“The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” Alexander B. Downes Todd S. Sechser
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Appendices for “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” Alexander B. Downes Todd S. Sechser George Washington University downes@gwu.edu University of Virginia tsechser@virginia.edu Updated August 20, 2012 Table of Contents This document contains several appendices associated with the article “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (International Organization 66:3: 457–89). Appendix A: Classification of Cases in the MID Narratives and ICB Archives . . . . . . . . . . 1 Appendix B: Replication of Schultz 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Appendix C: Procedures and Results Using the MCT Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Appendix A Classification of Cases in the mid Narratives and icb Archive In “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (2012, 460–64), we evaluated the 294 disputes in the mid Narratives document (Correlates of War 2 Project 2004) and the 1,000 crisis dyads in the icb dataset (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997) to determine which cases contained coercive threats. We found that the vast majority of cases in these datasets did not involve coercive threats, and are therefore inappropriate for testing theories about the effectiveness of threats. Instead, most cases in these datasets fall into five categories: (1) minor skirmishes and border violations, (2) noncoercive alerts and exercises, (3) maritime incidents, (4) wars and wartime campaigns, and (5) nonmilitarized episodes.1 The two categories of coercive threats – namely, (6) deterrent warnings, and (7) compellent threats – are quite rare, comprising only a small portion of each dataset. In the original article, we presented a table classifying the cases in these datasets into these seven categories (Downes and Sechser 2012, 462). This appendix indicates how we classified each of the cases in these datasets. MID Narratives We begin with the militarized interstate disputes described in the mid Narratives document. As we noted in our article, the mid dataset provides no narrative information about most of its cases, so we do not know which historical events are associated with most of these cases. Their appropriateness as a testing ground for theories about coercive threats therefore is difficult to judge without considerable additional research. However, thanks to the efforts of the Correlates of War 2 Project, we now have access to narrative synopses for 294 disputes – that is, most mids between 1992 and 2001. Although these summaries are not necessarily intended to be comprehensive, they do tell us a little bit about the events associated with these mids. Using these narratives as a starting point, we classified each of the 294 mids into the seven categories listed above. Our classifications are listed in Table 1.2 1 We describe these categories in more detail in the article (Downes and Sechser 2012, 460–64). Note that the “Side A” and “Side B” classifications are taken directly from the mid dataset and do not necessarily indicate which state (if any) issued a deterrent or compellent threat. For example, some states listed in the Side B column issued compellent threats. 2 –1– Dispute No. 3551 3555 3556 3557 4001 4002 4003 4004 4005 4006 4007 4008 4009 4010 4011 4012 4013 4014 4015 4016 4017 4018 4019 4020 4021 4022 4023 4024 4025 4026 4027 4028 4029 4030 4031 4032 4035 4038 4039 4040 4041 4042 4043 4045 4046 4048 4050 4051 4052 4054 4055 Side A United States + 13 others Croatia Croatia Yugoslavia Thailand Thailand Myanmar Vietnam Bangladesh India Pakistan Vietnam Venezuela Honduras Nicaragua Honduras Ecuador Belize Belize United States + 6 others Italy North Korea North Korea Taiwan United States, South Korea North Korea China Taiwan Taiwan Japan China Philippines China China Canada Dem. Rep. Congo China Turkey Cyprus Turkey Greece Russia Albania Yugoslavia Yugoslavia France Russia Russia China Russia + 5 others Russia Side B Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina Cambodia Myanmar Thailand Cambodia India Bangladesh India Thailand Colombia El Salvador Honduras Nicaragua Peru Guatemala Guatemala Haiti Slovenia China China China North Korea Reclassification Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Maritime incident Deterrent warning War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Maritime incident Maritime incident Alert/exercise United States + 4 others Taiwan Philippines Japan Taiwan Philippines China Vietnam Vietnam Spain Belgium Taiwan Cyprus Turkey Greece Albania Japan Yugoslavia Albania United States, Macedonia Croatia Ukraine Moldova Russia Afghanistan Afghanistan Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Maritime incident Maritime incident Nonmilitarized episode Maritime incident Maritime incident Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Maritime incident Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Table 1. Continued on next page. –2– violation violation violation violation violation violation violation Dispute No. 4058 4060 4061 4062 4063 4064 4065 Side A Albania Taiwan China China Indonesia China China 4066 4067 4068 4069 4071 4072 4073 4075 4076 4078 4079 4081 4082 4083 4084 4085 4086 4087 Ghana Chad Nigeria Dem. Rep. Congo Dem. Rep. Congo Iran Egypt Papua New Guinea Papua New Guinea Uganda Ethiopia Sudan Eritrea Kenya Kenya Nigeria Kazakhstan North Korea 4088 4089 4090 4092 4094 4095 4096 4097 4098 4100 4101 4102 4103 4104 4105 4106 4107 4108 4109 4111 4113 4114 4116 4117 4118 China North Korea Greece Turkey Turkey Turkey Russia Albania Russia Yugoslavia Hungary Hungary Russia China Russia Russia Russia Ukraine Azerbaijan Russia Iran Saudi Arabia Togo Botswana Tanzania Side B Macedonia Vietnam Japan Japan China United States, Taiwan United States, South Korea Togo Niger Chad Congo Angola Iraq Iran Solomon Islands Solomon Islands Sudan Sudan Eritrea Djibouti Uganda Uganda Ivory Coast Bulgaria United States, South Korea, Japan United States, Taiwan China Albania Greece Cyprus Greece, Cyprus Georgia Macedonia Ukraine Croatia Croatia Yugoslavia Latvia Russia Lithuania Poland Poland Romania Georgia Latvia Iraq Yemen Ghana Namibia Burundi Table 1. Continued on next page. –3– Reclassification Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Maritime incident Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation Dispute No. 4119 4121 4122 4123 4124 4125 4126 4127 4128 4130 4132 4134 4135 4136 4137 4138 4140 4141 4143 4144 4145 4146 4147 4148 4149 4150 4151 4152 4153 4154 4155 4156 4157 4158 4159 4160 4161 4162 4163 4164 4165 4166 4168 4169 4170 4171 4172 4173 4174 4175 4176 Side A Cameroon Eritrea Dem. Rep. Congo Burundi Eritrea United States, South Korea South Korea Japan Philippines Ethiopia Eritrea Egypt Thailand Yugoslavia United States + 23 others Myanmar Nicaragua Honduras Peru Ecuador Nicaragua Costa Rica Nicaragua United Kingdom Venezuela Belize Guatemala Belize El Salvador Venezuela Venezuela Suriname Suriname Turkey Iran Afghanistan Iran South Africa Togo Libya Cameroon Cameroon Angola Swaziland Dem. Rep. Congo Nicaragua Venezuela Turkey United States Armenia Russia + 3 others Side B Nigeria Yemen Rwanda Tanzania Sudan North Korea Reclassification Minor skirmish/border Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Japan South Korea China Sudan Yemen Sudan Cambodia Albania Yugoslavia Thailand Honduras Nicaragua Ecuador Peru Colombia Nicaragua Costa Rica Chile Trinidad and Tobago Guatemala Belize Guatemala Nicaragua Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Guyana Guyana Iraq Afghanistan Iran Afghanistan Lesotho Ghana Chad Nigeria Nigeria Congo Mozambique Uganda Honduras Colombia Russia Russia Azerbaijan Afghanistan Alert/exercise Maritime incident Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Compellent threat Maritime incident Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Maritime incident Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Maritime incident Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border Compellent threat Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Table 1. Continued on next page. –4– violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation Dispute No. 4177 4178 4179 4180 4182 4183 4186 4187 4188 4189 4190 4191 4192 4193 4195 4197 4200 4201 4203 4205 4206 4208 4210 4212 4213 4214 4215 4216 4217 4218 Side A Uzbekistan China Uzbekistan China Israel Canada United States + 37 others Djibouti Ethiopia Ecuador Syria Turkey Iran Greece United States Russia Eritrea Russia, Uzbekistan Saudi Arabia Iran Turkey Turkey Turkey Russia United States Equatorial Guinea Kuwait United States United States North Korea 4219 4220 4221 4222 4223 4224 4225 4226 4227 4228 Venezuela Russia Turkey Russia India Turkey North Korea North Korea United States Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan Albania Croatia Croatia Armenia Greece Armenia Azerbaijan Lesotho Norway Russia Belarus 4229 4230 4231 4232 4233 4235 4236 4237 4238 4239 4240 Side B Kyrgyzstan Mongolia Tajikistan Japan Syria, Lebanon United States Yugoslavia Eritrea Kenya Peru United States, Turkey Iran Iraq Turkey Libya United States, Canada Yemen Afghanistan Yemen Iraq Iraq Iraq Greece Georgia Russia Lithuania Iraq Iran Sudan United States, South Korea Colombia United States Russia, Armenia Japan Pakistan Yugoslavia Japan Japan Afghanistan Afghanistan