The Evolution of Party Leadership
OxfordHandbooksOnline
TheEvolutionofPartyLeadership
JefferyA.Jenkins
TheOxfordHandbookoftheAmericanCongress
EditedbyGeorgeC.EdwardsIII,FrancesE.Lee,andEricSchickler
PrintPublicationDate: Mar2011
OnlinePublicationDate: May
2011
Subject: PoliticalScience,U.S.Politics,PartiesandBureaucracy
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199559947.003.0030
AbstractandKeywords
PartyleadershiphasalwaysbeenafocusofstudiesonleadershipinCongress.From1922to1991,party
leadershiphasbeenthesubjectofmanycongressionalstudies.Today,partyleadershipisattheheartofmany
congressionaltheoriesofbehaviorandorganization,andthedegreetowhichpartyleadersexerciseinfluencehas
beenthemoststudiedquestioninCongressforthelasttwodecades.Whilepartyleadershiphasbeenoneofthe
moststudiedareasinCongress,muchofthestudiesfrom1922to1991werelargelytimeboundandfocusedon
theexistingpartyleadershipwithinaparticularcongressionalera.Thisarticlediscussestheevolutionofparty
leadershipbyexaminingstudiesofdifferenteras.Itdescribeshowmeaningfulleadershipemergedintheearly
nineteenthcentury,howitgrewslowlyforatimebeforerisingdramaticallylateinthecentury,peakingduringthe
“strongparty”from1890to1910,andhowitdeclinedbeforeresurgingagaininthelate1970s.Italsodiscusses
howpartyleadershiphasevolvedinCongressandtheSenate.Thearticlealsoindicatesthesignificantsubstantive
gapsthatexistintheliteratureandfuturedirectionsofpartyleadershipscholarship.
Keywords:partyleadership,leadership,Congress,evolution,nineteenthcentury,strongparty,1890to1910,late1970s,Senate
THE studyofleadershipinCongresshasnearlyalwaysfocusedonpartyleadershipasthekeydrivingforce.Party
leadershiphasbeenthesubjectofcongressionalstudiessinceGeorgeRothwellBrown'sTheLeadershipof
Congressin1922andPaulHasbrouck'sPartyGovernmentinTheHouseofRepresentativesin1927.1Sincethen,
partyleadershiphascontinuedtoelicittheinterestofcongressionalscholars,fromtheeraof“committee
dominance”—whichincludesRandallRipley'sPartyLeadersintheHouseofRepresentativesin1967andMajority
PartyLeadershipinCongressin1969—totheeraof“partyresurgence”—whichincludesDavidW.Rohde's
PartiesandLeadersinthePostreformHousein1991.Today,partyleadershipisattheheartofmany
congressionaltheoriesofbehaviorandorganization,andthedegreetowhichpartyleaderswieldinfluence
(generallyinCongress,andspecificallywithineachchamber)hasbeenperhapsthemoststudiedquestioninthe
Congressfieldoverthelasttwodecades(seeChapter17byRandallStrahaninthisvolume).
Onelimitationintheaforementionedstudiesisthattheyhavebeenlargelytimebound,asscholarshavefocused
mostlyonexaminingpartyleadershipwithinparticularcongressionaleras.Howpartyleadershiphasevolvedover
time,bycomparison,haselicitedfarfewertreatments.Thischaptertakesupthequestion,byincorporatingstudies
ofdifferenterastotraceouthowpartyleadershipinCongresshasevolvedfromthelateeighteenthcentury
throughthepresentday.Indoingso,Iwilldescribehowmeaningfulpartyleadershipemergedintheearly
nineteenthcentury,howitgrewslowlyforatimebeforerisingdramaticallylateinthecenturyandpeakingduring
the“strongparty”periodbetween1890and1910,andthenhowitdroppedoffconsiderablybeforeresurgingyet
againbeginninginthelate1970s.Overthecourseofthishistoricaltracing,Iwillnotehowpartyleadershipinthe
HouseandSenatemayhaveevolvedsimilarlyordifferentlyovertime.Finally,Iwillalsoindicatewheresignificant
substantivegapsexistintheliteratureandwhatthefrontiersforfuturestudiesofpartyleadershipmightlooklike.
Page 1 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
Partyleadershipintheantebellumera
PartyleadershipinCongresspriortotheCivilWarcanbedivided—relativelyneatly—intothreemoreorlessdistinct
periods:1789–1811,1811–37,and1837–61.Theseperiodswitnessedafairlylinearincreaseinpartyleadership.
Weakbeginnings,1789–1811
PartyleadershipinCongresswasweakearlyinourfederalsystem,inpartbecausepartieswerenotpartofthe
nation'sformallandscape.Indeed,asHofstadter(1969)notes,partieswerecastinanexceedinglynegativelight
bytheFoundersandotherenlightenedcitizens,oftenexcoriatedas“factions”thatweredrivenbyintrigueand
selfishmotives.Yet,informalpartyorganizationsinCongressemergedalmostimmediatelytoserveassolutionsto
collective‐actionproblemsthatexistedinthelegislativeprocess(Aldrich1995).Theseinformalpartyorganizations
—proto‐caucuses,proto‐whips,andsoon—werenotinstitutionalized,however,andmoreimportantly,theformal
(constitutionallydesignated)leadershippositionsinCongress—theSpeakerintheHouse,andtheVicePresident
andPresidentProTemporeintheSenate—didnotbecomeovertpartisanpositionsduringthenewnation'sfirsttwo
decades.
IntheyearsprecedingtheWarof1812,theelectionofSpeakerandotherHouseofficers(liketheClerkand
Sergeant‐at‐Arms,whichwerecreatedbystatute)occurredinachamberwhoseinternalinstitutionswereinflux.
Partyaffiliationamongtherankandfilewasloose,evenassomepolarizationwasevidentaroundthepersonalities
andpoliciesofThomasJeffersonandAlexanderHamilton.Thegeneralconsensusintheliterature,accordingto
JenkinsandStewart(forthcoming),isthatSpeakersgavelittleweighttoparty(howeverconstrued)inoverseeing
theHouse,andthebasicauthoritygiventotheSpeakertocontroldebateandappointcommitteeswasrarelyused
toprogrammaticends.
TheonlymeaningfulexceptiontothisSpeaker‐as‐non‐partisanperspectiveoccurredduringJohnAdams's
administration,duringthetenuresofJonathanDaytonandTheodoreSedgwick,FederalistSpeakersinthe5thand
6thCongresses(1797–1801).AccordingtoRisjord(1992),bothDaytonandSedgwickusedtheirpowerstohasten
aFederalistagenda.DaytontookanactivepartinHousedebateandbegantheprocessofusingcommitteesfor
partisanbenefit(see,also,Strahan,Gunning,andVining2006).Sedgwickwasanespeciallyaggressivepartisan,
activelystackingcommitteestohastenadistinctlypartisanpolicyagenda.Hewasalsocrucial(viaatie‐breaking
vote)inremovingfromtheHousefloortworeportersfromtheNationalIntelligencer,aRepublicannewspaperthat
hadbeencriticaloftheFederalistsandtheSpeakerinparticular.ThismoveproducedaRepublicanuproarover
censorshipanddenialoffreespeechthatlastedformonths.BothDaytonandSedgwickleftthespeakershipamida
gooddealofpartisanrancor.2 Consequently,thetwosucceedingRepublicanSpeakers,NathanielMaconand
JosephVarnum,werelessovertlypartisan.
Thus,exceptforabriefperiodinthelate1790s,thespeakershipwasregardedasaminorprizeamongtherank
andfileandthosewhomightrisetotheoffice.AtleastfourSpeakerelectionsduringthefirstelevenCongresses
weremulti‐ballotaffairs,3 notbecausethechamberwasrivenwithdeeppartisandivisions,butbecausepoliticking
forthepostwashaphazardandpersonalfactionsandnascentpartyorganizationswerenotstrongenoughto
winnowdownthefieldpriortotheactualconveningoftheHouse.Thelackofintenseandlastinganimositiesover
thechoiceofSpeakerisevidentinthatnoneofthemulti‐ballotaffairswereprotracted.Thus,therepercussionsof
organizationaljockeyingtendedtobeminor.
Alexander(1916)andHarlow(1917)notethattheinformalpositionoffloorleaderemergedduringthisera,and
wasinfactmorepowerfulthantheSpeaker.Ratherthanbeingadistinctpartyleader,thefloorleaderactedas
lieutenantofthepresident,especiallyduringJefferson'sreign.4 Thus,thefloorleadercouldbestbeviewedas
channelingpresidentialpreferencesratherthanbroaderpartypreferences(whenthese,infact,differed).5Beyond
theseearlystudies,however,littleisknownofthefloorleader'sevolutionduringthistime.
TheliteratureonSenatepartyleadershipduringthiseraismuchspottierthanthatoftheHouse.(Thiswillactually
bearecurringthemethroughoutmostsectionsofthischapter,asscholarshavedevotedfarlesstimetothestudy
ofSenatepartyleadership.)InherbookonSenatechange,Swift(1996)notesthatinformalpartyorganizations
developedearly,justasintheHouse,butthattheseorganizationswereweakandsporadicallyemployed.
Moreover,shenotesthatneithertheVicePresidentnorPresidentProTempore“hadmuchinfluenceoverthe
Senate'sproceedings”(1996,76),mirroringthelimitedSpeaker‐organizedenvironmentoftheHouse.Instead,
Page 2 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
leadershipintheSenatewascommittee‐basedratherthanparty‐based,withimportantfiguresonkeyselect
committeeseffectivelyholdingthereinsofpower.Swift'sbookremainsthebestaccount—andoneoftheveryfew
—ofleadership,andpartyleadershipmorespecifically,inthepre‐Warof1812Senate.
Thisperiodalsowitnessedproceduraldecisionsineachchamberthatwouldinfluencethedevelopmentofparty
leadership.AsBinder(1997)notes,apreviousquestionrule—aprocedureforcuttingoffdebateandproceedingto
avoteontheunderlyingsubjectofabill—waspassedintheHousein1811,whilesucharule,whichhadbeenin
placeintheSenate,waseliminatedin1806.6 Thus,after1811,acohesivemajorityintheHouse—perhapsledby
anactiveleadership—hadaclearproceduralmeanstoworkitswill,whileacohesivemajorityintheSenatelacked
asimilarproceduralmechanismtostifleavocalminority.7 This,accordingtoRobertsandSmith(2007),created
differentincentivesforthedevelopmentofpartyleadership,andconsequentlysetthetwochambersondifferent
evolutionarypaths.
Emergenceofpartyleadership,1811–37
Fromamodernperspective,theHouseduringthefirstelevenCongresseswasunderdeveloped.Asthe
speakershipsofJonathanDaytonandTheodoreSedgwickshow,however,itwaspossibleforleadershippositions
tobeputtopartisanuse.Still,inanerawherea“Jeffersonianethos”(Cooper1970;cf.Risjord1992)
characterizedtheHouseculture,therewerenoloudandpersistentvoiceswhoarguedthattheorganizationofthe
chambershouldbeconstructedself‐consciouslywithpartisanendsinmind.TheHouseasaformalinstitutionwas
underfundedandunderorganized.Asaconsequence,anyrolethattheincumbentofaHouseofficemightplayin
policyorpartisanintrigueswasadhocandfarfrominstitutionalized.
ThatbegantochangearoundthetimeHenryClay,afreshmanHousememberfromKentucky,becameSpeakerin
the12thCongress(1811–13).8 FromClay'sfirstspeakershipuntilthetimewhentheHousebegantoballotforits
Speakerspubliclyinthe26thCongress(1839–41),theformalstructureoftheHousebecamemorecomplex,the
roleofpoliticalpartieswastransformed,andthevalueofHouseoffices,includingsubsidiarypositionsliketheClerk
andPrinter,wasmuchenhanced.
