Mini-estudio de caso de 2003 sobre
Botswana
Experiencia reciente con
respecto a los conflictos de
interconexión
Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones
Este mini estudio de caso ha sido realizado por Robert Bruce y Rory Macmillan de Debevoise &
Plimpton, Londres, R.U. Las opiniones reflejadas en este documento son las de los autores y no
reflejan necesariamente las de la UIT, sus Miembros o del Gobierno de Botswana.
Los autores desean expresar su gratitud al Organismo de Reglamentación de las
Telecomunicaciones de Botswana (BTA) por su apoyo en la preparación de este mini estudio de
caso y, agradecen en particular a los Sres. Cuthbert Lekaukau, Martin Mokgware y M. O.
Tamasiga por su participación activa.
Este estudio forma parte de una serie de cinco estudios sobre la solución de controversias en la
interconexión llevadas a cabo la UIT. Para más información, sírvase consultar el sitio:
http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg
© 2003 UIT
Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones
Place des Nations
CH-1211 Ginebra, Suiza
Mini-estudio de caso de Botswana:
Experiencia reciente con respecto a los conflictos de interconexión
I.
Introducción
Con una población que ronda 1,7 millones de personas, el PIB de Botswana es de
aproximadamente 32 mil millones de pula (1,00 de BWP = 0,20 USD). En el sector de las
telecomunicaciones hay un operador de línea fija con cerca de 140 000 líneas fijas, una densidad
telefónica en torno al 8,2%, dos operadores móviles que cuentan con unos 460 000 abonados y una
tasa de penetración cercana al 27,3%.
Botswana tiene una buena y bien merecida reputación a este respecto, pues ha sido uno de los
primeros países de la región africana en crear un órgano de reglamentación independiente: el
Organismo de Reglamentación de las Telecomunicaciones de Botswana (BTA). En 1999, el BTA
establece y financia su presupuesto operativo y administra la concesión de licencias. En 1999,
resolvió su primer conflicto de interconexión que enfrentaba a la Corporación de Telecomunicaciones
de Botswana (BTC) y a los dos principales operadores de telefonía celular del país, Mascom Wireless
y Vista Cellular, mediante su Fallo número 1.
El consiguiente acuerdo de interconexión al que llegaron la BTC y Mascom y Vista
establecía tasas en función del reparto de ingresos, que seguirán vigentes durante un periodo de
24 meses a partir del 17 de febrero de 1998. Antes de que expirase el acuerdo, las partes decidieron
ampliar su validez; posteriormente, en marzo de 2001, entablaron negociaciones para revisarlo. Sin
embargo, las negociaciones entre la BTC y Mascom quedaron estancadas, y el 5 de julio de 2002
ambas partes solicitaron al BTA que resolviese un nuevo conflicto de interconexión. En respuesta a
dicha petición, el 26 de febrero de 2003, el Sr. C.M. Lekaukau, Presidente del BTA pronunció el
Fallo número 1, de 2003 (véase el Anexo 1 ("Fallo")), el cual abrió camino a decisiones posteriores,
ya que establece principios muy detallados para fijar nuevas tarifas de interconexión basándose en
criterios internacionales.
Este Fallo, que debería ser objeto de un estudio pormenorizado por parte de otros organismos
de reglamentación, se analiza en detalle en la sección siguiente. Su particularidad reside en el hecho
que por primera vez un organismo de reglamentación africano adoptaba criterios de la Unión Europea
(el Organismo Nacional de Reglamentación de las Telecomunicaciones de Marruecos (ANRT) los
utilizó anteriormente pero no de forma exclusiva). Si bien el Fallo resolvía únicamente un conflicto
entre Mascom y la BTC, y dejaba al margen a los demás operadores, la extensión y calidad del
razonamiento expuesto en dicha decisión indica la forma en que el BTA podrá responder a estos
problemas en el futuro. Así pues, el Fallo sirve de precedente para resolver de manera más
generalizada conflictos que puedan surgir en relación con los acuerdos de interconexión.
II.
Fallo número 1, de 2003, de la BTA
(a)
Antecedentes del conflicto sobre tasas de terminación
La controversia entre la BTC y Mascom giraba entorno a las modificaciones propuestas con
respecto a las tasas de terminación que se aplicarían a cada parte por la terminación en la red de la
otra parte. Básicamente, Mascom pretendía ampliar las tasas establecidas en el Fallo número 1, de
1999, de la BTA, mientras que la BTC era partidaria de introducir cambios significativos en las tasas
de terminación mensuales de la red móvil y fija, como se expone a continuación:
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23.09.2003
Cuadro 1: Tasas de terminación de llamada (pula de Botswana)
Tasas aplicadas en el
momento del
conflicto
(propuesta de
Mascom)
Tasas propuestas
por la BTC
Terminación en la red de la BTC:
- Hora punta
- Hora no punta
24.0
19.1
35.0
25.0
Terminación en la red de Mascom:
- Hora punta
- Hora no punta
96.0
76.9
75.0
58.0
Nota: 1,00 BWP = 0,20 USD
(b)
Principios básicos del fallo número 1, de 2003, del BTA
En este Fallo se destacan los distintos factores jurídicos y políticos a los que obedece la
decisión tomada en febrero de 2003, y se analizan pormenorizadamente los distintos argumentos y
factores sopesados por el BTA.
