approved ESP with
regard to all siting issues related to that particular site in the COL application. One of the consequences of
this expedited proceeding is that parties contesting a COL application referencing an ESP cannot
challenge any site-related characteristics.
Licensing Power Plant Designs. Another modernization of the old two-step licensing process is to
address new reactor designs. Under Part 52, the one-step licensing process provides for certifications of
pre-designed reactors. See US NRC, “Backgrounder on Nuclear Power Plant Licensing Process.” This
procedure recognizes that new reactor designs use much more sophisticated and often standardized
technology. Rather than conducting an analysis of identical plant designs for every application, the NRC
sought to encourage companies to build already-designed (and certified) reactors under a less-expensive
expedited process.
Thus, Part 52 mimics patent law: reactor designers petition the NRC and, if their reactor design
is approved, they can sell that design to companies wishing to build reactors. Bt examining all design
petitions and approving reactors believed to be the safest, the NRC promotes national design uniformity.
Page 15 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power The NRC is also freed from conducting safety checks and facility inspections, and setting maintenance
requirements. Nonetheless, a Part 52 review may still take nearly four years to complete and may lead to
problems stemming from new technological advancements made near the end of the licensing process.
NRC News.
After examining a design, the NRC conducts a safety evaluation report (SER) and initiates a
rulemaking process that invites limited public comment. Part 52 promotes design uniformity by deterring
design deviation: (1) any design changes must undergo a new review and new rulemaking; (2) design
certification holders cannot make significant design changes without receiving a strict exemption; and (3)
NRC may not retrofit reactors unless it is required to protect public health. The NRC has discretion
whether and when to hold public hearings, which many believe reduces the public’s ability to oppose a
submitted design.
While Part 52 maximizes licensing efficiency, the one-step process may not always serve the
public interest. For instance, the design certification process isn’t tied to specific locations, and people
living near potential reactor sites may not know about the possibility of having a reactor near their homes
until after the NRC grants a license.
Combined Operating Licenses (COLs). Part 52’s one-step COL combines construction and operation
licenses into a single application, thus allowing for more expedited operation of new reactors. Under the
old system, energy companies were subjected to two separate and lengthy licensing application processes.
In the new process an applicant need only attain a single COL before plant operation may commence.
Furthermore, if design requirements and siting criteria are resolved with a DC and ESP respectively, COL
applicants holding one or both of these licenses can simply reference either or both in a COL application
to satisfy those requirements.
In addition to the COL, Part 52 requires reactor operators must comply with the Inspections,
Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) process. ITAAC is a “final check” meant to ensure
safety and that the reactor meets construction requirements. ITAAC also requires reactor operators to
conduct periodic function tests and report the results of these tests directly to the NRC. The NRC
publishes a record of these reviews in the Federal Register. Any person affected by plant operation may
request a hearing within 60 days of the publication of the Federal Register notice “on whether the facility
as constructed complies, or on completion will comply, with the acceptance criteria in the combined
license.” NRC, “ITAAC” If an applicant passes all ITAAC tests related to siting, no party can raise a
last-minute challenge.
In Nuclear Info. Resource Serv. v. NRC. 969 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992), it was argued that the
new process violated the Atomic Energy Act because the AEA had intended to require two licensing
processes, and did not authorize the NRC to rely on pre-construction findings in the post-production
hearings. The court held that the AEA does not discuss the number of steps required in a licensing
process, and the NRC has the authority decide whether or not a later step needs to be revisited.
Despite these attempts at streamlining the licensing process, citizen and states opposed to nuclear
energy have been successful in slowing down licensing through litigation. For example, in 2012 the DC
Court of Appeals forced the NRC to freeze 19 licensing decisions. See State of New York v. NRC, 681
Page 16 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power F.3d 471 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The court held the NRC had violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) by allowing nuclear power plants to begin operating without an environmental review of the
impacts of long-term nuclear waste storage and disposal, as well as the impacts that could result if final
disposal options are never established.