IntheSpeaker'schair,Clayshowedthattheofficecouldbeusedtotheprogrammaticadvantageofthefactionthat
controlledit,whetherthatfactionbepersonality‐drivenorpurelypartisan.AsStewart(2007)describes,Clay's
dynamicleadershipintherun‐uptotheWarof1812demonstratedthatitwaspossiblefortheHousetotakean
active,leadingroleinmomentouspolicydecisions.Clayusedrelativelynewparliamentarytools,suchastheability
tocutofffloordebate,inaskillfulway—takingadvantageofRepublicanhomogeneityonwar‐relatedissuestopass
aclearpolicyagenda.The1810salsowerethetimewhenbothchambersofCongressshiftedfromselectto
standingcommitteestoprocessmostlegislation(GammandShepsle1989;Jenkins1998).Althoughthepowerand
capacityofthesestandingcommitteeswasstillintheformativestages,itwastheSpeakerwhoappointedthem
(seeChapter31byEricSchicklerinthisvolume).Thus,theSpeakerwasnowinpossessionofparliamentarytools
—rulingonpointsoforder,recognizingmembersindebate,andappointingcommittees—thatcould,atleastin
principle,makethisofficethemostinfluentialpolicypostinthenation.
Clay'sleadership‐ledpolicysuccessunraveledafterthewar,astheFederalists'demiseleftaone‐party
(Republican)systeminplacethatfactionalizedintoregionalcampsaroundpowerfulpresidentialhopefuls(see
Young1966;GammandShepsle1989;Jenkins1998).Yet,theleadershippotentialofthespeakershipwasalesson
thatallnowrealized.ThisbecameclearwhentheHouseballotedtoreplaceClayforSpeakerinthesecond
sessionofthe16thCongress(1819–21).9 Thecontestrequiredtwenty‐twoballotsstretchingoverthreedays
beforeJohnW.Taylor(NY)waselected.Thisbattlehadstrongsectionalundercurrents,asthecontesttookplace
amidsttheextendedproceedingsonMissouri'sadmittanceintotheUnion.AsJenkinsandStewart(2002)note,both
supportersandopponentsofTaylorbasedtheirvoteslargelyonbeliefsastowhathemightdoinstaffingthe
committees,especiallythosethatdealtwiththeMissouriquestion.AlthoughTaylorattemptedtobeconciliatoryin
hisappointmentofcommitteesandthe“MissouriCompromise”wasconsideredtobeaslightvictoryforpro‐slavery
advocates,southernHousemembersdistrustedTaylorandsucceededinoustinghimfromtheSpeaker'schairin
favorofoneoftheirowninthenextCongress.
Bythelate1820s,anewtwo‐partysystemwasbeginningtoformaroundthepoliciesandpersonalityofPresident
AndrewJackson.Jackson'ssupportersselectedAndrewStevenson(VA)astheirspeakershipcandidate,andhe
Page 3 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
servedfrom1826to1834,workingcloselywithJacksontofurtherthepresident'spolicyagendainCongress.In
1834,StevensonacceptedanambassadorshiptoEngland,andsixJack‐sonianscompetedtoreplacehiminthe
Speaker'schair.Thecontestrequiredtwelveballots,andeventuallyreducedtoaracebetweenJamesK.Polk(TN)
andJohnBell(TN),withBellemergingtriumphantbyappealingdirectlytoAnti‐Jacksonians(soontobecalled
“Whigs”)whowerewillingtojoinincoalitionwithpro‐BankDemocrats(Sellers1957).Bell,inturn,favoredAnti‐
JacksoniansinmakinghiscommitteeassignmentsandeventuallytookontheAnti‐Jacksonian(Whig)labelhimself.
Bell'sactionsasSpeakergalvanizedJackson'ssupporters,whoralliedbehindPolkattheopeningofthe24th
Congress(1835–7),electinghimeasilyonthefirstballot.PolkwouldbealoyalJacksonianintheSpeaker'schair,
whileBell,nowaleaderoftheminorityintheHouse,wouldharassPolkthroughouthistenureasSpeaker,
employingthefullrangeofdilatorytacticsathis(andtheminority's)disposal.Thus,withinaquarter‐centuryof
Clay'sinitialelection,thespeakershiphadevolvedfromachamberofficewithpartisanpotentialtoaclearly
partisanoffice.Andtheoftencontentiousandlengthybattlesoverthespeakership,asevidenceofthestrong
partisanshipattachedtotheoffice,wouldcontinue—andheighten—intothefuture.
Alsoduringthistime,asJenkinsandStewart(2003;forthcoming)note,otherHouseofficerpositionswouldbe
viewedthroughapartisanlens.ThetwomostprominentweretheClerkandPrinter.10 TheClerkpresidedovera
sizeablepatronageempire,controlledtheHouse'scontingentfund(worthupwardsofUS$10millionintoday's
dollars),andwasthepresidingofficerinthechamberattheopeningofeachnewCongress(callingtherollof
members‐electandtherebyformallydeterminingtheHousemembershipfororganizationalpurposes).ThePrinter
wasresponsibleforprintinganddistributingHousereportsandotherofficialdocuments,aswellasdisseminating
suchinformationtonewspapersthroughoutthecountry(whichcamewithfundstokeepsaidnewspapersafloat
financially),andpossessedconsiderablepatronagecapacitiesaswell.AstheSecondPartySystemdeveloped,
andDemocratic(formerlyJacksonian)politicianslookedforwaystomaintainanadvantageoverthenewlyforming
Whigs,theClerkandPrinterpositionswouldbereconfiguredaspartyleadershippositions,withtheirinternal
capabilitiesandsetsofresourcesrechanneledforthebenefitofthepartyratherthantheoverallchamber.Election
strugglesoverthetwopositionstookonadistinctpartisanhueinthemid‐1830s,mirroringthesituationin
speakershipelections.AndwhentheDemocratslosttheprintershipatthebeginningofthe26thCongress(1837–
9),thankstoacross‐partyintrigue,Democraticleadersbegancallingforanewleadershipinstitutiontocoordinate
nominationsandelectionsonthefloor.Thenewleadershipinstitution,apartynominatingcaucus,willbeexamined
inthenextsection.
Theinformalfloorleader,whohadbeenatoolofthepresidencypriorto1811,increasinglybecameanagentof
themajoritypartyintheHouseduringthisera.Asthespeakershipemergedasapartisanpowercenter,other
nodesofpowerwerealsoneeded.AsAlexander(1916)andRiddick(1949)argue,theSpeakertypicallyselected
theChairmanoftheWaysandMeansCommitteetoserveastheinformalfloorleaderinthechamber.Thiswas
oftenaconcessiontointra‐partyharmony,astheWaysandMeansChairwasoftenarivaloftheSpeaker.Howthe
floorleader'sfunctionsanddutieschangedasthepositionbecamemorepartisanhasneverbeenexaminedinany
detail,andthesubjectdeservesacomprehensiveexamination.
OntheSenateside,lessisknownabouttheevolutionofpartyleadershipbetween1811and1837.Forexample,
whilescholarshavestudiedthedevelopmentofthemajorHouseofficerpositions,littleattention—otherthanafew
shortoverviewsbyByrd(1991)—hasbeenpaidtothesubsidiarypositions(theSecretaryandthePrinter)below
theSenate'spresidingofficer.Thesewerepositionsthat,ataminimum,providedthesamesortsofbenefitsastheir
Housecounterparts.AndwhileSmith(1977)notesthattheamountspaidtoSenatePrinterswereroughlyone‐third
ofwhatHousePrintersreceived,hedescribesSenatePrinterelectionsasbeingverycontentiousduringthistime
(justasintheHouse).Thisisclearlyanareabeggingforresearch.
WhatisknownabouttheevolutionofSenatepartyleadershipduringthiserahasbeenprovidedalmostexclusively
byByrd(1991),Swift(1996),andGammandSmith(2000;2002).Thesestudiesshowthat,unliketheSpeakerof
theHouse,theSenate'spresidingofficerneverdevelopedasastrongpartyleader.ThiswasbecausetheVice
President,whoservedasthePresidentoftheSenate,wasnotelectedbythechamberandthusnottrustedbythe
members.ThePresidentProTempore,whochairedproceedingsintheVicePresident'sabsence,waselectedby
theSenate,butthepositionitselfwasonlytemporaryinnature.Thatis,whenevertheVicePresidentappearedin
thechamber,thecurrentPresidentProTempore'stermofficiallyended.ThepartisanramificationsoftheSenate's
weakpresidingofficerrelativetotheHouse'sstrongerpresidingofficerareputintocontextnicelybyRobertsand
Smith(2007,184):
Page 4 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
TheSenate,whichdidnothaveaprevious‐questionmotionorapresidingofficerelectedfromits
membership,lackedthemeansbywhichamajoritypartycouldassertcontrolovertheflooragenda.
Instead,itevolvedmechanismsthat,undermostcircumstances,requiretheconsentofbothmajorityand
minoritymemberstoorganizefloordebateandamendingactivity.
Asaresult,asthespeakershipwasevolvingintoapartyleadershipinstitutionduringthisera,themajoritypartyin
theSenatestruggledtoconsolidateitspower.Forexample,from1815–37,theSenateadopteddifferent
arrangementsforstaffingcommittees,sometimesgrantingthePresidentProTemporethepower(ifitwasfeltthathe
wouldbeavailable—andcouldbetrusted—toperformtheduty)andatothertimeschoosinginsteadtoballot(fora
breakdown,seeTable6–1inGammandSmith2000).Theballotoptionwouldbecomeastrongerconsiderationas
partisanshiprampedupinthe1830s.Indeed,theAnti‐Jacksonianmajorityturnedtotheballotin1833,unwillingto
allowHughWhite,thePresidentProTemporeandaJacksonianholdoverfromthepreviousCongress,toappointthe
committees.AsGammandSmith(2002,222)note,“Itwasinthisera,whencontrolofthechamberwasfiercely
contestedandoftenindoubt,thatcommitteechairmanshipsbecamepartisanpositions.”Andjustaspartisansin
theHousebegansearchingforanewpartyleadershipmechanismtobettersecurepositionsofpower,partisansin
theSenatealsosoughtsuchaninstitutionalsolution.Interestingly,theanswerintheSenatewouldbethesameas
intheHouse—apartycaucus.
Fitsandstarts,1837–61
TobettersecuretheformalHouseleadershippositions,theDemocraticmajoritypushedfortwoinstitutional
changes:1)amovefromasecrettoapublicballotinHouseofficerelectionsand2)theadoptionofaparty
nominatingcaucustosettleintra‐partisandifferencesanddecideonpartisannomineesinadvance.AsJenkinsand
Stewart(forthcoming)explain,thesechoiceswerepushedbyMartinVanBuren,thetitularleaderofthenational
DemocraticParty.VanBurencametopowerinNewYorkstatepoliticsinthe1820s,wherethecaucusstoodatthe
heartofanorganization—theAlbanyRegency—builtontenetsofstrictpartydisciplineandunwaveringparty
loyalty(Wallace1968;Hofstadter1969).
Thepublicballot—orvivavocevoting—wasfirstadoptedinareplacementelectionforHouseClerkin1838,and
wasextendedtoallHouseofficerelectionsin1839.ThepassageofvivavocevotingwouldallowVanBurenand
hissupporterstoinstitutionalizeapartynominatingcaucusintheHouse,whichwouldmeetjustpriortothestartof
anewCongress.Withintheconfinesofthecaucus,nominationsforeachofthemajorHouseofficerpositions
wouldbeheld,afterwhichelectionswouldbeconductedandchoicesmade.Minorityfactions—thosemembersof
thepartywhosupportedunsuccessfulnominees—wouldbeplacated,usuallythroughcommitteeassignmentsor
promisesofpatronage,andinexchangetheirsupportofthecaucusnomineesontheHousefloor(or“being
regular”)wasexpected.Andunlikethesecret‐ballotera,Democraticleaderscouldexaminewhetherparty
membersfollowedthroughandvotedforthecaucusnominees.Dissidentscouldnolongerdefectandescape
punishment.Thecaucusthushadthepotentialtobebinding.11
Wastingnotime,theDemocratsorganizedapartynominatingcaucuspriortotheopeningofthe26thCongress
(1839–41).TheWhigsmadeahalf‐heartedattempttofollowtheDemocrats'lead,beforeactivelyadoptingthe
samecaucusmachinerypriortotheopeninginthe27thCongress(1841–3),whereintheywouldenjoymajority
controloftheHouse.And,asaresult,acaucus‐ledsystemofHouseorganizationhadbegun.
