Obama’s Grand Strategy in Asia:
Cooperative Security
Jimmy Peterson*
I. Introduction
In November 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama administration’s foreign policy
“pivot”** to Asia was clearly articulated by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a Foreign Policy article called “America’s Pacific Century” (Beitelman 2012,
1086). Clinton stated that America’s commitment to the Asia Pacific region was
essential to sustaining long-term U.S. prosperity and international leadership
(Clinton 2011, 58). Six key areas for U.S. foreign policy in the Asia Pacific were
outlined: strengthening bilateral security alliances; deepening working relation-
* Personal Biography
Jimmy Peterson will be completing his MA in political science at Simon Fraser University in 2015. His most recent
publications have been for the NATO Defence College, the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, and the
Foreign Policy Journal on the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia, Southeast Asian responses to the rebalance,
ASEAN relations with Myanmar, and the Responsibility to Protect in Libya. He graduated at the top of the undergraduate class at Simon Fraser University in 2013 with the Governor General’s medal. In the same year, Peterson was
hosted and sponsored by the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs as part of a Canadian Young Leaders’ Delegation.
** The Obama administration has been on the defensive regarding the term “pivot” as it signalled to allies around the
world an abandonment of long-standing U.S. commitments elsewhere (Shambaugh 2013, 10). The pivot is often
negatively referred to as the “rebalance”, but for the purposes of consistency this essay will use the term “pivot”.
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ships with emerging powers, including China; engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a broad-based military
presence; and advancing democracy and human rights (Clinton 2011, 58). Investments in Asia strengthen institutions and partnerships that help the U.S. “establish a system and habits of cooperation that, over time, will require less effort to
sustain” (Radia 2011). The message was clear: America would have an important
leadership role in Asia then and in the future (Lieberthal 2011, 2).
The pivot involves shifting financial, diplomatic, and military resources away
from Europe and the Middle East towards the Asia Pacific region. Uncertainty
about the continuing Chinese military build-up and an increasingly assertive Chinese government perturbs many Asian countries, which maintain that the U.S.
is a vital guarantor of stability in the region (Jennings 2013, 38). Historically,
U.S. engagement has primarily focused on countries in Northeast Asia. Due to
China’s increasing economic leverage over the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, and Southeast Asia’s geographic position as a maritime
transit hub between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the U.S. began harnessing
closer ties to Southeast Asian countries (Evans 2013, 172). At the same time, U.S.
administration officials have tried to combat the perception of the pivot as part
of a containment strategy against China. Nonetheless, Obama has stressed that
defence budget constraints would not affect America’s commitment to Asia (Beitelman 2012, 1088). Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Kurt Campbell stated that the pivot should be judged on America’s future political
and economic role in the region (Campbell 2011). To be meaningful, the pivot
requires a sustained allocation of economic, military, and diplomatic resources.
Despite its rhetoric about Asia’s importance, the Obama administration has
been criticized for not investing the necessary resources to follow through with
the pivot properly. Obama has been accused of being “neglectful of Asia” (The
Economist 2014, 38). The government has been shackled in attempting to resolve massive domestic economic, social, and political problems (Lamothe 2014).
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Simultaneously, Washington has been accused of overemphasizing the military
realignment towards Asia and using a coercive diplomatic approach with respect
to China targeted at reducing “China’s rise as a regional military power” (McDonough 2013).
This essay will analyze the military, political, and economic dimensions of
the pivot. It will first outline key premises of the four major grand strategies of
neo-isolationism, selective engagement, cooperative security, and deep engagement* and how they relate to strategy in Asia. A grand strategy clearly asserts a
country’s strategic national interests and the tactical plans on how to fulfill those
interests.** It is guided by “big picture instrumental thinking” that seeks to align a
country’s foreign policy resources and goals (Payne 2012, 608). Grand strategies
differ most significantly on the level of military strength felt necessary to maintain
domestic and international stability (Posen and Ross 1996, 52). However, to obtain a comprehensive picture of grand strategy, one must consider the economic
and political elements as central to a country’s overall policy package. Although
most attempts at grand strategy at a broader level fail because they do not align the
vision, policies, and resources required (Krasner 2010, 4), this paper applies grand
strategy at a regional level. The essay will contend that Obama’s broad strategic
thinking informing the pivot has been that of cooperative security while demonstrating the limitations of this grand strategy. There are important implications
for Canadian policymakers that they should engage in more strategic high-level
thinking about Asia and be cognizant of the U.S. approach as they invest more
resources in the Asia-Pacific region. Canada would be wise to engage the region in
* Deep engagement is typically called primacy or hegemony, but these terms often have a negative connotation
(Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2012, 13). Thus, deep engagement will be used throughout this paper.
** This differs slightly from the grand strategy term used by Robert J. Art. Art contends that grand strategy refers to
how a state utilizes its military to pursue its national interests. Grand strategy differs from foreign policy due to its
predominant concentration on the military as an instrument of statecraft to support foreign policy objectives (Art
2009, 1).
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a balanced manner, continuing to expand its economic ties while promoting the
cooperative elements of the U.S. rebalance.
II. Grand Strategies and their Approaches to Asia
Neo-Isolationism
Neo-isolationism sees an active foreign policy as counterproductive (Posen
and Ross 1996, 13).* The U.S. is a secure largely geographically isolated country
possessing a nuclear deterrent. Neo-isolationists are sceptical of entangling alliances. Smaller allies, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, are free riders and
become overconfident of U.S. security protection, risking dragging the U.S. into
conflict by provoking China over relatively marginal territory (Posen 2013, 121).
The U.S. should break its alliances and let other countries assume responsibility
for their own defence (Westbrook 2010, 34).
Furthermore, the U.S. should undertake substantial reduction to its military.
Having a huge military tempts civilian and military leaders to employ it promiscuously. In any case, the U.S. has neither the responsibility nor capacity to sustain an activist foreign policy. The financial crisis exacerbated long-term structural
problems including the need to reign in federal spending to address enormous and
rising budget deficits (Layne 2012, 208). Demographic trends reinforce focusing
more internally, especially on establishing social programs to support an aging
population (Haas 2007, 114). Neo-isolations contend that the preponderance
of U.S. power since the end of the Cold War has made the U.S. a bigger target
(Westbrook 2010, 31). As a result, there is an even greater need for a diminished
global presence.
Neo-isolationism advocates against any variation of a containment approach
* Neo-isolationism is the least popular grand strategy and is very rarely promoted as a strategy to deal with Asia.
However, it is useful for this paper for its theoretical distinctions from the other grand strategies.
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to China. In the long-term, China’s neighbours depend on China more than they
do the U.S. (Bianchi 2013, 103). Economically, they will be drawn towards greater integration with China, as the size of the Chinese economy and military will
eventually surpass America’s. Maintenance of U.S. military bases in Asia are logistically expensive to support and politically provocative.
