July 2013
INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC POLICY
REVIEW
UNRESOLVED IDENTITY CONFLICTS:
BARRIERS TO RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA
OUR DOUBLE EDGED
SWORD: THE
BUSINESS CASE FOR
GENDER EQUALITY
NOT EVERYTHING IS
ROTTEN IN THE
STATE OF
WESTMINSTER:
THREE POINTS TO
CONSIDER FOR UK’S
CONSTITUTIONAL
REFORMERS
THE EUROPEAN
PROJECT:
A STEP TOWARDS
BETTER GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
From the Editors
Dear all, We are very pleased to present the very first edition of the
International Public Policy Review (IPPR) magazine. We were so
overwhelmed by the quantity, and in particular the quality, of the
submissions we received this year that we decided to make a more
accessible magazine with the very best of this year’s submissions. You
can of course also find all our articles online at www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/.
This year, our guiding ambition has been to emphasize the
contributions that students make to UCL. By providing a platform
for student publication, we hope to provide an opportunity for
students to air their thoughts and opinions on contemporary policy
issues.
Parama Chakravorty
With this publication, we hope to align ourselves with
UCL’s claim to the title of ‘London’s Global University’;
and to boldly claim the position of ‘UCL’s Global
Journal
The articles within this year’s publication perfectly encapsulate
the variety of submissions that we have received throughout this
academic year. It underlines the plurality of interests and ideas within
our diverse student body. The contributors provide qualified
assessments and critical questioning of contemporary issues.
Moira Nicholson outlines an economic case for gender equality,
arguing that growth will not be sustainable in the long runs if we
continue to force women to choose between working and having
children.
Hilary Power takes us abroad to Rwanda, where she takes a
second look at one of the greatest disasters of out time. She argues
that the reconciliation process in Rwanda has not failed, but that it
still remains incomplete due to a reluctance to engage meaningfully
with the identities and attitudes at the heart of the long-term identity
conflict.
Johannes Uhl takes us back to the UK and to the issue of
constitutional reform. He argues that just because we should keep the
constitution up to date, this is no reason to reject every unique
characteristic of the current system. We should aim to reform, not
reject the Wesminster model of government.
In the last article of this magazine Levi Leatherberry reflects on
the contradictory situation that there is not a single pan-European
federal political party, even though a truly democratic and unified
Europe has been at the heart of the European Union since its
inception. He argues that they EU should stop funding parties that
work against the EU’s goals, and should rather focus on creating a
unified Europe.
We sincerely hope you enjoy this magazine!
The Editorial Team
Ulrik Westen-Jensen
Birgithe Wille
Levi Leatherberry
OUR DOUBLE EDGED
SWORD: THE BUSINESS
CASE FOR GENDER EQUALITY
By Moira Nicholson*
“Poverty is being judged by what you have, not by who you are”
For thousands of years women
have had fewer life chances than men.
Despite changes in gender norms,
women are still performing almost all
of the household work and childcare
duties. Women are underrepresented
in government and boardrooms, earn
less than men for comparable work
and are much more likely to live in
poverty. In the UK, for instance,
almost half of all women have total
individual incomes of less than £100
a week, compared with less than a
fifth of men.
At the same time, fertility rates
are running at below replacement
levels in nearly every developed
country in the world. In their most
recent book Women, Work and
Politics Torben Iversen and Frances
“[Poverty means] never having
enough money to pay my bills
and give my children treats
and a holiday”
Rosenbluth demonstrate that this
fertility crisis is partly the outcome of
a trade-off that women are making
between having a career and having a
family.
We may be in the midst of an
economic crisis but this largely
overlooked demographic crisis is no
less dangerous. Growth doesn’t
happen overnight and is dependent
on two main ingredients: more
workers and higher worker
productivity. As women have
unequivocally chosen careers at the
expense of having children, we will
soon be drastically short of the
former. Improving gender equality
must therefore be the cornerstone of
any government strategy to avoid a
future pension’s crisis and ensure
sustainable economic growth. Or, to
put it another way, women’s
childbearing capacities might be one
of the most powerful sources of
female bargaining power to secure
gender equality.
Statistics about the gender pay
gap mask the realities of what daily
life is like to be a poor woman living
in a rich democracy.
In 2006, The Women’s Budget
Group interviewed a group of women
from Birmingham, Cardiff and
London in an attempt to map a
picture of individual women’s
experiences of living below the
poverty line. They asked participants
to complete the sentence ‘Poverty
means to me…’. Several overarching
themes emerged. In descending order
of prominence, they were: human
rights, isolation, children, money and
finances, employment and education,
“Poverty to me means making
excuses because of a lack of
money for not attending social
meetings with friends or taking
part in leisure activities”
physical and mental health, the
‘postcode lottery’ and housing.