ThefirstdecadeofVanBuren'scaucus‐basednominatingsystemproducedmixedresults.In1839,themajority
Democratslostthespeakership,thankstokeydefectionsfromtheCalhounites,whilein1841,themajorityWhigs
losttheclerkship,thankstotherejectionofHenryClay'shandpickedcandidatebytherankandfile.Thenextthree
setsofofficerelections,inthe28ththrough30thCongresses(1843–9),followedthecaucusdictateexactly,giving
partyleadershopethatRegency‐leveldisciplineandloyaltywasinstitutionalizing.Thesegeneralsuccesseshid
thefactthatgroupsofnorthernandsouthernfirebrandscontinuedtodefectfromthecaucusagreement,buttheir
numberswerenotlargeenoughintheseCongressestopreventthemajoritypartyfromachievingitspreferred
outcome.
Beginningin1849,thetenuouscaucus‐basednominatingsystemwouldflounder.Thesectionalstrainsthathad
permeatednominationsandspeakershipelectionsoverthepastdecadebrokethroughwithavengeance.TheU.S.
victoryintheMexican‐AmericanWarbroughttheslaveryissuefrontandcenter,asnewlyacquiredwesternland
Page 5 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
wouldneedtobeorganized.Severalyearslater,similarslavery‐extensionconcernswouldcropupinthe
organizationoftheKansas–Nebraskaterritories(aftertheMissouriCompromisewasannulled).Theslaveryissue
wouldeventuallytearthenationapartandleadtoCivilWarin1861.Butbeforethen,Houseorganizationalpolitics
wereaspectacle.
Lengthyspeakershipelectionswouldtakeplacein1849(31stCongress),1855–6(34thCongress),and1859–60
(36thCongress).In1849,thepluralityDemocratsfinallyelectedtheircaucusnomineeaftersixty‐oneballotsand
threeweeks,butthenwentontolosetheclerkshiptotheWhigsinatwenty‐ballotaffair.Officerelectionswent
accordingtothecaucusplanin1851and1853,thankstotheDemocrats'largemajoritiesinthechamber.In1855–
6,thenewlyformedRepublicans,comprisingapluralityofthechamber,wereabletoelectaSpeakerafter133
ballotsandtwomonths,butlostthePrintertoacoalitionofAmericansandDemocrats.In1857,theDemocratstook
advantageofRepublican‐Americanelectoralsquabblingtoelecttheircaucusslate.And,finally,in1859,the
RepublicanswereabletocaptureallmajorHouseoffices,includingthespeakership,afterforty‐fourballotsandtwo
months,butonlyafterdroppingtheirinitialchoicesforthoseoffices.12
Thus,theinitialattempttobindpartymemberstonominationchoicesincaucuswasunderminedbysectional
divisions.VanBuren'sdreamtofurtherpartyconsolidationintheHousebyusingthecaucusasaleadership
devicedidnotcometofruition.Atleastnotyet.
IntheSenate,thecaucuswasalsoattheforefrontofmembers'partisanmachinations.Becausethepresiding
officerdidnotdevelopasapartisanleaderintheSenate,astheSpeakerdidintheHouse,themajorityparty
soughttoinfluencethecompositionofcommittees(andnotably,committeechairmanships)directly.By1845,as
GammandSmith(2002)explain,adecisionwasmadetoassemblecommitteesbypublicballotonthefloor—and
thusbypassthepresidingofficercompletely—usingthecaucusasthecoordinationmechanism.Veryquickly,the
DemocratsandWhigsestablishedaprecedentbywhichcommitteelists(organizedandrankedbyparty)wouldbe
assembledincaucusandadoptedonthefloorbyunanimousconsent.Soonthereafter,in1847,theDemocratic
caucuscreateditsfirstcommitteeoncommittees,which“quicklybecameapowerfulorganoftheparty”(223).
TheRepublicanswouldfollowsuitwiththeirowncommitteeoncommitteesin1859.
Thus,theSenateparties'adoptionofthecaucustodealwiththeirchamber‐specificcollective‐actionproblem
(assemblingcommittees)followedshortlyaftertheHouseparties'adoptionofthecaucustodealwiththeir
chamber‐specificcollective‐actionproblem(electingofficers,liketheSpeaker,whoamongotherthingsassembled
committees).ThispatternoftheHouseactingfirstandtheSenatecopyingthebehavioralsooccurredatleast
oncebefore—intheconversionofthecommitteesystemfromoneinwhichselectcommitteesdominatedtoonein
whichstandingcommitteesdominated.Thisparallelhasnotbeennotedbeforeintheliterature,andthenotionof
Senatedecision‐makersreactingto(andfollowing)Housedecision‐makersprobablydeservesfurtherinvestigation.
PartyleadershipfromtheCivilWarthroughthepre‐NewDeal
FromtheCivilWarthroughthe1920s,partyleadershipinCongresswentthroughvariouscycles.First,therewas
anearlyconsolidation,centeringaroundtheemergenceofthepartycaucusasaviableandinfluentialleadership
mechanism.ThisledtoaperiodofpartypowerinCongress—unrivaleduntilthepresentday—thatspannedtwo
decadesaroundtheturnofthetwentiethcentury.Finally,abacklashagainststrongpartyleadershipoccurred,
andpowerwasdecentralizedinbothchambers.Abriefresurgenceoftraditionalpartyleadershiptookplaceinthe
1920s,butthisprovedtobeatemporaryrespitefromthetrendtowardgreaterdecentralization.
Partyconsolidation,1861–90
ThedifficultiesthatthepartiesfacedinorganizingtheHouseseeminglyvanishedwiththeadventoftheCivilWar.
AsJenkinsandStewart(forthcoming)describe,beginningin1861,nospeakershipelectionwouldextendbeyonda
singleballotformorethansixtyyears.AndnootherHouseofficerelectionswouldeverrequiremorethanasingle
ballot.Thepartynominatingcaucus,whichhadonlylimitedsuccessintheantebellumera,finallytookfirmhold.
Andwhilesectionalissueswouldemergeagaintotesttheparties—seeChapter33byRichardBenselinthis
volume—caucusdecisions,howevercontentious,wouldbehonoredonthefloor.
Theimportanceofacaucusinadvanceoffloorvotingwasunderscoredinthedaysbeforethespeakership
Page 6 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
electionof1863.There,theHouseClerk,EmersonEtheridge,plannedaninstitutionalcoupbyorganizing
Democratsandborder‐stateConservativestojoinincoalitionagainsttheRepublicans,whobythemselveslacked
afloormajority.EtheridgehadbeentheRepublican'sClerkcandidatein1861,butbrokewiththepartyafter
Lincoln'sEmancipationProclamationin1863.AspresidingofficerofthenewCongress,Etheridgeplannedtouse
hisabilitytodeterminetherollofmembers‐electtorejectcertainRepublicanswhodidnothavetheirelection
certificatesproperlyinorder.But,asBelz(1970)describes,RepublicanleadersgotwindofEtheridge'splanand
wereabletoresolvethecertificationissueandtherebysnuffouttheClerk'scoupattempt.Thisservedasa
wakeupcallfortheRepublicans,whowereslowinadoptinganominatingcaucus.Beginningwiththe39th
Congress(1865–7),bothmajorpartiesmadetheirofficernominationsinacaucusthatmetshortlybeforethe
conveningofanewCongress.
NotablecaucusnominationbattlesinvolvedthetusslebetweenDemocratsSamuelRandall(PA)andJosephJ.
Blackburn(KY)in1879andthebruising16‐ballotaffairbetweenRepublicansFrankHiscock(NY)andJ.Warren
Keifer(OH)in1881.13 Ineach,andinallothercasesduringthisera,thecaucusloserwasmagnanimousindefeat
andcalledforpartyunityonthefloor.Forexample,Blackburn'sstatementuponlosingthecaucusnominationin
1881isespeciallyrevealingofhowfarthecaucushadcomeasaleadershipinstitutionwithintheparty:“Theedict
ofthiscaucusistobefinalandconclusive,andiftherebeoneamongthe57gentlemenwhosepartialfriendship
hasgivenmetheirvotesthathesitatesordoubts,tohimInowappealtomaketheverdictofthiscaucuseffective
whento‐morrow'srolliscalled”(NewYorkTimes,March18,1879,1).AccordingtoJenkinsandStewart
(forthcoming),fidelitytothecaucusoccurredbecauseparty“losers”werecompensatedbythenewlyelected
Speakerthroughhisdistributionofcommitteeassignments.Thus,thecaucuswasanimportantinstitution,along
withtheSpeakerandthecommittees,inmaintainingcohesionwithinthemajorityparty.
Asthepartycaucusesgrewinimportance,thecaucuschairmen,whodirectedtheirproceedingsandhelped
determinetheirrules,tookonpositionsofleadershipwithineachparty.Thefloorleaderasapartisanpositionalso
continuedtoevolveduringthisperiod;forexample,beginningin1865,floorleadershipresponsibilityoftenshifted
fromtheWaysandMeansChairmantotheAppropriationsChairman(Alexander1916;Riddick1949).14 Finally,
HouseofficerpositionsundertheSpeakerbecamelessinfluentialinthepostbellumera.TheHouseClerkreceded
intothebackgroundafterEtheridge'sfailedcoupattempt,whiletheHousePrinter(anditsSenatecounterpart)was
eliminatedentirelyin1860afteraseriesofpublicprintingscandalswereuncovered.Bothpositions—especiallythe
printership—hadbeenimportantsourcesofpatronageandfundsthatcouldbeusedforpartydevelopment.Intheir
place,congressionalcampaigncommittees(CCCs)appeared.AsKolodny(1998)documents,theRepublican
CongressionalCommittee(RCC)wascreatedin1866,withtheDemocraticCongressionalCommittee(DCC)
followingtwoyearslaterin1868.Theseinstitutionswerecreatedtodirectandfundtheirrespectiveparty'sefforts
toachieve(ormaintain)majoritypartystatusintheHouse.BeyondKolodny'simpressivestudy,littleisknownof
theevolutionofCCCs(seealsoChapter10byRobinKolodnyinthisvolume).
OntheSenateside,GammandSmith(2002)haveculledthroughanolderandoftenfragmentedliteratureonparty
leadership,whilealsoexpandingourcollectiveknowledgethroughintensivearchivalwork.Theyobservethat
eachpartyestablishedformalcaucuschairmenduringthistime—theDemocratsin1857andtheRepublicansin
1873—andthatsubunitswithintheDemocraticcaucus,anadhocsteeringcommitteeandacommitteeon
committees,begantakingresponsibilityforpolicyrecommendationsandcommitteedecisionswithintheparty.
Moreover,GammandSmithnotethatDemocratsinthe1870sbeganmakingofficerpositions,liketheSecretary,
theClerk,theDoorkeepers,etc.,intoelectedpositions,therebytransformingthemintodistinctpatronageengines.
Thisisinteresting,asSmith(1977)andothersnotethatsomeSenatepositionslikethePrinterintheantebellum
periodwereelected—andaperusaloftheCongressionalGlobesuggeststhatotherpositions,liketheDoorkeeper,
werealsooccasionallyelected.Bothperspectivesarelikelycorrect,aschangesinmethodsofofficerselection
probablyoccurredfromtimeandtime.Morebroadly,thissuggeststhatamorecomprehensiveexaminationof
Senateofficerpositionsduringthenineteenthcenturyisneeded,sothattheevolutionisfullydocumented.
Finally,thecontinuingdivergenceininstitutionalevolutionbetweentheHouseandSenateisdetailednicelyby
RobertsandSmith(2007).Asnoted,thechambersdifferedbecauseofearlydecisionsintheirhistories(presiding
officerdifferences,previousquestiondifferences),whichaffectedsubsequentdecisionsaboutsettingthefloor
agenda.IntheHouse,specialordersfirstemergedinthe1880s,asawaytocentralizeauthorityintheRules
Committee(staffedbytheSpeaker)todictatehowbusinesswouldbeconductedonthefloor.(Theactiveuseof
suchspecialruleswouldnotbecomeprevalentforanotherdecade.)Aroundthesametime,complexunanimous
Page 7 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
consentagreements(UCAs)emergedintheSenate,tolimitdebateoramendments.Whilespecialordersclearly
benefittedthemajoritypartyinassertingproceduralcontrolintheHouse,UCAsrequiredcross‐partycoalitionsto
workefficiently.Thus,partyleadershipinthetwochamberscontinuedtoevolveonverydifferentpaths.