Furthermore, containment is unnecessary. China’s rise will be constrained by
domestic challenges including pollution, rising income inequalities, civil society
movements, internal threats to the Communist Party, corruption, and an ageing
population. China’s global agenda is overstated (Bandow 2013). China’s major
foreign policy goals have been defensive, to sustain its economic growth, diminish destabilizing international influences, and avoid territorial losses (Nathan and
Scobell 2012, 32). Chinese policymakers confront a multitude of security challenges, bordering 14 other states (Nathan and Scobell 2012, 34). Moreover, a
strong Confucian element in society underscores moral adjustments, as opposed
to rational domination, of the world (Xiang 2012, 126). China opposes the projection of values abroad.
Selective Engagement
Like neo-isolationists, advocates of selective engagement recognize that scarce
resources must be diligently employed (Posen and Ross 1996, 18). An activist
foreign policy is unsustainable, creates enemies, leads to allies’ free riding, and
triggers counterbalancing against the U.S. (Posen 2013, 117). However, selective
engagement is more globally engaging than neo-isolationism since its commitment to preventing war adversely affecting U.S. national interests is central to
domestic and international stability (Posen and Ross 1996, 17; He 2010, 1122).
U.S. efforts stress the maintenance of stable regional power balances, amicable relations among major powers, and diplomatic engagement (McDonough
2009, 8). A balance of power is the ideal world order, as wars among great powers
can escalate quickly because of the potential resort to weapons of mass destruction
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(Posen and Ross 1996, 17). Some military commitments are acceptable, such as in
Asia, where American economic interests are jeopardized (Art 2003, 122).* Clinton’s Foreign Policy article highlighted the Asia-Pacific as “a key driver of global
politics” comprising half of the world’s population and serving as a major engine
of global economic growth (Saunders 2013, 2).
Advocates of selective engagement believe that Japan, India, and other countries will mostly act in their own interests to restrain China from attaining regional hegemonic status (McDonough 2013). The U.S. maintains its alliances and can
support Japan with financial, political, and military resources to counterbalance
against the Chinese. The U.S. fears “releasing” Japan (as neo-isolationists propose)
since that opens the door to a nuclear Japan.** Accordingly a credible American
presence in Asia makes peace more likely.
Nevertheless, the U.S. military presence in Asia remains relatively modest in
size and does not dictate to others (Art 2003, 122). Supporters of selective engagement believe that harmonious international relations depend not so much on
U.S. action or inaction, but largely on the actions of other states (Art 2003, 241).
Individual countries must take responsibility within their regions, as the U.S.
cannot be the world’s policeman for all the world’s problems (Dallek 2007, 71).
Pursuing military, economic, and political dominance provokes other states into
counterbalancing against the U.S. (Posen 2013, 116-8). During the Cold War,
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued that the U.S. could not divorce
its policies toward the Soviet Union from its relations with China (Cleva 1989,
* Selective engagement is similar to offshore balancing, which is sometimes proposed as a distinct grand strategy.
When the two are distinct, offshore balancing is more similar to neo-isolationism allowing for security competition
in all other regions while selective engagement calls on the U.S. to be more active. However, in this scheme, selective
engagement is problematic theoretically because there is no consistency or threshold for what specific U.S. interests
are worth actively balancing for. When there are too many interests to balance, selective engagement becomes “global
engagement” (He 2010, 1124). Therefore, this paper uses the “softer” version of selective engagement, which may
seem more like offshore balancing to some readers.
** Japan has the materials and expertise to quickly build nuclear weapons.
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191). Similarly, today, the U.S. cannot divorce its policies toward China without
considering the outcome of pushing China closer to other powers, particularly
Russia.
Cooperative Security
The overarching aims of cooperative security are to create the conditions for
a secure homeland, a healthy global economy, and a cooperative international
environment (Ikenberry and Slaughter 2013, 641).* These conditions facilitate
interdependence, which is the preferred world order (Posen and Ross 1996, 6). As
states increasingly depend on international investment and trade, the likelihood
of governments resorting to force declines (Keohane and Nye 2013, 171). Therefore, sustaining global trade and partaking in a system based on international law
are closely linked to national security by allowing for greater economic prosperity
and reducing the number of external threats. Multilateral institutions coordinate
collective action, respond to imminent threats, and deter states from acting outside of the realm of international norms and laws (Posen and Ross 1996, 25).
Supporters of cooperative security view regional conflicts as having the potential for quick escalation.** Arms races may incubate, weapons of mass destruction can spread, external intervention is possible, and violence often spills over
borders (Posen and Ross 1996, 28). The disputes in the South China Sea, Taiwan’s
status, and North Korea’s recklessness are possible catalysts for war (Cossa 2009,
3). Long-term cooperation and interdependence are the best ways to counteract
* Much of the recent literature on cooperative security emphasizes human security and expanding the responsibilities
that state governments must uphold toward their citizens. This calls on the international community to assist individuals with fulfilling basic human needs and to undertake more humanitarian interventions when governments fail
to carry out their responsibilities to their people (Payne 2012, 621). One of the problems with this new literature is
that it obscures the grand strategy of cooperative security because it becomes all-encompassing.
** Some authors posit that cooperative security is the only liberal grand strategy while the other strategies are realist
in nature (Posen and Ross 1996, 24). The realist-liberal debate is not engaged in this essay, however, because it has a
tendency to obscure as much as it helps to clarify differences among the perspectives.
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escalation.
Cooperative security asserts that although China and the U.S. have conflicting interests, their mutual interests are underemphasized (Zhang 2012, 203). The
Asia-Pacific is the fastest growing economic region in the world, the U.S. and
China have one of the world’s largest trading relationships, and long-term U.S.
economic interests lie in Asia (Biswas 2014; Cossa 2009, 11). Addressing or at
least mitigating problems such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, poverty, and
climate change requires cooperation. These are “compatible interests” (Kissinger
2007). Many practical obstacles exist, but a coordinated approach is essential to
resolving global issues (Kissinger 2011, 522). Concentrating on areas of mutual
agreement and cooperation facilitates China’s gradual transition towards liberal
democracy (Betts and Christensen 2013, 652).*
Institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
ASEAN should be transformed and build new partnerships in Asia. Because Asia
lacks a comprehensive security arrangement, creating more powerful regional institutional organizations would provide greater regional stability (Steffens 2013,
88). Effective organizations could lead to cooperation on a practical case-by-case
basis (Hachigian 2014). NATO could focus on specific issue areas such as maritime security to reduce Sino-American tensions and the potential for misperceptions. ASEAN could be strengthened to link countries across the Asia-Pacific more
closely on security, economic, and political matters. Relying on multilateralism,
cooperative security commands large and lasting commitments from many states
to maintain peace (Posen and Ross 1996, 28). Yet, the prospects for cooperative
security have improved because of Asia’s democratic progress over the past few
decades (Editorial Board 2013).
