Journal Research in Peace, Gender and Development (JRPGD) Vol. 4(2) pp. 27-37, March, 2014
DOI: http:/dx.doi.org/10.14303/jrpgd.2014.013
Available online http://www.interesjournals.org/ JRPGD
Copyright © 2014 International Research Journals
Full Length Research Paper
Using the Cost Element Model to Explain Perpetrators’
Perceptions to Combat Cybercrime in Cameroon: A
Structural Equation Model Approach
*Eric Akuta
Global Institute for Crime Research and Department of Criminal Justice University of the Incarnate Word,
San Antonio, Texas
*Corresponding author email: akutaeric@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
The emergence and rapid diffusion of cybercrime in Sub Saharan Africa within the past two decades has
been a menace to the rest of the world especially the developed nations. Four of the world’s top ten
countries involved in cybercrime perpetration are in the Sub-Saharan African region with Cameroon
inclusive. In Cameroon, several steps including the purchase of latest anti-cybercrime equipment,
increase in law enforcement officers, partnership with developed countries and the passing of new laws
has been taken to curb cybercrime. These steps have not solved the problem because the rate of
cybercrime perpetration has steadily remained on the rise with an increase in Internet diffusion in
Cameroon. This study argued that, the solution to cybercrime lies in the adoption of a criminal focused
strategy that examines the perception of perpetrators on ways to combat cybercrime. The study begged
the question; how can the Cost Element Model be applied to combat cybercrime? To answer this, the
study looked at two main variables: the influence Perceived Risks involved in committing cybercrime
has on the rate of cybercrime perpetration and the effects Perceived Efforts required to commit
cybercrime have on the rate of cybercrime perpetration in Cameroon. The study surveyed 189
cybercrime perpetrators in Cameroon. Applying the Cost Element Model adopted from Clarke’s (1980)
Situational Crime Prevention Theory, the study used the Structural Equation Model (PLS) to establish
the relationship between the risk and effort involved in committing cybercrime and the rate of
cybercrime perpetration. The study concluded that, perceived effort has a partial influence on
perpetration rate while perceived risk has a strong influence on rate of cybercrime perpetration in
Cameroon.
Keywords: Cybercrime, Criminal-Focused Approach, Perceived Effort, Perceived Risk.
INTRODUCTION
The rapid diffusion of the Internet and its trajectory
strongly brings out the importance and influence the
Internet and other forms of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs) have on all world
sectors. Blind (2011) and Wartalla and Jennings (2000)
indicated that the information and communication
technologies, especially the Internet, have not only
affected world economies, but have also impacted the
society at large including political systems worldwide.
Consequently, the Internet is not only the result of
innovation in ICT, but also an enabler for various types of
innovations in the private, and public sectors, and for
broader and more complex innovation processes. As an
innovation that spread in the 1990s, the Internet and
other forms of ICTs created opportunities for learning,
business and interaction that challenged previous
traditional patterns. This exposure leapfrogged several
technologically backward regions of the world like Africa,
which was regarded as “backwards”, into the world of ICT
(Collins and Halverson, 2009). These new technologies
increase opportunities for several marginalized groups,
also allowing them to share in a knowledge base that was
28 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
once reserved for a select few in developed countries
(Collins and Halverson, 2009). This leap by supposed
“backward regions” has not come without a heavy price
to the world at large. As Akuta et al (2011) put it, while
the world enjoys the benefits of ICTs especially the
Internet, it has also been confronted with this heavy price
which has been referred to as the unintended
consequences of ICTs- Cybercrime.
Cybercrime caught the world at large and Cameroon
in particular off-guard. This has partly been as a result of
the weakness of existing policies and laws, the influence
of the establishment and the perception of other
stakeholders, especially in the case of Cameroon raising
concerns in the corridors of power (Akuta and Akuta,
2012; Longe, 2012). When these concerns are looked at
on a global scale as indicated by Serrano (2011),
cybercrime is rated as an industry that is worth a hundred
and fourteen (114) billion dollars. When the effects of
cybercrime are quantified in financial terms, it is realized
that the dollar amount lost to cybercrime annually is
significantly more than the annual global market for
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin combined, thus the need
for concern (Serrano, 2011).
More concern is raised when reference is made to
literature that indicates that out of the top ten countries in
the world with a high level of cybercrime prevalence,
Sub-Saharan Africa is host to four of these countries.