Thehightideofparty,1890–1910
Thetwodecadesbetween1890and1910wouldemergeasthehightideofpartygovernmentintheU.S.Congress.
Powerfulleadersandleadershiporganizationswoulddictatelegislativeproceedingsandoutputsinbothchambers
ofCongress.
IntheHouse,RepublicanThomasReed(ME)waselectedSpeakerinthe51stCongress(1889–91),andunderhis
leadershipthemajoritypartywouldworkitswillinawayneverbeforeseeninchamberhistory.Intheyearspriorto
Reed'sascension,hintsthattheHousemajoritywasattemptingtogainfirmercontrolofthechamberabounded—
mechanismslikespecialordersemerged(asalreadynoted)tohelpmanageHousebusiness,and,asBinder(1997)
andDion(1997)note,attemptstostifleminoritydissent(throughlimitsonproceduralrights)wereplentifulbutonly
marginallysuccessful.Asaresult,CoxandMcCubbins(2005)consider1880s‐eraHousepoliticstohavebeen
governedbya“dualveto,”whereindilatorythreats(andoftenbehavior)bytheminorityalongwithantiquated
rulesfordoingbusinessonthefloor(thecalendarsystemofthetime)effectivelymeantthateachpartyshared
agendapower.OnceintheSpeaker'schair,Reedsetouttoeliminateminorityobstruction.Thisstoryiswellknown
andhasbeendescribedindetailbymanyscholars(see,e.g.,Schickler2001).WithhisRepublicanmajority
backinghimonthefloorinthefaceofDemocraticchallenges,Reedchangedtherulesbywhichquorumswere
counted,reducedthequorumrequirementintheCommitteeoftheWholeto100members,andprovidedthe
Speakerwithdiscretiontoruledilatorymotionsoutoforder.Inaddition,Reedoversawthetransformationofspecial
ordersintospecialrules,whichfurtherenhancedtheauthorityoftheRulesCommittee(chairedbytheSpeaker)
andgavethemajoritypartymuchmoreflexibilityinshapingthelegislativeagenda.15
Thankstothesechanges,theHousemajorityparty—whencohesive—couldgoverneffectivelyandefficiently.
Reed'smantlewaslatertakenupbyRepublicanJosephCannon(IL),who,beginninginthe58thCongress(1903–
05),wouldfurtherconsolidatepowerinthespeakership.16 ElsewhereintheHouse,thefloorleaderposition
continuedtoevolve.Beginningin1896,theChairofWaysandMeanslargelytookcontrolofthepositionfromthe
ChairofAppropriations(Riddick1949),andin1899,thefloorleaderbecameaformallyidentifiedposition—the
MajorityLeader(Ripley1967).17 Also,in1897,anewformalpartyposition,theWhip,wascreatedbythemajority
Republicans(withtheminorityDemocratsfollowingsuitin1900)toserveasaninformationconduitbetween
leadersandtherankandfile(Ripley1964).
IntheSenate,thelackofaSpeaker‐likepresidingofficermadeitmoredifficultforpartyleadershiptoemerge.
Insteadofasingleindividual,agroupoffourpowerfulRepublicansenators—NelsonAldrich(RI),WilliamAllison(IA),
OrvillePlatt(CT),andJohnSpooner(WI)—emergedtocoordinatepartyactivity.Keytotheirsuccess,asdiscussed
byGammandSmith(2002),wastheexpandingpoweroftheRepublicancaucus.Insteadofusingadhoccaucus
committees,whichhadbeenthenorminthe1870san1880s,theRepublicansinstitutedaregularsteering
committeein1892,toorganizetheparty'slegislativeagenda.Thankstoitsmorepermanentinstitutionalstatus,the
newsteeringcommitteewasconsideredmorelegitimatebypartymembers,anditsinfluencegrewaccordingly.18
(TheminorityDemocratswouldadopttheirownregularsteeringcommitteeayearlaterin1893.)Andwhileparty
leadershipcentralizationoccurredintheSenate—tothepointthat,asRothman(1966,59)states,“Senatorsknew
theyhadtoconsultthe[steering]committeebeforeattemptingtoraiseevenminormatters”—itdidnotapproximate
thelevelreachedintheHouse.TheprocessandstructureoftheSenate,relativetothatoftheHouse,limitedwhat
couldbeachieved.
Astowhypartyleadershipconsolidatedduringthistime,scholarssuchasRohdeandShepsle(1987)pointtothe
electorallyinducedpreferencedistributionsofthepar‐ties.19 IntheHouse,partiesbecamemoreinternally
homogenousandpolarizedfromoneanother,creatingacontextthatallowed—andencouraged—membersto
delegateauthoritytoleaders.Inlaterwork,Rohde(1991)wouldrefertothishomogeneity/polarizationrequirement
astheconditionthatisneededtoproducedelegationandsubsequentstrongpartygovernment.20 Smithand
Gamm(2009)generallyagreewiththeRohdeandShepsleaccountfortheHouse,butnotethatasimilarstorydoes
notholdfortheSenate,asthetimingbetweenhomogeneity/polarizationandRepublicanPartyconsolidationisnot
nearlyasclean.Schickler(2001)andJenkins,Schickler,andCarson(2004)questiontheRohde/Shepsle
Page 8 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
explanationmoregenerally,however,astheyfind—usingdistrict‐leveleconomicdataandconstituency
characteristics,ratherthanroll‐callvotes—thatRepublicandistrictsdidnotbecomeincreasinglyhomogenousand
polarizedfromDemocraticdistrictsuntilseveralyearsaftertheadoptionoftheReedRules.Strahan(2007)
acknowledgesthelogicofthehomogeneity/polarizationargument,butcontends—inacasestudyofReed's
speakership—thattheindividualskillsof(would‐be)leadersareimportantconsiderationsthathavebeen
undervaluedintheliterature.Valelly(2009)makesarelatedpoint,statingthatleadershipisalsorelatedtopolitical
context,whichinhisviewhaslargelybeenignored;morespecifically,hemakestheclaimthatReed'sriseto
poweroccurredaspartof“agrandstrategyofRepublicanpartybuilding”thatcenteredonfederallyregulating
southernHouseelections(2009,115).
Inshort,questionsremainregardingwhy(andhow)partyleadershipconsolidatedduringthe1890–1910period,
thehigh‐watermarkofpartygovernmentinCongress.Additionalstudiesareneededbeforeanykindofconsensus
canbereached.
Insurgency,thebindingpolicycaucus,andtheresurgenceofpartyleadership,1910–33
AlthoughSpeakerJoeCannonpresidedoveracentralizedpartyorganizationinthefirstdecadeofthetwentieth
century,disaffectionwasgrowingwithinthemajorityRepublicanparty.AsJenkinsandStewart(forthcoming)
recount,youngHouseRepublicans—theso‐called“progressive”Republicans—wereincreasinglyunhappywith
Cannonandthewaythatheusedhispowerstofavortheinterestsofsenior,“OldGuard”Republicans.21Asa
result,spiritedcallsforreformemergedinthelatterpartofthe60thCongress(1907–09),butfelljustshortofbeing
enacted.AshowofoppositionagainstCannonwasthenmadeintheRepublicancaucuselectionsinMarch1909,
inadvanceoftheopeningofthe61stCongress(1909–11).Cannon,whohadreceivedtheRepublicanspeakership
nominationbyacclamationthreeprevioustimes,received162votes,with25votesscatteringand30absences.
ThecaucusvoteonCannonwouldbeaharbinger.InMarch1910,theprogressiveRepublicans,ledbyGeorgeW.
Norris(NE),wouldcombinewiththeDemocratsinthechambertochangetheHouserulesbyremovingtheSpeaker
fromtheRulesCommitteeandexpandingitsmembershipfromfivetoten,withRulesCommitteememberselected
bytheHouse(seeHolt1967;Schickler2001).22 WhentheDemocratstookcontroloftheHouseinthefollowing
(62nd)Congress,theyfinishedthejobbystrippingtheSpeakerofhisabilitytomakeallstandingcommittee
assignments.ThisfamousepisodeinthehistoryoftheHousewouldhavelastingeffects,asthedecentralizationof
powerfromtheSpeakertothecommitteeswouldremaintheinstitutionalstatusquountilthelatterpartofthe
twentiethcentury.
Asimilar“revolt”againsttheleadershipdidnotoccurintheSenate,buttheRepublican‐ledcoalitionfaced
significantchallengestoitsauthorityduringthesametime.23 Increasingly,asSmithandGamm(2009)detail,a
determinedminoritywasabletousethefilibusterandotherdilatorytacticstostymietheRepublicanpolicyagenda.
AndthereweresimplymoreinternaldivisionswithintheSenateRepublicanpartyduringtheAldricheraof
Republicanrule,makingpartyconsolidationextremelydifficult.Inevitably,aweakorganization(duetothe
particularsoftheSenateinstitutionalcontext)simplygotweakerovertime.Andby1911,withAldrich'sretirement
fromtheSenate,thegroupoffourpowerfulRepublicansenatorswhohadcoordinatedRepublicanSenateactivity
wereallgone.
ThefirstsixyearsofPresidentWoodrowWilson'sadministration(1913–19)wouldusherinunifiedDemocratic
controlofgovernmentforthefirsttimesince1893–5.Onceinpower,theDemocratswouldturntoanew
organizationaltooltoconsolidatepartypowerandpushapartyagenda:thebindingpolicycaucus.Partofthe
movetocaucusgovernmentintheHousefollowedonprogressivechangesinthewakeoftheCannonrevolt.24 For
example,thecaucuswouldnowbesupremeonorganizationalmatters—choosingboththeSpeakerandthe
MajorityLeader.TheMajorityLeaderwouldbeappointedbythecaucustochairtheWaysandMeansCommittee,
andtheDemocratsonWaysandMeanswouldfillouttherestoftheHouse'scommitteeassignments.TheSpeaker
thuswasabitplayerinthenewcaucus‐leddrama,withtheMajorityLeaderbeingthemostimportantindividual
leader.Thecaucuswouldbesecretinitsproceedingsandatwo‐thirdsvotewouldbindallmemberson
subsequentflooraction(seeGalloway1961).IntheSenate,theDemocratictakeoverwouldusherinformal
leadershipchanges,withthecaucuschairman(JohnWorthKern,IN)becomingthedesignatedMajorityLeaderand
aWhippositioncreated,bothin1913.(RepublicanswouldfollowsuitbydesignatingaMinorityLeaderin1913and
aWhipin1915.)TobettermimictheHouse'sabilitytocentralizedecision‐making—andtofortifyitsspotinthe
Page 9 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
bindingcaucussystem—theMajorityLeadermadedecisionsdirectly,bypassingtheformersteeringcommittees
thathademergedinthelatenineteenthcentury(SmithandGamm2009).
Thebestanalysisofthebindingcaucus,byfar,isprovidedbyGreen(2002),whoexaminestheDemocratic
caucusintheHousefrom1911to1919.Greenarguesthatthecaucuswasnotaspowerfulassomehistorians
havethought,ashefindsthat“thecaucusboundDemocrats'votesonjust15legislativemeasuresinfour
Congresses”(2002,622).Moreover,manyofthesebindingcaucusresolutionsprovedtobeunnecessary,asthey
werelinkedtobillsthatwerealreadysupportedbyasizeablemajorityofDemocratsonpureideologicalgrounds.
Whenameasurewasideologicallydivisive,abindingcaucusresolutioncouldnottypicallycompelparty
allegianceonthefloor,asdefectionswereoftennumerous.Insum,Green'sresultssuggestthatinstituting
parliamentary‐stylerulesonmattersotherthanorganizationalvotesisdifficult,especiallywhencross‐cuttingor
ideologicallydividingissuesemerge.AsimilaranalysistoGreen'sfortheSenatehasnotbeenconducted.25
TheRepublicansreturnedtopowerinthe66thCongress(1919–21)andcontrolledbothchambersofCongress
throughtheearly1930s.WhiletheywouldnotcontinuewiththeDemocrats'useofabindingpolicycaucus,a
resurgenceofpartisanshipwouldtakeplaceduringthistime,inboththeHouseandSenate,inthefaceofnew
progressivechallenges.TheseepisodeshavebeenrecountedindetailbySchickler(2001)andJenkinsand
Stewart(forthcoming).
