It’s not Easy Being Green:
Minor Party Labels as Heuristic Aids
Travis G. Coan
Jennifer L. Merolla (contact author)
Claremont Graduate University, Department of Politics & Policy
160 East Tenth Street
Claremont, CA 91711-6168
United Status
travis.coan@cgu.edu
jennifer.merolla@cgu.edu
Laura B. Stephenson
University of Western Ontario
lstephe8@uwo.ca
Elizabeth J. Zechmeister
University of California, Davis
ejzech@ucdavis.edu
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank the IGA Junior Faculty Research Program at UC Davis for providing
funding for the project, Robert Huckfeldt for the use of the experimental lab at UC Davis, faculty
members who gave their class extra credit for participating in the study, and research assistants
Ryan Claassen, David Greenwald, Steve Shelby, Breana Smith, and Brandon Storment.
ABSTRACT
This paper focuses on whether, and to what extent, minor party labels influence how individuals
express opinions on a wide range of political issues. Based on data from an experimental study
conducted in the U.S., we reach three conclusions: 1) partisan identification conditions the
influence of party cues on political opinions; 2) individuals often ignore, and sometimes resist,
minor party labels as cues; and, 3) the complexity of the political issue matters for the
effectiveness of party cues. Our findings are important given recent trends in public opinion
data, which indicate that the U.S. public is becoming more accepting of minor parties as
permanent features of the political system.
Key Word: Heuristics, Information Shortcuts, Party Cues, Minor Parties,
1
A large body of political science research focuses on the utility of cognitive heuristic
devices for rational decision-making by otherwise under-informed individuals. Party labels are
considered one of the most useful of such aids due to their accessibility and relevance to a
variety of political decisions (Huckfeldt, Levine, Morgan, & Sprague, 1999). This rosy picture of
the utility of party cues, however, has recently been questioned by several scholars of U.S.
politics (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998).
Using experimental data, we extend work in this area by exploring whether, and to what
extent, minor party labels in the U.S. influence individual opinions on a range of political issues.
Focusing on minor parties is of particular importance given that their influence appears to be
increasing in recent years. Among the public, there has been an increase in general
dissatisfaction with the two major parties and in the percentage who think there should be “a
third major party” (Collet, 1996). Furthermore, minor parties are beginning to compete in more
elections, especially at the state and local levels (Lacy & Monson, 2002), and have cost major
party candidates the election in some contests (Burden, 2005). Given the increasing presence of
minor parties, it is fitting to ask whether they act as information shortcuts for citizens in the same
way as major parties. With the exception of one study (see Lupia & McCubbins, 1998), however,
the literature is theoretically and empirically silent on the effects of minor party cues.
OVERVIEW OF EXTANT LITERATURE
A long line of literature has argued that citizens can make reasonable choices through the
use of information short-cuts, even if they possess minimal levels of information about the
political world (e.g., Downs, 1957; Sniderman, Brody &, Tetlock, 1991). One common heuristic
aid is the party label. Downs (1957) argued that one of the main purposes of political parties is to
provide an information short-cut for voters, to help them understand the issue positions and/or
2
ideology of political actors. Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) extended this idea,
arguing that the psychological attachments underlying party identifications shape political
attitudes and evaluations and help individuals to establish coherent sets of political opinions (see
pp. 128-136).
A great deal of contemporary scholarship has investigated the use of party labels as
heuristic devices in various domains. Scholars have found that people rely on partisan cues in the
voting booth (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Rahn, 1993); in predicting the issue and ideological
positions of candidates (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981; Huckfeldt et al., 1999; Koch, 2001);
and, in forming preferences on novel issues (Kam, 2005). Given this literature, major party labels
should be influential cues in the realm of opinion expression. Specifically, knowing where a
party stands on an issue should influence an individual’s own stand on that issue.
