July 2013 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW UNRESOLVED IDENTITY CONFLICTS: BARRIERS TO RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA OUR DOUBLE EDGED SWORD: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR GENDER EQUALITY NOT EVERYTHING IS ROTTEN IN THE STATE OF WESTMINSTER: THREE POINTS TO CONSIDER FOR UK’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS THE EUROPEAN PROJECT: A STEP TOWARDS BETTER GLOBAL GOVERNANCE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 From the Editors Dear all, We are very pleased to present the very first edition of the International Public Policy Review (IPPR) magazine. We were so overwhelmed by the quantity, and in particular the quality, of the submissions we received this year that we decided to make a more accessible magazine with the very best of this year’s submissions. You can of course also find all our articles online at www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/. This year, our guiding ambition has been to emphasize the contributions that students make to UCL. By providing a platform for student publication, we hope to provide an opportunity for students to air their thoughts and opinions on contemporary policy issues. Parama Chakravorty With this publication, we hope to align ourselves with UCL’s claim to the title of ‘London’s Global University’; and to boldly claim the position of ‘UCL’s Global Journal The articles within this year’s publication perfectly encapsulate the variety of submissions that we have received throughout this academic year. It underlines the plurality of interests and ideas within our diverse student body. The contributors provide qualified assessments and critical questioning of contemporary issues. Moira Nicholson outlines an economic case for gender equality, arguing that growth will not be sustainable in the long runs if we continue to force women to choose between working and having children. Hilary Power takes us abroad to Rwanda, where she takes a second look at one of the greatest disasters of out time. She argues that the reconciliation process in Rwanda has not failed, but that it still remains incomplete due to a reluctance to engage meaningfully with the identities and attitudes at the heart of the long-term identity conflict. Johannes Uhl takes us back to the UK and to the issue of constitutional reform. He argues that just because we should keep the constitution up to date, this is no reason to reject every unique characteristic of the current system. We should aim to reform, not reject the Wesminster model of government. In the last article of this magazine Levi Leatherberry reflects on the contradictory situation that there is not a single pan-European federal political party, even though a truly democratic and unified Europe has been at the heart of the European Union since its inception. He argues that they EU should stop funding parties that work against the EU’s goals, and should rather focus on creating a unified Europe. We sincerely hope you enjoy this magazine! The Editorial Team Ulrik Westen-Jensen Birgithe Wille Levi Leatherberry OUR DOUBLE EDGED SWORD: THE BUSINESS CASE FOR GENDER EQUALITY By Moira Nicholson* “Poverty is being judged by what you have, not by who you are” For thousands of years women have had fewer life chances than men. Despite changes in gender norms, women are still performing almost all of the household work and childcare duties. Women are underrepresented in government and boardrooms, earn less than men for comparable work and are much more likely to live in poverty. In the UK, for instance, almost half of all women have total individual incomes of less than £100 a week, compared with less than a fifth of men. At the same time, fertility rates are running at below replacement levels in nearly every developed country in the world. In their most recent book Women, Work and Politics Torben Iversen and Frances “[Poverty means] never having enough money to pay my bills and give my children treats and a holiday” Rosenbluth demonstrate that this fertility crisis is partly the outcome of a trade-off that women are making between having a career and having a family. We may be in the midst of an economic crisis but this largely overlooked demographic crisis is no less dangerous. Growth doesn’t happen overnight and is dependent on two main ingredients: more workers and higher worker productivity. As women have unequivocally chosen careers at the expense of having children, we will soon be drastically short of the former. Improving gender equality must therefore be the cornerstone of any government strategy to avoid a future pension’s crisis and ensure sustainable economic growth. Or, to put it another way, women’s childbearing capacities might be one of the most powerful sources of female bargaining power to secure gender equality. Statistics about the gender pay gap mask the realities of what daily life is like to be a poor woman living in a rich democracy. In 2006, The Women’s Budget Group interviewed a group of women from Birmingham, Cardiff and London in an attempt to map a picture of individual women’s experiences of living below the poverty line. They asked participants to complete the sentence ‘Poverty means to me…’. Several overarching themes emerged. In descending order of prominence, they were: human rights, isolation, children, money and finances, employment and education, “Poverty to me means making excuses because of a lack of money for not attending social meetings with friends or taking part in leisure