Journal of Research in Peace, Gender and Development (ISSN: 2251-0036) Vol. 3(1) pp. 9-17, January, 2013
Available online@ http://www.interesjournals.org/JRPGD
Copyright ©2013 International Research Journals
Review
Administrative handling of the Zhoa chieftaincy crisis,
North West Region, Cameroon 199-2008
Protus Mbeum Tem (PhD)
Bamenda University of Science and Technology, Cameroon
E-mail: temprotu@yaahoo.com
Abstract
This paper entitled “Administrative Handling of the Zhoa Chieftaincy Crisis, North West Region,
Cameroon 1994-2008” discuses the role played by the administration in managing the crisis which
greatly affected the unity and integration of the Fandom. The paper contends that Disagreement
between adversaries and the slowness or delay in giving judgment on the matter by the administration
instead accentuated the crisis. Conflicting decisions between the Divisional Officer and the Senior
Divisional Officer catalyzed or fuelled the problem. Things were even made worse by the inability of the
judiciary to dispense justice as this remained an administrative prerogative. The study concludes that
manipulations and the absence of any good will and determination from administrators in making
timely decisions has been a negative factor in the smooth transition of power in traditional political
institutions and the management of chieftaincy feuds.
Keywords: Chieftaincy, crisis, administration.
INTRODUCTION
The influence of administrators in succession to the
institution of chieftaincy has been an important and
determining factor in many African traditional political
institutions (Makora, 1998). The root of this administrative
interference could be traced back to the advent of
colonialism and the introduction of modern governmental
systems (Isa, 2001) where African chiefs or natural rulers
became subordinates to the Senior Divisional Officers
(SDOs) and Divisional Officers (DOs). This set up was
exported from the colonial into the post colonial era and
this has greatly eclipsed the power and influence of
chieftaincy institutions in many African societies. Though
much power was conferred on these administrators, they
had as a prima facie role, to govern according to the
dictates of the traditions and customs of the people but in
many instances they abused their powers and created or
compounded succession problems when called upon to
adjudicate or bring order when they arose.
Over the years, some of the decisions taken by
administrators have created social disequilibrium and
stagnation in development (Aganah, 2008). Many have
taken advantage of disagreements between kingmakers
in the selection of a consensus candidate to the throne
either deliberately or due to ignorance on the rules of the
game. Even when they want to respect the traditions and
customs of the people, there is pressure from some
gullible indigenes which make them to take wrong
decisions or interfere in purely traditional matters which
has mechanisms for handling such disagreements.
Others are prevented from taking time honoured
decisions by their immediate superiors who either refuse
to approve their decisions or even step in with
contradictory decisions thereby, accentuating the crisis.
In certain situations, the failure to learn from history
has only exacerbated the problem. However, some of
these Administrators are supported by some misguided
individuals that have remained blind to their customs and
traditions and are determined to distort historical facts to
suit their whims and caprices or their demands and better
still, for personal gains. Even where there is hope for a
quick solution to these crises, disagreement amongst
administrators and conflicting solutions have made things
worse.
These succession problems have not been
uncommon in the North West region of Cameroon
in general (Such could be found in Ashon where the
problem has been going on for many years with factions
headed by three aspirants to the throne. See also the
case of Bamali in Ndop where the administration had to
move in and dethroned the reigning Chief in favour of his
brother (See www.camerooncalling.cm of 3rd January
2010 for more analysis). Other conspicuous cases are
10 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
found in Kedjom Keku and Oshie.) and Menchum
Division in particular (Kam, 2008). Hence, a study of this
crisis in the Zhoa Fandom will bring to light the pitfalls of
the Administration in the management of such conflicts
and the dangers involved in disagreement between
administrators and the non respect of the people’s
customs and tradition and the unfolding consequences.
For the realisation of this paper, several methods and
techniques were employed in the collection and analyses
of data. Primary and a few secondary sources formed the
bulk of materials consulted. With regards to primary
sources, these were gotten from the Fungom Sub
divisional and Wum Divisional Archives and from
personal Archives of some protagonists of the conflict.
These were letters, correspondences, Administrative
Orders and Court decisions. As concerns secondary
sources, very few unpublished and published works were
of great help. Unpublished works included theses and
dissertations. Some few scholarly articles and published
works were also consulted. Written sources were
inadequate to give a comprehensive picture of conflict
and in this regard oral sources came in to complement.
Actors or participants as well as eyewitnesses were
interviewed. Multiple questioning on one and the same
issue was done to see whether the same answers would
be obtained and in this way, authenticity was guaranteed.
The thematic and chronological techniques were used in
analysing data. These were employed simultaneously in
presenting the sequence of events. These were
complimented by the qualitative approaches which
provided meaningful explanations and descriptions that
helped in better presenting the administrative handling of
the conflict.
