Ministerial Inquiry into use and operation of Foreign Charter
Vessels
7 October, 2011
1. Introduction
1.1 This submission is prepared on behalf of the New Zealand Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC)
and the Deepwater Group (DWG). SeaFIC acknowledges that it specifically requested the
Government to establish this Ministerial Inquiry, in light of the concern of its Board
regarding allegations made in the news media relating to working conditions and
remuneration of crew on Foreign Charter Fishing Vessels (FCVs).
1.2 It is acknowledged that there are a variety of views in the seafood industry on the use and
operation of Foreign Charter Vessels (FCVs). In recognition of this, the Board of SeaFIC
agreed that a submission to the Inquiry be prepared and that SeaFIC work with the
commercial interests directly involved in the use of FCVs. Individual companies will make
their own submissions to the Inquiry that accord with their individual views.
1.3 SeaFIC is a company established by the seafood industry at large to provide policy advice
and technical services of a generic, industry wide nature to industry stakeholders. SeaFIC is
funded in large part through a Commodity Levy Order on all fish, including shellfish, landed
or produced in New Zealand.
1.4 DWG is a company established by, and to represent the interests of, quota owners for fish
species predominantly caught in fisheries beyond the territorial sea but in New Zealand’s
Exclusive Economic Zone. DWG represents the interests of quota owners who may fish the
EEZ fisheries with New Zealand flagged, owned and operated vessels and/or contract
Foreign Chartered Fishing Vessels and/or sell some or all of their Annual Catch Entitlements
to enterprises that independently charter FCVs. DWG is funded by voluntary contributions
from its shareholders.
1.5 The submission directly addresses the Terms of Reference for the Inquiry. The submitters
note the short period of time provided by the Inquiry to make written submissions and
request the opportunity to provide further written submissions during the course of the
Inquiry, should the need arise. The submitters request the opportunity to meet with the
members of the Inquiry panel.
2. Executive Summary
2.1 The economic model that has developed for fishing in the EEZ fisheries in New Zealand over
the last thirty years has built-in the opportunity to contract FCVs as part of its normal
operating practice. New Zealand has an unsubsidised industry and the New Zealand owned
fleet is utilised at very high rate in the most profitable fisheries. While at any given time
there will be vessels that owners wish to sell for operational reasons, there is no excess
capacity in the New Zealand owned and operated freezer factory fleet that is tied up
because of FCVs.1
2.2 The opportunity to charter FCVs enables decisions to buy or build new vessel capacity to be
made on terms that are more likely to ensure that such investment will further maximise
ACE values and returns on quota shares as principal capital assets.
1
At the time of preparing this submission, two companies acknowledged that they have one vessel each
for sale that is unsuitable for their current operations. However in their view, this does not constitute
“excess capacity”.
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
2.3 FCVs are engaged on internationally competitive terms as Mode 3 Services, in international
trade jargon. Their foreign national crew (a Mode 4 service) must be compensated at
remuneration rates that exceed minimum wages guaranteed at law to New Zealand resident
workers. FCV crew are guaranteed minimum paid hours of work that are intended to ensure
their overall compensation is superior to the minimum wage conditions for many New
Zealand workers.
2.4 Compliance with New Zealand minimum labour conditions is a vessel registration condition
under Section 81 of the Fisheries Act for foreign controlled vessels registered as New
Zealand fishing vessels. Failure to comply would be an offence under the Fisheries Act. The
Code of Conduct between the industry and the Department of Labour imposes further
conditions that should have the effect of ensuring that crew are hired on terms superior to
those guaranteed to New Zealanders under domestic legislation. Failure to comply should
lead to refusal to grant temporary visas for crew and ensure that a non-complying FCV
operator cannot operate.
2.5 Given the regulatory controls imposed to ensure FCV crew working conditions and
remuneration, the reputational risks to New Zealand, if any, from contracting FCVs into New
Zealand appear largely to be as a consequence of public criticism based on “evidence” that
has yet to be independently tested. There is no corroborated evidence that companies are
failing to comply with their obligations as a general rule and there is no evidence that
officials are failing to implement audit and compliance measures.
2.6 There are some market access risks associated with contracting FCVs. The most acute is
related to New Zealand documenting exports to the EU from FCVs when the relevant EU
regulation (EU Council Reg. 1005/2008) states that is a responsibility for Flag States (rather
then the Coastal State exercising jurisdiction over fishing in its EEZ). That risk would apply
equally to demise chartered vessels crewed in New Zealand but retaining their original Flag
State status. Removal of FCVs would not be an appropriate response to a potential market
access problem arising from a clash with the EU over fisheries governance policies.
2.7 Removal of FCVs would not remove the emerging interest in the New Zealand fishing
industry to employ foreign crew on fishing vessels. That interest is already being articulated
within the New Zealand vessel operator sector as they face increasing difficulty attracting
and retaining suitable crew. Assuming that FCV vessel capacity could be replaced at
reasonable cost, the challenge to crew the replacement vessels would more than likely
require the recruitment of foreign labour, presumably under temporary visa conditions.
2.8 Removal of FCVs is more likely to lead to a reduction in total landings and a consequent
reduction in economic return from New Zealand’s fisheries. The market for vessels is
becoming extremely tight and there is doubt that sufficient capacity could be obtained at an
economic cost to maintain the fishing currently contracted to the 19 FCVs that operate in
the New Zealand EEZ.
2.9 If some lower value stocks become economically unfishable, there is every reason to expect
that the flag states of the former FCVs – and perhaps others – would seek the opportunity to
fish in the New Zealand EEZ under foreign licensed access terms. The Fisheries Act
recognises that obligation but seeks to limit the liability to unallocated, and effectively
unsaleable Crown owned ACE. There is no provision at present for quota owners facing
potentially worthless quota assets seeking innovative ways to exercise New Zealand’s
residual legal obligation under the Law of the Sea for their direct benefit.
3. Background
3.1 Foreign charter vessels have been a core part of the fishing sector operating in the Exclusive
Economic Zone beyond the territorial limit since the commencement of New Zealand’s
commercial fishing interest in those resources. The background paper, prepared by the
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
Ministry of Fisheries2 for the Inquiry, sets out some of the history of use of FCVs since the
late 1970s. The opportunity for New Zealand industry to hire foreign catching services is a
central part of the commercial model of fishing in the EEZ. All major New Zealand deep
water fishing companies use some foreign vessels and/or “lease” quota (i.e. sell Annual
Catch Entitlement) to companies that operate foreign vessels, there are no exceptions to
this.
