PAl,
CREATIVITY, REPRESENTATIONALREDESCRIPTION,
INTENTIONALITY, MENTALLIFE:
An Emerging Picture
From: AAAI Technical Report SS-93-01. Compilation copyright © 1993, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.
TERRY DARTNALLI
Computingand Information Technology
Griffith University
Nathan Qld 4111 Australia
Abstract. This paper outlines a general theory of creativity and locates the concept of creativity with respect to the
conceptsof thought, knowledgeand intentionality. Thepicture that I provide is outrageouslysimplified, but, as Dennett
said recently, such idealisation is the price we mustsometimespay for synoptic insight (Dennett 1992). I first provide
accountof a significant and central type of creativity. ThenI showthat there is independentempirical evidencethat we
are natively endowedwith this kind of creativity. Theemergingpicture throws light on what it is to have a mental life,
and on what it is for a representation to meansomethingto a system. This in turn gives a broader perspective, including
a general theory of creativity that, on the one hand, distinguishes betweencreative and non-creative systems,and, on the
other, accounts for individual differences betweencreative systems.
Thepaperis structuredas follows.Section1 arguesthat a
significantandcentraltypeof creativityis the ability to ’break
out’ of a mleset, or out of someother constrainingframework
of ideas. Section2 looksat ’breakingout’ in moredetail. We
break out whenweaccess certain representations in such a
waythat wecan reflect uponand modifythem.Butthese are
not anyold representations. Theyare declarative structures
that expressthe proceduralknowledge
that hadhitherto driven
our behaviour.In articulating these structures weacquirea
mentallife throughdiscoveringwhatit is that weknow,think
and believe. The beaver knowshowto build a dam, but
it cannot access this procedural knowledgeand express it
as a declarative structure: it doesnot knowwhatit thinks,
andconsequentlyhas no thoughts. Thusthere is an intimate
relationshipbetweenbeingcreative andhavinga mentallife.
Section 3 turns to AnnetteKarmiloff-Smith’sRepresentational RedescriptionHypothesis(RRH)(Karmiloff-Smith
1986,1990,1991,forthcoming
a, forthcoming
b, et al.; Clark
& Kamiloff-Smith,forthcoming;Clark, forthcoming). The
RRH
is a theory of cognitive development
that tries to explain howthe humanmindgoes beyonddomain-specificconstraints. It maintainsthat weare endogeneously
drivento redescribeour implicit proceduralknowledge
as explicit declarative knowledge,
andto continueto redescribeour knowledge
in increasinglyabstract terms. Thusweare natively endowed
with the kind of creative ability outlinedin Sections1 and
2. This empiricalevidenceis independentof the earlier argument.Creativitythereforetakes centrestage in our efforts
to understandhumancognition, becausewehavegroundsfor
believingthat it is in our natures(and maybe uniqueto our
natures)to be creative.
Thispackageof creativeability, mentallife andnativeendowment
appearsto be morethan a coincidence,and wemight
II wish to thank AndyClark, Margaret Boden and others for
helpful discussionsof this paper.
73
wonderwhetherthere is a unifyingfactor that wehavemissed.
This hunchis spurredby the fact that wewouldbe surprised
to find that a creativesystemcouldnot, evenin principle,have
thoughts,or that a systemwitha mentallife couldnot, evenin
principle,be creative. If this is correct thenwehavethe following:(1) a system
is creativeif andonlyif it canredescribe,
(2) a systemis creativeif andonlyif it has thoughts;therefore
a systemhas thoughtsif andonlyif it can redescribe.Thought,
creativity andredescriptionbeginto emergeas facets of the
samething. Canwethrowlight on this?
In Sections4, 5 and61 suggestthat the missinglink is that
it is only throughredescriptionthat wecan have(genuinely.
intentional)mentalstates. I suggestthat weinitially acquire
intentionalstates by beingcausallysituated in the world.Initially wedo not haveaccessto these states, whichconstitute
our implicit knowledge.Later weredescribe this knowledge
in termsof explicit, accessiblestructures - that expressour
knowledge,
thoughtsandbeliefs.