Historical Background
Squabbles
and
Early
Chieftaincy
Zhoa is the administrative headquarters of Zhoa
Subdivision in Menchum Division of the North West
Region of Cameroon. The people are Tikars and point
their origin to Ndobbo in North Eastern Nigeria and
journeyed south to their present settlement (Tem 2005,
16-18). It has Esu, Mekaf and Kufutu as her neighbours
and is situated between latitude 6N and 7N and longitude
9E and 10E (Nsakabo, 2008: 3).
Aka Nyieh led them into their present site and became
their first leader. Upon his ‘passing on’ to his ancestors,
he was succeeded by Dun, his grandson. Power changed
hands from his descendants to the Weanenghe because
his daughter had been married off to the Weanenghe
family. In the absence of a male heir, the grandson, Dun
took over power and Weanenghe became the seat of
authority in Zhoa (None interviewed deny to this nor was
any contrary view given). Dun was succeeded by his son
Chezelle and was resident in Weachekea quarter before
taking up command.
After Chezelle, his brother, Meh Sein, who
was from Weanenghe quarter succeeded to the throne
but he never lived long. He was accused of witchcraft
and sasswood poison was administered and this
proved him guilty and he died. Njueinde of Weachekea
stepped into his shoes. Oral evidence holds that
his reign was full of atrocities and he was burnt
to death by the people. Beng Meh then moved
into the scene but never stayed long as he was arrested
by the Germans an imprisoned in the Bamenda
prison where he died. This arrest and imprisonment was
trickled by the Zhoa’s attack and destruction of
crops on the Kung farms and when the incident was
reported to the Germans, Zhoa was attacked, many
killed and others taken prisoners together with their chief.
With the stool vacant, Zun Meh Achokum, son of
Njueinde and Anjei Sei, nephew of Beng Meh flexed their
muscles as each struggled to have his way to the throne.
The Weh Native Court intervened and passed a verdict in
favor of Njueinde. However, his reign was marked by
scandals and controversies (Accused of killing his
subjects and making women unfertile spiritually and
never respected the traditions and customs of his people)
and he was dethroned by the administration in 1943 and
was replaced by Chief Meh Beng of Weanenghe Quarter
on July 28 1943 (Mark Sheets of Meh Beng, 1966).
On assuming power, he waited until 1960
when the Resident of the province received a plea from
the Divisional Officer (SDO) for Wum to officially
recognize him as he was scored fourteen on
twenty by the former. His performance in the unification
of the various forces and the administration of his
Fandom was such that his recognition needed
no delay and a certificate of recognition was
granted him in 1966 and signed by the Secretary of State
for local Government and the Prime Minister of West
rd
th
Cameroon on the 3 and 4 of November, 1966
respectively (The Recognition of Chiefs Law, 1960, Chief
Meh Beng’s Recognition Certificate, 1966). He
remained in power until the 27 of September
1994 when he disappeared and was buried in the royal
tomb (Letter from Chief Che Meh Beng II to His
Excellency, The Governor of the North West
th
Province, Bamenda, 4 November, 1994). A successor
was then selected to occupy the vacant throne.
Things turn upside Down as Che Meh Beng
Chrisanctus is nominated and Crowned Chief and the
DO Nods
Similar to the transition from Beng Meh that created
problems in relation to succession, things turned sour
and bitter not between two individuals like the former but
between the Weanenghe and the Weachekea quarters.
The ‘missing’ of Che Meh brought a scenario of hatred,
antagonism and distrust that almost paralyzed the
peaceful co-existence that had existed since 1943.
Tem 11
Against the wishes and aspirations of the Weachekea,
their choice to the throne (Zun James) was rejected by a
majority of the kingmakers and the choice of Weanenghe
favored in line with the will of Meh Beng as indicated on
his Mark Sheets of 1966 (Mark Sheets for Chief Che Meh
Beng Chrisanctus, 1966). He had favoured the taking
over of his son after his demise. As a result, all king
makers from Weaneghe and some from Weackekea went
for his son Che Meh and he was crowned and presented
st
to the Fungom Sub divisional administration on the 21 of
October, 1994 (Correspondence from the Divisional
Officer to the Senior Divisional Officer for Menchum, Ref.
ST
No. E.28/04/C01/109, 21 October, 1994).
This was not welcome by the Weachekea who argued
that the stool moves from one quarter to the other and it
was then their turn (This was in relation to the past as the
various leaders of Zhoa were alternating from one quarter
to the other. With this, though not officially accepted as
part and parcel of their customs and tradition as gotten
from oral evidence, it would appear that by coincidence
and not by design, the throne changed hands between
the two quarters). This was ignored by the DO who said
that:
I am of the opinion that the Zhoa people have selected
a chief of their choice and the administration can only
assure them of the protection accorded by law. As
concerns that Zun family, it is in their interest that this
present chief is chosen out of their family as past history
shows (Correspondence from the Divisional Officer to the
Senior Divisional Officer for Menchum, Ref. No.
ST
E.28/04/C01/109, 21 October, 1994).