The report, Women and poverty:
experiences, empowerment and
engagement, published by the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation, is worth
reading in full and can be accessed
online.
George Osborne – swapping workers’ rights for company shares
But governments all over the
world are now facing a crisis. As it
turns out, gender inequality doesn’t
help anyone, least of all governments’
budgets. As the primary caregivers,
women are often forced to choose a
career over having children. And
women all over the world have voted,
and they have unequivocally chosen
careers at the expense of having
children. Average fertility across
OECD countries has more than
halved since 1970 and female labour
force participation has risen by 50 per
cent. The result: an increasingly
elderly population that is being
supported by a disproportionately
small workforce and an impending
pension and immigration crisis.
By withholding their childbearing
capacity, they have forced
governments to try to address the
conflict between having a family and
pursuing a career. Governments in
OECD countries have responded by
spending increasing amounts on
family services.
This relatively proactive response
is good news for women all over the
world who have either been forced to
choose between starting a family and
pursuing professional success or, who
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
Growth doesn’t happen
overnight and is dependent
on two main ingredients:
more workers and higher
worker productivity. As
women have unequivocally
chosen careers at the
expense of having children,
we will soon be drastically
short of the former.
“[Poverty means] going to bed
in the day to keep warm,
because can’t afford to keep
the heating on”
have had the decision made for them,
by an employer who didn’t want to
take the risk of hiring her during her
childbearing years.
In contrast, George Osborne’s
announcement last year that workers
will be able to trade their employment
rights, including their rights to request
flexible working, for shares was a
regressive step. Also, in light of the
already existing pension crisis, it
seems short-sighted to provide women
with even more disincentives to have
children. After all, capital gains tax
free shares won’t compensate the
poorest families; the average amount
that these families would have ever
paid in capital gains tax will likely be
much smaller than the value of being
able to work flexible hours or give less
than 16 weeks’ notice for returning
from maternity leave.
3
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
4
28.06.13 16:55
Will the government create Holland, workers who have been
employed at a firm for over a year are
well-paid, part-time jobs?
allowed to shorten or increase their
working hours on request, as a result
of The Act on Adjustment of Working
Hours passed in 2000. They are still
given the same pay and benefits as full
time workers (pro-rated) and part-time
work isn’t just reserved for low skilled
jobs, spanning occupations from law to
medicine. Fertility rates in Holland
have increased from 1.7 in 2000 to 1.8
in 2010. It’s likely that other factors
will have been at play here too, but it
also seems likely that Holland’s female
friendly labour market has had
something to do with the increase in
fertility.
A solution that is already being
tried in many countries across the
“[Poverty means] having no real world is to increase public sector
spending on day care and other family
Poor women hit hardest
chance to improve myself and
services to subsidise the cost of having
Gender inequality can partly be
no hope for my future. I can’t go
explained by the fact that women often to college because my husband children. This would help to reduce
the conflict between having children
take time off work or slow down their
won’t pay and because he won’t and seeking remunerative work but
careers to have children. But even
divorce me I can’t go”
won’t eliminate it altogether. As
women who don’t take time off are
already mentioned, as long as women
affected. All women are less likely to
And
as
long
as
women
make
less
are more likely than men to take
be hired or promoted because, on
money
than
men,
it
doesn’t
make
career breaks in order to raise children
average, as women, they are
economic
sense
for
women
to
continue
or look after aging or sick relatives,
statistically more likely to take a break
working
if
their
family
member
is
employers will still discriminate against
during child-bearing years or look
earning
more,
particularly
when
women when recruiting. And, as we’ve
after sick or aging relatives.
childcare
is
so
expensive.
already established by looking at our
If you think about any well-paid
Another approach would be to
low fertility rates, women are ready
promote
female-friendly
labour
and willing to forgo having children to
“[Poverty means having] to
file:///Users/birgithewille/Desktop/Pregnant_woman_silhouette.webarchive
Page
1 of 1
market
practices
such
as
increasing
the
gain economic independence.
choose between paying for my
number of part-time and flexi-time
The key to increasing fertility
boiler to be fixed or my
jobs. Unfortunately, part-time jobs
rates
is government policies that
children’s lessons to support
have tended to be the lowest skilled
reduce the need for women to trade
their dyslexia”
and therefore poorest paid. Also, part- having children with having a career.
This means investing in high quality,
or high skilled career or job, it’s easy to time hours are not much use if they
aren’t flexible. Consider, for example,
full-time childcare services as well as
see how a person’s productivity and
ability could be significantly hampered a woman who takes up a part-time job the creation of flexible and part-time
jobs across a full range of occupations
by taking time off for a few years. On that runs from 2pm-5pm every day.
