Overcoming the Prophecy of Rational-Choice: The Innovations of Sustainable
Development and the Limitations of Ecological Modernization Theory
Tyler Carlson
April 10th, 2013
POL 358 – Political Psychology
Environmental policy-making has been historically confronted with many economic,
political, and social barriers. Yet the logic used to conceptualize these barriers often carries
undertones of rational-choice theory. That is to say, problems of resource consumption are often
equated to ‘the tragedy of the commons’, while environmental protection is considered
undesirable after being reduced to an economic cost-benefit analysis (Weale, 1992; Carter,
2006). What this suggests is that the nature of environmental problems has been, to some degree,
predetermined. Consequently, this seems to attract solutions that follow the same questionable
logic, wherein environmental policies have to be justified in an instrumentally rational way in
order for actors on any level to take collective action. Ecological modernization (EM) was
developed as an environmental policy paradigm with this logic – offering rational-choice
solutions that reconcile the ‘economy-ecology’ divide. In contrast to this approach is sustainable
development (SD), which presents environmental problems and solutions in a more holistic and
innovative light. To illustrate this distinction, and the respective implications that each paradigm
has for the environment; this paper will compare the EM and SD literature to reveal which of the
two provides a better policy framework in the context of three traditional environmental
problems: temporal/spatial variability, public goods, and administrative fragmentation. This
analysis will ultimately find sustainable development to provide a superior environmental policy
model because it not only escapes from the rational-choice assumptions of EM, but also inspires
collective action on a global level.
To briefly provide context to these paradigms, sustainable development is widely
considered to originate from the 1987 Brundtland Commission, which provided the commonly
cited definition of SD as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (Our Common Future, 1987, p. 34).
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Both the sustainable development and ecological modernization literature draw insights from this
seminal work (Weale, 1992; Mol, 1996; Christoff, 1996; Baker et al. 1997). Among SD theorists,
Baker (2006) finds the Brundtland model to have ‘authoritative status’ in the SD literature.
Elsewhere, critics challenge the principles of EM and SD, such as Redcliffe (1987) and Shiva
(1988), while others divide the two concepts into ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ variants (Baker et al.
1997). Inevitably, there is some degree of conceptual overlap in these paradigms, as not many
EM theorists explicitly distance themselves from the Brundtland Report’s approach.
However, EM is thought to have its origins slightly before this document, as the works
of Joseph Huber and Martin Janicke in the mid-1980s are broadly regarded as the foundation of
EM theory (Christoff, 1996; Mol and Sonnenfield, 2000; Langhelle, 2000). Both the former and
latter are German sociologists, whereas other subsequent literature in EM emerged among policy
analysts in the Netherlands (Hajer, 1995; Mol, 1996), and in the U.K (Weale, 1992). Hence, it is
worth noting that EM theory first developed in wealthy, northern European countries with
limited domestic environmental concerns, whereas the Brundtland Commission consisted of a
diverse, international panel that found interconnections between both poverty alleviation and
environmental issues (Christoff, 1996). The influence that these distinct perspectives had on the
policy principles of SD and EM will remain in the subtext of the following analysis.
Exploring these paradigms and applying them to traditional environmental policy-making
barriers provides insight into how their respective policy principles act in practice. Although
similar analyses have been conducted in the literature (Pepper 1998; Langhelle, 2000; Brand,
2010), few have explored how reductionist conceptions of the environment based off rationalchoice can be challenged by sustainable development in both principle and practice. Therefore,
the aforementioned ‘core environmental policy-making problems’ of temporal/spatial variability,
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public goods, and administrative fragmentation will be utilised for revealing this confrontation.
These three problems made subtle appearances 1987 Brundtland Report; however, they were not
theorized and categorized until Weale (1992) and Carter (2006), respectively. The latter defines
environmental challenges as being both ‘intrinsic’ and ‘institutional’ in character. With
consideration of these useful conceptualizations from past literature, this analysis begins with
temporal and spatial divisions.
Temporal/spatial variability
Temporal factors are centred on the general myopia witnessed in environmental policymaking, whereas spatial variables reflect the geographical disconnect between cause and effect
in environmental degradation. In other words, the former explores the variability in willingness
of present generations (including governments and citizens) to make sacrifices to protect the
environment for future generations, whereas the latter involves the unequal distribution of
ecological impacts across the world resulting from environmentally destructive actions that come
disproportionately from the Global North. Weale (1992) first illustrates this phenomenon through
the example of acid rain falling on Scandinavian countries because of air pollution produced in
the United Kingdom. More broadly, Carter (2006) discusses how droughts, floods,
desertification and the destruction of biodiversity can be endured by populations who are seldom
the sole contributors to such outcomes. He also discusses environmental policies of Northern
countries in the 1970’s, which were characterized by end-of-pipe solutions and shortsighted
objectives for environmental protection. The question for SD and EM, therefore, is how these
policy paradigms attempt to overcome the prioritization of short-term policy agendas and
geographically proximate concerns. Moreover, how can these policies reconcile the inequity of
resource usage and climate impact across time and space?