These are regarded as top cybercrime hot spots; Nigeria,
Cameroon, Ghana and South Africa. This rate of
cybercrime prevalence has triggered a renaissance in the
fight against cybercrime in Cameroon, which is ranked
second in cybercrime prevalence in Africa after Nigeria
and forth in the world after the U.S., Britain, and Nigeria
(Akuta et al., 2011). According to reports from the World
Bank (2013), points out that, Cameroon is ranked as the
riskiest nation in the world for online trade. Because of
this surge in cybercrime perpetration, like several
countries, Cameroon is executing efforts to solve this
problem. New laws and policies are being passed,
software is being developed and cyber security
equipment are being purchased to enhance the fight
against cybercrime.
While all these measures are being put in place to
fight cybercrime, Akuta, (2012) holds that the fight
against cybercrime should involve all stakeholders.
Stakeholders in the fight against cybercrime in Cameroon
range from the average man on the street that knows and
fraternizes with cyber criminals to the administration that
enacts decrees and proposes laws passed by the
legislature, and the various international organizations set
up to prevent and deter cyber criminals from indulging in
cybercrime (Akuta et al., 2011). This should be focused
towards a preventive action. For a preventive action to
take place, Akuta, (2012) suggest that, the principal
stakeholder involved in the perpetration of cybercrime-the
perpetrators should be the main consulted group
especially because this venture is being dealt with in a
region where the local community does not necessarily
view cyber criminals as ‘criminals’ (Akuta, 2012).
To do this, the study was limited to Cameroon
because of its uniqueness in the cybercrime surge, and
was designed to provide policy makers both at local and
international levels with an in-depth knowledge on how
the use of a good understanding of cybercrime
perpetrators’ perceptions in combating cybercrime can be
of importance to craft and implement cybercrime laws
and policies that will reduce the rate of cybercrime
perpetration in Cameroon. Two questions were put in
place:
What are cybercrime perpetrators’ perceptions on
the antecedents to combat cybercrime in Cameroon?
Why do cybercrime perpetrators have the
perceptions they have on antecedents to combat
cybercrime in Cameroon?
This study assumed that:
An increase in the amount of effort required to
commit cybercrime negatively influences the rate of
cybercrime perpetration.
An increase in the amount of perceived risk to be
faced when committing cybercrime will cause a drop in
cybercrime perpetration rate.
Once this was determined, the study sort to first find
out what laws and policies have
been enacted to facilitate the fight against cybercrime,
using these laws and policies, what implementation
strategies have been tried and how has the
establishment handled issues concerning the fight
against cybercrime. Having a sound knowledge on these
and seeing a rising rate in cybercrime perpetration in
Cameroon gave the researcher the basis to argue for the
use of a Criminal Focused Approach in fighting
cybercrime.
Limitations of Existing Cybercrime Laws and Policies
According to Lu et al (2006) and Wada (2011), the
prevalence of cybercrime in Cameroon in particular and
SSA as a whole is due to the inability of existing laws and
policies to deter cybercriminals because cybercrime
criminals are unafraid of committing crimes in the cyber
world due to the fact that relevant laws are less clear and
enforcement is less stringent. Existing laws treated
computers as property and could only prosecute crimes
that involved stealing the whole computer system or
destruction of the computer but had no jurisdictional
powers over information hackers. Ojedukun (2005) points
out that there is no way law enforcement officers within
African countries could take action against cyber
Akuta 29
criminals unless countries first enacted laws that
criminalize the activities in which these offenders engage.
According to United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime
(2013), the rise in cybercrime perpetration rate in SSA is
due to the lawless nature of most SSA countries. In these
countries the present laws to prosecute cybercrime are
absent and existing laws are grossly inadequate to
reduce cybercrime. For instance, in Kenya where, as of
2002, there has been a significant rise in cybercrime,
there were no existing laws to deal specifically with cyber
criminals. The laws that existed at the time were
inadequate and did not specify how perpetrators of
cybercrime were supposed to be prosecuted when
arrested. Makhanya (2001) cites the example of South
Africa where in 2001, the laws that existed were ill
equipped to handle Internet and Internet related crimes.
For instance, the 1977 Criminal Procedure Act that was
implemented in South Africa had nothing to do with the
Internet when it was being drafted and so did not make
any stipulations that could cure this 21st century malaise.
These laws did not take into account offenses that
involved the theft and abuse of data as well as programs
found on the computer, thus leaving a host of
cybercriminals unprosecuted (Makhanya, 2001).
The lapse in existing laws that allowed cybercriminals
to go unprosecuted in several SSA countries and the
alarming rate of diffusion of cybercrime within and without
countries’ territorial boundaries, rekindled a reawakening
spirit of cybercrime fighting in most SSA governments.
This renaissance compelled SSA state governments and
regional organizations to enact legislations, laws and
form commissions that not only deal with specific crimes
but that deal with cybercrimes as a whole (Kioni, 2008).
