T he Int rom issibilit y of a
Pa r e t i a n A t h l e t i c D i r e c t o r
BY
LOUIS
M.
GUEN I N
he int er c o lleg iat e
t eams of a college comprise about 50 0 players. Most
ot her st udent s who enjoy part icipat ing in at hlet ics gain sat isfact ion t hrough int ramural and
r ec r eat io nal
p r o g r am s.
Varsit ies have recent ly provoked somet hing of
a commot ion. It has been alleged t hat in fielding
varsit ies, most colleges discriminat e “ on t he
basis of sex” in violat ion of Tit le IX of t he
Educat ion Amendment s of 1 9 7 2 . This sweeping
claim is t he out cropping of an int erpret at ion
lying several layers below in a st rat a of government r egulat ion. At op t he out cr opping has
grown a conversat ional t angle. My purpose here
is t o expose t he weaknesses in t hose st rat a and
t o suggest several int erest ing considerat ions
about ef ficient resource allocat ion, local just ice,
and social choice t hat t he t angle has hidden.
These considerat ions point t he way t o a consensus view of equal opport unit y.
T
Bi o g r a p h y o f a F a l l a c y
For an underst anding of equal opport unit y in at hlet ics—a t opic on which, cont r ary t o popular
Louis M. Guenin is lect urer on et hics at t he Harvard Medical School.
His work relat ed t o t his essay includes “ Dist ribut ive Just ice in
Compet it ive Access t o Int ercollegiat e At hlet ic Teams Segregat ed
by Sex,” St udies in Philosophy and Educat ion ( Oct ober 19 9 7) , and
“ Af f irmat ive Act ion in Higher Educat ion as Redist ribut ion,” Public
Af f airs Quart erly ( April 1 9 9 7 ) .
1
B R O O K I N G S
R E V I E W ,
F A L L
1 9 9 8
impression, Tit le IX is silent —
t he Depart ment of Educat ion’s
in t e r p r e t i v e a p p ar at u s h as
cranked slowly. Af t er a quart er
cent ur y , t he ent ire out put
t hereof collapses t o a single
precept ( hereaf t er “ Q” ) : if t he
rat io of it s male t o f emale varsit y at hlet es does not equal
t he rat io of it s male t o f emale
undergraduat es, a college perpet rat es sex discriminat ion. Q
assig n s t o t he m em b e rs o f
each sex t aken as a whole a
quot a of varsit y spot s equal t o
t hat sex’ s proport ion of t he
st udent body.
The relev ant 1 9 7 9 agency
policy begins wit h t hree purpo rt ed indicia of d iscrim inat ion—whet her t he sex rat ios of
a t h le t e s an d st u d e n t s a r e
equal, whet her t hat not obt aining, t here occurs cont inuous
expansion of women’s at hlet ics, and whet her, bot h of t he
f oregoing not obt aining, t here
is met every at hlet ic int erest of
f emale st udent s. In t he policy,
t he agency does not in f act
st at e whet her equalit y of sex
rat ios is good or bad. In 1 9 7 9
many colleges were predominant ly male. Equalit y of t he sex
r a t i o s c o u l d t h e n h av e
m a sk e d — as i n d e e d i t m ay
st ill— d isc r im in at io n ag ain st
w o m e n. To d ay at least t he
impact of t he policy is clear: it
ef f ect ively mandat es Q. This
f ollow s b e cause t he sec ond
t w o indicia are seldom at t aina b l e . T h e d r af t e r s d i d n o t
ant icipat e t he circum st ance in
which cont inual expansion is
inf easible f or colleges already
o f f e r in g e v e r y p r a c t i c ab l e
women’ s sport . Nor did t hey
recognize t hat t he largesse of
t he t hird condit ion would work
d is c r im in a t io n ag ai n st m e n
unless an at hlet ic program met
men’s every int erest , an inf eas ib l e f e a t f r o m t h e st ar t .