However, some recent work has questioned whether party cues are always useful. With
respect to voting, if the positions of candidates are inconsistent with those of the party, voters are
less likely to select the “correct” candidate (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Rahn, 1993). More
generally, Lupia and McCubbins’ (1998) theoretical results suggest that party cues are only
useful to the extent that they convey “information about knowledge and trust” (p. 207). From this
viewpoint, the influence of party cues depends on whether the individual perceives the party as
knowledgeable, and believes that the parties are being truthful. Studies of persuasion and
priming also find that individuals are more likely to incorporate messages when they trust the
sender of the message, especially in low information and motivation environments (e.g.,
Chaiken, 1980; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Following this line of
reasoning, some parties in the U.S. play such minor, low profile roles that the usefulness of their
labels to citizens is clearly questionable. For example, while individuals may have heard of a
3
particular minor party, they may be unfamiliar with the party’s stances on many issues.
Moreover, even among minor parties that are better known, the candidates running under their
label often represent inconsistent positions. In either case, it is unlikely that individuals will
perceive the minor party as knowledgeable and trustworthy; thus, even knowing where the party
stands on an issue might not help an individual figure out his or her own stand on that issue.
RESEARCH DESIGN
In order to test the travelling capacity of arguments about party cues from major to minor
parties, we conducted an experiment. The core of the experiment consisted of asking subjects to
fill out a questionnaire about political opinions, in which we embedded issue questions with
party cues. With respect to the treatments, we chose three parties to use as cues: one dominant
party (Republican) and two minor parties (Green and Reform). We expected that the Green party
would have a slightly better reputation than the Reform party, given Nader’s run for office in
2000 and 2004; the fact that the party takes more consistent positions; and, the geographic
location of our study (see below).
To create a fair test for the effect of party labels on opinion expression, we included two
additional variables in the study. First, we included measures of partisanship, since one’s
partisanship may moderate the effect of party labels, acting as a type of “perceptual screen”
(Campbell et al., 1960, p. 133). If an individual is a strong partisan of a particular party, he/she
should be more likely to accept that party’s cue while opposition partisans may reject it.
Second, we included issues of various complexities, since the effectiveness of party
labels may vary across types of issues (Carmines & Stimson, 1980). With easy issues,
individuals are more likely to have the capacity and the time to develop opinions. As issues
4
increase in complexity, citizens might rely more on cues in the expression of their political
preferences (Kam, 2005).
In sum, we expect that the major party cue will influence an individual’s political
opinions. Second, individuals will either ignore or resist cues from minor parties. If they do the
former, the minor party cue will have little—if any—effect on political opinions; if the latter,
individuals will express a policy preference that is opposite the minor party’s position. Finally,
the effects of party cues will be moderated by partisanship and issue complexity.
Participants and Design
The participants in our study were 250 undergraduate students enrolled in political
science classes at a large public university. The students volunteered to participate in the
research study about political opinions and attitudes in exchange for class credit. The study took
place in the Spring of 2005 in a computer lab. Subjects were randomly assigned to a treatment
(Republican N=54, Green N=50 and Reform N=66) or control group (N=78 for the control
group). The study consisted of a computer-based survey in which participants were asked about
basic demographics, political predispositions, and their opinions on a number of political issues.
The experimental condition was embedded in a series of four issue opinion questions,
which varied with respect to complexity. The content of the issue questions is identified in Table
I (along with the direction of the party prompt for each issue).
[Insert Table I about here]
Each issue question was preceded by a statement that one of the parties supported or opposed the
issue. The control group received a neutral cue: “Some politicians…”. After the prompt, each
subject was asked for their own opinion on the issue. For example, the abortion question read as
follows in the Republican treatment: "The Republican Party supports prohibiting abortion in all
5
cases. Do you support or oppose prohibiting abortion in all cases?” If the cues work as heuristic
aids in a positive sense, we should find that individuals adopt preferences in line with the given
party cue (see Table I).