Base y marco jurídicos para tratar los conflictos de interconexión
En el Fallo se tomó en consideración la base y el marco jurídicos vigentes para abordar los
conflictos de interconexión en Botswana, incluido el Artículo 47 de la Ley de Telecomunicaciones
de 1996 ("la Ley"), las licencias de ambas partes, el acuerdo de interconexión concertado a raíz del
Fallo de 1999 y la Política de Telecomunicaciones de Botswana, adoptada en 1995. La Ley dispone
que el BTA tiene la facultad de tomar decisiones sobre conflictos de interconexión y de fijar las
condiciones que juzgue "justas y razonables" al respecto. El BTA tiene un amplio criterio para decidir
lo que es justo y razonable y puede considerar una amplia gama de factores; por ejemplo, un
considerable poder comercial, la posibilidad de repartir ingresos, el análisis comparativo, la
promoción del acceso universal, la base de abonados, la transparencia, la orientación a los costos, una
tasa de inversión razonable, la no discriminación y la estructura del mercado. En el Fallo se señaló
también que las licencias de la BTC y Mascom incluyen requisitos que no vulneran el Artículo 47 de
la Ley.
Análisis de costos
En el acuerdo de interconexión entre las partes se admitía que las tasas de interconexión se
basarían en los costos, aunque se señalaba que, como es posible que las cifras correspondientes a los
costos no se encuentren disponibles a corto plazo, debería utilizarse un método diferente. Si bien la
idea era basarse en los costos, el acuerdo estipulaba que la interconexión debería dar lugar a una
rentabilidad razonable de los activos y los recursos, fomentar la utilización de la red y no obstaculizar
el crecimiento de los servicios celulares (Artículo 18 del Fallo). En el Fallo se confirmaba que las
tasas deberían corresponder a lo que se ha dado en llamar "la tríada de la interconexión": tasas justas
para los operadores, justas para los usuarios finales y acordes con el mandato del BTA.
En el Fallo se tomaron en consideración tres de los principales modelos para abordar el tema
de la interconexión: reparto de ingresos, retención íntegra de tasas de origen y tasas por la utilización
de la interconexión. Si bien se reconoció que el Fallo in icial de 1999 se había basado en el modelo de
reparto de ingresos, se llegó a la conclusión de que esas disposiciones se basaban en negociaciones
que reflejaban el carácter relativo del poder comercial de las partes y que el modelo tendía a generar
discriminación y conflictos entre los operadores en vez de una competencia dinámica en cuanto a las
tarifas aplicables a los consumidores. En el Fallo se indicó que había tres tipos de tasas de
interconexión en función del origen, la terminación y el tránsito, y se concluyó que las tasas, por el
uso de la interconexión deberían constituir la base de un nuevo acuerdo de interconexión que se
debería centrar de forma más generalizada en las tasas de terminación y dejar al margen las tarifas
abonadas por los consumidores.
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23.09.2003
Confianza en el análisis comparativo
Mediante el Fallo se rechazó el intento de Mascom de instar al BTA a recurrir a la relación
tasas de terminación fijas/móviles de los países africanos vecinos. Se llegó a la conclusión de que
estas relaciones y las tasas de terminación implícitas se basaban en el reparto de ingresos y no en
acuerdos de interconexión eficaces. Se examinaron análisis comparativos y metodologías de costos,
en la medida en que constituían dos amplios enfoques para fijar las tasas de interconexión. Se
concluyó que los costos históricos o del pasado no reflejaban las tendencias tecnológicas del
momento y, por lo tanto, no servirían para fijar eficazmente los precios. Sin embargo, los costos
incrementales a largo plazo (LRIC) o los costos incrementales medios a largo plazo (LRAIC)
constituían una opción que daba cuenta de los costos en los mercados de competencia. Asimismo, en
el Fallo se argumentaba que el análisis comparativo podría representar una herramienta de
reglamentación útil, ya que se basaba en resultados de países en cuyos mercados imperaba una
competencia considerable, o donde se habían aplicado metodologías de costos LRIC o LRAIC. En el
Fallo se analizó el plan de la Unión Europea (UE) para desarrollar parámetros de comparación de las
tasas de interconexión en distintos niveles de la red.
Como parte del expediente, la BTC presentó en las actas del procedimiento un estudio de
costos histórico. A su vez, Mascom comunicó datos de la UE y de países en desarrollo que reflejaban
tendencias a la baja en las tasas de terminación. El BTA concluyó que en el contexto del
procedimiento pendiente no era viable diseñar un modelo de costos para las tasas de terminación y si
establecían un modelo de este tipo para la BTC, sería necesario que Mascom contase con un modelo
similar.