Crit icized f or t he Procrust ean
B R O O K I N G S
R E V I E W ,
F A L L
bed ont o which it has f orced
t he concept of equal opport unit y, t he agency has rejoined
approvingly t hat t wo-t hirds of
some set of invest igat ed colleges sat isfi es t he t hird condit ion. This response neglec t s
w h at e v e r
d isc r im inat io n
against males is t hereby condoned and omit s ment ion of
t he pressure exert ed by t he
agency t o comply wit h Q.
It s e e m s t h a t Q i s t h e
st epc hild o f coinc idence. On
t he o ne hand, t he agenc y ’ s
policy is t he work of it s prosecut orial Of f ice of Civil Right s,
w hic h st rugg led t o int erpret
d ist r ib u t iv ely t he no t io n o f
“ equal at hlet ic o pp o rt unit y ”
b roac hed in a 1 9 7 5 ag enc y
regulat ion. Prosecut ors may be
adroit at pursuing procedural
in j u st i c e s b u t ar e u n li k e ly
aut hors of subt le met hods f or
allocat ing scarce resources. On
t he ot her hand, college at hlet ic direct or s, f or whom it is possible t o ov erest imat e t he f ascinat ion of t he Federal Regist er,
w ere not quick t o espy t he poli c y . W h e n p l a i n t i f f s fi r s t
brought privat e suit s, t he policy was t he only government al
int erpret at ion ext ant . Despit e
( or because of ) it s subsequent
not oriet y, t he policy has never
b een pr op osed as a f ederal
regulat ion.
It is easy t o see t hat Q
defi es logic and it s legal superiors.
Q deploys t he inf erence t hat
if object ionable discrim inat ion
ent ails disproport ionat e part icip at io n ( w hic h is d o u b t le ss
t rue) , t hen whenever disprop or t ionat e
p ar t icipat ion
occurs, object ionable discriminat ion occurs. This is t he f allac y o f af f i r m in g t h e c o n se quent . Q fi nds sex discriminat ion ( f or example, against men
in t heat r e and dance) w hen
innocent explanat ions f or dis1 9 9 8
p r o p o r t i o n at e p ar t ic ip at io n
( f o r ex am p le, int er est s an d
repert oire) are obvious.
Since 197 7 t he Supreme Court
has reject ed inferences of discriminat ion predicat ed on comparing some subset ’s represent at ion in a set of beneficiaries wit h
t he subset ’s represent at ion in a
set larger t han t he set of act ual
applicant s. Q is such an inference,
as it ref erences not t he set of
varsit y aspirant s but t he set of
undergraduat es. An explicit proviso t o Tit le IX also reject s any
q u o t a p r ed ic a t e d u p o n t h e
reject ed form of inf erence. That
is t o say not hing of t he disapproving view of quot as in Bakke
v. Regent s of t he Universit y of
California ( 19 7 8).
Bec ause m or e males t han
f emales aspire t o v arsit y play ,
Q assures spot s f or a great er
p r o p o r t io n o f int er est e d
w o m e n t h an m en . Co lleg e s
operat ing under Q present an
art ifi cially higher f emale t han
m ale sup p ly f u nct io n and
t hereby set a lower percent ile
r eq uir e m ent , in sex - r elat iv e
at hlet ic t alent , t o qualif y f or a
w o m e n ’ s v is- à- v is a m e n ’ s
t eam. Tit le IX proscribes pref erent ial t re at ment of eit her
sex. In a 1 9 7 9 law review art ic l e , Pr o f e s s o r Ru t h Ba d e r
Gi n s b u r g o b s e r v e d t h at i t
would be anomalous t o apply
any d if f erent st andar d t o a
se x - b a s ed t h a n t o a r ac e based pref erence. Insof ar as
t he Fo ur t eent h A m e nd m ent
prohibit s denial t o any person
of “ t he equal prot ect ion of t he
laws,” race is seldom considered t o be a charact erist ic by
which government may t reat
person s
dif f er ent ly .
In
Adarand v. Pena ( 1 9 9 5 ) , t he
Court held t hat st rict scrut iny
sho uld b e g iv en r ac e- b ased
pref erences even if “ benign.”