RESULTS
Before testing the treatment effects, we first assess whether perceptions of minor and
major parties differ in terms of awareness and trust, as Lupia and McCubbins (1998) lead us to
expect. To measure the former, we asked subjects for their familiarity with all parties and the
certainty of their placement of each party on an ideological spectrum (see Table II). As expected,
subjects are more familiar with and more certain of their ideological placement of the Republican
Party compared to the two minor parties, and these differences are statistically significant at
p<.001. With respect to trust, our measures indicate that subjects are significantly more trusting
of the Republican Party compared to the Reform party (p=.055), though they record highest trust
values for the Green party (p<.001). This result is due to the fact that Democrats outnumbered
Republicans in our sample by a fairly significant degree (52% of the subjects identified as
Democrats and 24% as Republican). Not surprisingly, strong Republicans are significantly more
trusting (mean=5.14) of their party than the Greens.
[Insert Table II about here]
With support for our characterization of the major and minor parties, we now turn to
multivariate analyses for each issue, testing the effect of different party cues on policy
preferences compared to the control group. The dependent variables in the analyses consist of the
respondent’s opinions on the political issues. These five-point, Likert scales are coded such that
higher values indicate a more liberal response. Since the dependent variables are measured on an
ordinal scale, we run ordered probit analyses.
6
In addition to dummy variables for each treatment group (the control group serves as our
baseline), we include the following control variables: female (one indicates that the respondent is
female), religion (a five-point scale, where higher values mean more church attendance),
ideology (a seven-point scale, where higher values mean more conservative), partisanship (a
seven-point scale, where higher values indicate stronger Republican identification), and the
interaction between partisanship and each treatment dummy variable. The latter set of
interaction terms is included to test for the moderating effects of partisanship. Ideology is a
control variable because it may have a strong influence on political opinions. Female and
religion are included because, in difference of means tests designed to check whether our random
assignment resulted in even cross-group distributions, we found significant differences across
groups with respect to these measures.
The results for each issue are presented in Table III. We report one-tailed tests for
individuals in the Republican treatment group as we expect these individuals to move in the
direction of the Republican Party cue, subject to partisanship. We report two-tailed tests for
subjects in the minor party treatment groups, as we expect individuals to ignore or resist the
minor party cues. Given the presence of interaction terms in the model, the results are
supplemented by Table IV, in which we calculate the slope of each treatment at each level of the
moderating variable of partisan identification. Since the coefficients from the ordered probit
estimations are not directly interpretable, Table IV also includes the first differences generated
using Clarify (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg & King, 2001). We report
the change in the probability of falling into the most liberal category, when one moves from the
control group to one of the treatments, at each category of partisanship.
7
Turning first to the Republican treatment, the cue is insignificant for the abortion and
services issues. With respect to imports, the cue is just outside of traditional significance levels
for strong Republicans (p =.11). For the class action issue, the treatment is significant for
Independents (p<.10) and Republican identifiers (p<.05). Individuals accept the Republican
information cue in both cases—i.e., they take a more conservative position relative to their
counterparts in the control group. These findings are somewhat supportive of the moderating
effects of issue complexity and partisanship, as significant results are only obtained among
Independents and Republicans and only for the two more complex issues. However, the
substantive effects are not substantial. For example, receiving the Republican treatment reduces
the probability of falling into the most liberal category by only 3 percentage points for the
imports issue and 2 percentage points for the class action issue among strong Republicans.
Turning next to the Green party, the results indicate that the treatment is insignificant for
the abortion and class action issues. The treatment is significant for almost all partisan groups
(with the exception of strong partisans) for the services issue. The direction of the coefficient
suggests that, in this case, individuals resist the party cue. For the imports issue, we find that
weak and strong Republicans reject the cue, becoming more entrenched in the conservative
position, relative to their counterparts in the control group. The substantive effects are a bit
higher than they were for the Republican cue. For example, weak Republicans in the Green
treatment are 7 percentage points less likely to fall into the most liberal category for the services
issue, while the comparable effect for the imports issue is only 2.7 percentage points.
