POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Public Affairs 857, Spring 2015, Tuesdays 1:20−3:15, 594 Van Hise Building
Melanie Frances Manion
Vilas-Jordan Distinguished Achievement Professor of Political Science and Public Affairs
Telephone: 608.263.9060 and 262.6278 E-mail: manion@lafollette.wisc.edu
Office hours: Mondays 11:15−1:00 or, as necessary, by appointment
201 Observatory Hill Office Building
In recent years, there has been increased interest in corruption—the abuse of public power or
the public trust for private gain. Building on existing theoretical foundations, progress has been
made in analyzing its causes and its political, social, and economic effects. A major impetus for
the recent explosion of empirical work is the increasing availability (and acceptability) of various
cross-national quantitative measures of corruption. Economists, political scientists, and policy
analysts have examined corruption empirically in analyses that attempt to sort out systematically
its underlying causes, its global distribution, and its consequences for growth, investment,
government expenditure, income distribution, and regime support. These studies are
complemented by other empirical work that relies on different sorts of evidence to investigate
the scope, severity, and variety of forms of corruption. All this is combined with greater postCold War agreement among governments, multinational corporations, and international lending
agencies that corruption is a practical problem with a generally detrimental impact on outcomes
of policies, investments, and projects. At the same time, anticorruption activism has grown at
the grassroots: in an increasing number of countries, nongovernmental watchdog organizations
have emerged to pressure governments toward greater transparency and accountability.
What are the prospects for success in anticorruption reform and prescriptions, if any, for
hurrying good governance along? This is an important generic research question and a formidable
practical policy problem. It is the focus of this seminar. We begin with questions about
definition and measurement and then examine perspectives on causes and consequences of
corruption. Much of the seminar, however, has a policy orientation: it considers our cumulative
knowledge about corruption as a policy issue that demands action both within countries and
globally by a wide range of players.
Reading Materials
Required reading materials, except for materials accessible on the Internet and for which links
are identified below, consist of one book and a selection of book chapters and journal articles.
You can purchase the book, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy by Michael
Johnston (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) or access it at: http://www.untagsmd.ac.id/files/Perpustakaan_Digital_1/CORRUPTION%20Syndromes%20of%20Corruption.pdf.
Johnston’s view on this in a 1 January 2014 e-mail to me is as follows: “If you and/or your
students find the material useful from that source, please use it with my blessing.” With the
exception of this book and readings linked to the Internet below, required readings are available
at the Learn@UW course website.
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For most topics, I also list supplementary readings. You can find these on your own, in hard copy
at the library or electronically. The supplementary readings may be useful for your research
report; they include a few classics, even studies that reflect now outmoded perspectives.
Expectations and Evaluation
Your grade is based on the quality of your performance on four dimensions, described below:
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Participation. (1) Before 5:00 a.m. each Tuesday, submit a discussion comment or question (or,
ideally, both) to the Learn@UW course website discussion board, taking into account
required readings for the week. You may also respond to questions and comments already
posted on the discussion board. (2) Before seminar, read contributions of your fellow
students. (3) Not least of all, participate, with informed and thoughtful contributions, in
exposition and discussion during seminar. Online comments and questions 10 percent, inseminar participation 10 percent
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Review report. Write a descriptive and analytical review of 2,000−2,400 words, focusing on
one week’s readings. Dates are assigned by random draw on 20 January; you may exchange
your assigned date with a fellow student, to accommodate tastes and schedules. For the
week’s readings on which you write a review report, expect me to call on you as a novice
expert on the topic. 20 percent
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Examination. Demonstrate what you have learned in a cumulative examination, consisting of
both in-class short answer and take-home essay components.1 30 percent, with 15 percent
for each component
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Research report. On your own or (even better!) in collaboration with fellow students,
research, write, and present an original empirical report that analyzes a corruption problem,
evaluates an anticorruption reform, or carries out a qualitative or quantitative study of some
other aspect of corruption or reform. See details on the last page of this syllabus. 30
percent
Graded assignments, due dates, and delivery modes are summarized below. Unless otherwise
specified, work is due at 5:00 a.m.