By Just ice Ginsburg’ s majorit y
o p in io n in U. S. v . V ir g in ia
2
T i t l e IX an d In t e r c o ll e g i at e Sp o r t s
( 1 9 9 6 ) , t he Co ur t sim ilar ly
ruled t hat government act ion
in which persons are t reat ed
dif f er ent ly ac c or ding t o sex
w i l l d e n y e q u al p r o t e c t i o n
un less t h e a ct io n b e ar s an
“ exc eeding ly
p e r s u a s iv e
j u st ifi c at i o n . ” A t m i n im u m ,
t hat requires t hat t he end const it ut e an “ import ant gov ernment al object iv e.” Q resoundingly f ails t o sat isf y t his crit erion as Q cont ravenes Tit le IX’ s
ban on sex discriminat ion and
ant iquot a prov iso.
A n o c c asio n al r e p o r t h as
suggest ed a judicial consensus
upholding Q. To t he cont rary ,
seven of t welve f ederal appellat e court s have never ruled on
Tit le IX and at hlet ics. In none
of f our appellat e cases ot her
t han
Co h e n
v.
Br o w n
Universit y ( 1 st Cir. 1 9 9 6 ) in
which t he subject surf aced in
v a r i o u s g u i s e s ( a l l d u r in g
1 9 9 3 –9 4 ) did a court syst emat ically explore w het her t he
a g e n c y p o l i c y i s v al i d . In
af f irming a judgment against
Brown f or violat ing Q, t he First
Cir c u it m a j o r it y ’ s p r i n c i p al
g r o u nd w as t hat t h e c o u r t
could not revisit whet her t he
ag en c y p o lic y w as v ali d
because a dif f erent panel of
t he court had recognized t he
policy earlier in t he case. The
panel accorded t hat recognit ion in 1 9 9 3 w hile indulging
t he pr esum pt io n t hat eq ual
proport ions of men and women
desire varsit y play. Lat er t his
pr esum pt io n co llap sed w hen
nat ional and local st udies cons i s t e n t l y r e v e a le d r o u g h l y
t wice as many male as f emale
varsit y aspirant s. Binding only
i n Ne w En g l a n d , B r o w n i s
unpersuasive elsewhere by dint
of a now discredit ed presumpt ion.
Every major at hlet ic conf erence f alls w it hin t he t errit ory
of t he f ederal appellat e circuit s
3
w h o s e p r e c e d e n t s f o r e t e ll
invalidat ion of Q or t hat have
yet t o consider it . The Nint h
Circuit , f ollow ing Adarand and
V irginia, recent ly invalidat ed a
st at ut e conf erring pref erences
by race and sex in const ruct ion
cont ract s. It lat er v alidat ed a
Ca l i f o r n i a
c o n st i t u t io n al
am endment pro scribing such
pref erences by public ent it ies,
an amendment t hat t he court
d e sc r ib ed as ef f ec t iv e ly an
exegesis of t he equal prot ect ion clause. Following Adarand,
t he Fif t h Circuit in Hopwood v.
Texas ( 1 9 9 6 ) dec lar ed t h at
r ac ial p re f erenc es in adm issions, t hough allegedly benign,
deny equal prot ect ion. Given
Virginia, it could scarcely reach
a dif f erent conclusion about Q.
( No t w it h st an d in g Ho p w o o d ,
t he agency advised Texas of f ic ials t hat st at e inst it ut io n s
may consider race in admissions. An unf ort unat e unreliab ilit y in legal int erp r et at io n
w as c o n fi r m e d w h e n s u c h
advice was cont radict ed by t he
solicit or g eneral.) The mo st
r e c e n t t r i a l c o u r t d e c isi o n
rej ect s Brown and disposes of
Q, fi nding Q neit her necessary
n o r s u f f i c ie n t t o r e f u t e a
charge of discriminat ion. Judge
Rebecca Dohert y observed in
Peder son v . Louisiana St at e
Univ er sit y ( 1 9 9 6 ) t hat o ne
must assume v ariat ion in int erest s. Q also cont ravenes t he
1 9 7 5 r eg ulat io n ’ s d ir e c t io n
t hat c o lleg e s he ed st ud ent
int erest s. Q is ripe f or invalidat io n i n f u t u r e su it s b y o r
against colleges.