Selección de datos comparativos
El BTA examinó con detenimiento las distintas formas en que se podrían utilizar los datos de
referencia y, en particular, los países que se considerarían en el análisis comparativo. Al analizar las
posibles fuentes de los datos comparativos, se tuvo en cuenta una serie de factores. En primer lugar,
se rechazó la utilización de datos de países que no se regían por el principio seguido en Botswana de
"quien llama paga". En segundo término, se rechazó la utilización de precedentes de países africanos
vecinos, ya que se adujo que en ninguno de estos países la competencia era importante en lo que se
refiere a las tasas de terminación y que no se seguían los principios LRIC para fijar tasas de
interconexión (Artículo 35 del Fallo). Por último, se concluyó que, a la vista del marco de directivas
de la UE, los países de la UE representaban un "marco regulador relativamente homogéneo, lo que
facilitaba las comparaciones entre los mismos y los países no miembros de la UE". En el Fallo se
señaló también que la metodología comparativa de la UE había sido "ensayada y probada" y que
numerosos organismos de reglamentación de la UE habían definido y aplicado metodologías de
costos tales como LRAIC. Por consiguiente, los países de la Unión Europea constituían "un buen
ejemplo de países que han alcanzado o alcanzarán tasas de terminación orientadas a los costos
eficaces para las redes fijas ..." (Artículo 37 del Fallo).
Regulación de las tasas de terminación de los servicios móviles
Por otra parte, en el Fallo se indicaba que "los organismos de reglamentación tienden cada
vez más a favorecer la reglamentación de las tasas de terminación de los servicios móviles", sobre
todo en el Reino Unido y Austria. Se señaló también que otros organismos de reglamentación de
países de la UE, como Suecia, Francia y Bélgica, están utilizando un análisis comparativo eficaz para
autorizar importantes reducciones de las tasas de terminación de los servicios móviles.
Es significativo que en el Fallo se reconozca que, habida cuenta de las diferentes condiciones
de desarrollo económico y sectorial en la UE, optar por tasas de terminación comparativas para la
BTC y Mascom podría prestarse a fijar tasas por debajo de costos eficaces orientados al futuro. No
obstante, en el Fallo se reconoció expresamente dicho riesgo como demuestra el hecho de que se
establecieran periodos de transición con miras a garantizar la eficacia de las nuevas tasas.
Tasas de terminación de los servicios fijos: Utilización de un promedio de tasas de los
países de la Unión Europea
En el Fallo se siguió la línea europea de análisis de los distintos niveles de interconexión,
atendiendo a la jerarquía del lugar de la red en que se terminaba la llamada y la distancia que debía
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23.09.2003
recorrer la llamada -"local" representaba la interconexión de la central local; "tránsito simple" la
interconexión a nivel "metropolitano", incluida la utilización de un conmutador tándem y "doble
tránsito" o "nacional" permitía el acceso de todos los clientes de la red e incluía enlaces en tándem de
al menos 200 kilómetros. En el fallo se concluyó que Botswana debería utilizar el nivel de
interconexión "nacional", en contraposición con las tasas de interconexión locales o de tándem
simple, para calcular las tasas de terminación. Además, se consideró que una media de los quince
Estados Miembros de la UE constituiría una "base justa y razonable" a partir de la cual se podrían
determinar las tasas de terminación de red fija de la BTC.
Tasa de terminación de los servicios móviles: Utilización de las tasas correspondientes
a las mejores prácticas de la Unión Europea
Resulta interesante comprobar que, en las conclusiones del Fallo se indica que el promedio de
todos los países de la Unión Europea no constituye una metodología de referencia eficaz en lo que se
refiere a las tasas de terminación de la red de servicios móviles ya que muchos de estos países no han
acabado de introducir la reglamentación de la terminación de servicios móviles basada en los costos.
En el Fallo se optó, en cambio, por la media o punto medio de la serie de las "mejores prácticas
actuales", sin precisar su fuente. A la vista del nivel de costos más elevado prevaleciente en cuanto a
las tasas, se concluyó que sería razonable utilizar tale s tasas de forma transitoria con el fin de que las
tasas de terminación comparativas de Mascom sean eficientes.
Periodo de transición
Seguidamente, en el Fallo se analizó el modo de enfocar el periodo de transición, dado que
los niveles de tasas propuestos estaban muy por debajo de las tasas vigentes. Se reconoció
explícitamente que habría que establecer un equilibrio entre la rápida aplicación de los objetivos de su
política de reglamentación y las posibles repercusiones negativas con respecto a los imperativos
financieros de los operadores. Se declaró que "los objetivos de reglamentación precisan un periodo de
aplicación breve, mientras que las necesidades financieras pueden requerir un periodo más extenso"
(Artículo 41 del Fallo).
