OF
Editor:
Mark S. Nagel
University of South Carolina
Associate Editor:
John M. Grady
University of South Carolina
Venue
Event
Management
JOURNAL
Editorial Board and Staff:
&
Consulting Editor:
Peter J. Graham
University of South Carolina
Editorial Review Board Members:
Rob Ammon—Slippery Rock University
John Benett—Venue Management
Association, Asia Pacific Limited
Chris Bigelow—The Bigelow
Companies, Inc.
Matt Brown—University of South Carolina
Brad Gessner—San Diego
Convention Center
Peter Gruber —Wiener Stadthalle, Austria
Todd Hall—Georgia Southern University
Kim Mahoney—Industry Consultant
Michael Mahoney—California
State University at Fresno
Larry Perkins—RBC Center
Carolina Hurricanes
Jim Riordan—Florida Atlantic University
Frank Roach—University of South Carolina
Philip Rothschild—Missouri
State University
Frank Russo—Global Spectrum
Rodney J. Smith—University of Denver
Kenneth C. Teed—The George
Washington University
Scott Wysong—University of Dallas
Perceptions of Terrorist Threat: Implications
for Intercollegiate Basketball Venue Managers
John Miller—Troy University
Adam Dunn—Texas Tech University
Abstract
Because of the September 11th attacks and heightened awareness of global terrorism, facility managers have had
to transition their focus to include the prevention of global terrorists from targeting athletic venues. This study attempted to discover NCAA Division I intercollegiate basketball venue manager’s perceptions of the terrorist threat as
well as tactics and techniques used to counter that threat. Division I college basketball arena managers whose institutions were in the top 100 of men’s basketball average attendance during the 2009-2010 season were contacted. Results
indicated that 15% of the arena managers reported that an athletic facility at their institution has received a terrorist
threat and 10% had received a threat specifically targeting their basketball arena. Additionally, nearly 50% of the arena
managers consider their arenas to be the subject of a terrorist threat and perceive that potential adversaries who are capable of executing intentional acts of violence against their facility exist within their local community. However, more
than half of those same managers did not implement rudimentary security actions to minimize those potential risks.
Perceptions of Terrorist Threat: Implications for
Intercollegiate Basketball Venue Managers
Since the events of September 11, the people and
the government of the United States have turned their
attention toward combating terrorism. One way to accomplish that objective is to identify critical assets and
then assess both the threat and vulnerability (Moteff,
2005). As a result, authorities have begun considering
new types of potential targets, including athletic venues.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) recognized
this possibility when it provided sport facility managers
a warning after it learned that individuals with possible
terrorist connections had downloaded data pertaining to several National Football League venues (Grace,
2002). In fact, then FBI Director Robert Mueller acknowledged that agents had been directed to look at any
potential locations that a terrorist might strike, one of
which could be a public assembly facility (Grace, 2002).
Because they are so strongly associated with the
American economy and culture, sports have been
considered significant targets of terrorism attacks
(Appelbaum, Adeland, & Harris, 2005; Atkinson &
Young, 2002). During a panel discussion, Paul Zoubek,
Counsel for the New Jersey Domestic Preparedness
Task Force, stated that: “Sports are a very symbolic target of terrorism because they are so associated with the
globalization of the American economy and the American culture” (Fallon, [quoting Zoubek], 2003, p. 367).
Prior to September 11, 2001 athletic venue security
tended to focus on issues such as crowd control. Because of the September 11th attacks and heightened
awareness of global terrorism, facility managers have
Journal of Venue and Entertainment Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1
had to transition their focus to include the prevention
of global terrorists from targeting athletic venues. A
majority of the investigations have emphasized security at mega-events or athletic events with extremely
large seating capacities (Baker, Connaughton, Zhang,
& Spengler, 2007; Miller, Gillentine, & Veltri, 2008;
Miller, Veltri, & Phillips, 2007). While those are certainly important areas to focus upon, it does not alleviate the need to examine smaller scale athletic events
such as intercollegiate basketball arenas that possess
many of the desirable target characteristics for a terrorist organization. Furthermore, much of the existing
research has focused on actual security precautions
as opposed to the perceptions of facility managers.
