International
Public Policy
Review
Unresolved Identity Conflicts as
a Barrier to Reconciliation in
Rwanda
Hilary Power
IPPR 2012/2013
International Public Policy Review • Vol.7, No 2 (June 2013)
The School of Public Policy • University College London
The Rubin Building 29/30 • WC1 9QU • London
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/
International Public Policy Review 1
Unresolved Identity Conflicts as
a Barrier to Reconciliation in
Rwanda
Hilary Power 
ABSTRACT: The official Rwandan government approach to reconciliation in the
aftermath of the 1994 genocide has been primarily focused on the Gacaca model of
restorative justice, civil education and the suppression of dangerous “genocide
ideology.” The identity issues at the heart of the long-term Hutu/Tutsi conflict have
not just “not been dealt with,” but rather government policy has criminalised the
discussion of them in public. In this essay, I will argue that this has thus far prevented
“ultimate reconciliation” (as an outcome) as it has failed to allow Rwandans to
meaningfully explore and deconstruct the identities and attitudes which led to the 1994
genocide. As new identities and attitudes have been pasted over the silenced ones, a
certain tension remains which poses a threat to the stability of the entire
reconciliation process. This is not to say, however, that reconciliation has failed as a
process, as this can be expected to be both lengthy and complex in the wake of the
brutality of the 1994 genocide. Rather, I suggest, we might consider the process of
reconciliation to be as yet incomplete
Keywords: Rwanda, genocide, reconciliation
 M.A. Human Rights (2012/2013), School of Public Policy, University College
London. Contact: hilarypower@hotmail.co.uk
2
Unresolved Identity Conflicts as a Barrier to Reconciliation in Rwanda
1 Introduction
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 saw mass popular participation in the massacre of
nearly one million Tutsi and moderate Hutu in approximately 100 days, the ultimate
objective being the eradication of Tutsi in Rwanda. Neighbours, friends and even
family members turned on each other, committing murder, rape and mutilation. The
violence was sparked by the assassination of Hutu president Juvénal Habyarimana for
which the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were assumed responsible. While the scale
of the violence was unprecedented, the cycle of Hutu versus Tutsi violence can be
traced back to at least the Tutsi massacre of 1959, which also took place in the wake of
suspected political assassination. At the heart of the episodes of violence lay a mutual
suspicion and fear of the other and attitudes of prejudice and resentment, often traced
back to Colonial ideology which emphasised the superiority of the Tutsi over the
Hutu. While the Tutsi minority had traditionally formed the elite ruling class and the
Hutu the farmers and menial workers, it is considered that the divide and rule strategy
of the Belgian colonialists introduced a more divisive element to the relationship
between the two ethnic groups. Evidently, following the genocide of 1994 the already
mutually-negating ethnic identities were further entrenched…
The official Rwandan government approach to reconciliation in the aftermath of the
1994 genocide has been primarily focused on the Gacaca model of restorative justice,
civil education and the suppression of dangerous “genocide ideology.” The identity
issues at the heart of the long-term Hutu/Tutsi conflict have not just “not been dealt
with,” but rather government policy has criminalised the discussion of them in public.
In this essay, I will argue that this has thus far prevented “ultimate reconciliation” (as
an outcome) as it has failed to allow Rwandans to meaningfully explore and
deconstruct the identities and attitudes which led to the 1994 genocide. As new
identities and attitudes have been pasted over the silenced ones, a certain tension
remains which poses a threat to the stability of the entire reconciliation process. This is
not to say, however, that reconciliation has failed as a process, as this can be expected
to be both lengthy and complex in the wake of the brutality of the 1994 genocide.
Rather, I suggest, we might consider the process of reconciliation to be as yet
incomplete.
International Public Policy Review 3
For the purposes of this essay, reconciliation is to be understood as both an “outcome”
(referred to here as “ultimate Reconciliation”) and a “process” (referred to here simply
as “reconciliation”) (Kelman 2004: 112). There are many interpretations of the term’s
substantive value, but generally it is considered to represent the full transformation of
relationship and attitudes of two or more opposing parties to a conflict and the removal
of the negation of the other(s) as an aspect of each party’s identity. As a useful
framework, I employ Sluzki’s (2003: 23) six stage model of “stepping stones” towards
ultimate Reconciliation: Conflict (starting point), Coexistence, Collaboration,
Cooperation, Interdependence and finally Integration. Progress, or perhaps negotiation
(as it is not a purely linear transition), between these stages can be considered to
represent the process of reconciliation.