A continuación, se resumió el enfoque normativo que había de aplicarse a las tasas de
terminación de servicios fijos de BTC, así como a las tasas de terminación de servicios móviles de
Mascom.
Cuadro 2: Tasas impuestas por el fallo del BTA de febrero de 2003 (pula de Botswana)
Operador
Fecha efectiva hasta el
29/02/04
A partir del 01/03/04
Hora punta
Hora no punta
15.0
12.0
11.0
8.8
Hora punta
Hora no punta
85.0
68.0
75.0
60.0
BTC
Mascom
Nota: 1,00 BWP = 0,20 USD
-4 -
23.09.2003
El Fallo permanecerá en vigor durante 24 meses efectivos a partir de la fecha en que se
pronunció. Las partes serán libres de concertar un acuerdo que no infrinja, mientras estén en vigor los
principios fundamentales del Fallo y que deberán ser aprobado por el BTA. Por lo que hace a la
revisión judicial, las partes podrán apelar al Tribunal Superior, de conformidad con el Artículo 56 de
la Ley.
(c)
Observaciones relativas al Fallo Nº 1 de 2003
El Fallo revela un enfoque pragmático y facilitador con respecto a las funciones del
organismo de reglamentación nacional. El BTA intervino en el conflicto, únicamente debido a que las
partes de un procedimiento de interconexión anterior no lograron convenir en las modificaciones del
correspondiente acuerdo. Durante el procedimiento, se observó que el BTA intervino activamente
asesorando a las partes para que aplicasen conjuntamente un nuevo enfoque a la interconexión,
basándose en las tasas de uso de la interconexión, y no en el acuerdo de reparto de ingresos, como era
el caso en el acuerdo de interconexión original. Asimismo, la idea era utilizar los recursos de por lo
menos una de las partes, Mascom, para generar datos comparativos de referencia con el fin de
utilizarlos en el procedimiento, aunque, por razones de principio finalmente, se recurrió a otras
fuentes de información.
En segundo lugar, si bien es cierto que existen elementos que evidencian una "justicia en
bruto" en la utilización de datos comparativos no hay duda de que el BTA intentó utilizar dichos
datos con el fin de alcanzar sus objetivos siguiendo un enfoque preciso. Escogió datos de referencia
de la UE, ya que procedían de un marco relativamente riguroso y homogéneo, y rechazó la utilización
de datos comparativos para los países africanos vecinos por temor de que sus acuerdos de
interconexión de referencia se basasen en acuerdos de reparto de ingresos derivados de
negociaciones, y no en los principios LRAIC.
En tercer lugar, por haber utilizado los datos de referencia de la EU, para procurar establecer
disposiciones más eficaces en materia de fijación de precios, el BTA demostró sensatez y buen juicio
en cuanto a la aplicación de las nuevas normas de referencia. Por ejemplo y como se ilustra en el
cuadro anterior, el BTA estipuló dos etapas para los nuevos niveles recomendados de tasas de
terminación; la primera de ellas comenzaría en la fecha efectiva del fallo y la segunda en marzo de
2004. En este sentido, el BTA trató de equilibrar sus prioridades institucionales para facilitar la rápida
introducción de nuevas iniciativas de reglamentación y la inquietud suscitada por los imperativos
financieros de BTC y Mascom.
Asimismo, utilizó con moderación los análisis comparativos de la UE, recurriendo a tasas de
terminación a nivel nacional y no local, puesto que reflejaban con mayor fidelidad la situación global
y, concretamente, de la competencia en el mercado de Botswana frente a lo que sucede en economías
más desarrolladas.
(d)
Otros aspectos del fallo
Existen al menos dos ámbitos en los que tal vez convenga realizar una evaluación y un
análisis más pormenorizados, a la vista de las repercusiones del nuevo enfoque del BTA,
considerando éste en su sentido más amplio.
Fomentar la mancomunicación de información entre los organismos reguladores, la
UE y las organizaciones regionales
El primero de estos ámbitos guarda relación con el proceso mediante el cual los organismos
de reglamentación nacionales pueden acceder a los datos más recientes y fiables sobre los acuerdos de
interconexión en vigor. Por ejemplo, el BTA ilustra el interés que puede revestir utilizar datos de
la UE para los organismos de reglamentación nacionales que se encargan de los sectores de las
telecomunicaciones en transición y de dar aplicación a los nuevos mandatos de reglamentación. Por
ello, tal vez convenga promover un diálogo más preciso entre la Comisión Europea -que compila
anualmente grandes cantidades de datos de cada sector en relación con sus informes sobre la
aplicación del marco de la UE- y los organismos de reglamentación de países con nuevos mercados,
para quienes todos o parte de estos datos pueden resultar muy útiles a la hora de realizar sus tareas.