While there was a spike in terrorism awareness immediately following September 11 (Miller, 2006), there
is little data showing what effects, if any, the lack of
significant terrorist activity within the United States
has had on security perceptions. The potential risk of
such an occurrence is often perceived and acted upon
in two primary ways. First, perceptive risk regards the
instinctive and intuitive reactions to danger. Second,
analytical risk relies on logic, reason, and scientific
consideration in assessing the potential risk and making an organizational decision (Slovic & Peters, 2006).
An effective manager needs to possess a certain level of
instinct and intuition in making a decision. However,
since perception is the process of attaining understanding through information, being able to logically and
rationally implement an organization decision is often preferred (Walker & Augoustinos, 2006). The most
2
common approach to measuring safety culture is to
perform a survey of a population designed to assess attitudes and perceptions about aspects of organizational
safety (Walker & Augoustinos, 2006). Conducting such
an assessment will provide insights into the organization’s fundamental safety culture (Burns, Mearns, &
McGeorge, 2006). Thus, this study attempted to discover NCAA Division I intercollegiate basketball venue manager’s perceptions of a terrorist threat as well
as tactics and techniques used to counter that threat.
Review of Literature
One of the most applicable studies to intercollegiate
sport venues was conducted by Baker, Connaughton,
Zhang, and Spengler (2007). The results indicated
strong perceptions that terrorism was a real threat.
Not only did the studied intercollegiate football facility
managers strongly agree that terrorism was a foreseeable threat, but they also agreed that terrorist activity at
a sports venue would occur in a matter of time. Other
noteworthy perceptions were that most of the football
stadium managers acknowledged the activity of September 11 altered the manner in which they thought
about terrorism. Additionally, most felt that a larger
facility located in a metropolitan area was at increased
risk of being targeted by a terrorist organization. Eighty
percent of the football facility managers monitored for
the possibility of terrorist activity during an intercollegiate athletic contest by communicating with local law
enforcement and federal agencies, and by monitoring
television reports. Interestingly, 87% of the football stadium managers had an established emergency action
plan in place in case of a terrorist attack; however, only
75% had actually practiced their emergency action plan.
The Baker et al (2007) study established that Division IA (now Bowl Championship Subdivision)
football facility managers generally perceived a terrorist threat to be real and acknowledged their duty
to employ measures to minimize the possibility of
being subject to an attack. While the football facility
managers acknowledged the perceived threat, some
of them reported that the implementation of a risk
management plan was lacking. Most commonly cited
as areas of concern were the lack of training and the
failure to consider the Department of Homeland Security’s color threat system to facilitate in decisions
regarding specific risk management implementation.
This research indicated that facility managers for football stadiums do perceive the terrorist threat as real.
Miller, Veltri, and Phillips (2007) also researched
Journal of Venue and Entertainment Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1
risk management as it pertained to collegiate football.
Some of the noteworthy results were that 91% either
agreed or strongly agreed that they possessed a risk
management plan capable of minimizing a terrorist
attack yet only seven percent believed that there were
groups operating within their community capable
of causing intentional violence against spectators at
one of their football games. One of the most pertinent results was the fact that every participant polled
stated that they had changed security and countermeasures in the wake of the September 11th events.
Miller, Gillentine, and Veltri (2008) later researched
similar areas within collegiate football, this time investigating how spectators perceived the threat. One
of the most interesting results was that although 75%
believed intercollegiate football stadiums would be
a viable target, 94% felt a terrorist attack at a football
stadium was not likely. This information indicates
that although people tend to perceive the threat, they
do not associate their own institutions as susceptible to that threat. The current study attempts to take
some of the same approaches to determine if there is
a similar sentiment within Division I intercollegiate
basketball, specifically with the facility managers.
An earlier research investigation conducted in the
aftermath of September 11 was conducted by Pantera
et al. (2003). After in-depth investigation and consultation with security experts, the investigators established
a 38-item checklist designed to be implemented in athletic facilities to ensure adequate security procedures
were being taken. Results indicated that football stadiums generally scored higher than basketball facilities.
A potential reason cited for this discrepancy was the
high volume of events that occur in a college basketball arena as compared to a football stadium making it
fiscally more challenging to keep an elevated security
posture at the basketball venues. Another explanation
was that basketball venues were often used for activities
other than competition. As a result basketball arenas
might be viewed as merely another building on campus as opposed to a strategically significant terrorist
target. While this study did not specifically question
the perceptions of the terrorist threat by facility managers, the specific precautions taken by facility managers may reasonably indicate their evaluation of the risk.