In 1998, the Kenyan parliament passed the Kenya
Communication Act (KCA) to address Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) mishaps. These
mishaps partly stemmed from the fact that an increased
use of the Internet and its rapid diffusion was
accompanied by crimes that were not virtualized when
the 1998 Act was being drafted. This act did not address
specific issues concerning cybercrime. For this reason,
the KCA was amended twice in 2009 to meet the
demands of the time (Wanjiku, 2009). According to the
Communication Commission of Kenya (CCK) (2009), the
first amendment in section 83U-Z criminalized
unauthorized access and interception to computer data
and service, modification of computer material, access
with intent to commit offenses and unlawful possession of
devices and data. This amendment also stipulated jail
terms for the aforementioned cybercrimes. The second
amendment commonly known as the E- Transaction’s Act
of 2009, went a step further to look at limitations to
contract formations in the Internet environment, and
liabilities of
service providers, privacy, security and the use of
electronic records and signature to governments. It also
addressed the definition of cybercrime and punishment
as well as e-signature and private policies (C C K, 2009).
Nigeria has also been in the international spotlight for
its involvement in cybercrime. Ranked as third in the
world behind the United States and Britain, and first
within the African continent in the rate of cybercrime
perpetration, Nigeria’s conspicuous position has been a
trigger factor that has influenced the way the nation
handles issues concerning cybercrime (Adomi, 2008;
Boateng et al., 2010). Ehimen and Bola (2010) pointed
out that there exists no specific law in Nigeria that
criminalizes perpetrators of cybercrime directly but there
are laws that can be used to prosecute cybercriminals. In
2003, following a presidential decree, there was
legislative action that established the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission of 2004. This commission
was vested with the power to investigate, prosecute and
penalize all economic and financial crimes related to
terrorism, money laundering, and drug trafficking and
advanced fee fraud. Although these stipulations did not
specifically mention cybercrime, EFCC partners with
other organizations in the combat against cybercrime
because in today’s society most economic and financial
crimes are committed with the use of the Internet (Longe
and Chiemeke, 2008). To make up for lapses of the
EFCC Act, and to specifically address the issue of cyber
and cyber related crimes, the Nigerian parliament passed
the Computer Security and Critical Information
Infrastructure Protection Bill in 2005. This bill, commonly
referred to as the Cybercrime Bill, aims to secure
computer systems and networks, and protect critical
information and infrastructure by criminalizing certain
computer based activities (Chawki, 2009); Chawki
(2009); Oriola (2005) continue to point out that with the
diverging nature of cybercrime and a significant increase
in the number of advanced fee fraud cases recorded, the
Advanced Fee Fraud and Other Fraud Related Offences
Act was passed in 2006. This Act proposed ways to
combat online scams and other related cybercrimes by
issuing harsher penalties of imprisonment of 5-15 years
without the option of a fine. This case is similar to that of
the Republic of South Africa, which like Nigeria was
ranked among the top ten countries in the world in
cybercrime prevalence (Africa News Monitoring Team,
2010).
With the most advanced economy on the African
continent, and more specifically SSA, South Africa has
had its share of a fast rise in unintended consequences
of ICTs. With the development of the South African IT
sector, there has been a rapid expansion of computer
system connectivity. “This rapid expansion of computer
connectivity has provided opportunities for criminals to
30 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
exploit security vulnerabilities in the on-line environment
in fast rising economies like that of South Africa
(Broadhurst, 2006). To catch up with this malaise, the
South African government passed the Electronic
Communications and Transactions Act of 2002 (Cole et
al., 2008). Chapter thirteen of the act clearly defines
cybercrimes and stipulates penalties for each offense.
These crimes were grouped into four categories: those
involving unauthorized access to data, interception and
interference with data and computer related extortion,
fraud and forgery. Understanding the trans-national
nature in which cybercrime operates, South Africa
aligned with other European countries as the only African
country to sign and ratify the council of Europe’s treaty on
cybercrime. This treaty obliged member states to
criminalize offenders that indulge in any form of
cybercrime and also cooperate with each other to
investigate and punish culprits guilty of cyber and cyber
related crimes (Cole et al., 2008).
After Nigeria, as a hub of cybercrime in SSA,
Cameroon tailgates Ghana as king of cybercrime
prevalence in Central Africa. A 2010 report by the
McAfee Cyber-security Firm cites Cameroon as the
world’s riskiest destination for Internet surfers with more
than a third (36.7%) of websites hosted in Cameroon
being suspicious (McAfee Inc, 2009). In line with this, the
country,
through
its
Ministry
of
Post
and
Telecommunications and the National Agency for
Information and Communication Technologies advanced
a bill to parliament that allows them to set up a cyberpolice force, define major crimes, and determine legal
procedures to help fight cybercrime. Also, the
Cameroonian parliament voted for a bill to set up a cyberpolice force to fight the alarming rate of cybercrime in the
nation (Mforgham, 2010).