Concretamente, la Comisión Europea publica índices de interconexión nacionales, incluidos de fijo a
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fijo y de fijo a móvil, precios del bucle local desagregado, tarifas al por menor y gran cantidad de
otros datos procedentes de los Estados Miembros. Las tasas de interconexión de la UE publicadas en
diciembre de 2002 figuran en el Anexo 2 a este Informe. En el sitio web de la Sociedad de la
Información de la Unión Europea (véase el Anexo 2) pueden verse otros datos.
Por otra parte, hace tiempo que diversos organismos de reglamentación de países de la UE,
tales como el Organismo Nacional de TI y Telecomunicaciones (NITA) de Dinamarca vienen
utilizando los datos de referencia y proporcionan a menudo asistencia a organismos de
reglamentación de países en desarrollo. Estas experiencias podrán desarrollarse y extenderse para
intensificar la asociación con organismos de reglamentación interesados en datos de referencia
recopilados y en los conocimientos prácticos que exigen su recogida. Además, quizá sea necesario
realizar mayores esfuerzos para habilitar a las entidades reglamentadas para proporcionar esos datos a
los organismos de reglamentación nacionales. Asimismo, los organismos regionales de
reglamentación pueden también plantearse la conveniencia de recoger y publicar datos sobre sus
regiones respectivas. Con frecuencia los operadores de los nuevos mercados son titulares o mantienen
relaciones de afiliación con operadores experimentados en muchos mercados internacionales. Cabría
esperar que tales operadores ofrezcan datos de referencia útiles, así como análisis e información que
faciliten la aplicación en un contexto nacional de estudios efectuados en el extranjero.
Crear modelos LRIC/LRAIC
En segundo lugar, puede ser útil diseñar en colaboración consultiva como complemento de la
recogida de información de referencia, modelos LRAIC o LRIC para la BTC. La experiencia que han
tenido otros organismos de reglamentación nacionales como el NITA de Dinamarca1 es un buen
ejemplo de cómo se pueden desarrollar esos modelos gracias a la participación del operador
tradicional y de otros operadores competidores. La posibilidad de que dicha experiencia signifique
una contribución importante al BTA puede depender, evidentemente, del grado de interés que pueden
tener los operadores distintos de la BTC para prestar asistencia al BTA, así como del acceso a la
información pertinente por parte de dichos operadores. Estos modelos de costos a largo plazo pueden
ser para el BTA otra herramienta que le permita evaluar y utilizar eficazmente datos externos para
adoptar un criterio de costos.
III.
Otras novedades interesantes
(a)
Desarrollo de acuerdos de interconexión de móvil a móvil
Uno de los aspectos del panorama actual del BTA es el establecimiento de tarifas de
interconexión de móvil a móvil entre Mascom y Vista Cellular, respectivamente, el segundo operador
y el más pequeño de Botswana. En estos momentos, no existe ningún acuerdo entre los dos
operadores pero sí un acuerdo de interconexión de facto, basado en la retención íntegra en origen. El
BTA está alentando a esos operadores a que mantengan negociaciones comerciales, pero existen
numerosos obstáculos para ello; por ejemplo lo que sostiene uno de los dos operadores en el sentido
de que ambos deberían pagarse por los servicios prestados. Por otro lado, no hay confianza entre ellos
con respecto a las cifras de tráfico utilizadas.
Si bien el BTA se encuentra limitado en su intento por proporcionar la confianza de los
operadores con respecto a sus relaciones comerciales, hay la posibilidad de que se inicie un diálogo
entre ellos sobre la base de los actuales acuerdos comerciales entre los operadores móviles en otros
mercados. En este sentido, podrían resultar útiles los acuerdos que se podrían utilizar de telón de
fondo para la intervención del BTA en asuntos de interconexión móvil a móvil. Por consiguiente, las
"redes" que se utilizan para transportar la información relativa a la terminación de fijo a móvil y de
móvil a fijo, lo que incluye las redes que podrían ser activadas por los dos operadores, podrían
constituir redes básicas en la siguiente fase de intervención del BTA en cuestiones de interconexión.
1
Véase el miniestudio de caso sobre Dinamarca de la UIT: Beyond Disputes and Towards Consensus Building on
TREG (http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/Case_Studies/Index.html), donde se hace referencia a una serie de modelos de
costos LRIC/LRAIC internacionales.
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23.09.2003
(b)
Procesos consultivos de la industria
Actualmente, el BTA consulta a los principales actores de Botswana en lo que se refiere a la
interconexión y otras cuestiones políticas afines y participa en la formulación de directrices de
interconexión, que se han enviado a las empresas para que formulen comentarios. El BTA considera
prioritario este proceso de consulta puesto que su objetivo es hacer participar a los actores
concernidos antes de que se terminen de elaborar las políticas y reglamentaciones del caso, y se
adopten otras medidas que puedan incidir en las actividades de los proveedores de servicios de
telecomunicaciones.