Furthermore, it is one of the few research projects that
investigated basketball arenas as part of their findings.
Another similar study was completed by Hall, Marciani, Cooper, and Rolen (2007). Various shortfalls
3
were observed ranging from emergency preparedness
and training to various technical details such as communication and credentialing. Ultimately, the data
were amassed to document trends and a process was
established to help create a methodology by which
security could be improved. Although this data provided positive information to facility managers, it did
not examine their perceptions of the terrorist threat
and, therefore, whether shortcomings were due to a
lack of execution or to a lack of the perceived threat.
While the aforementioned studies provide undeniable value from the perspective of a terror organization,
venues such as intercollegiate basketball arenas also
provide a significant target of importance and warrant
similar scrutiny. Although Division I intercollegiate
basketball facilities do not attract comparable crowds
to mega-events such as the Olympics or Super Bowls,
they possess sufficient capacities to result in drastic
casualties if they were to be the subject of an attack.
For example, it has been reported that a sporting target
does not need to have 70,000 fans present to have significantly consequential effects (Piccarello, 2005). The
top five individual team leaders in attendance during
the 2009–2010 season were the University of Kentucky
(24,111 per game), Syracuse University (22,152 per
game), the University of Louisville (19,397 per game),
the University of Tennessee (19,168 per game), and the
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (17,786 per
game) (NCAA Men’s Basketball Attendance, 2010).
The final five schools rounding out the top 100 during the same season were New Mexico State University (5,659 per game), the University of Northern Iowa
(5,642 per game), Tulsa University (5,491 per game),
Marshall University (5,481 per game), and the University of Central Florida (5,411 per game) (NCAA
Men’s Basketball Attendance, 2010). Thus, the average of the top five schools for attendance during the
2009–2010 season was 20,523 while the average for
the last five of the top 100 schools averaged 5,537
spectators per contest (NCAA Men’s Basketball Attendance, 2010). Although these figures may pale in
comparison to the attendance at intercollegiate football games, an organized attack could result in a death
toll greater than the official death toll from the September 11, 2001 attacks of 2,752 (Hirschkorn, 2003).
While the visibility of the event is certainly a significant factor, another aspect to consider is the attitudes
of sport facility managers. It could be that they simply
do not consider their facilities a target or perhaps they
do consider themselves a potential target but organizaJournal of Venue and Entertainment Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1
tional restraints prevent them from instituting appropriate measures. Regardless, the information may prove
to be useful in the better protection of sports venues.
Methodology
Instrument Reliability and Validity
The distributed questionnaire consisted of various
types of questions determined to elicit individual attitudes and perceptions of a terrorist threat with respect
to the college basketball arena of the manager’s institution. A 38-item questionnaire was developed for this
study. The first four questions dealt with institutional
and demographic information about the respondents.
The next 34 items, in the form of a five-point Likert
scale (1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=unsure, 4=disagree,
and 5=strongly disagree), were designed to measure the
intercollegiate basketball arena manager’s security attitudes. The questionnaire consisted of various types of
questions determined to elicit individual attitudes and
perceptions of the terrorist threat with respect to the
college basketball arena of the manager’s institution.
In order to ensure the reliability of the questionnaire, a test-retest protocol was conducted on 25 basketball arena managers at a nearby university and area
high schools. Several minor changes (i.e. grammar and
punctuation) to the questionnaire regarding clarification of wording were suggested and implemented.
When employing the test-retest method, reliability
may be estimated as a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient between two administrations of the
same measure (Patten, 2000). For this study the testretest was accomplished two weeks later with the same
group of arena managers and yielded a Pearson’s r of
.88. Since reliability does not imply validity and validity measures what the instrument is intended to measure, a test for content validity was conducted using the
same population to determine the instrument’s reliability. The result of this test for content validity yielded an
acceptable Cronbach’s alpha of .85 (Cronbach, 1951).
It should be noted that terrorism was defined using
the Federal Bureau of Investigation explanation of “…
the unlawful use of force or violence against persons
or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the
civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI, 2006, p. 3).
The investigators further differentiated spontaneous
terrorism from organized terrorism to the respondents.