27 January−14 April: online participation, by dropbox submission and active seminar participation
Random draw of one Tuesday, 27 January−14 April: review report, by dropbox submission
24 March: research proposal, by dropbox submission
21 April: cumulative examination, take-home and in seminar
2 28 April: research report, by dropbox submission and hard copy in seminar
Random draw of 21 or 28 April: oral presentation of research report
Written style guidelines. For the review report, exam essay, research proposal, and research
1. For persuasive evidence on the benefits of test taking, see “Retrieval Practice Produces More Learning
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report, follow Style Guidelines for PA 857 Written Work, posted on the Learn@UW course
website. Observe appropriate guidelines on what is considered plagiarism, when and how to cite,
et cetera. If you are not sure, consult Acknowledging, Paraphrasing, and Quoting Sources from
the University of Wisconsin−Madison Writer’s Handbook, also posted on the Learn@UW course
website.
Respect for others. Please respect others in seminar. Be at the seminar and seated by 1:20 so
that you do not disturb others, including me, with a late arrival. If you use a laptop to take notes,
stay on task so that your laptop screen content does not distract those seated near you.
Special accommodation. If you require special accommodation to enable full participation in this
seminar, let me know in the first few weeks of the semester. Information will remain
confidential. You also may wish to contact the McBurney Disability Resource Center at
608.263.2741 regarding campus policies and services.
Absence due to illness. Students with influenza-like illness (fever of 100 degrees F or higher,
with a cough or sore throat) should not come to class (or to my office hours!) until fever-free
for 24 hours without the aid of fever-reducing medications. If you experience symptoms of
influenza-like illness, send me an e-mail explaining your absence. We can work something out.
Schedule
20 January: Organizational Meeting
No required reading, supplementary reading below
Overviews:
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Pranab Bardhan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 35, no. 3 (1997): 1320−1346.
Arvind K. Jain, “Corruption: A Review,” Journal of Economic Surveys, vol. 15, no. 1 (2001):
71−121.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, “The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption,” 2004 Copenhagen
Consensus Challenge Paper.
Jakob Svensson, “Eight Questions about Corruption,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.
19, no. 3 (2005): 19–42.
Riveting accounts:
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Graham Hancock, The Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the
International Aid Business (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989).
Robert Klitgaard, Tropical Gangsters: One Man’s Experience with Development and
Decadence in Deepest Africa (New York: Basic Books, 1990).
Michela Wrong, In the Footsteps of Mister Kurtz: Living on the Brink of Disaster in
Mobutu’s Congo (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).
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27 January: Defining and Measuring Corruption
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Pranab Bardhan, “The Economist’s Approach to the Problem of Corruption,” World
Development, vol. 34, no. 2 (2006): 341−348.
Carl J. Friedrich, “Corruption Concepts in Historical Perspective,” in The Pathology of Politics:
Violence, Betrayal Corruption, Secrecy and Propaganda (New York: Harper and Row, 1972),
127−141. Reprinted in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnston, eds., Political
Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 3rd edition, (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Publishers, 2009), 15−23.
John A. Gardiner, “Defining Corruption,” Corruption and Reform, vol. 7, no. 2 (1993): 111−124.
Transparency International, 2013 Global Corruption Barometer at
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_barometer_2013 and
2014 Corruption Perceptions Index at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014.
Supplementary:
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Staffan Andersson and Paul M. Heywood, “The Politics of Perception: Use and Abuse of
Transparency International’s Approach to Measuring Corruption,” Political Studies, vol. 57, no.
4 (2009): 746−767.
Quality of Governance Institute, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, European Quality of
Governance Index at http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogeuregionaldata.
Mireille Razafindrakoto and Francois Roubaud, “Are International Databases on Corruption
Reliable? A Comparison of Expert Opinion Surveys and Household Surveys in Sub-Saharan
Africa,” World Development, vol. 38, no. 8 (2010): 1057−1069.
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators at
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
3 February: Broad Perspectives on Corruption and Anticorruption Reform
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Michael Johnston, Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1−59, 186−220, and any two of chapters 4, 5, 6, or 7.
Supplementary:
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Samuel P. Huntington, “Modernization and Corruption,” in Political Order in Changing
Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968), 59−71.
Michael Johnston, Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization,
29−56 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
Moisés Naím, “Bad Medicine,” Foreign Policy, no. 147 (2005): 95−96.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Ro Rothstein, “Anti-Corruption: The Indirect ‘Big Bang’ Approach,” Review of International
Political Economy, vol. 18, no. 2 (2011): 228−250.
Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner, “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust,” World
Politics, vol. 58, no. 1 (2005): 41−72.
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Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.
108, no.3 (1993): 599−617.