Reclassification Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Maritime incident Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina Azerbaijan Turkey Azerbaijan Armenia South Africa Russia Japan Lithuania Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Compellent threat Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Table 1. Continued on next page. –5– Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Compellent threat Alert/exercise violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation Dispute No. 4242 4243 4244 4245 4246 4248 4249 4250 4251 4252 4253 4254 4255 4256 4257 4258 4259 4260 4261 4262 4263 4264 4265 4266 4269 4270 4271 4272 4273 4274 4275 4277 4278 4279 4280 4281 4282 4283 4284 4285 4286 4287 4288 4289 4290 4291 4292 4293 4295 4296 Side A Russia Palau Angola Dem. Rep. Congo Angola Sudan Kenya Cameroon Nigeria, Guinea, Ghana Uganda Uganda United States Nigeria Nigeria, Sierra Leone Liberia Eritrea Honduras Venezuela United States Venezuela Colombia Australia New Zealand Japan United States + 6 others United States United States, United Kingdom, Kuwait Kuwait United States + 13 others Iraq Kuwait Pakistan China China China China North Korea United States + 14 others Central African Republic Armenia Sudan Sudan Egypt Turkey Turkey Turkey Iran Qatar Yugoslavia Australia Side B Georgia Philippines Dem. Rep. Congo Congo Congo Uganda Uganda Nigeria Sierra Leone Rwanda Rwanda Liberia Liberia Liberia Guinea Ethiopia Nicaragua Guyana Venezuela Colombia Nicaragua Indonesia Indonesia North Korea Iraq Iraq Iraq Reclassification Minor skirmish/border violation Maritime incident Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Maritime incident Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Iraq Iraq Kuwait Iraq India Australia Philippines United States United States, Taiwan South Korea Afghanistan Chad Iran Egypt Egypt Sudan Iran Iran Syria Iraq Saudi Arabia United Kingdom, Canada Norway Minor skirmish/border Compellent threat Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border Compellent threat Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border Table 1. Continued on next page. –6– violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation Dispute No. 4297 4298 4299 4300 4301 4302 4303 4304 4305 4306 4307 4308 4309 4310 4311 4312 4313 4314 4315 4317 4318 4319 4320 4321 4322 4323 4324 4325 4327 4328 4329 4330 4331 4332 4333 4334 4335 4336 4337 4338 4339 Side A Russia Yugoslavia United States Guinea Sierra Leone Guinea Angola Sudan Uganda Central African Republic Dem. Rep. Congo Niger Guinea Uganda Tanzania Nigeria India Myanmar Syria Iran Armenia Armenia Greece Norway Japan Turkey Turkey Turkey Honduras Vietnam Philippines Vietnam Taiwan Hungary Yugoslavia United Kingdom Norway China Iran Azerbaijan Dem. Rep. Congo + 4 others Side B Japan United States, Croatia Iraq Sierra Leone Liberia Liberia Zambia Uganda Sudan Cameroon Zambia Mali Ivory Coast Rwanda Burundi Benin Bangladesh Thailand Turkey Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Turkey Russia North Korea Greece Iraq Iraq Nicaragua China Vietnam Philippines Vietnam Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina Russia Russia United States Turkey Russia Rwanda, Uganda Reclassification Maritime incident Maritime incident Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Maritime incident Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Table 1. Classification of threats and nonthreats in the MID dataset. –7– violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation violation ICB We determined the frequency of coercive threats in the icb dataset by using the actorlevel version of the dataset, which contains 1,000 crisis observations (identified by the “crisis actor”) and covers 455 crises between 1918 and 2007 (version 10).3 With a few exceptions, each observation contains one interstate dyad. We then classified each observation into the seven categories described above. Following the approach of Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001), we identified the state listed by icb as the “source of threat to values” (southv) as the challenger, and the state listed as the “crisis actor” (actor) as the target. For a state to be coded as issuing a compellent threat, it must be listed as the challenger in the icb dataset. Conversely, for a state to be coded as issuing a deterrent threat, it must be coded as the target. If a threat of either type was issued by the appropriate actor, we coded the observation as a threat no matter what other actions were taken during the crisis. Our classifications of icb crisis dyads are listed in Table 2. 3 The icb dataset is available online at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb. –8– Crisis No. 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 15 16 17 17 18 19 19 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 22 22 23 23 Challenger France Costa Rica Nicaragua United Kingdom Estonia Russia Russia Russia Poland Czechoslovakia Romania Hungary France Hungary Italy Greece United Kingdom Afghanistan Finland Russia Romania Russia France Turkey Germany France Poland Russia United Kingdom Russia Finland Sweden Greece Lithuania Poland Greece Costa Rica Panama Belgium, Netherlands France Belgium Hungary Hungary Czechoslovakia Hungary Hungary Czechoslovakia Germany France Yugoslavia Albania Defender Russia Nicaragua Costa Rica Russia Russia Estonia Lithuania Latvia Czechoslovakia Poland Hungary Czechoslovakia Hungary Romania Greece Italy Afghanistan United Kingdom Russia Finland Russia Romania Turkey France France Germany Russia Poland Russia Iran Sweden Finland Turkey Poland Lithuania Turkey Panama Costa Rica Germany Belgium Netherlands Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia Hungary Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia Hungary Yugoslavia Austria Albania Yugoslavia Table 2. Continued on next page. –9– Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Compellent threat Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Crisis No. 24 24 25 26 26 27 27 27 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 32 32 33 34 34 34 35 35 36 36 37 37 38 38 39 39 40 40 41 41 42 42 43 44 44 45 45 45 45 46 46 47 47 47 47 48 48 Challenger Austria Hungary Turkey United Kingdom Turkey Soviet Union France France Italy Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia France Germany United Kingdom Turkey Bulgaria Greece Mexico Italy Yugoslavia Yugoslavia China China Poland Lithuania Paraguay Bolivia China Soviet Union Japan China Japan China Bolivia Paraguay Peru Colombia Japan Yemen Arab Republic Saudi Arabia Germany Germany Germany Italy Hungary Yugoslavia Italy Italy Germany United Kingdom Turkey Bulgaria Defender Hungary Austria Greece Turkey United Kingdom Poland Germany Netherlands Greece Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Germany France Turkey United Kingdom Greece Bulgaria Nicaragua Yugoslavia Albania Italy China Japan Lithuania Poland Bolivia Paraguay Soviet Union China China Japan China Japan Paraguay Bolivia Colombia Peru China Saudi Arabia Yemen Arab Republic Austria Czechoslovakia Italy Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Hungary Ethiopia United Kingdom France Italy Bulgaria Turkey Table 2. Continued on next page. – 10 – Reclassification Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Crisis No. 48 49 50 50 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 52 53 53 54 54 54 55 55 56 56 57 57 58 59 60 60 61 62 62 62 62 63 63 64 64 64 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 71 71 71 72 72 73 74 Challenger Turkey Germany Ecuador Peru Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Italy France Turkey Spain Spain Germany Soviet Union Japan Japan China Nicaragua Honduras Dominican Republic Japan Germany Austria Poland Germany Germany Germany Czechoslovakia Soviet Union Japan Germany Germany Germany Germany Italy Italy Italy Germany Germany Germany Italy Italy Italy Italy Japan Soviet Union Japan Germany Defender Bulgaria Lithuania Peru Ecuador Belgium Czechoslovakia Poland Romania Yugoslavia France United Kingdom Spain Turkey France Italy Germany Spain Japan Soviet Union China Japan Honduras Nicaragua Haiti United States Austria Germany Lithuania Czechoslovakia France United Kingdom Germany Japan Soviet Union Czechoslovakia France United Kingdom Soviet Union Spain France Spain Czechoslovakia Lithuania Poland Albania France Greece United Kingdom Soviet Union Japan United Kingdom Latvia Table 2. Continued on next page. – 11 – Reclassification Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Compellent threat Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Compellent threat Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Compellent threat Compellent threat Compellent threat Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Deterrent warning War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Crisis No. 