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23.09.2003
ANEXO 1
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003, Ruling on Interconnection charges Dispute between Botswana
Telecommunications Corporation and Mascom Wireless (PTY) Limited, 26 February 2003.
http://www.bta.org.bw/pubs/Ruling%20no%203-%20Interconnection%20Disputes%20BTCMascom%20%2025%20FEB%202003.pdf
23.09.2003
(Date: 26 February 2003)
BOTSWANA TELECOMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY (BTA)
BTA RULING NO. 1 OF 2003
[Pursuant to Section 19 as read with Section 47
of the Telecommunications Act, 1996 (No. 15 of 1996)]
RULING ON INTERCONNECTION CHARGES DISPUTE
BETWEEN:
BOTSWANA TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
AND
MASCOM WIRELESS (PTY) LIMITED
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
C. M. LEKAUKAU, EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
The parties herein, namely, Mascom Wireless (Pty) Limited
and Botswana Telecommunications Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as Mascom and BTC respectively) entered into and
concluded an Interconnection Agreement (hereinafter referred to
as the Agreement) on the 13 day of August 1999. The essence of
such an Agreement was to facilitate interoperability and access
into each other’s network, and its concomitant compensation, one
being a fixed line network operator (BTC) and the other being a
mobile cellular operator (Mascom). The said Agreement provided
inter alia for the review and termination of the same. I must point
out from the onset that the interconnection charges that were
incorporated into the Agreement were set by the Botswana
Telecommunications Authority (herein after referred to as BTA
and/or the Authority) following a dispute settlement process (see in
this regard BTA Ruling No. 1 of 1999).
The interconnection
charges that the Authority set in 1999 were to be valid for a period
of 24 months effective 17 February 1998. The parties however
decided to extend the interconnection charges’ validity period in
terms of the Agreement, which is the subject of these proceedings.
2.
In March 2001, the parties commenced negotiations with a
view to review the Agreement. A series of meetings were held as
evinced by several correspondences between the parties on this
subject matter. In the final analysis, the negotiations reached a
deadlock. Pursuant to a jointly signed declaration of dispute dated
2
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
5 July 2002, the parties filed with the Authority, an interconnection
dispute for determination, the gravamen thereof being national
interconnection charges.
3.
It is now apposite for me to spell out the prevailing charges,
which Mascom is desirous of having them retained, and the
proposed charges, which BTC is advocating for as follows (all in
Thebe per minute):
(a)
Call Termination on BTC network (not taking into account
corresponding volume discounts)
Current
Proposed by BTC
Peak
24.0
35.0
Off-Peak
19.1
25.0
(b)
Call Termination on Mascom network
Current
Proposed by BTC
Peak
96.0
75.0
Off-Peak
76.9
58.0
4.
It is worth mentioning that after the parties declared a
dispute, BTC on the 8 July 2002 served a notice of termination of
the Agreement on Mascom and thereby gave a 24 months notice
pursuant to Article 17.1 of the Agreement.
The notice of
termination spurred Mascom to raise two points in limine namely,
that there was no longer a dispute between the parties as a result
of the notice of termination and furthermore that BTC had waived
3
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
its rights under the Agreement to seek review of the Agreement by
serving the said notice of termination.
5.
The two points in limine are crucial in that once I uphold
them jointly or severally, they shall render consideration of the
variation and/or review of the Agreement unnecessary and that
would be the end of the matter. Before I discuss the said points in
limine, it is appropriate for me to outline the procedure, which the
parties were advised by the Authority to follow and which the
parties complied therewith.
6.
In brief, BTC and Mascom were advised to submit in a case–
stated format their written submissions and arguments (hereinafter
referred to as the Initial Submissions), which they did on 4 October
2002. The said written submissions were exchanged between the
parties to enable them to know each other’s cases. Following the
exchange of Initial Submissions, the parties were given an
opportunity to respond to each other’s submissions in writing
(hereinafter referred to as the Reply Submissions). Mascom and
BTC submitted their Reply Submission to the BTA on 22
November 2002. The said Reply Submissions were also
exchanged between the parties. After the Reply Submissions, the
parties were further afforded an opportunity to make oral
submissions (hereinafter referred to as the Oral Hearings). The
first of these were in the absence of each other (Mascom
individual Oral Hearing in the morning of 21 January 2003 and
BTC individual Oral Hearing in the morning of 22 January 2003)
4
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
and then a final one in each others’ presence for purposes of
making oral rebuttals (the joint Oral Hearing in the afternoon of 23
January 2003).
7.
In the morning of the day of the joint Oral Hearing Mascom
wrote BTA a letter in which it raised two points touching on the
propriety or otherwise of the procedure and the possible violation
of the rules of natural justice by the Authority. When amplifying
those points during the joint Oral Hearing, Mascom also sought
postponement of the joint Oral Hearing so as to be afforded ample
time to respond. In reply during the joint Oral Hearing, BTC wanted
the matter to proceed as scheduled. In my corresponding ruling
read out during the beginning of the joint Oral Hearing, I held that
the procedure adopted by the Authority as detailed in the
preceding paragraph more than substantially complied with the
rules of natural justice. The parties were afforded ample time to
prepare their cases. They were also given reasonable time to
make Initial and Reply Submissions and also afforded individual
and joint Oral Hearings and thus the request for postponement
was properly refused.