Genuine cooperation necessitates shared decision-making (Payne 2012, 605).
* Not viewing one another as opponents is critical in this regard. The majority of the Chinese public recognizes the
great costs associated with being viewed as an adversary by the U.S. (Zhang 2012, 202).
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However, cooperative security theorists encourage China to become a responsible
stakeholder in the international system if they want to have a larger role in global
leadership. Then, the Chinese can be recognized as a key world player alongside
the U.S. in international politics.
Deep Engagement
Defenders of deep engagement assert that the balance of power is unstable
and increases the risk of conflict (Posen and Ross 1996, 32). While conflict is
natural, U.S. hegemony has been pivotal to relative international peace since the
end of the Cold War (McDonough 2009, 10). The underlying objective of U.S.
foreign policy is to maintain U.S. economic, military, and political dominance by
containing possible peer competitors. A peer competitor would undermine the
entire international system. Conversely, a clear hierarchy is stable and peaceful
because there is less opportunity for miscalculating the balance of power (Blainey
2013, 120).
Rising superpowers attempt to re-write the rules governing international politics often through violence when sensing the decline of a hegemonic power (Gilpin 2013, 107). China strives to reshape the international system to reflect its own
interests and norms (Layne 2012, 211; Huntington 2013, 35). Chinese nationalists see China as reclaiming its “rightful place in the sun” (Betts and Christensen
2013, 652; Keagle, Fisher Jr. and Johnson 2013, 61). China may seek to play a
role in Asia similar to that of the historic U.S. role in the Western Hemisphere
with the Monroe Doctrine. The Chinese declaration of the East China Sea Air
Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) illustrates these aspirations (Beech 2013).
Furthermore, other Asian powers including Japan, South Korea, and India lack
the military power to be able to counter Chinese aggression effectively (Mearsheimer 2001, 54). Preventing China from reaching a point where it believes it
is able to match U.S. military strength is essential to deep engagement. Without
significant U.S. involvement in Asia, instability would grow.
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Advocates of deep engagement contend that the pivot should have actually
occurred immediately after the end of the Cold War when the disparity in economic and military power between the U.S. and China was much greater (Kaplan 2014). Nonetheless, proponents are optimistic that the U.S. can preserve
its hegemony and that the public can be persuaded to understand the dangers
of disengagement. While still holding the military and economic advantage, the
U.S. can proactively reduce the costs of confronting China by containing it early.
Sustaining high levels of defence spending and further modernizing the military aids the U.S. in deterring states from attempting to challenge U.S. leadership
(Posen and Ross 1996, 41). The threat of military force pressures states to cooperate (Art 2009, 8). The pivot should prioritize naval and air forces in Asia (Barno,
Benshael and Sharp 2012, 169).
Furthermore, the principles of democratization, interdependence, and multilateralism that cooperative security theorists support could be disastrous. Chinese
democratization would be destabilizing and violent (Betts and Christensen 2013,
651-2). Mutual dependence between the U.S. and China may actually increase
the chance of conflict because once a dispute between the two begins, neither
side expects the other to escalate situations greatly and therefore both countries
overreach in their demands. Additionally, multilateral institutions hinder the freedom of U.S. actions (McDonough 2009, 9). The U.S. is better served by building
stronger bilateral relationships in Asia than by joining regional arrangements such
as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Boutin 2011, 182).
Arguments for retrenchment overstate the costs of pursuing hegemony.
Throughout Asia, host countries participate in financing U.S. military bases and
the U.S. assists in preserving an open and stable global economy that serves U.S.
interests (Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013). As U.S. economic interests expand in the Asia Pacific, so should its military and diplomatic presence to protect
those interests (Barno, Bensahel and Sharp 2012, 161). Guaranteeing the security
of allies gives the U.S. leverage in negotiations. Negotiations over free trade with
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South Korea in 2011 led to an agreement that demonstrated the power of the U.S.
bargaining position, signified by concessions made by South Korea on labour and
environmental clauses (Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013).
III. Common Characterizations of the Pivot
Selective Engagement
Obama’s pivot has often been characterized in academic literature and the
press as part of a broader selective engagement vision. Sequestration to the defence
budget has led to many commentators calling for the U.S. to pull back (Brooks,
Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013, 7). Given the prospects for only moderate longterm U.S. economic growth combined with recent foreign policy failures,* a lack
of public support for an expansive foreign policy is likely to remain (Layne 2012,
203). The lack of forceful prodding by Obama against the Chinese over their
poor human rights record shows the limits of U.S. capacity (Brooks, Ikenberry
and Wohlforth 2013, 13). Yet, the renewed focus on Asia by the administration
indicates America’s increasing economic interests in the region. Selective engagers
debate whether the pivot can be properly financed, but recognize the clear signal
of the U.S. asserting itself as a credible presence in Asia.
Deep Engagement
The military component of the pivot has been emphasized leading some
commentators to view Obama as trying to maintain U.S. hegemony. Coordinating with Asian governments and the use of international law to constrain China is
described as deep engagement (Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth 2013, 23). New
U.S. military concepts intend to contain China (Hachigian 2014). In this view,
the Obama administration considers the U.S. to be the leader in Asia. Clinton
* The recent Iraq and Afghanistan wars are viewed by most Americans as failures overall (Page 2014).
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asserted that the pivot “fits logically into [America’s] overall global effort to secure
and sustain America’s global leadership” (Beitelman 2012, 1091).
Early on in the pivot, the announced realignment of U.S. military forces to
Asia and the confrontational nature of certain U.S. officials’ statements regarding territorial disputes in the South China Sea were spotlighted. U.S. Defence
Secretary Leon Panetta announced American intentions to improve its air force
and shift 60% of its naval assets to Asia by 2020 (Gardner 2013, 121). Obama’s
administration increased military cooperation with many of China’s neighbours
and contradicted Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea by appealing
to international law (Anonymous 2013, 86). The U.S. is viewed as using its allies
as proxies to challenge Chinese territorial claims and provoke China into overreacting and damaging its strategic position (Saunders 2013, 11).
America’s military force structure increasingly prioritizes naval and air services to enhance its operational access to the Asia Pacific (McDonough 2013).
The U.S. proclaimed it would station 2,500 marines in Darwin, Australia and negotiated for increased access for its fighter jets and warships, while strengthening
its forces in Guam. In 2010, Clinton warned China that the American security
treaty with Japan covered the disputed Senkaku or Diaoyu islands (McDonough
2013). Clinton also broke from the long-standing engagement policy with China
over the Spratly Islands, claiming that they legally belonged to the Philippines and
Vietnam (Ross 2012, 77). The new U.S. air-sea battle doctrine has an offensive
dimension with the threat of strikes into Chinese territory. When the Chinese
declared ADIZ, the U.S. denounced the declaration and flew two B-52 bombers
over the airspace (Green and Szechenyi 2014, 3).