2 The Gacaca Process
The Gacaca court system, based on a traditional method of resolving disputes at
community level, was developed to respond to the vast backlog of genocide cases in
Rwanda. Following the genocide, 120,000 genocide suspects were incarcerated in a
prison system designed to hold 45,000 inmates (Clark 2008: 297). Most of these
detainees were still in detention in 2003 due to the decimation of the Rwandan
criminal justice system (Clark, Kaufman & Nicolaïdis 2008: 382) and the sheer
quantity of cases to be processed.1 It was also hoped the Gacaca would serve as a
powerful tool of reconciliation, providing truth, healing, compensation, forgiveness
and rehabilitation to Rwandans at community level. The restorative element of the
Gacaca justice system was important on both a practical and a symbolic level; the
community service element of its sentences met the need for the rebuilding and
development of important local infrastructure and facilities while those judged guilty
of having tried to destroy communities were seen to be rebuilding them.
A first important contribution of the Gacaca system to the reconciliation process was
to break the cycle of impunity, which had existed prior to 1994 and had, some believe,
contributed to feelings on the part of génocidaires that they would not be caught.
Kayigamba, a survivor of the genocide, recalls a Hutu leader’s announcement over the
1
It is worth noting that The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) only dealt with highlevel organisers, and will be overlooked in this essay as it was not as integral to the reconciliation
process.
4
Unresolved Identity Conflicts as a Barrier to Reconciliation in Rwanda
infamous Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines during the genocide; “once the job
is done, nobody will be able to bring you to book!” This attitude was related, he
suggests, to the fact that many of those who had attacked or killed Tutsis in the 1960s
had repeated such crimes over the following decades and ultimately in the 1994
genocide. The Tutsi were afraid to confront the threatening behaviour before 1994, he
continues, for fear of reprisals. “Had the guilty been punished for their crimes in the
years before the genocide,” however, “perhaps people would have hesitated before
responding to the call to massacre of their neighbours” (Kayigamba 2003: 35).
There was criticism however that the Gacaca process was too lenient considering the
gravity of the crimes committed. Due to the sentencing guidelines, credit attributed for
time already served and the community service programme (which reduced
sentences), many of those found guilty at the Gacacas would have already completed
most, if not all, of their sentence (Harrell 2003: 87). From a victim’s perspective this
looked like “amnesty in disguise” (Harrell 2003: 88). The justice process did,
however, impose a clear and important moral distinction between the “guilty” and the
“innocent” making it clear that what happened was unjustifiable. Furthermore, the
community service element was still a punishment. Though not as harsh as prison,
offenders were required to dedicate a full three days a week or return to prison (Harrell
2003: 88).
The Gacaca courts also facilitated both initial and long-term social reintegration.
Initially, they addressed the logistical issue of returning génocidaires back to their
home communities, where their crimes had been committed. For co-existence of any
kind to be possible, genocide survivors would need a basic reassurance that the events
of 1994 would not recur. The perpetrators likewise, Clark reports, were somewhat
fearful for their safety anticipating the reactions of their victims and their families
(Clark 2010: 313). The Gacaca hearings provided a structured forum in which the
dialogue between perpetrators and survivors could be opened, with an expression of
guilt and remorse on the part of the perpetrator. The collaborative element of the
Gacaca process also provided the basis for longer-term social reintegration as the
devolution of the administration to local level put the local community as the main
agent. This, Clark suggests, provided the foundations for an on-going collaborative
relationship between ethnic groups as members of a community, which would prove
necessary to survival in rural Rwandan. “By talking to each other at Gacaca,” a
International Public Policy Review 5
survivor in Kigali Ville interviewed by Clark said, “we can learn to live together
again” (Clark 2010: 310-12). Furthermore, the process of truth-telling could provide
an important psychological need for atonement on the part of the perpetrators, in
admitting their guilt and confronting their victims, and closure on the part of the
survivors, having the injustice of their suffering acknowledged by its perpetrators and
finding out what had happened to loved ones. The face-to-face emotional nature of the
Gacacas also contributed to the re-humanisation of “the other” and thus to the partial
deconstruction of extreme enemy stereotypes.