As the background paper notes, there are alternatives to either owning and operating fishing
vessels under the New Zealand flag or chartering FCVs as foreign flagged and crewed
outsourced full service providers of catching and basic processing services at sea. The
background paper identifies demise (or bare-boat) charters as an alternative. There is no
obligation under maritime law in New Zealand for demise chartered vessels to be flagged to
New Zealand. There is a significant past history of use of foreign flagged, demise chartered
vessels where the vessel remains under its original flag and the interests of the owners and
insurers of the vessel are maintained with the key officers being recruited from the flag
state. The crew of such vessels have often been recruited in New Zealand. For demise
charters that flag under the New Zealand flag, Maritime New Zealand requires that they
must be placed in the full control of the New Zealand entity that charters the vessel. That
means the key officers must be hired by the New Zealand charterer and they must meet all
qualification and manning practices stipulated by MNZ for New Zealand flagged vessels. In
these cases, all crew would normally be recruited in New Zealand as though the vessel was
owned in New Zealand.
As New Zealand registered fishing vessel, FCVs are subject to the same legal requirements as
all other New Zealand fishing vessels. All catch must be recorded and reported, they may be
required to carry official observers and to deploy vessel monitoring equipment. All catch
belongs to the vessel charterer. It must be landed in New Zealand and sold to New Zealand
Licensed Fish Receivers.
All fishing vessels, regardless of Flag State, must be registered under Section 103 of the
Fisheries Act as New Zealand fishing vessels and are subject to the same operational rules as
all other fishing vessels under the Fisheries Act in all but one respect. Section 103 (5) makes
it a condition of registration for vessels owned or operated by an overseas person, and
approved by the Chief Executive to be registered as a New Zealand fishing vessel, that they
must observe the Minimum Wage and Wages Protection Acts and deems all persons
employed to work on such vessels under temporary entry class visas to be employees of the
New Zealand based operator. Section 103 (5) (g) provides all such persons with the full
protections of New Zealand employment law including recourse to the Employment
Relations Authority and Employment Court. This rule primarily is for application to FCVs,
however it would equally apply to demise chartered vessels that chose to continue to
operate under their original non-New Zealand flag rather than re-flag to New Zealand
jurisdiction.
The Code of Practice on Foreign Fishing Crew agreed between the Department of Labour,
SeaFIC and the Fishing Industry Guild3 sets minimum terms and conditions for all foreign
nationals employed under temporary entry class visas on board Foreign Chartered Fishing
Vessels and that must be observed by all companies that charter foreign flagged fishing
vessels. The Code of Practice requires that crew receive compensation that, in total,
2
Background Paper on the Use of Foreign Charter Vessels, Ministry of Fisheries
http://www.fish.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/0E670425-B6B0-4A74-89854B4F360CE80C/0/BackgroundpaperforFCVconsultation.pdf
3
Code of Practice on Foreign Fishing Crew, October 2006
http://www.immigration.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/A1F84CCF-D285-45D3-AD425C50F00CC9C9/0/CodeofPracticeonForeignFishingCrew_201006_.pdf
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
amounts to a premium of at least $2 per hour over the current minimum wage in New
Zealand – the regulated minimum wage is presently set at $13 per hour. The Code of
Practice also addresses other conditions of work and living conditions at sea, the net effect
of which may be said endeavours to ensure that crew on FCVs have living and working
conditions and remuneration on an at least equivalent level to minimum expectations for
people living and working in New Zealand.
3.6 FCVs are required to be operated under safety at sea requirements equal or at least
equivalent to those applying to New Zealand flagged and registered vessels. Maritime New
Zealand requires all FCVs to join the New Zealand Safe Ship Management system within 2
years of arrival in New Zealand. In the interim FCVs are subject to 6 monthly Port State
Inspections.
3.7 FCVs are permitted to fish only in New Zealand fisheries waters beyond the territorial sea.
Due to their length, over 46 metres, and in common with all fishing vessels of that length or
greater, they are required to fish at much greater distance from the shore than 12 miles.
They may not fish in several fisheries management areas. In so doing, separation from the
smaller vessels that make up the inshore fleet can be assured. Electronic monitoring by the
Ministry of Fisheries enables officials and vessel operators to know where vessels are at all
times.
3.8 FCVs are all at least limited processing freezer vessels, if not full freezer factory vessels. They
must be registered with MAF/NZFSA and operate either under the same Animal Products Act
mandated Regulated Control Scheme as applies to all limited processing vessels. If they are
full processing factories, they must operate under approved company-based Risk
Management Programmes as apply to all New Zealand fish factories either at sea or on land,
and be subject to regular, performance-based audit by MAF/NZFSA. In line with New
Zealand limited processing and freezer factory vessels, MAF identifies most FCVs as New
Zealand registered fish factories. It notifies all such vessels to the EU (DG Sanco) who lists
them among all New Zealand fish factories subject to New Zealand control and eligible to
supply processed fish products to the EU under the Veterinary Agreement between New
Zealand and the EU.
4. Response to Terms of Reference
a) The application of New Zealand’s legislative regime to the use and operation of fishing
vessels, and in particular foreign charter vessels (FCVs), with respect to labour, immigration,
maritime safety and fisheries management and the compliance with that regime by such
vessels and their operators;
4.1.1
As noted in the Background section above, FCVs are subject to the same mandatory
regulations as apply to all registered New Zealand fishing vessels. In addition the Code of
Practice with the Department of Labour sets conditions for crew payment and
conditions on that have the objective of ensuring the foreign recruited labour work in
conditions and receive remuneration at least on a par with minimum expectations for
workers in New Zealand. Compliance must be demonstrated through regular audit by
the Department. A record of compliance determines whether an operator will be
permitted to continue to contract foreign crew to work in New Zealand under temporary
work visas. Compliance is mandatory. Proof of compliance has the intent of ensuring
that FCVs operate on a level regulatory “playing field” with New Zealand owned and
operated vessels. Failure to comply should ultimately lead to companies being excluded
from the opportunity to contract FCVs. Exclusion of rogue, non-complying operators is
supported by industry – as is prosecution of those that set out to break New Zealand
law.
b) Any international reputation risks associated with the use of FCVs;
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
Demonstrating compliance with the legal obligations set out in the background section
places companies contracting FCVs on the same operational footing as operators of New
Zealand flagged vessels. In so far as compliance encompasses compliance with labour
legislation, including full recourse to the Employment Relations Authority and
Employment Court, contractors of FCVs are subject to the same legal employment
disciplines as any other New Zealand business. Demonstrated records of compliance
should mean there is no threat to international reputation.