Section7 returns us to creativity. This cannowbe seen as
the struggleto articulate whatit is to be (causallysituated)
in the world.Thebeaverstays on its plateau of behavioural
mastery,but wego beyondthis and transformour procedural
knowledge
into thoughtsandtheories that wecan reflect upon
and change.
This gives us a general theoryof creativity that consists
of a phylogeniccomponent,
distinguishingpeoplefromslugs
and Sun4s,and an ontogenetic component
that accountsfor
individualdifferencesin termsof our abilities to deployour
redescriptivepowers.Section8 suggeststhat rare individuals,
such as MozartandPicasso, mayhavedirect access to their
redescriptive powers.If machinelearning theorists can implementthis ability then machinesmaybecomemorecreative
than people.
1. Boden on ’Breaking Out’
MargaretBoden(1990, forthcoming)arguesthat creativity
the exploration andtransformationof conceptualspace--or
morecorrectly,
ofconceptual
spaces.
A conceptual
space
is
a spaceof structuresgenerable,that is, defined,bythe rules
of a generativesystem.Weexploresuch a space by studying
the structureswithinit, andwetransformit by modifying
the
rules of the systemto producedifferenttypesof structures.
Bodenarguesfor this by first consideringthe notionthat
creativity involvesthe novelcombinations
of old ideas. Creativity does involvenovelty, but Bodenobservesthat such
accounts do not tell us whichcombinationsare novel, nor
hownovel combinations can comeabout. Her main--and
related--criticismis that manycreativeideas not onlyd/d not
occur before, but could not have occuredbefore. Previous
thinking wastrappedin a framework,relative to whichnew
ideas wereimpossible.Consequently,creativity requires us
to ’think the impossible’,to haveideas that are impossible
in the present fiamework:weneedto ’break out’ of a conceptual space by changingthe rules that define it. Kekule,
for instance, brokeout of the spacedefinedby the rules of
nineteenth-centurychemistry, and openedup the newspace
of aromaticchemistry.
2. Breaking Out and Having a Mental Life
Let us look at a couple of cases of ’breakingout’. First,
supposethat youare a Newtonian
physicist whobelieves that
light travels in straight lines. Thereis nowa sensein which
it is unthinkable
for youthat light wavesshouldbend,since it
is logically impossiblefor Newtonian
physicsto be true and
for light wavesto bend:necessarily, /f the laws of Newtonlan physicsare true then light does not bend. Whilstyou
remainwithin the Newtonianframeworkyou are trapped by
this necessity.Or imaginethat youare followingthe rules of
Euclideangeometry.Withinthe frameworkdefined by these
rule, s it is logically impossiblefor the sumof the anglesof
a triangle to be other than 180 degrees. Wecan break out
of these frameworks
by representingthe rules to ourselves.
Oncewehavedoneso wewill see that the necessity lies in
the hypothetical’lfthese rules thenX’--notin Xitself.
This showsus howweare limited by the assumptionsthat
wemake,but it does not explain whywefind it so hard to
articulate the assumptions.
I suggestthat wecanthrowlight on
this by distinguishingbetweenrule users andrule followers.
Rulefollowers are subject to rules. Theydo whatthe rules
say. Computerprogramsfollow rules whenweset themthe
task of (say) generatingproofs in Euclideangeometry.Rule
users, onthe other hand,canaccessthe rules as a declarative
structure.
Sometimesweare rule followers--whenwe follow the
rules of grammar,for instance--and weare trapped to the
extent that weare merelyfollowers. Webreak out whenwe
becomeusers--whenwearticulate the knowledge
implicit in
the rules wehad beenfollowing.
74
Wecan cast light on this by imagining
a ’cognitiveladder’.
Atthe bottomof the ladderare marshflies,hoverfliesandants.
Themarshflyis exasperatinglypersistent andfollowsus about
despiteour attemptsto swatit away.Hoverfliesmeetandmate
in midair. Antsexhibit apparentlycomplexbehaviour.These
creatures, however,havelittle or no knowledge,
either proceduralor declarative.Theirbehaviouris principally driven
by information
that is in the environment,
not in the organism
(Dreyfus1979). Themarshflyfollowsthe carbondioxidethat
weemit. Hoverfliesare hardwiredto transforma specific signal into a specific muscularresponse(Boden1990). Antscan
detect contours,andhaveroutinesfor selectingthe mostlevel
path (Simon1969; see discussions in Pylyshyn1979/1981,
Winograd
1981; also Dreyfus&Dreyfus1987.)