While the efforts of Cameroon have rested in the
planning phase, countries like Botswana have moved a
step further. Botswana passed the Cybercrime and
Computer Related Crimes Bill of 2007. This bill defines
the jurisdiction of Botswana in crimes that affect its
citizens and brings out extradition conditions and
procedures of cyber criminals (Cole et al., 2008). The bill
also holds accountable Botswana nationals for
infringements committed not only in Botswana but
outside the borders of Botswana as well, especially within
countries like Zambia that shares a common boundary
(Botswana National Assembly, 2007). Zambia, on its part
developed the Computer Misuse and Crimes Act of 2004
to handle cybercrime issues. The Act dealt with the
criminalization of systems’ intrusion, interception of data,
and system disruption. It also went further to institute
harsh penalties for cybercrimes including prison
sentences of up to twenty-five years (Cole et al., 2008).
Though all these
laws and policies have been enacted by various SSA
countries, the enactment of outstanding legislatures and
crafting of policies with extremely harsh punitive
measures will serve at nothing if the implementation
process is taunted.
Role of Implementation Strategies Applied
Lu et al (2006) stated that the high level of cybercrime
perpetration is due to the fact that relevant laws and
policies are less clear and enforcement is less stringent.
To confirm this assertion with a look at the perceptions of
cybercrime perpetrators in Cameroon, there is a strong
need to examine the practical steps that have been taken
to implement the existing laws and policies in SSA as a
whole and Cameroon in particular. For instance, in
Nigeria, the creation of the Economic and Financial
Crimes Commission (EFCC) was a bold step towards the
fight against cybercrime. EFCC’s ascension to the power
throne of crime fighting in Nigeria ushered in the creation
of specialized units that saw the effective investigation
and prosecution of offenders, and training of staff
including the general and asset investigation unit, the
legal and prosecution unit and the training unit. While the
training unit has been able to organize sessions where
law enforcement officers have been trained on
eradicating crime, the investigation unit created a
monitoring and intelligence unit that assisted in the
gathering of information to facilitate investigation (Anadi
and Jones, 2011).
To facilitate the investigation of cybercrime, Operation
Eagle Claw was launched. In this operation, software that
facilitates the sniffing out of fraudulent emails, called
eagle claw software, was developed and deployed
(Oates, 2009). It also instituted and carried out an
aggressive campaign to educate the public on whistle
blowing and the ills of cybercrime through the use of local
media, public and private institutions and all levels of
educational establishments (Maska, 2009). Even with all
of these efforts, once the Nigerian administration, through
the EFCC, recognized that the fight against cybercrime
could not be won by a single nation or organization, they
alongside the Nigerian government, partnered with other
countries and organizations including the United Nations,
other African and West African countries, the African
Development Bank, INTERPOL, Microsoft, Western
Union, Yahoo, Google, and Coca Cola to explore
collective ways of combating this malaise (Chawki, 2009;
ANMT, 2010). This partnership opened the way for the
Nigerian government to take strong steps towards
curbing cybercrime by creating a central agency to
enforce crime laws, and regulate cybercafés by imposing
a ban on the operation of overnight cybercafé services.
These efforts have been buttressed among other things
Akuta 31
by the amount of funds received by various anti-crime
commissions. In 2004, the EFCC received an initial
funding of approximately $2 million U.S. dollars from the
Nigerian federal government and about $32 million U.S.
dollars from 2005-2009 from the European Union. In the
same year (2004), NCWG received about seven hundred
thousand US dollars from the Nigerian Federal
government to allow them the ability to smoothly carry on
their responsibilities (Adomi, 2008; Adeleye, 2009).
Like Nigeria, the fight against computer crimes
according to Mukinda (2009) has spread through the
nooks and crannies of Kenya. Kenya revamped its Cyber
Crime Unit of the police force by embarking on a program
to adequately train its law enforcement officers on
handling cybercrime offenders. In 2009, 18 police officers
were sponsored to receive four months of specialized
training in the United States on emerging Internet-based
criminal trends and the use of specialized equipment to
track down cybercriminals. This was followed by a
retraining of other members of the Cyber Crime Unit by
their colleagues who had been trained in the US. This
training gave the police force the ability to implement set
policies. To continue with sound implementation efforts,
Kenya Network Information Center (KENIC), which works
under the auspices of the Ministry of Information and
Communication and the Kenya police, established a
Computer Security Incidence Response Team (CSIRT).
This response team relays computer and network related
security threats and vulnerabilities to the local Internet
communities, and sends out a weekly newsletter of
recorded activities to members on the CSIRT mailing list
(Akuta et al., 2011).