Unless her partner can do the school
as opposed to just poorly paid partthe other hand, the damage to
run, she will likely have to pay
time jobs in the service industry. If we
women’s employability due to career
somebody else to pick up the kids from can close the gender pay gap, genderinterruption is much lower at the
nursery or school. This might not
neutral family leave policies would
bottom end of the career ladder:
make sharing equally in childcare
administrative work, food service jobs, seem so bad if it weren’t for the fact
that the ‘somebody else’ is likely to be responsibilities a realistic choice for
house cleaning and some manual
a woman working for very low wages
parents. If we sort out gender
labour jobs. This is often given as an
(childcare has never been a well-paid
inequality then the fertility crisis will
explanation for women’s domination
job). Moreover, to ensure parity with
take care of itself.
of the service industry and,
full-time male workers, these jobs need
consequently, the lowest paid jobs.
to offer full benefits on a pro-rated
basis, an offering many employers will
be able unable or unwilling to afford.
*Moira Nicholson is studying for
Nevertheless, increasing access to
a MSc in Public Policy at the School
part-time employment can work. In
of Public Policy at UCL
Women want to have careers. So
the best chance we have of raising
fertility rates to the sustainable
population equilibrium is to enable
women to carve out a career without
having to sacrifice a family. The
question now is, how can we best help
women to pursue careers without
having to forgo childbearing?
The most preferable solution
would be for men and women to share
equally in child rearing and domestic
responsibilities. However, the
traditional division of labour at home
is deeply culturally ingrained and so a
more equitable division seems far
away.
BARRIERS TO RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA
By Hilary Power*
Introduction INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
UNRESOLVED IDENTITY CONFLICTS:
the superiority of the Tutsi over the
Hutu. While the Tutsi minority had
traditionally formed the elite ruling
class and the Hutu the farmers and
menial workers, it is considered that
the divide and rule strategy of the
Belgian colonialists introduced a more
divisive element to the relationship
between the two ethnic groups.
Evidently, following the genocide of
1994 the already mutually-negating
ethnic identities were further
entrenched…
focused on the Gacaca model of
restorative justice, civil education and
the suppression of dangerous
The Rwandan genocide of 1994
“genocide ideology.” The identity
saw mass popular participation in the
issues at the heart of the long-term
massacre of nearly one million Tutsi
Hutu/Tutsi conflict have not just “not
and moderate Hutu in approximately
been dealt with,” but rather
100 days, the ultimate objective being
government policy has criminalised
the eradication of Tutsi in Rwanda.
the discussion of them in public. In
Neighbours, friends and even family
this essay, I will argue that this has
members turned on each other,
thus far prevented “ultimate
committing murder, rape and
reconciliation” (as an outcome) as it
mutilation. The violence was sparked
has failed to allow Rwandans to
by the assassination of Hutu president
meaningfully explore and deconstruct
Juvénal Habyarimana for which the
“The reconciliation process in the identities and attitudes which led
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were
Rwanda has not failed, but
to the 1994 genocide. As new
assumed responsible. While the scale
of the violence was unprecedented, rather remains incomplete as a identities and attitudes have been
pasted over the silenced ones, a
the cycle of Hutu versus Tutsi
result of a failure to engage
certain tension remains which poses a
violence can be traced back to at
meaningfully with the identities
threat to the stability of the entire
least the Tutsi massacre of 1959,
and attitudes at the heart of
reconciliation process. This is not to
which also took place in the wake of
the long-term identity conflict say, however, that reconciliation has
suspected political assassination. At
between Hutu and Tutsi”
failed as a process, as this can be
the heart of the episodes of violence
expected to be both lengthy and
lay a mutual suspicion and fear of the
The official Rwandan
complex in the wake of the brutality
other and attitudes of prejudice and
government approach to
of the 1994 genocide. Rather, I
resentment, often traced back to
reconciliation in the aftermath of the suggest, we might consider the process
Colonial ideology which emphasised
1994 genocide has been primarily
of reconciliation to be as yet incomplete.
5
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
6
The Gacaca Process
The Gacaca court system,
based on a traditional method of
resolving disputes at community
level, was developed to respond
to the vast backlog of genocide
cases in Rwanda. Following the
genocide, 120,000 genocide
suspects were incarcerated in a
prison system designed to hold
45,000 inmates (Clark 2008: 297).