Up to four coastal battleships will be stationed in Singapore (Xiang 2012,
113). Deepening ties with India is viewed as a means to limit China’s rise; India is
described as a “linchpin” in the pivot (McDonough 2013). The Obama administration has expanded joint military exercises with South Korea and been developing a military base on Jeju Island as an important geostrategic point to counter the
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Chinese (Gardner 2013, 126). Separate bilateral agreements have been established
with Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia, leading to military exercises, naval visits, and areas of defence cooperation (Evans 2013, 173). The U.S.
and the Philippines are negotiating a framework agreement to increase joint exercises and access for U.S. equipment and forces at Philippine facilities (Simon and
Baker 2013, 3). After China declined to renounce the use of force against Taiwan,
the U.S. boosted advanced weapons sales to Taiwan in 2010 (Gardner 2013, 122).
In 2010, in response to a North Korean nuclear test, the U.S. conducted joint naval exercises with South Korea and strongly pressured China to exert a restraining
influence on North Korea (Lieberthal 2011, 2).
IV. Cooperative Security Vision
In 2013, Vice President Joe Biden posited that the pivot is multidimensional
and that the military dimension is overstated (Cossa and Glosserman 2013, 5-6).
Biden argued that cooperation and competition between the U.S. and China
spurs innovation and economic growth. The second Department of Defence report for Congress* highlighted Obama’s statement that “the notion that [China
and the U.S.] must be adversaries is not pre-destined” (Lien 2012, 116).
There has been little concrete U.S. military action as part of the pivot. Despite Clinton’s use of the term “West Philippines Sea”, the Obama administration
has taken a neutral position.** Although the U.S. asserts that the disputed islands
between Japan and China are under Japanese administration and thus covered
by its security treaty with Japan, the guarantee does not extend to other Asian
* Of the Department of Defence reports while Obama has been in power.
** The Philippines’ preferred term for the South China Sea is the West Philippines Sea. While the U.S. is committed
to defend the Philippines by treaty, Obama’s administration has not discussed how the defence treaty would apply to
Philippine-Chinese disputes (Steffens 2013, 99).
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countries’ territorial disputes with China (The Economist 2014, 38). Washington
refers to international legal mechanisms to settle these disputes. Even after publicly rejecting the Chinese ADIZ, the State Department encouraged U.S. commercial airlines to file flight plans with China before entering the ADIZ (Green and
Szechenyi 2014, 3). Neither has Obama committed to new weapons systems that
could counter potential Chinese military threats in the area (Walsh 2012, B4).
While U.S. troops are being dispersed across different countries in the
Asia-Pacific, the overall number in Asia and their geographic proximity to China is decreasing. Re-deploying nearly a third of the soldiers in South Korea and
Japan, which are on the “front line” of the first island chain and have histories of
intense rivalry with China, to Guam (part of the second island chain) is a way
of alleviating tensions with the Chinese (Le Mière 2012, 83). The selection of
Singapore as the first Southeast Asian country for increased naval deployment was
carefully thought out. Singapore is not embroiled in any disputes with China over
islands in the South China Sea (Le Mière 2012, 90). Even so, only one Littoral
combat ship has been deployed to Singapore (Graham 2013, 311).
Obama’s pivot is predominantly framed by a cooperative security vision, as
Obama has stated his ambition to become the first “Pacific President”. Government officials consistently explain that the pivot is not part of a containment strategy but is a reassertion of the U.S. as a natural Pacific power (Evans 2013, 176).
China’s military modernization has caused concern among some of its neighbours
and propelled them to welcome greater U.S. involvement in the region (Obama
on Charlie Rose 2013). Rather than containing China, the U.S. seeks to expand
Asia’s security architecture to manage a more peaceful power shift in the region
(Chun 2013, 15). Obama’s former National Security Adviser Tom Donilon argued that America’s historical presence in Asia has been benevolent in terms of
creating stability, protecting countries’ freedom of navigation, helping to build
open market economies, facilitating South Korea’s development, and upholding
international rules (Evans 2013, 176). The U.S. Navy will not allow China to
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interfere with the global supply chain by impeding crucial sea-lines of commerce
and communication (Steffens 2013, 92). Asian countries rely on the U.S. to ensure freedom of navigation in order to defend international maritime laws.
Nevertheless, a major policy tool of the U.S. pivot has been its alliances (Limaye 2013, 42). Thailand, the Philippines, India, Singapore, South Korea, and
Japan are integral to the strategy. The U.S. recognizes regional stability should be
anchored by Asian countries (Steffens 2013, 102). Networks should link Southeast Asia with the rest of the Asia-Pacific to promote behaviour structured by a
legal framework. India, in particular, has been identified by Washington as needing to build greater links to Southeast Asia through the Indo-Pacific economic
corridor (Limaye 2014, 6). Indian economic development would accelerate Asia’s
growth, yield greater regional stability, and provide the U.S. with an enormously
important market. India has also enhanced its political, military, and economic
cooperation with Japan given uneasiness about Chinese searches for energy resources (Gardner 2013, 125).
Washington has not overlooked the domestic human rights and security situations in their engagement in Asia. Concerns about democratic progress and
human rights have constrained more expansive military engagement with Cambodia and Myanmar (Limaye 2013, 48). Rather than “releasing” Japan to counterbalance against China, the U.S. has encouraged Japan to act as a responsible
regional leader. In December 2013, Biden warned nationalist Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe against visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 war criminals
are honoured (Landler 2014, A10). The U.S. was unsuccessful in that case, but
it has pressured its allies to behave less provocatively towards China. Remarkably,
Japan recently gave the U.S. control over its nuclear stockpile (Shear and Sanger
2014, A1).
Obama’s government consistently comments on the need to cooperate with
the Chinese on major global and regional issues including combating terrorism
and climate change, ensuring global financial stability, and reversing Iranian
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and North Korean nuclear programs (Saunders 2013, 3). An unofficial working
meeting held in California between Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping in
June 2013 emphasized common interests, especially strategic dialogue to pressure
North Korea to act less provocatively (Glaser and Vitello 2013, 2). Obama and
Jinping agreed to upgrade discussions on energy policy to ministerial levels, recognizing the need to cooperate on climate change. Since December 2008, China
has participated in the joint naval anti-piracy operations with the U.S., European
countries, and Japan in the Gulf of Aden (Erickson and Strange 2014).
