La Follette School of Public Affairs Robert M.

advertisement
Robert M.
La Follette School of Public Affairs
at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
Working Paper Series
La Follette School Working Paper No. 2012-004
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers
Statewide Expansion of Treatment Alternatives to
Incarceration in Wisconsin: A Cost Benefit Analysis
Anne Chapman
MPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Colin Christopher
MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Tim Nardine, MD
MPH Candidate, Department of Population Health Sciences
Karen Parkinson
MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Justin Rabbach
MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Nicole Thiher
MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
April 2012
1225 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706
608-262-3581 / www.lafollette.wisc.edu
The La Follette School takes no stand on policy issues; opinions expressed
in this paper reflect the views of individual researchers and authors.
Statewide Expansion of
Treatment Alternatives to Incarceration in Wisconsin:
A Cost Benefit Analysis
Prepared by:
Anne Chapman, MPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Colin Christopher, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Tim Nardine, MD, MPH Candidate, Department of Population Health Sciences
Karen Parkinson, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Justin Rabbach, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Nicole Thiher, MIPA Candidate, La Follette School of Public Affairs
Public Affairs Course 881: Cost-Benefit Analysis
April 2012
Prepared for:
Community Advocates Public Policy Institute
728 N. James Lovell St., 3rd Floor
Milwaukee, WI 53233
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments ...................................................................................................................................................................iv
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................................................. v
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................................ 7
Corrections in Wisconsin ...................................................................................................................................................... 8
Treatment Alternatives and Diversion in Wisconsin................................................................................................. 9
Key Features of TAD Programs ........................................................................................................................................ 11
TAD Eligibility ............................................................................................................................................................... 11
TAD Program Components ...................................................................................................................................... 12
TAD Results to Date .................................................................................................................................................... 12
Our Task .................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
The Washington State Institute for Public Policy Model....................................................................................... 14
Calculating the Benefits and Costs.................................................................................................................................. 15
Analysis...................................................................................................................................................................................... 18
Determining Levels of Financial Investment ............................................................................................................. 20
Allocation of Program Slots ............................................................................................................................................... 23
Analysis of Selected Portfolios using the WSIPP Model ........................................................................................ 25
Results ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 27
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................................ 31
References ................................................................................................................................................................................ 33
Appendix A: Wisconsin Counties Operating TAD Programs ............................................................................... 38
Appendix B: Wisconsin Drug Courts ............................................................................................................................. 39
Appendix C: Wisconsin Diversion Programs ............................................................................................................. 40
Appendix D: History of the WSIPP Sentencing Tool Model.................................................................................. 41
Appendix E: Program Start-Up Costs ............................................................................................................................ 42
Appendix F: Calculation of Marginal Cost.................................................................................................................... 45
Police........................................................................................................................................................................................... 46
Court and Prosecutor Costs ............................................................................................................................................... 46
Adult Local Jail Costs ............................................................................................................................................................ 47
Adult Local Supervision Costs .......................................................................................................................................... 47
Adult State Prison Costs...................................................................................................................................................... 47
ii
Adult Post-Prison Supervision Costs ............................................................................................................................. 48
Appendix G: Additional Wisconsin data that would further refine the WSIPP model .............................. 49
Appendix H: WSIPP Comparison Programs Used in Analysis............................................................................. 51
Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (Proxy for TAD Diversion)................................................................... 51
Program Comparison between DOSA and TAD Diversion Programs .................................................... 51
Drug Court for Adult Offenders (proxy for TAD Drug Treatment Court)....................................................... 53
Program Comparison between WSIPP Drug Court and TAD Drug Court Programs........................ 54
Appendix I: Non-violent arrests in Wisconsin in 2010 .......................................................................................... 55
Appendix J: Monte Carlo Analysis ................................................................................................................................... 56
Appendix K: Victim Tangible and Intangible Costs from Various Types of Non-Violent Offenses ...... 58
Appendix L: County Level Results for each Program Portfolio at different funding levels .................... 61
iii
Acknowledgments
This analysis has benefited from the guidance and support of many individuals and
organizations dedicated to serving the best interests of the public. Debra Kraft, Nick Sayner,
and Marilyn Walczak from Community Advocates Public Policy Institute and Ray Luick
from Office of Justice Assistance have been committed toward sound policy analysis of the
criminal justice system for years and were invaluable to our group throughout the process.
We are also grateful to Steve Aos and his team at the Washington State Institute for Public
Policy for directing us and for allowing us the use of their cost-benefit model. We would
also like to thank Dane County Deferred Prosecution Program Director Pat Hrubesky and
Dane County Circuit Court Judge John Markson for their insight on corrections
programming statewide. Kit Van Stelle, Janae Goodrich, and Jason Paltzer from the
University of Wisconsin–Madison Population Health Institute provided valuable insight and
information regarding Treatment Alternatives and Diversion programs, for which we are
grateful. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the interest and support
of Professor David L. Weimer. His passion for analysis and dedication to our group
provided us with invaluable clarity and direction throughout the project.
iv
Executive Summary
Correctional facilities in Wisconsin are overcrowded, housing more than 4,000
inmates above the design capacity of 17,354. Wisconsin Department of Corrections projects
an increase in costs to maintain operations while facing a seven percent cut in funding in
the 2011-2013 state budget cycle. Wisconsin must respond to this challenge with costsaving measures. This process often requires a tradeoff between reducing the number of
individuals incarcerated and protecting public safety. One approach to address this
challenge is Wisconsin’s Treatment Alternatives and Diversion (TAD) programs. This
analysis predicts the costs and benefits of expanding TAD programs from seven sites to a
statewide implementation. Using an economic model developed by the Washington State
Institute for Public Policy, we used proxy programs to estimate the return to Wisconsin
taxpayers and crime victims from an investment by the state of Wisconsin to expand TAD
programs statewide. Based on the results of this analysis, we recommend that the state of
Wisconsin invest $20 million annually in TAD programs, allocating 75 percent of that
funding to diversion programs and 25 percent to drug courts. This investment generates a
net present value (NPV) of benefits of $86 million after the first year or $83 million in
benefits after subtracting $3 million in program start-up costs.
Since 2007, Wisconsin has been operating seven TAD sites through a combination of
state and local funding. These TAD sites implement a set of evidence-based corrections
practices, primarily diversion from prosecution and drug treatment court. Although
diversion and drug court serve different populations, both target non-violent offenders
who demonstrate a need for substance abuse treatment. Both approaches offer an array of
drug and alcohol treatment alongside community-based alternatives to incarceration.
v
Using these practices, Wisconsin’s TAD programs have demonstrated progress leading to a
decrease in the number of individuals incarcerated, thus cutting corrections costs, while at
the same time reducing recidivism and improving public safety.
We used the Washington State Institute for Public Policy model to conduct a costbenefit analysis of three TAD program investment portfolios at three funding levels,
calculating the NPV of each. The portfolios of TAD programs included the following:
exclusive implementation of diversion, exclusive implementation of drug court, and a
mixed portfolio of both approaches in which 75 percent of funding is allocated to diversion
and 25 percent is allocated to drug court. We calculated the annual NPV as the following:
benefits to taxpayers from crime reduction and avoided criminal justice costs; plus benefits
to crime victims from crime reduction; minus program implementation and operation
costs. We also include a separate first-year calculation of the NPV for each portfolio that
includes the start-up costs for the program.
Investment in drug courts alone, diversion alone, or a diversion/drug court
combination provides a positive annual NPV at $5 million, $10 million, and $20 million.
Although annually investing $20 million exclusively in diversion gives the largest NPV, we
recommend splitting the investment between diversion and drug court as Wisconsin
already has several well-functioning drug court programs. Because diversion and drug
court programs serve different populations, communities could benefit from having both
programs. Thus, we recommend investing in a portfolio that expands drug court capacity
and recognizes the need to maintain programs that serve an offender population that
requires more intensive treatment and monitoring services than diversion programs
typically offer.
vi
Introduction
Current corrections policy in Wisconsin is unsustainable. Whether measured in
terms of growth in prison population, corrections expenditures, or recidivism, Wisconsin
faces a confluence of fiscal and logistical challenges. The state’s prison population grew by
14 percent between 2000 and 2007 and is projected to expand by another 25 percent by
2019. As a result, the Wisconsin Department of Corrections projects $2.5 billion will be
needed to “reduce overcrowding in the prison system and accommodate the projected
growth in the prison population.” Moreover, trends in recidivism point to continued
acceleration in the growth of both prison populations and corrections expenditures.
Indeed, “[f]orty percent of people released from prison in 2005 [in Wisconsin] were reincarcerated in state prison within two years.” This represents an 11 percent jump above
the two-year re-incarceration rate in 2000 (Council of State Governments Justice Center
2009, 4).
Community Advocates Public Policy Institute is a Milwaukee-based advocacy
organization addressing these trends. One of the organization’s major advocacy initiatives
is its Community Justice Project whose aim is “to educate the public and other key
stakeholders in Wisconsin about the value and importance of implementing
comprehensive, evidence-based policy change within the statewide criminal justice
system” (Community Advocates Public Policy Institute 2012). To further this aim, the
organization’s Justice 2000 division administers one of seven state-funded pilot programs
called Treatment Alternatives and Diversion (TAD). Statewide, TAD programs offer
community-based alternatives to incarceration, including diversion, deferred prosecution,
and drug treatment court. Preliminary program evaluations of Wisconsin’s current TAD
7
sites suggest that public investments in TAD programs have the potential to reduce
recidivism, incarceration, and overall corrections costs statewide. In an effort to quantify
these outcomes, the organization requested that students at the University of WisconsinMadison La Follette School of Public Affairs conduct a cost-benefit analysis to estimate the
impact of an expansion of TAD programs statewide.
Corrections in Wisconsin
Wisconsin operates 20 adult correctional facilities and 16 correctional centers. The
state also administers educational programming, treatment programs, support groups, and
vocational training. The design capacity of these facilities, defined by industry standards as
the original capacity of the institution plus any expansions or modifications, is 17,354
inmates (Wisconsin Department of Corrections 2011b). The average daily prison
population is approximately 22,000, representing an incarcerated population of more than
4,000 inmates above the design capacity of correctional facilities.
The Wisconsin Department of Corrections fiscal year 2011 budget was $1.3 billion.
Adult correctional services accounted for more than 85 percent, or $1.1 billion, of the 2011
budgeted expenditures. During fiscal year 2011, less than one percent, or $9.9 million, of
the corrections budget was allocated for programs to increase public safety and reduce
recidivism rates for adults. The department projects that maintaining the current level of
operations will constitute a two and a half percent increase in total corrections costs over
the next two years (Wisconsin Department of Corrections 2011a).
By comparison, Minnesota had a 2011 corrections budget of $470 million, with an
incarcerated population of 9,650 adult inmates (Minnesota Department of Corrections
2010). Wisconsin and Minnesota’s geographic proximity and comparable ethnic, racial, and
8
socio-economic demographics allow for initial baseline comparisons. A comparison of 2009
data reveal respective Wisconsin and Minnesota median household incomes of $49,994
and $55,621, rates of individuals below the poverty line of 12.4 percent and 10.9 percent,
and state populations of 5.7 million and 5.3 million, respectively (U.S. Census 2010a;
2010b). Given the similarities in their demographic and economic characteristics, the
substantial difference in corrections expenditures between Wisconsin and Minnesota
demonstrates a real prospect of significant cost savings for Wisconsin.
Further, legislation enacted in 2011, Wisconsin Act 38, cancels previous legislation
allowing prisoner early release, negating any potential relief for the corrections budget that
would have been realized from early release. Additionally, Wisconsin is considering
sending portions of its current and future overflowing inmate population to neighboring
states. Outsourcing the incarceration of Wisconsin prisoners to out-of-state facilities incurs
higher per-capita expenditures than incarcerating them in state. This further demonstrates
the growing need for alternative corrections policies. Finally, the rising costs of maintaining
facilities and programs and a seven percent reduction for corrections funding in the
governor's 2011-2013 budget require changes to bring corrections costs in line with
funding levels (State of Wisconsin 2011).
Treatment Alternatives and Diversion in Wisconsin
In recognition of increasing corrections costs, legislators enacted 2005 Wisconsin
Act 25 (Wisconsin Court System 2005) and authorized funding for grants to counties to
operate TAD programs (Legislative Fiscal Bureau 2011) to reduce crime and maintain or
enhance public safety, while simultaneously reducing public expenditures, especially on
incarceration (Wisconsin Court System 2005).
9
Wisconsin's TAD programs primarily consist of two types of programs, drug
treatment courts and diversion models. Grant funding by the Office of Justice Assistance
since January 2007 has supported the operation of these programs in seven counties across
Wisconsin. Burnett and Washburn (operating under a shared funding model), Rock, Wood,
and Dane (partial funding) counties operate drug treatment courts. (A map of the counties
implementing TAD programs appears in Appendix A.) Drug courts aim to provide
treatment rather than mandatory incarceration to offenders who need substance abuse
treatment. In general, the treatment and case management services that characterize drug
treatment courts last 12 to 18 months (Van Stelle et al. 2011). (See Appendix B for a
detailed explanation of drug treatment court.)
Dane, Milwaukee, and Washington counties employ diversion models. Diversion
consists of pretrial agreements that divert eligible offenders from the criminal justice
system by offering them the opportunity to participate in treatment in lieu of criminal
charges and incarceration. In contrast to TAD drug courts, which share a common approach
based on standard National Drug Court Institute components, the TAD diversion models
vary in several dimensions such as target population and program length. For example,
Dane County offers a pre-trial bail diversion program for offenders with low to moderate
substance abuse risk. Milwaukee’s program serves a similar population with pre-charge
diversion or deferred prosecution agreement options. However, Washington County serves
a different population in terms of substance abuse treatment needs, offenders charged with
second or third offenses of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and offers them
alternatives to revocation of probation or parole supervision (Van Stelle et al. 2011).
Hence, although these three models share a common goal of diversion of offenders from
10
the criminal justice system, they vary in their approach. (See Appendix C for a detailed
explanation of diversion programs.)
When the TAD initiative was first announced in 2006, Wisconsin TAD programs
collectively received $1.02 million for their first year (Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance
2006). For the upcoming 2012 allocations, $968,400 will be available for all current
programs and at least one additional program (Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance
2011b).
Key Features of TAD Programs
The following section outlines TAD programs in Wisconsin, including eligibility of
offenders, program components, and the results of TAD programs to date.
TAD Eligibility
Wisconsin’s seven TAD sites follow similar criteria for determining offender
eligibility for enrollment. By Wisconsin state law [2005 Wisconsin Act 25, § 90m. 16.964
(12)], eligible participants cannot be violent offenders (i.e., a person charged with or
convicted of having carried, possessed, or used a dangerous weapon; used force; or been
involved in a crime that caused death or serious bodily harm). This standard allows
offenders to remain TAD-eligible for these offenses: drug crimes, property crimes, and
operating while intoxicated. In addition to eligibility based on crime, TAD participants have
demonstrated a need for substance-abuse treatment, a necessary requirement given that
the TAD programs focus is heavily weighted toward treating substance abuse problems.
Beyond these baseline criteria, TAD sites employ site-specific and district attorney
discretion-based criteria related to a variety of factors such as the severity of treatment
needs, likelihood of pretrial failure or rearrest, or county of residence (Dane County,
11
Milwaukee County, Rock County, Washburn and Burnett counties, Washington County,
Wood County).
TAD Program Components
Although each site’s program design and target population vary slightly, the unifying
hallmark of all TAD projects in Wisconsin is the use of evidence-based practices that
provide alternatives to prosecution, parole revocation, conviction, and incarceration for
non-violent offenders with substance abuse and possible mental health treatment needs.
As described previously, these alternatives take two interconnected approaches to
community-based, rather than incarceration-centered, criminal justice: diversion
(including deferred prosecution and related models) and drug treatment courts.
TAD Results to Date
Since the inception of the TAD grants, the University of Wisconsin–Madison
Population Health Institute has conducted ongoing performance evaluations of the TAD
sites. Its statistical findings relate to criminal justice outcomes such as the number of
diversions from prosecution, incidents of recidivism (e.g. new Wisconsin incarcerations,
and new Wisconsin convictions), and avoided days of incarceration. Results from a 2011
institute study suggest that TAD programs, as implemented in the seven current sites, hold
considerable promise as models for reducing incarceration rates while improving public
safety. Collectively, the seven TAD sites can serve an annual capacity of 426 to 545
participants. In the four years since TAD began, the Population Health Institute found that
the programs admitted 2,061 participants with an overall graduation rate of 64 percent.