After the decision, the NRC committed to addressing the risks of long-term on-site nuclear waste
storage before making any licensing decisions. Other courts have been more accepting of the NRC’s
attempts to re-start the nuclear power industry. See State of New York v. NRC, 589 F.3d 551 (2d Cir.
2009) (upholding NRC’s refusal to find that spent fuels at nuclear power plants create a significant
environmental impact within the meaning of NEPA); Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. NRC, 391 F.3d
338 (1st Cir. 2004) (upholding NRC’s decision to adopt an informal process for hearings on almost every
type of reactor licensing proceeding).
6.4.4
Obstacles to the Domestic Nuclear Power
Despite support for more domestic nuclear power, the industry is shrouded in unanswered
questions and crippling uncertainties. Political support for “energy independence” is undeniable, but
major concerns remain, such as lack of infrastructure for electric transportation, fuel supply, water use
impact, labor force adequacy, and availability of industrial components.
Moreover, greater use of nuclear power is unlikely to resolve our dependency on foreign oil.
Short of a complete transformation of our transportation systems to electric-powered vehicles, it’s
doubtful nuclear power would resolve our foreign oil dependency – which actually is being addressed by
new domestic oil extraction technologies, like fracking.
Fuel supply is another concern in the growth of domestic nuclear energy. Based on current
market prices and usage rates, the amount of Uranium available today would satisfy demand for the next
80 years. World Nuclear Organization, Information. While this assured supply is higher than some fossil
fuels, economically recoverable uranium reserves might not be adequate for a larger US nuclear market.
World Nuclear Association, “What is Uranium? How does it Work?” Some have suggested alternative
sources of reactor fuel (such as thorium), but their economic viability is speculative.
Water impact is also a problem for an expanded nuclear energy industry. Reactors require huge
amounts of water as coolant because of the heat generated in the reactor cores. Some municipalities are
considering the use of treated wastewater for reactor cooling, but competition from natural gas and coal
facilities may limit available water supplies. Moreover, heat is regulated as a pollutant under the Clean
Water Act, and requires a section 402 permit for discharge. See 33 USC § 1342, 1362(6).
Because of the long U.S. nuclear slow-down, workforce adequacy is another concern for the
expansion of the nuclear power industry. For example, Westinghouse has predicted, “more than half of
the world’s nuclear engineering workforce will need to be replaced in the next 10 years.” With scores of
plants being permanently decommissioned in the 1990s, the uncertainty about the future of nuclear energy
led to a decline in the workforce. To expand, hundreds of thousands of new workers, scientists, and
engineers will be required in the next twenty years.
Page 17 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Similarly, component shortages have developed as a result of the US nuclear slow-down.
Currently, Japan Steel Works and Russia are the only producers of the forgings used in reactor vessels.
Based on this supply-side shortage, quality control for nuclear components is a major concern. Any
expansion of the nuclear industry is likely to be slow. Components manufacturers have an eight-year
back-log of orders.
Political concerns about environmental justice also plague the nuclear industry. While the
expanded nuclear power seems to many politicians to be a “silver bullet” for our energy problems, citizen
and environmental groups find nuclear plants to be unattractive in their regions. New nuclear reactors are
unlikely to be constructed in wealthy regions of the country – including because of “not-in-my-backyard”
stance of potential investors. Moreover, losses incurred by investors based on the first generation of
nuclear plants are not easily forgotten, despite potential loan guarantees from the federal government. See
The New York Times, “DOE Delivers its First, Long-Awaited Nuclear Loan Guarantee.”
6.5
Disposal of Nuclear Waste
The issue of nuclear waste disposal is perhaps one of the most polarizing impediments to the
expansion of the U.S. nuclear industry See Nuclear Energy Institute, “Nuclear Waste Disposal.” Scientific
uncertainty, environmental justice issues, and past nuclear disasters play a major role in shaping policy on
the treatment of radioactive waste.
Radiation essentially contaminates anything coming into contact with radioactive material.