D i s t o r t i o n s
T h e f o r m e r So v i e t Un i o n
am u sed We st er n o b ser v e r s
w it h inart f ul f act ory quot as.
When a m inist r y p r escr ib ed
out put of nails in pounds per
p er io d , som e f ac t o ries p r o duced small quant it ies of huge
nails. The sim ilar ly ar t ifi c ial
impress of Q is a univer se of
at h let ic t e am s unc o rr elat ed
wit h
st ud ent
i n t e r e st s .
Ignoring demand, Q requires,
at a t y p ic a l c o lleg e w ho se
enrollment is half male and half
f emale, t hat women const it ut e
half t he v arsit y complement .
Inasmuch as a f oot ball t eam
alone will comprise more t han
1 0 0 players, women w ill usually not occupy half t he varsit y
sp o t s ev e n af t er a c o lleg e
fi elds virt ually every women’ s
t eam d esire d. Most co lleges
hav e st riven t o meet Q, adding
women’s t eams t o t he point
t hat access t o t hem is barely
compet it ive. Meanwhile varsit y
spot s are available f or only a
small proport ion of t he m en
who would like one. In service
of Q, many men’s t eams are
being curt ailed or t erm inat ed.
Be c a u s e o f d e m a n d f o r
t hem, an at hlet ic depart ment
is not likely t o halve it s men’ s
o p p o r t unit ies. Inst ead m o st
will add many more spot s f or
women t han t hey eliminat e f or
m e n . In fl at i o n a n d k e e p in g
pace wit h rivals cont ribut e t o
gr eat er expendit ures on at hlet ics, but t he fi nancial impact
of Q and t he concomit ant bow
t o commercial int rusions are
unmist akable. Pressures f rom
o p e r at in g r o u g h ly t w ic e a s
m an y t eam s as h e r e t o f o r e
hav e induced at hlet ic depart ment s not only t o c onsume
m o r e int e r n al f u nd s b ut t o
cloak t hemselves in commerc ia l ad v e r t isin g . It m ay b e
arg ued t hat , at t he g ov ernment ’s behest , colleges must
value int ercollegiat e vis-à-vis
int ramural at hlet ics dif f erent ly
t han t hey ot herw ise would.
E f f i c i e n c y
a n d
Eq u a l
O p p o r t u n i t y
As f urnished by or w it hin a vol-
B R O O K I N G S
R E V I E W ,
F A L L
1 9 9 8
u n t a r y o r g an i z at i o n w it h a
sp e cifi ed num b e r o f p ay in g
members, a public good known
as a club good is charact erized
by ( a) exc ludabilit y and ( b )
part ial nonrivalry ( congest ibilit y) . For example, by select ing
members and imposing f ees, a
golf course rest rict s ac cess,
and , u p t o t he p o int w he n
crow ding occurs, an addit ional
golf er’s play does not diminish
anot her’ s. A c ollege may be
v iew ed as a h et ero g e neo us
int ergenerat ional mult iproduct
club receiving subsidies f rom
t ax p ay er s and g rant o rs and
prov iding many club goods t o
i t s t u it i o n - p a y in g s t u d e n t
members. Like a publicly support ed sy mphony orchest r a, a
varsit y f urnishes t he means f or
ex c ep t io n al p lay er s t o p er f orm, ot hers t o at t end it s perf ormances, and st ill ot hers t o
gain alt ruist ic sat isf act ion or
b ask in it s r e fl ec t ed g lo r y .