Spontaneous terrorism included unplanned assaults
on players, coaches, or officials whereas planned ter4
rorism included items such as bomb threats in which
planning, organization, and rehearsal appeared to exist. For example, if the venue manager had received
a bomb threat indicating when and where an attack
would occur, it was recognized as organized terrorism.
However, since spontaneous terrorism requires nothing beyond one person wielding a makeshift weapon
the likelihood of mass casualties would appear to be
low (Merari, 1978). Conversely, organized terrorism requires a significant amount of planning, organization,
and rehearsal, such as the incidents at the World Trade
Center as well as the Oklahoma City bombing (Cohen,
2001).Thus, the participants were informed that the investigators were interested in organized terrorism only.
Procedure
Two weeks prior to the online distribution of the
questionnaire, Division I university basketball arena managers whose institutions were in the top 100
of men’s basketball average attendance during the
2009–2010 season (NCAA Men’s Basketball Attendance, 2010) were contacted via email, which introduced the researchers and the purpose of the study.
The emails were gleaned from the 2009–2010 NCAA
Directory. Previous research has determined that prenotification letters may minimize the possibility of
inadvertent discarding of the survey, bolster the credibility to the investigator, and increase the response
rate (Fox, Crask, & Kim, 1988; Kent & Turner, 2002).
One email address was returned during the initial
distribution because of an inaccurate address. In this
circumstance, further investigation produced a new
contact name who received the pre-notification e-mail.
It was assumed that the other email addresses were valid. Two weeks after the pre-notification, a second e-mail
was sent providing all recipients with a reaffirmation of
the purpose of the study as well as a link to the questionnaire webpage. An initial email distribution yielded
32 responses. After two more weeks, a follow-up correspondence was sent again encouraging all facility managers to participate in the research which resulted in an
additional seven responses. Of the questionnaires sent
to the 100 basketball arena managers, 39 were returned
for a response rate of 39%. Baruch (1999) conducted research to determine levels of satisfactory response rate.
He made the distinction between studies targeting top
management as opposed to those that elicited information from the general population. According to his
findings, survey research querying upper management,
as intercollegiate basketball arena managers are considered in athletic departments, should expect a response
Journal of Venue and Entertainment Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1
rate of 36%. Moreover, Alreck and Settle (1985) posited
that no more than 10% of the population is required to
yield accurate results. Krosnick (1999) further stressed
that, “… research has shown that surveys with very low
response rates can be more accurate than surveys with
much higher response rates” (p. 540). Alreck and Settle
pointed out that the reliability of the data is dependent
on the obtained sample rather than sent surveys. Thus,
due to the supporting arguments by the aforementioned papers, the investigators of this study felt that the
response rate of this survey was adequate to draw conclusions but not outside of the responding population.
The participants were asked to voluntarily complete
the questionnaire and were allowed to discontinue
participation at anytime. In accordance with the
institution’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements, each participant was given the opportunity
to voluntarily participate and informed consent was
obtained for all choosing to participate. According to
Cook, Heath, and Thompson (2000) response representativeness is more important than response rate in
survey research. To that extent, purposive sampling of
Division I intercollegiate basketball arena managers
was employed. Purposive sampling of Division I basketball arena managers was used given the study’s objective of examining perceptions of basketball facility
managers’ opinions of terrorism among this particular
cohort. Patton (1990) suggested that purposive sampling is appropriate when the sample is homogenous,
as was the case in this investigation, and when the
objective is to include people of interest and exclude
those who do not suit the study purpose. Although the
questionnaire requested basic demographic data about
the facility manager and arena, it did not specifically
request the institution by name, therefore ensuring
complete anonymity for all data provided. Additionally, the questionnaires had no revealing marks and were
anonymously placed into a database. A descriptive
statistics approach allowed a general portrayal of the
basketball facility managers’ perceptions as a whole.
Results
Demographics
Nearly 70% of the respondents indicated that the
maximum seating capacity of the basketball arena was
at least 11,000; 23% revealed that the capacity was between 8,000 and 10,999; and eight percent had arenas in
which the maximum capacity was less than 8,000. The
average attendance for home men’s basketball games
were fairly equal as 15 reportedly drew an average of
5
11,000 or more patrons; 11 attracted an average between
8,000 and 10,999; and 13 had 7,999 patrons or fewer in
attendance. The 39 participating arena managers represented a relatively experienced group as the most common response to the number of years of facility management was more than 10 years (44%). Moreover, 31%
have been employed as the arena manager at their present institution for only one to three years (see Table 1).