However, as radioactive material emits radiation, it gradually loses its radioactive property. Some
materials become safe within a matter of days while other materials remain dangerously radioactive for
hundreds or thousands of years. There are two main categories of radioactive waste: low-level radioactive
waste and high-level radioactive waste.
6.5.1
Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Low-level radioactive waste is material left behind at various stages of production of nuclear
energy. US NRC, “Low-Level Waste.” Mining and milling of uranium creates waste known as “mill
tailings,” which contain the radioactive decay products from the uranium chains and heavy metals. US
NRC, “Mill Tailings.” Later in the process, the refining, movement, and use of uranium creates waste
essentially everywhere it goes. Low-level waste can be created through the handling of material and can
include lab coats, tools, and materials coming into contact with neutron radiation. US NRC, “Low-Level
Waste.”
These byproducts are treated as low-level waste divided into four classes: A, B, C, and greaterthan-class-C. Radioactive Waste Streams: Waste Classification for Disposal. The half life, or amount of
time a radioactive material takes to decay (become safe), is the mechanism by which waste is categorized.
Waste Classification for Disposal. The classes are ranked in order of their hazard level, with Class A
waste being the least hazardous. Waste Classification for Disposal. Currently, all low-level radioactive
waste is stored in three active sites located in South Carolina, Washington, and Utah. US NRC: LowLevel Waste Disposal. EnergySolutions Barnwell Operations, located in Barnwell, South Carolina, and
U.S. Ecology, located in Richland, Washington, are licensed to receive wastes in Classes A-C while
EnergySolutions Clive Operations, located in Clive, Utah, is licensed only to receive Class A waste. US
Page 18 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power NRC, “Locations of Low-Level Waste Disposal Facilities.” Approximately 2 million cubic feet and 780
thousand curies of low-level radioactive waste were disposed of in 2008. US NRC, “Low-Level Waste
Disposal Statistics.”
6.5.2
High-Level Radioactive Waste
High-level radioactive waste receives the most attention, as it is much more dangerous. Highlevel radioactive wastes are the highly radioactive materials produced as a byproduct of the reactions that
occur inside nuclear reactors. NRC, “High-Level Waste.” High-level wastes take one of two forms: (1)
spent (used) reactor fuel when it is accepted for disposal and (2) waste materials remaining after spent
fuel is reprocessed. NRC, “High-Level Waste.” Spent nuclear fuel is fuel from a reactor that is no longer
efficient in creating electricity but remains thermally hot, highly radioactive and potentially harmful.
NRC, “High-Level Waste.” The major controversy arises from the question of where these high-level
wastes should go.
Onsite Storage. Since the only way radioactive waste becomes harmless is through natural decay, which
can take hundreds of thousands of years, nuclear waste must be stored and finally disposed of in a way the
provides sufficient protection of the public and environment for a long period of time. NRC, “High-Level
Waste.”
Currently, there are no permanent disposal repositories in the United States for high-level nuclear
waste; therefore, high-level waste is in temporary storage, mainly at nuclear power plants. NRC,
“Radioactive Waste: Production, Storage, Disposal (NUREG/BR-0216, Revision 2).” Onsite storage is
currently the only option in the United States for nuclear industry and all plants are responsible for safely
storing spent fuel rods and reaction byproducts on site at the plant where the fuel was used. As far as how
the waste is stored, all United States nuclear power plants store spent nuclear fuel in water pools. US
NRC: “Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.” These pools are made with reinforced concrete that is several feet
thick, with steel liners, and are designed to cool spent fuel rods under at least 20 feet of water for three to
five years. After that point the rods can be safely sequestered. NRC regulations do not specify a
maximum time for storing spent fuel in water pools; however, the NRC has expressed its view that
nuclear fuel can be stored safely in pools for at least 60 years beyond the licensed life of any reactor
without significant environmental concerns. US NRC. At current licensing terms that would amount to at
least 120 years of safe storage. US NRC. Today, approximately 40 of 65 nuclear sites have run out of
space for water pool storage.