Most of these detainees were still
in detention in 2003 due to the
decimation of the Rwandan
criminal justice system (Clark,
Kaufman & Nicolaïdis 2008: 382)
and the sheer quantity of cases to
be processed. It was also hoped the
Gacaca would serve as a powerful tool
of reconciliation, providing truth,
healing, compensation, forgiveness and
rehabilitation to Rwandans at
community level. The restorative
element of the Gacaca justice system
was important on both a practical and
a symbolic level; the community
service element of its sentences met
the need for the rebuilding and
development of important local
infrastructure and facilities while those
judged guilty of having tried to destroy
communities were seen to be
rebuilding them.
threatening behaviour before 1994, he
continues, for fear of reprisals. “Had
the guilty been punished for their
crimes in the years before the
genocide,” however, “perhaps people
would have hesitated before
responding to the call to massacre of
their neighbours” (Kayigamba 2003:
35).
There was criticism however that
the Gacaca process was too lenient
considering the gravity of the crimes
committed. Due to the sentencing
guidelines, credit attributed for time
already served and the community
service programme (which reduced
sentences), many of those found guilty
“There was criticism that the at the Gacacas would have already
completed most, if not all, of their
Gacaca process was too
sentence (Harrell 2003: 87). From a
lenient considering the gravity victim’s perspective this looked like
of the crimes committed.”
“amnesty in disguise” (Harrell 2003:
88). The justice process did, however,
A first important contribution of
impose a clear and important moral
the Gacaca system to the
distinction between the “guilty” and
reconciliation process was to break the the “innocent” making it clear that
cycle of impunity, which had existed
what happened was unjustifiable.
prior to 1994 and had, some believe,
Furthermore, the community service
contributed to feelings on the part of
element was still a punishment.
génocidaires that they would not be
Though not as harsh as prison,
caught. Kayigamba, a survivor of the
offenders were required to dedicate a
genocide, recalls a Hutu leader’s
full three days a week or return to
announcement over the infamous
prison (Harrell 2003: 88).
Radio Télévision Libre des Mille
The Gacaca courts also facilitated
Collines during the genocide; “once
both initial and long-term social
the job is done, nobody will be able to reintegration. Initially, they addressed
bring you to book!” This attitude was the logistical issue of returning
related, he suggests, to the fact that
génocidaires back to their home
many of those who had attacked or
communities, where their crimes had
killed Tutsis in the 1960s had repeated been committed. For co-existence of
such crimes over the following decades
any kind to be possible, genocide
and ultimately in the 1994 genocide.
survivors would need a basic
The Tutsi were afraid to confront the
reassurance that the events of 1994
would not recur.
The perpetrators likewise, Clark
reports, were somewhat fearful for
their safety anticipating the reactions
of their victims and their families
(Clark 2010: 313). The Gacaca
hearings provided a structured forum
in which the dialogue between
perpetrators and survivors could be
opened, with an expression of guilt
and remorse on the part of the
perpetrator. The collaborative element
of the Gacaca process also provided
the basis for longer-term social
reintegration as the devolution of the
administration to local level put the
local community as the main agent.
This, Clark suggests, provided the
foundations for an on-going
collaborative relationship between
ethnic groups as members of a
community, which would prove
necessary to survival in rural
Rwandan. “By talking to each other at
Gacaca,” a survivor in Kigali Ville
interviewed by Clark said, “we can
learn to live together again” (Clark
2010: 310-12). Furthermore, the
process of truth-telling could provide
an important psychological need for
atonement on the part of the
perpetrators, in admitting their guilt
and confronting their victims, and
closure on the part of the survivors,
having the injustice of their suffering
acknowledged by its perpetrators and
finding out what had happened to
loved ones. The face-to-face emotional
nature of the Gacacas also contributed
to the re-humanisation of “the other”
and thus to the partial deconstruction
of extreme enemy stereotypes.
existed before the Colonial period.
The emphasis is on the creation of a
new “Rwandan” identity, hoping that
citizenship can replace ethnicity as a
basis for identity. This narrative was
While extreme enemy stereotypes particularly stressed at the “Ingando”
may well have been challenged by the re-education camps where
Gacaca system, the reconciliation
perpetrators were sent before their
process failed to meaningfully address release into the community. Rather
the ethnic identity tensions at the
than providing an opportunity for
heart of the conflict. To the contrary, meaningful engagement with old
the government implemented a
attitudes and identities however, they
number of measures intended to
sought simply to silence them and
suppress discussions of the divisive
preach the one-dimensional narrative
issue of ethnic identity, considering it of Rwandan unity (Thomson 2011:
to be essential to the preservation of
444-5).
peace and the facilitation of social
The premise of much of the
reconciliation.
narrative is, however, based on the
dichotomy between “innocent” Tutsi
Rather than simply failing to and “guilty” Hutu, Thomson suggests
address identity issues, the (Thomson 2011: 444). The Gacaca
process, some contend, further
government effectively
perpetuates this dichotomy, as Hutu
criminalised public
are only able to participate as
engagement with them.