Drug court participants graduated at a rate of 55 percent, which exceeds the estimated
average national drug court graduation rate of 50 percent. The TAD diversion graduation
12
rate of 66 percent is lower than an estimated national median rate of 85 percent (where
the majority of programs had completion rates above 70 percent). Overall, TAD programs
in Wisconsin resulted in an estimated 135,118 avoided days of incarceration between 2007
and 2010. In addition, offenders who completed TAD programs were significantly less
likely to be convicted of a new criminal offense or sentenced to more incarceration than
those who did not complete the program (Van Stelle et al. 2011).
Our Task
The apparent success that Wisconsin TAD programs have demonstrated in
achieving favorable criminal justice and public safety outcomes suggests that a statewide
expansion could provide substantial social and economic benefits to the state. One way
policymakers could expand the reach of TAD is by diverting public funds for adult
corrections from incarceration to these community-based strategies. A significant obstacle
to this type of reform lies in the perception that alternatives to incarceration such as TAD
programs constitute a “soft-on-crime” approach to public safety. Preliminary evidence,
however, shows that evidence-based programs like TAD reduce recidivism while lowering
criminal justice system costs by avoiding costs associated with policing, arrest processing,
courts, and incarceration. Our task is to consider these results in the context of Wisconsin
corrections to answer the following question: Would a statewide implementation of TAD
programs provide a positive return on investment for Wisconsin residents by reducing
crime and the cost of corrections?
13
The Washington State Institute for Public Policy Model
Ideally, we would have conducted a cost-benefit analysis of expanding TAD
programs throughout Wisconsin by estimating TAD’s specific programmatic outcomes;
predicting the net benefits of TAD programs in the state; and extrapolating such findings
for statewide expansion. In the absence of available data to do this directly, we employed
an economic model developed by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP)
to project statewide impacts of proxy programs for TAD in Wisconsin. Based on findings
from this model, the Washington legislature changed several crime-related policies. In
2007, it allocated $48 million in the biennial budget for the expanded use of evidencebased programs (Drake et al. 2009). (See Appendix D for background information
regarding the WSIPP sentencing tool model.) This model has since become nationally
recognized. The Pew Foundation is providing funding to begin tailoring the model to reflect
the specific situations of each state. Our use of the WSIPP model did not include changing
all figures to reflect exact Wisconsin specifications. Before the implementation of programs
in Washington, WSIPP used national averages to approximate the predicted effects within
the state. As Washington continued to fund these programs, and more state specific data
became available, WSIPP has continued to refine the model. We acknowledge that the
proxy programs used from the selection available in the WSIPP model are not perfect
comparisons, but rather our best approximations of Wisconsin’s TAD programs. For drug
court, the model employs a meta‚Äźanalysis of more than 50 studies nationwide between
1997 and 2008. For the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA), the model uses a
2006 study from the Washington DOSA program.
14
Figure 1 lays out the basic framework of the WSIPP model. In this study, we did not
change sentencing policies, and therefore did not directly alter the number of people in
prison. Instead, we looked only at the costs and benefits of implementing drug courts or
diversion programs for adults who commit non-violent crimes in Wisconsin. The WSIPP
model calculates the benefits of starting or expanding these evidence-based programs as
the avoided costs to the criminal justice system and the avoided costs of victimization that
result from a reduction in crime and recidivism. As a result, the outcomes reflect the costs
and benefits of reducing crime through drug courts and diversion programs, the impact the
programs have on victimization rates and government spending, and the estimated return
on public investments for various policy options (Aos et al. 2011b). The WSIPP model
monetized values of these impacts, which determine, from a societal efficiency perspective,
whether the total benefits of the programs are greater than their cost of implementation.
Figure 1: WSIPP Model Flow Chart
Decide
investment
level
Invest in a
portfolio of
evidencebased
programs
Model
calculates the
change in
crime rate
Model
calculates the
change in
taxpayer
spending
Model
determines
total net
benefits of
the portfolio
of evidencebased
programs
Source: Authors
Calculating the Benefits and Costs
To estimate the costs of the evidence-based drug court and diversion programs and
their effectiveness in reducing crime, WSIPP conducted detailed meta-analyses of highquality evaluations of these types of programs already being administered. The institute
15
calculated weighted average effects to predict the efficacy of each program in reducing
crime. The costs of these evidence-based programs in the model are based on the marginal
cost of one additional person going through an existing program. Although capital costs
have been included through annualizing, these costs do not include the start-up costs of
beginning a new program (Drake et al. 2009). As a result, these costs and benefits may not
fully reflect the net impact of starting a new program. In our analysis we present the annual
net present value (NPV) of the benefits of each of our portfolios at three funding levels. We
then also include an estimation of first-year benefits that include start-up costs. The
specifics of the calculation of start-up costs appear in Appendix E.
We consider the following two types of benefits in this model: 1) the financial
benefits to the government from avoided criminal justice system costs resulting from
reductions in crime and recidivism; and 2) the social and financial benefits to potential
crime victims of avoided victimizations (Aos et al. 2011b). For example, if an evidencebased program reduces crime rates in Wisconsin, then the government would save money
due to reduced costs throughout the criminal justice system. Similarly, if fewer crimes are
committed, then fewer victims will suffer both the tangible and intangible costs that result
from crime.
With a more comprehensive data source, we could have considered benefits to the
offenders who participate in these programs. Future versions of the WSIPP model will
incorporate the impact of these benefits (including impacts on education, child welfare,
health, substance abuse, income, and welfare) and will provide policymakers with a more
comprehensive set of benefits to consider (Aos et al. 2011b).
16
The WSIPP model accounts for all of the criminal justice per-unit costs leading up to
and including incarceration, as well as costs incurred by crime victims. Table 1 shows all of
the sources of costs included in the model. Resource costs and victim costs avoided as a
result of a reduction in crime count as program benefits, while all program operations costs
count as program costs.
Table 1: Per-unit cost categories
Resource Costs
Marginal Operating
Costs
Capital Costs
Police
Police
Courts and
Courts and Prosecutors
Prosecutors
Adult Jail
Adult Jail
Adult Local Supervision
Adult State Prison
Adult State Prison
Adult Post-Prison
Supervision
Victim Costs
Tangible
Intangible
Program Costs
Drug Court
Drug Offender
Sentencing Alternative
Source: (Aos and Drake, 2010b)
Marginal operating costs are the added costs to the government for every additional
person going through each part of the criminal justice system. These added costs would
include employee wages, administrative costs, and supplies. Capital costs include the
purchase of buildings, vehicles, equipment, and other large, long-term purchases. Capital
costs do not necessarily increase as more participants enroll in a given program. Changes
in capital cost inputs occur only after a program reaches a given capacity threshold. These
costs accrue directly to the government, funded through tax dollars. Hence, a reduction in
corrections costs counts as taxpayer benefits. The model's calculations of costs also
consider the impact of the marginal excess tax burden, the amount of money lost to society
from raising an additional tax, estimated to be 17 cents for each dollar of taxes raised
(Boardman et al. 2011).
17
In addition to taxpayer-borne costs, victims incur some of the costs of crime. The
model includes both tangible and intangible costs that victims bear. Tangible costs are the
real financial losses that victims incur, including medical and mental health care expenses,
property damage and losses, and the reduction of the victim’s future earnings. Intangible
costs place a dollar value on the pain and suffering experienced by the victims. In this
model, WSIPP estimates intangible victim costs by using jury awards for pain, suffering,
and loss of quality of life (Aos et al. 2011b).
The WSIPP model analyzes policies specific to Washington State. Therefore, we
adapted the data and inputs for Wisconsin. For example, we changed the average daily
prison population data input from 18,400 to 22,212 to mirror the average daily prison
population of Wisconsin in 2009 (Mize 2009). The largest change we made was to adjust
the per-unit cost estimates for each of the seven parts of the criminal justice system listed
in Table 1 for seven different categories of crimes. We used the cost estimates calculated
for Wisconsin in Fredericks et al. (2010), where they calculated the Wisconsin-specific perunit cost inputs necessary for this model (see Appendix F). Ideally, we would have also
adjusted the annual costs of participation along with average effectiveness of these
programs to reflect Wisconsin results, but we could not due to data constraints. (See
Appendix G for a listing of additional refinement options for incorporation in future
analysis.)
Analysis
To produce an estimated impact of TAD programs when scaled up to various
statewide capacities, we used WSIPP’s findings from similar programs nationwide as a
proxy. In choosing comparison programs from the WSIPP catalog, we sought to identify the
18
programs that most closely aligned with the two primary TAD intervention models:
diversion and drug court.
Selection of a companion program for TAD’s drug court was relatively
straightforward. Although drug courts differ somewhat in design details and administrative
context (Hrubesky 2011; Markson 2011; Sayner 2011a; Van Stelle et al. 2011), they are
relatively standardized in that they all are based on ten specific program components
developed by the National Drug Court Institute (Van Stelle et al. 2011). Therefore, we
selected WSIPP’s “Drug Court for Adult Offenders” program to provide a proxy for TAD’s
drug treatment court programs in our analysis (Aos et al. 2011a).
Because TAD diversion models vary in approach and context more than TAD drug
courts do, finding a WSIPP program to represent TAD diversion programs is more difficult
than selection of a TAD drug court proxy. In addition, the WSIPP catalog does not contain a
program that perfectly matches TAD diversion programs. However, we selected DOSA, the
program that matches closest, to simulate the estimated impact of diversion programs if
expanded throughout Wisconsin. Both DOSA and TAD diversion programs offer substance
abuse treatment to nonviolent offenders with substance abuse treatment needs. The main
limitation to this comparison is that, whereas diversion projects concern diversion from
courts and jail, DOSA offers reduced prison sentences for offenders sentenced to prison and
residential community-based treatment for offenders not sentenced to prison. As the
WSIPP model does not contain a program that employs diversion from jail, we determined
DOSA to be the best available comparison program, given its similar intent to reduce
incarceration in favor of providing evidence-based substance abuse treatment to those who
19
could benefit most. Appendix H provides more details on the similarities and differences
between TAD programs and WSIPP programs.
After matching TAD programs to the WSIPP programs, we determined the feasible
capacity estimates required to assess the overall monetary impact of a given portfolio of
programs. This process included determining the levels of financial investment in selected
programs, calculating the number of slots funded at the state level, allocating the slots at
the county level while accounting for size constraints and feasibility, running the various
county level portfolios through the WSIPP model, and aggregating these county level
estimates to obtain state-level estimates.
Determining Levels of Financial Investment
To determine appropriate levels of financial investment in our selected programs,
we used program capacity estimates based on 2010 operating levels of TAD programs in
Wisconsin. For 2010, Wisconsin TAD participants across all programs represented
approximately one percent of the annual number of non-violent arrests in counties
operating TAD programs. We determined that statewide implementation of the selected
programs at the level of one percent of annual statewide arrests would require funding
approximately 3,500 program slots. See Appendix I for statewide non-violent arrest figures
for Wisconsin. Looking at the marginal costs of program participants in, the selected WSIPP
DOSA and Drug Court programs, we determined that funding a statewide expansion of
3,500 slots in only diversion programs would cost approximately $5 million dollars, while
funding 3,500 drug court slots would cost approximately $14 million. With both programs
active in Wisconsin, we determined that funding the 3,500 program slots necessary to
attain a capacity equal to one percent of annual non-violent arrests statewide could be
20
attained with $10 million, allowing for some flexibility in division of funding between the
two programs. The $10 million figure represents less than one percent of the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections 2011 fiscal year budget of $1.3 billion (Wisconsin Department
of Corrections 2011a).
Although multiple factors such as participant willingness to volunteer and referral
sources may affect the number of participants in a program, an important factor in
determining the level of participation at a TAD site is the amount of available funding.
Taking this fact into consideration, to demonstrate the possible range of results that could
be achieved from differing funding levels for a portfolio of programs, we analyzed each
portfolio for each county at statewide funding levels of $5 million, $10 million, and $20
million. These figures provide a “cushioned” estimate around the initial $10 million
allocation described above, which allows us to better gauge a range of NPV of benefits for a
given change in the funding of programs.
Using these three expenditure levels, we determined the number of funded slots for
drug courts and diversion programs across the state. The constant marginal cost estimates
of an additional program participant from the WSIPP model for drug court and diversion
were used with a specific funding level to determine the total number of slots that could be
funded with a statewide implementation of only a drug court program or only a diversion
program. For example, the marginal cost estimate of an additional program participant for
drug court in the WSIPP model is $4,095. With $10 million in funding, if all of the funds
went to drug court, 2,442 participant slots would be funded. Using the same formula
produces the number of slots for both drug court and diversion at $5 million, $10 million,
and $20 million levels. We present the results of these calculations in Table 2.
21
In addition to portfolios consisting entirely of drug court or diversion, we analyzed a
portfolio that allocated 75 percent of the funding at a given level to diversion and the
remaining 25 percent to drug court. We chose these percentages because diversion
produces comparable reductions in recidivism rates to drug court, but at a substantially
lower expense (Aos et al. 2011a; Sayner 2011a). We also allocated funds to drug court, as
this program is already in place in several Wisconsin counties and specifically addresses
the more serious, high-risk cases that require intensive supervision and treatment.
Investing in diversion allows the state to avoid expending additional resources by
addressing problems early, increasing the likelihood that offenders never end up in drug
court or prison. This relationship suggests potential benefits to having both programs
operate in the same county. We list the number of program slots funded statewide under
this portfolio in Table 2.
Table 2: Number of program slots funded statewide at a given investment level
Program
Diversion
Drug Court
75%/25%
Split
(Diversion +
Drug Court)
Marginal
Cost
$1,509
$4,095
See marginal
costs above
$5 Million
$10 Million
$20 Million
3,315
1,221
6,629
2,442
13,253
4,884
2,486 + 306 =
2,792
4,969 + 613 =
5,582
9,943 + 1,218 =
11,161
Source: Authors
The number of slots represents an annual investment in a program at a specific
funding level. These figures are annual costs and do not include start-up costs. The start-up
costs we include in our analysis are a one-time investment separate from these annual
investment figures.
22
Allocation of Program Slots
While the aggregate statewide impacts of the program are useful for comparison
and policy decisions, the program effect at the county level is important to consider.
Additionally, WSIPP director Steve Aos suggested to us that analysis of a selected program
was best completed on the margins when using the WSIPP model. His recommendation
stemmed from our use of the model to simulate grant funding rather than funding through
a reduction in the average daily prison population. Trying to run the model for a full
statewide implementation would have caused irregularities in the calculated values. At
such high program slot numbers, the total cost would be much higher than the budget
allotted by the model because we did not allow the model to fund the programs through a
reduction in the average daily prison population. Consequently, our analysis first allocated
program slots to each county for each of the three portfolios at our three given funding
levels. We then ran the model separately for every county for each of the nine portfoliofunding level combinations.
To determine a county’s allocation of slots at a given funding level, we took the
annual number of non-violent crime arrests in that county and divided by the total number
of non-violent crime arrests in the state. Each county was given an assigned proportion of
the non-violent crime arrests that occurred in the state. Taking these proportions and
multiplying them by the number of available slots statewide gave each county its allocation
of slots for a specific program under a given funding plan.
Using this method, however, yielded such small allocations to some counties that
taking on the start-up and ongoing administrative costs of the program would not be
advisable. For example, some counties have such a relatively low proportion of non-violent
23
crime arrests that they would only receive enough funding for one program slot. Setting up
a county-level program with only one annual participant would not be practical. In terms of
a statewide implementation strategy, we suggest several options.
One option, a dual-county administration of programs, would allow neighboring
counties to share operations and costs and thus bring the number of allocated program
slots up to some minimum number. This coordination could lead to the availability of
programs to residents of all counties throughout the state. We refrained from defining
specific dual-county administrative partnerships in this report as they would change
depending on the level of statewide funding and require collaboration and logistical
decisions on the part of local county governments. We believe that arbitrary partner
assignments in this report would fail to properly assess all details needed for consideration
before the forming of a partnership. Proof of the viability of this option does exist, however,
as a set of TAD programs are implemented under the dual administration of Washburn and
Burnett counties.
For this analysis, we selected a second option, focusing on the implementation of
programs in counties with a relatively higher number of non-violent arrests. Under this
option, programs are not offered in all counties. Holding the funding level constant, the
slots that would have been assigned to counties below a designated minimum we
reallocated proportionally to those counties above the minimum. This process is explained
below.
We determined eight annual participants for drug court or diversion as the
minimum needed to justify the start-up and continued administration of that program in a
specific county. This minimum threshold was chosen as a reflection of the current
24
operation of TAD programs in Wisconsin. The lowest annual program participation rate
was eight participants in each type of program for either drug court or diversion. This
means that no program in operation served fewer than eight participants in a given year.