Page 19 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power The shortage in pool capacity has led to an emerging trend called “dry cask storage.” See NRC,
“Dry Cask Storage.” Dry cask storage allows spent fuel that has already been cooled in a spent fuel pool
for at least one year to be sequestered and surrounded by inert gas inside a leak-tight steel container that is
either welded or bolted closed. NRC, “Dry Cask Storage.” Each container is then surrounded by
additional steel, concrete, or other material to provide additional radiation shielding. NRC, “Dry Cask
Storage.” Despite the original controversy over dry cask storage, studies show this method is safer (in
terms of security against attack, theft, etc.) and likely to be more economical than water storage (as dry
casks require much less attention and maintenance).
Source: NRC: “Typical Dry Cask Storage System”
Page 20 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power As plants reach their pool capacity they are forced to turn to dry cask storage systems. Therefore,
not only is dry cask storage an alternative way to store high-level radioactive waste, but it also is
becoming a more prevalent form of storage as plants run out of pool capacity. Dry cask storage systems
are now in place at a growing number of power plant sites and an interim facility located at the Idaho
National Environmental and Engineering Laboratory near Idaho Falls, Idaho. US NRC. As of November
2010, there were 63 independent spent fuel storage installations (“ISFSIs”) licensed to operate at 57 sites
in 33 states. Over 1,400 casks are stored in these independent facilities. US NRC. The locations of these
sites are shown below:
NRC, “US Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations”
Permanent Burial. Since the 1970s, the policy in the United States for dealing with nuclear waste over
the long-term has been to bury it underground. The reasons for this solution were logical: uranium came
from deep within the earth as an ore so it should be returned there; if buried underground, no one could
access it and use it for terrorist activities; and if deep underground in a secure, remote location, it would
pose the least amount of danger of pollution and contamination to humans. Reflecting these views, the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 commissioned the Department of Energy (DOE) to find and establish a
site that would serve as the permanent, underground repository for all of our nuclear waste. See Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 1982. The DOE eventually selected five sites that were narrowed down to three in
Nevada, Texas, and Washington State. In 1987, after much public outcry, the selection was then
narrowed to one: Yucca Mountain, Nevada.
Page 21 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Source: Nuclear Energy Institute
Exploratory and safety work then began on the Yucca Mountain site. Over the next 20 years, the
DOE, the NRC, and the EPA certified that the site was safe. On July 23, 2002, President George W. Bush
signed House Joint Resolution 87, which approved the site at Yucca Mountain for the development of a
high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel repository. Pub. L. 107-200.
The siting decision remained controversial. Nevadans were wary to have the nation’s sole nuclear
waste repository in their state. In addition, other states and cities did not want trains or trucks carrying
nuclear waste to the site through their communities. Besides these “not in my backyard” concerns, there
was the question of how far into the future could the government ensure the safety of the burial site? This
question was answered in Nuclear Energy Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency (D.C. Cir.
2004).
In this case, the court looked at the question of whether the compliance period had been properly
set. Under the statute, the EPA administrator was required to promulgate rules to ensure that the safety of
the site, consistent with recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). In 1995 the
NAS had issued a report questioning the projected window of time used to analyze the safety of the
Yucca Mountain site (the compliance assessment). Although the EPA and other agencies had made
safety and durability projections of the Yucca Mountain site using a 10,000-year window, the NAS
concluded that there was no scientific basis for limiting the time period of the window to 10,000 years—
indeed, the NAS said the time frame projection should be consistent with the scale of time that the
geologic aspects of the repository would be consistent: approximately 106 million years. Moreover, the
risk to humans of peak radiation from the burial of the waste might not occur until hundreds of thousands
of years later—not 10,000 years. Thus, the NAS recommended that the compliance assessment be
conducted for the time when the greatest risk occurs.
Despite the NAS report, the EPA promulgated its rule in which it adopted a 10,000-year
compliance period for the site, dismissing the NAS’s conclusion that a 1 million-year time period might
be possible to predict. The DOE concurred with the EPA’s decision, finding a longer time period
unworkable and infeasible.