While many past American administrations have preferred bilateral rela-
tions with Asian states, Obama’s government has been more receptive to regional
mechanisms. Obama was the first U.S. president to attend the East Asian Summit
(EAS) and ASEAN leaders meeting (Shambaugh 2013, 14). Clinton signed the
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which renounces the use of force
and pledges to bolster economic, social, cultural, and scientific cooperation in
Southeast Asia (Bureau of Public Affairs 2009). Clinton argued that ASEAN is the
“fulcrum for the [Southeast Asia’s] emerging regional architecture” (Limaye 2013,
45).*
The U.S. has also been active in less formal forums including the
Six-Party Talks and Asian Maritime Forum. On disaster relief, China, the U.S.,
New Zealand, and Australia have conducted multiple planning exercises on humanitarian assistance and tsunami damage mitigation through the EAS and ARF
(Office of the Spokesperson 2014). China, Brunei, New Zealand, and the U.S.
organized ARF roundtables on preventive diplomacy training in the Asia-Pacific.
The U.S. supported China’s hosting of the 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ocean-Related Ministerial Meeting on marine conservation.
The administration takes a long-term perspective in its approach. Clin-
ton contended that “there is less need for dramatic breakthroughs that marked
* The annual summit of the U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Meeting has been institutionalized (Limaye 2013, 46).
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earlier phases in [the U.S.-Asia] relationship… collaboration may not always be
glamorous, but it is strategically significant” (Limaye 2013, 48). The use of private bilateral diplomacy to develop closer personal ties among top Chinese and
American officials is a case in point (Lieberthal 2011, 7). Obama met numerous
times with former Chinese President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, Clinton
regularly interacted with her counterpart Dai Bingguo, and former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner established a close working relationship with Chinese
Vice Premier Wang Qishan (Shambaugh 2013, 13). On the military side, U.S.
efforts have been made to enhance communication with the Chinese military in
order to build trust and the potential for misunderstandings (Lien 2012, 116).
In terms of global leadership, the U.S. plays a major role in setting the political agenda in meetings in the Asia Pacific region, often pushing back against
Chinese proposals (Obama on China 2013). Obama rejects Jinping’s vision for
a “new model of major country relationship” (Glaser and Vitello 2013, 3). The
proposed Chinese model is founded upon mutual respect, win-win cooperation,
non-conflict, and non-confrontation. Obama contends that China “can’t [expect
to] have all the rights of a major world power but none of the responsibilities”
(Obama on Charlie Rose 2013). In cultivating a “new model of relations between
great powers”, as Donilon put it, China must be a constructive leader (deLeon and
Jiemian 2014). Rather than accentuating the preservation of its own dominance,
Obama’s administration has stressed that it wants to deter hegemonic behaviour
by the Chinese that conflicts with international law (Swaine 2011, 327).
It is commonly argued that the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is the
primary economic component of the pivot, seeks to neutralize China’s economic
rise (Sevastopulo, Donnan and Bland 2013).* However, the Obama administration is quick to counter that the idea of the TPP predates U.S. involvement
* The TPP negotiating countries include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Peru, Singapore, the U.S., and Vietnam (Saunders 2013, 7)
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and some of the countries in the negotiations are also part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations led by China (Cossa and
Glosserman 2013, 5). The TPP is open to all Asia-Pacific countries, including
China, as long as they adopt TPP standards. It would push China towards more
market-oriented reforms (Gardner 2013, 123). The trade agreement eliminates
the use of tariff and non-tariff barriers and serves as the template for the wider
Free Trade Agreement of the Asia-Pacific (Orr 2013). Rather than expanding its
bilateral trade relationships, the U.S. uses multilateralism to increase incentives on
Asian countries to join the TPP by raising the exclusionary costs.
V. Problems with Cooperative Security
There is cautiousness among Asian governments’ perspectives of the pivot because
they must maintain close economic relations with China and resist choosing between the U.S. and China. The reluctance of Southeast Asian nations to accept
the U.S. as integral to the region has undermined the pivot’s legitimacy (Boutin
2011, 180). East Asian states are unsure of which regional order will best serve
their interests in the future (Goh 2012, 887). While open to greater levels of
economic integration, Asia-Pacific countries are traditionally sceptical of security-oriented regionalism beyond consultative mechanisms (Boutin 2011, 188).
Therefore, U.S. efforts to promote ASEAN and regional security organizations
have been responded to with some hesitancy.
The 2008 financial crisis tarnished American prestige. Even if Obama’s cancellation of attendance at the 2013 APEC Forum and EAS was unavoidable, political gridlock in Washington has adversely affected the pivot (Pollack and Bader
2014). U.S. National Security Council spokeswoman Caitlyn Hayden stated that
the government shutdown set back America’s “ability to promote U.S. exports
and advance leadership” (Madhani 2013, A4). Asian leaders expressed concerns
about the sustainability of the pivot following Obama’s third cancelled Asian trip
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Asian Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 20 No. 2
(Simon and Baker 2013, 1).
U.S. domestic politics, the lack of trade promotion authority, and Congressional divisiveness complicates the negotiation process regarding the TPP (Solis
2012, 337). Organized groups oppose the strict regulations on intellectual property and seek more transparency in the negotiations. Domestic opposition in Asian
countries has also eroded momentum for the TPP (Solis 2012, 334). In Japan,
opposition from doctors, farmers and consumer groups has caused divisions within the government. The U.S. and Japan have been unable to settle differences
over market access for automobiles, tariffs on rice, and agricultural liberalization
(Green and Szechenyi 2014, 1). Market access is a very politically sensitive issue
for all negotiating states (Orr 2013).
Southeast Asian countries view much of the pivot as symbolic with little
value beyond Obama’s attendance at various summits (Graham 2013, 325). Vietnam’s government has maintained distance from the U.S. in terms of military
cooperation so that it does not provoke China (Graham 2013, 316). China is
Vietnam’s largest trading partner and often uses economic coercion against Vietnam in disputes over territory in the South China Sea (Steffens 2013, 97). Likewise, Thailand has shown ambivalence towards military cooperation rejecting
America’s request to use its U-Tapao air base (Graham 2013, 319). Although the
U.S. fully restored military ties with Indonesia in 2010 and created a “Defence
Planning Dialogue” to ramp up potential future military cooperation, Indonesia
publicly denounced the announcement of U.S. troops being stationed in Darwin,
Australia (Graham 2013, 322). Fear in Indonesia of American interference in the
region is due in large part to past covert international interventions in Indonesia
and East Timor, which used Darwin as their springboard. Malaysia does not have
a territorial dispute with China and seeks closer ties to that country (Steffens
2013, 98). Economically, the relative market share of U.S. trade with ASEAN
has dropped by more than half in the past 15 years (Graham 2013, 308). Only
Vietnam, Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia from Southeast Asia are party to the
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TPP talks (Limaye 2013, 46).
The U.S. pivot is further hindered by a lack of cooperation, particularly between Japan and South Korea whom the U.S. sought in counterbalancing China (The Economist 2014, 38). South Korea has refused to share military intelligence with Japan on North Korea partly due to historical mistrust of the Japanese
(Gardner 2013, 127).* Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine was rebuked by China
and South Korea. Despite growing political tensions, Japan and South Korea have
been negotiating a free trade agreement with China (Chiang 2013, 200). The
Chinese market is a huge source of potential demand for Korean and Japanese
businesses.