Lastly, the Reform party treatment fails to reach statistical significance for the abortion,
services, and class action issues. For the imports issue, the Reform treatment is significant for all
those with Democratic sympathies. As with the Green party treatment, for this issue, Democrats
8
and Independents reject the Reform party cue. The substantive effects, however, are minimal at
best—individuals receiving the treatment are not even 1 percentage point less likely to fall into
the most liberal category.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Our findings for the major party cue are generally consistent with the extant literature.
We did not expect this party cue to be influential for the easier issues. As the policy issues
became more complex, however, the Republican treatment became more important in predicting
policy opinions, which is consistent with the literature (e.g., Kam, 2005). Furthermore, we found
support for the moderating effect of party identification in that Democrats were not persuaded by
the cue.
Interestingly, while we find that the minor party cues are significant more often than the
major party cue, we also find that in all cases where the minor party cues are significant, subjects
act against the cues. For instance, individuals reject the Green cue for the services issue, and
reject the Green and Reform cues for the imports issue. These results support Lupia and
McCubbins’ (1998) argument that obscure parties are not perceived to be reliable cues, and
suggest an even stronger assertion: minor party cues work as negative heuristics or indicate to
individuals what policy position not to take. More generally, the results indicate that familiarity
with a cue giver, as well as trust, are both important conditions for persuasion via heuristic based
processing.
9
References
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Chaiken, S. (1980). Heuristic versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source
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Collet, C. (1996). Trends: Third Parties and the Two-Party System. The Public Opinion
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Political Behaviour, 27, 163-182.
King, G., Tomz M., & Wittenberg, J. (2000). Making the most of statistical analyses:
Improving interpretation and presentation. American Journal of Political Science, 44,
347-61.
10
Koch, J.W. (2001). When Parties and Candidates Collide: Citizen Perception of House
Candidates’ Positions on Abortion. Public Opinion Quarterly, 65, 1-21.
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Political Decision Making. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 951-971.
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They Really Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens are Guided by a Trusted Source.
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Petty, R.E. & J.T. Cacioppo (1986). Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral
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Sniderman, P.M., Brody, R.A., & Tetlock P.E. (1991). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in
Political Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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presenting statistical results. Version 2.0. Cambridge: Harvard University [software online; available from http://gking.harvard.edu.]
11
Table I: Issues Questions and Direction of Prompts (with expected sign in parentheses)
Type of Issue
U.S.
Prohibit abortion in all cases
Easy
Republican: Support (-)
Green: Oppose (+)
Reform: Oppose (+)
Decrease services and spending
Easy Intermediate
Republican: Support (-)
Green: Oppose (+)
Reform: Support (-)
Place more limits on imports
Hard Intermediate
Hard
Republican: Oppose (-)
Green: Support (+)
Reform: Support (+)
Limit class action law suits and move many from state
to federal courts
Republican: Support (-)
Green: Oppose (+)
Reform: Oppose (+)
*The sign in parentheses reflects the anticipated effect after the variables were recoded such that higher values
indicate more liberal responses, and reflect only the situation in which those receiving the cue are persuaded to adopt
stances in accord with that party’s stance (as compared to those in the control group).
12
Table II: Summary Statistics for Familiarity and Trust
N
Mean
Familiarity
Republican Party
250
4.168
Democratic Party
250
4.408
Green Party
250
3.060
Reform Party
250
2.320
Ideological Certainty
Republican Party
250
4.772
Democratic Party
250
4.796
Green Party
250
3.892
Reform Party
250
2.364
Trust
Republican Party
249
3.434
Democratic Party
249
3.831
Green Party
247
3.065
Reform Party
181
3.420
Republican Party
110
2.845
Trust by Party ID
Republican Party
Strong Democrat
49
2.163
Weak Democrat
78
2.718
Lean Democrat
34
2.441
Independent
13
2.769
Lean Republican
13
3.615
Weak Republican
38
4.211
Strong Republican
22
5.136
Green Party
Strong Democrat
39
3.872
Weak Democrat
56
3.482
Lean Democrat
25
4.120
Independent
8
3.000
Lean Republican
11
2.727
Weak Republican
23
3.043
Strong Republican
19
2.421
Reform Party
Strong Democrat
15
2.600
Weak Democrat
36
3.083
Lean Democrat
13
2.923
Independent
7
2.143
Lean Republican
7
2.286
Weak Republican
16
3.125
Strong Republican
16
2.750
Std. Dev.