Using eight annual participants as the cutoff for both programs, we proportionally
reassigned program slots from counties that did not reach the required minimum to the
remaining counties. For the portfolios consisting exclusively of drug court or diversion, any
county that was below the minimum eight slots was excluded from having that program in
that county (i.e. if only drug court or diversion were to be implemented, and a county was
below eight slots, it would not be allocated any funding and likely would not implement a
program). Under the split portfolio of 75 percent diversion funding and 25 percent drug
court, we excluded counties fully from having a program only if both drug court and
diversion slot allocations were each less than eight at the given funding level. This means
that in order for a county to host neither program, they would have needed to have
allocations of fewer than eight participants in both programs. Diversion is less costly to
administer, and several counties met the minimum requirement for diversion but not for
drug court. In these cases, the counties still received the allocated diversion program slots
and would implement the diversion program. The drug court slots, which were below the
minimum number of eight participants in this case, were reassigned to counties that had
allocated drug court slots of more than eight participants. This method of reallocation
resulted in a set of counties in the split portfolio that would only host diversion programs.
Analysis of Selected Portfolios using the WSIPP Model
For each county-level slot allocation we ran in the WSIPP model, we recorded the
corresponding results for changes in taxpayer costs, changes in victimizations, and the
25
likelihood in percentage terms that a given level of investment in a selected program would
reduce victimizations.
All analyzed portfolios produced results demonstrating a reduction in taxpayer
costs. This cost reduction is a benefit accruing to taxpayers, and thus we present these
figures as positive numbers titled “benefits to taxpayers.”
All analyzed portfolios also reduced victimizations. These reductions are listed in
our results tables as negative numbers, reflecting the number of fewer crimes predicted
form the status quo. Each reduction estimate is the mean result of a Monte Carlo analysis
within the WSIPP model. This analysis generates a percentage figure representing the
portion of trials in which victimizations were reduced. This percentage allows for an
assessment of the risk that a given investment in a portfolio of programs would actually
result in an increase in victimizations. For example, we may list the reductions in
victimizations from a given portfolio to be -15 with a likelihood of reductions to be 99
percent. This means that portfolio was run through the WSIPP model 10,000 times, and on
average the predicted number of reduced crimes was 15. The 99 percent means that in 99
percent of the trials the predicted change in crime was negative. For further explanation of
the Monte Carlo analysis used in the WSIPP model, see Appendix J.
In addition to results extracted directly from the WSIPP model, we provide a
monetized valuation of the benefits that accrue to victims as a result of the reduction in
victimizations. Using existing research, we calculated an average cost associated with a
single victimization of a type of crime. We then created weighted monetized values of a
single reduced victimization as a result of participation in diversion or drug court. Our
calculations produced a value of $4,495 for a victimization reduced from diversion and
26
$10,216 from drug court. (Appendix K provides an explanation of this calculation.) The
numbers differ between programs due to differences in the populations they serve. These
values allow for a calculation of victim benefits by multiplying them by the change in
victimizations from a given program (obtained from the model). We define these figures as
“benefits to crime victims” and list them as positive dollar values in our result tables
(Tables 3, 4, and 5).
The results described above for each county under each program portfolio at each
funding level appear in Appendix L.
Results
We found the statewide effects of a specific program portfolio at a given funding
level by aggregating the individual county level effects in that category. The statewide
results of investments in each portfolio appear in Tables 3, 4, and 5. The first NPV figure,
NPV (Benefits – Program Costs) Statewide, represents the annual benefits predicted from
the specified annual investment in each program. Additionally, we provide a value
representing necessary start-up costs that represent a one-time investment separate from
the annual investment in the program. Thus, the second figure represents the NPV in the
first year of operation. All dollar figures have been rounded to the nearest million.
Table 3 shows positive annual statewide NPV of benefits of drug court at all
investment levels before including start-up costs incurred in the first year, but only at a $20
million investment after including start-up costs. This difference demonstrates an issue of
scale. An investment in drug court only makes sense if expenditures amount to a particular
level of program participants that justifies the training of staff members to administer the
program. (Please note that we estimated start-costs at a $5 million investment in drug
27
court to be $427,500 and we thus rounded to $0. In addition, the NPV figures that rounded
to $0 resulted in actual values of the following: $5 million with start-up costs equaled
$131,333; and $10 million with start-up costs equaled $389,531.) In terms of crime
reduction, we see that an exclusive funding of drug court programs at all levels leads to
confident estimates of victimization reductions.
Table 3: Statewide results from exclusive funding of drug court programs
Investment Level
$5 Million
$10 Million
$20 Million
Program Slots Funded
1,221
2,443
4,885
Change in Victimizations
-244
-495
-987
Trials where Victimizations
are Reduced
100%
100%
100%
Benefits to Taxpayers
$3 million
$6 million
$12 million
Benefits to Crime Victims
$2 million
$4 million
$8 million
NPV (Benefits - Program
Costs) Statewide
$1 million
$1 million
$2 million
First-year Start-Up Costs
$0
$1 million
$1 million
NPV (Benefits -Program Costs
– First-year Start-up Costs)
Statewide
$0
$0
$1 million
Source: Authors
28
Table 4 presents the results based on exclusive funding of diversion programs at the
three funding levels. In this case we find clearly positive NPV of all investments and these
investments provide large returns while reducing crime. A $20 million investment
exclusively in diversion leads to a calculated NPV of benefits of $106 million annually after
the first year, incurring $4 million of first-year start-up costs. This investment also predicts
a crime reduction of more than 8,000 victimizations.
Table 4: Statewide results from exclusive funding of diversion programs
Investment Level
$5 Million
$10 Million
$20 Million
Program Slots Funded
3,311
6,626
13,248
Change in Victimizations
-2,192
-4,415
-8,682
Trials where Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to Taxpayers
$22 million
$44 million
$87 million
Benefits to Crime Victims
$17 million
$35 million
$68 million
NPV (Benefits - Program
Costs) Statewide
$27 million
$54 million
$106 million
First-year Start-up Costs
$1 million
$2 million
$4 million
NPV (Benefits - Program Costs
– First-year Start-up Costs)
Statewide
$26 million
$52 million
$102 million
Source: Authors
29
Table 5 presents results of split investments of 75 percent in diversion and 25
percent in drug court. In this case, all three funding levels result in positive calculations of
the NPV of benefits and reductions in crime. Thus, these portfolios reduce crime and costs.
The inclusion of relatively more expensive drug court programs in these portfolios leads to
fewer overall program slots being funded at each level here, as compared to the same
funding level with only diversion. The highest calculated NPV of benefits comes with the
highest level of investment, where a $20 million investment leads to a calculated NPV of
benefits of $86 million annually, following the first year in which $3 million of start-up
costs incurs. This investment predicts a reduction in crime of nearly 7,000 victimizations.
Table 5: Statewide results from a 75% diversion and 25% drug court investment
Investment Level
$5 Million
$10 Million
$20 Million
Program Slots Funded
2,485 DOSA +
306 Drug Court =
2,791
4968 DOSA +
609 Drug Court =
5,577
9,945 DOSA +
1,218 Drug Court
= 11,163
Change in Victimizations
-1,703
-3,419
-6,751
Trials where Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to Taxpayers
$17 million
$35 million
$66 million
Benefits to Crime Victims
$13 million
$26 million
$53 million
NPV (Benefits - Program Costs)
Statewide
$22 million
$45 million
$86 million
First-year Start-up Costs
$1 million
$2 million
$3 million
NPV (Benefits -Program Costs
– First-year Start-up Costs)
Statewide
$21 million
$43 million
$83 million
Source: Authors
30
Conclusion
This analysis demonstrates that positive monetary and social benefits can result
through an investment to expand TAD programs statewide. Excluding start-up costs
incurred only in the first year, investing $5 million, $10 million, or $20 million in drug
courts alone, diversion alone, or a 75/25-percent split between diversion and drug court
leads to a relatively large positive NPV of benefits for the residents of the state of
Wisconsin.
While the largest NPV of benefits at each funding level are realized from
investments made exclusively into diversion programs, we recognize that other factors
beyond monetary efficiency play a role in the decision to invest in these programs. We
account for considerations such as public perception of being “tough on crime,” the
difference in the populations that diversion and drug court serve, and that both programs
are already implemented in Wisconsin. From this, we recommend an annual investment of
$20 million into a mixed program, with 75 percent going to diversion and 25 percent going
to drug courts. We make this recommendation assuming that the taxpayer investment
would be shared among a broad array of stakeholders throughout the state’s criminal
justice system.
We believe this recommendation to be feasible, as it represents a level of investment
equivalent to approximately 1.5 percent of the $1.3 billion Department of Corrections
budget, and this agency is only one piece of the overall criminal justice system that may
contribute to TAD expansion. This investment returns a NPV of $86 million annually, an
increase of four times the initial expenditure. Funding both programs allows for inclusion
31
of a wider range of participants and provides leeway to counties with both programs.
These counties would be able to assign offenders to the program that better treats their
specific needs and increases their likelihood of being treated successfully. This portfolio
also requires $1 million less in initial start-up costs than the $20 million implementation of
a diversion only portfolio.
In view of the high rates of return on investment in our selected portfolio, we
encourage further analyses to determine if even higher levels of investment would produce
similar returns. If similar rates of return are present, the larger investment would allow for
implementation in a greater number of counties and an expansion of existing programs,
resulting in increased savings and greater crime reduction. Additionally, further work
could monetize the value of benefits that accrue to program participants, as these benefits
are not explicitly accounted for in this analysis. Inclusion of these benefits may lead to a
positive NPV of benefits, even after accounting for start-up costs and increased NPV of
benefits for all portfolios as well.
Overall, TAD programs can reduce both costs and crime at the same time. We hope
this analysis provides further evidence for consideration as Wisconsin policymakers
contemplate funding a statewide expansion of TAD programs. This analysis demonstrates
that investing in these alternative programs appears to be a very effective use of funds. It is
an investment that works to address crime itself rather than simply continuing growth in
spending on incarceration-based sentencing options.
32
References
2005 Wisconsin Act 25 § 90m. 16.964 (12). July 25, 2005.
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2005/related/acts/25.pdf
Aos, Steve, Polly Phipps, and Robert Barnoski. 2005a. Washington’s Drug Offender
Sentencing Alternative: An Evaluation of Benefits and Costs. Olympia: Washington State
Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 05-01-1901. Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/05-01-1901.pdf
Aos, Steve, Polly Phipps, and Robert Barnoski. 2005b. Washington’s Drug Offender
Sentencing Alternative: An Update on Recidivism Findings. Olympia: Washington State
Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 06-12-1901. Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/06-12-1901.pdf
Aos, Steve, and Elizabeth Drake. 2010a. Fight Crime and Save Money: Development of an
Investment Tool for States to Study Sentencing and Corrections Public Policy Options.
Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 10-04-1201.
Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/10-04-1201.pdf
Aos, Steve, and Elizabeth Drake. 2010b. WSIPP's Benefit-Cost Tool for States: Examining
Policy Options in Sentencing and Corrections. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public
Policy. Document No. 10-08-1201. Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/10-08-1201.pdf
Aos, Steve, Stephanie Lee, Elizabeth Drake, Annie Pennucci, Tali Klima, Marna Miller, Laurie
Anderson, Jim Mayfield, and Mason Burley. 2011a. Return on Investment: Evidence-Based
Options to Improve Statewide Outcomes. Olympia: Washington State Institute for Public
Policy. Document No. 11-07-1201. Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/11-07-1201.pdf
Aos, Steve, Stephanie Lee, Elizabeth Drake, Annie Pennucci, Tali Klima, Marna Miller, Laurie
Anderson, Jim Mayfield, and Mason Burley. 2011b. Return on Investment: Evidence-Based
Options to Improve Statewide Outcomes. Technical Appendix I: Detailed Tables. Olympia:
Washington State Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 11-07-1201A.
Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/11-07-1201A.pdf
Barnoski, Robert, and Steve Aos. 2003. Washington State’s Drug Courts For Adult
Defendants: Outcome Evaluation and Cost-Benefit Analysis. Olympia: Washington State
Institute for Public Policy. Document No. 03-03-1201. Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/drugcourtMar2003.pdf
33
Boardman, Anthony E., David H. Greenberg, Aidan R. Vining, and David L. Weimer. 2011.
Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice. 4th. NJ: Pearson Education Inc.
Community Advocates Public Policy Institute: Community Justice Project. 2012. Website.
Accessed April 4, 2012. http://www.ca-ppi.org/solutions/community-justice.php
Community Advocates. 2009. Annual Report. Milwaukee, WI.
Accessed December 1, 2011.
http://communityadvocates.net/documents/2009_CA_annual_report.pdf
Council of State Governments Justice Center. 2009. Justice Reinvestment in Wisconsin:
Analyses & Policy Options to Reduce Spending on Corrections and Increase Public Safety. NY.
Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Wisconsin%20Analyses%20and%2
0Policy%20Options.pdf
Dane County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion
2012 Grant Application.
Drake, Elizabeth, Steve Aos, and Marna Miller. 2009. Evidence-Based Public Policy Options
to Reduce Crime and Criminal Justice Costs: Implications in Washington State. Victims and
Offenders. 4: 170-196. Accessed March 20, 2012.
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/09-00-1201.pdf
Fredericks, Sylvia, Sara Kock, Emily Ley, Olivia Little, Natalie Olson, and Paul Waldhart.
2010. Efficiently Reducing Corrections Costs in Wisconsin: Applying the Washington State
Model. Robert M. La Follette School of Public Affairs. Working Paper No. 2011-001.
Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workingpapers/cba2011-001.pdf
Hrubesky, Pat, Director, Deferred Prosecution Unit, Office of the Dane County District
Attorney. 2011, October 28. Personal Communication to Colin Christopher.
Kennedy, Spurgeon, James Brown, Barbara Darbey, Anne Gatti, Tara Klute, Mary Pat Maher,
and Daniel Peterca. 2010. Promising Practices in Pretrial Diversion. Rochester, NY: National
Association of Pretrial Services Agencies. Accessed December 15, 2011.
http://www.pretrial.org/Docs/Documents/PromisingPracticeFinal.pdf
Legislative Fiscal Bureau. 2011, May 12. Treatment, Alternatives and Diversions Program.
Madison, WI. Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/budget/2011-13Budget/documents/Budget%20Papers/127.pdf
Markson, John, Judge, Dane County Circuit Court. 2011, October 27. Personal
Communication to Colin Christopher.
34
Marlowe, Douglas B. 2010. Research Update on Adult Drug Courts. Washington, DC: National
Association of Drug Court Professionals. Accessed December 15, 2011.
http://www.nadcp.org/sites/default/files/nadcp/Research%20Update%20on%20Adult%
20Drug%20Courts%20-%20NADCP_1.pdf
McCollister, Kathryn, Michael French, and Hai Fang. 2010. The Cost of Crime to Society:
New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation. Drug and Alcohol
Dependence. 108: 98-109.
Milwaukee County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and
Diversion 2012 Grant Application.
Minnesota Department of Corrections. 2010. Notable Statistics. St. Paul, MN. Accessed on
October 15, 2011.
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/aboutdoc/stats/documents/notablestatistics.pdf
Mize, Kate. 2009. Stopping the Revolving Door: Reform of Community Corrections in
Wisconsin. Hartland: Wisconsin Policy Research Institute. Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.wpri.org/Reports/Volume22/Vol22No5/Vol22No5.pdf
National Association of Drug Court Professionals. 2011. History: Justice Professionals Pursue
a Vision. Accessed December 15, 2011.
http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history
Rock County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion
2012 Grant Application.
Sayner, Nick, Director, Justice 2000. 2011a, October 4. Personal Communication to Anne
Chapman.
Sayner, Nick, Director, Justice 2000. 2011b, November 8. Personal Communication to Anne
Chapman.
State of Wisconsin. 2011. Statewide Budget and Position Summaries. Madison, WI: Division
of Executive Budget and Finance, Department of Administration.
http://www.doa.state.wi.us/debf/pdf_files/statewidetotals1113.pdf
U.S. Census Bureau. 2010a. State and County Quick Facts – Minnesota. Accessed November
1, 2011.
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/27000.html
35
U.S. Census Bureau. 2010b. State and County Quick Facts - Wisconsin. Accessed November 1,
2011.
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/55000.html
Van Stelle, Kit, Janae Goodrich, and Jason Paltzer. 2011. Treatment Alternatives and
Diversion (TAD) Program: Advancing Effective Diversion in Wisconsin, 2007-2010 Evaluation
Report. University of Wisconsin Population Health Institute. Madison, WI.
http://uwphi.pophealth.wisc.edu/about/staff/van-stelle-kit/tad-2011-evaluation-reportfull-report.pdf
Wade, Kate, Shelby McCulley, David Harkins, Allison La Tarte, Mary Regan, and Robert
Sommerfeld. 2008. 17-Year-old Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System. Madison, WI:
Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau. Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/08-3full.pdf
Walczak, Marilyn. Community Justice Project Manager, Community Advocates Public Policy
Institute. 2011b, November 8. Personal Communication to Anne Chapman.