activities” physical and mental health, the ‘postcode lottery’ and housing. The report, Women and poverty: experiences, empowerment and engagement, published by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, is worth reading in full and can be accessed online. George Osborne – swapping workers’ rights for company shares But governments all over the world are now facing a crisis. As it turns out, gender inequality doesn’t help anyone, least of all governments’ budgets. As the primary caregivers, women are often forced to choose a career over having children. And women all over the world have voted, and they have unequivocally chosen careers at the expense of having children. Average fertility across OECD countries has more than halved since 1970 and female labour force participation has risen by 50 per cent. The result: an increasingly elderly population that is being supported by a disproportionately small workforce and an impending pension and immigration crisis. By withholding their childbearing capacity, they have forced governments to try to address the conflict between having a family and pursuing a career. Governments in OECD countries have responded by spending increasing amounts on family services. This relatively proactive response is good news for women all over the world who have either been forced to choose between starting a family and pursuing professional success or, who INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 Growth doesn’t happen overnight and is dependent on two main ingredients: more workers and higher worker productivity. As women have unequivocally chosen careers at the expense of having children, we will soon be drastically short of the former. “[Poverty means] going to bed in the day to keep warm, because can’t afford to keep the heating on” have had the decision made for them, by an employer who didn’t want to take the risk of hiring her during her childbearing years. In contrast, George Osborne’s announcement last year that workers will be able to trade their employment rights, including their rights to request flexible working, for shares was a regressive step. Also, in light of the already existing pension crisis, it seems short-sighted to provide women with even more disincentives to have children. After all, capital gains tax free shares won’t compensate the poorest families; the average amount that these families would have ever paid in capital gains tax will likely be much smaller than the value of being able to work flexible hours or give less than 16 weeks’ notice for returning from maternity leave. 3 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 4 28.06.13 16:55 Will the government create Holland, workers who have been employed at a firm for over a year are well-paid, part-time jobs? allowed to shorten or increase their working hours on request, as a result of The Act on Adjustment of Working Hours passed in 2000. They are still given the same pay and benefits as full time workers (pro-rated) and part-time work isn’t just reserved for low skilled jobs, spanning occupations from law to medicine. Fertility rates in Holland have increased from 1.7 in 2000 to 1.8 in 2010. It’s likely that other factors will have been at play here too, but it also seems likely that Holland’s female friendly labour market has had something to do with the increase in fertility. A solution that is already being tried in many countries across the “[Poverty means] having no real world is to increase public sector spending on day care and other family Poor women hit hardest chance to improve myself and services to subsidise the cost of having Gender inequality can partly be no hope for my future. I can’t go explained by the fact that women often to college because my husband children. This would help to reduce the conflict between having children take time off work or slow down their won’t pay and because he won’t and seeking remunerative work but careers to have children. But even divorce me I can’t go” won’t eliminate it altogether. As women who don’t take time off are already mentioned, as long as women affected. All women are less likely to And as long as women make less are more likely than men to take be hired or promoted because, on money than men, it doesn’t make career breaks in order to raise children average, as women, they are economic sense for women to continue or look after aging or sick relatives, statistically more likely to take a break working if their family member is employers will still discriminate against during child-bearing years or look earning more, particularly when women when recruiting. And, as we’ve after sick or aging relatives. childcare is so expensive. already established by looking at our If you think about any well-paid Another approach would be to low fertility rates, women are ready promote female-friendly labour and willing to forgo having children to “[Poverty means having] to file:///Users/birgithewille/Desktop/Pregnant_woman_silhouette.webarchive Page 1 of 1 market practices such as increasing the gain economic independence. choose between paying for my number of part-time and flexi-time The key to increasing fertility boiler to be fixed or my jobs. Unfortunately, part-time jobs rates is government policies that children’s lessons to support have tended to be the lowest skilled reduce the need for women to trade their dyslexia” and therefore poorest paid. Also, part- having children with having a career. This means investing in high quality, or high skilled career or job, it’s easy to time hours