0.975
0.837
1.189
0.949
Min
1
1
1
1
Max
6
6
6
5
1.018
0.937
1.804
1.643
1
1
1
1
6
6
6
6
0.901
1.090
1.404
1.160
0.930
1
1
1
1
1
6
6
6
6
5
0.986
1.216
1.211
1.301
0.768
0.811
0.774
1
1
1
1
2
2
4
4
6
4
4
5
6
6
0.978
0.786
1.333
1.773
1.104
0.976
1.170
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
6
5
6
5
4
4
4
0.828
0.806
1.188
1.069
0.756
0.619
1.125
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
4
5
4
3
3
4
4
13
Table III. Effectiveness of Party Cues in Opinion Expression, Ordered Probit Results
Republican Treatment
(T)
Green T
Reform T
PID
Republican T * PID
Green T* PID
Reform T*PID
Ideology
Religion
Female
_cut1
_cut2
_cut3
_cut4
N
Pseudo R2
LR chi2 (10, 11)
Prob > chi2
Easy Issue:
Abortion
0.378
(0.335)
-0.502
(0.310)
-0.091
(0.310)
0.075
(0.080)
See Table 4
See Table 4
See Table 4
-0.170 ***
(0.084)
-0.239 ***
(0.061)
0.311 **
(0.152)
-3.605
(0.360)
-3.002
(0.337)
-2.678
(0.330)
-1.709
(0.312)
233
.128
79.87
.000
Easy Intermediate
Issue: Services
-0.112
(0.316)
-0.449
(0.273)
0.040
(0.290)
-0.184 **
(0.078)
See Table 4
See Table 4
See Table 4
-0.073 ***
(.077)
0.105 *
(0.060)
0.180
(0.148)
-3.213
(0.338)
-2.066
(0.298)
-1.525
(0.289)
-0.034
(0.304)
230
.130
83.67
.000
Hard Intermediate
Issue: Imports
0.313
(0.318)
0.439
(0.319)
-0.572 *
(0.307)
0.118
(0.082)
See Table 4
See Table 4
See Table 4
-0.150 *
(0.082)
0.119 *
(0.065)
0.230
(0.156)
-1.686
(3.17)
-0.231
(0.293)
0.718
(0.330)
2.480
(0.396)
204
.038
20.01
.019
Hard Issue:
Class Action
0.095
(0.346)
0.158
(0.339)
-0.147
(0.333)
-0.018
(0..085)
See Table 4
See Table 4
See Table 4
0.081
(0.082)
-0.115 *
(0.069)
0.200
(0.166)
-2.612
(0.386)
-0.798
(0.316)
0.570
(0.312)
2.217
(0.385)
187
.024
10.25
.419
***p≤0.01, **p≤0.05, *p≤0.10
Note: See Table IV for the slope of each treatment at each level of partisan identification.