Financing derives f rom ent ert ainment revenue, t uit ion, and
sub sidies. Fo r t hese o ne o r
more club goods, t he means of
exclusion vary among t ryout s,
gat e at t endant s, and remot eness. To cont rol congest ion,
t olls are imposed in t he f orm
of t alent t hresholds and t icket
prices. Congest ion ranges f rom
c o n sid er ab le, as w h e n o n ly
recruit s play or t he ar ena is
f ull, t o nil, as when a women’ s
rost er is incomplet e or seat s
are empt y.
An allocat ion x of resources
is ef f icient or “ Paret o opt imal”
if and only if t here is no ot her
allocat ion of which it can be
said t hat at least one person
pref ers t he ot her and everybody eit her pref ers t he ot her
or is indif f erent bet w een x and
t he ot her. Paret o opt imalit y in
t ur n r eq u ir es t h at a p ub lic
good g be supplied up t o t he
point t hat t he marginal cost of
g , r elat iv e t o o t her g o o d s,
B R O O K I N G S
R E V I E W ,
F A L L
T h e f or m e r
Sov ie t Un io n a m use d
W e st e r n ob se rv e r s w it h
reaches t he sum, f or all persons, of t heir marginal willingness t o pay f or g ( equal t o t he
quot ient of t he marginal ut ilit y
of g and t he marginal ut ilit y of
o t h er g o od s) . By eq u at io ns
t aking account of congest ion,
o n e c an d et er m i ne o p t im al
club good provision, membership siz e, an d t o lls. But o f
c o u r se Q d o es no t allo w a
Paret ian at hlet ic direc t o r t o
operat e.
Nonet heless let us consider
what might be done wit h Q dislodged. Let us assume t hat a
c olleg e fi elds any p r ofi t ab le
t eam. Such a t eam is ef f ect ively f unded at t he gat e and by
right s f ees; it s profi t s subsid iz e o t h er s. St u d e n t s c o n t ribut e t o a club good what ever shares of a lump sum at hlet ic f ee or t uit ion are direct ed t o
it . How ever we char act erize a
t eam t hat vies f or subsidy, we
encount er dif f icult y in ascert aining how much indiv iduals
are willing t o pay f or any public
good. One could ask by survey,
“ What aliquot f ee would you
be willing t o pay or absorb t o
fi eld a t eam in t he sport of a?”
Knowing t hat t hey can obt ain a
1 9 9 8
ina rt f u l f a c t o ry quo t a s.
W he n a m in ist r y
p r e sc ribe d o ut pu t o f
na ils in p ou nd s p e r
p e r io d , so m e f a c t o r ie s
p ro du c e d sm a ll
q ua n t it ie s o f hu g e
na ils. T he sim ila r ly
a rt ific ia l im p r e ss of Q is
a univ e r se o f a t hle t ic
t e a m s un co r r e la t e d w it h
st ud e nt in t e r e st s.
4
f ree ride on ot hers’ cont ribut ions, some may seek t o minimize t heir aliquot share of cost
by underst at ing t heir w illingness t o pay. If t hey do not
expect t o be billed according
t o t heir response, ot hers who
desire some good may overst at e t heir willingness t o pay.
St ill ot hers m ay st ruggle t o
quant if y t heir v iews. A device
called t he Clarke-Groves mechanism induces t rut hf ulness by
adj ust ing aliquot f ees so as t o
t ax t ho se w ho r esp o nd
unt rut hf ully about willingness
t o pay. Though ingenious, t he
device f ails t o assure Paret o
opt imalit y because it may raise
m o r e r e v e n ue t h an n ee d e d
and , lest incent iv es ag ainst
t r u t hf ulness ar ise f r o m t he
p r o s p e c t o f sh a r i n g i n an
excess, an excess cannot be
ret urned. Relat ed research has
borne f ruit in mechanisms t o
render t rut hf ulness a dominant
st rat egy, in t he design of surveys, and in result s about what
is “ se co nd b est ” t o Par et o
opt imalit y .