are not much use if they aren’t flexible. Consider, for example, full-time childcare services as well as see how a person’s productivity and ability could be significantly hampered a woman who takes up a part-time job the creation of flexible and part-time jobs across a full range of occupations by taking time off for a few years. On that runs from 2pm-5pm every day. Unless her partner can do the school as opposed to just poorly paid partthe other hand, the damage to run, she will likely have to pay time jobs in the service industry. If we women’s employability due to career somebody else to pick up the kids from can close the gender pay gap, genderinterruption is much lower at the nursery or school. This might not neutral family leave policies would bottom end of the career ladder: make sharing equally in childcare administrative work, food service jobs, seem so bad if it weren’t for the fact that the ‘somebody else’ is likely to be responsibilities a realistic choice for house cleaning and some manual a woman working for very low wages parents. If we sort out gender labour jobs. This is often given as an (childcare has never been a well-paid inequality then the fertility crisis will explanation for women’s domination job). Moreover, to ensure parity with take care of itself. of the service industry and, full-time male workers, these jobs need consequently, the lowest paid jobs. to offer full benefits on a pro-rated basis, an offering many employers will be able unable or unwilling to afford. *Moira Nicholson is studying for Nevertheless, increasing access to a MSc in Public Policy at the School part-time employment can work. In of Public Policy at UCL Women want to have careers. So the best chance we have of raising fertility rates to the sustainable population equilibrium is to enable women to carve out a career without having to sacrifice a family. The question now is, how can we best help women to pursue careers without having to forgo childbearing? The most preferable solution would be for men and women to share equally in child rearing and domestic responsibilities. However, the traditional division of labour at home is deeply culturally ingrained and so a more equitable division seems far away. BARRIERS TO RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA By Hilary Power* Introduction INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 UNRESOLVED IDENTITY CONFLICTS: the superiority of the Tutsi over the Hutu. While the Tutsi minority had traditionally formed the elite ruling class and the Hutu the farmers and menial workers, it is considered that the divide and rule strategy of the Belgian colonialists introduced a more divisive element to the relationship between the two ethnic groups. Evidently, following the genocide of 1994 the already mutually-negating ethnic identities were further entrenched… focused on the Gacaca model of restorative justice, civil education and the suppression of dangerous The Rwandan genocide of 1994 “genocide ideology.” The identity saw mass popular participation in the issues at the heart of the long-term massacre of nearly one million Tutsi Hutu/Tutsi conflict have not just “not and moderate Hutu in approximately been dealt with,” but rather 100 days, the ultimate objective being government policy has criminalised the eradication of Tutsi in Rwanda. the discussion of them in public. In Neighbours, friends and even family this essay, I will argue that this has members turned on each other, thus far prevented “ultimate committing murder, rape and reconciliation” (as an outcome) as it mutilation. The violence was sparked has failed to allow Rwandans to by the assassination of Hutu president meaningfully explore and deconstruct Juvénal Habyarimana for which the “The reconciliation process in the identities and attitudes which led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) were Rwanda has not failed, but to the 1994 genocide. As new assumed responsible. While the scale of the violence was unprecedented, rather remains incomplete as a identities and attitudes have been pasted over the silenced ones, a the cycle of Hutu versus Tutsi result of a failure to engage certain tension remains which poses a violence can be traced back to at meaningfully with the identities threat to the stability of the entire least the Tutsi massacre of 1959, and attitudes at the heart of reconciliation process. This is not to which also took place in the wake of the long-term identity conflict say, however, that reconciliation has suspected political assassination. At between Hutu and Tutsi” failed as a process, as this can be the heart of the episodes of violence expected to be both lengthy and lay a mutual suspicion and fear of the The official Rwandan complex in the wake of the brutality other and attitudes of prejudice and government approach to of the 1994 genocide. Rather, I resentment, often traced back to reconciliation in the aftermath of the suggest, we might consider the process Colonial ideology which emphasised 1994 genocide has been primarily of reconciliation to be as yet incomplete. 