Whenwe discover these things we should abandonany
suspicionsthat wemighthavehad aboutthese creatures having a mentallife. Theyare not merelymindless:they have
no knowledge
worth speakingabout. Theyare not evenrule
followers.
Midway
up the ladder is the beaver. It has structured,
proceduralknowledge
about howto build a dam.However,it
has no accessto this knowledge.
It is trappedin a procedural
framework,
doingwhatits rules tell it to: first you put in
stones, then youput in big logs, then youput in smallones.
If a stormsweepsawaythe smalllogs, the beaverdemolishes
what’s left of the damand starts again. (This maynot be
empiricallytrue of beavers--if it is not, run the argument
witha morestupidcreature.)In this respectthe beaveris like
a computer
program:it is a rule followerrather than a rule
user. It doesnot representthe rules as an accessiblestructure.
If it didit wouldbe able to directlyaccessthe rule for putting
smalllogs on top of big ones.
Nordoesthe beaverhaveanythoughts. Wesee it scurrying
about trying to put the log there. The log keeps slipping
out, and the beaver keepsputting it back. Wewantto say
that the beaverthinks that the log shouMgo there--but we
do not wantsay that it has the thought’the log shouldgo
there’. This is a distinction that wecommonly
drawwith
people:the tennis playeris ’thinkingwhatshe’s doing’when
she plays intelligently, but this doesnot meanthat she has
explicit thoughtsaboutwhatshe is doing.
(Adrian Cummins
(1990) drawsa similar distinction
tweenthoughtsthat have, or do not have, conceptualcontent.
If Jo believesthat Bill is a bachelor,thenJo has graspedthe
concept’bachelor’.But whenwesay that Fido’believesthat
the noise (or the scent) comesfrom the south’, wedo not
believe that Fido has graspedthe concept’south’! Cummins
believesthat Fidohas no structuredor contentfulthoughts.I
believethat he has nothoughtsat all.)
Wetie these facts together whenwesay that the beaver
’doesn’tknowwhatit thinks’. It thinksthat the log shouldgo
there, but it doesn’tknowthat it thinksthis. It doesnot have
accessto its proceduralknowledge.
Nowconsider Le Penseur (Rodin’s sculpture of someone
engagedin deep thought--head bent, browfurrowed). Le
Penseur’shumanequivalent has thoughtsby virtue of being
able to expresshis knowledge
as a declarativestructure, reflect uponit, andchangeit if necessary.In doingthis he is
exercisingan ability that all of us have.
Enterthe empiricalevidence--thatweare natively endowed
to re, describeour proceduralknowledge
as declarativeknowledge(and to continueto redescribeit at increasinglyabstract
levels). Weare endogenously
driven to go from being rule
followersto rule users, thereby’breakingout’ in the sense
described.
3. Representational Redescription
this transcendencecomethoughtsand the mentallife. And
there is independentevidencethat weare natively endowed
withsuchan ability.
Weare boundto ask more. Weare boundto ask whether
it is only redescriberswhoare creative and whohavemental
lives. In the nextsectionI arguethat this is indeedthe case,
since our declarativestructurescanonly be aboutanythingif
they are groundedin implicit knowledge
broughtaboutby our
beingcausallysituated in the world,andare thenredescribed
as accessiblestructures.
4. Intentionality
TheRRHis a theory of cognitive developmentproposedby
AnnetteKarmiloff-Smiththat tries to accountfor the way
in whichthe humanmindgoes beyonddomain-specificconstraints. It maintainsthat the mindis endogenously
drivento
go beyondbehaviouralmasteryandto represent its knowledge
to itself in increasingly
abstractforms.It doesthis, as it were,
under its ownsteam--withoutneed of exogenouspressure.
Initially, the system’sknowledge
is embedded
in procedures.
