U.S. DOD Form dod-opnavinst-3400-10f
—
OF
DEPARTMENT
OFFICE
OF
THE
CHIEF
2000
NAVY
WASHINGTON,
OF
THE
NAVAL
NAVY
OPERATIONS
PENTAGON
D.C.
20350-2000
IN REPLY
OPNAVINST
N86D
22 MAY*
Chief
TO
34OO.1OF
INSTRUCTION
From:
REFER
34 OO.1OF
of Naval
Operations
Sub-j: CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL
AND RADIOLOGICAL
(CBR) DEFENSE
REQUIREMENTS
SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL
FLEET READINESS
Ref:
(a) Quadrennial
Defense Review of May 97
Threat and Response, Office
(b) Proliferation:
Secretary of Defense, Nov 97 (NOTAL)
(c) Public Law 103-160
(d) Joint service Agreement of Jul 94 (NOTAL)
(e) JCS Joint Vision 2010, Jun 96 (NOTAL)
of the
To assign Navy responsibility
for establishing
1. PuxQQse.
mission requirements
and implementing
policy governing
Chemical,
and Radiological
(CBR) defense capabilities
in
Biological,
association
with the Department
of Defense
(DoD)
This
instruction
has been
Counterproliferation
(CP) Initiative.
substantially
revised and should be reviewed in its entirety.
2.
cellatl~
.
OPNAVINST
s3400.loE
(NOTAL) .
The end of the Cold War has reduced the threat of
3. ~.
global nuclear conflict, but there is a growing threat from the
aggressive
proliferation
of chemical and biological
weapons.
As
in part, by reference
(a), these weapons of mass
addressed,
destruction
(wMD) present a grave and urgent challenge to the
For rogue nations,
United States, our allies and troops abroad.
in winning
WMD are a ticket to power, stature and confidence
Reference
(b) details this new danger and discusses
regional war.
important strategies
on how to prevent, deter, and if necessary,
Reducing this serious risk is a national
respond to the threat.
priority and necessitated
enactment of reference
(c) to ensure top
level DoD oversight and appropriate
Joint Service participation
as
of
outlined in reference
(d) . Within this context, the Secretary
Defense has directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operational
Commanders
in Chief and Military Departments
and their Uniformed
Services give greater emphasis to CP requirements
and essential
OPNAVINST
34OO.1OF
22 MAY7ggg
capabilities.
In response to and support of these needs, this
directive
articulates
U.S. Navy CBR Defense policy and establishes
functional
responsibilities
to ensure the highest level of fleet
readiness and warfighting
sustainability
in a CBR environment.
4.
lntroductioa
At least 20 countries,
some hostile to the United States,
haveaor are in the process of developing WMD.
Some terrorist
groups and several countries designated
as “State Sponsors of
Terrorism”
have also shown an interest in pursuing a CBR
capability.
Others are strongly engaged in the sale or transfer of
associated
CBR technology.
These weapons are considered
“asymmetric
threats,” since adversaries
will seek an advantage
over
the U.S. by using unconventional
approaches
to circumvent
or
undermine
our strengths while exploiting
our vulnerabilities.
Unstable regimes, shifting power balances and terrorism are
prominent
characteristics
of the landscape today.
In Joint Vision
2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states that wider
access to advanced technology,
including WMD, will increase the
number of actors with sufficient military power to upset existing
regional power balances.
b.
The potential
for catastrophic
use of WMD is greater than
it has been in many decades.
Aimed at responding
to the
overwhelming
power and superiority
of the military infrastructure
of the U.S., either domestically
or abroad, WMD could seriously
disrupt the execution and tempo of military operations.
As an
example, contamination
of logistics nodes, ports or other choke
points created during deployment
and, force projection
could delay
the initiation
of military campaigns,
increase the exposure and
vulnerability
of troops and threaten the success of military
operations . It is imperative
that U.S. forces are prepared
to
operate effectively
in WMD-contaminated
environments
while they are
simultaneously
able to detect and identify threat agents, treat
casualties
and remediate contaminated
areas.
The equipment,
tactics and procedures
that enable a force to operate in a WMD
environment
are collectively
known as Passive Defense and represent
one of the seven major thrusts under DoD’s CP Initiative.
Enactment of reference
(c) has changed the way DoD manages
c.
and executes CBR Defense initiatives.
Most notably, the Services
are required to consolidate
all CBR Defense Research, Development,
Test, Evaluation
and Acquisition
(RDTE&A) funding into a single DoD
Program Objective Memorandum
(POM) . In addition, the Army, as DoD
Executive Agent (EA) for CBR Defense, is directed to coordinate
and
integrate Services’ RDTE&A efforts.