However, he promised to initiate consultative talks on
the matter while urging the SDO to recognize the new
chief. Historically, the performance of the Zuns as Chiefs
was not the best as none of them died on the stool, that
is Njueinde and Zun Meh Achokum and candidate by the
people.
The refusal by the people and confirmation by the DO
was not welcomed by the Zuns who argued that this was
not enough justification for their right to be denied them
as neither Meh Sein nor Beng Meh were any better. Such
arguments never yielded fruits and the DO went ahead
and installed Che Meh into his function as Chief of Zhoa
th
on the 6 of December 1994 (Correspondence from the
Divisional Officer to the Senior Divisional Officer for
ST
Menchum, Ref. No. E.28/04/C01/109, 21
October,
1994).
The DO’’s immediate recognition and public
presentation of Chief Meh and later installation was
hastily done because he knew too well that there was
dissention from the Zuns. He should have instituted talks,
diagnose the problem and even sought the advice of his
immediate superior, the SDO, before moving on with
these acts. This is because when a decisions are taken in
conflicting situations in favour of one of the protagonists
without any attempt at discussing out their differences,
the expected outcome is the lost of confidence on the
arbiter by the disfavoured. This therefore becomes a
great hindrance to the peaceful resolution of conflict as
future attempts at reconciling the parties is often greeted
with hostility and a feeling that the judge or negotiator is
bias and will never be taken seriously because nothing
good will come out of his efforts. This notion accentuates
conflicts instead of arresting it. This is exactly what
happened in Zhoa as the Zuns became more determined
to frustrate the DO and the authority of the new chief
leading to the escalation of the crisis.
With the loss of confidence on DO and dissatisfied
with his handling of the crisis, the Zuns then turned to the
Divisional administration. They had been received by the
th
SDO on the 28 of November, 1994 and prayed on him
to stop the DO from installing their adversary. With
tempers flaring up in Zhoa, the SDO suspended all
activities in relation to the disputed installation and
emphasized that “…the customs of the people must be
respected” (Correspondence from the Senior Divisional
Officer to the Divisional Officer for Fungom, Ref. No.
nd
E.28/C.106/75, 03 December, 1994). This was on the 2
of December, 1994. He further called on the DO to fix a
date for a meeting to be presided over by him. In
attendance were to be; the contestants, kingmakers,
members of Ntoit (House of Notables), security forces
and the administration of Zhoa (Letter from the Senior
Divisional Officer to Pa Jammoney Chu, Members of
Ntoit and all Kingmakers, Ref. No.E.28/04, 02 December,
th
1994). The date was slated for Sunday the 4 of
December by the DO.
This date was not welcomed by Jammoney (quarter
head) and kingmakers from Wacheakea. They argued
that this date was single handedly chosen by the DO
without consulting them. The date was not convenient
because this was a Sunday, a day meant for worship.
They further argued that he (Jammoney) and Song Ngea,
senior kingmaker from Weachekea, were not consulted
on the choice of the date. Above all, it was so near and
sudden and the decision so abrupt making it impossible
this was a contributory factor to the rejection of their for
him to rally his people for the meeting. He lamented, that
it was not good for the SDO to move into the Sub
Divisional Headquarters on an important administrative
matter without his population set and ready to receive
th
him and listen to him and proposed the 14 of December
which would be convenient to all (Letter from Pa
Jammoney Chu to the Prefect, Menchum Division, 02
December, 1994).
However, the installation went ahead as planned. This
was rejected by the Weachekea but the House of Ntoit
reported this rejection as a no event and according to
them; this was a small and negligible faction of the
population and better still only the Zun family. In a letter
to the Governor, they argued that this family had become
so unpopular and detested by everyone in the Fandom
12 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
(Letter from House of Notables (Ndaw Ntoit) to His
th
Excellency, the Governor of the North West Province, 5
September, 1995).
Even if it was true that the disgruntled faction was
made up of a single family and unpopular in Zhoa, as
opined by the House of Ntoit, it was not logical for the
administration in ignoring their plea for the postponement
of the consultative talks that was necessary in bringing
the two parties together for dialogue and once more trash
the problem plaguing the chiefdom. Besides, none
respect of the SDO’s orders by his subordinate is
unacceptable as this not only ignited distrust for the
administrative machinery of the Division but also
encouraged anarchy. Disagreement by administrators or
those charged with the resolution of conflicts has and will
never be a positive factor for the peaceful resolution of
conflict. It ignites differences between the actors and time
that would have been used in minimising the conflict is
instead spent in settling differences between them than
the actual matter while disagreement becomes more
entrenched. It was therefore necessary for these
administrators to concert and sought long lasting
solutions to the problem.