However, reputation is not only a function of compliance. It is also a result of public
opinion. The intensity of comment in the media, whether based on fact or allegation,
may present risk to international reputation. This Inquiry is the opportunity to test
whether there has been compliance with legal obligations that have the intent to ensure
that FCVs operate on a level playing field with New Zealand domestic operators. The
Inquiry is therefore also an opportunity for the Inquiry to examine whether a regulated
level playing field is sufficient to satisfy public criticism and defend international
reputation.
It could be inferred from the recent interest of the US Government in whether there are
instances of people trafficking or “slave labour” in New Zealand that media comment on
conditions on FCVs has caught their attention. The most recent State Department report
(see Annex 1 attached) makes reference to foreign labour on fishing vessels in the
context of commenting also on allegations of sex trafficking in New Zealand and concern
about conditions for foreign temporary labour in the horticulture sector. The key
comment made in that report however is “The Government of New Zealand fully
complies with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking.”
c) Any trade access risks associated with the use of FCVs;
3.3.1




This section discusses several market access implications that may arise from the
contracting of FCVs. They include:
a discussion of Rules of Origin of fish related to where a fishing vessel may work
and the Flag State of the vessel;
situations where the Flag State of FCVs permits fish caught from such vessels to
be traded to the Flag State as domestic product and enter without the border
restrictions that normally apply to imports of fish and fish and fish products;
responsibilities for documentation of fish caught by FCVs that is exported to
markets in the European Union;
the potential for market access to jeopardised as result of negative publicity
associated with FCV operations.
Rules of Origin
3.3.2 Market access is a function of the Rule of Origin attached to a good. In the case of fish
taken in territorial waters, it is clearly the product of the Coastal State. For fish taken in
the high seas in areas beyond national jurisdiction, the country of origin is determined
by the Flag State of the vessel. There is a degree of uncertainty about the rule of origin
for fish taken in an EEZ of a Coastal State. All doubt is eliminated where the flag of the
vessel and coastal state with jurisdiction of the EEZ are the same. On the other hand,
where a Coastal State grants access on a government to government basis for the fishery
of an EEZ to be fished by foreign flagged vessels, the flag state of the vessel would
normally claim Rule of Origin. This is in essence the status quo that applied at the time of
the declaration of the New Zealand EEZ in 1977.
3.3.3 When New Zealand eliminated foreign licensed access but permitted New Zealand
companies to charter FCVs to fish in the New Zealand EEZ it moved to ensure to the
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
3.3.4
maximum extent possible that the fish caught by FCVs would be New Zealand origin fish
and have the same market access conditions to export markets as any other fish taken in
the EEZ by New Zealand flagged vessels. New Zealand’s claim to rule of origin is backed
up other regulatory behaviour including the requirement to report all catch as New
Zealand catch, for all catch to be landed in New Zealand and to allocate commercial
fishing rights in the EEZ and territorial sea as quota shares to New Zealand domiciled
companies. Limitations on foreign investment in quota may also contribute to
reinforcing New Zealand’s claim to country of origin for all fish taken in the EEZ as well
as the territorial sea.
However the Law of the Sea requires Flag States to be responsible for the actions of
their vessels when outside the territorial sea of the Flag State and in so doing enable the
Flag State to continue to lay claim to the fish as product of the Flag State. Some Flag
States, especially those with a history of distant water fishing, endeavour to exercise
some control over their vessels even when they are clearly subject to the control and
jurisdiction of a Coastal State that has permitted access to its EEZ under private contract
terms, as in the case of FCVs. For example, the Flag State may require vessels to report
catch taken in another Coastal State’s EEZ in addition to the reporting requirements of
the Coastal State. This can lead to double counting and reporting to international
organisations, such as FAO.
Treatment of Exports to FCV Flag States
3.3.5 The Flag States of some FCVs can also enable the catch from some FCVs to be treated as
domestic in origin if any fish is eventually exported from New Zealand to the FCV Flag
State. Such fish can avoid tariff or other border access measure that might otherwise
apply to imported fish.
3.3.6 We understand that Korea requires its flagged vessels contracted as FCVs in New
Zealand to report catch to Korea. In the context of the current Free Trade negotiation
between New Zealand Korea, Korean officials have claimed all catch taken by its flagged
FCVs in the New Zealand EEZ as exports of fish from Korea to New Zealand. They have
valued this “export” trade in the order of $70 million annually, whereas the total value
of New Zealand recorded seafood exports to Korea is in the order of $50 million
annually.
3.3.7 It is common practice for some New Zealand companies that charter FCVs to sell a
portion of the catch back to the vessel operator. The Fisheries Act requires all
commercial fish to be landed to licensed fish receivers and for there to be a commercial
transaction between the catcher and LFR at that point in the value chain. Thus the FCV
operator must purchase any fish that it eventually exports to the Flag State of the vessel.
This ensures that the commercial transaction for the services of a FCV and the sale of
fish landed from a FCV are kept at documented arms length. However, it clear that this is
no impediment to Flag States of FCVs still treating fish exported from those vessels as
domestic product – even when New Zealand ensures that fish is documented as New
Zealand origin and accompanied with documentation such as health certification or
certificates of origin required by that State for fish imports.
3.3.8 The capacity for fish caught by some FCVs to be traded as domestic catch of the Flag
State in the Flag State may be seen as a market access risk for New Zealand fish
exporters. An importer of non FCV caught, New Zealand origin fish will have to pay any
tariff in order to clear it through the border, whereas FCV caught fish, where the market
state is also the Flag State, may avoid any tariff. This enhanced status for FCV fish may
crowd out sales of the same species identified as New Zealand in origin.
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
3.3.9
On the other hand the tariff free status of FCV caught fish sold into the Flag State may be
seen as a benefit if it provides a ready market or if it enables a better return to be made
for the sale of that fish than the New Zealand owner could obtain in the same market.
3.3.10 Domestic market access status is relevant for the trade of some frozen fish products to
Korea discussed in greater detail in Annex 2. It is also relevant to the export of frozen
southern bluefin tuna to Japan that has been landed from the seasonal visit of chartered
Japanese longliners that are privately contracted to fish some of the annual New
Zealand southern bluefin tuna quota. It is unlikely that the Ukraine flagged FCVs
contribute significantly to increasing export sales of the fish they are contracted to
catch, as exports to Ukraine in 2010 were less than 1% of New Zealand’s total global
seafood exports.
Catch Documentation of FCV caught fish exported to the European Union
3.3.11 One area of potential market access risk is to exports of wild caught fish to the EU. Since
the start of 2010, all wild caught finfish imported into the EU must be accompanied with
a certificate validated by the Flag State that the fish was caught with the appropriate
legal authority of the Flag State. The New Zealand government and industry recognised
the potential risk this might have for fish landed from FCVs and exported to the EU –
either directly or following further processing prior to export to the EU. The Flag State of
a FCV has no legal capacity to control its vessel when in the New Zealand EEZ and
therefore would have difficulty validating a Catch Certificate to the effect that the fish
had been caught legally.