10 February: Social, Political, and Economic Effects of Corruption
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Paulo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, no. 3 (1995):
681−712.
Paolo Mauro, “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment, and Government
Expenditure: A Cross-Country Analysis,” in Kimberly Ann Elliott, ed., Corruption and the
Global Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1997), 83–107.
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 9−26.
Andrew Wedeman, “Looters, Rent-Scrapers, and Dividend Collectors: The Political Economy
of Corruption in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines,” Journal of Developing Areas, vol. 31,
no. 4 (1997): 457–478.
Supplementary:
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Oskar Kurer, “Clientelism, Corruption, and The Allocation of Resources,” Public Choice, vol.
77, no. 2 (1993): 259−273.
Nathaniel H. Leff, “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption,” American
Behavioral Scientist, vol. 8, no. 3 (1964): 8−14.
J. S. Nye, “Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis,” American Political
Science Review, vol. 61, no. 2 (1967): 417−427.
Michael T. Rock and Heidi Bonnett, “The Comparative Politics of Corruption: Accounting for
the East Asian Paradox in Empirical Studies of Corruption, Growth, and Investment,” World
Development, vol. 32, no. 6 (2004): 999−1017.
Mitchell A. Seligson, “The Impact of Corruption on Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study
of Four Latin American Countries, Journal of Politics, vol. 64, no. 2 (2002): 408−433.
17 February: Survey of Causes of Corruption
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Daniel Treisman, “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public
Economics, vol. 76, no. 3 (2000): 399–458.
Daniel Treisman, “What Have We Learned about the Causes of Corruption from Ten Years of
Cross-National Empirical Research?” Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 10 (2007):
211−244.
In Hong Kong on 24 February, meeting to be rescheduled: The Culture of Corruption
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Ray Fisman and Edward Miguel, “Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from
Diplomatic Parking Tickets,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 15, no. 6 2007): 1020−1038.
Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong
Kong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 1–23.
Philip Oldenburg, “Middlemen in Third-World Corruption: Implications of an Indian Case,”
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World Politics, vol. 39, no. 4 (1987): 508–535.
Supplementary:
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Stanislav Andreski, “Kleptocracy or Corruption as a System of Government,” in The African
Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernization (London: Michael Joseph, 1968),
92−109.
Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958),
83−104.
Keith Darden, “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Insititution,”
Politics and Society, vol. 36, no. 1 (2008): 36−60.
Jyoti Khanna and Michael Johnston, “India’s Middlemen: Connecting by Corrupting?” Crime,
Law and Social Change, vol. 46, nos. 3−5 (2007)”
William L. Miller, Åse B. Grodeland, and Tatyona Koshechkina, A Culture of Corruption: Coping
with Government in Post-Communist Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press,
2001).
Gunnar Myrdal, “Corruption—Its Causes and Effects,” in Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the
Poverty of Nations, vol. 2 (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), 937−958.
Alberto Simpser, “The Intergenerational Transmission of Attitudes Toward Corruption,”
Working Paper (March 2013).
3 March: The Influences of Gender and Salaries
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Björn Frank, Johann Graf Lambsdorff, and Frédéric Boehm, “Gender and Corruption: Lessons
from Laboratory Corruption Experiments,” European Journal of Development Research, vol.
23, no. 1 (2011): 59−71.
“Mexican State’s Anti-Corruption Plan: Hire Female Traffic Cops,” All Things Considered, 28
September 2013 at http://www.npr.org/2013/09/28/226903227/mexican-state-s-anticorruption-plan-hire-women-traffic-cops.
Hung-En Sung, “Women in Government, Public Corruption, and Liberal Democracy: A Panel
Analysis,” Crime, Law, and Social Change, vol. 58, no. 3 (2012): 195−219.
Caroline Van Rijckeghem and Beatrice Weder, “Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of
Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption, and By How Much?” Journal of
Development Economics, vol. 65, no. 2 (2001): 307–331.
Supplementary:
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Namawu Alhassan-Alolo, “Gender and Corruption: Testing the New Consensus,” Public
Administration and Development, vol. 27, no. 3 (2007): 227−237.
Adora Cheung and Rey Hernandez-Julian, “Gender and Corruption: A Panel Data Analysis,”
SSRN Working Paper (July 2009).
David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti, “Are Women Really the ‘Fairer’ Sex?:
Corruption and Women in Government,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol.
14, no. 2 (2001): 423−429.