5 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 6 The Gacaca Process The Gacaca court system, based on a traditional method of resolving disputes at community level, was developed to respond to the vast backlog of genocide cases in Rwanda. Following the genocide, 120,000 genocide suspects were incarcerated in a prison system designed to hold 45,000 inmates (Clark 2008: 297). Most of these detainees were still in detention in 2003 due to the decimation of the Rwandan criminal justice system (Clark, Kaufman & Nicolaïdis 2008: 382) and the sheer quantity of cases to be processed. It was also hoped the Gacaca would serve as a powerful tool of reconciliation, providing truth, healing, compensation, forgiveness and rehabilitation to Rwandans at community level. The restorative element of the Gacaca justice system was important on both a practical and a symbolic level; the community service element of its sentences met the need for the rebuilding and development of important local infrastructure and facilities while those judged guilty of having tried to destroy communities were seen to be rebuilding them. threatening behaviour before 1994, he continues, for fear of reprisals. “Had the guilty been punished for their crimes in the years before the genocide,” however, “perhaps people would have hesitated before responding to the call to massacre of their neighbours” (Kayigamba 2003: 35). There was criticism however that the Gacaca process was too lenient considering the gravity of the crimes committed. Due to the sentencing guidelines, credit attributed for time already served and the community service programme (which reduced sentences), many of those found guilty “There was criticism that the at the Gacacas would have already completed most, if not all, of their Gacaca process was too sentence (Harrell 2003: 87). From a lenient considering the gravity victim’s perspective this looked like of the crimes committed.” “amnesty in disguise” (Harrell 2003: 88). The justice process did, however, A first important contribution of impose a clear and important moral the Gacaca system to the distinction between the “guilty” and reconciliation process was to break the the “innocent” making it clear that cycle of impunity, which had existed what happened was unjustifiable. prior to 1994 and had, some believe, Furthermore, the community service contributed to feelings on the part of element was still a punishment. génocidaires that they would not be Though not as harsh as prison, caught. Kayigamba, a survivor of the offenders were required to dedicate a genocide, recalls a Hutu leader’s full three days a week or return to announcement over the infamous prison (Harrell 2003: 88). Radio Télévision Libre des Mille The Gacaca courts also facilitated Collines during the genocide; “once both initial and long-term social the job is done, nobody will be able to reintegration. Initially, they addressed bring you to book!” This attitude was the logistical issue of returning related, he suggests, to the fact that génocidaires back to their home many of those who had attacked or communities, where their crimes had killed Tutsis in the 1960s had repeated been committed. For co-existence of such crimes over the following decades any kind to be possible, genocide and ultimately in the 1994 genocide. survivors would need a basic The Tutsi were afraid to confront the reassurance that the events of 1994 would not recur. The perpetrators likewise, Clark reports, were somewhat fearful for their safety anticipating the reactions of their victims and their families (Clark 2010: 313). The Gacaca hearings provided a structured forum in which the dialogue between perpetrators and survivors could be opened, with an expression of guilt and remorse on the part of the perpetrator. The collaborative element of the Gacaca process also provided the basis for longer-term social reintegration as the devolution of the administration to local level put the local community as the main agent. This, Clark suggests, provided the foundations for an on-going collaborative relationship between ethnic groups as members of a community, which would prove necessary to survival in rural Rwandan. “By talking to each other at Gacaca,” a survivor in Kigali Ville interviewed by Clark said, “we can learn to live together again” (Clark 2010: 310-12). Furthermore, the process of truth-telling could provide an important psychological need for atonement on the part of the perpetrators, in admitting their guilt and confronting their victims, and closure on the part of the survivors, having the injustice of their suffering acknowledged by its perpetrators and finding out what had happened to loved ones. The face-to-face emotional nature of the Gacacas also contributed to the re-humanisation of “the other” and thus to the partial deconstruction of extreme enemy stereotypes. existed before the Colonial period. The emphasis is on the creation of a new “Rwandan” identity, hoping that citizenship can replace ethnicity as a basis for identity. This narrative was While extreme enemy stereotypes particularly stressed at the “Ingando” may well have been challenged by the re-education camps where Gacaca system, the reconciliation perpetrators were sent before their process failed to meaningfully address release into the community. Rather the ethnic identity tensions at the than providing an opportunity for heart of the conflict. To the contrary, meaningful engagement with old the government implemented a attitudes and identities however, they number of measures intended to sought simply to silence them and suppress discussions of the divisive preach the one-dimensional narrative issue of ethnic identity, considering it of Rwandan unity (Thomson 2011: to be essential to the preservation of 444-5). peace and the facilitation of social The premise of much of the reconciliation. narrative is, however, based on the dichotomy between “innocent” Tutsi Rather than simply failing to and “guilty” Hutu, Thomson suggests