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 74 75 75 75 76 76 76 76 77 77 77 77 77 78 78 78 78 78 79 80 80 80 81 82 82 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 Challenger Soviet Union Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union Germany Soviet Union Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Japan Soviet Union Hungary Bulgaria Germany Italy United Kingdom Italy Italy Italy Bulgaria Greece United Kingdom Germany Germany Defender Japan United Kingdom Soviet Union Luxembourg Switzerland Denmark Estonia Finland Norway Romania Sweden Lithuania Australia Belgium France Netherlands New Zealand Canada Poland South Africa Estonia Latvia Lithuania Finland Sweden France United Kingdom Norway Denmark Netherlands France United Kingdom Luxembourg Netherlands Belgium United Kingdom France United Kingdom Romania Romania Romania United Kingdom United Kingdom Italy Greece Yugoslavia United Kingdom Turkey Italy Germany Yugoslavia Greece Table 2. Continued on next page. – 12 – Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Compellent threat Compellent threat Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Compellent threat Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Compellent threat Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Crisis No. 83 84 84 84 84 85 85 86 86 87 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 89 89 90 90 91 91 92 93 93 93 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 102 103 104 104 104 105 105 106 107 108 108 Challenger Germany United Kingdom Germany United Kingdom United Kingdom Germany Germany Peru Ecuador Soviet Union United States Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan United States United States Germany Soviet Union United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union United States United States Soviet Union United States Soviet Union United States Soviet Union United States Romania Soviet Union United States Yugoslavia Yugoslavia United States France United Kingdom Soviet Union United States Soviet Union Soviet Union Defender United Kingdom Iraq United Kingdom Germany Luxembourg Soviet Union Soviet Union Ecuador Peru Iran Japan United Kingdom Netherlands Australia New Zealand Canada United States Thailand Germany Italy Soviet Union Germany Germany Italy Italy Germany Hungary Romania Germany Hungary Germany Germany Japan Iran Japan United Kingdom Japan Germany Japan Soviet Union Romania Japan United Kingdom United States Yugoslavia Syria France Turkey Japan Iran United Kingdom Table 2. Continued on next page. – 13 – Reclassification War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Crisis No. 108 108 109 109 110 111 111 112 113 113 114 114 114 115 115 116 116 117 118 118 119 119 120 120 120 120 120 120 121 121 122 123 123 123 123 124 125 125 126 127 127 128 128 128 129 129 130 131 132 132 132 132 Challenger Soviet Union United States Indonesia Netherlands United States Soviet Union Soviet Union Yugoslavia United States Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union United States Soviet Union Netherlands Indonesia Cuba Pakistan India Pakistan India Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Egypt United States Soviet Union Soviet Union United States Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Pakistan Soviet Union China Nicaragua Netherlands Indonesia Israel Israel United Kingdom Pakistan Afghanistan Cuba Soviet Union North Korea Soviet Union United States China Defender United States Soviet Union Netherlands Indonesia Soviet Union Turkey United States Greece Soviet Union Hungary Greece Turkey United States Soviet Union Czechoslovakia Indonesia Netherlands Dominican Republic India Pakistan India Pakistan Iraq Egypt Lebanon Jordan Syria Israel Soviet Union Czechoslovakia Finland Soviet Union France United Kingdom United States India United States China Costa Rica Indonesia Netherlands Egypt United Kingdom Israel Afghanistan Pakistan Dominican Republic Yugoslavia South Korea United States China Taiwan Table 2. Continued on next page. – 14 – Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Crisis No. 133 133 133 133 133 134 134 135 135 136 136 137 138 139 139 140 140 140 140 141 142 142 143 144 144 144 145 145 145 146 146 146 146 147 147 148 149 149 150 150 151 152 152 152 152 152 152 153 153 154 154 155 Challenger United States United States United States China North Korea Israel Syria Pakistan India United Kingdom Egypt Soviet Union Taiwan Vietnam Vietnam Soviet Union United States South Korea North Korea United States Italy Yugoslavia Israel United States Soviet Union Guatemala Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam United States China China China Nicaragua Costa Rica United States Israel Egypt Pakistan Afghanistan India Egypt Egypt Israel Israel Soviet Union Soviet Union Israel Iraq Poland Soviet Union Hungary Defender North Korea China Soviet Union United States South Korea Syria Israel India Pakistan Egypt United Kingdom Sweden Myanmar France Laos United States China North Korea South Korea Soviet Union Yugoslavia Italy Jordan Guatemala United States Honduras France United States United Kingdom China Taiwan United States Taiwan Costa Rica Nicaragua Egypt Egypt Israel Afghanistan Pakistan Portugal France United Kingdom Egypt Soviet Union United States Israel Jordan Israel Soviet Union Poland Soviet Union Table 2. Continued on next page. – 15 – Reclassification War/wartime campaign Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Crisis No. 155 156 156 157 158 159 159 159 160 161 162 162 163 164 165 165 165 165 166 166 166 167 167 168 168 168 168 168 168 169 169 170 170 170 170 171 171 172 172 173 173 174 175 175 176 176 176 177 177 178 178 179 Challenger Soviet Union Honduras Nicaragua Egypt France Soviet Union Soviet Union United States Morocco Indonesia Egypt Egypt Egypt United States Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt China China United States Cambodia Thailand Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union United States United States Mexico Guatemala Cuba Cuba Cuba Cuba India China Iran Iraq Israel Egypt Togo Dominican Republic Venezuela Congo Belgium Belgium Senegal Mali Cuba Cuba Somalia Defender Hungary Nicaragua Honduras Jordan Tunisia Turkey United States Syria Spain Netherlands Iraq Jordan United States Indonesia Lebanon Jordan United Kingdom United States Taiwan United States China Thailand Cambodia France United Kingdom United States West Germany East Germany Soviet Union Guatemala Mexico Panama Nicaragua Dominican Republic Haiti China India Iraq Iran Egypt Israel Ghana Venezuela Dominican Republic Belgium Dem. Rep. Congo Dem. Rep. Congo Mali Senegal Nicaragua Guatemala Ethiopia Table 2. Continued on next page. – 16 – Reclassification War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Maritime incident Maritime incident Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Compellent threat Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Crisis No. 180 180 181 181 182 182 183 183 183 184 184 185 185 185 185 185 185 186 186 187 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 193 194 194 194 195 195 195 195 196 196 196 197 197 198 198 199 199 200 201 202 202 202 203 203 203 Challenger Vietnam Vietnam United States Cuba Afghanistan Pakistan United Kingdom Iraq Iraq Tunisia France West Germany United States Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Vietnam Vietnam Netherlands Indonesia Syria Soviet Union India Morocco United States Vietnam Vietnam China India China Egypt Egypt Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Soviet Union United States United States Indonesia Malaysia Haiti Dominican Republic Morocco Algeria Cuba Somalia Greece Turkey Turkey Israel Israel Israel Defender United States Thailand Cuba United States Pakistan Afghanistan Iraq Kuwait United Kingdom France Tunisia East Germany Soviet Union France United Kingdom West Germany United States Republic of Vietnam United States Indonesia Netherlands Egypt Finland Portugal Mauritania China Thailand United States India China India Jordan Saudi Arabia Egypt Yemen Arab Republic United States Cuba Soviet Union Malaysia Indonesia Dominican Republic Haiti Algeria Morocco Venezuela Kenya Turkey Cyprus Greece Jordan Lebanon Syria Table 2. Continued on next page. – 17 – Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Compellent threat Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Crisis No. 203 203 204 204 205 205 206 206 207 208 208 209 209 209 210 210 211 211 211 211 212 212 212 213 213 213 214 214 215 216 216 216 217 218 219 219 219 220 220 221 222 222 222 222 222 222 223 223 223 224 224 224 Challenger Israel Syria Benin Niger Burundi Rwanda United States Panama Uganda Somalia Ethiopia Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Egypt United States Soviet Union Soviet Union Dem. Rep. Congo Soviet Union United States Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Egypt Vietnam Soviet Union United States Pakistan India Dominican Republic Pakistan India China Ivory Coast Zimbabwe Egypt Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia Jordan Israel Cuba Egypt Israel Israel Soviet Union Israel Israel Greece Turkey Turkey North Korea North Korea United States Defender Egypt Israel Niger Benin Rwanda Burundi Panama United States United Kingdom Ethiopia Somalia Yemen Arab Republic Egypt Saudi Arabia Vietnam United States Dem. Rep. Congo Belgium United States Soviet Union Egypt Yemen Arab Republic Saudi Arabia Republic of Vietnam United States Vietnam India Pakistan United States India Pakistan India Guinea Zambia Saudi Arabia Egypt Yemen Arab Republic Israel Jordan Bolivia Israel Jordan Egypt United States Syria Soviet Union Turkey Greece Cyprus South Korea United States North Korea Table 2. Continued on next page. – 18 – Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Crisis No. 225 225 226 226 227 227 227 227 227 227 228 229 230 230 231 231 232 232 232 232 232 233 234 234 235 235 236 237 237 237 237 238 238 238 238 239 240 241 241 242 242 242 242 243 243 244 245 245 246 246 246 Challenger Vietnam Vietnam Jordan Israel Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Soviet