Page 22 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power The court held that the EPA had failed to comply with the statute when it acknowledged and then
disregarded the NAS’s report and recommendation in the compliance assessment. The court noted that
the EPA could have adopted the NAS’s recommendation and then modified it, but simply rejecting the
recommendation by choosing a different compliance period was not permitted.
The court’s decision forced the EPA to issue a revised radiation standard for Yucca Mountain that
was “based upon and consistent with” NAS recommendations. The statute had originally established a 15
millirem (“mrem”) per year exposure standard for the facility that applied for 10,00 years. EPA’s Final
Health and Safety Standard for Yucca Mountain. (A millirem is a unit used to measure the effect of
radiation on the human body. What is a “mrem”?) In response to the court’s decision, the EPA in 2005
proposed a revised rule with the (previous) dose limits of 15 mrem for the first 10,000 years, but a dose
limit of 350 mrem/year for the next 990,000 years – the natural radiation levels for the region. In its final
rule, the EPA modified the dual compliance standards (15 mrem/year with a separate groundwater
protection standard for the first 10,000 years), and 100 mrem/year for the remaining period.
In 2009, President Obama proposed the DOE’s budget, which eliminated funding for the Yucca
Mountain Project. He questioned the safety of Yucca Mountain as a storage site. His solution instead was
to store the nuclear materials at the plants where they were produced or at some other, as yet
undesignated, short-term storage site. Then in 2010, President Obama’s Energy Secretary, Steven Chu,
withdrew the license to operate Yucca Mountain “with prejudice,” so that the license application can
never be reviewed again. This spelled the end to the Yucca Mountain storage site – all after billions of
dollars had been spent to establish, secure, verify, and prepare it as a nuclear repository site. See NRC,
“High-Level Waste Disposal.”
Reprocessing. President Obama’s decision to end the Yucca Mountain project is partially buoyed by the
weakening, science underpinning that project. Some scientists advocate leaving the waste on the surface
so that it can be monitored and, if needed, retrieved at a later date for reuse. For example, Canada has
initiated this approach by selecting an “Adaptive Phased Management” strategy. See Nuclear Waste
Management Organization, "Implementing APM." Supporters of this movement point to advances in
technology that allow us to reprocess used nuclear fuel to recover fissile and fertile materials to provide
fresh fuel for existing and future power plants. Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel.
Further, by separating out nearly 500 radioactive isotopes, it might be possible to remove the
most dangerous elements of the nuclear fuel and reduce the toxicity of the remaining waste. France has
adopted this policy, though it is also moving towards using an underground storage facility for all waste
that is to be operational in 2025. Smart Planet, “What France Plans to do with its Nuclear Waste.”
Finland and Sweden are also moving towards the use of permanent underground storage facilities.
Storage and Disposal Options.
Page 23 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power Source: Nuclear Energy: A Recyclable Energy Solution
The United States used to operate reprocessing facilities similar to those operated by France, but
they were banned by President Carter in 1977 due to concerns about nuclear pollution and the ease with
which such facilities could be used to make a nuclear bomb (the process produces plutonium, an
ingredient in nuclear weapons). Some scientists are now calling for a reconsideration of this policy, as
countries such as India, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom have had success with them. Processing
of Used Nuclear Fuel.
Blue Ribbon Commission. In 2010, the DOE announced the formation of a “Blue Ribbon Commission
on America’s Nuclear Future” to provide recommendations for a safe, long-term solution to managing the
used nuclear fuel and waste. See Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future, “Report of the
Secretary of Energy.” The Commission’s final report, issued in 2012, concluded that the United States
nuclear waste management policy had been troubled for decades and had finally reached an unacceptable
impasse with the Obama Administration’s decision to halt work on the Yucca Mountain repository. PR
Newswire.