address identity issues, the (Thomson 2011: 444). The Gacaca process, some contend, further government effectively perpetuates this dichotomy, as Hutu criminalised public are only able to participate as engagement with them. defendants, Tutsi as victims. So too are Hutu excluded from the The use of ethnic labels on national identity cards was banned in commemoration process. “To 2003, while the groups involved in the remember is good,” a young rural woman told Buckley-Zistel, “but it reconciliation process were not to be should be inclusive. For instance, my referred to as “Tutsi” or “Hutu” but parents were killed during the rather as “victims” and “suspects” or “survivors” and “perpetrators” (Clark genocide. But when they (the public) 2010: 310). Furthermore, a number of remember they remember only Tutsi, so I am frustrated because they don’t laws were passed to criminalise remember my family” (Buckley-Zistel “divisionism,” “promoting genocide ideology” or “preaching negationism” 2008: 135). Responding to such claims, President Kagame writes that thus legally curtailing public Hutus have not been criminalised in discussion of ethnicity. The revised this way, but continues pointedly that 2003 constitution went as far as “genocide happened in broad criminalising public references to daylight, and the population knows ethnic identity (art. 33) as well as the who is guilty and who is innocent of vaguely defined offences of “ethnic genocide crimes.” (Kagame 2008: divisionism” and “trivialising the xxiii) genocide” (Thomson 2011: 443). Anyone who does not assume the Thus rather than simply failing to identity ascribed to them by the above address identity issues, the narrative may find themselves in government effectively criminalised serious trouble, as a result of the public engagement with them. previously mentioned anti-divisionism Meanwhile, the Policy of laws, with potential consequences National Unity and Reconciliation, including imprisonment, which Thomson refers to as an disappearance or even death “ambitious social engineering (Thomson 2011: 444). A public project” (Thomson 2011: 443) reference to Hutu victims of the embraces civic education as a means conflict, such as the RPF massacres of of building a sense of unified Rwandan identity as an alternative to Hutu in Zaire (now DRC) or revenge killings of Hutu could essentially now an ethnic one. A one-dimensional narrative was adopted and promoted, be a criminal offence; “trivialisation” or “negationism” of the genocide. romanticising Rwanda’s historic past This official selective amnesia and stressing the ethnic unity that might well pose a significant obstacle to achieving Reconciliation. The genocide was a result of mutuallynegating ethnic identities which had been built over a century, and consequent deep seated fear and resentment of “the other”. This was so significant that it was able to be translated into neighbour-onneighbour, friend-on-friend and even family-on-family murder and mutilation. Such deep-seated identities and attitudes cannot be expected simply to disappear; though they may be publicly silenced, they may remain intact. Failing to address them negates the possibility of dismantling and neutralising them. The new single identity - “Rwandan” - and the narrative of unity has been pasted over the silenced identities and attitudes rather than reconciled with them. At the heart of the episodes of violence lay a mutual suspicion and fear of the other and attitudes of prejudice and resentment, often traced back to Colonial ideology, which emphasised the superiority of the Tutsi over the Hutu. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 The Impact of Suppressive Reconciliation Methods Consequently, it is likely the new identity and narrative will not necessarily fit existing “valuestructure(s) and belief system(s)”. The instability of the relationship between the new and the old “belief systems,” Kelman suggests, may pose a serious threat to long-term peace and reconciliation. Consequently, circumstantial changes, such as a change in leadership or policy, economic failure or food shortages, may easily trigger the re-emergence of old attitudes “in full force” (Kelman 2004: 118-9). It is perhaps a recognition of the need to deal with these silenced issues which accounts for the incredible popularity of Musekeweya Radiosoap, which has been able to explore ethnic identity and conflict issues under the guise of fiction (though the ethnic identities of the soap characters are unnamed). (Radio in Rwanda, Oxfam Website) 7 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 8 circumstantial changes. Until the identity issues and attitudes at the heart of the conflict are addressed and deconstructed in a meaningful way, they may well remain open to manipulation. Conclusion In conclusion, the reconciliation process in Rwanda has not failed, but rather remains incomplete as a result of a failure to engage meaningfully with the identities and attitudes at the heart of the long-term identity conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, of which the interests of cooperation (Afzali & Selective and Chosen 1994 genocide is the most recent (and Colleton 2003: 4-5). Vision 2020, the most brutal) paroxysm. We might Amnesia ambitious government development consider the current process to have programme has been a strong driver of advanced as far as cooperation or On a personal level, Buckleyeconomic, social and infrastructural interdependence, but must accept that Zistel considers “chosen amnesia” to