3.3.12 An Administrative Agreement was negotiated in good faith between New Zealand and
the EU that permits New Zealand to supply a simplified version of the rather detailed
and prescriptive standard EU Certificate and that agrees to New Zealand supplying Catch
Certificates for catches originating from New Zealand registered fishing vessels. This
wording was clearly understood by both sides to mean FCVs as well as New Zealand
owned and operated vessels, as all are legally New Zealand fishing vessels.
3.3.13 Towards the end of 2010, after several months of using the New Zealand certificate, the
EU proposed that the Agreement could only apply to catch from New Zealand flagged
vessels, as the substantive regulation (1005/2008) could not encompass the
construction that had been negotiated by both sides. This issue remains unresolved for
the time being. Trade of all wild caught fish from New Zealand to the EU continues to be
documented by New Zealand, but it may only be a matter of time until the EU takes
action to uphold its interpretation of its own regulation.
3.3.14 It should be noted that the risk is not simply a risk for FCV caught fish. It would equally
apply to any catch from a demise chartered, foreign flagged fishing vessel operating in
New Zealand fisheries waters.
3.3.15 The EU interpretation ignores the fact that New Zealand is a responsible Coastal State
that fully controls all fishing within its EEZ and coastal waters, whereas the Flag State of
any FCV or demise chartered vessel has no legal capacity to control the activities of
flagged vessel when in New Zealand waters. The EU motivation for its interpretation has
little to do with being assured that the fish it is receiving has been legally caught – that is
clearly validated in the New Zealand certificate. Rather it is an outcome of the EU’s
unwillingness to give up any right to “control” vessels flagged to EU member states
when they operate in other states’ EEZs – either under fisheries access arrangements or
private contract.
3.3.16 Given that this market access risk is also a risk for demise chartered, New Zealand
crewed vessels, it cannot be seen as a FCV issue only.
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
General Market Access risk arising from the use of FCVs
3.3.17 In general there is little chance in our view for international concern that New Zealand
permits contracting of FCVs per se leading to market access problems. As already stated,
the industry strongly supports New Zealand authorities exercising their full authority if
they find non-compliance among FCV operators or charterers. In so doing, we feel sure
that national reputation would be safeguarded and market access would remain
unthreatened.
d) Whether the economic factors supporting the use of FCVs deliver the greatest overall benefit
to New Zealand’s economy and to quota owners;
3.4.1
As noted in the background, the New Zealand EEZ fisheries have been harvested through
a mix of New Zealand owned and operated vessels and FCVs since the start of the EEZ
fisheries. That reliance continues to the present day and strongly suggests that overall
long-term returns to quota share owners (and therefore the value of their quota shares)
are perceived to be higher when the opportunity to use FCVs is available. That was most
recently put to the test when industry had to confront how to deal with an emerging
oversupply of vessel capacity following the severe cuts to the hoki quota at the turn of
the century. The graphics below illustrate that the number of FCVs was cut back in
relatively close alignment to the reduction in landings over the period from the late
1990s to now, but FCVs were not eliminated entirely. At the same time, New Zealand
companies also chose to sell off, or release from charter, relatively recently built or
acquired New Zealand flagged factory vessels rather than try to continue deploying
them and eliminate FCVs in their entirety.
Key NZ EEZ Mid-water Landings
500,000
S Warehou
400,000
Squid
300,000
SB Whiting
J. Mack
200,000
Hoki
100,000
Hake
Barracouta
0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
NZ Chartered Fishing Fleet
120
100
Others
80
Ukraine
60
Russia
40
Korea
20
Japan
0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
3.4.2
3.4.3
3.4.4
3.4.5
3.4.6
3.4.7
4
A significant day to day measure of economic return is the price of Annual Catch
Entitlement (ACE). ACE is widely traded between fishing companies through the course
of the year as companies must balance (or account for) catches of quota stocks with
ACE. Owners of quota shares who don’t fish need to sell the ACE that their quota shares
generate in order to recover costs associated with quota share ownership, including
meeting MAF/M’Fish cost recovery and other associated industry costs and obtain a
return on capital that is tied up in owning quota shares. Most mandated iwi enterprises
that have received quota shares as part of their Treaty of Waitangi related distributions
and settlements fall into this group.
The price that a purchaser of ACE is prepared to pay is a reflection of the competition
from other ACE purchasers who also must balance catches with ACE. ACE prices reflect
the margin remaining after all the costs of fishing and a return on assets are accounted
for by the ACE purchaser from the anticipated price for fish caught. If a FCV operator can
fish more cost efficiently than a New Zealand flagged vessel operator then the FCV
operator can pay a higher price for ACE. If FCVs were to be removed from the New
Zealand ACE market, it is reasonable to conjecture that this will reduce competition in
the ACE market and consequently the price that an ACE owner could expect to obtain
for sale of ACE. In time, any structural adjustment to the value of ACE in the open
market will reflect through to the value of quota shares. A reduction in ACE market
prices arising from reductions in competition for ACE and/or cost efficiency of fishing will
inevitably mean a reduction in value of the underlying quota share asset and therefore a
reduction in the overall benefit to the New Zealand economy.
This will hold true unless New Zealand companies can increase market prices for their
fish and fish products. Given that, in the main, New Zealand seafood companies are
price takers rather than makers, they lack market power to impose price increases to
recover increases in their unique operating costs.
On the other hand the value of quota shares will increase when the price of ACE
increases. ACE prices will increase from either an increase in competition for ACE due to
the presence of competing fishing interest or from an increase in market prices for fish
leading to increased competition for ACE.
The opportunity to make a “free” market choice either to use NZ flagged vessels
(whether or not NZ owned) or foreign flagged, demise chartered vessels or FCVs has
enabled rational investment decisions when it comes to vessel ownership. The FCV fleet
has been significantly reduced in the last 15 years in line primarily with reductions in the
TACC for hoki and the flow-on effect to fishing for other stocks in the EEZ. Using FCVs
has meant that they could also be readily dismissed when catch opportunities were
reduced and the industry has been able to avoid over-capacity in fleet resources.
However, as noted, companies also chose to sell, or release from lease, NZ flagged
vessels in order to ensure that fleet capacity remained fully utilised in the most
profitable fisheries.