India’s receptiveness to the pivot has been mixed. China is India’s second
largest trading partner and India coordinates with China in many international
forums, often criticizing U.S. policy** and calling on the replacement of the U.S.
Dollar as the international reserve currency (Qazi 2012, 29-30). Moreover, Japan’s
foreign policy stance will depend heavily on the success of Abe’s domestic economic reform package called “Abenomics”, which includes fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and structural reforms (Green and Szechenyi 2014, 2).*** Abe’s regional
leadership is largely contingent on obtaining more legitimacy with the Japanese
public, which will require effective structural reforms, maintaining higher levels of
economic growth, reducing resource dependence on China, and integrating more
economically with other Asian states.
VI. Canada’s Role in the Rebalance
* Japan is distrusted because it has not properly apologized for and reconciled with the atrocities that its military
committed during the Second World War (Kaplan 2014).
** Often as part of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Criticism of the Libyan operation and
the misapplication of the R2P is a prominent example.
*** The first two parts of the package, fiscal stimulus and monetary easing, have occurred. Structural reforms are currently underway but is the most difficult part of Abenomics.
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That Canada is hardly ever mentioned as a U.S. ally with enormous economic
and political interests in and connections to the Asia-Pacific region is problematic.
Canada’s current federal government has done little high-level strategic thinking
about the region. With respect to its China policy, following the 2008 financial
crisis, the Stephen Harper government has principally emphasized a transactional
relationship based on trade and investment (Evans 2013, 75). Ignored is the idea
of being a responsible middle power or bridge helping to shape China’s peaceful
rise within the international system. Yet, Canada’s long-term perception of China
as neither a real threat nor enemy is consistent with the U.S. rebalance (Evans
2013, 84). Canada need not prioritize enhancing its naval capabilities within the
Asia-Pacific region at the expense of a constructive relationship with China, but as
part of a broader strategy mixing economic, military, and diplomatic facets. At the
regional level, in 2012, former ASEAN secretary-general, Surin Pitsuwan, called
on Canada to take on a mediating role in the South China Sea disputes (Manicom
2014, 125).* Canadian scholars have done so historically, via the Jakarta Informal
Meetings in the early 1990s. Given Canada’s non-colonial past, its status as a maritime country with a strong diplomatic track record, and its evolving economic
relationship with China, it has an opportunity to help relay a different perspective
and valuable practices to ASEAN.
VII. Conclusion
Obama’s pivot to Asia has often been portrayed as that of selective or deep engagement. However, these narratives overlook certain components of grand strategy.
Selective engagement portrayals do not give sufficient attention to the Obama
* J. Manicom, “Canada’s Role in the Asia-Pacific Rebalance: Prospects for Cooperation,” Asia Policy 18, July 2014,
p. 125. Canadian scholars have had a long history in trying to bring a mediating role in the SCS, via the Jakarta
Informal Meetings.
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administration’s emphasis on multilateralism and international order. Washington
wants a more effective ASEAN and ARF to become fundamental to Asia’ security
architecture and generate more respect for international law. The U.S. also has a
long-term vision based on private collaboration with all of Asia’s governments,
including China’s, to enhance cooperation on crucial global and regional issues.
Sino-American understanding of the necessity to subdue bellicose North Korean
actions and naval collaboration in the anti-piracy campaign off Somalia’s coast
since 2008 are particular examples of major areas of cooperation. Meanwhile,
deep engagement strategists fail to recognize that the military element of the pivot has been quite limited and underestimate the political and economic tools
Obama utilizes. The U.S. has not encouraged its allies to behave confrontationally
with China, but to act responsibly to uphold regional and international stability.
Asia is recognized as an increasingly essential engine for the American and global
economy. China is deterred from taking destabilizing actions in the South China
Sea that affect the region’s freedom of navigation, but it can have a stake in international leadership if it takes on a more constructive role regionally and internationally. As the U.S. government has repeatedly claimed, the U.S. and China are
not enemies ‘nor do power shifts have to lead to conflict (Beitelman 2012, 1089).
In his 2014 State of the Union Address, Obama omitted mentioning the pivot (Tiezzi 2014). Recently, a more concerted foreign policy effort has been made
by Obama’s administration on the Middle East and Iran (Jennings 2013, 44).
Many commentators have argued that this is a way of deflecting attention away
from the pivot’s problems. Cooperative security relies on countries in the Asia-Pacific to anchor regional stability but has been undermined by a lack of cooperation in Asia. China’s increasing economic leverage over the Asia-Pacific region has
caused apprehensiveness about cooperation with the U.S., particularly military
cooperation in Southeast Asia. Domestic opposition to the high TPP standards,
especially from the Japanese agricultural industry, has complicated negotiations.
Strategy requires diplomatic, economic, and military prongs to support each
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other to increase the chances of long-term success (Graham 2013, 308). Although
Presidents hold significant power in steering the direction of foreign policy, domestic politics is typically more compelling as a driver of strategy. Gaining the
support of other states is critical to aligning the means and ends of a grand strategy. Much of the success of grand strategy depends on how others behave. Nevertheless, cooperative security is a long-term approach that does not expect dramatic
breakthroughs, but pursues steady unglamorous progress.
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Obama’s Grand Strategy in Asia:Cooperative Security
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in the text, e.g. “Table 1 about here.”
Format of References in Text
Identify all sources within the text, using the author-date system. Accordingly, all references are to be identified at the appropriate point in the text by last name of author, year of
publication, and pagination where appropriate, all within parentheses. Endnotes are to be
used only for substantive observations. Specify subsequent citations of the same source in
the same way as the first one; do not use “ibid.,” “op. cit.,” or “loc. cit.”
1. When author’s name is in the text: Chan (1999). When author’s name is not in text:
(Wright, 1989).
2. Pagination follows year of publication: (Lee, 2001:35-36).
3. For more than three authors, use “et al.”
4. With more than one reference to an author in the same year, distinguish them by use
of letters (a, b) attached to the year of publication: (Smith, 2000a)
5. Enclose a series of references with a single pair of parentheses, separated by semicolons: (Chan, 1999; Wright, 1989; Lee, 2001; Smith, 2000a).
6. For newspaper and magazine articles, cite the name of the publication, followed by
year (New York Times, 1987).
Format for Bibliographical Citations
List all items alphabetically by author, providing the full list of multiple authors and, within author(s), by year of publication, in an appendix titled “References.” Assemble a list of
references according to the following style:
Books: Janelli, Roger. 1993. Making Capitalism: The Social and Cultural Construction
of a South Korean Conglomerate. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Edited volume: Tang, James T. H., ed. 1995. Human Rights and International Relations
in the Asia-Pacific Region. London: Pinter.