The Commission’s report outlined a nuclear waste management strategy that included three main
elements. Draft Report. First, the Commission recommended a consent-based approach to finding sites
for future nuclear waste facilities, noting that trying to force such facilities on unwilling states and
communities has not worked historically. Draft Report. Second, the Commission recommended that the
responsibility for the nation's nuclear waste management program be transferred to a new organization
that is independent of the DOE and dedicated solely to assuring the safe storage and ultimate disposal of
spent nuclear waste fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Draft Report. Third, the Commission
recommended changing the manner in which fees being paid into the Nuclear Waste Fund are treated in
the federal budget to ensure they are being set aside and available for use as Congress initially intended.
Draft Report. The report also recommended immediate efforts to commence development of at least one
geologic disposal facility and at least one consolidated storage facility, as well as efforts to prepare for the
eventual large-scale transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste from current storage sites to
those facilities. Draft Report. The report also recommended the U.S. continue to provide support for
Page 24 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power nuclear energy innovation and workforce development, as well as strengthening its international
leadership role in efforts to address safety, waste management, non-proliferation and security concerns.
Draft Report.
Other views. Some politicians, such as Al Gore, have advocated against reprocessing because we know
little about the nuclear fuel cycle beyond reactor operation (i.e., how the fuel acts once it leaves the
reactor); because of local concerns about storing nuclear fuel near any community or neighborhood; and
because of concerns that terrorists could seek to acquire or simply destroy nuclear fuel deposit sites.
According to Gore, there is an international consensus supporting the stability, viability, and safety of
long-term storage of nuclear fuel underground.
Gore has also addressed the issue of transporting nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain or some other
deposit site. According to Gore, transporting such waste is controversial and risky and thus should be
minimized. By sending all material to one site, it would reduce the need to move waste from interim site
to interim site. Furthermore, the U.S nuclear energy industry has demonstrated a strong safety record in
the transportation of nuclear waste, with more than 3,000 shipments of used nuclear fuel over the past 40
years with no harmful release of radioactivity or any injuries or environmental damages. NEI: “Nuclear
Waste Disposal.” But opponents suggest that, though there is no record of any nuclear accident resulting
from transporting nuclear materials, if all nuclear waste were moved to one site, the movement of all that
material would far outweigh the relatively small amount of waste that has been transported so far.
Richard Stewart advocates a different tack. He claims that future generations will benefit from
nuclear power and could possibly use the nuclear waste we seek to dispose of for other purposes. Solving
the U.S. Nuclear Waste Dilemma. Therefore, he argues that we should save nuclear waste on the surface
and not bury it in case future generations develop the technology to harness the great energy benefits
locked in nuclear waste. Solving the U.S. Nuclear Waste Dilemma. Still, he advocates moving forward on
one long-term repository for future use, and developing sound scientific methods for interim, short-term
storage facilities. Solving the U.S. Nuclear Waste Dilemma. Moreover, we should open Yucca Mountain
but only use a small portion of it for storage, to demonstrate to the public that it is a safe and viable
option, to build public trust and consensus on a long-term storage site.
Waste Disposal Future.
While politicians and scientists quibble over the issue of long-term storage or immediate
reprocessing, the nuclear industry must deal with the issue now. The NRC has essentially turned to the
exclusive use of the “dry casks” storage systems if pool capacity is reached. Some advocacy organizations
suggest dry casks are a better alternative than a place like Yucca Mountain, though they fall short of
recommending long-term solutions for the utilization and storage of nuclear products. See Alliance for
Nuclear Accountability, “Yucca Mountain Project: Not the Solution to Nuclear Waste.”
However, dry casks are unproven, as they were only adopted in 1986, so their long-term
sustainability is untested beyond 25 years. Moreover, many other concerns, such as their susceptibility to
terrorist attacks and the effects of leakage and cleanup after long-term storage, remain unaddressed.
Opposition to High-Level Nuclear Waste.
Page 25 of 26 Chapter 6 – Nuclear Power As it stands, the United States has no long-term solution for nuclear fuel and waste storage,
storage at nuclear plants is unfeasible except for the short-term, and NIMBY concerns prohibit the
contemplation of transporting nuclear fuel through many states to some other yet unknown nuclear store
site. What will we do with our nuclear waste?
Page 26 of 26 
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