Teams award varsit y spot s
as t hey recruit and c onduc t
t ryout s. An account of f airness
in selec t io n w ou ld r ehe ar se
precept s f amiliar f rom college
admissions. We are spared t hat
exerc ise in det ail because a
coach’ s select ions, even in our
lit ig ious so ciet y , are seld om
cont est ed. But in general we
may insist on impart ial considerat ion. That is not t o deny
t hat on occasion, as in def ending af f irmat ive act ion, one may
ar g ue t hat selec t io n is n o t
deserved, t hat impart ial considerat ion should giv e way t o
o t her g o als. By alm o st any
a c c o u n t o f e q u al a t h l e t i c
opport unit y f or sexes known
t o dif f er in at hlet ic abilit y, one
implicit ly set s dif f erent perf ormance st andards f or select ion
by sex. Nevert heless, in allot t ing varsit y spot s—presumably
5
u sin g a n ac c o u n t o f e q u al
o p p o r t u nit y t o selec t f r o m
among t he mult it ude of Paret o
o p t i m a — w e m a y i n s is t o n
r o ug hly eq ual selec t iv it y . A
college might of f er subsidized
v arsit y spot s so t hat , g iven
demand, t he minimum sex-relat ive percent ile in abilit y necessary t o qualif y f or a women’s
t eam a p p r o x im at e s t h at
r e q u i r e d t o j o i n a m e n ’ s.
Lacking measures of abilit y, a
benchmark might be compet it ive access, t he number of rost er p osit io ns o n sub sid iz e d
varsit ies divided by t he number of aspirant s t o subsidized
v arsit ies, comput ed separat ely
by sex. Anot her survey quest ion might be “ Assuming equal
co m pet it ive acc ess f o r m en
and women, what number of
varsit y spot s, if any, would you
shif t b et w een t he ext ant
m en ’ s and w om en’ s pr o grams?”
A n at h let ic d ir ect or co uld
also conduct a purely or dinal
survey in which st udent s might
rank men’ s at hlet ics, women’s
at hlet ics, and ot her uses f or an
at hlet ics subsidy . ( The result s
could be rendered single-caved
and compilable not w it hst anding Arrow’s t heorem by st ipulat ing t hat “ ot her” may not be
vot ed fi rst , by allowing no t ies
on t he ballot s, and if t he number of vot ers should be ev en,
by discarding a random ballot .)
Or t here could be present ed
f or approval v ot ing a number
of t riples present ing dif f erent
allo t m e n t s f o r t h o se t hr ee
alt e r n at iv es. Fo r an ex t an t
t eam, one would not overlook
t he obvious, t he t urnout f or
t he t eam and in int ramur als.
By a local-just ice analogue
of a princ iple f ormulat ed by
John Raw ls, one way t o select
among Paret o opt ima is t o perm it o n ly t h o se ine q uali t ies
benefi cial t o t he overall w elf are, as v iewed by a majorit y
of it s members, of t he relev ant
s o c i a l p o si t i o n t h a t t h e
inequalit y disf avors. Majorit ies
of men and women may analyze no dif f erent ly t he import ance of demand. An agency
regulat ion requires t hat men’ s
and w o m en’ s ho using b e
apport ioned t o demand, but
inexplicably does not so provide f or at hlet ics. Rat her t han
undergraduat e women import uning more t eams, one more
o f t en h e ar s law y e r s w h o ,
remot e f rom any campus and
dependent f or a livelihood on
Tit le IX disput es, complain of
part icipat ion rat ios. At a given
college, a majorit y of women
m ay p r e f er t o t r ad e an
increased at hlet ics budget f or
bet t er housing, improved labor at o r y f ac i li t i es , o r lo w e r
t uit ion. In such cases, t he st at us quo is not Paret o opt imal.