3 The Impact of Suppressive Reconciliation Methods
While extreme enemy stereotypes may well have been challenged by the Gacaca
system, the reconciliation process failed to meaningfully address the ethnic identity
tensions at the heart of the conflict. To the contrary, the government implemented a
number of measures intended to suppress discussions of the divisive issue of ethnic
identity, considering it to be essential to the preservation of peace and the facilitation
of social reconciliation. The use of ethnic labels on national identity cards was banned
in 2003, while the groups involved in the reconciliation process were not to be referred
to as “Tutsi” or “Hutu” but rather as “victims” and “suspects” or “survivors” and
“perpetrators” (Clark 2010: 310). Furthermore, a number of laws were passed to
criminalise “divisionism,” “promoting genocide ideology” or “preaching negationism”
thus legally curtailing public discussion of ethnicity. The revised 2003 constitution
went as far as criminalising public references to ethnic identity (art. 33) as well as the
vaguely defined offences of “ethnic divisionism” and “trivialising the genocide”
(Thomson 2011: 443). Thus rather than simply failing to address identity issues, the
government effectively criminalised public engagement with them.
Meanwhile, the Policy of National Unity and Reconciliation, which Thomson refers to
as an “ambitious social engineering project” (Thomson 2011: 443) embraces civic
education as a means of building a sense of unified Rwandan identity as an alternative
to an ethnic one. A one-dimensional narrative was adopted and promoted,
romanticising Rwanda’s historic past and stressing the ethnic unity that existed before
the Colonial period. The emphasis is on the creation of a new “Rwandan” identity,
hoping that citizenship can replace ethnicity as a basis for identity. This narrative was
particularly stressed at the “Ingando” re-education camps where perpetrators were sent
6
Unresolved Identity Conflicts as a Barrier to Reconciliation in Rwanda
before their release into the community. Rather than providing an opportunity for
meaningful engagement with old attitudes and identities however, they sought simply
to silence them and preach the one-dimensional narrative of Rwandan unity (Thomson
2011: 444-5).
The premise of much of the narrative is, however, based on the dichotomy between
“innocent” Tutsi and “guilty” Hutu, Thomson suggests (Thomson 2011: 444). The
Gacaca process, some contend, further perpetuates this dichotomy, as Hutu are only
able to participate as defendants, Tutsi as victims. So too are Hutu excluded from the
commemoration process. “To remember is good,” a young rural woman told BuckleyZistel, “but it should be inclusive. For instance, my parents were killed during the
genocide. But when they (the public) remember they remember only Tutsi, so I am
frustrated because they don’t remember my family” (Buckley-Zistel 2008: 135).
Responding to such claims, President Kagame writes that Hutus have not been
criminalised in this way, but continues pointedly that “genocide happened in broad
daylight, and the population knows who is guilty and who is innocent of genocide
crimes.” (Kagame 2008: xxiii)
Anyone who does not assume the identity ascribed to them by the above narrative may
find themselves in serious trouble, as a result of the previously mentioned antidivisionism laws, with potential consequences including imprisonment, disappearance
or even death (Thomson 2011: 444). A public reference to Hutu victims of the
conflict, such as the RPF massacres of Hutu in Zaire (now DRC) or revenge killings of
Hutu could essentially now be a criminal offence; “trivialisation” or “negationism” of
the genocide.
This official selective amnesia might well pose a significant obstacle to achieving
Reconciliation. The genocide was a result of mutually-negating ethnic identities which
had been built over a century, and consequent deep seated fear and resentment of “the
other”. This was so significant that it was able to be translated into neighbour-onneighbour, friend-on-friend and even family-on-family murder and mutilation. Such
deep-seated identities and attitudes cannot be expected simply to disappear; though
they may be publicly silenced, they may remain intact. Failing to address them negates
the possibility of dismantling and neutralising them. The new single identity “Rwandan” - and the narrative of unity has been pasted over the silenced identities and
attitudes rather than reconciled with them. Consequently, it is likely the new identity
International Public Policy Review 7
and narrative will not necessarily fit existing “value-structure(s) and belief system(s)”.
The instability of the relationship between the new and the old “belief systems,”
Kelman suggests, may pose a serious threat to long-term peace and reconciliation.