134
Asian Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 20 No. 2
Articles in journals: Minami, Ryoshin. 1981. Behavior of Income Shares in Labor
Surplus Economy: Japan’s Experience. Economic Development and Cultural Change 29(2):333-52.
Chapters in books: Huang, Mab. 1999. The Anti-Nuclear Power Movement in Taiwan:
Claiming the Right to a Clean Environment. In Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A.
Bell, eds., The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Newspaper articles: New York Times. 2001. Japan’s Neighbors in Asia Benefit from Rise
of Yen. August 24.
Should you require any questions with regard to the style guideline of AJCS, please contact
David B. Kim, Editor, canadianstudies@korea.ac.kr
『캐나다논총』투고 및 원고 작성 요령
본 한국캐나다학회의 학술지 『캐나다논총(Asian Journal of Canadian Studies)』에 논
문게재를 신청하고자 하는 분은 다음의 투고 및 원고 작성 요령을 유념하여 기고하여
주시기 바랍니다.
Ⅰ. 논문 투고 방법
1. 투고 논문의 대상
투고논문은 캐나다학 관련 분야에서 독창성 및 적실성을 갖는 학술논문으로서 다른 학
회지 또는 문헌 등에 발표되지 않은 것이어야 한다. 단, 발표를 위한 가인쇄물(예: 발표
논문집) 또는 유인물 등은 발표된 논문으로 간주하지 아니한다.
2. 투고 논문의 종류
일반논문, 정책논단, 서평
3. 투고자격
본 학회의 정회원(회비완납자)은 학회지에 논문을 투고할 수 있으며, 공동논문일 경우
본 학회의 회원이 아닌 자와 공동투고 할 수 있다.
4. 논문접수 일정
논문접수 및 심사는 연중 계속해서 실시하되, 당해연도 5월 31일 이전까지 접수된 논
문은 당해연도 제1호, 그 이후 11월 30일까지 접수된 논문은 당해연도 제2호 게재의
심사대상으로 한다.
5. 논문제출 방식
논문 투고자는 e-mail을 이용하여 파일형태로 전송한다.
6. 수정・재심 논문
투고논문의 심사결과 수정 또는 재심 의뢰를 받은 경우 수정된 논문의 제출은 원 논문
의 제출과 동일한 과정을 거친다. 최종 게재확정 통보를 받으면 최종원고를 e-mail로
1부 제출한다.
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Asian Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 20 No. 2
Ⅱ. 원고 작성 방법
1. 논문의 체계
『캐나다논총(Asian Journal of Canadian Studies)』 투고논문은 다음과 같은 체계를
원칙으로 한다.
1) 논문제목(국문, 영문(또는 불문))
2) 연구자명(국문, 한자, 영문(또는 불문))
3) 국문 논문일 경우 영문 요약(Abstract), 영문 (또는 불문) 논문일 경우 국문 요약
4) 키워드(Keyword, 반드시 영문(또는 불문)으로 5개 이상)
5) 연구자 소속기관 및 지위(공저 시 제1저자 구분 표시)
6) 본문
7) 각주(영문(또는 불문)일 경우 Notes)
8) 참고문헌(영문(또는 불문)일 경우 References)
9) 부록(단, 필요시에만 표기)
10) 연락처(주소, 전화: 직장・자택, 핸드폰 번호, Fax 번호, E-mail 주소 등)
11) 논문게재 시에 논문투고일과 심사완료일 및 주민등록번호 표시
2. 논문 작성 도구 및 분량
투고 원고는 아래아 한글 프로그램(한글 97 이상) 또는 MS Word의 사용을 원칙으로
하며, 분량은 각주, 도표, 참고문헌을 포함하여 논문작성양식을 기준으로 하여 A4 용
지 20매 내외로 한다.
3. 원고 체계
원고에는 표지를 달고, 표지에는 논문 제목, 논문 저자명을 기입한다. 표지 이후 본문
은 논문제목과 저자명, Abstract, Keyword, 저자의 소속 및 지위 그리고 본문과 참고
문헌, 연락처의 순으로 작성한다. 저자가 2인 이상일 때에는 이름 작성시 제1저자를 제
일 앞에 위치시킨다.
4. 사용어 및 표기
1) 논문의 사용어는 국어과 영어(또는 불어)로 제한한다. 국문 논문일 경우 편집방법을
기준으로 15줄 이내의 영문초록과 주제어(keyword)를 첨부해야 하며, 영문(또는 불
문) 논문일 경우에는 편집방법을 기준으로 15줄이내의 국문초록과 주제어(keyword)
를 첨부해야 한다.
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『캐나다학 논총』 원고작성 요령
2) 국문을 사용하는 경우 한글의 사용을 원칙으로 하며, 오독할 염려가 있어나 독해
에 해를 미칠 가능성이 있는 경우 뜻을 명확히 하기 위해 한자를 괄호 속에 표기*한다.
3) 국문을 사용하는 논문은 외국 학자의 이름을 한글발음으로 쓰고 괄호속에 1회 원
어로 표기하며, 한글발음으로 전환하기 곤란한 인명, 지명 등의 고유명사는 원어를 그
대로 쓴다.
5. 본문 구성체계
1) 저자는 영문 제목 및 영문 이름을 국문제목 및 국문이름 하단에 표기한다.
2) 본문의 구성은 장(章)은 Ⅰ, Ⅱ, Ⅲ...의 순으로, 절(節)은 1, 2, 3...의 순으로, 그리
고 항(項)은 1), 2), 3)... 순으로 표시하며, 목(目)이 필요한 경우에는 (1), (2), (3)...
순으로 번호를 매긴 후 제목을 표기한다. 가능하면 세분화를 지양하되 불가피한 경우
①, ②, ③... 순으로 전개한다.
3) 수식의 경우, 변수는 이탤릭체로 하고 수식의 번호 매김은 장, 절의 구분 없이 우측
정렬하여(선 없음) 괄호 속의 일련번호로 표기한다. 세분화된 수식번호는 (1), (1)‘,
(1)“... 등으로 사용한다. (단, log, ln, max 등의 기호는 정자체로 표기).a/b+c와 같이
혼돈되기 쉬운 표현은 (a/b)+c나 a/(b+c)로 명확히 표현토록 한다.
4) 표 및 그림은 세분화 없이 논문 전편을 통하여 일련번호를 부여한다. 표 및 그림은 <
표 1>과 <그림 1>과 같이 표와 그림 상단에 표기하고, 표 내용에 대한 주기 사항 및 자
료의 출처는 표 아랫부분에 기재한다.
5) 인용문헌의 표기는 각주로 처리하지 않고 본문중에서 직접 본문주로 처리한다. 본
문 중에 참고문헌을 표시할 경우 (저자, 연도) 및 (저자, 연도, 페이지)와 같은 방식으
로 표기한다. 외국저자인 경우는 원어표기를 원칙으로 한다. 본문의 내용에 설명을 부
연하기 위한 내용 주(content notes)는 해당 부분의 오른쪽 위에 논문 전편을 통해서
일련번호를 매기고 (예: ...하였다.1)) 각주로 처리한다.
