www.ijecs.in
International Journal Of Engineering And Computer Science ISSN:2319-7242
Volume 4 Issue 2 February 2015, Page No. 10459-10463
Privacy-Preserving Public Auditing for Shared Data in the
Cloud
Prof. C. M. Jadhav , Ms.S.D. Shabade
Bharat Ratna Indira Gandhi College Of Engineering,
Kegaon ,Solapur
chanderonly@gmail.com
Bharat Ratna Indira Gandhi College Of Engineering,
Kegaon ,Solapur
shabade.shraddha288@gmail.com
Abstract—With cloud storage services, it is commonplace for data to be not only stored in the cloud, but also shared across
multiple users. However, public auditing for such shared data — while preserving identity privacy — remains to be an open
challenge. In this paper, we propose the first privacy-preserving mechanism th at allows public auditing on shared data stored in
the cloud. In particular, we exploit ring signatures to compute the verification information needed to audit the integrity of shared
data. With our mechanism, the identity of the signer on each block in shared data is kept private from a third party auditor (TPA),
who is still able to publicly verify the integrity of shared data without retrieving the entire file. Our experimental results
demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism when auditing shared data.
Keywords: Public auditing, privacy-preserving, shared data, cloud computing.
1 INTRODUCTION
C
LOUD
service providers manage an enterprise-class
infrastructure that offers a scalable, secure and reliable
environment for users, at a much lower marginal cost due to
the sharing nature of resources. It is routine for users to use
cloud storage services to share data with others in a team, as
data sharing becomes a standard feature in most cloud storage
offerings, including Dropbox and Google Docs.
The integrity of data in cloud storage, however, is subject
to skepticism and scrutiny, as data stored in an untrusted cloud
can easily be lost or corrupted, due to hardware failures and
human errors [1]. To protect the integrity of cloud data, it is
best to perform public auditing by introducing a third party
auditor (TPA), who offers its auditing service with more
powerful computation and communication abilities than regular
users.
The first provable data possession (PDP) mechanism [2] to
perform public auditing is designed to check the correctness of
data stored in an untrusted server, without retrieving the entire
data. Moving a step forward, Wang et al. [3] (referred to as
WWRL in this paper) is designed to construct a public auditing
mechanism for cloud data,so that during public auditing, the
content of private data belonging to a personal user is not
disclosed to the third party auditor.
We believe that sharing data among multiple users is
perhaps one of the most engaging features that motivates cloud
storage. A unique problem introduced during the process of
public auditing for shared data in the cloud ishow to preserve
identity privacy from the TPA, because the identities of
signers on shared data may indicate that a particular user in the
group or a special block in shared data is a higher valuable
target than others.
For example, Alice and Bob work together as a group and
share a file in the cloud. The shared file is divided into a
number of small blocks, which are independently signed by
users. Once a block in this shared file is modified by a user,
this user needs to sign the new block using her public/private
key pair. The TPA needs to know the identity of the signer on
each block in this shared file, so that it is able to audit the
integrity of the whole file based on requests from Alice or Bob.
Auditing Task 1
AAAAAABABB
TPA
8th
Auditing Task 2
AAAAAAABBB
Auditing Task 3
AAAABAAABB
8th
A a block signed by Alice B a block signed by Bob
Prof. C. M. Jadhav, IJECS Volume 4 Issue 2 February, 2015 Page No.10459-10463
Page 10459
Fig. 1. Alice and Bob share a file in the cloud. The TPA
audits the integrity of shared data with existing mechanisms.
verification information (i.e. signatures) are both stored in the
cloud server. The third party auditor is able to verify the
integrity of shared data in the cloud server on behalf of group
members.
As shown in Fig. 1, after performing several auditing tasks,
some private and sensitive information may reveal to the TPA.
On one hand, most of the blocks in shared file are signed by
Alice, which may indicate that Alice is a important role in this
group, such as a group leader. On the other hand, the 8-th block
is frequently modified by different users. It means this block
may contain high value data, such as a final bid in an auction,
that Alice and Bob need to discuss and change it several times.
As described in the example above, the identities of signers on
shared data may indicate which user in the group or block in
shared data is a higher valuable target than others. Such
information is confidential to the group and should not be
revealed to any third party. However, no existing mechanism in
the literature is able to perform public auditing on shared data
in the cloud while still preserving identity privacy.
2.
Auditing
Request
Message
3.