The Installation and Recognition of Che Meh Beng: A
Bitter Peel to Swallow
The installation of Che Meh Beng by the DO intensified
the love hate relationship that was already entrenched by
his nomination and coronation. Things fell apart and the
Zuns were prepared for a showdown and were ready to
dethrone the new chief no matter what it would take and
their candidate installed. Peace was threatened in Zhoa
and necessitated the intervention of the provincial
authorities. It was because of this that the Interim
Secretary General at the North West Governor’s office,
Ngalle Kinge Jacob, called on the administration of
Menchum, to do whatever it could to avert the situation
and prevent any move that could lead to confrontation
and the breach of peace (Correspondence from the
Secretary General, North West Province, to the Senior
th
Divisional Officer for Menchum, 12 September, 1995).
\In spite of this, tension was mounting as the Weachekea
led by the Zuns and their supporters were ready to install
th
their own chief on the 14 of October 1995. Zhoa was in
for a real combat as the Weaneghe and their supporters
were determined to put a stop to any move at enthroning
another chief in Zhoa. Confrontations and possible
bloodshed was therefore imminent between the two
protagonists (Correspondence from the Divisional Officer,
Fungom, to the Senior Divisional Officer, Menchum, Ref.
th
No. E.28/04/C01/179, 9 October, 1995).
To avoid such occurrences, the DO for Fungom
banned any coronation and installation of a chief in the
Weachekea quarter on the envisaged day and any
other date thereafter. Any act of this magnitude was an
infringement on article 7 and 15 of Decree No. 77/245 of
05/07/77 regulating the institution of chieftaincy in
Cameroon. Those concerned were advised to call it off
and shun any move that could instil disorder in Zhoa.
Meanwhile, those out of Zhoa were banned from moving
into the village on or before that date. All meetings and
social gatherings could only hold with the approval of the
DO. A violation of this order was tantamount to arrest
(Sub Prefetoral Order No. 9/95, Banning the Supposed
Coronation or Installation of a Chief in Weachekea
th
Quarter of Zhoa Village in Fungom Sub Division, 6
October, 1995).
In a bid to pre-empt an unfortunate incident, the DO
called on the SDO for security reinforcement and to stop
the Weachekea from splitting the village until a new chief
was appointed by the SDO for Zhoa (Though approved
by the Sub Divisional Administration, he was not yet
recognized
and
appointed
by
the
Divisional
administration as the law entails). He demanded for at
least ten gendarmes and eighteen policemen to beef up
th
th
the security of Zhoa between the 12 and 18 of October
1995. Worthy of note is the fact that, the Zuns were
threatening his personality arguing that he was a
stumbling block to their wishes and aspirations
(Correspondence from the Divisional Officer, Fungom, to
the Senior Divisional Officer, Menchum, Ref. No.
E.28/04/C01/179, 9 October, 1995).(This claim by the DO
seem to hold if one takes into consideration the fact that
the Zuns are so critical of Fungom administration for
obstructing the SDO from recognizing their candidate.
They claim that the DO was bribed by the Weanenghe
and the Weanenghe also accuses the Weachekea of
bribing the SDO not to recognize Chief Che Meh. This
explains why he was playing delaying tactics in giving
judgment on the matter) Meanwhile the Governor’s office
had instructed the SDO for Menchum to stop any
anticipated installation by the Zuns and he was asked to
warn them to maintain order until a solution was sought
to the crisis.
Though the coronation never went on as planned, it
was believed rightly or wrongly that the SDO was
accentuating and perpetuating the crisis by refusing to
pass or pronounce judgment on the disputed stool. In a
correspondence to the SDO, Mamadou Bala, that was
th
copied the Governor, on the 19 September 1995, the
DO accused the SDO of playing the cat and mouse
game. He argued that it had come to his knowledge that
the SDO had planned to install one of the Zuns as chief
but this never took place (Correspondence from the
Divisional Officer for Fungom to the Senior Divisional
Officer, Menchum, Ref. No. E.28/04/C.01/174, 19
th
September, 1995). This was again planned on the 20
September 1995 but this also failed. He, the DO, had
ignored this and thought there were rumours since he
had not been notified by his boss. As evidence to the
SDO’s double standard role in the affair, the Zuns had
arrived Zhoa a day before the set date. This was suspi-
Tem 13
cious as they DO argued they hardly visited since they
had no residences in Zhoa and whenever they showed
up, tension was high in Zhoa (Ibid).
This claim is justifiable by the fact that, the Zuns
accepts that the SDO was in favour of their candidacy to
the throne and had planned to come and install their
choice. But they had to wait until the return of the DO
who was on leave. But when he resumed duty, the SDO
started playing delaying tactics. This is further supported
by a correspondence to that effect. This was directed to
Mukunda, their quarter head and he was advised to
maintain calm and serenity till the DO’s resumption of
duty, after which the installation would proceed
(Correspondence from the Senior Divisional Officer to
th
Mukunda Kumbuh Chekai, Ref. No. E.28/C.106/S47, 14
October, 1996). In a reply, Mukunda expressed gratitude
and acknowledged his adherence to the SDO’s
postponement of the installation (Letter from Mukundah
Kumbuh Chekai to the Prefect of Menchum, 16 October,
1996).