defendants, Tutsi as victims. So too
are Hutu excluded from the
The use of ethnic labels on
national identity cards was banned in commemoration process. “To
2003, while the groups involved in the remember is good,” a young rural
woman told Buckley-Zistel, “but it
reconciliation process were not to be
should be inclusive. For instance, my
referred to as “Tutsi” or “Hutu” but
parents were killed during the
rather as “victims” and “suspects” or
“survivors” and “perpetrators” (Clark genocide. But when they (the public)
2010: 310). Furthermore, a number of remember they remember only Tutsi,
so I am frustrated because they don’t
laws were passed to criminalise
remember my family” (Buckley-Zistel
“divisionism,” “promoting genocide
ideology” or “preaching negationism” 2008: 135). Responding to such
claims, President Kagame writes that
thus legally curtailing public
Hutus have not been criminalised in
discussion of ethnicity. The revised
this way, but continues pointedly that
2003 constitution went as far as
“genocide happened in broad
criminalising public references to
daylight, and the population knows
ethnic identity (art. 33) as well as the
who is guilty and who is innocent of
vaguely defined offences of “ethnic
genocide crimes.” (Kagame 2008:
divisionism” and “trivialising the
xxiii)
genocide” (Thomson 2011: 443).
Anyone who does not assume the
Thus rather than simply failing to
identity
ascribed to them by the above
address identity issues, the
narrative
may find themselves in
government effectively criminalised
serious
trouble,
as a result of the
public engagement with them.
previously
mentioned
anti-divisionism
Meanwhile, the Policy of
laws,
with
potential
consequences
National Unity and Reconciliation,
including imprisonment,
which Thomson refers to as an
disappearance or even death
“ambitious social engineering
(Thomson 2011: 444). A public
project” (Thomson 2011: 443)
reference to Hutu victims of the
embraces civic education as a means
conflict, such as the RPF massacres of
of building a sense of unified
Rwandan identity as an alternative to Hutu in Zaire (now DRC) or revenge
killings of Hutu could essentially now
an ethnic one. A one-dimensional
narrative was adopted and promoted, be a criminal offence; “trivialisation”
or “negationism” of the genocide.
romanticising Rwanda’s historic past
This official selective amnesia
and stressing the ethnic unity that
might well pose a significant obstacle
to achieving Reconciliation. The
genocide was a result of mutuallynegating ethnic identities which had
been built over a century, and
consequent deep seated fear and
resentment of “the other”. This was
so significant that it was able to be
translated into neighbour-onneighbour, friend-on-friend and even
family-on-family murder and
mutilation. Such deep-seated identities
and attitudes cannot be expected
simply to disappear; though they may
be publicly silenced, they may remain
intact. Failing to address them negates
the possibility of dismantling and
neutralising them. The new single
identity - “Rwandan” - and the
narrative of unity has been pasted
over the silenced identities and
attitudes rather than reconciled with
them.
At the heart of the episodes
of violence lay a mutual
suspicion and fear of the
other and attitudes of
prejudice and resentment,
often traced back to Colonial
ideology, which emphasised
the superiority of the Tutsi
over the Hutu.
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
The Impact of Suppressive Reconciliation Methods
Consequently, it is likely the new
identity and narrative will not
necessarily fit existing “valuestructure(s) and belief system(s)”. The
instability of the relationship between
the new and the old “belief systems,”
Kelman suggests, may pose a serious
threat to long-term peace and
reconciliation. Consequently,
circumstantial changes, such as a
change in leadership or policy,
economic failure or food shortages,
may easily trigger the re-emergence of
old attitudes “in full force” (Kelman
2004: 118-9). It is perhaps a
recognition of the need to deal with
these silenced issues which accounts
for the incredible popularity of
Musekeweya Radiosoap, which has
been able to explore ethnic identity
and conflict issues under the guise of
fiction (though the ethnic identities of
the soap characters are unnamed).