6) 저자 또는 역자가 3인 이상의 경우는 본문과 각주에서는 ‘누구 외’로 표시하고, 참
*예, 한글(한자)
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Asian Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 20 No. 2
고문헌에서는 3인까지 적는다.
7) 각주는 일련번호를 매기고 같은 페이지 원고하단의 각주란으로 모은다.
8) 참고문헌은 논문의 맨 뒤에 놓는다. 배열의 순서는 한글문헌, 영문(불문)문헌, 기타
의 순으로 배열한다. 또한 저자(저자가 없을 경우에는 발행기관)의 이름에 따라 한글
문헌은 가나다 순으로, 서양문헌은 알파벳 순으로 정돈한다. 논문(학위논문 포함) 제
목이나 기사제목의 경우 줄여쓰지 않으며, 국문 또는 외국 문헌 모두 “ ” 안에 표기한
다. 저서 또는 역서・편저서・학회지・월간지・주간지・일간지・논문집의 경우 국문
또는 동양 문헌은 『 』, 서양문헌은 이탤릭체로 표기한다. 같은 저자의 여러 문헌은 연
도순으로 배열하며, 같은 해에 발행된 문헌이 둘 이상일 경우에는 글에서 언급된 순서
에 따라 발행연도 뒤에 a, b, c를 첨가하여 구분한다. 동일저자의 저작물이 여러 편일
경우 두 번째부터는 ‘______’로 인명을 대체한다. 참고문헌에 대한 자세한 표기는 <표
1>의 예를 따른다.
<표 1> 참고문헌 작성 예
구 분
국내 논문
국내 단행본
참고문헌 작성 예
홍길동. 1999. 지방재정 발전에 관한 연구. 『한국지방재정논집』,
4(1): 207-223.
김동건. (1996). 『현대재정학』. 박영사.
Grossman, Peter. 1990. “The Impact of Federal and State Grants on Local
외국 논문
Government Spending: A Test of the Fiscal Illusion Hypothesis.” Public
Finance Quarterly 18(3):313-327.
외국 단행본
Hepworth, Norman. 1993. The Finance of Local Government, 6th ed. Boston:
George Allen & Unwin.
6. 논문작성양식
학회에 투고한 논문의 세부적 지침은 다음의 표와 같다.
139
『캐나다학 논총』 원고작성 요령
<표 2> 학회 투고원고의 편집 규정
구 분
편집규정
위쪽
25
오른쪽
33
편집용지
아래쪽
50
머리말
15
(A4)
제본
0
꼬리말
0
왼쪽
33
용지방향
좁게
정렬방식
양쪽 혼합
낱말간격
0
왼쪽여백
0
줄간격
170
오른쪽여백
0
본문글자크기
11
문단위
0
문단아래
0
문단모양
첫째줄
들여쓰기
각주
참고문헌
2
130
『캐나다논총 투고논문 심사규정』
제 1 조 (규정의 목적) 이 규정은 한국캐나다학회가 정기적으로 발간하는 『캐나다논총
(Asian Journal of Canadian Studies)』에 투고된 논문의 심사에 관한 제반 사항을 정
하는 것을 목적으로 한다.
제 2 조 (투고논문의 심사 절차)
① 투고된 논문의 접수일자는 당 학회에 접수된 날로 한다.
② 편집위원회는 접수된 논문을 전공영역을 기초로 동일 전공영역에서 상당한 연구실
적을 쌓고 덕망이 있는 심사위원 3인을 위촉하고 심사를 의뢰하며 그 심사결과를 토대
로 게재여부를 결정한다.
③ 논문심사의 게재판정은 게재가, 조건부게재, 재심, 게재불가의 네 가지로 한다.
④ 투고자는 심사결과에 대해 이의가 있을 시 편집위원회를 통해 논문 심사자와 의견
을 교환할 수 있다.
⑤ 투고자와 심사위원은 각각에 대해 익명으로 처리되어야 한다.
⑥ 논문을 심사하는 심사위원에게는 소정의 심사수당을 지불할 수 있다.
제 3 조 (투고 논문의 심사 원칙) 투고 논문의 심사기준은 주제, 내용, 형식 등으로 구분
하여 심사하되, 주제는 연구의 필요성 및 독창성, 내용은 전개의 논리성 및 객관성, 그리
고 형식은 표현의 적절성 및 논문으로서의 형식성 등을 기준으로 심사하는 것을 원칙으
로 한다. 다만, 편집위원회의 의결에 따라 투고 논문의 심사원칙은 다소 변경될 수 있다.
제 4 조 (투고 논문의 심사 기준) 논문심사는 1차 심사의 경우 게재 ○, 수정△, 게재
불가 × 의 세 가지로 하며, 2차 심사(재심)의 경우 게재 ○, 게재불가 ×의 두 가지로
만 심사한다.
제 5 조 (논문의 게재판정 기준) 판정기준은 아래의 한국캐나다학회 논문심사 판정기
준에 따라 게재여부를 편집위원회에서 최종 결정한다.
제 6 조 (기타) 본 규정에 정해지지 않은 사항에 대해서는 편집위원회의 결정에 따른다.
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『캐나다학 논총』 투고논문 심사규정
<투고 논문의 게재판정 기준>
판정기준
심사결과
게재가능
조건부 게재
재심
게재불가
비고(후속절차)
○
○
○
게재 확정
○
○
△
수정권고 후 게재
○
○
×
○
△
△
△
△
△
○
△
×
△
△
×
×
×
×
×
×
△
×
×
○
수정을 전제로 게재
△에게 재심을 의뢰하여 게재가능하면 게재
△에게 재심을 의뢰하여 2인 모두가 게재가능
하여야 게재
【부 칙】
제 1 조 (개정 및 폐지) 본 규정의 개정 및 폐지에 대해서는 편집위원회의 결정에 따
르되, 의결정족수는 재적 위원 과반수의 출석과 출석 위원 과반수의 찬성으로 한다.
제 2 조 (효력) 본 규정은 편집위원회의 결정이 있은 다음 날로부터 효력을 갖는다.
◆ 2015년도 논문 접수(온라인):
•김병철
교수 (편집위원장)
•전화: 031-750-5133 •이메일: davidkim@gachon.ac.kr
캐나다학 논총 제20집 제2호
발행일 : 2014년 12월 31일
편집 및 발행 : 한국캐나다학회
인쇄 : 부북스출판사
한국캐나다학회 사무국
464-711
경기도 광주시 곤지암읍 경충대로26
동원대학교 관광학과
Tel : 031-760-0421
Fax : 031-760-0425
E-mail : canadianstudies@korea.ac.kr
http : www.kacs.kr
ISSN : 1225-8628