However, the installation communiqué never reached
the DO and Chief Che Meh Beng II nor the Ntoit. When
th
the Zuns showed up from Wum to that effect on 19
June, they were arraigned and questioned by the DO and
they confirmed that their mission in Zhoa was to prepare
for the coronation and installation of their candidate as
chief of Zhoa. The DO immediately banned all meetings
organized in the Weachekea quarter in order to instill
stability in Zhoa (Correspondence from the Divisional
Officer for Fungom to the Senior Divisional Officer,
Menchum, Ref. No. E.28/04/C.01/174, 19 September,
1995).
Communication is an important tool for the peaceful
resolution of conflict not only between the conflicting
parties but also between those concerned with the
management of the crisis. It is based on this argument
that one will bicker, without any fear of contradiction, that
the absence of dialogue on a delicate matter like this is
not welcomed from these administrators. The SDO
should have corresponded with the DO administratively in
case of any developments and its justification as well as
new evidences that warranted this decision. It was
improper for him to raise the hopes of the Zuns without
communicating to the sitting tenant and his supporters as
well as the House of Ntoit and means put in place to
thwart any unforeseen circumstances. The absence of
information/ or communication only came to pit the Zuns
against the Weachekea and the Weanenghe against the
SDO and the resultant effect was the intensification of the
crisis.
While the Zuns and Weachekea looked up to the DO
as the devil incarnate, Chief Che Meh Beng II and the
Weanenghe frowned at the delay in recognizing him and
their candidate respectively and the friendship that
existed between their adversaries and the SDO. In a
complaint to the Governor, Chief Che Meh Beng II had
this to say:
The administration instead of easing tension creates
tension through delays seemingly denying justice which
is so clear in the eyes of every reasoning being, for how
long shall we continue to wait Mr. Governor? The delay is
indirectly incubating war. When if it does hatches, I do not
know how the administration is going to handle it. A right
thing to do now, is to avert the war which is looking
somehow imminent for tempers are rising daily. I have all
along been calming tempers for Zun’s group matures and
exhibits provocations time and again. He gives the
impression that the Prefect of Menchum Division Mr.
Mamadou Bala is his close friend. He the Prefect will
ensures that he takes over the throne. This saying seems
to hold when one considers… how Zun James visits Mr.
Balla…The Senior Divisional Officer of Menchum Division
maintains a lukewarm attitude on a delicate issue like this
one (Letter from Chief Che Meh Beng to His Excellency,
th
The Governor of the North West Province, 4 November,
1995).
He was so critical of the SDO’s attitude and delay in
recognizing him. He argued that he had forwarded his
documents (hand written application, copy of his father’s
death certificate and a letter of non conviction) and
wondered why the delay and concluded that the SDO
had an interest in the matter. This was possibly to the
advantage of the Zuns, he argued (Ibid). Counter
accusations from both sides continued unabated.
Mukunda was also frustrated by the SDO’s reluctance in
giving judgment on the matter.
Eclipsed from both sides by the DO who was
determined to see Che Meh Beng recognized as the
rightful heir to the throne and the chiefs of Menchum who
welcomed Che Meh Beng into their conference against
his liking, the SDO was dumbfounded. As fons of fons for
Menchum, chief Meh Beng of Esu presented Chief Che
Meh Beng to the Governor as the rightful heir to the
throne on November 11 1995. On his return, a victory
ceremony or celebration was planned following his
presentation to the provincial authorities.
In a protest letter against the celebrations destined for
15 November 1995, Mukunda could not understand why
their own manifestations were constantly banned by the
Sub Divisional authorities. He accused the DO of
constantly holding meetings with the Weanenghe. He
also accused the Fon of Esu and the DO of having
skillfully planned the celebrations on a day the DO will be
out of station with his Brigade Commander and some of
his elements so that this will make their enemies to
celebrate victory (Letter from Mukunda to the Senior
th
Divisional Officer for Menchum, 12 November, 1995).
As a counter measure, the SDO banned these
manifestations and called on the DO to do everything
possible to avoid any confrontations (Correspondence
from the Senior Divisional Officer, Menchum, to the
th
Divisional Officer, Fungom, Ref. No. E.28/C.106/385, 15
November, 1995). This was again reechoed by the
Secretary General in the North West Governor’s office on
14 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
th
the 24 of November 1995. All manifestations to that
effect were banned and he called on the administration of
the Division to furnish his office with the situation at hand
(Correspondence from Enow Abraham Egbe, By
Delegation, North West Governor’s Office to the Prefect
of Menchum, 0109/L/E/GNW.55/S.3/SG/LA88, 24
December, 1994). Faced with this unfortunate situation,
the SDO for Menchum was advised by the Provincial
Boss to embark on consultative talks with the rivaling
th
groups. This took place on the 25 of October 1996.