Union Czechoslovakia Soviet Union Venezuela Israel Vietnam Vietnam China Soviet Union Egypt Israel Israel Israel Egypt North Korea Iraq Iran Honduras El Salvador Syria United States Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Jordan Syria Syria Syria Soviet Union Portugal Republic of Vietnam Republic of Vietnam Pakistan India Pakistan India Chad Libya South Africa Uganda Tanzania Vietnam Vietnam Republic of Vietnam Defender Republic of Vietnam United States Israel Jordan East Germany Poland Bulgaria Hungary Soviet Union Czechoslovakia Guyana Lebanon United States Republic of Vietnam Soviet Union China Israel Egypt Egypt Soviet Union Israel United States Iran Iraq El Salvador Honduras Lebanon Vietnam Cambodia Republic of Vietnam United States Syria United States Israel Jordan United States Guinea Laos Vietnam Bangladesh Pakistan India Pakistan Libya Chad Zambia Tanzania Uganda Republic of Vietnam United States Vietnam Table 2. Continued on next page. – 19 – Reclassification War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Deterrent warning Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Deterrent warning War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Crisis No. 247 247 248 248 249 249 249 250 251 252 253 254 254 255 255 255 255 255 255 256 257 257 257 258 258 259 259 260 260 260 260 260 260 260 261 261 261 261 262 263 263 264 265 266 267 267 268 269 270 270 271 272 Challenger Tanzania Uganda Yemen People’s Republic Saudi Arabia Vietnam Vietnam Republic of Vietnam Zimbabwe Libya Iraq Egypt Iceland United Kingdom Egypt Egypt Israel Soviet Union Israel Israel Yemen People’s Republic Turkey Greece Turkey Vietnam Vietnam Cambodia United States Angola Angola Soviet Union South Africa South Africa United States Soviet Union Morocco Algeria Morocco Algeria Guatemala Iceland United Kingdom Portugal Israel Uganda Mozambique Zimbabwe Algeria Iraq Syria Israel Libya Turkey Defender Uganda Tanzania Yemen Arab Republic Yemen People’s Republic Republic of Vietnam United States Vietnam Zambia Israel Kuwait Israel United Kingdom Iceland Israel Israel Syria United States Egypt Soviet Union Oman Cyprus Turkey Greece Republic of Vietnam Cambodia United States Cambodia Zambia Dem. Rep. Congo South Africa Angola Cuba Soviet Union United States Spain Morocco Algeria Mauritania United Kingdom United Kingdom Iceland Indonesia Syria Kenya Zimbabwe Mozambique Mauritania Syria Israel Uganda Sudan Greece Table 2. Continued on next page. – 20 – Reclassification Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Deterrent warning War/wartime campaign Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Deterrent warning Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Crisis No. 272 273 274 274 275 276 277 277 278 279 280 281 281 282 282 283 284 284 284 285 285 286 287 287 288 288 289 290 290 290 291 291 292 292 292 292 292 293 293 294 294 294 295 295 296 296 296 297 298 298 299 300 Challenger Greece Zimbabwe North Korea United States Syria Zimbabwe Angola Dem. Rep. Congo Zimbabwe Guatemala Algeria United States Libya Somalia Soviet Union Zimbabwe Vietnam Cambodia Cambodia Algeria France Zimbabwe Argentina Chile Chad Libya Israel Libya France Libya Angola South Africa Angola Dem. Rep. Congo Angola Soviet Union Angola Zambia Zimbabwe Costa Rica Nicaragua Costa Rica Argentina Chile Uganda Tanzania Tanzania South Africa Soviet Union China Algeria Zambia Defender Turkey Mozambique United States North Korea Israel Botswana Dem. Rep. Congo Angola Mozambique United Kingdom Mauritania Libya Egypt Ethiopia Somalia Zambia Cambodia Vietnam Thailand France Algeria Mozambique Chile Argentina Libya Chad Lebanon France Libya Chad South Africa Angola Dem. Rep. Congo Angola Belgium United States France Zimbabwe Zambia Nicaragua Costa Rica Nicaragua Chile Argentina Tanzania Uganda Libya Angola China Vietnam Morocco Zimbabwe Table 2. Continued on next page. – 21 – Reclassification Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Crisis No. 300 300 301 301 302 303 303 303 303 304 304 304 305 305 306 307 307 307 307 308 309 309 310 310 311 311 312 313 314 314 315 315 315 315 316 317 317 318 319 320 320 320 321 321 322 322 323 324 324 325 325 326 Challenger Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Yemen People’s Republic Saudi Arabia South Africa United States Soviet Union Soviet Union Soviet Union Chad Libya Libya Algeria Morocco Soviet Union Mozambique Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Zimbabwe South Africa Iran United States Nicaragua Colombia Libya France Algeria South Africa Libya Egypt Soviet Union Poland Poland Poland Libya Iraq Iran Libya Syria Ethiopia Somalia Somalia Libya France Peru Ecuador South Africa Iraq Israel Venezuela Cuba Nicaragua Defender Angola Zambia Yemen Arab Republic Yemen People’s Republic Angola Soviet Union Afghanistan Pakistan United States Libya Chad France Morocco Algeria Pakistan Zimbabwe Botswana Mozambique Zambia Angola United States Iran Colombia Nicaragua Tunisia Libya Morocco Angola Egypt Libya Poland Soviet Union Czechoslovakia East Germany Malta Iran Iraq Gambia Jordan Somalia Ethiopia Kenya France Libya Ecuador Peru Mozambique Israel Iraq Guyana Venezuela Honduras Table 2. Continued on next page. – 22 – Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Crisis No. 326 327 327 328 328 329 330 331 332 333 333 334 334 335 336 336 337 337 337 338 338 339 340 340 340 341 341 342 342 342 343 343 344 345 346 347 348 348 348 348 349 350 350 350 351 352 352 353 353 354 354 Challenger Honduras Israel Syria Cameroon Nigeria Gambia United States South Africa Algeria Soviet Union Sweden Iran Iran Iran Argentina United Kingdom Israel Israel Syria Ethiopia Somalia South Africa Libya Libya United States Nigeria Chad Libya Libya France Grenada United States United States Zimbabwe Ethiopia South Africa Iran Iraq Iran Iran Turkey Libya Libya United States Vietnam China Vietnam Laos Thailand Soviet Union United States Defender Nicaragua Syria Israel Nigeria Cameroon Senegal Libya Angola Morocco Sweden Soviet Union Bahrain Saudi Arabia Iraq United Kingdom Argentina Lebanon Syria Israel Somalia Ethiopia Lesotho Sudan Egypt Libya Chad Nigeria Chad France Libya United States Grenada Soviet Union Botswana Sudan Angola Iraq Iran Kuwait Saudi Arabia Greece Sudan Egypt Libya Thailand Vietnam China Thailand Laos United States Nicaragua Table 2. Continued on next page. – 23 – Reclassification Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Deterrent warning Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Crisis No. 355 356 357 357 358 358 359 359 360 361 361 361 361 362 362 362 363 363 364 365 365 365 366 367 368 369 369 370 370 371 371 372 372 373 374 375 375 375 376 376 377 378 378 379 379 380 380 381 381 382 382 383 Challenger South Africa Libya Israel Syria Libya Egypt Burkina Faso Mali South Africa Iran Iran Iran Iraq Libya Libya France United States Libya Qatar South Africa South Africa South Africa Sudan Mozambique Ghana Nicaragua Honduras Libya Chad China Vietnam Pakistan India Ethiopia Iran Algeria Morocco Morocco Turkey Greece Cameroon Sri Lanka India Iran Saudi Arabia South Africa Cuba Thailand Laos Uganda Kenya Nicaragua Defender Botswana Tunisia Syria Israel Egypt Libya Mali Burkina Faso Lesotho Iraq Kuwait Saudi Arabia Iran Chad France Libya Libya United States Bahrain Botswana Zambia Zimbabwe Uganda Malawi Togo Honduras Nicaragua Chad Libya Vietnam China India Pakistan Somalia Syria Morocco Mauritania Algeria Greece Turkey Nigeria India Sri Lanka Saudi Arabia Iran Angola South Africa Laos Thailand Kenya Uganda Honduras Table 2. Continued on next page. – 24 – Reclassification Compellent threat Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Crisis No. 383 384 384 385 386 386 387 387 388 388 389 390 391 391 392 392 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 393 394 395 396 397 397 397 398 399 399 399 400 400 401 401 402 402 403 403 403 404 404 405 Challenger United States China Vietnam Iraq Libya United States Mauritania Senegal China China Nicaragua Algeria Panama United States Pakistan India Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq United States Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Iraq Uganda Burkina Faso Togo Croatia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Iraq Dem. Rep. Congo Dem. Rep. Congo France Peru Ecuador Azerbaijan Armenia Sudan Egypt Yugoslavia Bosnia and Herzegovina Yugoslavia Papua New Guinea Solomon Islands Myanmar Defender Nicaragua Vietnam China Iran United States Libya Senegal Mauritania Cambodia Vietnam Honduras Morocco United States Panama India Pakistan Kuwait United States Bahrain Egypt France Iraq Israel Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Syria United Arab Emirates United Kingdom Rwanda Sierra Leone Ghana Yugoslavia Slovenia Croatia Kuwait Belgium France Dem. Rep. Congo Ecuador Peru Armenia Azerbaijan Egypt Sudan Bosnia and Herzegovina Yugoslavia Croatia Solomon Islands Papua New Guinea Thailand Table 2. Continued on next page. – 25 – Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Compellent threat Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Compellent threat Crisis No. 405 406 407 408 408 408 409 409 410 410 411 411 412 412 412 412 413 413 414 415 415 416 416 417 417 418 418 419 419 420 420 421 421 422 422 423 423 424 424 425 425 426 426 426 426 426 426 426 427 427 427 Challenger Thailand United States, United Kingdom, France Russia United States North Korea North Korea Syria Israel Cameroon Nigeria Haiti