1
In this paper, we propose Oruta , a new privacy-preserving
public auditing mechanism for shared data in an untrusted
cloud. In Oruta, we utilize ring signatures [4], [5] to construct
homomorphic authenticators [2], [6], so that the third party
auditor is able to verify the integrity of shared data for a group
of users without retrieving the entire data — while the identity
of the signer on each block in shared data is kept private from
the TPA. In addition, we further extend our mechanism to
support batch auditing, which can audit multiple shared data
simultaneously in a single auditing task. Meanwhile, Oruta
continues to use random masking [3] to support data privacy
during public auditing, and leverage index hash tables [7] to
support fully dynamic operations on shared data. A dynamic
operation indi-cates an insert, delete or update operation on a
single block in shared data. To our best knowledge, this paper
represents the first attempt towards designing an effective
privacy-preserving public auditing mechanism for shared data
in the cloud.
2 EXISTING SYSTEM
The first provable data possession (PDP) mechanism to
perform public auditing is designed to check the correctness of
data stored in an un trusted server, without retrieving the entire
data. Moving a step forward, Wang et al. (referred to asWWRL
in this paper) is designed to construct a public auditing mechnism for cloud data, so that during public auditing, the content
of private data belonging to a personal user is not disclosed to
the third party auditor.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
3.1 System Model
As illustrated in Fig. 2, our work in this paper involves three
parties: the cloud server, the third party auditor (TPA) and
users. There are two types of users in a group: the original user
and a number of group users. The original user and group users
are both members of the group. Group members are allowed to
access and modify shared data created by the original user
based on access control polices [8]. Shared data and its
. AuditingAuditing
1
Report
Auditing
Proof
.
4
Shared Data Flow
Fig. 2. Our system model includes the cloud server, the
third party auditor and users.
In this paper, we only consider how to audit the integrity of
shared data in the cloud with static groups.It means the group
is predefined before shared data is created in the cloud and the
membership of users in the group is not changed during data
sharing. The original user is responsible for deciding who is
able to share her data before outsourcing data to the cloud.
Another interesting problem is how to audit the integrity of
shared data in the cloud with dynamic groups — a new user
can be added into the group and an existing group member can
be revoked during data sharing —while still preserving identity
privacy. We will leave this problem to our future work. When
a user (either the original user or a group user) wishes to check
the integrity of shared data, she first sends an auditing request
to the TPA. After receiving the auditing request, the TPA
generates an auditing message to the cloud server, and retrieves
an auditing proof of shared data from the cloud server. Then
the TPA verifies the correctness of the auditing proof. Finally,
the TPA sends an auditing report to the user based on the result
of the verification.
3.2 Threat Model
2.2.1 Integrity Threats
Two kinds of threats related to the integrity of shared data are
possible. First, an adversary may try to corrupt the integrity of
shared data and prevent users from using data correctly.
Second, the cloud service provider may inadvertently corrupt
(or even remove) data in its storage due to hardware failures
and human errors. Making matters worse, in order to avoid
jeopardizing its reputation, the cloud server provider may be
reluctant to inform users about such corruption of data.
Prof. C. M. Jadhav, IJECS Volume 4 Issue 2 February, 2015 Page No.10459-10463
Page 10460
2.2.2 Privacy Threats
The identity of the signer on each block in shared data is
private and confidential to the group. During the process of
auditing, a semi-trusted TPA, who is only responsible for
auditing the integrity of shared data, may try to reveal the
identity of the signer on each block in shared data based on
verification information. Once the TPA reveals the identity of
the signer on each block, it can easily distinguish a high-value
target (a particular user in the group or a special block in
shared data).
3.3 Design Objectives
To enable the TPA efficiently and securely verify shared data
for a group of users, Oruta should be designed to achieve following properties: (1) Public Auditing: The third party auditor
is able to publicly verify the integrity of shared data for a group
of users without retrieving the entire data. (2) Correctness:
The third party auditor is able to correctly detect whether there
is any corrupted block in shared data. (3) Unforgeability: Only
a user in the group can generate valid verification information
on shared data. (4) Identity Privacy: During auditing, the TPA
cannot distinguish the identity of the signer on each block in
shared data.
4 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly introduce cryptographic primitives
and their corresponding properties that we implement in Oruta.
4.1 Bilinear Maps
We first introduce a few concepts and properties related to
bilinear maps. We follow notations from [5], [9]: 1) G1, G2 and
GT are three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p; 2) g1
is a generator of G1, and g2 is a generator of G2; 3) is a
computable isomorphism from G2 to G1, with (g2) = g1; 4) e is
a bilinear map e: G1 × G2 ! GT with the following properties:
Computability: there exists
an efficiently computable
algorithm for computing the map e. Bilinearity: for all u 2 G1,
v 2 G2 and a, b 2 Zp, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab. Non-degeneracy:
e(g1, g2) 6= 1. These properties further imply two additional
properties:(1) for any u1, u2 2 G1 and v 2 G2, e(u1 ・ u2, v)
=e(u1, v) ・ e(u2, v); (2) for any u, v 2 G2, e( (u), v) = e( (v),
u).