In attendance at the Sub-Divisional office, Zhoa the
SDO for Menchum, the Mayor, DO for Fungom, Brigade
Commander, Zhoa, Assistant Commissioner, Special
Branch, Wum, Honourable J.C. Kangkolo, Section
President for CPDM, Menchum and Mr. Stanislus Tabi,
DO’s office Fungom, all kingmakers and members of
Ntoit as well as quarter heads sought a lasting solution to
the crisis. Opening the meeting, the prefect made it clear
that he was there to give a final solution to the problem.
He was there to consult them and not to look for magic
solutions. Though tradition was outside the fief of the
administration, it was necessary for the administration to
intervene where tradition failed in maintaining peace and
order.
Everyone present in the meeting said that it was the
kingmakers that nominate a chief. He is presented to the
Ntoit which has the right to reject or accept the candidate.
This was also approved by the kingmakers. The two
families to the contest were not indifferent and were
ready to accept the choice of the Ntoit. The SDO then
came to the conclusion that the Ntoit was the supreme
authority in relation to the selection of a chief in the Zhoa
tradition.
Kingmakers from the contesting families were called
upon to present their candidates to the throne and this
was done (Correspondence from Enow Abraham Egbe,
By Delegation, North West Governor’s Office to the
Prefect of Menchum, 0109/L/E/GNW.55/S.3/SG/LA88, 24
December, 1994). He appealed to the kingmakers to
make history by providing a lasting solution to the crisis
plaguing Zhoa because administrators will always come
and go but the Zhoa people will live together for life. They
were asked to make excellent choices and Jerome Wong
and Che Meh Beng Chrisantus were selected from the
Weachekea and Weanenghe families respectively. Those
eligible to vote were the seven members of the Ntoit and
the four quarter heads (Ibid).
Only J.C. Kangkolo, the SDO and Police
Commissioner for Special Branch, Wum, were allowed to
conduct the elections. Even the DO was sent out to avoid
petitions of intimidation from rival camps. By a vote of 8
to 3, Che Meh defeated Zun Jerome (Ibid). The SDO
congratulated all the participants for a job well done. The
decision had been taken by the people of Zhoa and not
the administration, he intimated. The SDO then
recognized Che Meh Chrisantus as the chief of Zhoa on
the same day and a Prefectoral decision to that effect
th
was signed on the 15 of May 1997 (Prefectorial Order
No. 057/97 Bearing on the Homologation of Mr.
rd
Chrisanctus Meh Che as 3 Class Chief of Zhoa Village –
Fungom Sub Division, Ref. No. E.28/C.106/87, 15 May,
1997). For the first time, it was hoped that calm will once
more return to the Fandom of Zhoa after three long years
of suspense.
The intervention of the Secretary General is salutary,
though it came late, as the long awaited talks held. The
success of these talks laid to rest differences between
administrators of the Division and for the first time they
talked the same language indicative of the fact that
dialogue and concord between administrators is an
excellent factor for the lessening of conflicts.
Chief Che Meh Beng II’s Consolidation of Power and
Weachekea Response
After the election and recognition of Chief Che Meh Beng
II by the SDO, he was to consolidate his position in
power. The Weachekea led by the Zuns lamented and
regretted the unfortunate precedence set by the
administration. They argued that this was the first time
this was happening in the history of Zhoa, whereby a
chief is elected. This had perturbed the smooth rotatory
tradition of the royal stool. In a bid to vent their
frustrations, the Weachekea called on the SDO to
recognize Weachekea as a chiefdom within the shortest
possible time (Letter from Mukunda through the
Divisional Officer, Menchum, 29 January, 1997). They
promised hell if this was not done. This was not heeded
to by the administration which had conducted the election
that the Weachekea were contesting.
The silence of the administration preyed, Mukunda,
their leader to remind it that it was their right as citizens of
the country to receive feed backs and advice on what to
do in response to any appeal launched to the authorities
whether positively or negatively. Such acts of
irresponsibility and delays, they postulated, were a
source for constant rumors and petition writing (Letter
from Mukunda to the Senior Divisional Officer, Menchum
Division, through the Divisional Officer, Fungom Sub
th
Division, Zhoa, 9 May, 1997). Their frustration at loosing
the throne was so great that they vented their anger on
the administration. The period of peaceful romance with
the Divisional Authorities was over and they were ready
to regain their lost prerogatives. With no hope for any
administrative support, they decided to enthrone Ghong
th
Jerome Zun as chief of Zhoa on the 16 of August 1997.
The Weachekea led by the Zuns and Mukunda dammed
the consequences of their actions and warned that
should any irregularities occur thereafter, the
administration would be blamed (Letter from Mukunda to
the Divisional Officer, Fungom Sub Division, Zhoa, 17
August, 1997).
