International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, Volume 2, Issue 7, July-2013 ISSN 2278-7763 473 Comparative Analysis of Hop-to-Hop and End-to-End Secure Communication Shital Y. Gaikwad M. Tech. (Second Year Student) (Computer Network and Information Security) SGGS Institute of Engineering and Technology, Vishnupuri, Nanded. (M.S.), India shitalygaikwad@gmail.com Abstract — End-to-End secure communication between sensor and sink is important in network communication management. In majority cases End-toEnd secure communication is largely ignored since most of us give importance to Hop-to-Hop communication. Endto-End secure communication protocol in randomly deployed wireless sensor network is based on methodology called differentiated key pre-distribution [19]. Here, the main idea is to distribute different number of keys to different sensors to speed up the resilience of certain links. To determine the optimum protocol parameters in the End-to-End Secure communication, the theoretical analysis is necessary and it is being discussed in this paper. It is observed that End-to-End solution can provide secure communication between the sensor nodes and the sink in the Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). The theoretical analysis was practically attempted to prove its work and same been discussed in this paper. U. V. Kulkarni Professor and Head, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, SGGS Institute of Engineering & Technology, Nanded - 431606, Maharashtra, INDIA. uvkulkarni@sggs.ac.in In this process End-to-End secure communication can naturally be done via Hop-to-Hop encryption or decryption. In the first approach there are some limitations in multi-hop WSN because it stops the working of intermediate sensors performing encryption/decryption along the path. This function is important for interpreting and aggregating data at intermediate sensors to save energy. To protect from fake packets injection attack, denial of service attack etc. it is authenticated. Hence in WSNs, we need to use hop by hop based encryption/decryption in providing End-to-End secure communication. In the second approach, the system works well if all links in the network are highly resilient. It is very difficult but not impossible to achieve high resilience for all the links in randomly deployed WSNs since it depends on inherent resource limitation of sensors, nature of random deployment and presence of attacks. To provide security, communication in sensor network should be encrypted and authenticated. It is important to prevent unauthorized users from eavesdropping, obstructing and tampering with sensor data, and launching denial-of-service (DOS) attacks against entire network. A secure routing protocol should handle any attack in a way so that network continues to function properly [4, 7 and 8]. WSNs are collection of nodes where each node has its own sensor, processor, transmitter and receiver and such sensors usually are low cost devices that perform a specific type of sensing task. Being of low cost such sensors are deployed densely throughout the area to monitor specific event. The traditional security mechanisms are authentication, symmetric key encryption and decryption and public key infrastructure cryptography. The major challenge is to deploy the above encryption techniques or their counterparts in a sensor network which is characterized with constrained memory, power supply and processing capability. Today, Intrusion Detection Systems are widely used as a security solution in a wired network in the form of software/hardware by which one can detect IJOART Keywords — WSNs, security, attacks, Advanced Encryption Standard 1. INTRODUCTION Now a day’s WSN is used in military, emergency, railway, aero-plane and inquiry applications, in which sensor nodes need to send sensed data to the sink. WSNs can be deployed in both indoors and outdoors. Depending on the deployment platform, there are various applications for such sensor networks. In some cases under certain conditions sensor nodes cannot be deployed and thus randomly deployed into the field. In such cases to save the data from attacker End-to-End secure network is important [2, 5, 9, 13, 16 and 18]. There are two approaches to provide a high degree of End-to-End secure communication in WSN. There is unique pair wise key into each sensor and the sink, prior to deployment which allows each sensor to use this pair wise key to encrypt the communication with the sink. In second approach it provides Hop-to-Hop secure communication between neighboring sensors into the network. Copyright © 2013 SciResPub. IJOART International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, Volume 2, Issue 7, July-2013 ISSN 2278-7763 474 unwanted services going on in the system by way of enhanced/abnormal network activity and identifying suspicious patterns that may indicate whether the network/system is under attack. For WSN several schemes were proposed but they have limited features like only concerned to attacks on a particular layer [15, 17 and 20]. Some others have also proposed a theoretical framework that is not suitable at deployment time. Xbow (developer of Mica mote) and Ambient System (developer of μ node) were first two companies who produced sensor nodes for commercial use. Recently Sun Microsystems have also developed a WSN platform that runs java code “on-the-metal” on their motes known as Sun SPOTs. Figure 1. Sybil Attack 2. ATTACKS ON WSN The security breaches occur primarily in the form of interruption that breaks down the communication links, interception which is unauthorized access of WSN is again modified means change of data by unauthorized access and fabrication means addition of false data by unauthorized accesses [1, 11, 14, and 22]. 