Reference
(d) established
a
formal process and provides a mechanism
to oversee the Joint
and Chemical
(NBC) Defense Program.
Nuclear, Biological
In this
regard, the Navy functions as an equal partner to fully integrate
2
OPNAVINST
22
the Joint program
fleet CBR Defense
and provide
needs.
requisite
focus
34OO.1OF
MAYW98
to expedite
priority
5.
~
a.
. The national policy with respect to WMD,
is to prevent further proliferation
and to reduce to the greatest
extent possible the current inventory consistent with the national
interest.
The national goal with respect to chemical and
biological
warfare is a complete and verifiable
world-wide
ban on
the development,
production
and stockpiling
of chemical and
biological
weapons.
Until such a ban is achieved, however, and is
consistent
with existing treaties and international
law, U.S.
policy is to deter the use of chemical, toxin and biological
weapons against U.S., allied and coalition forces by maintaining
the capabilities
to deny an enemy significant
military advantage
from their use.
Deterrent capabilities
shall include the ability
to survive an initial attack and continue military operations
in a
contaminated
environment.
b.
Navy Policy . Consistent with national policy and strategy,
the Navy shall maintain those CBR Defense capabilities
required to
support deterrence
and enhance conventional
warfighting
through
defensive means.
The goal is to ensure that the use or threat of
use of chemical or biological
weapons or radiological
contamination
against a naval force will be a non-decisive
factor in the outcome
of any operation.
The Navy shall implement its CBR Defense
responsibilities
in the spirit of reference
(c) and within the
framework delineated
in reference
(d) .
6.
Discussion
a.
Joint Vision 2010 reference
(e) calls for U.S. forces to
have full spectrum dominance
in any future conflict.
Critical to
achieving
this dominance
is the concept of full dimensional
protection.
It is envisioned
that new sensors and information
dissemination
systems will be employed to detect chemical and
biological
attacks at ranges greater than those possible today, and
to provide warning to specific units that may be affected.
Enhanced deception and camouflage measures,
increased individual
and collective
protection
and a joint restoration
capability
against the effects are key elements of full dimensional
protection.
Reference
(a) indicates that U.S. forces will use a
full array of active and passive measures to establish multiple
layers of protection
against WMD in order to maintain freedom of
action during deployment,
maneuver and engagement.
3
.
OPNAVINST
34OO.1OF
22M/iYm!la
b.
Concerning
the use of passive defense measures in response
to paramilitary,
covert and terrorist threats, three primary tenets
for CBR Defense are germane:
contamination
avoidance,
protection
and decontamination.
The preferred tactic is to avoid becoming
contaminated
by destroying
the delivery system or maneuvering
around the affected area whenever practical.
Units must provide
sufficient
protection
(individual and/or collective)
to remain
mission capable.
Units must also be prepared to fight “dirty”
(i.e., operate with some degree of contamination)
for as long as
possible before commencing
decontamination
procedures.
Prudence
dictates the need for operational
commanders
to assess risk to
mission capability
from the use or threatened use of CBR weapons.
,,
7.
licablllt~d
Sco~ . This instruction
applies to all Navy
activities
afloat and the Navy shore base establishment
for
operations
in a high threat or potentially
contaminated
environment . Sustainment
of mission capability
shall be
accomplished
through the development
and employment
of defensive
methods and equipment utilizing
the following elements:
a.
Operational
Intelligence
b.
Operational
Doctrine,
Tactics
and Training
Detection,
c.
Identification,
Warning,
Monitoring
(Contamination
Avoidance)
d.
Individual
Protective
e.
Collective
Protection
f.
Contamination
9.
Casualty
Reportinq and
­
Equipment
Control/Decontamination
Handling,
Procedures
Medical
Treatment
Capabilities
and Prophylaxis
8.
a.
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
(Resources, Warfare
Requirements
and Assessments) (OPNAV N8) shall require that
applicable
resource sponsors identify and develop CBR Defense
requirements
and ensure these requirements
are addressed during the
Joint Nuclear, Biological
and Chemical
(NBC) Defense Program
Objective Memorandum
(POM) process.
In addition, OPNAV N8 shall
ensure applicable
warfare sponsor Navy Operations
and Maintenance
funding is in place to support capabilities
being developed
and
procured by the OSD-funded
program.
OPNAV N8 shall designate
the
Director,
Surface Warfare Division
(OPNAV N86) as the Chief of
Naval Operations
(CNO) Executive Agent (EA) for CBR Defense.
As
EA, OPNAV N86 shall act as the organizational
focus for other
4