Tension loomed as tempers flared in Zhoa. The tense
Tem 15
atmosphere in Zhoa was blamed or directed at the Zuns
by the DO of Fungom. To him, their constant presence in
the village was instigating and provocative or infringing
on the tranquility that reigned since the official recognition
of Che Meh Beng II. This outburst was provoked by the
fact that Weachekea was planning to install their own
chief publicly. It therefore meant the Fandom and people
were to pay allegiance to two chiefs, a move that would
have provided undesirable consequences. For fear of the
unforeseen, the DO addressed the Zuns in the following
words:
Your
timed
activities
this
year
again
is
sufficient prove to the fact that you are determined to
deprive the Zhoa peace loving village dwellers from
peacefully staying in their village as you do in town where
you have your permanent place of abode and no
temporal hut to occupy in the village…Your activities
are likened to those of mercenaries (Correspondence
from Sub Divisional Officer, Fungom, to Ngong
Jerome, Zun James, and Meh Tem Sukah of Wum,
Ref.
No.
E.28/04/C.1/261,
29
August
1997).
Considering this, the following measures were taken by
him; Ngong Jerome Zun, Zun James and Meh Tem
Sukah were forbidden from entering the Fandom from the
th
29 of August 1997 and thereafter. This could only
happen with the expressed permission of the DO. Such
could only be lifted if they publicly denounced their
destabilizing tendencies to the population verbally and in
writing for disturbing the peace and meddling in
chieftaincy affairs of the village; while he contemplated
criminal charges against them (Ibid).
While the ban on the external elite of the Weachekea
was taking effect, the two quarter heads of Weanenghe
and Weachekea decided to take the bull by the horns.
Tem Abraham Abingong and Mukunda Kumbu decided to
handle the matter amicable without the assistance of the
administration. They both contented that failure to reach
a consensus on the matter; the aggrieved party could
seek redress in court. However, this meeting was
th
destined for the 17 of December 1997, but it never held.
This was ignored by the Weaneghe for they argued that it
was not meant for peace but for the dethronement of the
Chief.
Immediately after this failed attempt, the DO went
ahead to publicly present chief Che Meh Beng II to the
population and installed him. This was the last blow to the
Weachekea. In a letter to the quarter head of
Weanenghe, Abraham Tem and Mukunda warned that
nothing could stop him from also installing Wong Jerome
Zun in Weachekea. The Governor, SDO and DO and the
entire security services in the Division were served
copies of this declaration. (Letter from Mukunda to
Abraham Tem of Weanenghe, 18 December 1997).
The Weachekea in a last desperate attempt decided
to challenge the SDO’s order in the Wum High Court on
24 of April 1998. They prayed the court to annul the
decision that was contrary to the customs and traditions
of their people. So unsuccessful were they that the matter
was referred to the administration. The court argued inter
alia that it had no jurisdiction on such matters and that it
was the prerogative of the administration. They further
held that, where the administration fails in handling the
issue, redress could be sought at the Administrative
Bench of the Supreme Court of Cameroon. This was on
th
13 April 1999. The matter was therefore dismissed
based on the court’s incompetence (Law Suit,
WHC/13/98 -99, Between Mukunda Kumbuh and 4
others – Plaintiffs and Abraham Tem and 3 others –
Defendants, 13 April 1999).
The SDO Enow Abrams made it clear to the plaintiffs
that he could not change the decision of his predecessor
and the only avenue for this was the Supreme Court.
With the matter at the highest court of the land, the
plaintiffs thought the time had come for them to revert the
obnoxious decision of the SDO recognizing and installing
their adversary but this was an administrative matter and
this was again referred to the Ministry of Territorial
Administration for a solution (Minutes of the Meeting
Concerning Chieftaincy of the Zhoa Village on
28/03/2008). This had little or no effect on the situation on
the ground and successive administrators of the Division
continued to grapple with petitions and counter petitions
from both parties. Each side did all it could to impress
these administrators and win their favor or support. For
th
instance, on 26 February 2007, the DO for Fungom was
braised with the situation by the Weachekea who pleaded
on his indulgence to do all he could to redress the matter.
th
Again on 7 December 2007, they came on forcefully in a
plea entitled “Illegal Holding of the chiefdom in Zhoa
village”.
They accused the Weanenghe of illegally holding the
stool of Zhoa. This attempt could be likened to the last
kicks of a dying horse. Quoting the example of Esu where
succession moves from one of the two families to the
other with tranquility and smoothness, they could not
understand why this should be different in the case of
Zhoa. They called on the administration to prop into the
matter and establish the truth (Letter from Mukunda
Kumbu, Senior Kingmaker Weachekea, to the Senior
Divisional Officer, Menchum, through the Sub – Ptrefect,
Fungom, 7 December 2007). They blamed their rivals on
the slow pace of peace but they promised the SDO for
the continuous maintenance of tranquility in Zhoa.
In response, the notables of Zhoa fired back in a
petition captioned; “Reaction to a petition for illegal
holding of the Zhoa Chiefdom in Zhoa Village” and
castigated the writers of the petition. They argued that the
procedure that brought Che Meh Beng to power was in
due respect of the laws and regulations guiding the
institution of chieftaincy in Zhoa. They called on the SDO
not to be preyed or misguided by a people leaving out of
Zhoa. To the Notables, they knew nothing of the customs
and traditions of Zhoa. They reiterated the fact that, the
father of these instigators died as an ordinary Zhoa man
16 J. Res. Peace Gend. Dev.
and not as a Chief. Such counter accusations brought
more and more rift and division and at one time, the
kingmakers fell out with the notables (Letter from the
Notables (Ntoit), through the Divisional Officer, Fungom
Sub Division, to the Senior Divisional Officer, Menchum
Division, 20 September, 2007).