Security (DHS). Nearly half of the respondents disagreed with such a statement. Finally, 44% of the arena
managers indicated that they were protected by insurance in the event of a terrorism-related event. Thus, it
appeared that most of the respondents did not give the
terrorist threat significant value, which takes on significance considering the results of the next section.
Training Methods Used to Mitigate Potential
Terrorism
When asked about activities designed to curtail or
mitigate an organized terrorist risk, responses again
demonstrated mixed sentiments (see Table 2). Eightyseven percent revealed that they currently possessed an
emergency action plan in case of a terrorist attack. Yet,
less than half required routine staff training designed
to address counter-terrorism practices. Of those who
met with their staffs, the most cited response (17.9%)
was once per year, while more than 64% reported that
meeting with their staffs to discuss counter-terrorism
issues did not apply. More than 50% of the respondents
indicated that they and their staffs routinely met with
the local law enforcement agency to discuss the prospects for potential terrorist activities. For those who
met with the local law enforcement, 15% indicated
that they did so either once per year or once every six
months. However, ten percent revealed that they met
either prior to every home contest or once per month.
The participants were asked if they consistently adjusted their security policies based on the color threat
level communicated by the Department of Homeland
Journal of Venue and Entertainment Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1
Perception of Terrorist Threat
When asked if they considered their basketball arena to be a potential terrorism target, 46% of the respondents agreed with that statement (see Table 3). Fortyone percent perceived potential adversaries existed
within the community who were capable of carrying
out intentional acts of violence targeted against their
facility. Finally, 15% of the arena managers reported
that an athletic facility at their institution has received
a terrorist threat such as a bomb threat while they have
been the arena manager at their institution. Specifically,
10% indicated that the basketball facility had received a
terrorist threat during their tenure as facility manager.
6
ly basic security actions such as routine training and
adjusting security posture based upon federal threat
levels to minimize the risk. This result supports previous researchers who reported that security personnel at sporting events seldom possess sufficient antiterrorist training (Baker et al., 2007; Goss, Jubenville,
& MacBeth, 2003; Miller, Gillentine, & Veltri, 2008).
Discussion
The descriptive analysis indicated that a majority of
Division I intercollegiate basketball arena managers
did not consider the threat of terrorist activity aimed at
their facility a real threat. As a result it appeared that the
respondents did not undertake various steps that might
assist in mitigating this threat. The results of this study
support previous contentions that the basketball facilities have been consistently evaluated to be less prepared
than football stadiums (Pantera, et al., 2003). Although
previous research has focused heavily on mega-events
or intercollegiate football where the capacity crowds are
extremely high, even small-to-medium-size basketball
facilities present a significant amount of potential casualties for an impending terrorist and may offer a “soft
target” (Piccarello, 2005), which is why the subject demands more attention and data collection. A soft target
is a susceptible location that is usually not well-protected, offers relatively easy access, and allows great numbers of individuals to continually enter and exit in a relatively congested area (Clonan, 2002; Piccarello, 2005).
Possibly, intercollegiate basketball arena managers might not consider themselves to be a viable target due to smaller capacities than football facilities,
which was one of the purposes the current research
attempted to explore. Yet, because nearly 50% of the
arena managers consider their arenas to be the subject of a terrorist threat, it is surprising that less than
half of those same managers did not carry out relativeJournal of Venue and Entertainment Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1
Despite the findings indicating that while intercollegiate basketball arena managers previously received
threats, reported that potentially adversarial groups
or individuals were present in their communities, and
perceived that they were potential targets of terrorism,
they did not alter any of their counter-terrorism precautions. Perhaps this may be an overall reflection of
the safety culture, or lack of it, that appears to be present in intercollegiate venue management. An organization’s safety culture has been assumed to impact safety
performance through safety management practices
(Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, 1993). Reason (1997) stated that to create a
safety culture, an organization should initially possess
a safety information system but that its effectiveness
is dependent on the willing participation of the workforce. The results of this study indicated that although
the arena managers reportedly had received terrorist
threats and believed that entities existed in the community that could create damage, it appeared that they did
not address them, thereby rendering their safety culture ineffective. Reason (1997) further proposed that a
learning culture must exist to create an organizational
safety culture. Venue managers must be willing to understand information generated from the safety information system and implement any needed changes.