IntheHouse,thefirstmulti‐ballotspeakershipbattlesincebeforetheCivilWartookplacein1923,attheopeningof
the68thCongress(1923–5).26 AnewgenerationofprogressiveRepublicans,demandingaliberalizationofHouse
rulestofreeuplegislationthatlanguishedincommitteesdominatedbyRepublicanregulars,usedtheirpivotal
numbers(roughlytwentymembers)todelaythereelectionofRepublicanSpeakerFrederickGillett(MA).Nicholas
Longworth(OH),theRepublicanMajorityLeader,wasenragedbytheprogressives'actionsandtriedtofacethem
down—withoutsuccess.Aftereightspeakershipballotsovertwodays,Longworthconcededandofferedthe
progressivesadeal,whichwouldprovideanopeningfortheliberalizationofHouserules.Theprogressives
acceptedthedeal,threwtheirsupportbehindGillettonaninthfloorballot—therebyelectinghim—andthenused
Longworth'sopeningtoinitiateseveralruleschanges,suchasdevelopingaworkabledischargeruletodraw
legislationoutofcommitteeandeliminatingthepoweroftheRulesCommitteeChairmantoperforma“pocketveto”
onresolutionsapprovedbytheRulesCommittee.AportionofthisprogressivegroupofRepublicanswouldthen
defectfromtheRepublicanpresidentialticketofCoolidgeandDawesin1924,infavorofRobertLaFollette's
ProgressivePartycandidacy.
Inthe69thCongress(1925–7),LongworthwaselectedSpeaker,andhewouldhavehisrevengeonthe
progressives.Thanksto“regular”Republicanelectoralgainsinthe1924elections,theprogressivewingofthe
partywasnolongerpivotalinofficerselection.Thus,Longworth,withthehelpofBertrandSnell(NY),theRules
CommitteeChairandMajorityLeader,andtheRepublicanCommitteeonCommittees(RCOC),kicked13
progressivesoutoftheRepublicancaucusandannouncedthattheywouldbewelcomedbackwhentheybecame
“regular”onceagainonspeakershipvotes.Longworth'shardlinewasintendedtoreestablishastrongparty
organizationintheHouseandreturnthespeakershiptoapositionofprominence.And,onceintheSpeaker's
chair,heproceededtooverseetherollingbackoftheprogressive‐ledrulesreformsofthepreviousCongress.The
progressiveRepublicansrejectedLongworth'sdemandsforatime,butbeingreadoutoftheRepublicancaucus
andlosingtheircommitteesenioritywaseventuallytoomuchtobear—andtheyreturned“home”andvotedfor
LongworthforSpeakerinthe70thCongress(1927–9).Thus,LongworthhadreestablishedaSpeaker‐ledsystemof
partyorganizationintheHouse,albeitonethatincorporatedtheintra‐partypowersharingrealitiesofthepost‐
Cannonera.Moreover,asBacon(1998)documents,Longworthusheredinproceduralleadershipthatstruck
observersasafriendlierversionoftheReed–Cannonyears.
Ingeneral,lessisknownaboutSenatepartyleadershipduringthe1920s.Schickler(2001)doesnote,however,
thatananti‐progressivebacklashoccurredthatmirroredtheHousecase.In1925,theRepublicanSenate
conferenceexcludedRobertLaFol‐lette(WI),EdwinLadd(ND),SmithBrookhart(IA),andLynnFrazier(ND)for
refusingtosupporttheCoolidge–Dawesticket.Thispunishmentaside,theregularRepublicansoftenfoundthe
progressiveelementintheirranks—midwesternandwesternmembers,oftenreferredtoasthe“Farmbloc”—too
largetocontainadequately.ThisRepublicanheterogeneity,asSmithandGamm(2009)note,madeitdifficultfor
strongpartyleadershiptodevelop.Indeed,Gould(2005)goessofarastorefertoRepublicanpartyleaders—
formalMajorityLeaderslikeHenryCabotLodge,Sr.(MA),CharlesCurtis(KS),andJamesE.Watson(IN),aswellas
27
Page 10 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
informalleaderslikeWilliamBorah(ID)—as“spearless”duringthisera.27
PartyleadershipfromtheNewDealthroughthepresent
Beginninginthe1930s,aperiodofweakpartyleadershipemergedinbothchambers,ascontextualconditionsled
topowerresidingalmostwhollywithinthecommitteesystem.Overtime,conditionswouldevolveandcreatea
congressionalenvironmentthatwasripeforaresurgenceinpartisanship.Inturn,astrengtheningofparty
leadershipwouldoccur.ThiswouldbemostclearlyvisibleintheHouse,thankstothepassageofahostofparty
andchamberrulesdesignedtostrengthenthehandofleaders.IntheSenate,whereasimilarspateofformalrules
changesdidnottakeplace,leadershavehadtorelyuponmoreinformaltechniquestoenhancetheirauthority.
Committeeascendancy,1933–60
AftertheDemocratswoncontrolofbothchambersofCongressin1932,aspartofFDR'selectoraltidalwave,they
wouldmaintaintheirstatusasthemajorityparty—asidefromtwoblipsinthe80th(1947–9)and83rd(1953–5)
Congresses—untilRonaldReagan'selectionin1980.Thus,majoritypartyleadershipformuchoftheNewDealera
andbeyondwouldbeshapedbycontextualconditionswithintheDemocraticParty.
ThefirstfouryearsofFDR'spresidencysawexecutive‐ledpolicymakinginCongress,asDemocratsinboththe
HouseandSenatelargelyacquiescedtotheNewDealagenda.Forexample,theRulesCommitteeintheHouse
workedhand‐in‐handwithFDRtogethislegislativeprioritiespassed.Beginningin1937,however,atransformation
occurredasconservativeDemocratsandRepublicansbegancooperatingtostymieFDR'smomentum.This
“conservativecoalition”hasbeenwelldocumentedintheliterature—putsimply,conservativesouthern
Democrats,wereconcernedabouttheexpansiveliberaldirectionthatFDRandnorthernDemocratsweretaking,
especiallyintermsofhowitmightaffect(andchallenge)theJimCrowsystemthathaddevelopedintheSouthafter
Reconstruction.Thus,intheHouse,theRulesCommitteestoppedbeinganarmofthemajoritypartyleadershipand
beganoperatingasanindependentbipartisanforce,onethatrepresentedideological(conservative)ratherthan
partisaninterests(Galloway1961).
From1937through1960,therefore,averydifferentsystemoperatedinCongress.Partyleadershipwasweakin
eachchamber,thanksinparttotheheterogeneitywithinthemajorityDemocraticParty.Withlargeliberaland
conservativewings,locatedintheNorthandSouth,noconsensusemergedabouta“party”agenda,andthuslittle
powerwasdelegatedtoleaders.Houseleaders(theSpeakerandMajorityLeader)wereverymuchlikeSenate
leaders(theMajorityLeader)duringthistime,operatingasagentswhocouldworktocoordinateinterests,but
possessinglittletonoformalauthoritytodictateorcompelbehavior.Leadershipinfluencethusoccurredatthe
margins,andreliedheavilyupontheinterpersonalskillandsavvyoftheleadersthemselves;SpeakerSam
Rayburn(TX)intheHouseandMajorityLeaderLyndonJohnson(TX)intheSenate,forexample,werenotedfor
theirabilitytousecommunicationnetworksandindividualrelationshipstohelpachievecertainpartisangoals(see,
e.g.,Huitt1961;CooperandBrady1981;HardemanandBacon1987;Caro2002).28 Instead,powerwas
decentralizedinthestandingcommittees(andespeciallyinthecommitteechairmen),jurisdictionalcontrolwas
paramount,andintercommitteereciprocitywashowbusinessgotdone(Sinclair2005).Positionsofpoweron
committeesweredeterminedbyseniority,and,asaresult,southernDemocrats—thankstotheirlongtenuresin
Congress—cametocontrolmanyofthejurisdictionalfiefdoms.AsShepsle(1989)notes,thisportraitrepresentsthe
“textbookCongress”thatmanyscholarspost‐WorldWarIIcametoknowsowell.
Whilethisaccountofpartyleadershipweaknessduringtheconservativecoalitioneraiswidelyshared,Coxand
McCubbins(1993,2005)haveofferedsomeevidencetothecontrary.Simplyput,theyhavearguedthatpartiesin
theHousehaveexertedinfluencecontinuouslygoingbacktotheReedRules—suchinfluencehasbeen
proceduralinnature,asmajority‐partymembershavebeenexpectedtosupportcaucusdecisionsonrules(orrisk
punishment,whichcanincludebeingpassedoverforcommitteechairmanshipsandcanbeassevereas
expulsionfromthecaucus)andmajority‐partyleaders(theSpeaker,committeechairs,theRulesCommittee)have
beenexpectedtoavoidtakingactionsthatwouldharmamajorityofthemajorityparty.TheseworksbyCoxand
McCubbinshavebeeninfluential,andscholarshaverespondedtotheirclaims.Thechiefcritiqueshavecomefrom
SchicklerandRich(1997a,1997b),SchicklerandPearson(2009),andPearsonandSchickler(2009),whoexamine
suchlegislativefeaturesasHouserules,committeejurisdictions,seniorityviolations,anddischargepetitionsduring
theconservativecoalitioneraandarguethatcross‐partycoalitionsweremoreimportantthanmajority‐party
Page 11 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
leadershipinexplainingobservedoutcomes.CoxandMcCubbins(1997,2005)haverespondedtomanyofthese
critiques,andindoingsohavehelpedfosteralivelyacademicdebate.Currently,bothsidesagreethatthe
conservativecoalitionexertednegativeinfluenceinthisperiod—blockingliberalDemocraticinitiativesthatmany
Democratsfavored—buttheydisagreeaboutwhethertheconservativecoalitionexertedpositiveinfluence—
pushinganagendaactivelyhostiletomajority‐partyDemocraticinterests.Sortingouttheseconflictingclaimsina
definitivewaywillrequirenew(andbetter)theoriesofpositiveagendacontrol—aphenomenonweknowlessabout
asascholarlycommunitythannegativeagendacontrol—and(verylikely)newandbetterempiricalmeasuresas
well.29
Reform,transformation,andcontemporarypartyleadership,1960–2010
TounderstandthecurrentstateofpartyleadershipinthecontemporaryCongress,scholarshavetypicallyfocused
onthe1958congressionalelectionsasaninitialflashpoint.Inthatyear,aswathofnewliberalDemocratswere
electedtotheHouseandSenate,andtheyfound(veryquickly)thattheirprogrammaticpolicydemandswere
stymiedbytheconservative‐based,committee‐dominatedsystemthatwasinplaceinbothchambers.Thistension
—whichescalatedthroughthe1960sassubsequentelectionsbroughtinmoreliberalDemocrats—ledtochamber
developmentthatoccurredalongtwoseparatepaths:institutionalreformintheHouseandatransformationin
behaviorintheSenate.Anumberofexcellentbook‐lengthtreatmentsexistonthedevelopmentoftheHouseand
Senateduringthisera.ExamplesincludeRohde(1991),Sinclair(1989,1998,2006,2007),andSmith(1989).
Other,shorter,accountsincludeSinclair(2005),Smith(2005),andAldrichandRohde(2009).Thissectionborrows
heavilyfromthesevariousworks.
IntheHouse,aninitialchangeoccurredin1961,whenSpeakerRayburnhelpedspearheadanexpansionofthe
RulesCommittee(fromtwelvetofifteenmembers),inresponsetoconcernsthatPresidentKennedy'slegislative
agendawouldotherwisestagnate.Asignificantburstofchangewouldthenoccurbetween1969and1975,asthe
Democraticcaucuscontinuedtomoveinaliberaldirection,helpedalongbytheelectoraleffectsoftheVoting
RightsActof1965.Suchchangesincludedtheeliminationofthesenioritysystemthatautomaticallygoverned
committeechairmanships,asacaucusruleschangeprovidedforasecretballotforallchairmanshipsatthe
beginningofeachCongress(conditionalontherequestof20percentofthecaucusmembership);a
decentralizationofauthorityfromcommitteestosubcommittees;anexpansionofresourcesthroughoutthe
congressionalranks,whichgavejuniormembersmoreopportunitiestoparticipate;andastrengtheningofthe
powersoftheSpeaker,whowasgrantedtheabilitytoappointtheChairandDemocraticmembersoftheRules
Committee(makingtheRulesCommitteeonceagainanarmofthepartyleadership),givennewauthorityto
determineappointmentstoallotherstandingcommittees(throughdisproportionateinfluenceonthenewSteering
andPolicyCommittee),andprovidedwiththerighttoreferbillstomorethanonecommittee(i.e.“multiplereferral”)
andsetdeadlinesforreporting.