Some limited evidence is now emerging of expansion of fleet catch capacity, at this stage
an increase in vessel size or catching power rather than total numbers of vessels – both
NZ flagged and FCV – with the recovery of hoki stocks and increasing Total Allowable
Commercial Catch levels. However, market prices for second hand freezer vessels are
high. There is a recent example of factory freezer vessel similar to other Sterkoder
vessels favoured in the NZ fishery close to 25 years of age being offered for sale for use
in New Zealand at US$15 million (see Annex 3). A newly built factory freezer vessels is
likely to cost at least $55 million4 and the delivery period will be significant as the yards
“A new 70-metre factory trawler costs $55 million to build and equip for fishing in New Zealand waters”
in “Reform needed to get back on track” an op-ed by Peter Talley, Nelson Mail, 1 July 2011
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
3.4.8
that built vessels for use in New Zealand in the 1990s have either gone out of business
or have downsized significantly.
Globally, concern about over-capacity in fisheries in the northern hemisphere in the last
decade has led to the successful implementation of policies to remove subsidies for new
fishing vessel construction and successful implementation of policies to scrap excess
vessels in Europe and North Asia. As a consequence, the market for quality second hand
vessels has been significantly reduced and the global fishing fleet’s average age is
increasing. For the present, FCVs provide an alternative to very significant capital
investment. But eventually all vessels have to be replaced and an ongoing short supply
and high cost of vessel replacement, regardless of flag, will inevitably be felt in the NZ
fishery. Unless market returns for fish can be improved in real terms, it is likely that ACE
prices and thus quota share value will be put under pressure as replacement or
additional, higher priced vessels have to be brought into the fishery.
e) Whether acceptable and equitable labour standards (including safe working environments)
are, or can be, applied on all fishing vessels operating in New Zealand’s fisheries waters
within the Exclusive Economic Zone;
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3
3.5.4
As noted, in regard to foreign owned and operated vessels registered to fish as New
Zealand fishing vessels under section 103 of the Fisheries Act, the Fisheries Act requires
foreign fishing vessel operators to apply the Minimum Wage and Wages Protection Acts
as a condition of registration and deems the crew of the vessels to be employees of the
entity registering the fishing vessel. The same condition does not apply to New Zealand
owned and operated vessels, presumably because they are already subject to that
legislation directly, as New Zealand domiciled businesses.
Many New Zealand owned fishing vessels’ crews are not employees but independent
contractors. This is a long standing traditional practice in the western world’s fishing
sectors. Crew are risk takers in the fishing operation and payment of crew is heavily
dependent on the success of each fishing trip. It is possible under such conditions on
New Zealand owned and operated vessels that a trip that fails to catch sufficient fish of
sufficient value could result in the crew receiving compensation for the trip that would
be less than the minimum wage had they been employees under the Minimum Wage or
Wages Protection Acts. There are numerous instances of small and medium sized
businesses throughout the New Zealand economy where the owner of the business
receives less from the business than the businesses’ employees who receive the
minimum wage.
FCV operators must comply with the Code of Practice between the industry and
Department of Labour. Failure to do so will eventually lead to the operator losing the
opportunity to obtain crew for those vessels as the Department will ensure that
temporary work visas will not be issued. The Code of Practice requires that when final
accounting is made at the conclusion of a contract, the crew must have received
payment at least equal to the minimum wage plus $2 per hour and that no costs of
accommodation, meals etc may be deducted until the crewman has been paid a
minimum sum equivalent to 42 hours per week. As crew are working outside the
territorial sea of New Zealand, they do not pay any tax or ACC, so the gross wage is also
the net wage. (It should also be noted that crew are not entitled to draw on any services
that might be provided by tax and ACC).
A tax paying, single New Zealand resident not entitled to any additional tax or welfare
assistance would need to earn in excess of $37,650 gross ($32,760 net) to be better paid
than a crewman on a FCV who receives their full entitlement set out in Code Practice.
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
3.5.5
We know of no instance to date of any current New Zealand FCV operator being refused
the opportunity to renew charter contracts or obtain replacement crew at the end of a
contract. We take this as evidence that New Zealand FCV operators are being found to
be in compliance with the Code of Practice and have passed Department of Labour
audits to the satisfaction of the Department. Neither are we aware of any current FCV
operator being refused registration of fishing vessel by the Chief Executive of the
Ministry of Fisheries for failure to observe the Minimum Wage or Wages Protection Acts.
3.5.6 According to Statistics New Zealand, the median yearly individual income in New
Zealand from all sources in 2010 was $27,508 ($529 per week) from which tax had to be
paid as well as all living expenses including accommodation and meals. On a broad
measure of equity and regulated minimum labour standards across the whole New
Zealand economy as measured by the New Zealand minimum wage, crew on FCVs are
required to receive better compensation than many New Zealanders.
3.5.7 The use of FCVs are examples of Mode Three and Mode Four trade in services, as
defined by the World Trade Organisation’s General Agreement on Trade in Services. The
fishing vessel provides a Mode Three fish catching service within the territory (strictly
the EEZ) of New Zealand by its commercial presence in New Zealand fisheries waters.
The suppliers of the labour on the vessels are natural persons providing a Mode Four
service as natural persons present as crew in New Zealand fisheries waters.
3.5.8 FCVs are reported to employ 2000 foreign workers annually. At the minimum payment
stipulated in the Code of Practice, this equates to a transfer of over $65 million annually
to citizens of several developing countries. By comparison, New Zealand’s official
development assistance budget for 2011/12 to fund the activities of non-government
organisations, such as Oxfam or VSA, is $31 million. The normal wages available to crew
employed on FCVs if they remained in their home countries or worked on fishing vessels
operating internationally in fisheries outside New Zealand, would be significantly less
than the total compensation they should receive under the Code of Practice.
3.5.9 Economic analysis undertaken for the industry in the early 2000s estimated a multiplier
effect for every direct job created in fishing a further two jobs are created in associated
direct and indirect services. On that basis, employment of 2000 foreign fishers at wage
rates on a par with wages in the New Zealand economy should generate further 4000
jobs in associated direct and indirect services. Those jobs may be in New Zealand or,
more likely, in the home countries of the foreign crew, given that they are principally
paid through their overseas bank accounts.
3.5.10 New Zealand is an active participant in international Mode 4 service markets, both as
the receiver of labour and the supplier of labour. Foreign temporary labour is being
recruited to work in New Zealand throughout the primary food producing sectors. There
is growing interest among the operators of New Zealand flagged fishing vessels to recruit
foreign labour to crew their vessels. The common problem is a chronic shortage of
appropriately skilled and motivated workers in New Zealand – despite New Zealand’s
somewhat elevated level of unemployment. In the fishing sector, crew must be at sea
for several weeks at a time, frequently in uncomfortable working conditions and be
prepared to work and live in an isolated and enforced alcohol and drug free
environment while at sea. It is not seen as an attractive work place for many people.