The basketball arena managers in this study might
not have envisioned their facility as a target on a dayto-day basis and therefore did not modify their staff
training methods accordingly. A potential reason for
this mindset may be the venue manager’s lack of education regarding the topic. The lack of safety education
may then impact the lack of training that the managers in this study identified. For example, of the respondents who required staff training designed to address
counter-terrorism practices, most met only once per
year. By meeting only once per year, staff members
may lose focus on providing a safe environment. Additionally, new staff members may gain their knowledge
of safety through second and third sources thereby
negatively impacting the main message. A major terrorist activity, spontaneous or organized, involving
intercollegiate athletics facilities would certainly af7
fect a significant paradigm shift in the industry. It is
clearly advisable to generate proactive risk management practices via personnel education and reinforcement in an effort to prevent the possibility of a terrorist act. It appears in this study that many of those
potential risk management practices have not been
implemented. Thus, it is clear that opportunities for organized or planned terrorism may happen when there
is an overlap between motivation of the terrorist, the
suitability of the target, and the lack of effective risk
management practices (Wilcox, Land, & Hunt, 2003).
Before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001,
public assembly managers most often dealt with raucous fans, medical emergencies, thefts, as well as
larger-scale fan disorders referred to as spontaneous
terror attacks (Goss et al., 2003). For spontaneous terrorist activities, however, the main objective may be to
physically act out displeasure of a judgment that went
against the home team or an intense dislike of an opposing team without any forethought. For example,
fans throwing beer bottles at the end of a professional
football game when an overturned call occurred in the
final minutes may be regarded as a spontaneous terror attack (Goss et al., 2003; Withers, 2002). However,
organized terrorists often have a discrete set of objectives when selecting potential targets they believe will
further their cause (such as media exposure, economic
harm and number of potential casualties) (Suder, 2004).
It is clear that for a variety of previously stated reasons,
athletic venues offer opportunities to satisfy many, if
not all of those potential objectives, which intercollegiate basketball arena managers must try to prevent.
Research Limitations
As with any research study, limitations exist. First, it
can only be assumed that the subjects responded in a
truthful and honest manner. Second, these findings may
not be generalized to the greater population of NCAA
Division I intercollegiate basketball arena managers, especially since the response rate was less than 50% of the
identified 100 “top” basketball attendance schools. However, given that this study was an initial investigation,
the sample size and data provides valuable information.
for NCAA Division II or III universities. An investigation dealing with the university/college athletic department’s familiarity and understanding of current risk
assessment procedures as recommended by State and
Federal agencies could be undertaken. Finally, future
studies could be conducted to determine how university/college athletic departments develop, implement and
assess event risk management policies and procedures.
Conclusion
Due to the evolution of risk management practices,
it is recommended that sport venue managers concentrate on the security goals established after September
11, 2001. First, facility managers must simply accept
the fact that any facility or event exists as a potential
target for organized and/or spontaneous acts of terror (Hurst, Zoubek, & Pratsinakis, 2002). Second,
these managers must possess the education to be able
to handle incidents should they occur (International Association of Assembly Managers, 2010). Third,
though it may never be fully possible, venues should
work to establish a level of foreseeability in which
they address all potential threats (Piccarello, 2005).
While a significant portion of the existing research
has focused on “larger” sporting events, it is also clear
that intercollegiate basketball games retain all of the
traits to qualify as a suitable target for a potential terrorist attack. These venues possess the crowd capacity,
public scrutiny, and economic impact to have significant effects on both the local area as well as the entire
sport if one were to be targeted by an organization
determined to promote their causes through violent
means. Although some surveyed venue managers were
mindful of its potential consequences, over half did
not view the threat as significant and, therefore, did
not perform basic practices to minimize the threat. It
is necessary to continue to research not only the relationship between terrorism and athletic facilities, but
specifically intercollegiate basketball facilities so that
the overall awareness of the threat increases and ultimately results in a higher percentage of arena managers acting in accordance with industry standards.
Future Research
Future investigations could be conducted regarding
Division I intercollegiate basketball arena managers’
perceptions of security since September 11, 2001 and
if security changes have been enacted as a result. Additionally, future investigations could replicate this one
Journal of Venue and Entertainment Management, Vol. 3, Issue 1
8
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