On the contrary, according to INTERPOL (2009),
Cameroon fostered cybercrime laws and policy
implementation efforts by signing an accord with
international organizations to create and eventually
establish a sub-regional bureau of INTERPOL in
Yaoundé that serves the entire Central African region.
This accord has helped to fight trans-border crimes like
cybercrime, vehicle theft, and piracy, amongst other
things. This has been a major boost to the law
enforcement agency that has in many cases used this
accord to facilitate the fight against cybercrime. The
signing of this accord was accompanied by the President
of Cameroon signing and providing Visa waiver status for
all personnel operating on INTERPOL passports. He also
called on all Central African leaders to do the same so as
to allow swift apprehension of cyber and cyber related
criminals (INTERPOL, 2009). The involvement of other
African leaders with the Cameroonian government came
with a mass effort to fight cybercrime from a trans-border
point of view. The government, together with INTERPOL
organized a working session that involved all police
chiefs in Central Africa to discuss, be educated and adopt
steps that could be taken by the region to fight transborder crimes. This included partnering with international
organizations like the United Nations, and the creation of
specialized units and training of specialized law
enforcement officers on how to handle 21stcentury crime,
headed by crime involving the use of the computer
(Mosima, 2009).
The partnerships that Cameroon created with other
countries and International Organizations was preceded
by the creation of the National Information and
Communication Infrastructure (NICI) in 2001 to wage a
10 year fight from 2004 to 2015 against cybercriminals in
Cameroon (Economic Commission for Africa, 2006). By
2006, the degree that created the NICI was revisited by
the Presidency partly due to the rapid diffusion of
cybercrime and the inability of NICI to take over the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications. Two things
were amended; the name was changed to the National
Agency for Information and Communication Technology,
(ANTIC) and the agency was placed directly under the
auspices of the Presidency in association with the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, which had
overseen the creation of NICI towards the fight against
computer crime (Asongwe, 2012). The implementation
strategies put in place in various countries including
Cameroon were in a bid to bring down the rate of
cybercrime perpetration.
Role of Neo Institutions
Both the enactment and implementation of laws and
policies to fruition as mentioned above depends very
much on the collaboration of all stakeholders. These
stakeholders when categorized under their various
functions form what (Longe, 2012) refers to as the play of
Institutions. These institutions influencing cyber-attacks,
according to Longe (2012) reside at different levels
including global, national, local, social network,
professional, industrial, inter-organizational and intraorganizational. In like manner, Akuta et al (2011) points
out that the stakeholders who make up the various
institutions transcend established institutions like
international organizations, governments of various
nations, legislatures, through banks, law enforcement
agencies, and anticrime commissions to relations, friends
and members of the community where these cyberattacks emanate to the cybercriminals themselves. A look
at these institutions allowed the researcher to revisit the
idea that institutions play a salient part in influencing the
perpetration of cyber-attacks both directly and/or
indirectly. This intentional or unintentional part played by
institutions portrays the strategic influence the perception
of institutions has on the fight against cybercrime (Longe,
2012; Akuta et al., 2011). There is a significant difference
32 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
in the perceptions of stakeholders on ways to combat
cybercrime perpetration at the national level of analysis.
Methodology
From the review of the work done by previous authors,
questionnaire items that are relevant to the constructs in
this study were identified. The main constructs were
developed based on existing measures as drawn from
Clarke’s Situational Crime Prevention Theory as
expounded by Arkers, (2004) who have used the same
theory to test crime. Constructs developed from the work
of these authors included: Perceived Effort to Commit
Crime and Perceived Risk of being Caught Committing a
crime. Although most items used in this study were based
on previous empirical studies, the actual measurement
scales to capture the context of this study were
developed by this researcher. Once that was done,
questionnaire items were modified to match this study on
cybercrime perpetrators’ perceptions in Cameroon. Also,
important concepts in the survey were defined in order to
provide the respondents with a clearer understanding of
the questionnaires.
To get the most appropriate data for this study, the
researcher solicited experts in the perpetration of
cybercrime in Cameroon. The expert group targeted here
is the cybercrime perpetrators themselves. There is no
better group to get the perceptions of cybercrime
perpetrators from than from the perpetrators themselves.