3.5.11 New Zealand is seen in some countries as a source of cheap, skilled foreign labour. It is
the source currently of dispute in the Australian airline industry with the Qantas
subsidiary Jet Connect recruiting crew in New Zealand at significantly lesser
compensation rates than their Australian counterparts, and has been a concern of US
based workers in the film industry concerned about the export of film projects to New
Zealand. There are now estimated to be around 1 million New Zealanders living and
working outside New Zealand for better compensation than can they can achieve in New
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Zealand. The New Zealand fishing industry has to compete in international labour
markets to retain its key skilled labour force – especially marine engineers and officers.
They are in demand to fill similar roles in the oil, gas and mining sectors.
3.5.12 Many New Zealand businesses have exported jobs previously done in New Zealand to
other countries with wage rates considerably less than minimum wage rates in New
Zealand. Included among them are companies in the New Zealand seafood sector who
have remained internationally competitive by exporting significant processing activities
to China, Vietnam and Thailand. They are not alone. Iconic New Zealand companies
including Fisher and Paykel, Fonterra and Icebreaker have done likewise. Air New
Zealand has been publicly criticised for contracting cabin crew in China for its services to
and from that market at compensation rates significantly less than the rates for New
Zealand cabin crew.
3.5.13 The New Zealand coast is now serviced almost entirely by foreign going cargo vessels
serviced by crew recruited from many of the same countries that supply crew for FCVs.
They also transport cargo between ports in New Zealand and have replaced the former
New Zealand flagged and manned coastal shipping service. In the final analysis, the
Code of Conduct requires that crew employed on FCVs in the New Zealand EEZ are
employed at compensation rates that equate with minimum wages in New Zealand.
They are receiving payments that are well in excess of what is the norm for their fellow
citizens in the international fishing sector or indeed crew on some of the merchant
vessels plying the coastal ports of New Zealand as part of their international cargo
services.
5. Potential Consequences should FCVs be excluded from New Zealand
5.1 There are a number of consequences that potentially could arise if the opportunity to
contract FCVs were to be removed.
5.2 If done immediately, the freezer trawler fleet would be reduced in capacity by some
nineteen vessels, at a time when companies are starting to contemplate some limited
increase in capacity as some catch limits are increased.
5.3 FCVs are predominantly used to provide “top-up”capacity in some fisheries, such the
seasonal peak of the hoki fishery and to catch lower market value species that are
uneconomic for New Zealand operated vessels to catch. This pattern of use ensures that
New Zealand owned and operated freezer vessels can be fully deployed for 300 days or
more a year. FCVs provide an alternative to needing to own the catch capacity to catch peak
seasonal abundance. It is clear that immediate removal of all FCVs would mean that some
fisheries would not and could not be fished.
5.4 That shortage might be overcome if equivalent vessel capacity could be found either
through demise chartering or by purchase. However, as has already been noted, the world is
no longer faced with an over supply of suitable freezer trawlers or ready capacity to get new
vessels built for the sort of prices paid in real term 15 years ago. The global fleet is getting
older and quality vessels are becoming an appreciating asset. The costs of purchasing
replacement vessels would amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.
5.5 New Zealand companies are already facing shortages of skilled and suitably qualified, drugfree crew and some are exploring employing temporary foreign crew on New Zealand
operated vessels. Companies would struggle to find in the order of 1000 to 1500 people to
replace the 2000 people currently employed on FCVs, without needing to seek a temporary
work arrangement for foreign crew along similar lines to the temporary work visa
arrangements now common in the rest of the primary food producing sector. In summary,
the questions in the public arena as to the use of foreign crew when there is high
unemployment of unskilled people in New Zealand or related to the terms and conditions
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
under which foreign crew are employed would be unlikely to disappear simply be removing
FCVs.
5.6 Assuming that the removal of FCVs would lead to reduction in total landings and the
possibility that some fisheries might not be fished in any significance, some in the industry
have begun to question whether New Zealand might be pressured to re-open foreign
licensed access to the flag states that have been suppliers of FCVs and potentially to others.
5.7 A legal opinion obtained by one company confirms that New Zealand has an obligation
under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to optimally utilise the resources that it has
claimed in the EEZ or open the fishery to others who would have an interest in the
resources.
5.8 The Fisheries Act recognises this obligation and in Section 81 sets out the process that the
Ministry of Fisheries would follow to calculate foreign allowable catch. Section 81 (2) and (3)
confine the obligation to grant foreign licensed access only to unencumbered quota held by
the Crown and remaining unsold after the Crown has offered it for sale as ACE. It does not
provide for quota that has been allocated to quota share owners and for which the owners
have identified that there is no market for their ACE.
5.9 Quota owners faced with economically unfishable and unsaleable ACE are faced in the
scenario with no recourse – apart from the return of quota shares to the Crown as a
valueless asset. That might provide the Crown to recommence foreign licensed access and
for the proceeds no doubt to go to the Crown.
5.10
Given that the Crown will no doubt seek to continue to recover costs associated with
“managing” economically unfishable stocks, quota owners would appear to have to
contemplate quota share assets that could well become liabilities. If they are precluded from
seeking FCVs to catch their fish and have no other economic alternative, might they not seek
to find a solution through a version of foreign licensed access that might enable them to
obtain a benefit? For example, they could offer the Crown fishable parcels of ACE for the
Crown to negotiate under foreign licensed terms.
5.11
The Fisheries Act does not contemplate this kind of solution. But in a situation where
the industry is unable to economically fish certain stocks that foreign fishers would find
commercially attractive, there is no reason why quota owners and their former FCV partners
might not seek to find a solution through recourse to exercising the Law of Sea obligation in
their favour. It is uncertain whether the Section 81 would hold up in a dispute.
5.12
Ironically, as demonstrated by the EU when it negotiates access to fisheries for its
vessels, foreign licensed access could entail the temporary transfer of the right to fish to
another State, in return for a compensatory payment akin to a resource rent. The foreign
vessel or its Flag State would be under no obligation to observe legislation such as the
Minimum Wage or Wages Protection Acts or conform to the Code of Practice. There is every
chance that the crew on such vessels would be employed on the same international terms as
they would be if the vessel was on the high seas or in any other EEZ except New Zealand.
6. Conclusion
6.1 We reiterate, this submission cannot be taken to represent a consensus industry view, as
there is no industry consensus. It represents a view shared by the majority of rights owners
in the fisheries that currently use the services of FCVs and New Zealand owned and operated
fishing vessels. Individual stakeholders will make their own submissions.
6.2 We request the opportunity to meet with the Inquiry members and to provide further
written submissions should the need arise.