4.2 Ring Signatures
The concept of ring signatures is first proposed by Rivest et al.
[4] in 2001. With ring signatures, a verifier is convinced that a
signature is computed using one of group members’ private
keys, but the verifier is not able to determine which one. This
property can be used to preserve the identity of the signer from
a verifier. The ring signature scheme introduced by Boneh et
al. [5] (referred to as BGLS in this paper) is constructed on
bilinear maps. We will extend this ring signature scheme to
construct our public auditing mechanism.
Homomorphic authenticators (also called homomorphic
verifiable tags) are basic tools to construct data auditing
mechanisms [2], [3], [6]. Besides unforgeability (only a user
with a private key can generate valid signatures), a
homomorphic authenticable signature scheme, which denotes a
homomorphic authenticator based on signatures, should also
satisfy the following properties: Let (pk, sk) denote the •
signer’s public/private key pair, _1 denote a signature on block
m1 2 Zp, _2 denote a signature on block m2 2 Zp.
Blockless verification: Given _1 and _2, two random values
_1, _2 2 Zp and a block m0 = _1m1 + _2m2 2 Zp, a verifier is able
to check the correctness of block m0 without knowing block m1
and m2.
•
• Non-malleability
Given _1 and _2, two random values _1, _2 2
Zp and a block m0 = _1m1 + _2m2 2 Zp, a user, who does not
have private key sk, is not able to generate a valid signature _0
on block m0 by linearly combining signature _1 and _2.
Blockless verification allows a verifier to audit the correctness
of data stored in the cloud server with a single block, which is a
linear combination of all the blocks in data. If the combined
block is correct, the verifier believes that the blocks in data are
all correct. In this way, the verifier does not need to download
all the blocks to check the integrity of data. Non-malleability
indicates that an attacker cannot generate valid signatures on
invalid blocks by linearly combining existing signatures. Other
cryptographic techniques related to homomorphic authenticable
signatures includes aggregate signatures [5], homomorphic
signatures [10] and batchverification signatures [11]. If a
signature scheme is blockless verifiable and malleable, it is a
homomorphic signature scheme. In the construction of data
auditing mechanisms, we should use homomorphic
authenticable signatures, not homomorphic signatures.
5 HOMOMORPHIC AUTHENTICABLE RING
SIGNATURES
5.1 Overview
In this section, we introduce a new ring signature scheme,
which is suitable for public auditing. Then, we will show how
to build the privacy-preserving public auditing mechanism for
shared data in the cloud based on this new ring signature
scheme in the next section.
As we introduced in previous sections, we intend to utilize ring
signatures to hide the identity of the signer on each block, so
that private and sensitive information of the group is not
disclosed to the TPA. However, traditional ring signatures [4],
[5] cannot be directly used into public auditing mechanisms,
because these ring signature schemes do not support blockless
verification. Without blockless verification, the TPA has to
download the whole data file to verify the correctness of shared
data, which consumes excessive bandwidth and takes long
verification times. Therefore, we first construct a new
homomorphic authenticable ring signature (HARS) scheme,
which is extended from a classic ring signature scheme [5],
denoted as BGLS. The ring signatures generated by HARS is
able not only to preserve identity privacy but also to support
blockless verification.
5.2 Construction of HARS
4.3 Homomorphic Authenticators
Prof. C. M. Jadhav, IJECS Volume 4 Issue 2 February, 2015 Page No.10459-10463
Page 10461
HARS contains three algorithms: KeyGen, RingSign and
RingVerify. In KeyGen, each user in the group generates her
public key and private key. In RingSign, a user in the group is
able to sign a block with her private key and all the group
members’ public keys. A verifier is allowed to check whether a
given block is signed by a group member in RingVerify.
6 Batch Auditing
With the usage of public auditing in the cloud, the TPA may
receive amount of auditing requests from different users in a
very short time. Unfortunately, allowing the TPA to verify the
integrity of shared data for these users in several separate
auditing tasks would be very inefficient. Therefore, with the
properties of bilinear maps, we further extend Oruta to support
batch auditing, which
can improve the efficiency of
verification on multiple auditing tasks.
.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose Oruta, the first privacypreserving
public auditing mechanism for shared data in the cloud. We
utilize ring signatures to construct homomorphic authenticators,
so the TPA is able to audit the integrity of shared data, yet
cannot distinguish who is the signer on each block, which can
achieve identity privacy. To improve the efficiency of
verification for multiple auditing tasks, we further extend our
mechanism to support batch auditing. An interesting problem in
our future work is how to efficiently audit the integrity of
shared data with dynamic groups while still preserving the
identity of the signer on each block from the third party auditor.
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