Washburn/Burnett Counties. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives
and Diversion 2012 Grant Application.
Washington County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and
Diversion 2012 Grant Application.
Washington State Courts. 2011. Directory of Drug Courts and Other Problems Solving Courts
in Washington State, Introduction section on Adult Drug Courts. Accessed November 1, 2011.
http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_dir/?fa=court_dir.psc&tab=1
Wisconsin Court System. 2005. Wisconsin – ‘Roessler Bill’ Provision of the 2005 Budget Act.
Madison, WI. Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://www.wicourts.gov/courts/programs/docs/2005wisact25.pdf
Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 2011a. Agency Budget Request, 2011-2013 Biennium.
Madison, WI. Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://www.wi-doc.com/PDF_Files/DOC%20201113%20BIENNIAL%20BUDGET%20REQUEST.pdf
Wisconsin Department of Corrections. 2011b. Institution Populations. Week of November 4,
2011. Accessed on November 20, 2011.
http://www.wi-doc.com/doc-pdf/fri_11_04_2011.pdf
Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance. 2006. Governor Doyle Announces $616,000 for Alcohol
and Drug Treatment and Diversion. Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://oja.wi.gov/journal_media_detail.asp?prid=2328&locid=97
36
Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance. 2011a. Arrests in Wisconsin 2010. Accessed
November 15, 2011.
http://oja.wi.gov/docview.asp?docid=21986&locid=97
Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance. 2011b. Justice System Improvement: Treatment
Alternatives and Diversion 2012 Grant Announcement. Accessed October 1, 2011.
http://oja.state.wi.us/docview.asp?docid=21960&locid=97
Wood County. 2011. Justice System Improvement: Treatment Alternatives and Diversion
2012 Grant Application.
37
Appendix A: Wisconsin Counties Operating TAD Programs
This map shows the locations of TAD programs currently funded in Wisconsin.
Figure A-1: Map of Wisconsin counties operating TAD programs
Figure: Authors
Source: U.S. Census 2010b
Note: For the purposes of TAD, Dane County is a diversion project. The Dane County drug
court is only partially funded by TAD grants.
38
Appendix B: Wisconsin Drug Courts
Compared to diversion programs, drug courts aim to provide treatment rather than
incarceration to higher risk non-violent offenders with more intensive substance abuse
treatment needs. These programs are built on key program components, as defined by the
National Drug Court Institute. Unlike diversion, which is primarily a pretrial approach, drug
courts can be offered to offenders at several stages in the criminal justice process, from
pre-plea to post-plea to post-conviction, or as an alternative to revocation of community
supervision. Drug courts are longer-term and more intensive than diversion programs,
ranging from 12 to 18 months. Drug courts offer a comprehensive array of substance abuse
treatment, case management, and monitoring. Drug courts funded through the TAD
program in Wisconsin operate in Rock, Wood, Dane (partially funded) Burnett, and
Washburn counties. Burnett and Washburn (in collaboration with the St. Croix tribe) run
separate drug courts but are funded under a joint application (Van Stelle et al. 2011).
As of December 2010, more than 2,600 drug courts operated in the United States,
according to the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (2011). Since the
establishment of the first drug court in 1989, drug courts have been subject to extensive
evaluations that show positive results. Multiple meta-analyses of drug court research have
been performed, showing on average reduction in recidivism of between ten and 15
percent for participants. Drug court participants have been found to exhibit less drug and
alcohol usage than non-participants (as confirmed by drug testing) as well as self-reported
improved interpersonal relationships, employment rates, and income (Marlowe, 2010).
39
Appendix C: Wisconsin Diversion Programs
Diversion programs consist of pretrial agreements that redirect eligible offenders
from the criminal justice system and offer them treatment alternatives in lieu of criminal
charges and incarceration. These models include evidence-based customized treatment
and procedure plans such as: bail monitoring, deferred prosecution agreements, diversion
from prosecution, and alternatives to revocation of probation or parole. In contrast to drug
courts, county diversion programs do not follow a uniform program design. In general, they
emphasize early intervention and target offenders with a low risk of rearrest and high
probability of completing their customized treatment program. As a result, although
diversion programs vary in length, they can be completed in as little as six months or less
(Sayner 2011a). Diversion models with TAD support in Wisconsin operate in Dane,
Milwaukee, and Washington counties (Van Stelle et al. 2011).
Diversion programs have been operating in the United States since the 1960s, with
funding from the federal government and presidential encouragement. Today, almost 300
pretrial diversion programs operate nationally. These programs operate at the county,
state, and federal levels serving a wide variety of participants. Evaluations of diversion
programs show the following estimates of recidivism rates for new crimes: five percent for
felonies, 15 percent for misdemeanors, and one percent for traffic offenses (Kennedy et al.
2010). However, since there is a wide variety of types of diversion programs, metaanalyses of these programs are not as widely available as they are for drug courts.
40
Appendix D: History of the WSIPP Sentencing Tool Model
To conduct the analysis presented in this study, we employed a model developed by
the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP). The Washington legislature
established this institute in 1983 to conduct non-partisan research on important state
issues. Since 1997, WSIPP has been developing and refining an analytical model, known as
the WSIPP sentencing tool, to identify the costs and benefits of different mixes of
incarceration and evidence-based alternative programs that could potentially reduce crime
and government costs (Aos and Drake 2010a). At its inception the WSIPP model was
limited to using meta-analysis data as approximations of how these programs could be
implemented within the state. Over time, as program-specific data have become available,
WSIPP has refined the model to better reflect actual programs rather than national
averages.
In 2010, the Pew Charitable Trusts contracted WSIPP to develop a policy tool that
focuses on criminal justice sentencing policies and programs from an investment point of
view. They are now working together to make this sentencing tool available and adaptable
to other states. The WSIPP sentencing tool is user-friendly software, and the Pew
Foundation works directly with states to help with adoption, modification, and
implementation of the model. “The purpose of the WSIPP sentencing tool is to allow users
to enter state-specific input factors endorsed by each state, and then test bottom-line
results on crime levels and taxpayer savings for different combinations of public policy
choices” (Aos and Drake 2010b, 4).
41
Appendix E: Program Start-Up Costs
To estimate program start-up costs, we consulted Nick Sayner, director of Justice
2000, the program that administers the Milwaukee County diversion program, and Marilyn
Walczak, community justice project manager at Community Advocates Public Policy
Institute. They stated that start-up costs for drug court and diversion programs are
typically staff-driven, because these programs generally operate within existing program
infrastructure throughout the criminal justice system, such as the courts, prosecutors’
offices, mental health facilities, and so on. This arrangement limits the need for substantial
fixed or capital costs to implement new programs. In addition, start-up costs are not
generally itemized separately in grant applications. According to Sayner and Walczak,
programs typically build start-up costs into the grant request for the first year of funding.
As the program builds up its infrastructure in the initial stages, the program serves a
relatively low client population. After about three to six months, the program typically
becomes fully operational. The primary costs incurred when starting a new program
involve the staff training, supplies, and equipment necessary for staff members to carry out
their duties (Sayner 2011b, Walczak 2011). Consequently, we assumed program start-up
costs can be estimated on a per-employee basis.
Based on his experience and knowledge of drug court and diversion program
operations, Sayner estimates per-employee start-up costs to be roughly $5,000 to $10,000.
Costs could vary considerably depending on the type of program, setting, participant
population, and other variable factors, especially in diversion programs. Sayner’s aggregate
per-employee estimate breaks down as follows: $1,500 for a desk and chair, $1,000 for a
computer, $500 for a printer (which may not be needed for each staff member), $500 for
42
monthly telephone charges, $100 for business cards, $500 for office supplies, and $150 for
technical support (to set up the computer, email, printer, etc.). These estimates total $4,350
(Sayner 2011b). Apart from equipment and supplies, several other factors affect start-up
costs, most notably staff training. Some counties may also need to invest in database
development, administration, and integration within an existing criminal justice tracking
system.
The relationship between staff-driven start-up costs and the size of the program is
not linear. One staff member can serve some capacity range before needing another staff
member, at which point a program could again grow by some number of participants
before needing another staff member.
Second, although real costs are associated with training and equipping staff
members to start a program, the extent to which a new program could avoid direct
budgetary outlays by utilizing excess equipment, supplies, office rental, and other forms of
underutilized capacity from other programs and agencies within the criminal justice
system is variable. In Milwaukee, for example, the diversion program all but eliminated
budgetary outlays for its start-up costs. Although the use of excess capacity from other
program cost centers does represent an opportunity cost, such a cost is likely to be lower
than an outright purchase of needed equipment and supplies. Valuing these opportunity
costs is difficult because each county has a different administrative setting with varying
arrangements of program resources.
Taking all of these assumptions into account with the intention of making
conservative estimates to account for considerable uncertainty and variability in costs, we
43
use the median between Sayner’s estimates of $5,000 to $10,000 (Sayner 2011b) peremployee, to arrive at a start-up cost of $7,500 per staff member.
From there, we estimated how much staffing would be needed for a given county to
start a program at a given participant capacity. We constructed estimates of the staffing-toparticipants ratio based on personnel data we gathered from the 2012 TAD grant
applications for each current TAD site. Where we found the necessary data in the grants,
we performed separate calculations for the ratio for diversion and drug court. For both
programs, we calculated the average staffing-to-participant ratio to be approximately one
staff person to 30 participants.
Using this estimate, we assumed that one full-time staff member can serve
approximately 30 participants in each of our programs (i.e., one staff member for up to 30
participants, two staff members for 30 to 60 participants, etc). Combining these staff
member allocations per county with an estimated $7,500 cost per staff member, we
estimated a total start-up cost for each county. We include start-up cost calculations for
each county in Appendix L.
44
Appendix F: Calculation of Marginal Cost
Instead of using the Washington-based cost data embedded in the model, we
replaced it with Wisconsin-specific per-unit cost estimates from a 2010 La Follette School
cost-benefit analysis by Fredericks et al. Although Fredericks et al. did not find significant
differences between Washington and Wisconsin costs in their analysis, we believe using
Wisconsin cost data better approximates net benefits for Wisconsin taxpayers of
implementing these programs. Based on Washington State Institute for Public Policy’s
(WSIPP) methods, the following outline explains the calculations of their cost estimates,
and the results of these calculations are shown in Table F-1. Please see Fredericks et al.
(2010) for further explanation.
Table F-1: Marginal costs
Murder
Marginal Operating Costs
Rape
and
Sex
Agg.
Offense Robbery Assault Property
Drug
Misdemeanor
Capital
Costs
PerUnit
Costs Paid by Government
Police
$439
$439
$439
$439
$439
$439
$439
$189
Courts and
Prosecutors $126,634 $15,599
Adult Jail
$14,000 $14,000
$8,199
$14,000
$4,053
$14,000
$167
$14,000
$167
$14,000
$167
$14,000
$21
$55,000
Adult Local
Supervision
$1,100
$1,100
$1,100
$1,100
$1,100
$1,100
$1,100
-
Adult State
Prison
$13,939
$13,939
$13,939
$13,939
$13,939
$13,939
$13,939
$85,673
Adult PostPrison
Supervision
$1,030
$1,030
$1,030
$1,030
$1,030
$1,030
$1,030
-
Source: Fredericks et al. (2010)
45
Police
Wisconsin’s aggregate data on total direct current expenditures for police from
2004 to 2007 from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics was used to estimate police
operating costs of $439 in 2010 dollars. Fredericks et al. used arrest rates from the
Wisconsin Office of Justice Statistics from 2004 to 2007 to calculate an average cost per
arrest. They found a line of best fit for these four years and used it to approximate the
average cost per arrest for 2010 and the average annual escalation rate. They then applied
a ratio of the difference between Washington’s average costs per arrest and their marginal
operating costs to Wisconsin’s average costs per arrest to obtain an estimate of the
marginal operating costs of police in Wisconsin. They used the same process to calculate
Wisconsin’s police capital costs.
Court and Prosecutor Costs
Using data on court expenditures from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics and the
number of felony convictions in Wisconsin, which the authors estimated as 24 percent of
adults arrested for felonies, they calculated an average operating cost per conviction from
2004 to 2007. They then calculated a weight for each type of crime from Washington’s
average and marginal costs per conviction and applied it to Wisconsin’s average costs per
conviction to find Wisconsin’s marginal cost per conviction. The costs vary from $126,634
for a murder to $167 for a misdemeanor.
Fredericks et al. obtained data on the capital expenditures for Wisconsin’s court
systems from the United States Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2006 and divided it by the
number of federal convictions in a year in Wisconsin to estimate the average capital costs
46
per conviction for courts. They converted this number into an annualized capital payment
by converting this cost into a 20-year financing term with a specific bond-financing rate.
Adult Local Jail Costs
The average cost per prisoner of $14,000 in local Wisconsin jails was found in Wade
et al. (2008) for 2006. Fredericks et al. found a ratio of Washington’s average costs to
Washington’s marginal costs and applied this ratio to Wisconsin’s average costs to find
Wisconsin’s marginal operating costs in local jails. Fredericks et al. followed WSIPP’s
method of calculating capital based on the cost for new jail beds. After a review of the costs
for a variety of new jails from across the country, WSIPP estimated that it costs $150,000
per county jail bed.
Adult Local Supervision Costs
The average cost per prisoner under local supervision ($1,100) comes from Wade et
al. (2008). Fredericks et al. calculated a ratio of Washington’s average costs to
Washington’s marginal costs and applied this ratio to Wisconsin’s average costs to find
Wisconsin’s marginal operating costs of local supervision.
Adult State Prison Costs
Wisconsin’s ADP data and average annual operating costs of adult state prisons was
obtained from the Wisconsin Department of Corrections for 2006 to 2010. An average
annual state prison cost per average daily prison population was then calculated and used
to fit a linear regression to predict prison operating costs and escalation rate. Using a ratio
of Washington’s average costs to marginal costs, this number was converted into an
estimate of Wisconsin’s marginal state prison operating costs of $13,939 per inmate.
47
Fredericks et al. estimated capital costs of a new state prison bed based on cost
information from the Redgranite Correctional Institution that was completed in 1999 in
Waushara County. They estimated per-bed costs and used a 25-year financing term at a
specified bond rate to convert the per bed costs estimate into an annualized capital
payment.
Adult Post-Prison Supervision Costs
Fredericks et al. obtained Wisconsin’s average daily prison population data and
average annual operating costs of adult post-prison supervision from the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections for 2006 to 2010. A line of best fit was found between these four
costs per ADP estimated to project the average operating costs per year and to estimate the
average annual rate of escalation. Using a ratio of Washington’s average costs to marginal
costs, this number was converted into an estimate of $1,030 for Wisconsin’s per-unit
marginal operating costs for adult post-prison supervision.
48
Appendix G: Additional Wisconsin data that would further
refine the WSIPP model
The results of the WSIPP model are based on inputs from Washington and national
averages. To narrow the predicted results for Wisconsin programs, parameters within the
model could be further adjusted to better reflect Wisconsin inputs. In this analysis, we
replaced the Washington-based per-unit cost estimates of the corrections system with
Wisconsin-specific per-unit cost estimates from Fredericks et al. (2010) (See Appendix F).
We changed the average daily prison population from 18,400 to 22,212 to mirror the
average daily prison population of Wisconsin in 2009 (Mize 2009). We also adjusted the
number of arrests annually for each type of crime in Wisconsin in 2010 (Wisconsin Office
of Justice Assistance 2011a).
Data availability and time constraints limited further adjustments to the WSIPP
model. Future studies of Wisconsin’s TAD programs using the WSIPP model could
incorporate more adjustments with available data. The most important parameters to
adjust in the model to make it more representative of Wisconsin programs are the actual
costs and participant results of the TAD programs. The specific inputs that can be adjusted
for each program in the WSIPP model are: annual cost per person, the average age of
participants, the number of participants, the category of crime (as specified by the WSIPP
model) that the primary participants fall into, and the effect size and standard error of the
program.
Another possible category of inputs to adjust, if data are available, is annual crimes
in Wisconsin. We only adjusted the number of annual arrests in Wisconsin for each type of
49
crime, but other parameters could be adjusted in the WSIPP model to better reflect crime in
Wisconsin. These parameters include statewide data for each category of crime for the
number of statewide crimes reported to the police, the percentage of crimes reported to
the police, the number of convictions, and the number of counts per conviction.
