Atoms for Peace or Atoms for War? The Future of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Sco$ D. Sagan Stanford University Stanford Graduate School of Business March 27, 2014 Nuclear Power: Expansion vs. Spread Post-­‐Fukushima 2013 Red = Canceling plans Green = ConHnuing with plans
Black = No evidence Yellow = Ongoing debates that have produced a delay or uncertainty about plans Americas ArgenHna States with Nuclear Power Brazil Canada Programs United States Mexico Peru Aspiring Nuclear Power Venezuela Uruguay States Dominican Republic HaiH Bolivia Chile Jamaica El Salvador Western Europe Eastern Europe Central and East Asia/ South Asia Oceania Middle East Africa Germany Switzerland Belgium Finland France Netherlands Spain Sweden United Kingdom Armenia India Bulgaria Pakistan Czech Republic Hungary Slovakia Romania Russia Slovenia Ukraine Japan Iran China South Korea Taiwan South Africa Italy Belarus Poland Lithuania CroaHa Latvia Albania Estonia Greece Thailand Singapore Myanmar Indonesia Malaysia Vietnam North Korea Philippines Senegal Nigeria Tanzania Tunisia Libya Kenya Algeria Namibia Niger Uganda Ghana Morocco Sudan Bangladesh Kazakhstan Sri Lanka Mongolia Georgia Israel Egypt Jordan Turkey UAE Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia Bahrain Oman Syria Yemen Governance, CorrupLon, and Regime Type 2013 States with Nuclear Power Aspiring Nuclear Power States 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 PoliLcal Stability Government EffecLveness Regulatory Quality Control of CorrupLon Democracy Score NTI Security RaLng Sources: World Bank, World Governance Indicators, 2011, info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index/asp; Polity IV Project, Poli6cal Regime Characteris6cs and Transi6ons, 1800-­‐2007, www.systemicpeace.org/inscr.htm; NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index, h$p://www.nHindex.org/. * Measurement for Democracy/Autocracy Score is mean Polity IV 20-­‐point score on a 100-­‐point scale. Scores above 50 represent democracy; below 50 implies non-­‐democracy. Figure © Sco$ D. Sagan 2013 The Nuclear Fuel Cycle Source: Adam Bernstein (2009). The Produc6on of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from h$p://www.lanl.gov/orgs/ndo/n4/documents/02.prod_fissile_mat_nuc_weap_nuc_power.pdf
States with Nuclear Weapons States that Explored or Pursued Nuclear Weapons : Autocracy (-­‐10 – 0) : Semi-­‐Democracy (1 – 6) : Democracy (7 – 10) : TransiHon Period Start and End of Nuclear Weapons AcLvity and NPT RaLficaLon : RaHfied NPT : RaHfied NPT as ROC : RaHfied NPT, Withdrew in 2003 Switzerland
Brazil
Yugoslavia (1) + (2)
Sweden
Australia (1) + (2)
Italy
(West) Germany
South Korea
Egypt
North Korea
Taiwan (1) + (2)
South Africa
Libya
Iraq
Algeria
Iran (1) + (2)
Romania
Syria
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Five Cracked “Pillars” of the NPT ArLcle I: “Each Nuclear Weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices… not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.” ArLcle IV: : I: A
rLcle V
: ArLcle IIX
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reaty… I
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not iate n axplosive ny tndo ssist, tn mdonths in aay dvance.” weapons othis r evices… otareaty ther evices…
ArLcle nuclear IV: “withdrawal… Nothing re
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nalienable ra
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nuclear energy encourage, nduce a
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uclear eapon not tpo manufacture r otherwise acquire for discriminaHon adisarmament.” nd in co
onformity with A
rHcle peaceful urposes without discriminaHon and in conformity with ArHcle II and to manufacture o
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cquire II of tState his treaty.” nuclear w
eapons.” and II of this treaty.” ArLcle VI: “Each of the parHes of the treaty ueapons.” ndertakes to pursue negoHaHons in good nuclear w
on effecHve measures relaHng to cessaHon of the nuclear arms race at an faith date and to nuclear disarmament.” early X: “Each Party shall in exercising its naHonal sovereignty have the right to ArLcle withdraw from the Treaty… It shall give noHce of such withdrawal… three months in advance.” Iran’s Nuclear Program Evidence on Iran’s Bomb Program •  InstrucHons for making uranium metal hemispheres •  Tests of implosion-­‐type detonaHon systems •  Missile RV engineering work •  CommunicaHon and links between nuclear and missile programs •  Failure to cooperate fully with IAEA Iran: A Security-­‐Driven Program? “If anyone in the neighborhood has [the bomb], we must be ready to have it.” -­‐Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, 1973 “The commander has said we can have no victory for another five years, and even by then we need to have 350 infantry brigades, 2500 tanks, 300 fighter planes... [Iran would need] a considerable number of laser and nuclear weapons to confront the a$acks.” -­‐Ayatollah Khomeini, 1988 “The moral teachings of the world are not very effecHve when war reaches a serious stage…We should fully equip ourselves in the defensive and offensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons.” -­‐Hashemi Akbar Rafsanjani, 1988 Iran’s Security Concerns •  2001 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review •  January 22, 2002: “Axis of Evil” Speech •  2003: Tehran should “take a number” •  2006: “How can a side that wants to topple the regime also a$empt to negoHate?” Ali Larijani, Iran’s top nuclear nego6ator August 2005 -­‐ October 2007 Iran: DomesLc PoliLcs •  Broad support for nuclear power •  Split on nuclear weapons? •  Reformers and industry want internaHonal trade •  IRGC and weapons interest Iran: The Norms Model •  Fatwa Against Chemical and Nuclear Weapons •  Islam and the Nuclear Taboo •  Membership in the “Nuclear Power Club” November 2013 Iran Nuclear Deal •  Interim deal between P5+1 and Iran reached on November 24th in Geneva •  Adds Hme to an Iranian nuclear “breakout” in exchange for limited sancHons relief –  Suspension of work on Arak –  No enrichment above 5% –  Dilute or convert 20% –  Improved IAEA safeguards Recent Developments on Iran Nuclear Deal Nego6ators Wait for Start of Closed-­‐Door Nego6a6ons in March 2014 Ensuring a Safer Nuclear Future InternaLonal Fuel Bank Regional Repositories NSG Export Guidelines IAEA AddiLonal Protocol 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit •  Pledge by 35 countries to turn nuclear security guidelines into naHonal law and undergo external reviews of nuclear security procedures –  Russia, China, India, and Pakistan not part of group endorsing these measures •  New nuclear materials reducHon commitments by Japan, Italy, and Belgium