development and has required the integration phase, and ultimate be a “coping mechanism,” allowing cohesion and commitment from the Reconciliation, will be a lengthy, risky communities to achieve some degree Rwandan people (Campioni & and complex process. Europe is still of peaceful coexistence. She notes the Nowack 2012: 5). As the government dealing with reconciliation issues from Kinyarwanda phrases “Kwishyra mu states, Vision 2020 “is to be achieved the Holocaust almost seventy years Mutuzo” or “Kwihao in a spirit of social cohesion and after the event, while Rwandan Amahoro” (meaning “pretending equity” (Ministry of Finance and Historian Charles Ntampaka predicts peace”) which imply a coping that it may be another two or three mechanism whereby tensions are “The premise of much of the generations before the situation is ripe silenced in the interests of narrative is based on the for Rwandans to begin to deal with the ensuring social equilibrium, dichotomy between “innocent” deep-seated identity issues at the heart allowing coexistence and even Tutsi and “guilty” Hutu” of the conflict (cited in Buckley-Zistel cooperation. Anthropologist 2008: 136). Perhaps we might hope Murray Last suggests “as Economic Planning). that the creation of trust and ‘wounded’... metaphorically people Perhaps the official selective cooperation will allow future turn in on themselves, curl up, lie still amnesia should be also considered a generations who did not experience at least until they get their strength necessary short-term coping the violence of the genocide first-hand back and the pain goes.” (cited in mechanism. "It's easy for outsiders to to meaningfully engage with the issues Buckley-Zistel 2008: 138) criticise (the suppression of public of their ancestors, for whom both Rwandans seemingly have no alternative to peaceful coexistence due discussion of ethnicity)”, a presidential forgiveness and identity confrontation adviser commented in 2004, “but if and change and may ask too much. to the absence of ethnic segregation We should still remain aware of the and the exigencies of life in Rwandan we open political space who do you rural communities, in which financial think is going to fill it?" (Carroll 2004). need to open up public discourse to It is important, however, to remain deal with such matters (when prosperity and even survival can aware on the one hand of the need at practically possible) and of the depend on effective cooperation and political interests that might seek to co-dependency. Collective agricultural some stage for enforced unity to give way to a more open, honest and delay this process. In the meantime we cultivation is far more effective, nuanced discussion of the Rwandan must also remain sensitive to the meanwhile neighbours are depended past and on the other of the potential vulnerability of the incomplete on for assistance in times of illness or political impediments to the reconciliation process and its emergency. Some even now “find facilitation of such a discussion, susceptibility to circumstantial change. themselves dependent on the notably the narrative’s potential to murderers of their family” to nurse control the population and consolidate them at their sickbed (Buckley-Zistel * Hilary Power is studying for a government power (Thomson 2011: 2008: 136). Other collective goals, M.A.in Human Rights at the such as the wildly successful economic 439-440). Furthermore, until Rwanda School of Public Policy at UCL is ready to address such identity issues recovery, the rebuilding and * For the full bibliography, please we must remain aware of the development of infrastructure and see the article online at: http:// local government projects require that instability of the reconciliation process www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr/journal/ groups set their differences aside in the and the vulnerability of progress to THREE POINTS TO CONSIDER FOR UK’S CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMERS By Johannes Uhl* In the past two decades, the United Kingdom has experienced an unprecedented move towards institutional change and constitutional reform. The traditional setup of government in Britain – known to scholars of comparative politics as the Westminster Model – seems to be outdated. And it seems obvious what levers the reformers must pull: write a constitution that empowers the people as sovereign, abolish the aristocratic traditions embodied by the House of Lords, make the head of state elected by the people, devolve authority to the regions, and make the electoral system more proportional. But is the change to come this clear-cut? Will we really face a new end of history with the consensus model of democracy triumphing over its British counterpart? Will federalism, presidentialism, proportional representation and an extensively large party system be the new standard for democracy? We should doubt this. “Keeping the constitution up to date is important to ensure the quality of democracy. However, this does not imply that one has to jettison every unique characteristic of the own constitutional tradition.” Firstly, the consensus model does not fully deliver on the promise of being “kinder and gentler”1 towards the people. Although policy outcomes may be more responsive to people’s needs, consensus democracy performs less well in terms of accountability and participation. With the larger number of actors involved in decision-making, bargaining procedures and informal communication between political elites are brought about. Sometimes disparagingly characterised as horse-trading, these processes tend to be rather non transparent and do allow for a relatively low extent of public involvement. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that participation in politics is less popular in consensus democracies; and that active participation is less equally distributed along the ideological spectrum2. Secondly, one should not diminish the qualities of Parliament. In modern polities, due to the complexity of social life, democracy cannot be enacted through direct participation of every citizen. So it is Parliament as the representative body that ensures popular sovereignty. The aim of constitutional reform should thus be to keep Parliament as strong an actor as possible. Strengthening the second chamber by making it elected and thereby effectively splitting up Parliament does not achieve this goal. With two different kinds of MPs connected to each INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 NOT EVERYTHING IS ROTTEN IN THE STATE OF WESTMINSTER: citizen, responsibilities and accountability are blurred. Furthermore, if the two chambers are elected at different points in time, their compositions will be different. This may then lead to a need for bargaining and compromise; or even to gridlocks within Parliament. Its strength against external actors will decrease. Thereby people’s power will indirectly be harmed, too. Finally, reformers should not forget the virtues of the British electoral system, colloquially referred to as first past the post (FPTP). It is true that it produces very disproportional results, discriminates against minor parties and marginal opinions. But it also leads to a high level of accountability of politicians as it ensures a strong link between members of parliament and their constituencies as they are directly accountable to them and the role of parties is weaker than in proportional systems. Secondly, FPTP has the crucial advantage of being a very simple and comprehensible system. Introducing a new system or even several different systems might lead to confusion, which eventually decreases people’s inclination to vote and engage in politics. And finally, experience shows that proportional representation will almost always lead to the need to form governmental coalitions. This however involves the aforementioned informal elite practices typical for consensus systems. Keeping the constitution up to date is important to ensuring the quality of democracy. However, this does not imply that one has to jettison every unique characteristic of the own constitutional tradition. British constitutional reformers are now in the privileged position to create a new model that reconciles both the consensus and the majoritarian, Westminster, model of democracy. * Johannes Uhl is studying for a MSc in Democracy and Comparative Politics at the School of Public Policy at UCL 9 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 THE EUROPEAN PROJECT: A STEP TOWARDS BETTER GLOBAL GOVERNANCE By Levi Leatherberry * Beyond all eloquence, beyond all intelligence there is still today not a single pan-European federal political party. The utter necessity of a pan-European political party, which would aim to assist and create truly democratic and unified Europe has been clearly desired by many panEuropean scholars the very inception of the EU. Indeed the 'father' of the European Union Altiero Spinelli was also the co-founder of the Union of European Federalists (UEF). Today even a section of the EU budget is set aside purely to fund pan-European parties at the tune of around “None of the parties funded by the European Union promote a federal unified government for Europe, or a single unified European form of citizenship expressly or directly and they certainly do not campaign regularly for it.” 30 million Euros. But the UEF is just an NGO and of the 12 organizations registered for this 30 million Euros not a single one is federalist. They are nationalist, quasi-fascist and socialist. The newly registered “Alliance of European National Movements” of which BNP is a member receives 300,000 Euro to criticise and demand segregation within the EU. Furthermore, the European Alliance for Freedom in 2011 is outspokenly Euro-sceptic and receives registered 0.4 million Euro from the EU. Although these funds shy from the 7+ million Euro the leftist parties get from the same fund they are vital in securing permanent members in headquarters in European capitals which otherwise lack in many circumstances even this minimal funding and support to their radical views. But the socialist and Marxist organizations that take the bulk of the funding do not necessarily hold pro-integration views of Europe either and are seemingly more than happy to sit in their national or elected (as quite a few seem to be) offices in the 10 European union and pander to nationalism and Euroscepticism as it benefits their funding and membership. None of the parties promote a federal unified government for Europe, or a single unified European form of citizenship expressly or directly and they certainly do not campaign regularly for it. This is vital to political evolution within the EU in a positive direction. I find it then ironic that the EU does not fund a party founded in part by its ideological founder. Instead it funds the opposition to federalism which is at the heart of the European debate, it is not as if the dialogue is whether Europe should be a unitary state, or a socialist state, or a fascist state it is predominantly a