50
Appendix H: WSIPP Comparison Programs Used in Analysis
To estimate the effect of TAD diversion and drug court programs in Wisconsin using
the WSIPP model, we chose the two WSIPP programs that were as close as possible to TAD
in terms of program features. For Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) (the TAD
diversion proxy program), the model uses one 2006 study from the Washington state
program. For drug court, the WSIPP model employs a meta-analysis of more than 50
studies of drug court programs nationwide between 1997 and 2008 (Aos et al. 2011b).
Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative (Proxy for TAD Diversion)
Washington’s DOSA reduces recidivism by offering non-violent adult drug-involved
felony offenders a reduced prison sentence or community-based residential treatment in
exchange for agreeing to complete substance abuse treatment. Until 2005, participants
completed drug treatment while incarcerated, splitting their sentence between prison and
community custody. Should an offender fail to complete substance abuse treatment or be
“administratively terminated from DOSA, the legislation requires that he or she return to
prison to serve the remainder of the community custody term” (Aos et al. 2005b, 2).
Changes to Washington law in 2005 expanded the program to offer communitybased treatment for offenders who had not received prison sentences. Although the
original DOSA design targeted incarcerated offenders, its evolution toward communitybased alternatives for non-incarcerated offenders brings it conceptually closer to the TAD
pretrial diversion approach (Aos et al. 2005b).
Program Comparison between DOSA and TAD Diversion Programs
Eligibility requirements for TAD and DOSA target non-violent offenders with
substance abuse problems. Similar to TAD diversion programs in Wisconsin, Washington’s
51
DOSA program tailors treatments offered to participants using an intensive substance
abuse assessment. Individualized DOSA treatment programs are based on addiction
severity, custody level, risk classification, sentence length, and treatment capacity such that
an offender’s individual needs determine assignment to a customized combination of
evidence-based treatment modes. These modes include up to 12 weeks of intensive
outpatient care, a 30-day intensive inpatient program, six to 12 months of long-term
residential treatment, and continuing outpatient treatment offered at a minimum of three
months after completing one of the previous three modes (Aos et al. 2005a). In comparison,
all seven of Wisconsin’s TAD sites offer distinct combinations of “case management,
substance abuse treatment, drug testing and monitoring, but vary in program
model/approach, length, treatment intensity, and target population” (Van Stelle et al. 2011,
4). Specific similarities between DOSA and TAD diversion components include intensive
outpatient treatment, inpatient/residential treatment, and less intense outpatient care.
Although program similarities make DOSA the most appropriate proxy for TAD
available from the WSIPP catalog, some limitations to a direct comparison exist. For
example, while Wisconsin TAD participants do not receive treatment while incarcerated,
up until 2005, Washington DOSA participants completed drug treatment while
incarcerated, splitting their sentence between prison and community custody. Additionally,
Washington’s DOSA program does not allow participants to access the community-based
components of the program unless they “serve two years on community custody, or half
the midpoint of the standard sentence range, whichever is greater” (Aos et al. 2005b, 2). By
contrast, as mentioned, the treatment length of TAD diversion and deferred prosecution
programs vary. For example, in Milwaukee, the location of most of Wisconsin’s TAD
52
diversion cases, participants complete the program within an average of six months while
demonstrating recidivism and substance abuse outcomes comparable to those achieved by
participants in Milwaukee’s (non-TAD-funded) 12- to 18-month drug court program
(Sayner 2011a). In addition, none of the offenders offered diversion and deferred
prosecution agreements in Wisconsin serve time in prison unless they fail to comply with
their agreements and are sentenced to prison. This process parallels what a communitybased DOSA participant would follow, but differs from a prison-based DOSA participant.
This suggest there could be differences between the two programs in terms of target
populations, available services, service treatment intensity, or other program aspects that
we could not identify given the information available.
In summary, despite their differences, TAD diversion and DOSA programs employ
similar evidence-based program components, target nonviolent offenders with substance
abuse needs, and aim to reduce the amount of incarceration for such offenders. Because the
WSIPP model does not have a jail-diversion program, we determined DOSA to be the best
choice available for using the WSIPP model to estimate the impacts of TAD diversion
programs.
Drug Court for Adult Offenders (proxy for TAD Drug Treatment Court)
Drug courts are specialized forms of criminal court that attempt to assist nonviolent offenders overcome their substance abuse problems. Supervised by a drug court
judge, the rehabilitation process involves a range of professionals from criminal justice
(such as prosecutors and defense attorneys), substance abuse treatment and counseling,
corrections (such as probation and law enforcement), and educational and vocational
training (Barnoski and Aos 2003). According to the National Association of Drug Court
53
Professionals, the general aim of this intensive resource investment, common to drug
courts nationwide, is to “increase the offender’s likelihood of successful rehabilitation
through early, continuous, and intense judicially supervised treatment, mandatory periodic
drug testing, community supervision, and use of appropriate sanctions and other
rehabilitation services” (Washington State Courts 2011).
Drug courts tend to involve higher costs than regular adjudication costs due to
“frequent use of court resources…expenses of drug treatment, urinalysis, and drug court
staff” (Barnoski and Aos 2003, 2). The theory behind this approach is that a substantial
portion of crime stems specifically from offenders’ problems with drug and alcohol
addiction. Drug courts attempt to provide reductions in recidivism among this specific
offender population in several ways. Courts assure their enrollment in effective substance
abuse treatment programs, and increase offender accountability for the success of such
treatment by requiring regular and frequent appearances before the drug court judge
(Barnoski and Aos 2003).
Program Comparison between WSIPP Drug Court and TAD Drug Court Programs
Both Washington’s drug court model and Wisconsin’s TAD drug court model employ
program components developed by the National Drug Court Institute. They operate on the
premise that offering drug court to eligible offenders is an alternative to additional criminal
court processing such as further prosecution, revocation of parole, or conviction. This
alternative provides offenders with a strong incentive to comply with required treatment
conditions (Barnoski and Aos 2003). As Washington and Wisconsin’s drug court models
are similar in structure and follow national guidelines, we consider them programmatically
equivalent and comparable for our analysis.
54
Appendix I: Non-violent arrests in Wisconsin in 2010
To calculate the number of non-violent arrests in Wisconsin in 2010, we used data from the
Office of Justice Assistance as shown in Table I-1. Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance
lists five types of crime in its yearly arrest report: violent crime, property crime, drug
crime, crimes against society, and other crimes. As TAD program requirements state that
those who commit violent crimes are ineligible, we included all other types of crime in our
calculation. We realize that within the nonviolent categories as defined by the Office of
Justice Assistance, some offenders would not be eligible for TAD programs. Our analysis
would be affected if a particular county did not have enough eligible offenders to fill the
allocated slots. Given the small number of slots allocated relative to the number of arrests
made, this scenario is unlikely.
Table I-1: Non-violent arrests 2010
Type of NonViolent
Crime
Composition
Arrest Rate
(per
100,000
Adults)
Total
Arrests
Property
theft, vandalism, fraud, burglary, motor vehicle
theft, embezzlement, forgery, stolen property,
and arson
968
54,072
Drug
possession and sale/manufacturing
501
25,750
Crimes
against
society
disorderly conduct, operating while intoxicated,
liquor law violations, weapon law violations,
prostitution, sex offenses, gambling violations,
vagrancy, curfew and loitering, and runaways
2,520
140,299
Other
negligent manslaughter, other assaults, family
offenses, and all other (except traffic)
2,415
127,276
6,404
347,397
State-wide
non-violent
arrests
Source: Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance, 2011a.
55
Appendix J: Monte Carlo Analysis
Monte Carlo analysis is a computational simulation that provides reasonable
estimates of a program’s results by accounting for uncertainties in model parameters and
repeating the analysis numerous times. To do a Monte Carlo analysis, probability
distributions must be assigned to the important variables uncertain in the model. Then, for
each trial run, parameters are randomly selected from the chosen distribution of each
variable and used to calculate the realized net benefits. The WSIPP model runs 10,000
trials. The average of the results of these trials provides us with an estimate of the expected
value of the net benefits of the program. We used the Monte Carlo designed in the WSIPP
model, leaving the parameters as set for the proxy programs. For example, for drug court
the mean victimization avoided per offender going through the program is 0.2 with a
standard error of 0.04. For DOSA, the mean victimization avoided is 0.68 with a standard
error of 0.28. More information on these parameters can be found in the WSIPP Technical
Appendix (Aos et al. 2011b).
The Monte Carlo analysis from the model we used estimates the changes in
victimizations by accounting for a range of effects a program may have on recidivism. Our
primary concern is that victimizations do not increase as a result of these programs. The
results of the Monte Carlo analysis suggest that there is a low risk of crime rates increasing
as a result of a Wisconsin statewide TAD program expansion. For all levels of funding for
drug courts, the Monte Carlo analysis found in 100 percent of trials run that victimizations
would not increase as a result of implementing the program. For all levels of funding for
diversion and the 75 percent diversion / 25 percent drug court split, the Monte Carlo
56
analysis found, in 99 percent of trials run, that victimizations would not increase as a result
of implementing the program.
57
Appendix K: Victim Tangible and Intangible Costs from Various
Types of Non-Violent Offenses
The WSIPP model estimates the benefits that accrue to victims for each offender
who goes through a drug court or diversion program. It uses estimates of the cost to
victims of various crimes developed by McCollister et al. (2010) to calculate these victim
benefits. Victim benefits are the costs to victims avoided by reducing crime.
Participation in TAD drug court and diversion programs is limited to only nonviolent offenders. As a result, the victim benefits of these programs seem to be
overestimated in the WSIPP model. To more accurately estimate the benefits to victims of
these programs, we took a weighted average of the total cost of non-violent crime
estimates presented by McCollister et al. (2010). These include the property crimes of
arson, motor vehicle theft, stolen property, household burglary, vandalism and
larceny/theft as well as other non-violent crimes including embezzlement, forgery and
counterfeiting, and fraud. The tangible and intangible costs to victims of each of these types
of crime is included in Table K-1. The average cost per victim of each of these crimes is
included in Table K-2. To make these costs more representative of crime in Wisconsin, we
weighted the average cost of each of these crimes by their proportion of arrests in
Wisconsin in 2010. This resulted in a weighted average of costs to victims of $4,495.
58
Table K-1: Victim costs by Type of Offense
Type of Offense
Arson
Motor Vehicle
Theft
Stolen Property
Household
Burglary
Embezzlement
Forgery and
Counterfeiting
Fraud
Vandalism
Larceny/Theft
Average Victim
Costs
Portion of
Arrests
0.30%
Tangible
Cost
$16,429
Intangible
Cost
$5,133
Total
Cost
$21,103
Weighted
Costs
$63
2.00%
3.11%
$10,534
$7,974
$262
N/A
$10,772
$7,974
$215
$248
8.26%
0.39%
$6,169
$5,480
$321
N/A
$6,462
$5,480
$534
$21
2.27%
7.85%
16.61%
59.21%
$5,265
$5,032
$4,860
$3,523
N/A
N/A
N/A
$10
$5,265
$5,032
$4,860
$3,532
$120
$395
$807
$2,091
100%
$7,252
$1,432
$7,831
$4,495
Source: (McCollister et al. 2010; Wisconsin Office of Justice Assistance 2011a)
Table K-2: Average Victim Costs by TAD Program
TAD Program
Weighted
Average
Victim Costs
Non-Violent
Crimes
$4,495
Diversion
$4,495
Drug Court
Drug Court /
Diversion Split
Source: Authors
$10,216
$5,945
The benefits to victims of reducing crime from drug court participants should be
greater than the benefits to victims of reducing crime from diversion participants because
drug court participants tend to have committed more serious crimes and to be higher risk.
These benefits reflect the differences in the estimated victim benefits that the WSIPP model
finds for drug court and diversion programs. The WSIPP model estimates that the benefits
to victims are 227 percent higher for drug courts than for diversion programs. By
weighting the cost of crimes by their portion of arrests, of which more than 75 percent
59
were the relatively minor crimes of theft and vandalism, our estimated victim benefits from
a reduction in crime tend to reflect the benefits of reducing less serious, lower risk crimes.
As a result, we used our estimated weighted average cost to victims of $4,495 as our
estimate of the benefits to victims of a reduction in crime through the diversion program.
To reflect the difference in program benefits between diversion and drug court, we scaled
up the estimated costs for diversion by 227 to estimate victim benefits from drug court.
This resulted in an average per victim benefit from drug court programs of $10,216. We
then multiplied our estimate of the average per victim cost of non-violent crimes by the
number of crimes reduced by each program under each funding level to produce an
estimate of the total benefits to victims.