8.
Before addressing the preliminary and substantive issues, I
consider it important to underline the importance of this dispute
and to place it in context.
9.
The setting of fair and efficient interconnection charges is an
essential
requirement
for
the
5
creation
of
a
competitive
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
telecommunications market. Interconnection charges can account
for a substantial proportion of operators’ expenses and can also
constitute a very significant revenue flow, and hence the
importance thereof cannot be overstated. I therefore consider that
the establishment of a correct and appropriate interconnection
charge framework is of fundamental importance in ensuring a
consumer friendly and pro-competitive telecommunications market
in Botswana.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
10.
I shall now address the preliminary points raised by Mascom
seriatim.
Whether there is a dispute
11.
In its Submissions and during Oral Hearings Mascom has
argued that there is no dispute.
According to Mascom, BTC’s
serving of a notice of termination, altered the factual position with
regard to the joint declaration of dispute and therefore required a
formal withdrawal of the dispute by the parties. Mascom further
argued that by serving the notice of termination, BTC was
accepting to abide by the existing terms and conditions of the
Agreement until it lapses 24 months after the date of the notice. In
short, Mascom is arguing that the serving of notice of termination
vitiated the review process that has been initiated three days
earlier. During the hearing Mascom was asked by the Authority
6
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
whether their case was that once a party serves a notice of
termination, it forgoes the right to invoke the other provisions of
the Agreement during the notice period. In response, Mascom
suggested that in so far as the review was concerned, BTC could
not during the notice period seek to continue to review the
Agreement.
12.
In its Reply Submission and during Oral Hearings BTC
argued that the serving of notice did not preclude it from
continuing with the review process which it had initiated.
13.
A dispute, by its very nature, presupposes the co-existence
of a non-frivolous claim and a rejection of the said claim. In other
words, there must be both a claim and a rejection in order to
constitute a dispute or difference. The issue for determination now
is whether there is a dispute between the parties, bearing in mind
the notice of termination served on Mascom by BTC. I hold that
the serving of notice of termination by BTC on Mascom did
not in any way affect the factual position of the parties herein.
The reason for so holding is that the Agreement still subsists and it
will only lapse after 24 months from the date of notice of
termination. Not only that, even the dispute still subsists since the
provision
under
which
it
was
declared
notwithstanding the notice of termination.
remains
valid
In any case the
Agreement expressly recognises this fact. Clause 16.5 thereof
provides as follows:
7
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
“For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby agreed that
notwithstanding these provisions for review the terms
and conditions of this Agreement shall remain in full
force and effect during such review until such time as
the Parties complete an agreement replacing or
amending this Agreement.”
14.
Taking into consideration all of the analysis and
discussion above, I hold that there is indeed a dispute
between the parties.
Whether BTC has waived its rights to seek review or variation
of the Agreement.
15.
It has been argued by Mascom that, BTC, by serving a
notice of termination thereby waived its right to seek a review or
variation of the Agreement. Mascom places heavy reliance on
Article 16.3 of the Agreement, which states as follows:
“If notwithstanding the parties negotiating in good faith
pursuant to clause 16.2 above, at the end of (two
months) from the date of the Review Notice the Parties
have failed to agree appropriate modifications to this
Agreement and the Review Notice has not been
withdrawn by the issuing party then the parties will
each agree either to:
8
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
(a)
each prepare a written proposal on the dispute
and send the other party a copy of such proposal
within 7 days of the end of such period; and refer the
dispute
for
resolution
in
accordance
with
the
procedures specified in clause 21; or (my underlining)
(b)
16
terminate this Agreement.”
According to Mascom’s interpretation of the clause cited
supra, the parties can only choose one option and cannot elect
both. In other words, once a party proceeds by referring a dispute
to the BTA for determination, then and only then will such party be
precluded from seeking termination of the same Agreement.
Mascom is therefore arguing that the aforecited provisions are
mutually exclusive. At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that
BTC’s notice of termination was pursuant to Article 17.1 as stated
in its letter dated 8 July 2002 and not Article 16.3, which Mascom
is relying upon.
17.
Article 17.1 of the Agreement, which BTC is relying upon,
states as follows:
“This Agreement will remain in force unless and until
terminated by either party giving to the other at least
24 months notice in writing to expire at the end of the
Initial Period or at the end of any calendar month
9
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
thereafter or either Party ceases to hold a licence
granted by the Regulatory Authority.”
18.
I hold that serving of notice of termination of the Agreement
herein did not ipso jure (through law) and ipso facto (through fact)
mean that the terms and conditions of the Agreement lapsed at
the time the notice was served. The Agreement will only lapse
after effluxion of 24 months from the 8 July 2002, the date on
which the notice was served. In the interim, all the constituent
terms and conditions of the Agreement remain in existence. Once
such terms and conditions are in existence; as I hereby hold, the
parties’ rights, duties and obligations arising therefrom still subsist.