Consequently, circumstantial changes, such as a change in leadership or policy,
economic failure or food shortages, may easily trigger the re-emergence of old
attitudes “in full force” (Kelman 2004: 118-9). It is perhaps a recognition of the need
to deal with these silenced issues which accounts for the incredible popularity of
Musekeweya Radiosoap, which has been able to explore ethnic identity and conflict
issues under the guise of fiction (though the ethnic identities of the soap characters are
unnamed). (Radio in Rwanda, Oxfam Website)
4 Selective and Chosen Amnesia
On a personal level, Buckley-Zistel considers “chosen amnesia” to be a “coping
mechanism,” allowing communities to achieve some degree of peaceful coexistence.
She notes the Kinyarwanda phrases “Kwishyra mu Mutuzo” or “Kwihao Amahoro”
(meaning “pretending peace”) which imply a coping mechanism whereby tensions are
silenced in the interests of ensuring social equilibrium, allowing coexistence and even
cooperation. Anthropologist Murray Last suggests “as ‘wounded’... metaphorically
people turn in on themselves, curl up, lie still - at least until they get their strength
back and the pain goes.” (cited in Buckley-Zistel 2008: 138)
Rwandans seemingly have no alternative to peaceful coexistence due to the absence of
ethnic segregation and the exigencies of life in Rwandan rural communities, in which
financial prosperity and even survival can depend on effective cooperation and codependency. Collective agricultural cultivation is far more effective, meanwhile
neighbours are depended on for assistance in times of illness or emergency. Some
even now “find themselves dependent on the murderers of their family” to nurse them
at their sickbed (Buckley-Zistel 2008: 136). Other collective goals, such as the wildly
successful economic recovery, the rebuilding and development of infrastructure and
local government projects require that groups set their differences aside in the interests
of cooperation (Afzali & Colleton 2003: 4-5). Vision 2020, the ambitious government
development programme has been a strong driver of economic, social and
infrastructural development and has required cohesion and commitment from the
Rwandan people (Campioni & Nowack 2012: 5). As the government states, Vision
8
Unresolved Identity Conflicts as a Barrier to Reconciliation in Rwanda
2020 “is to be achieved in a spirit of social cohesion and equity” (Ministry of Finance
and Economic Planning).
Perhaps the official selective amnesia should be also considered a necessary shortterm coping mechanism. "It's easy for outsiders to criticise (the suppression of public
discussion of ethnicity)”, a presidential adviser commented in 2004, “but if we open
political space who do you think is going to fill it?" (Carroll 2004). It is important,
however, to remain aware on the one hand of the need at some stage for enforced unity
to give way to a more open, honest and nuanced discussion of the Rwandan past and
on the other of the potential political impediments to the facilitation of such a
discussion, notably the narrative’s potential to control the population and consolidate
government power (Thomson 2011: 439-440). Furthermore, until Rwanda is ready to
address such identity issues we must remain aware of the instability of the
reconciliation process and the vulnerability of progress to circumstantial changes.
Until the identity issues and attitudes at the heart of the conflict are addressed and
deconstructed in a meaningful way, they may well remain open to manipulation.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, the reconciliation process in Rwanda has not failed, but rather remains
incomplete as a result of a failure to engage meaningfully with the identities and
attitudes at the heart of the long-term identity conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, of
which the 1994 genocide is the most recent (and most brutal) paroxysm. We might
consider the current process to have advanced as far as cooperation or
interdependence, but must accept that the integration phase, and ultimate
Reconciliation, will be a lengthy, risky and complex process. Europe is still dealing
with reconciliation issues from the Holocaust almost seventy years after the event,
while Rwandan Historian Charles Ntampaka predicts that it may be another two or
three generations before the situation is ripe for Rwandans to begin to deal with the
deep-seated identity issues at the heart of the conflict (cited in Buckley-Zistel 2008:
136). Perhaps we might hope that the creation of trust and cooperation will allow
future generations who did not experience the violence of the genocide first-hand to
meaningfully engage with the issues of their ancestors, for whom both forgiveness and
identity confrontation and change and may ask too much. We should still remain
aware of the need to open up public discourse to deal with such matters (when
International Public Policy Review 9
practically possible) and of the political interests that might seek to delay this process.
In the meantime we must also remain sensitive to the vulnerability of the incomplete
reconciliation process and its susceptibility to circumstantial change.
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