60
Appendix L: County Level Results for each Program Portfolio at different funding levels
Table L-1: County level results for drug court at $5 million investment
County
Slots
Funded
Program
Costs
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
Brown
Chippewa
Columbia
Dane
Dodge
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Grant
Jefferson
Kenosha
LaCrosse
Manitowoc
Marathon
Milwaukee
Monroe
Oneida
Outagamie
Ozaukee
Portage
Racine
Rock
Saint Croix
Sauk
Shawano
52
10
13
99
16
9
11
32
20
9
20
43
46
22
29
309
12
13
48
12
10
48
59
13
21
10
$212,940
$40,950
$53,235
$405,405
$65,520
$36,855
$45,045
$131,040
$81,900
$36,855
$81,900
$176,085
$188,370
$90,090
$118,755
$1,265,355
$49,140
$53,235
$196,560
$49,140
$40,950
$196,560
$241,605
$53,235
$85,995
$40,950
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$82,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$130,121
$25,035
$32,592
$248,435
$40,132
$22,569
$27,487
$80,016
$50,017
$22,569
$50,017
$107,746
$115,214
$55,111
$72,704
$772,396
$30,058
$32,592
$120,598
$30,058
$25,035
$120,598
$148,289
$32,592
$52,641
$25,035
-11
-2
-3
-20
-3
-1
-2
-7
-4
-1
-4
-9
-9
-5
-6
-62
-2
-3
-10
-2
-2
-10
-12
-3
-4
-2
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$107,268
$20,432
$26,562
$205,342
$32,691
$10,216
$22,475
$66,404
$40,864
$10,216
$40,864
$88,879
$95,009
$45,972
$60,274
$637,478
$24,518
$26,562
$100,117
$24,518
$20,432
$100,117
$117,484
$26,562
$43,929
$20,432
NPV
Benefits
with
Start- up
Costs
$9,449
-$2,983
-$1,581
$18,372
-$197
-$11,570
-$2,583
$380
$1,481
-$11,570
$1,481
$5,540
$6,853
$3,493
$6,723
$62,019
-$2,064
-$1,581
$9,155
-$2,064
-$2,983
$9,155
$9,168
-$1,581
$3,075
-$2,983
NPV
Benefits
per year
$24,449
$4,517
$5,919
$48,372
$7,303
-$4,070
$4,917
$15,380
$8,981
-$4,070
$8,981
$20,540
$21,853
$10,993
$14,223
$144,519
$5,436
$5,919
$24,155
$5,436
$4,517
$24,155
$24,168
$5,919
$10,575
$4,517
61
County
Sheboygan
Walworth
Washington
Waukesha
Waupaca
Winnebago
Wood
Source: Authors
Slots
Funded
Program
Costs
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
34
29
45
49
11
43
21
$139,230
$118,755
$184,275
$200,655
$45,045
$176,085
$85,995
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$85,188
$72,704
$112,679
$122,672
$27,487
$107,746
$52,641
-7
-6
-9
-10
-2
-9
-4
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$70,490
$60,274
$92,966
$101,138
$22,475
$88,879
$43,929
NPV
Benefits
with
Start- up
Costs
$1,448
$6,723
$6,370
$8,155
-$2,583
$5,540
$3,075
NPV
Benefits
per year
$16,448
$14,223
$21,370
$23,155
$4,917
$20,540
$10,575
62
Table L-2: County level results for diversion at $5 million investment level
County
Slots
Funded
Program
Costs
Start-up
Costs
Benefits to
Taxpayers
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
Benefits to
Victims (from
reduced
Victimizations)
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
NPV
Benefits per
Year
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Brown
Calumet
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Dane
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Forest
Grant
Green
Green Lake
Jackson
Jefferson
Juneau
Kenosha
Kewaunee
LaCrosse
Langlade
Lincoln
Manitowoc
Marathon
Marinette
Milwaukee
11
11
12
131
10
26
11
32
245
41
10
23
26
80
50
9
23
13
9
12
49
10
108
11
114
9
20
56
72
15
769
$16,599
$16,599
$18,108
$197,679
$15,090
$39,234
$16,599
$48,288
$369,705
$61,869
$15,090
$34,707
$39,234
$120,720
$75,450
$13,581
$34,707
$19,617
$13,581
$18,108
$73,941
$15,090
$162,972
$16,599
$172,026
$13,581
$30,180
$84,504
$108,648
$22,635
$1,160,421
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$37,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$67,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$22,500
$7,500
$195,000
$72,905
$72,905
$79,723
$868,236
$66,242
$171,343
$72,905
$212,147
$1,629,003
$272,992
$66,242
$153,014
$171,343
$531,825
$332,807
$59,712
$153,014
$86,390
$59,712
$79,723
$324,561
$66,242
$720,461
$72,905
$761,202
$59,712
$132,793
$370,367
$479,188
$98,914
$5,086,058
-7
-7
-8
-87
-7
-17
-7
-21
-163
-27
-7
-15
-17
-53
-33
-6
-15
-9
-6
-8
-32
-7
-72
-7
-76
-6
-13
-37
-47
-10
-507
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$32,806
$32,806
$35,952
$390,079
$29,660
$76,847
$32,806
$95,273
$730,724
$122,686
$29,660
$68,758
$76,847
$238,631
$149,201
$26,964
$68,758
$38,648
$26,964
$35,952
$145,606
$29,660
$324,017
$32,806
$341,544
$26,964
$59,770
$164,031
$213,016
$44,491
$2,278,907
$81,612
$81,612
$90,067
$1,023,136
$73,312
$201,456
$81,612
$244,132
$1,922,522
$318,809
$73,312
$179,565
$201,456
$627,236
$391,558
$65,595
$179,565
$97,921
$65,595
$90,067
$381,226
$73,312
$851,506
$81,612
$900,720
$65,595
$154,883
$434,894
$561,056
$113,270
$6,009,544
$89,112
$89,112
$97,567
$1,060,636
$80,812
$208,956
$89,112
$259,132
$1,990,022
$333,809
$80,812
$187,065
$208,956
$649,736
$406,558
$73,095
$187,065
$105,421
$73,095
$97,567
$396,226
$80,812
$881,506
$89,112
$930,720
$73,095
$162,383
$449,894
$583,556
$120,770
$6,204,544
63
County
Monroe
Oconto
Oneida
Outagamie
Ozaukee
Pierce
Polk
Portage
Racine
Rock
Saint Croix
Sauk
Sawyer
Shawano
Sheboygan
Taylor
Vernon
Vilas
Walworth
Washburn
Washington
Waukesha
Waupaca
Waushara
Winnebago
Wood
Source: Authors
Slots
Funded
Program
Costs
Start-up
Costs
Benefits to
Taxpayers
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
Benefits to
Victims (from
reduced
Victimizations)
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
NPV
Benefits per
Year
30
13
32
119
29
17
9
26
119
148
33
51
10
26
84
9
9
15
72
9
113
122
26
13
107
52
$45,270
$19,617
48288
179571
$43,761
25653
13581
39234
179571
223332
49797
76959
15090
39234
126756
13581
13581
22635
108648
13581
170517
184098
39234
19617
161463
78468
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$37,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$30,000
$37,500
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$15,000
$197,955
$86,390
$212,147
$792,266
$192,214
$112,433
$59,712
$171,343
$792,266
$983,447
$218,573
$339,418
$66,242
$171,343
$558,891
$59,712
$59,712
$98,914
$479,188
$59,712
$755,806
$815,643
$171,343
$86,390
$709,529
$344,985
-19
-9
-21
-79
-19
-11
-6
-17
-79
-98
-22
-34
-7
-17
-56
-6
-6
-10
-47
-6
-76
-82
-17
-9
-71
-34
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$86,734
$38,648
$95,273
$355,475
$86,285
$48,535
$26,964
$76,847
$355,475
$439,513
$97,969
$152,347
$29,660
$76,847
$250,765
$26,964
$26,964
$44,491
$213,016
$26,964
$339,297
$366,710
$76,847
$38,648
$318,175
$154,594
$231,919
$97,921
$244,132
$938,170
$227,238
$127,815
$65,595
$201,456
$938,170
$1,162,128
$251,745
$399,806
$73,312
$201,456
$660,400
$65,595
$65,595
$113,270
$561,056
$65,595
$894,586
$960,755
$201,456
$97,921
$836,241
$406,111
$239,419
$105,421
$259,132
$968,170
$234,738
$135,315
$73,095
$208,956
$968,170
$1,199,628
$266,745
$414,806
$80,812
$208,956
$682,900
$73,095
$73,095
$120,770
$583,556
$73,095
$924,586
$998,255
$208,956
$105,421
$866,241
$421,111
64
Table L-3: County level results for 75/25 split (diversion/drug court) at $5 million investment
County
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Brown
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Dane
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du
Lac
Grant
Green
Jackson
Jefferson
Kenosha
Kewaunee
LaCrosse
Lincoln
Manitowoc
Marathon
Marinette
Milwaukee
Monroe
Oconto
Oneida
Outagamie
Slots
Funded:
Drug
Court
Drug
Court
Cost
Slots
Funded:
DOSA
DOSA
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
N/A
N/A
N/A
18
N/A
N/A
N/A
34
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$73,710
N/A
N/A
N/A
139,230
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
9
8
9
101
20
9
25
189
31
8
18
20
62
$13,581
$12,072
$13,581
$152,409
$30,180
$13,581
$37,725
$285,201
$46,779
$12,072
$27,162
$30,180
$93,558
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$60,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
N/A
N/A
39
$58,851
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
15
N/A
16
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
108
N/A
N/A
N/A
17
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
61,425
N/A
65,520
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
442,260
N/A
N/A
N/A
69,615
18
10
9
38
83
8
88
16
43
56
12
593
23
10
25
92
$27,162
$15,090
$13,581
$57,342
$125,247
$12,072
$132,792
$24,144
$64,887
$84,504
$18,108
$894,837
$34,707
$15,090
$37,725
$138,828
$35,670
$31,509
$35,670
$417,934
$79,069
$35,670
$98,093
$778,795
$122,467
$31,509
$71,340
$79,069
$244,340
NPV
Benefits
with
Start- up
Costs
$74,301
$65,057
$74,301
$875,002
$174,182
$74,301
$218,275
$1,624,021
$266,776
$65,057
$156,549
$174,182
$540,203
$81,801
$72,557
$81,801
$905,002
$181,682
$81,801
$225,775
$1,684,021
$281,776
$72,557
$164,049
$181,682
$562,703
99%
$154,570
$340,832
$355,832
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$71,340
$39,237
$35,670
$149,220
$343,621
$31,509
$368,590
$63,017
$170,027
$221,154
$47,560
$2,440,423
$90,959
$39,237
$98,093
$381,075
$156,549
$82,889
$74,301
$328,487
$713,850
$65,057
$768,256
$137,587
$376,103
$494,339
$101,675
$5,082,259
$201,766
$82,889
$218,275
$793,127
$164,049
$90,389
$81,801
$343,487
$743,850
$72,557
$798,256
$145,087
$391,103
$509,339
$109,175
$5,262,259
$209,266
$90,389
$225,775
$823,127
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
were Reduced
Victim Benefits
(from Reduced
Victimizations)
$59,712
$53,120
$59,712
$713,187
$132,793
$59,712
$165,407
$1,329,657
$206,088
$53,120
$119,871
$132,793
$411,921
-6
-5
-6
-70
-13
-6
-17
-131
-21
-5
-12
-13
-41
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$15,000
$260,113
-26
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$180,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$119,871
$66,242
$59,712
$251,609
$586,901
$53,120
$627,978
$106,214
$285,963
$372,689
$79,723
$4,158,933
$153,014
$66,242
$165,407
$650,495
-12
-7
-6
-25
-58
-5
-62
-11
-29
-37
-8
-411
-15
-7
-17
-64
NPV
Benefits
per Year
65
County
Slots
Funded:
Drug
Court
Ozaukee
N/A
Pierce
N/A
Portage
N/A
Racine
17
Rock
21
Saint Croix
N/A
Sauk
N/A
Shawano
N/A
Sheboygan
12
Vilas
N/A
Walworth
N/A
Washington
16
Waukesha
17
Waupaca
N/A
Waushara
N/A
Winnebago
15
Wood
N/A
Source: Authors
Drug
Court
Cost
Slots
Funded:
DOSA
DOSA
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
N/A
N/A
N/A
69,615
85,995
N/A
N/A
N/A
49,140
N/A
N/A
65,520
69,615
N/A
N/A
61,425
N/A
22
13
20
92
114
26
40
20
65
12
55
87
94
20
10
83
40
$33,198
$19,617
$30,180
$138,828
$172,026
$39,234
$60,360
$30,180
$98,085
$18,108
$82,995
$131,283
$141,846
$30,180
$15,090
$125,247
$60,360
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$37,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$30,000
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$15,000
$146,013
$86,390
$132,793
$650,495
$809,728
$171,343
$265,653
$132,793
$462,548
$79,723
$364,962
$616,996
$669,050
$132,793
$66,242
$586,901
$265,653
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
were Reduced
Victim Benefits
(from Reduced
Victimizations)
-14
-9
-13
-64
-80
-17
-27
-13
-46
-8
-36
-61
-66
-13
-7
-58
-27
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$83,825
$51,127
$79,069
$381,075
$474,411
$101,660
$157,543
$79,069
$271,092
$47,560
$216,398
$361,456
$392,370
$79,069
$39,237
$343,621
$157,543
NPV
Benefits
with
Start- up
Costs
$189,140
$110,400
$174,182
$793,127
$988,618
$226,269
$347,836
$174,182
$563,915
$101,675
$483,365
$751,649
$819,959
$174,182
$82,889
$713,850
$347,836
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$196,640
$117,900
$181,682
$823,127
$1,026,118
$233,769
$362,836
$181,682
$586,415
$109,175
$498,365
$781,649
$849,959
$181,682
$90,389
$743,850
$362,836
66
Table L-4: County level results for drug court at $10 million investment
County
Slots
Funded
Program
Costs
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Brown
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Dane
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Grant
Green
Jackson
Jefferson
Kenosha
Kewaunee
LaCrosse
Lincoln
Manitowoc
Marathon
Marinette
Milwaukee
Monroe
Oconto
Oneida
Outagamie
Ozaukee
8
8
9
99
20
9
24
186
31
8
17
20
61
38
17
10
9
37
82
8
86
15
42
55
11
583
23
10
25
90
22
$32,760
$32,760
$36,855
$405,405
$81,900
$36,855
$98,280
$761,670
$126,945
$32,760
$69,615
$81,900
$249,795
$155,610
$69,615
$40,950
$36,855
$151,515
$335,790
$32,760
$352,170
$61,425
$171,990
$225,225
$45,045
$2,387,385
$94,185
$40,950
$102,375
$368,550
$90,090
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$52,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$22,500
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$150,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$20,058
$20,058
$22,548
$248,410
$50,017
$22,548
$60,087
$465,210
$77,761
$20,058
$42,607
$50,017
$152,872
$95,337
$42,607
$25,035
$22,548
$92,649
$205,559
$20,058
$215,160
$37,533
$105,199
$137,970
$27,487
$1,475,351
$57,448
$25,035
$62,548
$225,137
$54,951
-2
-2
-2
-20
-4
-2
-5
-38
-6
-2
-3
-4
-12
-8
-3
-2
-2
-8
-17
-2
-17
-3
-9
-11
-2
-119
-5
-2
-5
-18
-4
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$16,346
$16,346
$18,389
$200,234
$40,864
$18,389
$50,058
$384,122
$64,361
$16,346
$34,734
$40,864
$125,657
$78,663
$34,734
$20,432
$18,389
$76,620
$169,586
$16,346
$177,758
$30,648
$86,836
$114,419
$22,475
$1,218,769
$48,015
$20,432
$52,102
$186,953
$44,950
NPV
Benefits
with
Start- up
Costs
-$3,856
-$3,856
-$3,418
$13,239
$1,481
-$3,418
$4,365
$35,162
$177
-$3,856
$226
$1,481
$6,234
$3,390
$226
-$2,983
-$3,418
$2,754
$16,855
-$3,856
$18,248
-$744
$5,045
$12,164
-$2,583
$156,735
$3,778
-$2,983
$4,775
$21,040
$2,311
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$3,644
$3,644
$4,082
$43,239
$8,981
$4,082
$11,865
$87,662
$15,177
$3,644
$7,726
$8,981
$28,734
$18,390
$7,726
$4,517
$4,082
$17,754
$39,355
$3,644
$40,748
$6,756
$20,045
$27,164
$4,917
$306,735
$11,278
$4,517
$12,275
$43,540
$9,811
67
County
Pierce
Portage
Racine
Rock
Saint Croix
Sauk
Shawano
Sheboygan
Vilas
Walworth
Washington
Waukesha
Waupaca
Waushara
Winnebago
Wood
Source: Authors
Slots
Funded
Program
Costs
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
13
20
91
112
25
39
20
64
12
54
86
93
20
10
81
40
$53,235
$81,900
$372,645
$458,640
$102,375
$159,705
$81,900
$262,080
$49,140
$221,130
$352,170
$380,835
$81,900
$40,950
$331,695
$163,800
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$30,000
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$15,000
$22,500
$30,000
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$15,000
$32,593
$50,017
$228,405
$279,826
$62,548
$97,690
$50,017
$160,278
$30,058
$134,961
$215,160
$232,232
$50,017
$25,035
$202,855
$100,141
-3
-4
-19
-23
-5
-8
-4
-13
-2
-11
-17