Some suggest t hat if only a
c o l leg e w e r e t o r ed uc e it s
f oot ball program, it might t olerat e Q. Foot ball rost ers hav e
alr ead y b een p ar ed — t o t h e
e x t e n t t h at , g i v e n r i sk o f
injury, t eams now scrimmage
less f requent ly and must play
f reshmen. Expense reduct ions
risk a disproport ionat e ef f ect :
w er e a sav ing s t o sac r ifi c e
a d v a n t a g e in r e c r u i t i n g o r
preparat ion and a self -sust aining t eam were t o lose anot her
game per season, appear less
of t en on t elev ision, or receiv e
a less desirab le b ow l placement , t he rev enue loss could
d w ar f t he sav ing s, t h e r eb y
hurt ing all subsidized t eams.
Tennis t eams t raveling by van
h av e lo n g u n d e r st o o d w h y
f oot ball t eams t rav el by chart ered plane. By accident s of
t h e e n t e r t ain m e n t m ar k e t ,
p r o fi t a b le t e am s e x e m p l i f y
inequalit ies just ifi able by t he
Ra w l si a n a n a l o g u e n o t e d
above.
The t heor y of c lu b goo ds
accommodat es t he f act t hat
B R O O K I N G S
R E V I E W ,
F A L L
1 9 9 8
some clubs pay members t o join. For a maj or
at hlet ic program, at hlet ic scholarships sound in
t he millions of dollars. An agency regulat ion
mandat es equalit y of f emale and male scholarship expendit ures per at hlet e. Recent ly it has
been argued t hat NCA A maxima by sport allow
more f ull scholarships in t he aggregat e f or men
t han f or w om en and t hereby drive expendit ures
per f em ale at hlet e below t hose per male. This
conj ures a f alse confl ict . For allocat ive f airness,
t he r elevant quant it y f or comparison is subsi diz ed expense per at hlet e. Profi t able t eams do
not draw f rom, but augment , t he subsidy pie.
Just t his view was adopt ed in int erpret ing an
ant idiscriminat ion law in a 1 9 8 7 decision by t he
Supreme Court of Washingt on. The v illain in any
dilut ion of expendit ures per f emale at hlet e is Q.
Under Q’ s art ifi c ial impress, because of t he
ineluct ably large size of a f oot ball rost er more
w o m en ’ s t eam s m ust b e c o nt r iv ed ev en if
demand f or t hem is lean or exhaust ed.
Co lle g e s e m b e d m an y o t h er in eq ualit ie s
t rac eable t o ext ernal infl uenc es. Pro f essors o f
phy sics ar e o f t en p aid less t han pro f essor s o f
law , b ut n ot , it seem s saf e t o say , because it
is t ho ug ht t hat lawy er s are smart er and mo re
deserv ing . In re cent ly clarif y ing it s v iew o f
w hat w ould c o nst it ut e sex discr iminat ion in
t he salaries o f m ale and f em ale c oac hes, t he
Eq ual Em p lo y m en t Op p o r t un it y Co m m issio n
af f ir med t he app rop riat eness o f pay ing h igher
salaries t o c oac hes of t eam s t hat relat iv e t o
ot hers pro duce mo re rev enu e ( ev en if t hey
ar e n o t self - sust ain ing ) , g ene r at e “ g r eat er
sp ect at or at t en danc e and m edia demands,” o r
com prise mo re at hlet es and assist an t co aches. The EEOC also adum br at ed t he idea t hat
one t eam’ s rev enue pro duc t ion m ay be less
t han anot her ’ s bec ause t he f orm er has been
slig ht ed in it s expense b ud get . But it ack no wledg ed t hat “ m any v ar iables” o f t he ent er t ainm ent mar ket “ are no t w it h in an inst it ut ion’ s
d ir ec t c o nt ro l.” In t he Unit e d St at es, o nly
t hr ee co lleg e spor t s ( f o ot ball, basket b all, and
ho ckey ) dr aw signifi cant aud ien ces.
Wit hin t he f acult ies of colleges and universit ies,
societ y’s f ont of ideas on just ice and ef f iciency,
reposes t he expert ise t o guide a Paret ian at hlet ic
direct or. All t hat seems lacking is t he f reedom t o
■
operat e.
B R O O K I N G S
R E V I E W ,
F A L L
1 9 9 8
6