Further contacts should be addressed to:
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Alastair Macfarlane
General Manager
New Zealand Seafood Industry Council
Private Bag 24 901,
Wellington 6142
Tel: 385-4005; Fax: 385-2727; Email: alastair.macfarlane@seafood.co.nz
George Clement
Chief Executive
Deepwater Group
PO Box
Nelson
Tel: 03 545 7020; Mobile: 021 932 369 ; Email: clement@fishinfo.co.nz
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Annex 1
US State Department – Trafficking in Persons Report 2011
NEW ZEALAND (Tier 1)
New Zealand is a source country for underage girls subjected to sex trafficking within the country, and
a destination country for foreign men and women in forced labor. New Zealand is reportedly a
destination country for women from Asian countries, such as Hong Kong, Thailand, Taiwan, and
China, and Eastern Europe trafficked into forced prostitution, though no new substantive information
about such cases was discovered in the past year. According to a press report during the year,
women, including some from Malaysia, are recruited by labor agents, but upon arrival in New
Zealand, are handed over to brothel owners, who confiscate their passports and force them into
prostitution for up to 18 hours a day to repay the “loan” of recruitment and transportation costs. Child
trafficking victims are found engaging in prostitution illegally in brothels and off the street, some being
closely controlled by local gangs. Asians and Pacific Islanders migrate to New Zealand voluntarily to
work legally or illegally in the agricultural sector, and women from the Philippines migrate legally to
work as nurses. Some foreign workers report being charged excessive and escalating recruitment
fees, experiencing unjustified salary deductions, restrictions on their movement, confiscation of
passports, and altered contracts or working conditions without their permission – all indicators of
human trafficking. According to a press report and the United Nations Inter-Agency Project on human
trafficking, there were concerns that some fishermen from Indonesia, Vietnam, and elsewhere in
Southeast Asia are allegedly victims of forced labor in New Zealand waters; these men may have
experienced conditions including passport confiscation, significant debts, physical violence and
abuse, and are often forced to work a seven-day work week. No independent research has been
conducted to determine the full extent of the trafficking problem in New Zealand.
The Government of New Zealand fully complies with the minimum standards for the elimination of
trafficking. The government has in the past prosecuted traffickers under a range of laws; however, the
government did not prosecute or convict any offenders of trafficking during the year, nor did it identify
or assist any trafficking victims during the reporting period. The government did, however, make
efforts during the year to raise public awareness of human trafficking through an anti-trafficking
website and trafficking brochures.
Recommendations for New Zealand: Make efforts to study sex and labor trafficking occurring in
New Zealand; significantly increase efforts to investigate and prosecute both sex and labor trafficking
offenders; make efforts to proactively screen vulnerable populations, including women in prostitution,
foreign workers, and illegal migrants, in order to identify and assist trafficking victims, through the
routine employment of formal victim identification measures; identify and assist child trafficking victims
engaged in commercial sexual activity; make proactive efforts to identify victims of labor trafficking,
particularly among populations of vulnerable foreign laborers; investigate and prosecute employment
recruiting agencies or employers who subject foreign workers to involuntary servitude or debt
bondage; and develop and implement a visible anti-trafficking awareness campaign directed at clients
of the legal and illegal sex trades.
Prosecution
The Government of New Zealand continued efforts to train front-line officers on trafficking, but did not
make overall progress in its anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts during the past year. Authorities
did not arrest or prosecute any sex or labor trafficking offenders during the past year, nor did it
cooperate on any international trafficking investigations. The police did not report any prosecutions of
“sellers” of sex services who profited from the labor of children in prostitution. New Zealand does not
have a comprehensive anti-trafficking law and the Government of New Zealand does not feel that
such a law is necessary, relying instead on a definition of trafficking that focuses on the transnational
movement of people in prostitution. Part 5 and various amendments of the Crimes Act of 1961
prohibit transnational sex and labor trafficking. Laws against sexual slavery, the receipt of financial
gain from exploiting children in prostitution, and labor exploitation prohibit forms of internal trafficking.
Such crimes are not specifically included within the anti-trafficking provisions of the Crimes Act and
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
therefore cases of internal trafficking are not recognized or tracked by the government as trafficking
crimes. A press report during the year described cases of Asian women who were victims of forced
prostitution in New Zealand, including a case of a Malaysian woman reportedly forced into prostitution
for 16 hours a day who had her passport confiscated by the brothel owner. Authorities reported an
initial investigation but the woman departed the country immediately upon having her passport
returned to her, after police intervention. The Department of Labor investigated this case and reported
that the woman was interviewed and found to be working willingly. The government trained staff from
Customs, Immigration, Labor, and Police on People Trafficking on identifying victims of trafficking and
victim interview techniques. Compliance inspectors who inspect sex industry premises use interview
templates to determine whether individuals are willingly and voluntarily in New Zealand’s legal sex
industry; the template has questions related to trafficking indicators.
Protection
The Government of New Zealand offers an extensive network of protective services to both internal
and transnational trafficking victims, regardless of whether they are officially recognized as trafficking
victims. The government, however, did not report identifying or assisting any trafficking victims during
the year, despite reports of children exploited in the commercial sex trade and foreign workers
subjected to passport confiscation, debt bondage, threats of financial harm, and other internationallyrecognized indicators of forced labor. The government did not have formal procedures for referring
victims to NGOs and service providers. Authorities did not report the number of children under 18
found to be in prostitution during the year. Press reporting indicated authorities identified at least 13
girls under the age of 16 in prostitution in Auckland and put them in Child, Youth, and Family custody,
but the government asserted that children under 18 identified in prostitution were not victims of
trafficking, as they did not cross an international border and were not compelled into prostitution.
There are currently no shelters specifically dedicated to trafficking victims. Authorities reported that
were they to be identified, victims would receive food and shelter and would be informed of available
physical and mental health services, legal services, and social welfare. The law allows foreign victims
temporary legal residence and relief from prosecution for immigration offenses. However, as the
government claims to have never identified a trafficking victim, this provision has never been offered.
The Department of Labor developed a policy to allow police-certified trafficking victims, were they to
be identified, to remain in New Zealand and work for up to one year on a temporary visa; however,
this provision has never been utilized. It is possible that trafficking victims were deported as
immigration violators instead of being investigated as possible trafficking victims.
Prevention
The Government of New Zealand made some efforts to increase public awareness of trafficking
during the year. The Ministry of Social Development distributed brochures on trafficking indicators in
six languages to regional departments, who distributed them to community groups around the
country. In June 2010, the Department of Labor partnered with ECPAT to convene a forum on
trafficking for representatives from government agencies and non-government organizations.