-19
-4
-2
-16
-8
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$26,562
$40,864
$188,996
$231,903
$52,102
$80,706
$40,864
$131,786
$24,518
$111,354
$177,758
$193,082
$40,864
$20,432
$167,542
$82,750
NPV
Benefits
with
Start- up
Costs
-$1,580
$1,481
$14,756
$23,089
$4,775
$3,691
$1,481
$7,484
-$2,064
$10,185
$18,248
$14,479
$1,481
-$2,983
$16,202
$4,091
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$5,920
$8,981
$44,756
$53,089
$12,275
$18,691
$8,981
$29,984
$5,436
$25,185
$40,748
$44,479
$8,981
$4,517
$38,702
$19,091
68
Table L-5: County level results for diversion at $10 million investment level
County
Slots
Funde
d
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizatio
ns
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Brown
Calumet
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Dane
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Forest
Grant
Green
Green Lake
Iowa
Jackson
Jefferson
Juneau
Kenosha
Kewaunee
LaCrosse
Lafayette
Langlade
Lincoln
Manitowoc
Marathon
22
21
23
257
20
51
22
63
484
80
21
45
52
159
98
18
45
26
18
13
23
97
19
213
21
224
12
18
40
110
142
$33,198
$31,689
$34,707
$387,813
$30,180
$76,959
$33,198
$95,067
$730,356
$120,720
$31,689
$67,905
$78,468
$239,931
$147,882
$27,162
$67,905
$39,234
$27,162
$19,617
$34,707
$146,373
$28,671
$321,417
$31,689
$338,016
$18,108
$27,162
$60,360
$165,990
$214,278
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$67,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$22,500
$127,500
$22,500
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$45,000
$30,000
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$60,000
$7,500
$60,000
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$37,500
$146,013
$138,998
$153,014
$1,716,924
$132,793
$339,418
$146,013
$419,064
$3,253,942
$531,825
$138,998
$299,574
$344,985
$1,057,209
$648,745
$119,871
$299,574
$171,343
$119,871
$86,390
$153,014
$645,674
$125,731
$1,418,049
$138,998
$1,502,814
$79,723
$119,871
$265,653
$734,714
$943,636
-14
-14
-15
-172
-13
-34
-14
-41
-325
-53
-14
-30
-34
-106
-65
-12
-30
-17
-12
-9
-15
-64
-13
-141
-14
-150
-8
-12
-27
-74
-94
% of Trials
where
Victimizatio
ns are
Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimization
s)
$63,365
$62,467
$68,758
$770,721
$59,770
$152,347
$63,365
$186,052
$1,459,651
$238,631
$62,467
$134,371
$154,594
$475,016
$290,762
$53,928
$134,371
$76,847
$53,928
$38,648
$68,758
$289,414
$56,175
$636,350
$62,467
$674,549
$35,952
$53,928
$119,091
$330,309
$423,784
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$168,680
$162,276
$179,565
$2,032,332
$154,883
$399,806
$168,680
$487,549
$3,855,737
$627,236
$162,276
$351,040
$406,111
$1,247,294
$761,625
$139,137
$351,040
$201,456
$139,137
$97,921
$179,565
$758,715
$145,735
$1,672,982
$162,276
$1,779,347
$90,067
$139,137
$309,384
$869,033
$1,115,642
$176,180
$169,776
$187,065
$2,099,832
$162,383
$414,806
$176,180
$510,049
$3,983,237
$649,736
$169,776
$366,040
$421,111
$1,292,294
$791,625
$146,637
$366,040
$208,956
$146,637
$105,421
$187,065
$788,715
$153,235
$1,732,982
$169,776
$1,839,347
$97,567
$146,637
$324,384
$899,033
$1,153,142
69
-19
-5
-7
% of Trials
where
Victimizatio
ns are
Reduced
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimization
s)
$86,734
$23,818
$29,660
-1021
-39
-17
-42
-156
-36
-23
-13
-34
-7
-156
-8
-194
-7
-44
-68
-13
-34
-110
-12
-9
-12
-19
-93
-11
-149
-161
-34
-17
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$4,589,722
$176,165
$76,847
$190,546
$700,165
$163,582
$101,115
$56,175
$152,347
$32,806
$698,817
$35,952
$870,038
$32,806
$196,837
$303,794
$59,770
$152,347
$492,992
$53,928
$41,345
$53,928
$86,734
$417,942
$48,535
$667,359
$723,983
$154,594
$74,151
County
Slots
Funde
d
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizatio
ns
Marinette
Marquette
Menominee
30
8
10
$45,270
$12,072
$15,090
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$197,955
$53,120
$66,242
Milwaukee
Monroe
Oconto
Oneida
Outagamie
Ozaukee
Pierce
Polk
Portage
Price
Racine
Richland
Rock
Rusk
Saint Croix
Sauk
Sawyer
Shawano
Sheboygan
Taylor
Trempealeau
Vernon
Vilas
Walworth
Washburn
Washington
Waukesha
Waupaca
Waushara
1516
59
26
64
235
57
34
19
51
11
236
12
291
11
66
102
20
51
166
18
14
18
30
141
17
223
241
52
25
$2,287,644
$89,031
$39,234
$96,576
$354,615
$86,013
$51,306
$28,671
$76,959
$16,599
$356,124
$18,108
$439,119
$16,599
$99,594
$153,918
$30,180
$76,959
$250,494
$27,162
$21,126
$27,162
$45,270
$212,769
$25,653
$336,507
$363,669
$78,468
$37,725
$382,500
$15,000
$7,500
$22,500
$60,000
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$60,000
$7,500
$75,000
$7,500
$22,500
$30,000
$7,500
$15,000
$45,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$37,500
$7,500
$60,000
$67,500
$15,000
$7,500
$10,231,459
$392,675
$171,343
$424,955
$1,561,452
$377,983
$225,566
$125,731
$339,418
$72,905
$1,558,892
$79,723
$1,937,285
$72,905
$439,068
$676,926
$132,793
$339,418
$1,098,745
$119,871
$92,469
$119,871
$197,955
$932,552
$112,433
$1,487,252
$1,612,936
$344,985
$165,407
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$231,919
$57,366
$73,312
$12,151,03
7
$464,809
$201,456
$496,425
$1,847,002
$440,552
$260,375
$145,735
$399,806
$81,612
$1,841,585
$90,067
$2,293,204
$81,612
$513,811
$796,802
$154,883
$399,806
$1,296,243
$139,137
$105,188
$139,137
$231,919
$1,100,225
$127,815
$1,758,104
$1,905,750
$406,111
$194,333
$239,419
$64,866
$80,812
$12,533,53
7
$479,809
$208,956
$518,925
$1,907,002
$455,552
$275,375
$153,235
$414,806
$89,112
$1,901,585
$97,567
$2,368,204
$89,112
$536,311
$826,802
$162,383
$414,806
$1,341,243
$146,637
$112,688
$146,637
$239,419
$1,137,725
$135,315
$1,818,104
$1,973,250
$421,111
$201,833
70
County
Winnebago
Wood
Source: Authors
Slots
Funde
d
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizatio
ns
212
103
$319,908
$155,427
$60,000
$30,000
$1,423,205
$681,893
-142
-68
% of Trials
where
Victimizatio
ns are
Reduced
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimization
s)
$638,597
$306,491
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$1,681,894
$802,957
$1,741,894
$832,957
71
Table L-6: County level results for 75/25 split (diversion/drug court) at $10 million investment
County
Fond du Lac
Jefferson
Sauk
Wood
Manitowoc
Walworth
Marathon
Eau Claire
Sheboygan
Kenosha
Winnebago
LaCrosse
Washington
Outagamie
Racine
Waukesha
Brown
Rock
Dane
Milwaukee
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Calumet
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Forest
Slots
Funded:
Drug
Court
11
11
12
12
13
16
17
18
19
25
25
26
26
27
27
28
30
34
56
176
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Drug
Court
Cost
Slots
Funded:
DOSA
$45,045
$45,045
$49,140
$49,140
$53,235
$65,520
$69,615
$73,710
$77,805
$102,375
$102,375
$106,470
$106,470
$110,565
$110,565
$114,660
$122,850
$139,230
$229,320
$720,720
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
74
73
76
77
82
106
107
119
125
160
159
168
167
176
177
181
193
218
364
1138
16
16
17
15
39
17
47
60
16
34
39
13
DOSA Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
$111,666
$110,157
$114,684
$116,193
$123,738
$159,954
$161,463
$179,571
$188,625
$241,440
$239,931
$253,512
$252,003
$265,584
$267,093
$273,129
$291,237
$328,962
$549,276
$1,717,242
$24,144
$24,144
$25,653
$22,635
$58,851
$25,653
$70,923
$90,540
$24,144
$51,306
$58,851
$19,617
$22,500
$22,500
$22,500
$22,500
$30,000
$37,500
$37,500
$37,500
$37,500
$52,500
$52,500
$52,500
$52,500
$52,500
$52,500
$52,500
$60,000
$67,500
$105,000
$330,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$517,771
$512,236
$535,073
$537,877
$580,182
$745,504
$754,991
$833,330
$874,404
$1,124,137
$1,109,724
$1,177,411
$1,164,157
$1,238,714
$1,242,795
$1,268,446
$1,336,349
$1,540,923
$2,552,592
$8,096,892
$106,214
$106,214
$112,433
$98,914
$260,113
$112,433
$310,116
$396,344
$106,214
$225,566
$260,113
$86,390
-51
-51
-53
-53
-57
-74
-75
-82
-86
-111
-110
-116
-115
-122
-123
-125
-132
-152
-252
-800
-11
-11
-11
-10
-26
-11
-31
-40
-11
-23
-26
-9
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$304,384
$300,817
$314,491
$315,680
$341,243
$437,552
$443,497
$489,274
$513,648
$659,301
$650,978
$691,998
$683,675
$727,668
$730,046
$744,909
$784,146
$905,424
$1,499,924
$4,753,622
$63,017
$63,017
$64,206
$58,856
$154,570
$64,206
$183,701
$239,584
$63,017
$133,763
$154,570
$51,127
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$642,944
$635,351
$663,240
$665,724
$714,452
$920,082
$929,910
$1,031,823
$1,084,122
$1,387,123
$1,365,896
$1,456,927
$1,436,859
$1,537,733
$1,542,683
$1,573,066
$1,646,408
$1,910,655
$3,168,920
$10,082,552
$137,587
$137,587
$143,486
$127,635
$340,832
$143,486
$407,894
$530,388
$137,587
$293,023
$340,832
$110,400
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$665,444
$657,851
$685,740
$688,224
$744,452
$957,582
$967,410
$1,069,323
$1,121,622
$1,439,623
$1,418,396
$1,509,427
$1,489,359
$1,590,233
$1,595,183
$1,625,566
$1,706,408
$1,978,155
$3,273,920
$10,412,552
$145,087
$145,087
$150,986
$135,135
$355,832
$150,986
$422,894
$545,388
$145,087
$308,023
$355,832
$117,900
72
Slots
Funded:
County
Drug
Court
Grant
N/A
Green
N/A
Green Lake
N/A
Iowa
N/A
Jackson
N/A
Juneau
N/A
Kewaunee
N/A
Lafayette
N/A
Langlade
N/A
Lincoln
N/A
Marinette
N/A
Menominee
N/A
Monroe
N/A
Oconto
N/A
Oneida
N/A
Ozaukee
N/A
Pierce
N/A
Polk
N/A
Portage
N/A
Price
N/A
Richland
N/A
Rusk
N/A
Saint Croix
N/A
Sawyer
N/A
Shawano
N/A
Taylor
N/A
Trempealeau
N/A
Vernon
N/A
Vilas
N/A
Washburn
N/A
Waupaca
N/A
Waushara
N/A
Source: Authors
Drug
Court
Cost
Slots
Funded:
DOSA
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
34
19
13
10
17
14
16
9
14
30
22
8
45
20
48
43
26
14
39
8
9
8
49
15
38
13
11
14
22
13
39
19
DOSA Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
$51,306
$28,671
$19,617
$15,090
$25,653
$21,126
$24,144
$13,581
$21,126
$45,270
$33,198
$12,072
$67,905
$30,180
$72,432
$64,887
$39,234
$21,126
$58,851
$12,072
$13,581
$12,072
$73,941
$22,635
$57,342
$19,617
$16,599
$21,126
$33,198
$19,617
$58,851
$28,671
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$225,566
$125,731
$86,390
$66,242
$112,433
$92,469
$106,214
$59,712
$92,469
$197,955
$146,013
$53,120
$299,574
$132,793
$315,797
$285,963
$171,343
$92,469
$260,113
$53,120
$59,712
$53,120
$324,561
$98,914
$251,609
$86,390
$72,905
$92,469
$146,013
$86,390
$260,113
$125,731
-23
-13
-9
-7
-11
-9
-11
-6
-9
-19
-14
-5
-30
-13
-32
-29
-17
-9
-26
-5
-6
-5
-32
-10
-25
-9
-7
-9
-14
-9
-26
-13
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$133,763
$74,313
$51,127
$39,237
$64,206
$54,694
$63,017
$35,670
$54,694
$114,739
$83,825
$31,509
$177,756
$79,069
$187,268
$170,027
$101,660
$54,694
$154,570
$31,509
$35,670
$31,509
$192,618
$58,856
$149,220
$51,127
$43,399
$54,694
$83,825
$51,127
$154,570
$74,313
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$293,023
$163,873
$110,400
$82,889
$143,486
$118,537
$137,587
$74,301
$118,537
$259,924
$189,140
$65,057
$394,425
$174,182
$415,633
$376,103
$226,269
$118,537
$340,832
$65,057
$74,301
$65,057
$428,238
$127,635
$328,487
$110,400
$92,205
$118,537
$189,140
$110,400
$340,832
$163,873
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$308,023
$171,373
$117,900
$90,389
$150,986
$126,037
$145,087
$81,801
$126,037
$267,424
$196,640
$72,557
$409,425
$181,682
$430,633
$391,103
$233,769
$126,037
$355,832
$72,557
$81,801
$72,557
$443,238
$135,135
$343,487
$117,900
$99,705
$126,037
$196,640
$117,900
$355,832
$171,373
73
Table L-7: County level results for drug court at $20 million investment
County
Slots
Funde
d
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Brown
Calumet
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Dane
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Forest
Grant
Green
Green Lake
Iowa
Jackson
Jefferson
Juneau
Kenosha
Kewaunee
LaCrosse
Lafayette
Langlade
Lincoln
Manitowoc
Marathon
16
16
17
190
15
38
17
47
358
59
15
34
39
117
73
13
33
19
13
10
17
72
14
157
15
165
9
14
29
81
105
$65,520
$65,520
$69,615
$778,050
$61,425
$155,610
$69,615
$192,465
$1,466,010
$241,605
$61,425
$139,230
$159,705
$479,115
$298,935
$53,235
$135,135
$77,805
$53,235
$40,950
$69,615
$294,840
$57,330
$642,915
$61,425
$675,675
$36,855
$57,330
$118,755
$331,695
$429,975
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$52,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$90,000
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$30,000
$22,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$45,000
$7,500
$45,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$30,000
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizatio
ns
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
$40,098
$40,098
$42,607
$477,509
$37,533
$95,337
$42,607
$117,617
$894,821
$147,812
$37,533
$85,254
$97,690
$292,411
$181,855
$32,593
$82,505
$47,622
$32,593
$25,035
$42,607
$180,418
$34,974
$396,416
$37,533
$415,011
$22,548
$34,974
$72,704
$202,989
$263,043
-3
-3
-3
-39
-3
-8
-3
-10
-72
-12
-3
-7
-8
-24
-15
-3
-7
-4
-3
-2
-3
-15
-3
-32
-3
-34
-2
-3
-6
-16
-21
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations
)
$32,691
$32,691
$34,734
$394,338
$30,648
$78,663
$34,734
$97,052
$737,595
$117,484
$30,648
$70,490
$80,706
$242,119
$151,197
$26,562
$68,447
$38,821
$26,562
$20,432
$34,734
$149,154
$28,605
$327,934
$30,648
$342,236
$18,389
$28,605
$60,274
$167,542
$217,601
NPV Benefits
with Start-up
Costs
NPV
Benefits
per Year
-$231
-$231
$226
$41,297
-$744
$3,390
$226
$7,204
$76,406
$8,691
-$744
$1,514
$3,691
$25,415
$11,617
-$1,580
$817
$1,138
-$1,580
-$2,983
$226
$12,232
-$1,251
$36,435
-$744
$36,572
-$3,418
-$1,251
$6,723
$16,336
$20,669
$7,269
$7,269
$7,726
$93,797
$6,756
$18,390
$7,726
$22,204
$166,406
$23,691
$6,756
$16,514
$18,691
$55,415
$34,117
$5,920
$15,817
$8,638
$5,920
$4,517
$7,726
$34,732
$6,249
$81,435
$6,756
$81,572
$4,082
$6,249
$14,223
$38,836
$50,669
74
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizatio
ns
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
$54,951
-4
100%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations
)
$44,950
$2,787,990
-225
100%
$110,352
$47,622
$117,617
$433,244
$105,199
$62,548
$34,974
$95,337
$20,058
$435,725
$22,548
$539,618
$20,058
$121,530
$187,872
$37,533
$95,337
$307,905
$32,593
-9
-4
-10
-35
-9
-5
-3
-8
-2
-35
-2
-44
-2
-10
-15
-3
-8
-25
-3
$7,500
$27,487
$7,500
$7,500
$30,000
$7,500
$45,000
$45,000
$15,000
$7,500
$45,000
$34,974
$54,951
$262,173
$32,593
$415,011
$447,599
$97,690
$45,896
$396,416
County
Slots
Funde
d
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Marinette
22
$90,090
Milwaukee
1120
$4,586,400
Monroe
Oconto
Oneida
Outagamie
Ozaukee
Pierce
Polk
Portage
Price
Racine
Richland
Rock
Rusk
Saint Croix
Sauk
Sawyer
Shawano
Sheboygan
Taylor