Ross H. McLeod, “Inadequate Budgets and Salaries as Instruments for Institutionalizing
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Public Sector Corruption in Indonesia,” South East Asia Research, vol. 16, no. 2 (2008):
199−223.
Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Lee Young, and Omar Azfar, “Gender and Corruption,” Journal
of Development Economics, vol. 64, no. 1 (2001): 25−55.
Jian Zhang, John Giles, and Scott Rozelle, “Does It Pay to be a Cadre? Estimating the
Returns to being a Local Official in Rural China,” Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 40,
no. 3 (2012): 337−356.
10 March: The International Business of Corruption
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Shawn Cole and Anh Tran, “Evidence from the Firm: A New Approach to Understanding
Corruption,” in Susan Rose-Ackerman and Tina Søreide, eds., International Handbook on the
Economics of Corruption, vol. 2 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2011), 408−427.
Johann Graf Lambsdorff, “Corrupt Intermediaries in International Business Transactions:
Between Make, Buy and Reform,” European Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 35, no. 3
(2013): 349−366.
Tina Søreide, “Corruption in International Business Transactions: The Perspective of
Norwegian Firms,” in Susan Rose-Ackerman, ed., International Handbook on the Economics of
Corruption (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006), 381−417.
Transparency International, 2011 Bribe Payers Index at
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/bpi_2011.
Supplementary:
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BS 10500 Antibribery Management package at http://www.bsigroup.com/en-GB/BS-10500Anti-Bribery/.
Sharon Eicher, Corruption in International Business: The Challenge of Cultural and Legal
Diversity (Farnham, UK: Gower, 2012).
Sue Hawley, “Exporting Corruption: Privatisation, Multinationals and Bribery” (June 2000) at
http://www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC8375.pdf.
17 March: Third-Party Incentives and International Initiatives
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Rachel Brewster, “The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention,” Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 14, no. 1 (2014): 84−109.
Hannes Öhler, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Axel Dreher, “Does Conditionality Work? A Test for
an Innovative US Aid Scheme,” European Economic Review, vol. 56, no. 1 (2012): 138−153.
Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Holger Moroff, “Controlling Business Payoffs to Foreign
Officials: The 1998 [sic] OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,” in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and
Michael Johnston, eds., Political Corruption: Concepts and Contexts, 3rd edition, (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2009): 943−959.
Supplementary:
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Alberto Alesina and Beatrice Weder, “Do Corrupt Governments Receive Less Foreign Aid?”
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NBER Working Paper no. 7108 (May 1999).
Ingrid Aune, Yanyan Chen, Christina Miller, and Joshua Williams, “The MCC Incentive Effect:
Quantifying Incentives for Policy Change in an Ex-Post Rewards System” (2013), prepared
for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, La Follette School of Public Affairs, Workshop in
International Public Affairs:
http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/publications/workshops/2013/MCC.pdf.
Paul J. Beck, Michael W. Maher, and Adrian E. Tschoegl, “The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act on U.S. Exports,” Managerial and Decision Economics, vol. 12, no. 4 (1991):
295−303.
Anna D’Souza, “The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade,” Journal
of Development Economics, vol. 91, no. 1 (2012): 73−87.
Doug Johnson and Tristan Zajonc, “Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance?
Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation,” (2006):
http://ssrn.com/abstract=896293.
Theodore H. Moran, Combating Corrupt Payments in Foreign Investment Concessions: Closing
the Loopholes, Extending the Tools (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development, 2008).
OECD, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, 1997: http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf .
Jose Taveras, “Does Foreign Aid Corrupt?” Economics Letters, vol. 79, no. 1 (2003): 99−106.
24 March: Information and Transparency
Research proposal due today
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John C. Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. Grimes, “Using ICTs To Create a Culture of
Transparency: E-Government and Social Media as Openness and Anti-Corruption Tools for
Societies,” Government Information Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3 (2010): 264 -271.
Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder, “A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption,” Journal of
Public Economics, vol. 87, nos. 7–8 (2003): 1801–1824.
Catharina Lindstedt and Daniel Naurin, “Transparency Is Not Enough: Making Transparency
Effective in Reducing Corruption,” International Political Science Review, vol. 31, no. 3 (2010):
301−322.
Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 107–123.
Supplementary:
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Bernardina Beniot, Francisco Bastida, Ana-María Ríos, and Cristina Vicente, “The Causes of
Legal Rents Extraction: Evidence from Spanish Municipalities,” Public Choice, vol. 161, nos.