(Radio in Rwanda, Oxfam Website)
7
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
8
circumstantial changes. Until the
identity issues and attitudes at the
heart of the conflict are addressed and
deconstructed in a meaningful way,
they may well remain open to
manipulation.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the reconciliation
process in Rwanda has not failed, but
rather remains incomplete as a result
of a failure to engage meaningfully
with the identities and attitudes at the
heart of the long-term identity conflict
between Hutu and Tutsi, of which the
interests of cooperation (Afzali &
Selective and Chosen 1994 genocide is the most recent (and
Colleton 2003: 4-5). Vision 2020, the
most brutal) paroxysm. We might
Amnesia
ambitious government development
consider the current process to have
programme has been a strong driver of advanced as far as cooperation or
On a personal level, Buckleyeconomic, social and infrastructural
interdependence, but must accept that
Zistel considers “chosen amnesia” to
development and has required
the integration phase, and ultimate
be a “coping mechanism,” allowing
cohesion and commitment from the
Reconciliation, will be a lengthy, risky
communities to achieve some degree
Rwandan people (Campioni &
and complex process. Europe is still
of peaceful coexistence. She notes the
Nowack 2012: 5). As the government
dealing with reconciliation issues from
Kinyarwanda phrases “Kwishyra mu
states, Vision 2020 “is to be achieved
the Holocaust almost seventy years
Mutuzo” or “Kwihao
in a spirit of social cohesion and
after the event, while Rwandan
Amahoro” (meaning “pretending
equity” (Ministry of Finance and
Historian Charles Ntampaka predicts
peace”) which imply a coping
that it may be another two or three
mechanism whereby tensions are
“The premise of much of the
generations before the situation is ripe
silenced in the interests of
narrative is based on the
for Rwandans to begin to deal with the
ensuring social equilibrium,
dichotomy between “innocent”
deep-seated identity issues at the heart
allowing coexistence and even
Tutsi and “guilty” Hutu”
of the conflict (cited in Buckley-Zistel
cooperation. Anthropologist
2008: 136). Perhaps we might hope
Murray Last suggests “as
Economic Planning).
that the creation of trust and
‘wounded’... metaphorically people
Perhaps the official selective
cooperation will allow future
turn in on themselves, curl up, lie still amnesia should be also considered a
generations who did not experience
at least until they get their strength
necessary short-term coping
the violence of the genocide first-hand
back and the pain goes.” (cited in
mechanism. "It's easy for outsiders to
to meaningfully engage with the issues
Buckley-Zistel 2008: 138)
criticise (the suppression of public
of their ancestors, for whom both
Rwandans seemingly have no
alternative to peaceful coexistence due discussion of ethnicity)”, a presidential forgiveness and identity confrontation
adviser commented in 2004, “but if
and change and may ask too much.
to the absence of ethnic segregation
We should still remain aware of the
and the exigencies of life in Rwandan we open political space who do you
rural communities, in which financial think is going to fill it?" (Carroll 2004). need to open up public discourse to
It is important, however, to remain
deal with such matters (when
prosperity and even survival can
aware on the one hand of the need at practically possible) and of the
depend on effective cooperation and
political interests that might seek to
co-dependency. Collective agricultural some stage for enforced unity to give
way to a more open, honest and
delay this process. In the meantime we
cultivation is far more effective,
nuanced discussion of the Rwandan
must also remain sensitive to the
meanwhile neighbours are depended
past
and
on
the
other
of
the
potential
vulnerability of the incomplete
on for assistance in times of illness or
political
impediments
to
the
reconciliation process and its
emergency. Some even now “find
facilitation
of
such
a
discussion,
susceptibility to circumstantial change.
themselves dependent on the
notably
the
narrative’s
potential
to
murderers of their family” to nurse
control the population and consolidate
them at their sickbed (Buckley-Zistel
* Hilary Power is studying for a
government power (Thomson 2011:
2008: 136). Other collective goals,
M.A.in Human Rights at the
such as the wildly successful economic 439-440). Furthermore, until Rwanda
School of Public Policy at UCL
is ready to address such identity issues
recovery, the rebuilding and
* For the full bibliography, please
we must remain aware of the
development of infrastructure and
see
the article online at: http://
local government projects require that instability of the reconciliation process
www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/
groups set their differences aside in the and the vulnerability of progress to
THREE POINTS TO CONSIDER FOR UK’S
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS
By Johannes Uhl*
In the past two decades, the United Kingdom has
experienced an unprecedented move towards institutional
change and constitutional reform. The traditional setup
of government in Britain – known to scholars of
comparative politics as the Westminster Model – seems to
be outdated. And it seems obvious what levers the
reformers must pull: write a constitution that empowers
the people as sovereign, abolish the aristocratic traditions
embodied by the House of Lords, make the head of state
elected by the people, devolve authority to the regions,
and make the electoral system more proportional. But is
the change to come this clear-cut? Will we really face a
new end of history with the consensus model of
democracy triumphing over its British counterpart? Will
federalism, presidentialism, proportional representation
and an extensively large party system be the new standard
for democracy?
We should doubt this.
“Keeping the constitution up to date is
important to ensure the quality of
democracy. However, this does not
imply that one has to jettison every
unique characteristic of the own
constitutional tradition.”
Firstly, the consensus model does not fully deliver on the
promise of being “kinder and gentler”1 towards the
people. Although policy outcomes may be more
responsive to people’s needs, consensus democracy
performs less well in terms of accountability and
participation. With the larger number of actors involved
in decision-making, bargaining procedures and informal
communication between political elites are brought about.