14
Table IV: Effectiveness of Party Cues in Opinion Expression, Ordered Probit Results (Effect of
Treatment at Different Levels of Party Identification)
Party ID
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
Party ID
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
Party ID
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Republican
Cue
0.378
(0.335)
0.270
(0.263)
0.162
(0.219)
0.054
(0.221)
-0.054
(0.268)
-0.162
(0.342)
-0.270
(0.429)
Republican
Cue
-0.112
(0.313)
-0.079
(0.302)
-0.046
(0.326)
-0.013
(0.378)
0.020
(0.449)
0.053
(0.532)
0.085
(0.621)
Republican
Cue
0.313
(0.318)
0.169
(0.249)
0.025
(0.212)
-0.119
(0.224)
-0.263
(0.277)
Easy Issue: Abortion
First
Green
First
Difference+ Cue
Difference+
0.145
-0.502
-0.178
(0.310)
0.104
-0.357
-0.136
(0.241)
0.063
-0.212
-0.084
(0.210)
0.021
-0.067
-0.028
(0.232)
-0.021
0.078
0.027
(0.297)
-0.062
0.223
0.077
(0.382)
-0.100
0.368
0.118
(0.477)
Easy Intermediate Issue: Services
First
Green
First
Difference+ Cue
Difference+
-0.040
-0.449
-0.144
(0.297)
-0.024
-0.505**
-0.135
(0.232)
-0.012
-0.561*** -0.123
(0.210)
-0.002
-0.617**
-0.105
(0.241)
0.006
-0.673**
-0.087
(0.310)
0.011
-0.729*
-0.070
(0.397)
0.015
-0.785
-0.054
(0.494)
Hard Intermediate Issue: Imports
First
Green
First
Difference+ Cue
Difference+
0.010
0.440
0.016
(0.318)
0.006
0.220
0.007
(0.249)
0.001
0.000
0.000
(0.221)
-0.004
-0.220
-0.008
(0.249)
-0.011
-0.440
-0.016
(0.318)
Reform
Cue
-0.192
(0.310)
-0.116
(0.247)
-0.002
(0.210)
0.165
(0.212)
0.375
(0.253)
0.605
(0.318)
0.845
(0.395)
First
Difference+
-0.034
Reform
Cue
0.040
(0.290)
0.025
(0.228)
0.010
(0.190)
-0.005
(0.190)
-0.020
(0.228)
-0.035
(0.290)
-0.050
(0.363)
First
Difference+
0.015
Reform
Cue
-0.572**
(0.307)
-0.486**
(0.243)
-0.400**
(0.205)
-0.314
(0.207)
-0.228
(0.249)
First
Difference+
-0.007
-0.010
0.020
0.048
0.075
0.098
0.117
0.010
0.005
0.002
-0.001
-0.003
-0.004
-0.008
-0.009
-0.010
-0.011
15
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
Party ID
Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Lean Democrat
Independent
Lean Republican
Weak Republican
Strong Republican
-0.407
(0.355)
-0.551
(0.444)
Republican
Cue
0.095
(0.346)
-0.045
(0.272)
-0.185
(0.228)
-0.325*
(0.232)
-0.465**
(0.283)
-0.605**
(0.361)
-0.745**
(0.452)
-0.020
-0.660*
-0.027
(0.407)
-0.032
-0.880*
-0.040
(0.507)
Hard Issue: Class Action
First
Green
First
Difference+ Cue
Difference+
0.008
0.158
0.014
(0.339)
-0.002
0.099
0.008
(0.438)
-0.009
0.040
0.003
(0.734)
-0.014
-0.019
0.001
(1.075)
-0.017
-0.078
-0.004
(1.429)
-0.020
-0.137
-0.006
(1.789)
-0.023
-0.196
-0.008
(2.151)
-0.142
(0.315)
-0.056
(0.392)
-0.010
Reform
Cue
-0.147
(0.333)
-0.115
(0.265)
-0.083
(0.226)
-0.051
(0.232)
-0.019
(0.281)
-0.013
(0.355)
0.045
(0.442)
First
Difference+
-0.008
-0.006
-0.007)
-0.005
-0.003
-0.002
-0.000
0.001
***p≤0.01, **p≤0.05, *p≤0.10 (One-tailed tests for Republican treatment and two-tailed for the minor parties)
Note: We used Clarify to calculate these first differences. Numbers in cells are based on the model presented in Table
III. In all cases, female is held constant at its maximum value (1) and the ideology and religion variables are held
constant at their mean values.
16