federal vs. national issue. The only party the EU should be funding is a federal party. The United States of Europe was preceded by another social experiment with nationalism the United States of America, in which separatist states were overcome internally – through a single federal system. The European Experiment will likely be successful the same way in its external experiment with overcoming nationalism. I am not a federalist or European, yet I support the fulfilment of a single federal Europe. Why? Because it shows that nationalism can be overcome within our lifetimes. Although the systems which replace it will not be “The only party the EU should be funding is a federal party.” perfect, as no system ever is, it will be the work of future generations to improve and develop the systems they inherit. However, if the EU declines due to petty nationalism then this is a sad reflection of the times in which we live, and will be a psychological blow to other post-nationalist movements worldwide. A unified Europe on a strong transparent, inclusive and unified system could be a stepping-stone to a global experiment in creating a just and equitable form of supra-national global governance. * Levi Leatherberrry is studying for a MSc in Global Governance at the School of Public Policy at UCL Throughout the 2012/2013 academic year, IPPR hosted a number of events for the students of the School of Public Policy, ranging from debatable and at times contentious political documentary screenings to career talks with both internal and external speakers from different sectors and policy areas. Political Documentaries IPPR opened the series of film screenings in November with the controversial Obama’s America 2016 by Dinesh D’Souza, which asked from a conservative standpoint "If Obama wins a second term, where will we be in 2016?". The second documentary, U.N. Me, by Ami Horowitz and Matthew Groff offered instead a critique – at times biased – of the United Nations as an organization that has drifted from its founding principles. In January, Dr Jeff Kucik joined students in discussing the Danish documentary Armadillo, by Janus Metz, on a group of Danish soldiers fighting in Afghanistan, while in February, Dr Niheer Dasandi moderated the showing of The End of Poverty by Philippe Diaz, a daring and thought-provoking work by award-winning filmmaker, Philippe Diaz, arguing that global poverty is not an accident, but rather that it has reached new levels because of unfair debt, trade and tax policies. In March, Dr Alex Braithwaite joined IPPR for The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara, a 2003 American documentary by Errol Morris about the life and political career of former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara. Finally, Dr Niheer Dasandi concluded the series by introducing the controversial Enjoy Poverty, a 2008 documentary film by Dutch artist Renzo Martens who spent three years traveling throughout the DRC asking the question: "Who owns poverty?" in an attempt to expose the inherent viciousness of poverty’s status quo. All of the the screenings sparked interesting debates which were continued in the pubs surrounding UCL. Career Talks Alongside the film screenings, IPPR organised an internal careers talk inviting four current SPP students, Marina Raïs, Ben Morgan, Rachel Franklin and Nazgul Yergalieva, with experience in the "real working world", to share their professional development and offer advice for students looking to pursue similar careers. Finally, IPPR invited three high-profile practitioners to share their experience and answer students’ questions about how to pursue a career path in different areas of politics. Stephen Wordsworth, distinguished British diplomat, Roxanne Mashari, Parliamentary Research Assistant for Kate Green MP and Labour Party Councillor in the London Borough of Brent, and Tom Raines, currently Research Associate and Coordinator of the Europe Programme at Chatham House, provided interesting insight into their respective careers. INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY REVIEW July 2013 A YEAR OF IPPR EVENTS IPPR would very much like to thank Drs Niheer Dasandi, Jeff Kucik, and Alex Braithwaite for their thought-provoking choice of documentaries. We would also like to thank all internal and external speakers for sharing their working experience with the School of Public Policy’s students and for their encouraging advice. And last but not least, IPPR says thank you to all SPP students who came along to our events. We hope you have enjoyed this year as much as we have! The 2013 Events team: Ashley Burdett, Esther Brobbey, Franziska Eckhard, Levi Leatherberry, Liana Moro, Dasha Moseeva, Renate Preukschat, Marina Raïs 11 Acknowledgements: Throughout the year, we have been fortunate enough to receive support and help from various people in the work of IPPR: Dr. Jeffrey Kucik - for his help and his role as IPPR coordinator. IT administrator Stephen Thompson - for his assistance with the IPPR web page, as well as any IT related inquiries we have sent his way. Administrative Assistant Katerina Syriou - for assisting us with any practicalities and other administrative issues. We would also like to thank all of the contributors to both this magazine and our online journal. Without you we would literally not have been able to produce either of them. Last, but not least, we would like to thank the entire School of Public Policy at UCL for giving us the opportunity to continue to develop this great platform. IPPR July 2013 Vol.1