United States Iraq Iraq Iraq United States Peru Ecuador China Taiwan China Yemen Arab Republic Eritrea Greece Turkey Nonstate actor Israel United States Iraq North Korea South Korea Rwanda Dem. Rep. Congo Iraq United States Cyprus Turkey Ethiopia Eritrea Pakistan India Dem. Rep. Congo Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Zimbabwe United States Afghanistan United States Defender Myanmar Iraq Reclassification Minor skirmish/border violation Alert/exercise Georgia North Korea South Korea United States Israel Lebanon Nigeria Cameroon United States Haiti Kuwait Saudi Arabia United States Iraq Ecuador Peru Philippines China Taiwan Eritrea Yemen Arab Republic Turkey Greece Israel Lebanon Iraq United States South Korea North Korea Dem. Rep. Congo Rwanda United States Iraq Turkey Cyprus Eritrea Ethiopia India Pakistan Rwanda Angola Chad Dem. Rep. Congo Namibia Zimbabwe Uganda Afghanistan United States Sudan Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Alert/exercise War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation War/wartime campaign Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Table 2. Continued on next page. – 26 – Crisis No. 428 429 429 429 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 430 431 431 432 432 433 434 434 434 434 435 435 436 436 437 437 438 438 439 439 440 440 440 441 441 442 442 442 442 443 443 444 444 445 445 446 446 Challenger Turkey Iraq Iraq United States Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Yugoslavia United States Pakistan India Indonesia Australia Iran United States Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Pakistan India Pakistan India Myanmar Thailand Morocco Spain Georgia Russia United States Iraq Iraq North Korea United States Iran Iran Iran United States Syria Israel Rwanda Dem. Rep. Congo Russia Georgia Eritrea Ethiopia Defender Syria United Kingdom United States Iraq Albania Belgium Canada France Germany Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain United Kingdom United States Yugoslavia India Pakistan Australia Indonesia Azerbaijan Afghanistan Pakistan United Kingdom United States India Pakistan India Pakistan Thailand Myanmar Spain Morocco Russia Georgia Iraq United Kingdom United States United States North Korea France West Germany United Kingdom Iran Israel Syria Dem. Rep. Congo Rwanda Georgia Russia Ethiopia Eritrea Table 2. Continued on next page. – 27 – Reclassification Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat Nonmilitarized episode War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Alert/exercise Compellent threat Alert/exercise Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Alert/exercise Alert/exercise Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Compellent threat War/wartime campaign War/wartime campaign Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Deterrent warning Deterrent warning Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border violation Minor skirmish/border violation Crisis No. 447 447 448 448 448 448 449 450 450 451 451 452 453 453 454 454 455 455 Challenger Sudan Chad Iran Iran Iran United States Sudan North Korea United States Nonstate actor Israel Nonstate actor Sudan Chad Ethiopia Eritrea Nonstate actor Nonstate actor Defender Chad Sudan France United Kingdom United States Iran Chad United States North Korea Israel Lebanon Ethiopia Chad Sudan Eritrea Ethiopia Chad Sudan Reclassification Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Minor skirmish/border Nonmilitarized episode Nonmilitarized episode Table 2. Classification of threats and nonthreats in the ICB archive. – 28 – violation violation violation violation Appendix B Replication of Schultz 2001 In “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (2012, 467–70), we attempted to replicate the analysis of Militarized Interstate Dispute (mid) reciprocation conducted in Kenneth A. Schultz’s book Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (2001) in order to identify the 25 most influential democratic victories in his analysis. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain the original dataset from the study, so instead we re-created the dataset by following the procedures described in the book.4 This appendix describes the procedures and results for that replication.5 Page references in this appendix refer to Schultz (2001) unless otherwise noted. Data and Procedures 1. Dispute data. Schultz used a dataset of 2,042 mids between 1816 and 1992 (125–26). The version of the mid dataset available to him at the time was version 2.1, which we downloaded from the Correlates of War website. It contains 2,034 mids from 1816– 1992. Due to missing data, Schultz was forced to exclude mids occurring after 1984, leaving 1,785 mids between 1816 and 1984. Version 2.1 of the mid dataset contains 1,778 mids during this period. 2. Initiators. We coded dispute initiators using the mid dataset’s sidea variable: states for which sidea = 1 are coded as initiators. Schultz does not actually specify that he used sidea to code initiators, but it is standard practice to do so. 3. Reciprocation. The dependent variable, mid reciprocation, was coded 1 if the target of the mid achieved a hostility level (hostlev) of 2 or greater (263). This information is also provided by the mid dataset’s recip variable. 4. Originators. Schultz required that initiators and targets be original participants in the dispute, excluding late-joiners from the analysis (262–63). Information about mid 4 Schultz described these procedures in scrupulous detail on pages 125–31, 141–44, and 261–72. The file Appendix B.do, available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/tsechser, performs the operations described in this appendix. 5 – 29 – originators and joiners is provided by the originate variable; we exclude participants for which originate = 0 in the dataset. 5. Regime type data. Schultz employed the Polity III dataset, which covers the years 1800–1994 (129). Although the Polity dataset has been updated since the publication of Schultz’s book, we obtained the original Polity III dataset from the icpsr website to ensure that we replicated the original study as closely as possible. 6. Democracy. Schultz coded democracies as states that had a competitively-elected executive as well as a stable, enduring system of political competition (128–30). The Polity III dataset provides this information with the xrcomp and parreg variables. Democracies are coded 1 if xrcomp = 2 or 3 and parreg = 2 or 5. 7. Major powers. Schultz coded major powers in the system as follows (264): United States: 1899–1993; Great Britain: 1816–1993; France: 1816–1940 and 1945–93; Prussia/Germany: 1816–1918, 1925–45, and 1990–93; Austria-Hungary: 1816–1918; Italy: 1860–1943; Russia/Soviet Union: 1816–1917 and 1922–93; China: 1950–93; Japan: 1895–1945; 1990–93. 8. Military capabilities data. Schultz derived military capabilities data from the National Material Capabilities dataset (264). The dataset used in the book is version 2.1, which covers the years 1816–1993. We were able to download this version of the dataset from the Correlates of War website. 9. Participants’ military capabilities. In Schultz’s analysis, each dispute participants’ military capabilities were calculated using the standard Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (cinc) score (264–65). This variable contains information about individual states’ annual share of global capabilities across six dimensions: military personnel, military expenditures, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. The cinc score is calculated by computing a state’s proportion of capabilities in each of the six categories, and then averaging the six proportions. We computed cinc scores this way using data from the National Material Capabilities dataset. 10. Contiguity. Schultz coded disputants as contiguous if they either shared a land border or were separated by 150 miles of water or less (265). He derived this information from the Direct Contiguity dataset, available from the Correlates of War website.6 6 Schultz does not indicate which version of the Direct Contiguity dataset he used; we therefore used the only version available on the website, which was version 3.1. – 30 – 11. Alliance portfolio similarity. To control for the similarity of disputants’ alliance portfolios, Schultz utilized “S-scores,” weighted to account for each ally’s military capabilities (265–66). Schultz’s original source for these data was a website that unfortunately is no longer available, so we calculated these scores using EUGene software (v. 3.204). 12. Status quo evaluation. The measure for status quo satisfaction used in Schultz’s study is the τb score, which indicates the similarity of a given state’s alliance portfolio to that of the most powerful state in the system (266). Schultz does not specify where he obtained these data, but we were able to generate τb scores using the EUGene program. 13. Issue type. Schultz included dummy variables to indicate whether the central issue in a dispute was about territory, government/regime type, policy, or something else. These data were drawn from the mid dataset’s variable for type of revision (rev type). Using this variable, we created the same four variables used in Schultz’s analysis. 