The House of Notable and Kingmakers at Extreme
ends and the Administration Silence the Chieftaincy
Debacle
th
The failure of the reconciliatory meeting held on 24
November 2007 by kingmakers from both sides never
produced the desired results. Another one envisaged on
th
the 7 December and the abstention of the Weanenghe
leading to a petition against them by Weachekea. This
further intensified the crisis and brought condemnation
from the Ntoit on the kingmakers concerned (Letter from
Mukunda, Senior Kingmaker, Senior, Weackekea, to the
Senior Divisional Officer, Menchum, through the Sub
Prefect, Fungom Sub Division, 7 December, 2007; See
Also, Letter from the Notables (Ntoit), through the
Divisional Officer, Fungom Sub Division, to the Senior
Divisional Officer, Menchum Division, 20 September,
2007). They called on the SDO to use his good offices in
instituting peace and development in Zhoa as the time for
talking and petition writing was over and all were to
concert their efforts on the development of the Fandom
(Letter from the Notables (Ntoit), through the Divisional
Officer, Fungom Sub Division, to the Senior Divisional
Officer, Menchum Division, 20 September, 2007).
A clash between these two institutions was so
dangerous to the uneasy calm that now reigned in the
village. Such a move from kingmakers brought sympathy
to the Weachekea course and with counter accusations
and differences, the administration of Menchum came in
to once more put a final full stop to the disturbing
th
phenomena and bring peace and order. On the 28 of
March 2008, in a meeting attended by all kingmakers,
notables, the Divisional administration, traditional rulers
across Fungom, the disputing families, security heads of
the Division, a cross section of Fungom population, the
SDO reminded all present of the trend the chieftaincy
struggle was taking. He recounted the story from its
genesis and concluded that the Zhoa people had elected
their chief in 1996.
However, this was not welcomed by Zun James who
made it clear that this was against the tradition of the
Western Grasslands of Cameroon. This had no bearing
as the SDO argued that where kingmakers fail and do not
agree, the administration has no choice but to go by
elections. This was approved` by a majority of all present
(Minutes of the Meeting Concerning Chieftaincy of Zhoa
Village on 28.03.2008. The Weachekea were cautioned
to accept the result because if they were successful, they
should not have been complaining. It was impossible for
the administration to take a contrary decision after twelve
years and Che Meh Beng was and must continue to reign
as chief of Zhoa. He pronounced this with a very stern
warning when he posited;
That in no occasion will the administration of
Menchum entertains disturbances from anyone
concerning this issue. Besides, that as from today, if
anyone is proclaiming himself chief of Zhoa village; he
will be prosecuted according to the law (Ibid).
To mend fences, he concluded that with the
disappearance of the present chief, the Weachekea
family will equally have to mount the throne for two
successive terms (Ibid). This, for once, buried the
moribund chieftaincy debacle in the Zhoa Fandom.
In spite of all these, not all parties took the decision
whole heartedly. Zun James walked out of the hall
immediately after this was pronounced in protest and the
Zhoa kingmakers and the Ntoit did not also welcome
such a decision from the administration. They held that it
was against the customs and traditions of their Fandom
to know in advance where the next leader would come
from. The silence of the administration over these
pronouncements should be frowned upon as this only
temporary arrested the situation. Again, refusing to
entertain any complaint on the matter was unwise for it
would have been better to handle all grievances related
to the matter to avoid any reoccurrence when the stool
becomes vacant. Moves should have been taken by the
authorities in reconciling the two parties and make them
accept the decision no matter what it could take for their
unwillingness in accepting the arbitration of the
administration is an indication that the struggle has not
ended and is surging on.
CONCLUSION
This paper dwelled on the attempt of the administration in
managing the Chieftaincy crisis in Zhoa from 1994-2008.
The study revealed that the delay by the administration of
the Division in making a decision on the matter created a
vacuum as the Weachekea continuously challenged the
authority of the new chief between 1994 and 1997. With
the official recognition by SDO, the Weachekea had to
seek for redress at the Wum High Court and the
Administrative Bench of the Supreme Court but the case
was referred back to the administration. Though an
attempt was made in 2008 by the SDO laying the matter
to rest and refused entertaining any complaint and
petitions to that effect, it is feared that problems may still
crop up in future. The administration is therefore called
upon to look back into this struggle and in future avoid
discrepancies in the decisions or judgments they take.
They should equally put aside personal interest and
greed and put the interest of the people they govern to
the fore front. In this way, the explosion of these conflicts
will be minimized and development enhanced in the
North West Region in general and Zhoa in particular.
Tem 17
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