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According to the SD literature, the solution to myopic environmental agendas begins with
reframing the concept of the ‘future’. Sustainable development does so by posing ‘multiple
futures’ with varying global environmental consequences; however, a sustainable future begins
with two guiding principles: intra- and inter-generational equity. In essence, these concepts
necessitate that environmental policies reflect the needs of generations of both the present and
future as well as the disparities of the Global North and South. Michael Redcliffe, a prominent
and early critic in the SD literature, finds these two principles to be the ‘foremost objective’ of
sustainable development (Baker et al., 1997). Baker (2006) emphasizes the normative role of
these principles, equating them to “moral statements that specify what is good or bad, and mould
attitudes and guide behaviour” (p. 36). In effect, SD evokes a moral imperative for not forfeiting
the needs of future generations, which is based on tangible connections between poverty, the
overexploitation of resources, and climate change. What is also pointed out by Baker (2006) is
that the Brundtland Report centers on promoting sustainable development, not achieving it. The
logic behind focusing on promotion of this concept is that the desirable characteristics of
sustainable development will evolve over time and will vary across borders. Arguably, such a
flexible and holistic approach has the potential for broad, international appeal.
The appeal of sustainability was first witnessed in the summer of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro,
where the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (WCED) was being
held. The Brundtland Report and its normative principles had been the core inspiration for
Agenda 21, which was adopted by 172 states. Inevitably, this voluntary, non-binding
international agreement has both strengths and weaknesses. It brings together the international
community for collective action on sustainable development and disseminates norms of global
ecological interdependence (Martin, 2004). However, it remains silent on relevant issues such as
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international debt and population control. Among the many states who signed Agenda 21 were
the Vatican and the Philippines, whose presence prevents any discussion of methods to reduce
birth rates such as contraceptives (Baker, 2006). Regardless of its flaws, though, this action plan
confronts rational-choice narratives that assume that any intergenerational benefits are
outweighed by present, individual costs (Weale, 1992). Put simply, the future externalities of
decisions take precedence in policy-making for SD, which is encompassed in the precautionary
principle. The main way this diverges from ecological modernization is that literature in EM
tends to lack prioritization of ecological issues like climate change, nor does it promote equity
across generations.
Instead, EM theorists like Weale (1992) posit a revamped cost-benefit analysis to
encompass future generations:
If the ‘costs’ of environmental protection are avoided the effect is frequently to
save money for present generations at the price of an increased burden for future
generations. In other words, the costs do not disappear, they are merely pushed
forward and possibly magnified in the process. Thus, a failure to regulate
industrial waste disposal of agricultural pesticide use in one generation will
simply have the effect of creating soil clean-up costs for future generations (p.
76).
Of course, this remark does not acknowledge the extent to which these spillover effects have
also amplified spatial disparities of current ecological problems. The general neglect among EM
theorists regarding the distribution of biodiversity, which is overwhelmingly found in the Global
South, is a case in point. Christoff (1996) points out that “the entire literature is somewhat
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Eurocentric, deeply marked by the experience of local debates over the politics of acid rain and
other outputs, rather than conflicts over biodiversity preservation” (p. 486). Mol and
Spaargaren (2000) explain this prioritization by the fact that EM initially “developed in a limited
number of West European countries,” and that its solutions “still partly mirror this geographical
focus” (p. 42). This sheds light on why early EM theorists like Huber and Janicke placed the role
of technological innovation at the forefront of the environmental policy-making agenda, as it
confronted the industrial burdens of pollution faced by the North, while conveniently ignoring
the unequal distribution of ecological problems in the South (Langhelle, 2000).
Public goods
Related to the international character of environmental problems is the next category,
public goods. This concept derives from the fact that many aspects of nature are ‘non-rival’ and
‘non-excludable’. Meaning that one’s consumption of a particular natural resource does not limit
another’s ability to do the same (Our Common Future, 1987). In the context of the global
commons, it implies that efforts to reduce carbon emissions by one country will benefit other
nations, regardless of whether or not they follow suit (Carter, 2006). Therefore, preventing
climate change is faced with the quintessential rational-choice problem of ‘free riding’, as there
is thought to be no incentive for actors to engage in these activities if they perceive others to be
already acting on their behalf. This problem directly relates to ‘the tragedy of the commons,’ in
which rationally self-interested actors end up exhausting the carrying capacity of an ecosystem in
attempt to maximize individual gains (Weale, 1992). Evidently, this assumes a predetermined
cost-benefit analysis that favours the myopic thinking addressed in the previous section.