3−4 (2014): 367−383.
Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig, “Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in ResourceRich Countries?” World Development, vol. 37, no. 3 (2009): 521−532.
Edmund Malesky, Paul Schuler, and Anh Tran, “The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: Evidence
from a Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly,”
American Political Science Review, vol. 106, no. 4 (2012): 762−768.
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28 March−5 April: Spring Recess
7 April: Audits and Grassroots Monitoring
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Rafael Di Tella and Ernesto Schargrodsky, “The Role of Wages and Auditing during a
Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 46
(2003): 269–292.
Benjamin A. Olken, “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia,”
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 115, no. 2 (2007): 200−249.
Supplementary:
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Shaazka Beyerle, Curtailing Corruption: People Power for Accountability and Justice (Boulder,
Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2014).
Claudia Ferraz and Frederico Finan, “Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s
Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 123,
no. 2 (2008): 703−711, 743−744.
Benjamin A. Olken, “Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field
Experiment in Indonesia,” American Political Science Review, vol. 104, no. 2 (2010): 243−247.
14 April: Anticorruption Agencies
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Michael Johnston, “A Brief History of Anticorruption Agencies,” in Andreas Schedler, Larry
Diamond, and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in
New Democracies (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 217–226.
Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong
Kong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 27–83.
Patrick Meagher, “Anti-Corruption Agencies: Rhetoric versus Reality,” Journal of Policy
Reform, vol. 8, no. 1 (2005): 69–103.
Supplementary:
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John R. Heilbrunn, Anti-Corruption Commissions: Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight
Corruption? Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004.
Jeremy Pope, "The Need for, and Role of, an Independent Anti-Corruption Agency,"
Transparency International Working Paper (1999) at http://www.transparency.org.
Jeremy Pope and Frank Vogl, “Making Anticorruption Agencies More Effective,” Finance and
Development, vol. 37, no. 2 (2000) at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/06/pope.htm.
21 April: Cumulative Examination
28 April and 5 May: Presentations of Research Reports
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Research Report
The research report accounts for 30 percent of the course grade. I welcome (indeed, encourage)
you to work with one or more fellow students on a collaborative report; collaborative work
receives a single grade, based on product. Your original empirical report may analyze a corruption
problem, evaluate an anticorruption reform, or carry out a qualitative or quantitative study of
some other aspect of corruption or reform. I will accommodate any reasonable alternatives,
based on your interests and experience.
Useful Resources
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World Bank, “Literature Survey on Corruption, 2000−2005,” updated 28 March 2006, at
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/ACLitSurvey.pdf.
Links to articles using the Quality of Governance Institute, University of Gothenburg,
Sweden Quality of Governance dataset at http://qog.pol.gu.se/data/dataextras/qog-dataarticles.
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute at http://www.unicri.it/
Transparency International at http://www.transparency.org/. See especially data, links, and
research under “What We Do.”
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development anticorruption data, research,
monitoring of 1997 Antibribery Convention, et cetera at http://www.oecd.org/corruption/.
Council of Europe, Group of States Against Corruption at
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/default_en.asp.
Obviously, you should also consult scholarly sources through the library’s standard electronic
databases (e.g., Academic Search, JSTOR, EconLit) as well as NBER working papers.
Reminder of Due Dates
24 March: dropbox submission of research proposal—consisting of (1) a 300-word abstract that
introduces your research question and briefly describes your method of answering it, and (2) a
preliminary list of key references or data (or both) that you have already consulted at least
briefly, i.e., enough to know they will be useful.
28 April: dropbox and in-seminar submission of completed report
28 April and 5 May: oral presentation
For your presentation, you may use PowerPoint or distribute a handout or just talk. If you use
PowerPoint, bring your slides on a flashdrive and one hard copy of the slide printout for me.
Style Guidelines and Evaluation
The report itself must be no longer than 5,000 words in length and may be significantly shorter.
This does not include front matter, references, tables, figures, or appendices. Your grade will
mainly reflect your demonstrated research and analytical effort and your success in presenting
and supporting a clear argument with evidence from appropriate sources. Substantively good
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papers with very significant problems of style (e.g., organization, grammar, diction, spelling,
referencing, punctuation) will not be awarded a grade higher than a B, however. Follow style,
referencing, and citation guidelines summarized in the two documents on the Learn@UW course
website.