Wong, Tsz-Ning
Pennsylvania State University
303 Kern Graduate Building
University Park, PA 16802, USA
Mobile Phone no.: (412) 944-4658
Email: tvw5087@psu.edu
Website: https://sites.psu.edu/tszningwong/
EDUCATION
 Ph.D. in Economics, Pennsylvania State University
Expected 2016
 MPhil. in Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong
2010
 B.Sc. in Physics and Mathematics, Hong Kong University of Science and
2008
Technology
RESEARCH INTERESTS
Game Theory, Strategic Experimentation, Strategic Communication, Political Economy
WORKING PAPERS
“Free Riding and Duplication in R&D” (Job Market Paper)
“Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme” with Hao Hong
“When Monitoring Hurts: Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Game of Persuasion”
with Lily Ling Yang
WORKS IN PROGRESS
“Endogenous Information Acquisition in Persuasion Games: An Experiment” with Rachel
Landsman and Lily Ling Yang
TEACHING EXPERIENCES
 Instructor, Pennsylvania State University
Statistical Foundations for Econometrics
Introduction to Econometrics
Summer 2015
Summer 2013, 2014
 Teaching Assistant, Pennsylvania State University (Fall 2010 – Spring 2015)
Graduate Course: Advanced Macroeconomic Theory
Undergraduate Courses: International Economics, Decision Making and Strategy in
Economics, Advanced International Trade Theory and Policy
 Teaching Assistant, Chinese University of Hong Kong (Fall 2008 – Spring 2010)
Undergraduate Courses: Introductory Econometrics, Intermediate Microeconomic Theory,
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory, Mathematical method in Economics III
PRESENTATIONS
 1st Prospects in Economic Research Conference, Pennsylvania State
University
 Microeconomics Brownbag Seminar, University of Pittsburgh
 9th Graduate Student Conference in Economics, Washington
University in St. Louis
 Poster Session, 26th Jerusalem School in Economic Theory, Hebrew
University of Jerusalem
 26th International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook
University
 Job Market Session, Simposio de la Asociacion Espanola de
Economia, Girona, Spain
 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society, Milan, Italy
HONORS & SCHOLARSHIPS
 Penn State Economics Department Research Assistantship
 Penn State Economics Department Teaching Assistantship
 CUHK Economics Department’s Highest GPA Award
 HKUST Academic Achievement Medal
 Paul Ching-Wu Chu Scholarship in Physics
 Mr. Tong Man Leung and Mrs. Tong Lam Lai Ying Scholarship
 HSBC Hong Kong Scholarship
2012
2014
2014
2015
2015
(Scheduled) 2015
(Scheduled) 2015
2015 - present
2010 - 2015
2009
2008
2007 - 2008
2006 - 2007
2006 - 2007
COMPUTING SKILLS
C++/ C, MATLAB
LANGUAGES
Cantonese Chinese (Native), Mandarin Chinese (Fluent), English (Fluent), Classical
Greek (Beginner), Italian (Beginner)
REFERENCES
Kalyan Chatterjee (Advisor)
Distinguished Professor of
Economics and
Management Science
(814) 865-6050
kchatterjee@psu.edu
Vijay Krishna
Distinguished Professor
of Economics
(814) 863-8543
vkrishna@psu.edu
Daniel Goldstein (Teaching Reference)
Senior Lecturer
(814) 863-4940
dag27@psu.edu
Edward Green
Professor of Economics
(814) 865-8493
eug2@psu.edu
WORKING PAPER ABSTRACTS
“Free Riding and Duplication in R&D” (Job Market Paper)
We study a model of R&D race in the exponential-bandit learning framework (Choi 1991;
Keller, Rady, and Cripps 2005), in which two heterogeneous firms, each endowed with an
independent R&D process, choose when to irreversibly exit the R&D race. Each R&D process
can be either good or bad. In the absence of a research breakthrough (innovation), a firm
becomes more pessimistic about its R&D process over time. We show that strict patent
protection may lead to excessive duplication of research efforts, while the lack of patent
protection leads to free riding and under-experimentation of research opportunities. The choice
of optimal patent system involves a trade-off between duplication in the early stage of R&D
when both firms are optimistic and under-experimentation in the later stage when one firm has
already exited and the remaining firm is pessimistic. Unless the firms are homogeneous, the
optimal patent system is inefficient. Nevertheless, we propose an asymmetric distribution policy
that implements the social optimum.
“Authoritarian Election as an Incentive Scheme” (with Hao Hong)
Authoritarian rule requires teamwork of political elites. However, elite class members may lack
incentive for the contribution of their efforts. In this paper, we develop a model to study the
decision of authoritarian rulers to introduce elections. Our model suggests that elections can
motivate the ruling class to devote more effort to public good provision. As a result, elections
alleviate the moral-hazard-in-teams problem within the authoritarian government. Excessive
electoral control hinders the introduction of elections, but mild electoral control facilitates it. Our
findings offer a new perspective on understanding authoritarian elections and explain many
stylized facts in authoritarian regimes.
“When Monitoring Hurts: Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Game of
Persuasion” (with Lily Ling Yang)
We study a persuasion game between a decision maker (DM) and an expert. Prior to the
communication stage, the expert exerts costly effort to obtain decisive information about the
state of nature. The expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We show that monitoring
of information acquisition hampers the expert's incentives to acquire information. Contrary to
everyday experiences, monitoring is always suboptimal if the expert's bias is large, yet
sometimes optimal if the expert's bias is small.