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However, the issues of greater pertinence here are the rational-choice assumptions made about
consumers and producers who provoke this hypothetical ‘tragedy’ in the first place.
There is generally a consensus in the literature that reductions to resource consumption
are at the heart of SD. Some go further to say it profoundly confronts the capitalist system
(Christoff, 1996). As per Lafferty (2007), “of the numerous issues covered by sustainable
development, one of the far most crucial is the nature and level of consumption in the
overdeveloped North,” wherein “each American birth represents a level of consumption that is
hundreds of times that of each birth in Nepal, Vietnam, or Madagascar ” (p. 47). On the other
hand, EM theory, albeit vocal on the problem of consumption, places more emphasis on the type
of consumption rather than the level. This rests on the belief that, with the use of more efficient,
innovative technologies, the goal of ‘producing more with less’ becomes ecologically feasible
(Carter, 2006). That is to say, the consumption of Green products can reduce negative
environmental impacts. When contrasted to SD, EM appears reductionist in the fact that ecology
is “reduced to concern about resource inputs, waste and pollutant emissions” (Baker, 2006, p.
139). Al Gore, perhaps unknowingly a proponent of EM, uses a similar line of argument in his
Global Marshall Plan. Despite offering an ambitious plan for international cooperation on
sustainable initiatives, his emphasis on “the stabilizing of world population” and “the rapid
creation and development of environmentally appropriate technologies” has apparent
shortcomings (Dryzek, 1998, p. 325).
In effect, these strategic objectives, albeit important, do not challenge the structure that
permits capitalism to disguise itself in an eco-friendly facade, nor are they inclusive of the
Global South. It is worth noting that Gore’s plan seems to align closely with the rational-choice
perspective of Garrett Hardin, who maintained after writing The Tragedy of the Commons that
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“pre-emptive, even coercive, action is needed to control population and conserve resources”
(Redcliffe, 1987, p. 9). Although Gore’s vision is not necessarily ‘coercive’, he does concede
that his Marshall Plan relies on nations that follow the ‘philosophical direction’ of democracy,
free markets, and global co-operation. Yet the global ‘inclusiveness’ of this plan falters after he
admits that “the responsibility for taking the initiative, for innovating, catalyzing, and leading
such an effort, falls disproportionately on the United States” (Dryzek, 1998, p. 324). Hence the
reasonable suspicions by Dryzek (1998) that Gore, along with other EM theorists, bolster Green
consumerism without identifying the underlying structure that provokes ecological disasters. It is
also a legitimate concern that the Global South may face ‘mal-development’ because of EM
theory’s disregard for the ever-increasing consumption levels produced by capitalist society
(Shiva, 1988).
Moving past these claims, where SD fundamentally differs from EM is the ability to
reframe consumption through cause and effect and the emergent structures of inequality induced
by disproportionate global consumption (Baker, 2006). To some extent, the approach of SD takes
the form of an appeal to mutual understanding and education of the social, economic, and
ecological interdependence of this planet. This emphasis, which places global interconnections
and the centrality of maintaining a sustainable carrying capacity, seems to lie outside of the
realm of rational choice. Conversely, Weale (1992)’s EM approach to the public good returns to
reductionist terms:
The task of politics is to supply the public good of environmental protection. A similar
logic can be applied to relations between states. On this account, international regimes of
pollution control exist to solve the prisoners’ dilemma that nations face when they
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confront one another over the use of common resources like the global atmosphere or the
open seas (p. 42).
Weale’s application of rational-choice theory has considerable implications for this next core
problem as well, which turns to the institutional barriers of environmental policy-making.
Administrative fragmentation
In essence, administrative fragmentation refers to the division of administrative tasks into
policy sectors with conflicting environmental objectives. This is best described in Carter
(2006)’s own words:
A core group of economic ministries – typically finance, industry, employment, energy,
agriculture and transport – make policy decisions affecting production, consumption,
mobility and lifestyles that will frequently have negative consequences for the
environment. A transport ministry might implement a massive road-building programme,
or the agriculture ministry might encourage intensive farming methods, while
responsibility for protecting the environment is typically given to a separate ministry (p.
180).
Beyond this summation, Carter (2006) goes on to note that this institutional rigidity is
incompatible with ecological problems, which require a holistic approach from all administrative
sectors. Issues such as climate change are marginalized when fragmentation exists; therefore, it
is relevant to see how EM and SD propose to resolve this division of interests and overcome the
status quo of environmental negligence that it maintains.