2.1. Denial of service: This type of attack results into making unavailable the resources to their intended users. As an example node A sends request to node B for communication and node B acknowledges to node A but A keeps on sending request to B continuously. As a result B is not able to communicate with any other nodes and thus intended information becomes unavailable to all of them. Denial of service attack may also occur at physical layer by jamming that is by broadcasting mechanism and/or tampering i.e. by modification or fabrication of the packet. 2.2. Attack on information in transit: In case of WSNs usually each node reports changes to a cluster head or base station only for data above some threshold. Information in transit may be altered, spoofed, replayed again or vanished. In this type of attack attacker has high processing power and large communication range. This type of attack may be prevented by data aggregation and authentication techniques. 2.3. Sybil attack: In this attack as shown in Fig. 1 the attacker gets illegally multiple identities on one node. By this, the attacker mostly affects the routing mechanism. Sybil attacks are generally prevented by validation techniques. 2.4. ‘Hello flood’ attack: This is one of the simplest attacks in WSNs in which attacker broadcasts HELLO packets with high transmission power to sender or receiver. The nodes receiving the messages assume that the sender node is nearest to them and sends packets by this node. By this attack congestion occurs in the network. This is a specific type of DOS. Blocking techniques are used to prevent Hello Flood attacks. 2.5. Black hole/ Sinkhole Attack: In this type of attack as shown in Fig. 2, attacker places himself in a network with high capability resources (high processing power and high band width) by which it always creates shortest path. As a result, all data passes through attackers’ node. IJOART Copyright © 2013 SciResPub. Figure 2. Black hole/Sinkhole Attack 3. ALGORITHM FOR HOP-to-HOP COMMUNICTION Here we present the algorithm for Hop-to-Hop communication in which, we use Ad-hoc on Demand Distance vector protocol for choosing routing path for the better communication. The proposed algorithm data packet is used to transmit the information from node to node. User Datagram packet is designed to control the signals and subsequently to control traffic generator in the node. As a check transport layer is available in the network, the data goes to the destination, without losing its designed route to the destination. Further, Media access control code and authentication are checked data from the source to the destination. As the result the IJOART International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, Volume 2, Issue 7, July-2013 ISSN 2278-7763 packet goes to application layer ultimately. The steps in the algorithm are listed below in figure 3. Step1: Start Step2: Initialize wireless sensor node a. Key distribution in (AODV) b. Data packet proposed Step3: Agent node initiated Step4: Traffic generator a. Data packet (AODV) b. Down the process Step5: Check transport layer it is available in the network then it goes to the destination and it will not route. Step6: MAC (authentication check) Step7: Send authentication to destination Step8: Reach the packet to the destination after it goes to the application layer. Step9: End. Figure 3: Steps for Hop-to-Hop communication 4. ALGORITHM FOR END-to-END SECURE COMMUNICTION 475 Here we put forth the algorithm for End-to-End communication in figure 4 by using AODV protocol for choosing routing path for safe, sound and intact communication and transmission of secure data. In this process, the proposed algorithm data packet is used to transmit the information from node to node. In order to complement the prior process, we designed to control the signals by using User Datagram Protocol packet. In the earlier processes we have used the traffic control generator mechanism in node. Further it confirms the presence of transport layer in the network. The data goes to the destination without losing its route hence MAC code and authentication is checked, resulting in making the node sending authentic data from the source to the destination. If destination is not available, node will send the data to the source address and source broadcast address hence resulting in creation of new link. When the destination is available, keys are checked. Consequently the data is not only encrypted and decrypted but also forwarded to the next node. As a result the packet goes to the application layer. 