14. Multilateral disputes. We replicated Schultz’s fourth model of mid reciprocation, which excludes multilateral mids (146–47). We therefore excluded mids containing more than one participant on either side. 15. World war years. Model 4 excludes the years 1914–18 and 1939–45; thus, our replication also excludes mids initiated during these years. Results The results from our replication of Schultz’s Model 4 are reported in Table 3. The first column displays Schultz’s original results; the second column reports the equivalent results from our attempt to replicate Schultz’s model by following his procedures verbatim. These results are very near to those originally reported by Schultz. This “verbatim replication” is the regression used to generate the list of the 25 most influential democratic victories reported in Downes and Sechser (2012, 469). Although we followed the procedures in Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy as closely as possible, we acknowledge that the replication results in column 2 do not perfectly match Schultz’s original results. Since we do not have access to the original dataset, it is impossible to ascertain the reason for this disparity. However, we discovered that a minor modification to the original procedures yielded results which, in our view, are substantially closer to the original – particularly with respect to the critical democratic initiator variable. This modification involves the two measures of alliance portfolio similarity used in the regressions: – 31 – Schultz 2001, Original Model 4 (pp. 146–47) −0.53?? (0.19) 0.0019 (0.17) 0.41 (0.36) Downes and Sechser 2012 Verbatim Replication −0.37? (0.19) −0.05 (0.17) 0.49 (0.36) Downes and Sechser 2012 Modified Replication −0.47? (0.19) 0.0049 (0.17) 0.50 (0.36) major power initiator– major power target −0.52? (0.25) −0.31 (0.31) −0.51? (0.25) major power initiator– minor power target minor power initiator– major power target initiator’s share of capabilities −0.40? (0.19) 0.05 (0.24) 0.04 (0.25) −0.24 (0.21) 0.23 (0.26) 0.06 (0.25) −0.36† (0.19) 0.17 (0.25) 0.11 (0.25) contiguous alliance portfolio similarity 0.55?? (0.16) −0.05 (0.24) 0.55?? (0.15) 0.17 (0.23) 0.59?? (0.16) −0.11 (0.20) status quo evaluation of initiator 0.54† (0.29) −0.08 (0.20) 0.18 (0.19) status quo evaluation of target −0.72?? (0.26) −0.26 (0.23) −0.48? (0.19) 0.29† (0.17) 0.35 (0.36) 0.27 (0.17) 0.24 (0.38) 0.30† (0.17) 0.31 (0.39) −1.27?? (0.16) −0.51 (0.65) 0.43 (0.34) −1.21?? (0.16) −0.61 (0.59) 0.08 (0.28) −1.20?? (0.16) −0.49 (0.59) 0.21 (0.24) 172.93?? 68.0% 50.8% 1,184 183.11?? 67.0% 50.7% 1,153 188.17?? 67.4% 50.7% 1,153 democratic initiator democratic target both democratic territory government policy other constant χ2 Correctly Predicted Modal Outcome N note: Standard errors in parentheses. † p <0.10, ? p <0.05, ?? p <0.01. The “modified” replication uses τb scores (rather than weighted S-scores) for alliance portfolio similarity and weighted S-scores (rather than τb scores) for the status quo evaluation variables. Table 3. Attempted replication of Schultz’s (2001) analysis of – 32 – MID reciprocation. τb scores and weighted S-scores. In the original regression, the τb method was used to calculate dyadic portfolio similarity, while the S-score method was used to measure similarity with the system leader. We simply switched these two measures, substituting τb scores for weighted S-scores in the variable alliance portfolio similarity and substituting weighted S-scores for τb scores in the status quo evaluation variables. This change yields the results in the third column, which more closely match Schultz’s original Model 4. Our list of the 25 most influential democratic victories (Downes and Sechser 2012, 469) was derived from the “verbatim replication” regression. However, the “modified regression,” while slightly inconsistent with the procedures described by Schultz (2001), appears to match his original results more closely. It is therefore important to ask whether our list of 25 cases changes significantly when the “modified” regression is used to generate dfbetas. We find that it does not. Table 4 lists the 25 most influential democratic victories from the verbatim replication, in descending order of influence. The second column from the right reports each case’s ranking in the “modified” replication. The table demonstrates that there is very little change from one regression to the next: 22 of the top 25 democratic victories in the first regression remain in the top 25 in the second regression, and all cases remain in the top 30. Individual rankings change by an average of just 3.4 spots between the two regressions, and three cases (including the most influential case) do not move at all. The reason for including the list of Schultz’s 25 most influential democratic victories in our article was to demonstrate that the most important democratic victories in the mid dataset are not actually appropriate for evaluating democratic credibility theory: these cases do not contain coercive threats, and thus tell us little about the credibility of threats. This exercise demonstrates that our argument remains valid even if we modify Schultz’s procedures so that the regression results more closely match his original regressions. – 33 – Dispute No. 1335 1739 2089 2101 1100 2116 1462 3421 3420 3376 3382 3383 2087 3414 3416 2841 3117 2100 2099 2878 1555 2042 1309 3187 1548 Initiator Botswana Greece India India Chile United States India Israel Israel Israel Israel Israel Argentina Israel Israel Burma Malaysia India India Austria United States Costa Rica India Greece United States Target Rhodesia Ottoman Empire China China Argentina Mexico Nepal Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Egypt Chile Syria Syria Thailand Philippines China China Hungary Mexico Nicaragua Pakistan Bulgaria Mexico Year 1969 1888 1954 1979 1959 1842 1968 1959 1958 1962 1977 1979 1984 1952 1955 1959 1980 1973 1971 1960 1836 1957 1961 1928 1859 DFBETA (×10−2 ) −2.342 −2.265 −2.158 −2.026 −1.922 −1.901 −1.859 −1.831 −1.813 −1.799 −1.734 −1.722 −1.689 −1.685 −1.676 −1.675 −1.662 −1.636 −1.629 −1.525 −1.523 −1.496 −1.487 −1.483 −1.470 Ranking: Verbatim 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Ranking: Modified 1 5 4 3 2 8 7 9 11 12 16 17 6 20 22 21 24 15 14 19 29 18 27 28 25 Rank Change 0 −3 −1 +1 +3 −2 0 −1 −2 −2 −5 −5 +7 −6 −7 −5 −7 +3 +5 +1 −8 +4 −4 −4 0 Table 4. The 25 most influential democratic victories in the “verbatim” replication of Schultz’s (2001) analysis. – 34 – Appendix C Procedures and Results Using the mct Dataset One of the central objectives of “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (2012, 474-83) was to reevaluate democratic credibility theory using a dataset comprised of only coercive threats. This was critical because, as the first part of the article demonstrated, the mid and icb datasets contain a high proportion of superfluous events and therefore cannot yield reliable inferences about democratic threats.7 To conduct a more reliable test, we need a dataset in which the unit of analysis is the coercive threat. We therefore employed the Militarized Compellent Threats (mct) dataset (Sechser 2011) for our tests. This dataset, which was constructed explicitly for the purpose of evaluating hypotheses about the effectiveness of threats, contains 210 episodes in which a challenger demanded that a target revise the status quo and threatened to use military force if it did not comply. To ensure the most favorable conditions for democratic credibility theory, our tests emulated the research designs of Schultz (2001) and Gelpi and Griesdorf (2001). In this appendix, we describe our procedures in more detail; present full regression results from the central tests; and present results from several robustness checks that were mentioned in the article.8 Emulation of Schultz 2001 We first emulated the empirical approach used by Schultz in Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, employing binary logistic regressions to estimate the probability that a compellent threat, once issued, will fail. Schultz included 15 independent variables in his regressions; we created the same 15 variables in our dataset using the same coding procedures and data.9 Where possible, we used updated versions of the datasets Schultz employed. Specifically, we used version IV of the Polity dataset; version 3.02 of the National Material Capabilities 7 See also Sechser and Fuhrmann (2013). The file Appendix C.do, available at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/tsechser, performs the operations described in this appendix. 9 In two regressions, Schultz also included a dummy variable for each of the world war years. We duplicated these variables as well. 8 – 35 – dataset; and version 3.1 of the Direct Contiguity dataset. We generated alliance portfolio data from version 3.204 of the EUGene program.10 In Schultz’s regressions, factors that were associated with unreciprocated disputes – that is, successful challenges – took on a negative coefficient. For ease of comparison with Schultz’s results, we coded failed compellent threats as 1 and 0 otherwise, so that factors associated with successful threats also would take on a negative coefficient. Broadly, we considered a threat successful if (1) the target complied with the challenger’s demands and (2) the challenger did not have to use significant military force to achieve this compliance.11 In operational terms, we defined successful threats as those that achieved full compliance with all of the challenger’s demands, with 100 or fewer military fatalities on the target’s side. This standard acknowledges that challengers sometimes use limited amounts of force to communicate their resolve, while still distinguishing demonstrative uses of force from outright physical compulsion. We also employed several different dichotomous indicators of democracy to ensure that our findings were not dependent on any one measure. First, we used Schultz’s own definition, which relied on data from the Polity dataset.12 Second, we used the standard Polity definition of democracy (Jaggers and Gurr 1995), which defines democracies as states with polity scores of +6 or higher (on a scale from −10 to +10). Finally, we used democracy indicators developed by three different teams of scholars: Cheibub et al. (2010); Przeworski et al. (2000), and Boix and Rosato (2001). In all, we used five different measures of democracy. The regression tables below report the findings from these tests. 