Trempealea
u
Vernon
Vilas
Walworth
Washburn
Washington
Waukesha
Waupaca
Waushara
Winnebago
44
19
47
173
42
25
14
38
8
174
9
215
8
49
75
15
38
123
13
$180,180
$77,805
$192,465
$708,435
$171,990
$102,375
$57,330
$155,610
$32,760
$712,530
$36,855
$880,425
$32,760
$200,655
$307,125
$61,425
$155,610
$503,685
$53,235
$7,500
$285,00
0
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$45,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$7,500
$45,000
$7,500
$60,000
$7,500
$15,000
$22,500
$7,500
$15,000
$37,500
$7,500
11
$45,045
14
22
104
13
165
178
39
18
157
$57,330
$90,090
$425,880
$53,235
$675,675
$728,910
$159,705
$73,710
$642,915
NPV Benefits
with Start-up
Costs
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$2,311
$9,811
$2,302,686
$219,276
$504,276
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
$90,922
$38,821
$97,052
$357,560
$86,836
$52,102
$28,605
$78,663
$16,346
$359,603
$18,389
$445,418
$16,346
$101,138
$155,283
$30,648
$78,663
$254,378
$26,562
$6,094
$1,138
$7,204
$37,369
$5,045
$4,775
-$1,251
$3,390
-$3,856
$37,798
-$3,418
$44,611
-$3,856
$7,013
$13,530
-$744
$3,390
$21,098
-$1,580
$21,094
$8,638
$22,204
$82,369
$20,045
$12,275
$6,249
$18,390
$3,644
$82,798
$4,082
$104,611
$3,644
$22,013
$36,030
$6,756
$18,390
$58,598
$5,920
-2
100%
$22,475
-$2,583
$4,917
-3
-4
-21
-3
-34
-36
-8
-4
-32
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
$28,605
$44,950
$216,579
$26,562
$342,236
$368,798
$80,706
$37,799
$327,934
-$1,251
$2,311
$22,872
-$1,580
$36,572
$42,487
$3,691
$2,485
$36,435
$6,249
$9,811
$52,872
$5,920
$81,572
$87,487
$18,691
$9,985
$81,435
75
County
Wood
Source: Authors
Slots
Funde
d
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
76
$311,220
$22,500
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizatio
ns
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
$189,428
-15
100%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations
)
$157,326
NPV Benefits
with Start-up
Costs
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$13,034
$35,534
76
Table L-8: County level results for diversion at $20 million investment level
County
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Bayfield
Brown
Buffalo
Burnett
Calumet
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Crawford
(2009)
Dane
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Forest
Grant
Green
Green Lake
Iowa
Iron
Jackson
Jefferson
Juneau
Kenosha
Kewaunee
LaCrosse
-29
-28
-30
-6
-342
-9
-9
-27
-68
-30
-84
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$129,877
$124,933
$136,168
$26,964
$1,534,701
$41,345
$38,648
$119,091
$303,794
$134,371
$377,047
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$337,992
$325,011
$355,891
$65,595
$4,045,022
$105,188
$97,921
$309,384
$796,802
$351,040
$989,468
$352,992
$340,011
$370,891
$73,095
$4,180,022
$112,688
$105,421
$324,384
$826,802
$366,040
$1,026,968
$79,723
-8
99%
$35,952
$90,067
$97,567
$6,309,742
$1,057,604
$272,992
$597,639
$687,489
$2,130,636
$1,309,875
$237,535
$597,639
$339,418
$231,497
$178,733
$66,242
$299,574
$1,284,718
$251,609
$2,826,124
$272,992
$2,950,132
-630
-106
-27
-60
-69
-213
-131
-24
-60
-34
-23
-18
-7
-30
-128
-25
-282
-27
-294
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$2,828,973
$474,117
$122,686
$267,842
$308,288
$956,323
$587,815
$106,508
$267,842
$152,347
$103,811
$79,993
$29,660
$134,371
$576,580
$112,799
$1,267,308
$122,686
$1,323,034
$7,436,539
$1,245,281
$318,809
$707,171
$808,841
$2,527,615
$1,549,426
$274,719
$707,171
$399,806
$267,493
$210,483
$73,312
$351,040
$1,517,561
$292,066
$3,341,116
$318,809
$3,487,652
$7,684,039
$1,290,281
$333,809
$729,671
$838,841
$2,610,115
$1,601,926
$289,719
$729,671
$414,806
$282,493
$217,983
$80,812
$366,040
$1,570,061
$307,066
$3,453,616
$333,809
$3,600,152
Slots
Funded
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
44
42
46
9
513
14
13
40
102
45
126
$66,396
$63,378
$69,414
$13,581
$774,117
$21,126
$19,617
$60,360
$153,918
$67,905
$190,134
$15,000
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$135,000
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$30,000
$15,000
$37,500
$289,511
$278,456
$304,137
$59,712
$3,419,438
$92,469
$86,390
$265,653
$676,926
$299,574
$840,055
12
$18,108
$7,500
964
160
41
90
104
316
196
36
90
51
35
27
10
45
193
38
424
41
446
$1,454,676
$241,440
$61,869
$135,810
$156,936
$476,844
$295,764
$54,324
$135,810
$76,959
$52,815
$40,743
$15,090
$67,905
$291,237
$57,342
$639,816
$61,869
$673,014
$247,500
$45,000
$15,000
$22,500
$30,000
$82,500
$52,500
$15,000
$22,500
$15,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$52,500
$15,000
$112,500
$15,000
$112,500
NPV
Benefits
per Year
77
County
Slots
Funded
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
Lafayette
Langlade
Lincoln
Manitowoc
Marathon
Marinette
Marquette
Menominee
Milwaukee
Monroe
Oconto
Oneida
Outagamie
Ozaukee
Pierce
Polk
Portage
Price
Racine
Richland
Rock
Rusk
Saint Croix
Sauk
Sawyer
Shawano
Sheboygan
Taylor
Trempealeau
Vernon
Vilas
Walworth
Washburn
Washington
23
37
79
218
283
59
16
20
3018
118
52
127
467
113
68
37
102
22
469
23
579
22
131
202
39
102
331
35
29
37
60
281
34
443
$34,707
$55,833
$119,211
$328,962
$427,047
$89,031
$24,144
$30,180
$4,554,162
$178,062
$78,468
$191,643
$704,703
$170,517
$102,612
$55,833
$153,918
$33,198
$707,721
$34,707
$873,711
$33,198
$197,679
$304,818
$58,851
$153,918
$499,479
$52,815
$43,761
$55,833
$90,540
$424,029
51306
668487
$7,500
$15,000
$22,500
$60,000
$75,000
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$757,500
$30,000
$15,000
$37,500
$120,000
$30,000
$22,500
$15,000
$30,000
$7,500
$120,000
$7,500
$150,000
$7,500
$37,500
$52,500
$15,000
$30,000
$90,000
$15,000
$7,500
$15,000
$15,000
$75,000
$15,000
$112,500
$153,014
$245,831
$522,220
$1,446,185
$1,880,389
$392,675
$106,214
$132,793
$19,029,605
$784,271
$344,985
$849,133
$3,087,621
$755,806
$452,634
$245,831
$676,926
$146,013
$3,086,626
$153,014
$3,820,856
$146,013
$874,782
$1,351,164
$260,113
$676,926
$2,221,708
$231,497
$192,214
$245,831
$396,344
$1,885,001
$225,566
$2,950,244
-15
-24
-52
-144
-188
-39
-11
-13
-1900
-78
-34
-85
-308
-76
-45
-24
-68
-14
-308
-15
-382
-14
-87
-135
-26
-68
-222
-23
-19
-24
-40
-188
-23
-294
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$68,758
$108,305
$234,137
$648,484
$843,524
$176,165
$47,636
$59,770
$8,536,802
$351,880
$154,594
$381,091
$1,384,601
$339,297
$203,129
$108,305
$303,794
$63,365
$1,384,152
$68,758
$1,714,461
$63,365
$392,776
$606,241
$116,844
$303,794
$996,769
$103,811
$86,285
$108,305
$181,108
$845,771
$101,115
$1,323,034
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$179,565
$283,303
$614,646
$1,705,707
$2,221,866
$464,809
$122,206
$154,883
$22,254,745
$928,089
$406,111
$1,001,081
$3,647,519
$894,586
$530,651
$283,303
$796,802
$168,680
$3,643,057
$179,565
$4,511,606
$168,680
$1,032,379
$1,600,087
$303,106
$796,802
$2,628,998
$267,493
$227,238
$283,303
$471,912
$2,231,743
$260,375
$3,492,291
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$187,065
$298,303
$637,146
$1,765,707
$2,296,866
$479,809
$129,706
$162,383
$23,012,245
$958,089
$421,111
$1,038,581
$3,767,519
$924,586
$553,151
$298,303
$826,802
$176,180
$3,763,057
$187,065
$4,661,606
$176,180
$1,069,879
$1,652,587
$318,106
$826,802
$2,718,998
$282,493
$234,738
$298,303
$486,912
$2,306,743
$275,375
$3,604,791
78
County
Waukesha
Waupaca
Waushara
Winnebago
Wood
Source: Authors
Slots
Funded
Program
Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
479
104
49
422
205
722811
156936
73941
636798
309345
$120,000
$30,000
$15,000
$112,500
$52,500
$3,193,324
$687,489
$324,561
$2,851,565
$1,366,366
-319
-69
-32
-285
-137
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$1,433,137
$308,288
$145,606
$1,279,891
$613,431
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$3,783,650
$808,841
$381,226
$3,382,158
$1,617,952
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$3,903,650
$838,841
$396,226
$3,494,658
$1,670,452
79
Table L-9: County level results for 75/25 split (diversion/drug court) at $20 million investment
County
Adams
Ashland
Barron
Brown
Buffalo
Burnett
Calumet
Chippewa
Clark
Columbia
Crawford
(2009)
Dane
Dodge
Door
Douglas
Dunn
Eau Claire
Fond du Lac
Forest
Grant
Green
Green Lake
Iowa
Iron
Jackson
Jefferson
Juneau
Kenosha
Kewaunee
LaCrosse
Lafayette
Slots
Funded:
Drug
Court
N/A
N/A
N/A
52
N/A
N/A
N/A
10
N/A
13
Drug
Court Cost
Slots
Funded:
DOSA
N/A
N/A
N/A
$212,940
N/A
N/A
N/A
$40,950
N/A
$53,235
N/A
99
16
N/A
9
11
32
20
N/A
9
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
20
N/A
43
N/A
46
N/A
-22
-21
-23
-264
-7
-7
-19
-47
-23
-65
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$129,601
$126,034
$133,763
$1,567,102
$43,399
$39,237
$114,739
$276,443
$133,763
$383,453
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$283,377
$274,893
$293,023
$3,326,783
$92,205
$82,889
$259,924
$569,873
$293,023
$808,995
$298,377
$289,893
$308,023
$3,439,283
$99,705
$90,389
$267,424
$592,373
$308,023
$838,995
$59,712
-6
$35,670
99%
$74,301
$81,801
$5,101,961
$837,619
$206,088
$467,939
$537,243
$1,667,472
-$1,021,860
$178,733
$465,285
$260,113
$171,343
$132,793
$53,120
$225,566
$1,011,327
$186,505
$2,235,128
$206,088
$2,325,452
$119,871
-504
-83
-21
-46
-53
-165
-101
-18
-46
-26
-17
-13
-5
-23
-100
-19
-221
-21
-230
-12
$2,996,875
$494,030
$122,467
$273,470
$316,274
$980,925
$601,634
$105,821
$274,065
$154,570
$101,660
$79,069
$31,509
$133,763
$592,122
$110,577
$1,314,440
$122,467
$1,367,350
$71,340
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
$6,390,915
$1,047,549
$266,776
$579,442
$668,270
$2,092,224
-$768,949
$236,311
$578,892
$340,832
$226,269
$174,182
$65,057
$293,023
$1,257,744
$247,330
$2,796,121
$266,776
$2,901,417
$156,549
$6,600,915
$1,085,049
$281,776
$601,942
$690,770
$2,159,724
-$723,949
$243,811
$601,392
$355,832
$233,769
$181,682
$72,557
$308,023
$1,302,744
$254,830
$2,893,621
$281,776
$2,998,917
$164,049
DOSA Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
33
32
34
385
11
10
30
77
34
94
$49,797
$48,288
$51,306
$580,965
$16,599
$15,090
$45,270
$116,193
$51,306
$141,846
$15,000
$15,000
$15,000
$112,500
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$22,500
$15,000
$30,000
$218,573
$212,147
$225,566
$2,666,086
$72,905
$66,242
$197,955
$473,073
$225,566
$650,623
N/A
9
$13,581
$7,500
$405,405
$65,520
N/A
$36,855
$45,045
$131,040
$81,900
N/A
$36,855
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$81,900
N/A
$176,085
N/A
$188,370
N/A
724
120
31
68
78
237
147
27
67
39
26
20
8
34
145
28
318
31
335
18
$1,092,516
$181,080
$46,779
$102,612
$117,702
$357,633
$221,823
$40,743
$101,103
$58,851
$39,234
$30,180
$12,072
$51,306
$218,805
$42,252
$479,862
$46,779
$505,515
$27,162
$210,000
$37,500
$15,000
$22,500
$22,500
$67,500
$45,000
$7,500
$22,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$45,000
$7,500
$97,500
$15,000
$97,500
$7,500
NPV
Benefits
per Year
80
County
Langlade
Lincoln
Manitowoc
Marathon
Marinette
Marquette
Menominee
Milwaukee
Monroe
Oconto
Oneida
Outagamie
Ozaukee
Pierce
Polk
Portage
Price
Racine
Richland
Rock
Rusk
Saint Croix
Sauk
Sawyer
Shawano
Sheboygan
Taylor
Trempealeau
Vernon
Vilas
Walworth
Washburn
Washington
Waukesha
Slots
Funded:
Drug
Court
N/A
N/A
22
29
N/A
N/A
N/A
309
12
N/A
13
48
12
N/A
N/A
10
N/A
48
N/A
59
N/A
13
21
N/A
10
34
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
29
N/A
45
49
Drug
Court Cost
Slots
Funded:
DOSA
N/A
N/A
$90,090
$118,755
N/A
N/A
N/A
$1,265,355
$49,140
N/A
$53,235
$196,560
$49,140
N/A
N/A
$40,950
N/A
$196,560
N/A
$241,605
N/A
$53,235
$85,995
N/A
$40,950
$139,230
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
$118,755
N/A
$184,275
$200,655
28
59
164
213
44
12
15
2,265
89
39
95
351
85
51
28
77
17
352
17
435
17
98
152
29
77
249
26
22
28
45
211
26
333
360
DOSA Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
$42,252
$89,031
$247,476
$321,417
$66,396
$18,108
$22,635
$3,417,885
$134,301
$58,851
$143,355
$529,659
$128,265
$76,959
$42,252
$116,193
$25,653
$531,168
$25,653
$656,415
$25,653
$147,882
$229,368
$43,761
$116,193
$375,741
$39,234
$33,198
$42,252
$67,905
$318,399
$39,234
$502,497
$543,240
$7,500
$15,000
$52,500
$67,500
$15,000
$7,500
$7,500
$645,000
$30,000
$15,000
$30,000
$105,000
$30,000
$15,000
$7,500
$22,500
$7,500
$105,000
$7,500
$127,500
$7,500
$30,000
$45,000
$7,500
$22,500
$75,000
$7,500
$7,500
$7,500
$15,000
$60,000
$7,500
$97,500
$105,000
$186,505
$392,675
$1,139,308
$1,479,180
$290,768
$79,723
$98,914
$15,308,356
$618,479
$260,113
$659,856
$2,458,119
$583,373
$339,418
$186,505
$473,073
$112,433
$2,465,175
$112,433
$2,962,386
$112,433
$681,076
$1,053,655
$192,214
$473,073
$1,725,716
$171,343
$146,013
$186,505
$299,574
$1,469,581
$171,343
$2,326,411
$2,498,647
-19
-39
-113
-146
-29
-8
-10
-1512
-61
-26
-65
-243
-57
-34
-19
-47
-11
-244
-11
-293
-11
-67
-104
-19
-47
-171
-17
-14
-19
-30
-145
-17
-230
-247
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$110,577
$233,044
$670,002
$870,348
$172,405
$47,560
$58,856
$8,991,218
$364,429
$154,570
$388,803
$1,444,635
$341,243
$201,536
$110,577
$276,443
$64,206
$1,448,797
$64,206
$1,740,102
$64,206
$399,504
$619,469
$114,144
$276,443
$1,013,623
$101,660
$83,825
$110,577
$177,756
$863,214
$101,660
$1,368,539
$1,469,604
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
99%
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$247,330
$521,688
$1,419,244
$1,841,856
$381,777
$101,675
$127,635
$18,971,334
$769,467
$340,832
$822,069
$3,071,535
$717,211
$448,995
$247,330
$569,873
$143,486
$3,081,244
$143,486
$3,676,968
$143,486
$849,463
$1,312,761
$255,097
$569,873
$2,149,368
$226,269
$189,140
$247,330
$394,425
$1,835,641
$226,269
$2,910,678
$3,119,356
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$254,830
$536,688
$1,471,744
$1,909,356
$396,777
$109,175
$135,135
$19,616,334
$799,467
$355,832
$852,069
$3,176,535
$747,211
$463,995
$254,830
$592,373
$150,986
$3,186,244
$150,986
$3,804,468
$150,986
$879,463
$1,357,761
$262,597
$592,373
$2,224,368
$233,769
$196,640
$254,830
$409,425
$1,895,641
$233,769
$3,008,178
$3,224,356
81
Slots
Funded:
Drug
Drug
Court Cost
Court
Waupaca
11
$45,045
Waushara
N/A
N/A
Winnebago
43
$176,085
Wood
21
$85,995
Source: Authors
County
Slots
Funded:
DOSA
78
37
317
154
DOSA Cost
Start-up
Costs
Taxpayer
Benefits
Change in
Victimizations
$117,702
$55,833
$478,353
$232,386
$22,500
$15,000
$90,000
$45,000
$537,243
$245,831
$2,198,611
$1,076,098
-53
-24
-218
-107
Benefits to
Victims (from
Reduced
Victimizations)
$316,274
$143,275
$1,293,632
$633,143
% of Trials
where
Victimizations
are Reduced
99%
99%
99%
99%
NPV
Benefits
with Startup Costs
$668,270
$318,273
$2,747,805
$1,345,860
NPV
Benefits
per Year
$690,770
$333,273
$2,837,805
$1,390,860
82
Download