Intheearlyyearsafterthereforms,decentralizationofpowerintheHousepredominated,aspartyleaders,likethe
Speaker,werereluctanttoexerttheirnewfoundinfluence.ButaspoliticsintheHousebecameunwieldy,thanksto
aproliferationofparticipatoryeffortsbymemberslookingtomaketheirmarkandappealtoconstituentsentiment,
theDemocraticrankandfilelookedtotheleadershipforguidanceandcoordination.BecausetheDemocraticParty
hadbecomeincreasinglyhomogenousbythelate1970s,assouthernconservativeDemocratsbegan
disappearing,thecaucuswaswillingtoallowleadersmorediscretioninsettingandoverseeingthelegislative
agenda.Tocontrolproceedings,theleadershipbeganrelyingonspecial(restrictive)rulestostructuredebateand
floorvoting—bythelate1980s,asSinclair(2005,231)notes,“Democraticleadersdevelopedrestrictiverulesinto
powerfultoolsforadvancingtheirmembers'legislativepreferences.”Leadersalsotookonamoreactiveroleat
thepre‐floorstage,negotiatingwithcommitteesonthecontentandlanguageoflegislationandgenerallyusing
theirauthoritytoinsurethattheparty'sagendaproceededexpeditiously.Bythistime,theRepublicanminority,
increasinglyhomogenousasaconservativegroup,beganadoptingsimilarcaucus‐basedrulesinthehopesof
bettercounteringtheDemocrats.WhentheHousechangedpartisanhandsafterthe1994elections,the
RepublicansunderNewtGingrich(GA),andthenlaterunderDennisHastert(IL),furthercentralizeddecision‐
makingauthorityintheSpeaker,whotookanevermoreactiveroleincommitteeselection(chairsandmembers)
andlegislativepolicymaking.NancyPelosi(CA),whobecameSpeakerwhentheDemocratsrecapturedtheHouse
followingthe2006elections,hasfollowedtheGingrich–Hastertplanintermsofactivityandassertiveness,buthas
alsoreliedmoreupontheexpertiseofcommitteechairmentoshareinleadershipdecisions.
Page 12 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
IntheSenate,thedecentralizationofthetextbookeragavewaytoindividualism.Withtheinfluxofnew,liberal
memberseagertomaketheirmark,normsthathadoperatedinthepreviousera—respectforseniority,deference
tocommitteesandcommitteechairs,etc.—quicklyeroded.MuchasintheHouse,floorparticipationincreased,
especiallyinregardstoamendmentvotesandextendedfloordebate(Sinclair1989).Inaddition,andmore
problematically,obstructionalsoincreased,asmembers'useoffilibustersandotherformsofdilatorybehavior
(suchas“holds”)becamemoreprevalent.But,unliketheHouse,thedominantpartycaucusintheSenatehasnot
formallydelegatednewproceduralauthoritytotheMajorityLeadertorespondtothesechangingchamber
conditions.Asthroughouthistory,theSenate'sinstitutionalpath—asasmaller,moreconsensualbody,withbiases
towardrelativelyweakleadershipandunimpededdebate—havelimitedwhatchamberleaderscouldaccomplish.If
anything,thepost‐1960erahasmademajority‐partyleadersrelyevenmoreuponbargainingandpersuasionto
directthepolicymakingprocessintheSenate.Thatsaid,theyhavealsosoughtnewwaystoleadeffectively,
especiallyasdilatorybehaviorbytheminorityhasescalated.Forexample,SmithandGamm(2009)notethat
SenateleadershavebecomemorecreativeinmanagingSenatebusiness—examplesincludeattemptingtostave
offfilibustersbysplittingorcombiningbills,seekingunanimousconsentagreementstorequiresixty‐votemajorities,
andbypassingtheconferencestageininter‐chamberproceedingsandnegotiatingdirectlywithHouseleaders.30
Inaddition,Lee(2008)arguesthatasSenatepartieshavebecomemoreeffectiveinrecentyearsatsteeringthe
legislativeagendatowardpartycleavageissues—thoseonwhichthereisinternalpartyunityandwidedivergence
betweenthetwoparties—astrengtheningofformalleadershipstructuresintheSenatehasalsooccurred,with
partycaucusesmeetingmorefrequentlyandenhancedresources(bothfundsandstafflevels)beingdevotedto
partyleadershipoffices.31
Whilethesenewleadershipdevelopmentshavebeenhelpful,theminority'sprivilegedproceduralpositioninthe
Senateisanever‐endingproblem—asHarryReid,theDemocraticMajorityLeadersinceJanuary2007,has
discoveredtimeandtimeagain.Intheend,themajority'sinability(or,perhapsmoreaccurately,unwillingness)to
delegatebroadformalauthoritytoitsleaderhaslimitedwhatcanbeaccomplishedintheSenaterelativetothe
House.Instead,themajoritypartyintheSenatehasrelieduponmoreinformalchannelstoachieveitsgoals,along
withabasic(andsometimesslightlynaïve)“hopethatitsdedicatedfloorleadercanimproveefficiencyand
persuadethepublicofitsprogram”(SmithandGamm2009,161).
What'snext?Frontiersinstudyingtheevolutionofpartyleadership
WhilepartyleadershipinCongresshasbeenacentralfocusofstudyoverthepasttwodecadesormore,a
numberofinterestingandimportantresearchavenuesremain.Acompletelistisbeyondthescopeofthischapter,
butIwillhighlightseveralthatstrikemeasespeciallyripeforstudy.
TheturntothehistoricalstudyofCongressisstillrelativelynew,andasIhaveindicatedthroughoutthischapter,
thereisstillmuchthatwe(asanacademiccommunity)donotknowaboutpartydevelopmentintheU.S.Senate.
GammandSmith(2000,2002;SmithandGamm2009)havedoneatremendousjoboffillinginmanyofthegapsin
ourcollectiveknowledge,butahostofadditionalquestionsremain.Perhapsthebiggestquestionis:howdidparty
leadershipdevelop,andhowdiditaffectSenatedecision‐making,intheantebellumera?Moreover,thehistorical
roleoftheSenateMajorityleader—andhowthepositionevolvedfromamoreinformal“floorleader”position—begs
forgreaterexplanation.Thisincludesevolutionextendingintothe“modern”period.Forexample,Smith(2007,68)
notesthattheMajorityLeaderachievedthe“fullrangeofmodernleadershipresponsibilities,”whichincludedthe
rightoffirstrecognition,inthe1930s—yet,scholarsknowlittleabouteventhesemorerecentdevelopments.In
addition,Lee's(2008)workontheriseofinformalmechanismsofpartypoweroffersafreshperspectivefor
understandingpartyleadershipdevelopmentintheSenate—andonethatisnottiedto“orthodox”ideasstemming
fromHouse‐basedtheories.Inshort,someonelookingtomakeamarkinthestudyofpartyleadershipinCongress
wouldnotgowronginselectingtheSenateashis/herareaoffocus.
MuchmoreisknownabouttheevolutionofpartyleadershipintheHouse.Butthisdoesnotmeangapsinour
collectiveknowledgedonotexist.Whilethedevelopmentofthespeakershiphaselicitedagoodamountof
attention(e.g.Peters1997;PetersandRosenthal2010;JenkinsandStewart,forthcoming),ashasthewhipsystem
(e.g.Ripley1964;EvansandGrandy2009),verylittleisknownaboutthedevelopmentoftheMajorityLeader
position.Ingeneral,understandingtheevolutionoffloorleadershipinboththeHouseandtheSenateisfertile
groundforsystematicinquiry.
Page 13 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
Thetimingofinstitutionaladoptionacrosschambershasalsonotbeenstudiedsystematically.Forexample,in
notingthattheHouseandSenateadoptedstandingcommittees(1810s)andcaucuses(1840s)aroundthesame
time,onequestiontoaskis:doescross‐chamber“learning”goon?Dopartyleadersinonechamberanalyzewhat
institutionalchoiceswork(ornot)intheotherchamber—andcopy(ornot)accordingly?Andarethereother
examplesof“copying”beyondstandingcommitteesandcaucuses?Relatedly,thedifferingmembershipsizesof
theHouseandSenateovertimemayaffectleadershipchoiceand,moregenerally,howpartyleadershipinthetwo
chambershasevolved.Whileothercross‐chamberchoicesearlyincongressionalhistoryhavebeenstressed—on
presiding‐officercapabilitiesandprevious‐questionruledecisions—theincreasingsizegapbetweentheHouse
andSenatethroughtheearlytwentiethcenturyisaninstitutional(structural)factorthatdeservesgreaterattention
infutureexplanationsofcross‐chamberleadershipdevelopment.
Examininghowcongressionalpartyleadersmanagerelationswiththepresidentisalsoanareathatrequires
greaterattention.Thepresident'sroleininfluencingthepartyagendainCongressisnotoftenpartofcontemporary
theoreticaltreatments(seeCoxandMcCubbins2005foranexception);thiswasnotalwaysthecase,asTruman's
(1959)studyofthecongressionalpartyfocusedheavilyontheintersectionbetweenpartyleadersandthe
president.Primequestionsforexaminationwouldinclude:whendopartyleadersdependonpresidentialhelp,
givenunifiedpartygovernment?;towhatextentareleaders'jobsdictatedbyapresident'sstrategicchoicesrather
thanasimpleproductofwhatmostcaucusmemberswant?;andhowhastheinteractionbetweencongressional
leadersandthepresidentvariedbytimeandbychamber?
Finally,instudyingthecontemporaryCongress,anumberoftopicsBarbaraSinclairreferstoas“unorthodox
lawmaking”deservemoresystematicanalysis(seeSinclair2006,2007).First,shenotestheemergenceof“task
forces”inboththeHouseandSenateinrecentdecades;thesetaskforcesrepresentbothcomplementsand
challengestothechambers'committeesystems.Whenandunderwhatconditionsdoleadersturntotaskforces?
Andisthereevidencethattheexistenceoftaskforcesaffectspoliticaloutcomesinsomepredictableways?
Second,Sinclairdescribespartyleadersbeingmoreactiveinthepolicymakingprocessinbothchambers,
sometimesbypassingthecommitteesystem(andtheirestablishedjurisdictions).Doesthishappenoften?Andisit
morelikelytohappenwithcommitteesthatarelessrepresentativeofthemajorityparty?Third,Sinclairnotesthat
partyleadershipalsoinvolvesthinkingbeyondtheparticularchamberinquestion—HouseleadersandSenate
leadersoftenhavetocoordinateonpolicyquestionsinordertoexpeditetheproductionoflaws.Whendoleaders
bypassthetraditionalcross‐institutionalmechanismsforcooperation(i.e.conferencecommittees)andnegotiate
directlywiththeotherchamber'sleaders?Isthishappeningmoreoftenovertime?Andwhatexplainsthevariation
—thesubstantiveissueareaunderconsideration,coalitionsizeineachchamber,ideologicaldispersionineach
chamber,dividedgovernment,orsomethingelse?
Insum,whilethecongressionalliteratureonpartyleadershipisfullofimportantandinsightfulworks,opportunities
fornewresearchabound.Studiesthatfocusontheevolutionofpartyleadershipareespeciallywellpositionedto
makeasignificantscholarlyimpact.Aswe,asanacademiccommunity,learnmoreabouthowpartyleadership
operatesindifferenteras(andsub‐eras),thenextlogicalstepistoassesshow,when,andwhypartyleadership
changes(ornot)acrosseras(andsub‐eras)inasystematicway.Someexcellentresearchinthisregardisbeing
done,asIhaveindicatedthroughoutthischapter,butmoreisneeded—andwillundoubtedlybeproducedin
upcomingyears.Ieagerlyawaitsuchwork.