10 See Appendix B for more details about coding procedures. As we argued in “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” (see especially pages 464–67), the mid and icb datasets conflate military compulsion with successful coercive diplomacy. To avoid this problem in our analysis, it is important that threats be considered unsuccessful if the challenger resorts to significant military force to achieve its objectives. 12 Schultz (2001) defined democracies as states with a competitively elected executive and a stable, enduring system of political competition. Using variables from the Polity dataset, this translates to xrcomp ≥ 2 and parreg = 2 or 5. Schultz (2001, 127–30) argued that this definition most closely fits with the logic of democratic credibility theory. 11 – 36 – Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities Democracy measure: Schultz 2001 democratic initiator democratic target both democratic major power initiator− major power target major power initiator− minor power target minor power initiator− major power target initiator’s share of capabilities contiguous alliance portfolio similarity status quo evaluation of initiator status quo evaluation of target territory government policy other constant N All Crises 1 2 World Wars World Wars Included Excluded 0.31 0.22 (0.55) (0.56) 0.33 0.44 (0.52) (0.58) −0.47 −0.53 (0.82) (0.87) −0.27 −0.91 (0.86) (1.00) 0.84 0.79 (0.55) (0.63) Bilateral Crises Only 3 4 World Wars World Wars Included Excluded 0.40 0.32 (0.63) (0.64) 0.43 0.21 (0.66) (0.72) −1.32 −1.09 (1.09) (1.14) −0.79 −1.28 (0.88) (0.99) 0.72 0.45 (0.56) (0.59) −2.34? (1.10) 0.10 (0.68) −0.36 (0.45) 0.55 (0.72) −0.31 (0.55) −1.91† (1.12) 0.20 (0.77) −0.16 (0.48) 0.61 (0.81) 0.05 (0.63) −2.19? (1.01) 0.33 (0.74) 0.07 (0.54) 0.26 (0.79) −0.61 (0.68) −1.87† (1.03) 0.14 (0.82 ) 0.05 (0.58) 0.28 (0.88) 0.07 (0.75) −1.07 (0.67) 0.14 (0.43) −2.10? (0.91) 0.06 (0.49) −0.39 (0.72) −0.16 (0.49) −1.82? (0.89) −0.07 (0.54) −2.19?? (0.72) 0.05 (0.39) 0.12 (0.43) 0.30 (0.94) −2.61?? (0.81) −0.07 (0.46) 0.35 (0.53) 0.15 (1.01) −2.48?? (0.77) −0.03 (0.42) −0.11 (0.46) 0.40 (1.09) −2.05? (0.80 ) −0.32 (0.48) 0.05 (0.51) 0.66 (1.25) 230 198 177 149 note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 employ robust standard errors clustered on crisis. ?? p <0.01. Dummy variables for world war years are included in Models 1 and 3 but not reported here. Table 5. Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the – 37 – MCT † p <0.10, dataset. ? p <0.05, Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities Democracy measure: Polity democratic initiator democratic target both democratic major power initiator− major power target major power initiator− minor power target minor power initiator− major power target initiator’s share of capabilities contiguous alliance portfolio similarity status quo evaluation of initiator status quo evaluation of target territory government policy other constant N All Crises 5 6 World Wars World Wars Included Excluded −0.00 −0.19 (0.51) (0.51) −0.75 −0.76 (0.49) (0.56) 0.62 0.70 (0.84) (0.89) −0.39 −1.14 (0.87) (0.97) 0.71 0.66 (0.54) (0.60) Bilateral Crises Only 7 8 World Wars World Wars Included Excluded 0.22 0.03 (0.63) (0.63) −0.80 −1.02 (0.55) (0.62) −0.76 −0.52 (1.14) (1.19) −0.96 −1.60 (0.91) (1.01) 0.49 0.25 (0.57) (0.60) −2.51? (1.11) 0.10 (0.68) −0.52 (0.45) 0.41 (0.73) −0.35 (0.55) −2.00† (1.13) 0.23 (0.77) −0.22 (0.49) 0.35 (0.81) 0.10 (0.62) −2.28? (1.02) 0.42 (0.74) −0.12 (0.55) 0.05 (0.80) −0.74 (0.67) −1.90† (1.04) 0.37 (0.83) 0.01 (0.60) −0.07 (0.90) 0.05 (0.75) −0.75 (0.67) 0.22 (0.44) −1.77? (0.88) 0.11 (0.50) 0.07 (0.74) 0.01 (0.51) −1.42 (0.90) 0.10 (0.56) −2.29?? (0.71) 0.12 (0.40) 0.05 (0.44) 0.76 (0.93) −2.76?? (0.81) −0.06 (0.47) 0.21 (0.55) 0.70 (1.01) −2.48?? (0.77) 0.09 (0.43) −0.14 (0.46) 0.80 (1.11) −2.10?? (0.81) −0.26 (0.49) −0.05 (0.52) 1.02 (1.25) 230 198 177 149 note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 5 and 6 employ robust standard errors clustered on crisis. ?? p <0.01. Dummy variables for world war years are included in Models 5 and 7 but not reported here. Table 6. Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the – 38 – MCT † p <0.10, dataset. ? p <0.05, Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities Democracy measure: Cheibub et al. 201013 major power initiator− major power target 9 All Crises 0.27 (0.70) 0.16 (0.85) −1.08 (1.46) −0.43 (1.18) 10 Bilateral Crises Only 0.51 (0.99) −0.11 (0.97) −1.16 (1.53) 0.00 (1.50) major power initiator− minor power target minor power initiator− major power target 1.19 (1.10) −0.14 (1.03) 1.94† (1.16) 0.40 (2.19) initiator’s share of capabilities contiguous 2.21† (1.16) 0.23 (0.59) 3.11? (1.48) 0.43 (0.96) alliance portfolio similarity status quo evaluation of initiator 2.20† (1.20) 0.07 (0.93) 2.90† (1.51) 0.06 (1.15) status quo evaluation of target territory −2.43? (1.00) −0.08 (0.77) −2.59† (1.33) −0.68 (0.87) government −2.93† (1.64) −4.35?? (1.41) policy −0.61 (1.08) 0.27 (1.01) −1.99 (1.60) −1.96? (0.93) −0.63 (0.98) −2.25 (1.93) democratic initiator democratic target both democratic other constant N 117 93 note: Standard errors in parentheses. Model 9 employs robust standard errors clustered on crisis. p <0.01. Table 7. Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the † MCT p <0.10, ? p <0.05, ?? dataset. 13 Note that data from Cheibub et al. (2010) extend from 1946–2001, thus obviating the need for differential treatment of the world war years. – 39 – Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities Democracy measure: Przeworski et al. 200014 major power initiator− major power target 11 All Crises 0.32 (0.73) 0.26 (0.87) −1.48 (1.37) −0.39 (1.20) 12 Bilateral Crises Only 0.58 (1.01) 0.03 (0.99) −1.75 (1.56) 0.05 (1.53) major power initiator− minor power target minor power initiator− major power target 1.30 (1.12) 0.28 (1.01) 2.05† (1.20) 1.02 (2.60) initiator’s share of capabilities contiguous 2.62? (1.21) 0.57 (0.62) 3.78? (1.60) 0.96 (1.04) alliance portfolio similarity status quo evaluation of initiator 2.20† (1.22) 0.05 (0.93) 2.92† (1.53) 0.01 (1.17) status quo evaluation of target territory −2.26? (1.02) −0.11 (0.79) −2.33† (1.37) −0.89 (0.89) government −2.80† (1.62) −4.29?? (1.44) policy −0.63 (1.12) 0.26 (1.07) −2.55 (1.68) −2.17? (0.98) −0.72 (1.00) −2.96 (2.06) democratic initiator democratic target both democratic other constant N 115 91 note: Standard errors in parentheses. Model 11 employs robust standard errors clustered on crisis. p <0.01. Table 8. Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the † MCT p <0.10, ? p <0.05, ?? dataset. 14 Note that updated data from Przeworski et al. (2000) extend from 1946–2001, thus obviating the need for differential treatment of the world war years. – 40 – Compellence success: Full compliance, <100 fatalities Democracy measure: Boix and Rosato 2001 democratic initiator All Crises 13 14 World Wars World Wars Included Excluded −0.36 −0.67 (0.56) (0.55) Bilateral Crises Only 15 16 World Wars World Wars Included Excluded −0.31 −0.69 (0.65) (0.67) −1.32? (0.59) 1.29 (0.95) −1.50? (0.70) 1.45 (1.02) −1.15? (0.56) −0.31 (1.15) −1.78?? (0.68) 0.37 (1.22) major power initiator− major power target major power initiator− minor power target −0.61 (0.96) 0.87 (0.57) −1.60 (1.05) 0.83 (0.63) −1.00 (0.95) 0.60 (0.59) −1.89† (1.09) 0.36 (0.62) minor power initiator− major power target initiator’s share of capabilities contiguous −2.34? (1.16) −0.20 (0.75) −0.68 (0.50) −0.08 (0.84) −0.13 (0.67) −1.66 (1.20) −0.09 (0.90) −0.34 (0.58) −0.33 (0.96) 0.62 (0.83) −1.96† (1.03) 0.17 (0.78) −0.20 (0.59) −0.17 (0.86) −0.21 (0.68) −1.54 (1.11) 0.02 (0.90) −0.11 (0.68) −0.36 (0.99) 0.91 (0.83) −0.86 (0.73) 0.12 (0.47) −2.20? (0.99) −0.05 (0.56) −0.07 (0.77) −0.09 (0.53) −1.89† (1.00) 0.08 (0.60) −2.43?? (0.71) −0.16 (0.44) −0.33 (0.47) 1.71 (1.10) −2.89?? (0.88) −0.46 (0.52) −0.32 (0.58) 1.96 (1.22) −2.71?? (0.79) 0.07 (0.44) −0.50 (0.49) 1.33 (1.21) −2.45?? (0.83) −0.36 (0.52) −0.57 (0.56) 1.90 (1.44) 197 165 161 democratic target both democratic alliance portfolio similarity status quo evaluation of initiator status quo evaluation of target territory government policy other constant N 133 † note: Standard errors in parentheses. Models 13 and 10 employ robust standard errors clustered on crisis. p <0.10, ? p <0.05, ?? p <0.01. Dummy variables for world war years are included in Models 13 and 11 but not reported here. Table 9. Logit analyses of compellent threat failure using the – 41 – MCT dataset. Emulation of Gelpi and Griesdorf 2001 We next emulated the empirical approach used by Gelpi and Griesdorf in their 2001 article in the American Political Science Review. As with our emulation of Schultz (2001), we adopted the same coding procedures and methods (where possible) to ensure the most favorable testing conditions for democratic credibility theory. Data and Procedures 1. Threat success. Gelpi and Griesdorf coded crisis outcomes trichotomously, indicating whether a crisis represented a win, draw, or loss for a challenger. The mct dataset does not explicitly code wins, draws, and losses, but its trichotomous compliance measure maps quite nicely onto this coding scheme. We coded threats that achieved full compliance with fewer than 100 fatalities as “wins” (success = 2), threats that achieved partial compliance with fewer than 100 fatalities as “draws” (success = 1), and threats that either achieved no compliance or escalated beyond 100 fatalities as “losses” (success = 0). 