5. KEY GENERATION IJOART Step1: Start Step2: Initialize wireless sensor node a) Key distribution in(AODV) b) AES algorithm initialize c) Data packet proposed Step3: Agent node Step4: Traffic generator a) Data packet (AODV) b) AES- Encryption/ Key code Down the process Step5: Check transport layer it is available in the network then it goes to the destination and it will not route. Step6: MAC (authentication check) Step7: Send authentication to destination Step8: Destination is not available that time sent (ACK) to the source, source broadcast and new link created Step9: Destination is available check the Tr-key and Rx-key and checks the process. Step10: payload (data packet) encryption/decryption and forward to next. Step11: Reach the packet to the destination after it goes to the application layer. Step12: End. Figure 4: Steps for End-to-End secure communication Copyright © 2013 SciResPub. By using AES, secret keys in End to End communication are created. Here, AES must be a symmetric block cipher with a block length of 128 bits and support for key lengths of 128,192 and 256 bits [3, 6, 10, 12 and 21]. AES is used in End-to-End communication with a motive of securing the communication and the data as well. It is applicable to all keys and to all nodes. If the first node communicates with the neighbor, the neighbor node decrypts the key and it creates its own key to communicate with the other neighbor and the same process goes on. 6. SIMULATION RESULTS In packets packets to-Hop packets AES. these graphs the x axis shows number of being sent, whereas y axis shows number of being received for both End-to-End and Hopcommunications which depicts that more are lost in Hop-to-Hop than End-to-End due to End-to-End delay packets: X AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 44.0000000000 Maximum: 590.0000000000 Y AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 0.0000000000 Maximum: 0.0017043800 Hop-to-Hop delay packets: X AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: IJOART International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, Volume 2, Issue 7, July-2013 ISSN 2278-7763 Minimum: 32.0000000000 Maximum: 1078.0000000000 Y AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 0.0000000000 Maximum: 0.1520521342 476 X AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 0.3035373920 Maximum: 99.9975590300 Y AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 1.0000000000 Maximum: 5.0000000000 Figure 5. Analysis of HOP-to-Hop and End-to-END communication. Figure 7. Capability of Hop-to-Hop method. The figure 5 shows graph for delay between Hopto-Hop and End-to-End communication which is clearly proving that the delay is more in Hop-to-Hop than Endto-End communication. The figure 7 depicts the number of packets being lost against number of packets being sent. Here, the x axis shows packet sent and y axis shows the packet received for Hop-to-Hop. IJOART Figure 6. Efficiency of proposed approach The figure 6 depicts the number of packet being lost against number of packet being sent, x axis shows the packet being sent and y axis shows the packet received for End-to-End. End-to-End sending packets: X AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 0.3005350000 Maximum: 99.9969550000 Y AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 1.0000000000 Maximum: 384.0000000000 End-to-End receiving packets: Copyright © 2013 SciResPub. Hop-to-Hop sending: X AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 0.3005350000 Maximum: 99.9997455060 Y AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 1.0000000000 Maximum: 703.0000000000 Hop-to-Hop-receiving: X AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 0.3035373920 Maximum: 99.9978976150 Y AXIS VALUES STATISTICS: Minimum: 1.0000000000 Maximum: 498.0000000000 7. CONCLUSIONS It was observed that in the End-to-End secure communication, the loss of packets is almost four times less than that of Hop-to-Hop communication. It implies that the simulation and throughput is better in End to End secure communication. Worth to note, that the packet delivery ratio is high in End-to-End secure communication at lower simulation time. As against this, in Hop-to-Hop packet loss is more and throughput is less. We observed that Simulation time is high and the packet delivery ratio is low in Hop-to-Hop. IJOART International Journal of Advancements in Research & Technology, Volume 2, Issue 7, July-2013 ISSN 2278-7763 So in this experimental work we observed that in the End-to-End communication the packet transfer is better than Hop-to-Hop by using AES. Hence, we have practically proved that the End-toEnd secure communication outwits the Hop-to-Hop communication in transmitting and receiving the accurate information. REFERENCES [1] A. Das, “An unconditionally secure key management scheme for large scale heterogeneous wireless sensor networks, “in Proc. First International Comm. Syst. Netw. Workshops, pp. 1-10, 2009. [2] Abhishek Pandey, R. C. Tripathi, “A Survey on Wireless Sensor Networks Security”, International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887), Volume 3, No. 2, pp. 43-49, June 2010. [3] Alzaid, D. Park, J. Nieto, C. Boyd, and E. Foo, “A forward and backward secure key management in wireless sensor networks for PCS/SCADA," Sensor Syst. Software, pp. 66-82, 2010. 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