Thus, cybercrime perpetrators in Cameroon who are
considered to be the most important but neglected
stakeholder, served as the expert group in this study. In
line with this, Beebe & Rao (2005) argue that the main
focus on solving crime should be directed towards the
criminals thereby enhancing a Criminal Focused
Research. They argue that crime prevention is achieved
by influencing the would-be criminal’s decision-making
process through various environmental and protection
measures known as situational factors. The hypotheses
of this study were tested with the use of both quantitative
and qualitative data. While the perceptions of cybercrime
perpetrators was tested quantitatively, the qualitative data
was used to test the reasons why perpetrators had the
perceptions they exhibited. This was done with the use of
open-ended questions. The unit of analysis used in this
study is cybercrime perpetrators drawn from four main
cities in Cameroon. This was done with the aid of paid
informants who claimed to be former cybercrime
perpetrators. To achieve this, the researcher developed a
seven step Likert scale that assisted in the measurement
of the two major variables.
The administration of the survey was done using a
very rigorous and covert approach to ensure that the
study validity addressed the questions the researcher
posed concerning the perceptions of cybercrime
perpetrators in Cameroon. The questionnaires, which
gathered principally primary data, were administered
using a web-based survey system.The initial mail sent
out for responses did not result in the researcher having
the desired response rate. This led to the researcher
bringing in a paid inside informant and also played the
part of a non-participating undercover for some of the
viable perpetrators whom this study found very valuable.
This greatly improved the response rate of 31.7 with a
sample size of, N=189 which was regarded as sufficient
for the study. According to Chin (1998), the required
number of cases for a PLS analysis of this sought is 10
times the number of indicators. To make sure the
respondents were actually cybercrime perpetrators, the
researcher secretly requested the services of cybercafé
operators who dealt with the perpetrators on a daily basis
for confirmatory identification. The quality of data
collected was verified in terms of its validity and reliability
with a look at the exploratory factor analysis, Cronbach’s
alpha, composite reliability and indicator loadings,
weights, and the Average Variance Extracted.
The study employed the Structural Equation Model
(SEM) using Partial Least Squares (PLS) algorithms to
obtain better results. Once PLS was applied, the
researcher evaluated the measurement and the structural
models simultaneously. The measurement model was
examined for convergent and discriminant validity. The
structural model provided the required information that is
needed to evaluate the hypotheses in the research
model.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
The Cost Element, as stated in this study, refers to the
variables that require the Perpetrators to put in some
effort, risk or time to perpetrate cybercrime (Clarke,
1997). In this study, the researcher used the following
variables to make up the Cost Element Model; Perceived
Risk and Perceived Effort to commit cybercrime. The
researcher conducted PLS analysis on the cost element
model of perpetrator’s perceptions to find out the
contribution of cost element constructs on the overall
model. The table below displays R2 for each endogenous
construct in the model. According to the results, the
constructs explain 56% of the perception of perpetrators
on cybercrime perpetration rate. The table indicates the
coefficients of all hypothesized paths in the model with
the significance. The model indicates that Perceived Risk
significantly influenced perpetrators perceptions with path
coefficients of 0.629 and Perceived Effort partially
influenced perpetrators perceptions with a path
coefficient of 0.173.
Akuta 33
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Questionnaire item responses
N
Min
Cybercrime Perpetration Rate (RP)
RPCP
189
1
Max
Mean
7
0.700004
Σ
0.059101
RPEO
189
1
7
0.710008
0.058072
RPER
189
1
7
0.770037
0.043494
RPID
RPSL
189
189
1
1
7
7
0.713579
0.693396
0.064522
0.069222
Perceived Effort to Commit Cybercrime (PE)
PEAF
189
1
7
0.657326
0.092289
PECR
7
0.629643
0.116253
189
1
PEPR
189
1
7
0.697092
0.091932
PEPS
189
1
7
0.752351
0.067277
PETS
189
1
7
0.739949
0.070979
Perceived Risk to Commit Cybercrime (PR)
PRBF
PRCD
189
189
1
1
7
7
0.707420
0.058642
0.756204
0.054167
PRLP
189
1
7
0.648609
0.075058
PRRT
189
1
7
0.766212
0.05160
PRSC
189
1
7
0.731311
0.059505
Table 2. Responses to Categorical Demographic Questions
Targeted City
Yaoundé
Douala
Bamenda
Buea
Gender
Male
Female
Highest Level of Education
Primary (Elementary)
Secondary (Middle)
High School
Undergraduate
Post Undergraduate
Age Group
10-18
19-27
28-36
Perceived Effort on Perpetration Rate
Perceived Effort to commit cybercrime was one of two
constructs that made up the Cost Element Model. It was
N
57
46
45
41
%
30.2
24.3
23.8
21.7
N
115
74
%
61
39
N
14
46
39
53
37
%
9
25
22
28
20
N
37
107
48
%
20
57
25
the first hypothesis (H1), stated by the researcher that
suggested that an increase in the perceived amount of
effort required to commit cybercrime negatively
influences the rate of cybercrime perpetration. This
34 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
Figure 1. Cost Element Model Indicators Constructs Dependent Variable
Table 3. Path Coefficient and R2 for Cost Element Model
Independent
Variables
Perceived Effort
Perceived Risk
Path
Strength
Dependent Variable
Path
T
P(t)
Perpetration Rate
0.173
2.654
0.022
Perpetration Rate
0.626
9.903
0.000
R2
0.55
Note. Solid arrows represent significant relationships at the 5% level of significance
R2 = the coefficient of determination
construct was explained by the following indicator
statements: available private chat rooms in cyber cafés
provide a conducive environment for cybercrime
perpetration; privacy secured cyber cafés provide the
preferable environment for cybercrime perpetration; the
closer one moves towards urban areas, the more access
they have to Internet connectivity; the request for detailed
identification information will be a hurdle to requesting
home Internet subscription; and sharing the same home
with parents or guardians limits one’s ability to engage in
cybercrime activities. This hypothesis, as observed, was
partially supported by the results obtained. The
perceptions of Perpetrators indicated that preference was
given to cyber cafés with private chat rooms than those
without. The study revealed that the usage of cyber cafés
with private chat rooms was skewed towards the female
perpetrators than towards the male perpetrators. Over
82% of female cybercrime perpetrators surveyed agreed
that they engaged primarily in sex related cybercrime.