Evidently, this implies structural change to environmental regimes so that they
encompass the entire bureaucracy, not just one section of it. It is important to note that SD and
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EM emerged during a structural change from the Fordist to post-Fordist system of production. It
demanded increased specialization and efficiency, rather than mass production for mass
consumption. The post-Fordist system calls for resource efficiency and pollution control, which
are evidently the principles in which EM is grounded. Arguably, EM is merely a rational-choice
narrative for a systemic transformation that it did not entirely understand. Christoff (1996)
explained this as the ecological aspect of modernity. SD, on the other hand, was directly
influenced by the series of environmental disasters that occurred during the four years that the
Brundtland Commision was meeting, such as the Chernobyl incident and severe droughts of subSaharan Africa (Baker, 2006). The Brundtland Report subsequently stressed the need to enact
environmental policies that are preventative, not curative (Mol, 1996). Hence the position of
much of the SD literature during and after the publishing of Our Common Future that structural
change is vital to ecological protection (Dryzek, 1998; Langhelle, 2000).
The necessities to reform these institutional gaps, which result from fragmented sectors of
the bureaucracy, are even recognized by recent work in ecological modernization. Martin Janicke
identified four complexes that place considerable burdens on environmental policy –
construction, transportation, energy, and agro-industrial. All of these, he finds, require
restructuring (Langhelle, 2000). One principle that arguably challenges his four complexes is the
“bottom-up” involvement of individual citizens in SD. This is articulated by Baker et al. (1997)
as follows:
The failure of the state adequately to address the problem of environmentally damaging
activities affecting public welfare, and thereby securing social harmony, often generates
opposition at the grassroots level. In such case, legitimation concerns of the polity can act
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as political opportunity structures for grassroots activists to pressure the state and gain
concessions (p. 22).
Grassroots participation is one of the principle goals encompassed in the 1992 Rio Earth
Summit through the establishment of Local Agenda 21 (LA21) (Baker et al., 1997). LA21 is
based on the message presented in the Brundtland Report that SD must rely on political will on
the local level just as much as the international level. This rejects claims by EM theorists that key
actors in the policy process will not account for the ‘spill-over effects’ of other sectors. As the
Brundtland Commission advocates, “All governments should develop a 'foreign policy for the
environment' as one major way of improving the international coordination of national
environmental policies.” This works in tandem with notion that the local and grassroots levels
must actively participate in the same manner. This idea is crucial because the consequences of
destructive environmental actions, such as acid rain or pollution, are often endured on the local
level. Therefore, it is a vital for this level to be engaged in finding collective solutions, as they
understand the real-life implications of environmental policy (Langhelle, 2000).
Perhaps the most prominent success story of Agenda 21 in the context of the Global South
is Costa Rica, a nation that is now seen as a global leader in sustainable development. This
country’s environmental policy makes the necessary link between development and the
environment by promoting forest conservation and renewable energy initiatives in tandem with
the promotion of local political participation among municipalities throughout the country
(Carter, 2006; Porras, 2012). In a sense, this dismantles the early EM proposition that the Global
North will be the principal source of global environmental change. In Baker (2006)’s analysis of
LA21, there have been tangible results for public participation and good governance in several
regions of the world. Her work suggest that the next challenge to overcome is ‘capacity building’
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for communities to solve ecological problems on the local level. This observation, of course,
returns to SD’s emphasis on intra-generational equity, which attempts to alleviate economic
disparities (Baker et al., 1998.
Conclusion
In the end, rational-choice suggests that individual actors will assume their influence in
the political agenda is marginal, which consequently results in a self-fulfilling, self-defeating
prophecy (Weale, 1992). Sustainable development provides a framework to confront this
defeatist rationale. In consideration of the three sections discussed above, it appears that SD and
EM take considerably different approaches to environmental policy. The former utilizes
normative principles and implements them on all scales to provide a resonant, global ecological
discourse. Meanwhile, the latter concedes with many of the status-quo assumptions that resulted
in domestic end-of-pipe solutions during the 1970s (Carter, 2006). SD is perhaps strongest
through its emphasis of intra- and inter-generational equity, as well as its call for reduced
consumption in the Global North. These positions make the necessary point of global ecological
interdependence that the modern world faces. Where rational-choice ultimately falters is its
generalized cost-benefit analysis of environmental problems: it neglects the emergent structures
of inequality and the international norms that allure collective action. While ecological
modernization offers reductionist solutions to predetermined problems in the global commons,
sustainable development ultimately seeks to overcome them by reframing the discourse and
reconceptualising individual agency in a holistic and innovative manner.
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