Bibliography
References
ALDRICH,J.H.1995.WhyParties?:TheOriginandTransformationofPartyPoliticsinAmerica.Chicago:University
ofChicagoPress.
ALDRICH,J.H.,andROHDE,D.W.2009.CongressionalCommitteesinaContinuingPartisanEra,pp.217–40in
CongressReconsidered,9thedn,ed.L.C.DoddandB.I.Oppenheimer.Washington:CQPress.
ALEXANDER,D.A.1916.HistoryandProcedureoftheHouseofRepresentatives.Boston:HoughtonMifflin.
Page 14 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
BACON,D.C.1998.NicholasLongworth:TheGenialCzar,pp.119–43inMastersoftheHouse,ed.R.H.Davidson,
S.WebbHammond,andR.M.Smock.Boulder:Westview.
BELZ,H.1970.TheEtheridgeConspiracyof1863:AProjectedConservativeCoup.JournalofSouthernHistory,36:
549–67.
BINDER,S.A.1997.MinorityRights,MajorityRule:PartisanshipandtheDevelopmentofCongress.Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.
—— MADONNA,A.J.,andSMITH,S.S.2007.GoingNuclear,SenateStyle.PerspectivesonPolitics,5:729–40.
—— andSMITH,S.S.1997.PoliticsorPrinciple?:FilibusterintheUnitedStatesSenate.Washington:Brookings
InstitutionPress.
BROWN,G.R.1922.TheLeadershipofCongress.Indianapolis:TheBobbs‐MerrillCompany.
BYRD,R.C.1991.TheSenate,1789–1989:AddressesontheHistoryoftheUnitedStatesSenate,Vol.2.
Washington:GovernmentPrintingOffice.
CARO,R.A.2002.MasteroftheSenate.NewYork:Knopf.
COOPER,J.1970.TheOriginsoftheStandingCommitteesandtheDevelopmentoftheModernHouse.Houston:
RiceUniversityStudies.
—— andBRADY,D.W.1981.InstitutionalContextandLeadershipStyle:TheHousefromCannontoRayburn.
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,75:411–25.
Cox,G.W.,andMCCUBBINS ,M.D.1993.LegislativeLeviathan:PartyGovernmentintheHouse.Berkeley:
UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
—— —— 1997.TowardaTheoryofLegislativeRulesChanges:AssessingSchicklerandRich'sEvidence.American
JournalofPoliticalScience,41:1376–86.
—— —— 2005.SettingtheAgenda:ResponsiblePartyGovernmentintheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
DION,D.1997.TurningtheLegislativeThumbscrew:MinorityRightsandProceduralChangeinCongress.Ann
Arbor:UniversityofMichiganPress.
EVANS ,C.L.,andGRANDY,C.E.2009.TheWhipSystemsofCongress,pp.189–215inCongressReconsidered,9th
edn,ed.L.C.DoddandB.I.Oppenheimer.Washington:CQPress.
FINOCCHIARO,C.J.,andROHDE,D.W.2007.SpeakerDavidHendersonandthePartisanEraoftheU.S.House,pp.259–
70inParty,Process,andPoliticalChangeinCongress,Vol.2,ed.D.W.BradyandM.D.McCubbins.Stanford:
StanfordUniversityPress.
—— —— 2008.WarfortheFloor:PartisanTheoryandAgendaControlintheU.S.HouseofRepresentatives.
LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,33:35–61.
FOLLETT,M.P.1896.TheSpeakeroftheHouseofRepresentatives.NewYork:Longmans,Green,andCo.
FULLER,H.B.1909.TheSpeakersoftheHouse.Boston:Little,Brown,andCompany.
GALLOWAY,G.B.1961.HistoryoftheHouseofRepresentatives.NewYork:ThomasY.CrowellCompany.
GAMM,G.,andSHEPSLE,K.1989.EmergenceofLegislativeInstitutions:StandingCommitteesintheHouseand
Senate,1810–1825.LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,14:39–66.
—— andSMITH,S.S.2000.LastAmongEquals:TheSenate'sPresidingOfficer,pp.105–34inEsteemed
Colleagues:CivilityandDeliberationintheU.S.Senate,ed.B.A.Loomis.Washington:BrookingsInstitutionPress.
Page 15 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
—— —— 2002.EmergenceofSenatePartyLeadership,pp.212–40inU.S.SenateExceptional‐ism,ed.B.I.
Oppenheimer.Columbus:TheOhioStateUniversityPress.
GOULD,L.L.2005.TheMostExclusiveClub:AHistoryoftheModernUnitedStatesSenate.NewYork:BasicBooks.
GREEN,M.N.2002.InstitutionalChange,PartyDiscipline,andtheHouseDemocraticCaucus,1911–1919.
LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,27:601–33.
HARDEMAN,D.B.,andBACON,D.C.1987.Rayburn:ABiography.Lanham,MD:MadisonBooks.
HARLOW,R.V.1917.TheHistoryofLegislativeMethodsinthePeriodBefore1825.NewHaven:YaleUniversity
Press.
HASBROUCK,P.D.1927.PartyGovernmentinTheHouseofRepresentatives.NewYork:Macmillan.
HEITSHUSEN,V.2007.PartyLeadersintheU.S.Congress,1789–2007.CRSReportforCongress,RL30567.
HOFSTADTER,R.1969.TheIdeaofaPartySystem:TheRiseofLegitimateOppositionintheUnitedStates,1789–
1840.Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress.
HOLT,J.1967.CongressionalInsurgentsandthePartySystem,1909–1916.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity
Press.
HUITT,R.K.1961.DemocraticPartyLeadershipintheSenate.AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,55:333–44.
JENKINS ,J.A.1998.PropertyRightsandtheEmergenceofStandingCommitteeDominanceintheNineteenth–Century
House.LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,23:493–519.
—— SCHICKLER,E.,andCARSON,J.L.2004.ConstituencyCleavagesandCongressionalParties:Measuring
HomogeneityandPolarization,1857–1913.SocialScienceHistory,28:537–73.
—— andSTEWART,III,C.2002.OrderfromChaos:TheTransformationoftheCommitteeSystemintheHouse,1816–
1822,pp.195–236inParty,Process,andPoliticalChangeinCongress:NewPerspectivesontheHistoryof
Congress,ed.D.W.BradyandM.D.McCubbins.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.
—— —— 2003.OutintheOpen:TheEmergenceofVivaVoceVotinginHouseSpeakershipElections.Legislative
StudiesQuarterly,28:481–508.
—— —— Forthcoming.FightingfortheSpeakership:TheHouseandtheRiseofPartyGovernment.Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress.
KOGER,G.2010.Filibustering:APoliticalHistoryofObstructionintheHouseandSenate.Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress.
KOLODNY,R.1998.PursuingMajorities:CongressionalCampaignCommitteesinAmericanPolitics.Norman:
UniversityofOklahomaPress.
KREHBIEL ,K.,andWISEMAN,A.2001.JosephG.Cannon:MajoritarianfromIllinois.LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,26:
357–89.
—— —— 2005.JoeCannonandtheMinorityParty:TyrannyorBipartisanship?LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,30:
497–505.
LAWRENCE,E.D.,MALTZMAN,F.,andWAHLBECK,P.J.2001.ThePoliticsofSpeakerCannon'sCommitteeAssignments.
AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience,45:551–62.
LEE,F.E.2008.AgreeingtoDisagree:AgendaContentandSenatePartisanship,1981–2004.LegislativeStudies
Quarterly,33:199–222.
LOWELL ,A.L.1902.TheInfluenceofPartyuponLegislationinEnglandandAmerica.AnnualReportoftheAmerican
HistoricalAssociationfor1901,1:321–544.
Page 16 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
MARTIN,J.1960.MyFirstFiftyYearsinPolitics.NewYork:McGraw‐Hill.
MONROE,N.W.,ROBERTS ,J.M.,andROHDE,D.W.(eds).2008.WhatNotParties?:PartyEffectsintheUnitedStates
Senate.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.
OLESZEK,W.J.1991.JohnWorthKern:PortraitofaFloorLeader,pp.7–37inFirstAmongEquals:Outstanding
SenateLeadersoftheTwentiethCentury,ed.R.A.BakerandR.H.Davidson.Washington:CQPress.
PEABODY,R.L.1976.LeadershipinCongress:Stability,Succession,andChange.Boston:Little,Brownand
Company.
PEARSON,K.,andSCHICKLER,E.2009.DischargePetitions,AgendaControl,andtheCongressionalCommitteeSystem,
1929–76.JournalofPolitics,71:1238–56.
PETERS ,JR.,R.M.1997.TheAmericanSpeakership:TheOfficeinHistoricalPerspective.2ndedn.Baltimore:Johns
HopkinsUniversityPress.
—— andROSENTHAL,C.S.2010.SpeakerNancyPelosiandtheNewAmericanPolitics.Norman:Universityof
OklahomaPress.
RIDDICK,F.M.1949.TheUnitedStatesCongress:OrganizationandProcedure.Manassas,VA:NationalCapitol
Publishers.
RIPLEY,R.B.1964.ThePartyWhipOrganizationsintheUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentatives.AmericanPolitical
ScienceReview,58:561–76.
RIPLEY,R.B.1967.PartyLeadersintheHouseofRepresentatives.Washington:TheBrookingsInstitution.
—— 1969.MajorityPartyLeadershipinCongress.Boston:Little,BrownandCompany.
RISJORD,N.K.1992.PartisanshipandPower:HouseCommitteesandthePowersoftheSpeaker,1789–1801.William
andMaryQuarterly,49:628–51.
ROBERTS ,J.M.,andSMITH,S.S.2007.TheEvolutionofAgenda‐SettingInstitutionsinCongress:PathDependencyin
HouseandSenateInstitutionalDevelopment,pp.182–204inParty,Process,andPoliticalChangeinCongress,Vol.
2,ed.D.W.BradyandM.D.McCubbins.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.
ROHDE,D.W.1991.PartiesandLeadersinthePostreformHouse.Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress.
—— andSHEPSLE,K.A.1987.LeadersandFollowersintheHouseofRepresentatives:ReflectionsonWoodrow
Wilson'sCongressionalGovernment.CongressandthePresidency,14:111–33.
ROTHMAN,D.J.1966.PoliticsandPower:TheUnitedStatesSenate1869–1901.Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity
Press.
SCHICKLER,E.2001.DisjointedPluralism:InstitutionalInnovationandtheDevelopmentoftheU.S.Congress.
Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
—— andPEARSON,K.2009.AgendaControl,MajorityPartyPower,andtheHouseCommitteeonRules,1937–1952.
LegislativeStudiesQuarterly,34:455–92.
—— andRICH,A.1997a.ControllingtheFloor:PartiesasProceduralCoalitionsintheHouse.AmericanJournalof
PoliticalScience,41:1340–75.
—— 1997b.PartyGovernmentintheHouseReconsidered:AResponsetoCoxandMcCubbins.AmericanJournal
ofPoliticalScience,41:1387–94.
—— andSIDES ,J.2000.IntergenerationalWarfare:TheSenateDecentralizesAppropriations.LegislativeStudies
Quarterly,25:551–75.
SELLERS ,JR.,C.G.1957.JamesK.Polk:Jacksonian.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.
Page 17 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
SHEPSLE,K.A.1989.TheChangingTextbookCongress,pp.238–67inCantheGovernmentGovern?,ed.J.E.
ChubbandP.E.Peterson.Washington:BrookingsInstitution.
SINCLAIR,B.1989.TheTransformationoftheU.S.Senate.Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.
—— 1998.Legislators,Leaders,andLawmaking:TheU.S.HouseofRepresentativesinthePostre‐formEra.
Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.
—— 2005.PartiesandLeadershipintheHouse,pp.224–54inTheLegislativeBranch,ed.P.J.QuirkandS.A.
Binder.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
—— 2006.PartyWars:PolarizationandthePoliticsofNationalPolicyMaking.Norman:UniversityofOklahoma
Press.
—— 2007.UnorthodoxLawmaking:NewLegislativeProcessesintheU.S.Congress.Washington:CQPress.
SMITH,C.H.1977.ThePress,Politics,andPatronage:TheAmericanGovernment'sUseofNewspapers,1789–
1875.Athens:TheUniversityofGeorgiaPress.