This warranted them to expose sensitive sexual parts of
their bodies and or perform sexual acts at the request of
potential clients. For this reason, they needed more
privacy than male perpetrators thus the high demand for
private chat rooms. Female perpetrators held that the
elimination of private chat rooms from cyber cafés would
be a serious blow to their brand of “business”, in spite of
the fact that Face-book has presented them with the
opportunity to easily share their story with potential
clients. This accounts for the reason for which many of
them created several Face-book accounts with different
aliases.
In the same light, 62% of perpetrators preferred to
engage in cybercrime in cyber cafés that were less
exposed to the public, mainly because it reduced the risk
Akuta 35
Table 4. Results of Hypothesis Testing for Model of Perpetrators’ perceptions
Hypothesis
H1
H2
An increase in the perceived amount of effort required to commit
cybercrime negatively influences the rate of cybercrime perpetration.
An increase in the perceived amount of risk involved to commit
cybercrime negatively influences cybercrime perpetration rate.
of being caught by law enforcement officers. It should be
noted that perpetrators did not see the idea of being
arrested in itself as an issue, the reason for which they
feared arrest is because once arrested, they would lose a
reasonable amount of money for what they termed
“settlement to the police” (bribing their way out of
prosecution) and not because they were afraid of being
prosecuted and incarcerated. Perpetrators also revealed
that though cybercrime is purely an urban and education
skewed crime, they would have preferred rural settings to
perpetrate cybercrime because it took them away from
the lamplight of tight urban security. However, this was
not possible because of the lack of Internet connectivity
in the rural areas of Cameroon. Thus cybercrime is
undeniably an urban crime reserved exclusively for the
educated class (Adomi and Igun, 2008).
In discussing security, perpetrators were of the
perception that having varying types of security devices
placed in cyber cafés would not act as a deterrence
factor to them. Only those that had just began or were
amateurs would see this as a setback mainly because
they depend heavily on cyber cafés, which are relatively
cheap. Also in the category to be affected by security
devices in cyber cafés are perpetrators that shared
rooms with siblings or lived in the same house with
parents or guardians. Others held that they were not
worried about such security moves because they could
afford to install Internet services in their homes. At this
juncture, the question of instituting tougher Internet
subscription terms was introduced. For an individual to
get home Internet subscription, he or she had to provide
detailed identification information to the Internet providers
who in turn submit information to law enforcement
officers when necessary. Perpetrators indicated this
would not be a problem because most of them use
aliases to acquire Internet subscriptions. One of the
reasons for which this indicator was considered to be
moderately supported is because perpetrators indicated
that they could circumvent the issue of providing their real
identity by bribing police officers who are in charge of
Identification Cards production to establish an
Identification card carrying their image but with a fake
name. Finally, 70% of perpetrators agreed to have a
tough time engaging in cybercrime from a home that is
shared with their parents or guardians. This had to do
with the long hours of work put in, the types of friends
involved and the kinds of discussions they get involved in
when they have to talk with potential victims on phone.