2. Democracy. Gelpi and Griesdorf used polity scores to create the variables challenger’s democracy and defender’s democracy, both of which range from 1 to 21. We obtained this data from version IV of the Polity dataset. To check the robustness of our findings, we repeated our regressions using democracy scores developed by Vanhanen (2000) and Pemstein et al. (2010). Like the 21-point polity scores, these measures are continuous.15 The variable joint democracy was calculated by simply interacting these two terms, and relative audience costs was computed by subtracting the defender’s democracy score from the challenger’s score and squaring the difference, following Gelpi and Griesdorf’s procedure (2001, 638). 3. Military capabilities. To create the variable relative military capabilities, Gelpi and Griesdorf used the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (cinc) score A . We for each participant in the crisis: relative military capabilities = cinccinc A +cincB computed cinc scores this way using data from version 3.02 of the National Material Capabilities dataset, available from the Correlates of War website. 4. Nuclear weapons possession. Gelpi and Griesdorf coded nuclear possession beginning in the year of a state’s first publicly acknowledged nuclear tests. These start dates are as follows: United States: 1945; United Kingdom: 1952; France: 1960; China: 1964; India: 1974. They also coded Israel as a nuclear state beginning in 1969, and 15 To allow for easier comparison, the democracy scores from Vanhanen (2000) and Pemstein et al. (2010) were rescaled to match the range of the Polity dataset (i.e., 1–21). – 42 – identified Pakistan as a publicly acknowledged nuclear state beginning in 1992.16 We adopted the same rules. 5. Alliances. Following Gelpi and Griesdorf’s procedure, we coded the variable shared alliance ties by referring to the Formal Interstate Alliance dataset (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). We used version 3.03 of the dataset, available at the Correlates of War website. This variable was coded 1 if the challenger and defender shared an alliance at the time of the crisis, and 0 otherwise. 6. Resolve. Gelpi and Griesdorf sought to include a measure of each state’s relative reliance on violence in their bargaining strategy. Their goal was to test whether democracies have an advantage in crises when they publicly demonstrate resolve. The icb dataset, which Gelpi and Griesdorf relied on for their study, codes each state’s crisis management strategy on an eight-point scale, where higher values represent increasing levels of violence. Gelpi and Griesdorf collapsed this down to a four-point scale, then subtracted the defender’s score from the defender’s score to obtain the variable relative resolve. While the mct dataset does not have a variable explicitly measuring states’ reliance on violence, it does indicate whether challengers engaged in demonstrations or actual uses of military force against targets. We therefore coded relative resolve as 2 if the challenger used military force against the target, 1 if it employed military maneuvers or demonstrations of force during the crisis, and 0 if it used neither. The procedure is slightly different, but the principle is the same: to identify public signals of resolve that might engage domestic audiences and enhance the credibility of democratic threats. 7. Interests. Gelpi and Griesdorf included a variable intended to measure the relative importance of the crisis stakes to each participant. This variable, relative interests at stake, was derived directly from icb’s six-point measurement of interests. Unfortunately, the mct dataset does not contain an equivalent measurement of interests, so we could not include this variable. However, this variable was not central to Gelpi and Greisdorf’s test of democratic credibility theory. Results As discussed in our article (pages 479–83), Gelpi and Griesdorf used ordered probit regressions; we did so as well. We present three regressions below – one for each of the three measures of democracy that we employed. 16 Gelpi and Griesdorf do not code South Africa as a nuclear state. They explain this decision on page 639, footnote 19. – 43 – 17 Polity −0.0148 (0.0567) 18 Vanhanen 2000 −0.0527 (0.0577) 19 Pemstein et al. 2010 −0.2445 (0.2206) defender’s democracy 0.0117 (0.0573) −0.0252 (0.0568) −0.2861† (0.2123) joint democracy 0.0022 (0.0052) 0.0098† (0.0067) 0.0367† (0.0241) relative audience costs 0.0009 (0.0030) 0.0074? (0.0039) 0.0187† (0.0125) relative audience costs × relative resolve −0.0006 (0.0012) −0.0031? (0.0017) −0.0055 (0.0053) relative military capabilities × joint democracy relative military capabilities −0.0020 (0.0025) −0.0268 (0.4520) −0.0050† (0.0038) −0.2168 (0.3944) −0.0074 (0.0117) 0.0786 (1.2155) relative resolve −0.3101? (0.1700) 0.0491 (0.5344) −0.0938 (0.6971) −0.2568 (0.3552) −0.1465 (0.1698) −0.1819 (0.5595) 0.2437 (0.7429) −0.3428 (0.3149) −0.1451 (0.2267) 0.1875 (0.8668) −0.1037 (1.1754) −0.4194 (0.4643) defender nuclear weapons 0.7994? (0.4448) 0.7452† (0.4967) 1.0524? (0.5526) First Threshold Second Threshold N −0.2317 −0.0924 242 −0.1015 0.0469 221 −1.5783 −1.4321 112 challenger’s democracy disputants share alliance tie relative military capabilities × disputants share alliance tie challenger nuclear weapons note: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, clustered on crisis. † p <0.10, ? p <0.05, ?? p <0.01, one-tailed tests. The regression results reported on page 480 of “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility” are contained in Model 17. Table 10. Ordered probit analyses of compellent threat success using the MCT dataset. Table 10 reports the results of these regressions. Because of the interaction terms, however, it is difficult to assess the net effect of democracy by examining the coefficients and standard errors. Figure 1 therefore plots the predicted probability of compellent threat success as the challenger becomes more democratic. The charts assume favorable conditions for democratic challengers – namely, resolved challengers and highly autocratic targets.17 For comparison, chart (a) plots Gelpi and Griesdorf’s original results. The results indicate that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a challenger’s level of democracy is unrelated to the probability that a compellent threat will succeed, other things being equal. This is true no matter which measure of democracy we use. 17 All of these charts were generated using Clarify (King et al. 2000). These estimates hold other variables constant at the following values: defender’s democracy 1; joint democracy 0; relative resolve 2 (maximum); disputants share alliance tie 0; challenger nuclear weapons 0; defender nuclear weapons 0. Relative military capabilities was held at the in-sample mean, and thus varied from sample to sample. – 44 – 100% Probability of Compellent Threat Success Probability of Challenger Victory 100% 80% 90% Confidence Interval 60% 40% 20% 1 5 9 13 17 60% 90% Confidence Interval 40% 20% 1 21 5 9 13 17 21 Challenger's Democracy Score Challenger's Democracy Score (a) Gelpi and Griesdorf ’s (2001) original results using the International Crisis Behavior dataset. (b) Reassessed results using the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset (Model 17). 100% Probability of Compellent Threat Success 100% Probability of Compellent Threat Success 80% 80% 60% 90% Confidence Interval 40% 20% 1 5 9 13 17 90% Confidence Interval 80% 60% 40% 20% 1 21 5 9 13 17 21 Challenger's Democracy Score Challenger's Democracy Score (c) Reassessed results using the MCT dataset and Vanhanen’s (2000) democracy scores (Model 18). (d) Reassessed results using the MCT dataset and Pemstein et al.’s (2010) democracy scores (Model 19). Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of compellent threat success. – 45 – References Boix, Carles and Sebastian Rosato. 2001. “A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-1999.” Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago. Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/. Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2010. “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited.” Public Choice 143(1-2): 67–101. Correlates of War 2 Project. 2004. “Dispute Narratives – MID 3.0 Dataset.” Unpublished manuscript, Pennsylvania State University. Available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu. Downes, Alexander B. and Todd S. Sechser. 2012. “The Illusion of Democratic Credibility.” International Organization 66(3): 457–89. Gelpi, Christopher and Michael Griesdorf. 2001. “Winners or Losers? 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