It is implicitin the system’s
abilities. It is notavailableto other
procedures,nor to the systemas a whole.As Karmiloff-Smith
putsit, it is in the system,but notavailableto the system.Later
the systemredescribesit as declarative knowledge,
whichis
available to other procedures.Thesystemcontinuesto redescribeits knowledge
on increasinglyabstract levels, all of
whichare retained and maybe accessed whennecessary.
Themostcommonly
cited evidencefor this is the ’funny
men’pictures(see FigureI).
Westart with a groupthat has achievedmasteryof a task.
Childrenbetweenthe ages of four and six, for instance, are
able to drawhousesand stick figures of people. But when
they are asked to drawa funny manor a funny house, they
can do very little. Theyare lockedinto their house-drawing
or man-drawing
procedures:first youdrawthe head, then you
drawthe body, then you drawthe legs etc. To begin with
they can only modifyparts of the procedure,suchas drawing
a squarehead. Butslowlythey acquirethe ability to access
the proceduresas declarative structures, whereupon
they can
apply the rules in any order they wish. Children between
eight andten are quite fluent at this, andcan drawhandson
the end of legs and feet on the end of arms. Theycan even
mixprocedurestogether, and drawcentaurs, andheads that
have windows.
’But’, you mightsay, ’the youngerchildren could have
donethings like that--it just didn’t occurto themto doso’.
Tomeetthis objection, Karmiloff-Smith
askedthe 4-6 yearolds to drawa manwith two heads. Commonly,
the children
drewa man,drewa secondhead, and then went on to drawa
secondbody-and-legs:they werelocked into a man-drawing
procedure.
Theplot so far is this. Acentralandsignificanttypeof creativity is the ability to breakout of a ruleset, to gofrombeing
subjectto rules to beingable to articulate anduse them.With
75
and Redeseription
Theproblemof intentionality is the problemof howmental
states, symbolstructuresor artifacts canbe aboutanything.I
havearguedthat a systemis creativeif andonlyif it canaccess
its knowledge
structures. Butwhatis it for a structureto rapresent knowledgefor a system?Thestandard computational
accountis that the structure is in the mind’s’knowledge
bin’
or "thoughtbin" andthat the mindmanipulatesit according
to formal rules (Dennett1986calls this "HighChurchComputationalism";see also Richardson1981,Fodor1987). The
Knowledge
RepresentationHypothesis(see esp. Brian Smith
1985)says that a systemcontainsknowledge
if andonly if it
containsa syntactic structure that meanssomething
to us, and
that causesthe systemto behavein an appropriateway.E.g.,
the systemknowsthat tigers bite if andonlyif it containsa
structuresuchas ’Tigersbite’ that causesit to get up trees in
the presenceof tigers.
It is not clear howlocatinga structure withina systemcan
enableit to knowwhatthe structure means.Andunderstanding a sentencesurelyinvolvesmorethanbeingpropelledbyits
morphology.
Ratherthan pursuingthese points I shall outline
an accountof intentionalitythat gives a majorrole to representationalredescription,andthat throwslight oncreativity.
5. The InformationTheoretic Accountof
Intentionality
Myaccount is based on the InformationTheoretic account
of intentionality. This is most commonly
associated with
Fred Dretske, though John Heil and K.M.Sayre have developedtheir ownversions (Dretske1980,1981,Heil 1983,
Sayre1986). TheInformationTheoreticaccountexploits the
mathematicaltheory of informationadvancedby Shannonand
Weaver,whichsays that one state carries informationabout
anotherjust to the degreethat it is lawfullydependent
onthat
other state. Dretskerealisedthat this shedslight onintentionality, since "Anyphysicalsystem,then, whoseintemalstates
are lawfullydependent,in somestatistically significant way,
on the valueof an externalmagnitude..,qualifiesas an intentional system."(1980,p 286). Thusaboutnessis not a unique
featureof mentalstates but is foundin all causalrelationships.