Sometimes disparagingly characterised as horse-trading,
these processes tend to be rather non transparent and do
allow for a relatively low extent of public involvement.
Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that
participation in politics is less popular in consensus
democracies; and that active participation is less equally
distributed along the ideological spectrum2.
Secondly, one should not diminish the qualities of
Parliament. In modern polities, due to the complexity of
social life, democracy cannot be enacted through direct
participation of every citizen. So it is Parliament as the
representative body that ensures popular sovereignty. The
aim of constitutional reform should thus be to keep
Parliament as strong an actor as possible. Strengthening
the second chamber by making it elected and thereby
effectively splitting up Parliament does not achieve this
goal. With two different kinds of MPs connected to each
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
NOT EVERYTHING IS ROTTEN IN THE
STATE OF WESTMINSTER:
citizen, responsibilities and accountability are blurred.
Furthermore, if the two chambers are elected at different
points in time, their compositions will be different. This
may then lead to a need for bargaining and compromise;
or even to gridlocks within Parliament. Its strength against
external actors will decrease. Thereby people’s power will
indirectly be harmed, too.
Finally, reformers should not forget the virtues of the
British electoral system, colloquially referred to as first past
the post (FPTP). It is true that it produces very
disproportional results, discriminates against minor parties
and marginal opinions. But it also leads to a high level of
accountability of politicians as it ensures a strong link
between members of parliament and their constituencies
as they are directly accountable to them and the role of
parties is weaker than in proportional systems. Secondly,
FPTP has the crucial advantage of being a very simple
and comprehensible system. Introducing a new system or
even several different systems might lead to confusion,
which eventually decreases people’s inclination to vote and
engage in politics. And finally, experience shows that
proportional representation will almost always lead to the
need to form governmental coalitions. This however
involves the aforementioned informal elite practices
typical for consensus systems.
Keeping the constitution up to date is important to
ensuring the quality of democracy. However, this does not
imply that one has to jettison every unique characteristic
of the own constitutional tradition. British constitutional
reformers are now in the privileged position to create a
new model that reconciles both the consensus and the
majoritarian, Westminster, model of democracy.
* Johannes Uhl is studying for a MSc in Democracy
and Comparative Politics at the School of Public Policy at
UCL
9
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
THE EUROPEAN PROJECT:
A STEP TOWARDS BETTER GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
By Levi Leatherberry *
Beyond all eloquence, beyond all intelligence there is
still today not a single pan-European federal political party.
The utter necessity of a pan-European political party,
which would aim to assist and create truly democratic and
unified Europe has been clearly desired by many panEuropean scholars the very inception of the EU. Indeed
the 'father' of the European Union Altiero Spinelli was
also the co-founder of the Union of European Federalists
(UEF). Today even a section of the EU budget is set aside
purely to fund pan-European parties at the tune of around
“None of the parties funded by the
European Union promote a federal unified
government for Europe, or a single unified
European form of citizenship expressly or
directly and they certainly do not
campaign regularly for it.”
30 million Euros.
But the UEF is just an NGO and of the 12
organizations registered for this 30 million Euros not a
single one is federalist. They are nationalist, quasi-fascist
and socialist. The newly registered “Alliance of European
National Movements” of which BNP is a member receives
300,000 Euro to criticise and demand segregation within
the EU. Furthermore, the European Alliance for Freedom
in 2011 is outspokenly Euro-sceptic and receives registered
0.4 million Euro from the EU.
Although these funds shy from the 7+ million Euro
the leftist parties get from the same fund they are vital in
securing permanent members in headquarters in
European capitals which otherwise lack in many
circumstances even this minimal funding and support to
their radical views. But the socialist and Marxist
organizations that take the bulk of the funding do not
necessarily hold pro-integration views of Europe either
and are seemingly more than happy to sit in their national
or elected (as quite a few seem to be) offices in the
10
European union and pander to nationalism and
Euroscepticism as it benefits their funding and
membership. None of the parties promote a federal
unified government for Europe, or a single unified
European form of citizenship expressly or directly and
they certainly do not campaign regularly for it. This is vital
to political evolution within the EU in a positive direction.
I find it then ironic that the EU does not fund a party
founded in part by its ideological founder. Instead it funds
the opposition to federalism which is at the heart of the
European debate, it is not as if the dialogue is whether
Europe should be a unitary state, or a socialist state, or a
fascist state it is predominantly a federal vs. national issue.
The only party the EU should be funding is a federal
party. The United States of Europe was preceded by
another social experiment with nationalism the United
States of America, in which separatist states were
overcome internally – through a single federal system. The
European Experiment will likely be successful the same
way in its external experiment with overcoming
nationalism.