SMITH,S.S.1989.CalltoOrder:FloorPoliticsintheHouseandSenate.Washington:BrookingsInstitution.
—— 2005.PartiesandLeadershipintheSenate,pp.255–78inTheLegislativeBranch,ed.P.J.QuirkandS.A.
Binder.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
—— 2007.PartyInfluenceinCongress.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.
—— andGAMM,G.2009.TheDynamicsofPartyGovernmentinCongress,pp.141–64inCongressReconsidered,
9thedn,ed.L.C.DoddandB.I.Oppenheimer.Washington:CQPress.
STEWART,III,C.2007.ArchitectorTactician?HenryClayandtheInstitutionalDevelopmentoftheU.S.Houseof
Representatives,pp.133–56inParty,Process,andPoliticalChangeinCongress,Vol.2,ed.D.W.BradyandM.D.
McCubbins.Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress.
STRAHAN,R.2007.LeadingRepresentatives:TheAgencyofLeadersinthePoliticsoftheU.S.House.Baltimore:
TheJohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.
—— GUNNING,M.,andVINING,JR.,R.L.2006.FromModeratortoLeader:FloorParticipationbyU.S.HouseSpeakers,
1789–1841.SocialScienceHistory,30:51–74.
—— MOSCARDELLI,V.,HASPEL,M.,andR.WIKE.2000.TheClaySpeakershipRevisited.Polity32:561–93.
SWIFT,E.K.1996.TheMakingofanAmericanSenate:ReconstitutiveChangeinCongress,1787–1841.Ann
Arbor:UniversityofMichiganPress.
THOMPSON,C.W.1906.PartyLeadersoftheTime.NewYork:G.W.DillinghamCo.
TRUMAN,D.B.1959.TheCongressionalParty:ACaseStudy.NewYork:Wiley.
VALELLY,R.M.2009.TheReedRulesandRepublicanPartyBuilding:ANewLook.StudiesinAmericanPolitical
Development,23:115–42.
WALLACE,M.1968.ChangingConceptsofPartyintheUnitedStates:NewYork,1815–1828.AmericanHistorical
Review,74:453–91.
WAWRO,G.J.,andSCHICKLER,E.2006.Filibuster:ObstructionandLawmakingintheU.S.Senate.Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress.
YOUNG,J.S.1966.TheWashingtonCommunity,1800–1828.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
Notes:
Page 18 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
(1)Identifyingtheearlieststudiesof“partyleadershipinCongress”isopentosomeinterpretation.Earlier
academicstudiesofpartyinfluenceexisted,suchasLowell's(1902)comparisonofvotingintheU.S.Houseof
RepresentativesandBritishHouseofCommons,butdidnotfocusonpartyleadershipexplicitly.Anumberof
narroweracademicstudies,focusingonlyontheHousespeakership,suchasFollett(1896)andFuller(1909),
precededBrownandHasbrouck.And,finally,journalisticaccountsofpartyleadership,likeThompson(1906),
existed,butweredesignedmainlyasbiographicalcompilationswithoutadistincttheoreticaloverviewor
perspective.
(2)Asaresultoftheirovertpartisanship,DaytonandSedgwickreceiveddividedvotesof“thanks”astheirtenures
cametoanend,40–22and40–35,respectively(AnnalsofCongress,5–3,3/3/1799,3054;6–2,3/3/1801,1079).
Suchvotesofthanks,priortothattime,hadbeenunanimous.
(3)BallotdataforthefirsttwoSpeakerelectionsdonotexist.
(4)AsHarlow(1917,177)notes,duringJefferson'spresidency,“[floorleaders]werepresidentialagents,appointed
bytheexecutive,anddismissedathispleasure.”ThisdifferedfromtheFederalist‐dominatedera,whenthefloor
leaderactedmoreas“anassistanttotheSpeaker”(176).
(5)Thedistinctionbetweenpresidentialandpartypreferenceswasnotoftengreat,asthepresident(andhis
cabinetmembers)oftendefinedthepartyatthispoint.
(6)Inaddition,Binderfindsevidencetosuggestthatpartisanshipwasacauseofthepassageoftheprevious
questionruleintheHouse,despitethefactthatpartyfeelingswereverymuchinaformativestageinCongressat
thistime.
(7)WhileWawroandSchickler(2006,64)agreethat“[t]heabsenceofapreviousquestionruledidcomplicate
effortstoendSenateobstruction,”theycontendtherewereotherrulesandprecedentsavailabletofloormajorities
intheSenatetoovercomeobstructionistbehavior.Moregenerally,theyarguethattheSenatewasfairly
majoritarianduringmuchofthenineteenthcentury,andthatminorityobstructionwasabiggerprobleminthe
HousethantheSenatepriorto1890(andtheadventoftheReedRules).Foraburgeoningdebateonprocedural
development,minoritypower,andgoverningintheSenateduringthenineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies,see
Binder(1997);BinderandSmith(1997);WawroandSchickler(2006);Binder,Madonna,andSmith(2007);Koger
(2010).
(8)MuchhasbeenwrittenaboutClayandhisroleintheinstitutionalizationoftheHouse,bothbyaugmentingthe
Speaker'sroleinguidingdebateandindevelopingthestandingcommitteesystem.SeeparticularlyGammand
Shepsle(1989);Jenkins(1998);Strahan,Moscardelli,etal(2000);Stewart(2007);Strahan(2007).
(9)ClayretiredtoKentuckytemporarilybecauseofhealthandfinancialreasons.
(10)OthermoreminorelectedHouserofficerpositionsincludedtheSergeant‐at‐Arms,theDoorkeeper,andthe
Postmaster.Whileallhadsignificantpatronagepotential,nonecomparedinstatureandinfluencetotheClerkand
Printer.
(11)Caucusesthemselveswerenotanewphenomenononthecongressionallandscape.Theyhadalonghistory
incongressionalpolitics,withlegislativepartycaucusesgoingbacktotheearlyfederalisteraandthe
CongressionalNominatingCaucus(or“KingCaucus”)dictatingpartyselectionofpresidentialnomineesfrom1800
through1824.Butforthefirstfourdecadesofourfederalsystem,aregularpartycaucustoselectHouseofficer
candidatesnevertookhold,perhapsduetothesecretballot(andresulting“enforceabilityissues”)thatultimately
determinedofficerselectionontheHousefloor.
(12)TheRepublicansdidnotmakeexplicitcaucusnominationsuntilthe38thCongress(1863–5).Priortothattime,
theyadoptedaninformalagreementthatmemberswouldbeallowedtovotetheirtruepreferencesonthefirst
ballot(foragivenoffice)andthencoordinatearoundthetopvote‐getterthereafter.
(13)Perhapsthemostcontentiouscaucusnominationbattleoccurredjustoutsideofthesub‐era,in1891,as
DemocratsCharlesF.Crisp(GA)andJohnQ.Mills(TX)clashedforthirtyballotsovertwodays,beforeCrispwas
finallynominated.
Page 19 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
(14)ThisoccurredafterAppropriationsbecameastand‐alonecommitteein1865.Suchashiftwasnotcomplete,
however,asseveralWaysandMeansChairmenduringthe1870sand1880s,likeWilliamMorrison(IL),Fernando
Wood(NY),WilliamKelley(PN),andWilliamMcKinley(IL),alsodoubledasfloorleaders.
(15)Whileaspecialorderprovidedfortheconsiderationofbillsreportedfromcommittee,theydidnottypically
altertheproceduresbywhichthebillswouldbeconsidered.Aspecialruleprovidedforconsiderationand
stipulatedprocedurallimits,suchasrestrictionsondebateand/oramendments.
(16)TheDemocrats,aftertakingbacktheHouseinthe52ndCongress(1891–3),wouldrepealtheReedRules.But
afterfacingdilatorybehaviorledbyReedhimself,theywouldreinstatemanyoftheReedRulesinthe53rd
Congress(1893–5).TheRepublicanswouldretaketheHouse,andReedwouldreturntotheSpeaker'schairinthe
54thand55thCongresses(1895–9),beforeyieldingtoDavidHenderson(IA)inthe56thand57thCongresses
(1899–1903).HistorianshavegenerallyconsideredHendersontohavebeenaweakpresidingofficer,butrecent
workbyFinocchiaroandRohde(2007)suggeststhatthismaybeanoverstatement.
(17)DiscrepanciesexistastowhenaformalMinorityLeaderpositionemerged.Ripley(1967)suggests1881,while
othersources(likeGalloway(1961)andHeitshusen(2007))suggest1899or1901.
(18)Schickler(2001),basedonasurveyofthesecondaryliterature,pointsto1897asthekeydateinwhich
party‐leadershipinfluencefullyconsolidated.
(19)See,also,CooperandBrady(1981)onthisgeneralpoint.
(20)Rohdereferredtothisas“conditionalpartygovernment.”
(21)Recently,adebatehasemergedaroundCannon'scommitteeassignmentsandwhetherhetrulyactedasa
majority‐party“tyrant.”KrehbielandWiseman(2001,2005)findevidencetosuggestthatCannon'scommittee
slatesoftenreflectedabipartisantinge,whileLawrence,Maltzman,andWahlbeck(2001)findthatpartisanshipwas
oneofseveralfactorsthathelpedexplainCannon'scommitteeassignments.
(22)ProgressiveRepublicanslosttheirinitialskirmishwithCannoninMarch1909,ontheadoptionoftheHouse
rules,thankstoafewDemocratswhobackedCannoninexchangeforaminorreformconcession.Later,after
winningtheirshowdownwithCannonin1910,theprogressiveRepublicansstoppedshortofacomplete“coup”by
leavinghim—nowshornofmuchofhisagendapower—intheSpeaker'schair.SeeHolt(1967)andSchickler
(2001)fordetailedoverviews.
(23)SchicklerandSides(2000),however,donoteanearlierinsurgencywithintheRepublican‐controlledSenate—
in1899,asetofjuniorandwesternsenatorstookontheAldrich/Allisonleadershipandsuccessfullydecentralized
appropriationsawayfromAllison'sAppropriationsCommittee.ThiswasindicativeofthedifficultythatRepublican
leadersintheSenatehad—relativetoRepublicanleadersintheHouse—throughoutthe“strongpartyera”of
1890–1910.
(24)Onesuchprogressivechangewastoeliminatemuchoftheremainingpatronagecontrolledbythesubsidiary
Houseofficers(Clerk,Sergeant‐at‐Arms,Doorkeeper,Postmaster)andredirectittoaCommitteeonCommittees
withintheDemocraticcaucus.SeeJenkinsandStewart(forthcoming).
(25)ThebestportraitofSenatepartyleadershipduringthe1910sisprovidedbyOleszek(1991).
(26)Thiswouldalsobethelastmulti‐ballotspeakershipbattleontheHousefloor.
(27)SeeChapter6ofGould's(2005)historyofthemodernSenate,entitled“SpearlessLeadersinthe1920s.”
(28)“Persuasion”seemedtobethemaintoolofpartyleadersduringthisera,regardlessofchamber.Forexample,
RepublicanSpeakerJoeMartinnoted,“Iworkedbypersuasionanddrewheavilyonlong‐establishedpersonal
friendships”(Martin1960,182),whileDemocraticSenateMajorityLeaderLyndonB.Johnsonargued,“Theonly
realpowertothe[majority]leaderisthepowerofpersuasion”(quotedinPeabody1976,339).
(29)Foranoverviewofnegativeandpositiveagendacontrol,seeCoxandMcCubbins(2005)andFinocchiaroand
Rohde(2008).
Page 20 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014
The Evolution of Party Leadership
(30)Foradditionalevidenceofmajority‐partyeffectsintheSenate—whicharenottiedexclusivelytoleadership
influence—seetheessaysinMonroe,Roberts,andRohde(2008).
(31)Moregenerally,Leecontendsthatmajority‐partymembershaveinformallydelegatedauthoritytoleadersto
pursuecommongoals,bywillinglyacquiescingtoleaders'agendadecisions;thiscontrastswiththeformal
delegationthathasoccurredintheHouse.
JefferyA.Jenkins
JefferyA.JenkinsisassociateprofessorofpoliticsattheUniversityofVirginia.
Page 21 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford
Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: Oxford University Press - Master Gratis Access; date: 01 October 2014