Now,however,Dretskefaces the problemof cognitive error (of howwecan havefalse beliefs, etc). Hemaintainsthat
informationis distorted by the cognitivesystem.His critics
reply that this commits
himto sayingthat wecan gain knowl-
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edgeby removingthe errors fromour cognitivesystems.This
implies that cognitive systemsmerelydistort information-andthis runs counterto our belief that morecomplex
systems
can gathermoreandbetter information.I shall return to this.
were,have’prime’intentionality--intentionality
that is dueto
direct causal influence.Genuinerepresentationsare grounded
by virtue of the system’beingin the world’.
Areall genuinerepresenters re, describers?Considerthe
beaver on the one hand, and a Sun4on the other. TheSun4
6. Combining Accounts
contains datastmcturesbut has no mentalstates. Its datastructures donot haveanyintentionalityfor it, donot express
Let us run the story with a redescriber. Theredescriber is
knowledge
for it, do not ’meananythingto it’. Let us supplaced in the world. Its peripheries are bombarded.It deposethat this is becausetheyare not redescriptionsof prime
velopsinternal states that constitnteprocedural
knowledge:
it
intentionality. Thebeaver(certainly the marshfly)is at the
can build dams,drawpictures, pronouncewords,etc. This is
knowledge
in the systemthat is not availableto the system. other extreme.It has primeintentionality, but doesn’tknow
whatit thinks. Let us supposethat this is becauseit hasn’t
It consistsin the systembeingin a certain state. Because
this
redescribedits knowledge
into accessible structures. Given
state wascausally determinedby the worldin a lawlike way,
these assumptions,the Sun4and the beaverhave no mental
it is knowledge
aboutthe world.
life becausethey are not redescribers. If havingno mental
ConsiderNETtalk.Whenit is bombardedwith phonemes,
life is alwaysdueto oneof these twoimpediments,
then only
NETtalkdevelopsintemal states that are about phonemes.It
redescribers havea mentallife. (Kant said that "concepts
settles into internal states that (to use Dretske’swords)are
without percepts are empty,percepts without concepts are
"lawfullydependent,in [a] statistically significant way,on
blind". Wemightsay that ’ungroundedrepresentations are
the value of an extemalmagnitude".Thesestates account
empty,primestates are blind’.)
for its ability to pronouncewords.Of course, it requires,
This, however,only restates the problem.Consequently
I
e.g., cluster-analysisto identifythe states that it has settled
shall
resort
to
an
onus
of
proof
argument--sometimes
referred
into, so that, as ClarkandKarmiloff-Smith
(forthcoming)say,
to as ’the best badargument
in philosophy’.Let us assumethat
the states are not available to NETtalk.Theyare only just
(despite somecontemporary
philosophicalopinions)wereally
availableto us!
do havementalstates. Theseare intentionalstates. Now,what
Wecan provide a straightforwardlycausal accountof the
groundshavewegot for thinkingthat intentional states can
intentionality of such a system.Moreover,its knowledge
is
arise in anywayother thanthroughcausalstimulationfromthe
relativelyundistorted,sinceits intemalstate is a direct reflecenvironment?If wehave no groundsthen wemust believe
tion of its environment.
Onthe other hand,this knowledge
is
that this is howintentional states comeabout in us. The
limited,inflexibleandinaccessible.
RRH
thentells its redescriptivestory. Surelythe point about
Backto our re, describer. Theredescribernowredescribes
beinga physicalsymbolsystem,rather thana virtual one, is
its implicit knowledge
as explicit knowledge--as
knowledge
that it can causallyacquireintentional states. Then,if the
availableto the system.Thisis aboutthe worldbecauseit is a
architectureis right, it canredescribethe knowledge
implicit
redescriptionof knowledge
that cameabout by beingsituated
in these states in termsof explicit symbolicrepresentations.
in the world.Its intentionalitylies in its pedigree.
Cognitivescientists andmachine
learningtheorists mustshow
Withredescriptioncomesrisk andthe possibility of cogni- us howthis is done.
tive error, whichis the price that wepayfor increasedabstraction, flexibility andan improved
ability to gatherinformation.