Results
Partially Supported
Strongly Supported
Perceived Risk on Perpetration Rate
The second hypothesis tested (H2), postulated that an
increase in the perceived amount of risk involved to
commit cybercrime negatively influences the cybercrime
perpetration rate. This implied that the greater the
perceived risk by cybercrime perpetrators the lower the
rate of cybercrime perpetration. This was the second
strongest construct in the main model measured with
path coefficient of 0.354 and a 0.000 P-value at the 0.05
level of significance. Note that a higher path coefficient
indicates a strong relationship between the construct and
the dependent variable, while a low p-value indicates a
significant effect of the construct on the dependent
variable. One of the greatest things that scared
perpetrators was the idea of being caught. Thus the
higher the risk, the lower the perpetration rate and the
lower the risk of being caught the higher the rate of
perpetration. The hypothesis was therefore strongly
supported. It should be noted that Perceived Risk is one
of the constructs that make up the Cost Element model. It
was flanked by the following indicator statements; there is
an increase in the risk and difficulty to perpetrate
cybercrime with the introduction of security cameras in
cyber cafes; there is an increase in the risk and difficulty
to perpetrate cybercrime with the introduction of website
censor devices on all computers in cyber cafes; there are
available tough laws that prescribe sanctions for
cybercrime perpetrators; the introduction of a cybercrime
specially trained branch of the rapid intervention unit
(BIR) would be a major deterrence factor for cybercrime
perpetrators; and with bribe free law enforcement officials
in Cameroon, the risk of engaging in cybercrime
becomes enormously high.
Perpetrators perceived that the introduction of security
cameras in cyber cafes would pose a great threat to their
attempt to engage in cybercrime perpetration. To them,
one of the main reasons, aside from accessibility to
engage in cybercrime perpetrating activities from cyber
cafes, is the presence of secured privacy. Most cyber
café operators are aware of the activities of perpetrators
and provide a safe, confined and uncensored
environment suitable for their activities. The presence of
security cameras means that anybody who visits the
cyber café could be visually identified. Perpetrators also
indicated that the idea of installing security cameras
becomes more complicated when Central Processing
Unit censor devices are installed on all computers in the
36 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
cyber café. To them, the presence of these two measures
raises the risk of being caught and thus reduces the zeal
to engage in cybercrime activities in a cyber café. Though
they thought a solution to this would be subscribing to
Internet connection in their homes, despite the fact that it
was more expensive, the idea of providing detailed
identification information when subscribing for Internet
home connection as mentioned before closes this lapse.
With the idea of available tough laws and well-defined
sanctions
against
cybercrime
perpetrators,
the
researcher was amazed to find that though 63% of
respondents actually thought there were established laws
against cybercrime perpetration, all of them were also of
the opinion that these laws were a window dressing and
could be circumvented. On the other hand, none of them
could say what the newly enacted cybercrime law or any
other existing law stated about cybercrime perpetration.
The perpetrators were of the perception that any such
laws could only have an effect if law enforcement officers
stopped accepting bribe. This led to the idea of instituting
a cyber-security branch of the Rapid Intervention Unit
Force, commonly known by its French acronym BIR
‘bee’. 73% of perpetrators surveyed indicated that they
would consider stopping the perpetration of cybercrime if
the BIR were to engage in cyber security efforts.
Presently in Cameroon, the BIR is regarded as the most
deadly, brutal, merciless and community unfriendly
special force that keeps law and order in the country
during special moments as deemed by the
administration.
Perpetrators indicated that the main reason for fearing
the ‘bee’ is because they do not offer the latitude to
propose a settlement amount. They held that with the
regular police force, when they are in the process of
receiving a large amount of money (25,000,000 FRS or
$50,000), they requested police protection. Having police
protection allowed them to ‘settle’ with just that group of
police officers, and not get harassed by others. It was
surprising to learn that among the perpetrators were
spies for law enforcement officers. These spies were not
there to feed the police district with information, but to tip
off officers who would subsequently come in and offer
their protective services in return for compensation. It is
worth mentioning that a request to talk to some of these
law enforcement officers was unequivocally turned down.
CONCLUSION
The study concludes that, 56% of the cybercrime
perpetrated in Cameroon can be curbed by significantly
increasing the risk of engaging cybercrime perpetration
and making it more time consuming to go through the
process of committing cybercrime. This will still be done
with the use of laws, policies and software that targets
risk and effort. Thus, with an increase in the opportunity
reducing technics in cybercrime perpetration, there will be
a significant drop in the rate of cybercrime perpetration
witnessed in Cameroon and other countries south of the
Sahara with the same demographics as Cameroon.
While this study explains 56% of the rate of perpetration,
there is a need to find out what accounts for the 44% that
has not been accounted for by the Risk and Effort
variables. The study suggests a look at two more
perpetrators centered models; Benefit Element Model
and the Justification Model.
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How to cite this article: Akuta E. (2014). Using the Cost Element
Model to Explain Perpetrators’ Perceptions to Combat Cybercrime
in Cameroon: A Structural Equation Model Approach. J. Res. Peace
Gend. Dev. 4(2):27-37