Fraudulent employment and recruiting practices are prohibited under the Crimes Act of 1961 and the
Wages Protection Act of 1983. New Zealand has never prosecuted trafficking offenders under these
laws. Sufficiently stringent penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine of $250,000 under
the above statutes are commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes. The Immigration
Act prohibits retention or control of a person’s passport or any other travel or identity document, but
there were no prosecutions for passport confiscation during the year. During the year, the Department
of Labor launched an anti-trafficking Internet website to raise awareness of trafficking. The
government’s Inter-Agency Working Group on trafficking, led by the Department of Labor, met once
during the year. The government did not make efforts to address the demand for commercial sex acts
in the decriminalized commercial sex industry. The government gave $22,800 to ECPAT to raise
awareness about child sex trafficking. The Department of Labor reported over 1,500 labor inspection
visits during the year – an increase over the previous year, including 424 compliance inspections of
horticulture and viniculture businesses. It did not report the number of brothel compliance inspections
conducted during the year. In August 2010, authorities arrested one New Zealand citizen for
organizing and promoting child sex tours; his case remains pending. The government provided antitrafficking training to military personnel prior to their deployment abroad on international
peacekeeping missions.
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Annex 2
Exports of Fish to Korea: Calendar Year 2010
(Potentially attributable to catch from FCVs that could enter the market tariff free - highlighted in Yellow)
Alfonsino
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Finfish, Frozen Whole
Kgs
480
144
5,904
6,528
NZ$ fob
$527
$270
$4,516
$5,313
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Finfish, Frozen Whole
30
62,064
17,016
7,746
86,856
$64
$72,828
$18,980
$4,568
$96,440
Finfish, Frozen Other form
24
24
$146
$146
Finfish, Frozen Other form
288
288
$1,354
$1,354
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
10
72
8,136
8,218
$68
$183
$5,780
$6,031
Other Crustacea, Live, Chilled or Frozen
6,960
6,960
$2,912
$2,912
624,804
624,804
$3,410,569
$3,410,569
1,530
1,530
$649,126
$649,126
277,870
300
926,033
1,204,203
$1,436,941
$5,295
$969,185
$2,411,421
54,827
54,827
$177,094
$177,094
526,220
526,220
$823,503
$823,503
144
1,272
1,416
$201
$9,121
$9,322
Barracouta
Bluenose
Cod, Blue
Cod, Red
Crab
Crustaceans
Other Crustacea, Canned or otherwise
processed
Crustn, Molluscs extract
Other Crustacea, Canned or otherwise
processed
Eels
Finfish, Chilled Live
Finfish, Chilled Other form
Finfish, Frozen Whole
Finfish, other fish meat
Finfish, Processed Other
Fish prod unfit for human
Finfish, Processed Other
Gemfish
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Ghostshark
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
1,902
1,902
$1,948
$1,948
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
744
744
$3,682
$3,682
Finfish, Frozen Whole
12,168
12,168
$22,200
$22,200
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Finfish, Frozen Whole
26,322
51,864
7,248
85,434
$130,647
$32,572
$20,590
$183,809
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Whole
36,761
135,518
61,581
233,860
$170,461
$361,762
$54,999
$587,222
5,350
5,350
$6,346
$6,346
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
10
18,189
204,768
222,967
$68
$71,259
$221,014
$292,341
Finfish, Frozen Whole
907,325
907,325
$3,188,329
$3,188,329
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Whole
5,784
50
5,834
$9,542
$66
$9,608
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Finfish, Frozen Whole
31,656
576
231,802
264,034
$44,315
$930
$277,075
$322,320
13,135
13,135
$71,929
$71,929
2,576
2,817,148
1,020
21,394
37,951
2,880,089
$127,039
$12,895,062
$4,908
$108,938
$103,442
$13,239,389
24
24
$31
$31
27,720
27,720
$58,124
$58,124
Groper
Gurnard
Hake
Hoki
Leatherjacket
Finfish, Frozen Whole
Ling
Livers and Roe
Mackerel, Blue
Mackerel, Jack
Monkfish
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
Mussels
Mussels,
Mussels,
Mussels,
Mussels,
Mussels,
Freeze-dried pwd
HS Frozen
Live
Meat Frozen
Whole Frozen
Octopus
Other Molluscs, Live, Chilled or Frozen
Orange Roughy
Finfish, Frozen Whole
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Oreo Dory, Other
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
1,392
188
1,580
$2,434
$266
$2,700
13
13
$68
$68
19,980
19,980
$423,177
$423,177
60,552
41,808
192,866
295,226
$74,718
$148,034
$260,394
$483,146
270
270
$6,910
$6,910
300
300
$3,021
$3,021
Finfish, Chilled Other form
Finfish, Processed Smoked
9,639
4,500
14,139
$89,445
$106,837
$196,282
Finfish, Chilled Fillets
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
15,025
1,211
16,236
$149,484
$12,082
$161,566
1,495
192
1,687
$2,774
$817
$3,591
Finfish, Frozen Whole
182,973
182,973
$235,356
$235,356
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
283,805
283,805
$881,469
$881,469
Finfish, Frozen Whole
227,100
227,100
$1,230,865
$1,230,865
112
2,248
30
2,390
$246
$2,611
$30
$2,887
Finfish, Frozen Whole
976,283
976,283
$1,001,575
$1,001,575
Squid, Frozen Whole
8,295,423
8,295,423
$18,291,931
$18,291,931
Other chilled finfish
Finfish, Chilled Headed and Gutted
Other frozen fillets
Finfish, Frozen Fillets
Other frozen finfish
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Finfish, Frozen Whole
Other invertebrate
Other Molluscs, Live, Chilled or Frozen
Other Molluscs
Other Molluscs, Live, Chilled or Frozen
Salmon, Pacific
Salmonidae
School shark
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Sea Bass
Skate
Snapper
Southern Blue Whiting
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
Finfish, Frozen Whole
Spiny
Dogfish
Squid
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Tarakihi
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
48
864
912
$127
$2,024
$2,151
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
1,056
336
1,392
$2,428
$771
$3,199
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Other form
168
72
240
$830
$738
$1,568
189
216
405
$427
$273
$700
11,353,313
$24,316,807
17,270,351
$47,275,392
65.7%
51.4%
Warehou, Blue
Warehou, Other
Warehou, Silver
Finfish, Frozen Headed and Gutted
Finfish, Frozen Whole
TOTAL potentially attributable to FCVs entering tariff-free
TOTAL Exports to Korea
% of Exports to Korea attributable to FCVs
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040
Annex 3
Please attach File “ Vessel Offer.pdf”
Seafood Industry Council, Private Bag 24901
Wellington 6142
Deepwater Group, PO Box1460
Nelson 7040