7. A GeneralTheoryof Creativity
This resolvesDretske’sproblemof howcognitivesystemscan
Wenowhavethe rudimentsof a general theoryof creativity.
apparently go wrong.Theydo not go wrong--butthere is a
trade-off betweenrisk and flexibility. (MargaretBodenhas Sucha theory contains a phylogeniccomponentand on onpointedoutto methat skills andabilities are fallible as well-- togenetic component.The phylogenic componentconcems
see her chapter on Hoverflies and Humansin Boden1990. the difference betweencreative systems(suchas people)and
Hoverfliescan missoneanotherin mid-air. Beaverscan build non-creativesystems(suchas slugs andSun4s).Theontogeis concernedwith individual differencesin
faulty damsby putting in the smalllogs first. Thepoint I am netic component
the
ability
to
redescribe.
making
is that at least someof the fallibility that is associated
Thephylogeniccomponent
locates creativity at whatClark
withhighercognitivesystems---e.g,false belief--is a natural
(forthcoming)
call "a genuinejoint in the
consequence
of re, describingour knowledge
in increasingly &Karmiloff-Smith
natural order". Oneof the great evolutionarydividesappears
abstract terms.)
Thusredescribers can acquire intentional states and gain to be betweensystemsthat can redescribe their procedural
knowledge
as accessible structures, and that havethoughts
knowledgethrough being situated in the world. Theythen
redescribe this knowledgein terms of accessible, modifi- anda mentallife, andsystemsthat cannotanddo not.
Nowlook at ontogeny.Thechild redescribesits procedural
able structures that constitute genuinerepresentations,such
as thoughtsand beliefs. Theyare genuinerepresentations, knowledge
as declarative knowledge.Hereontogenyrecapitmoreover,becausethey are redescriptions. Theyhaveinten- ulates phylogeny.Wethen continueto update our framework
tionality becausetheyare redescriptionsof states that, as it
of beliefs, strugglingto giveexpressionto whatit is to be
77
causallysituated in the world.
Of course, such frameworksare not everywheregrounded
in re, description. Theyare only groundedas a whole.Quine
andDavidson
talk abouta looselygrounded
webof belief. The
RRH
says that there are layers of (re)description, grounded
(if myaccountis correct) in the bottomlayer of primeintentionality. Nolayers are lost or destroyed,andall can be
accessed.Andour articulatedbeliefs, as well as a fluctuating
environment,cause us to continually restructure andupdate
the framework.
This is mostobviousin the Arts. Art tries to expresswhat
weknowor believebyarticulatingit as a declarativestructure:
Munch’sScream,El Greco’sRevelation of St John, Bach’s
Passions,Owen’swarpoetry--all articulate by extemalising.
Wesometimessay that we do not knowwhat we believe
until wehavewritten it down.In writing Sons and Lovers
D.H. Lawrence
articulated his complex
attitude to his parents,
that haddrivenhimto regardhis father as a despotandtyrant.
Havingvoiced his attitude he wasable to evaluate it and
changeit. "Weshedour sicknessesin books,"he said.
Thetheoryof redescriptionexplainswhatis goingon here,
andshowswhyit is creative. Redescriptiondoesnot give expressionto beliefs that werealreadythere: it actuallybrings
theminto existence.Hithertowebelievedthat.., suchandsuch
(just as the beaverbelievesthat the log shouldgo there, but
doesnot havethe thought’the log shouldgo there’). Wewere
in states that droveour behaviour.Redescriptionexpresses
the dispositionsinherentin these states as accessiblerepresentations. Thisis not creatingsomething
out of nothing--but
it is the nextbestthing.
This resolves an apparentproblemwith Boden’saccount.
Thereis, I think, a dangerof her accountbeggingthe question by sayingthat routinecreativity is the creativesearchof
conceptual
space(or the searchof a limited,’creative’space).
Since generative rules only determinewellformedness,we
need to knowwhyMozartwas consistently moresuccessful
(that is, morecreative) in searchingthroughthe musicalspace
of his daythanSalieri was.
I suggestthat the answerlies in distinguishing between
three kinds of art. The first merely explores a space of
structures--say, musicalstructures. Wemightbe inclined
to regardthis as little morethana technicalexercise.Atthe
otherextremewehaveart that breaksout of the confinesof the
genre.Thethird kind remainswithinthe genre, but breaksout
of anotherspaceby givingvoiceto feelingsandattitudes that
hadnot beenvoicedbefore,either by the individualor at all
(Boden’sdistinction betweenP-creativityandH-creativity).