I am not a federalist or European, yet I support the
fulfilment of a single federal Europe. Why? Because it
shows that nationalism can be overcome within our
lifetimes. Although the systems which replace it will not be
“The only party the EU should be funding
is a federal party.”
perfect, as no system ever is, it will be the work of future
generations to improve and develop the systems they
inherit.
However, if the EU declines due to petty nationalism
then this is a sad reflection of the times in which we live,
and will be a psychological blow to other post-nationalist
movements worldwide. A unified Europe on a strong
transparent, inclusive and unified system could be a
stepping-stone to a global experiment in creating a just and
equitable form of supra-national global governance.
* Levi Leatherberrry is studying for a MSc in Global
Governance at the School of Public Policy at UCL
Throughout the 2012/2013 academic year, IPPR hosted a number of events for the students
of the School of Public Policy, ranging from debatable and at times contentious political
documentary screenings to career talks with both internal and external speakers from
different sectors and policy areas.
Political Documentaries
IPPR opened the series of film
screenings in November with the
controversial Obama’s America 2016
by Dinesh D’Souza, which asked
from a conservative standpoint "If
Obama wins a second term, where
will we be in 2016?". The second
documentary, U.N. Me, by Ami
Horowitz and
Matthew Groff offered instead a
critique – at times biased – of the
United Nations as an organization
that has drifted from its founding
principles.
In January, Dr Jeff Kucik joined
students in discussing the Danish
documentary Armadillo, by Janus
Metz, on a group of Danish soldiers
fighting in Afghanistan, while in
February, Dr Niheer Dasandi
moderated the showing of The End of
Poverty by Philippe Diaz, a daring
and thought-provoking work by
award-winning filmmaker, Philippe
Diaz, arguing that global poverty is
not an accident, but rather that it
has reached new levels because of
unfair debt, trade and tax policies.
In March, Dr Alex Braithwaite
joined IPPR for The Fog of War:
Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S.
McNamara, a 2003 American
documentary by Errol Morris about
the life and political career of
former U.S. Secretary of Defense,
Robert S. McNamara.
Finally, Dr Niheer Dasandi
concluded the series by introducing
the controversial Enjoy Poverty, a 2008
documentary film by Dutch artist
Renzo Martens who spent three
years traveling throughout the DRC
asking the question: "Who owns
poverty?" in an attempt to expose
the inherent viciousness of poverty’s
status quo.
All of the the screenings
sparked interesting debates which
were continued in the pubs
surrounding UCL.
Career Talks
Alongside the film screenings,
IPPR organised an internal careers
talk inviting four current SPP
students, Marina Raïs, Ben Morgan,
Rachel Franklin and Nazgul
Yergalieva, with experience in the
"real working world", to share their
professional development and offer
advice for students looking to pursue
similar careers. Finally, IPPR invited
three high-profile practitioners to
share their experience and answer
students’ questions about how to
pursue a career path in different
areas of politics. Stephen
Wordsworth, distinguished British
diplomat, Roxanne Mashari,
Parliamentary Research Assistant for
Kate Green MP and Labour Party
Councillor in the London Borough
of Brent, and Tom Raines, currently
Research Associate and Coordinator
of the Europe Programme at
Chatham House, provided
interesting insight into their
respective careers.
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013
A YEAR OF IPPR EVENTS
IPPR would very much like to thank
Drs Niheer Dasandi, Jeff Kucik, and Alex
Braithwaite for their thought-provoking
choice of documentaries. We would also
like to thank all internal and external
speakers for sharing their working
experience with the School of Public
Policy’s students and for their encouraging
advice. And last but not least, IPPR says
thank you to all SPP students who came
along to our events.
We hope you have enjoyed this year as much as we have!
The 2013 Events team:
Ashley Burdett, Esther Brobbey, Franziska Eckhard, Levi Leatherberry, Liana Moro, Dasha
Moseeva, Renate Preukschat, Marina Raïs
11
Acknowledgements:
Throughout the year, we have been fortunate enough to receive support and help from
various people in the work of IPPR:
Dr. Jeffrey Kucik - for his help and his role as IPPR coordinator.
IT administrator Stephen Thompson - for his assistance with the IPPR web page, as
well as any IT related inquiries we have sent his way.
Administrative Assistant Katerina Syriou - for assisting us with any practicalities and
other administrative issues.
We would also like to thank all of the contributors to both this magazine and our
online journal. Without you we would literally not have been able to produce either of
them.
Last, but not least, we would like to thank the entire School of Public Policy at UCL for
giving us the opportunity to continue to develop this great platform.
IPPR July 2013 Vol.1