8. Are there TwoTypesof CreativeAbility?
developinghis figure-drawing programAARON,
Harold Cohenfoundit necessaryto continuallyextemaliseandevaluate
AARON’s
ability, in order to find out whatits procedural
knowledgeenabledit to do. Edmonds
(forthcoming)quotes
himas saying"weextemalisein order to find out whatit is
that wehavein our heads... It is throughthis extemalising
process that weare able to knowwhatwebelieve about the
world"(Cohen,1983;see also McCorduck,
1991).
A fewrare individuals, however,seemto create with consumateease. Mozartsaid that he wouldexperience a composition all at once--in a moment--both
before andafter he
wroteit down:"Aah,whata feast is there" he said. Wemay
he sceptical, but the manuscriptscontainno errors. Thereis
no apperceptiveagonisinghere, no evidenceof an extemalisation/evaluation
cycle. Picasso,too, wasunableto put a foot
wrong:"I do not seek--I find", he said. MozartandPicasso
seemto havedirectly and unproblemmaticaUy
achievedwhat
the rest of us blindlystrugglefor. Mozart’s
talk aboutinstantaneousnesssuggeststhat he haddirect andspontaneousaccess
to a declarativestructure. In ’A Conversation
withEinstein’s
Brain’the tortoise/DougHofstadterinvites us to imaginewhat
it wouldbe like to experiencea pieceof musicinstantaneously
bylookingat the side of a long-playingrecord:"since all of
the musicis on the face of the record,whydon’tyoutake it in
at a glance,or at mosta cursoryonce-over?
It wouldcertainly
provide a muchmoreintense pleasure". And"Why
don’t you
paste all the pagesof the writtenscoreof someselectionupon
your wall and regard its beauties fromtime to time, as you
woulda painting?.., insteadof wastinga full hourlistening
to a Beethovensymphony,on wakingup someroomingyou
couldsimplyopenyoureyes andtake it all in, hangingthere
on the wall, in ten secondsor less, andbe refreshedandready
for a fine, fulfilling day?"(Hofstadter1981).
Wasit like this for Mozart?(Remember
that he claimsto
r) The
haveexperiencedit all at oncebeforehe wroteit down.
RRH
saysthat wehavethe ability to spontaneously
redescribe,
so perhapsMozarthad(almost?)full controlof this ability.
If so, there are twotypes of creativity ability. Thefirst
involves the extemalisation/evaluationcycle: weconstruct
theories aboutour abilities by observingthemin action. The
secondrests on the fact that abilities are grounded
in states.
Balls are able to bouncebecauseof their molecularstructure.
NETtalk
is able to pronounce
wordsbecauseit has settled into
a subsymbolic
state. Ourabilities are similarly groundedin
states. Nowsupposethat wecan redescribe the knowledge
that is implicit in these states. Thenwewouldno longer
needto construct theories about whatweknowand believe
by observing our actions. TheRRHtells us that wehave
exactlythis ability. Mozart,it seems,wasespeciallygoodat
exercising
it.
For mostof us the creative process is a slow and painful
one. Weengagein a cycle of extemalisation and evalua9. Conclusion
tion, in whichweexternalisesomething,
evaluateit, readjust
our goals, and repeat the process (Edmonds,forthcoming; TheRRH
is a philosopher’sstone for creativity research: it
Sharpies, forthcoming).Attemptsto producecomputerisad solves problems,generatesplausibleexplanations,andleaps
art and computer-assistedart havefoundprecisely this. In
mightybuildingsat a single bound.Wepay a price for this:
78
the belief that the mindis endogenously
drivento spontaneouslyredescribe--thatto someextent human
knowledge,
like the objective knowledge
of Hegel’sOvermind
or Absolute, ’evolvesunderits ownsteam’.Thisphraseis Pepper’s
(1972),whovigorouslyobjectsto the notion.Theclaim,however, is nowan empiricalone. Assuming
that the dataand
analysisof human
cognitionare correct,cognitivescientists
andmachine
learningtheoristsmustnowtry to implement
this
ability.
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