The end result thereof is that any party may invoke any of the
provisions of the existing Agreement. The notice of termination did
not therefore freeze or stall the operation of the terms of the
Agreement.
19.
If I were to extend Mascom’s interpretation of the Agreement
to its logical conclusion, it would mean that once a party has
served a 24 months notice as provided for in the Agreement, then
there can never be any exercise of any of the terms of the
Agreement for instance, review of the terms of Agreement
whatsoever. A party will be precluded and estopped from invoking
any of the terms of the Agreement and this could not have been
the intention of the contracting parties. Serious and far reaching
economic ramifications within the telecommunications sector may
arise if such an important Agreement is rendered immune from,
10
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
not only review, but also the exercise of any rights emanating from
the Agreement for a period of 24 months, which is the notice
period.
20.
The telecommunications market is an ever-evolving industry
and having to wait for a period of 24 months (notice period)
without invoking any of the terms of such a very vital agreement
may have adverse consequences within the telecommunications
industry. I would therefore adopt a conjunctive interpretation of
Article 16.3 for purposes of giving effect to the intention of the
parties and to remove any absurdity that may arise therefrom and
to further ameliorate any adverse repercussions (as stated above)
that may arise once I find solace in a disjunctive interpretation.
The use of the word ‘or’ in the said Article is therefore construed
conjunctively as opposed to disjunctively, bearing in mind that in
ordinary usage “or” is disjunctive whereas under certain instances
like in the present case, it is construed conjunctively.
connection
see
Uddin
v.
Associated
Manufactures Ltd [1965] 2 QB 582.
Portland
In this
Cement
On the basis of this
progressive reasoning, I am inclined to conclude that BTC did not
waive its right to seek a review of the said Agreement by serving a
Notice of Termination of the Agreement on Mascom.
21.
Even if I were to rule that BTC can only and distinctively
seek either a review or termination of the Agreement, that is to
say, to adopt a disjunctive interpretation, the end result shall be
the same. If it is review on its own, that does not present any
11
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
difficulty at all as the Authority is now asked to review the said
Agreement by BTC. On the other hand, if it is termination as
preceded by the served notice, still a review of the Agreement
shall be in order for the simple reason that notice of termination
did not in any way extinguish any of the terms of the Agreement,
for instance, review of the said Agreement.
22.
If I were to invoke, mero motu, a common sense approach
that if two or more acts by the same individual are repugnant or
inconsistent, the last one must prevail, still, such an approach
does not advance the Mascom case any further. In this case, BTC
asked initially for a review of the Agreement and three days later
served a notice of termination of the said Agreement. If I uphold
that notice of termination must prevail, the aforestated conclusion
is also reached, which is: notice of termination does not ipso facto
and ipso jure freeze the operation of the terms of the Agreement
and BTC will be justifiably entitled to invoke any of the provisions
of the Agreement.
23.
Assuming I were to agree with Mascom that the provisions of
clause 16.3 are mutually exclusive and should be interpreted
disjunctively, I still cannot agree that BTC could be said to have
waived its right to continue with the review process it initiated prior
to the serving of notice of termination. In that case my position
would be that BTC did exercise its option, in terms of clause 16.3,
on 5 July 2002 by opting for a review process and that by so doing
it may have precluded itself from opting for a termination process.
12
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
24.
I accordingly hold that BTC has not waived its right to
seek a review of the Agreement.
25.
Having adequately addressed the preliminary points in limine
raised by Mascom I shall now proceed to briefly consider
instances under which a review of the Agreement may be
possible.
26.
In terms of the Agreement, certain procedural and
substantive requirements have to be satisfied in order to initiate
the review process.
The relevant clause thereof is clause 16,
dealing with the giving of the review notice, and review when there
is a material change of circumstances. In the circumstance the
said conditions precedent have been satisfied by BTC. In any
event, Mascom is not arguing that there was non compliance with
either procedural and or substantive requirements of the said
article dealing with review. On the basis of the afore mentioned
justification I hold that BTC is entitled to seek a review of the
Agreement.
LEGAL
BASIS
FOR
THE
DETERMINATION
OF
INTERCONNECTION CHARGES
27.
In reviewing the appropriate legal basis for the determination
of interconnection charges, I shall place heavy reliance on the Act,
the licences of the two parties herein, the Agreement and the
13
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
Telecommunications Policy of Botswana (1995), (hereinafter
referred to as the “Policy”).
The Telecommunications Act, 1996 (No. 15 of 1996)
28.
The relevant provision thereof is section 47 of the Act, which
inter alia, provides that in the event of an interconnection dispute
the Authority shall have the power to decide on the matter and set
down such terms and conditions for interconnection as seem fair
and reasonable to it. The fundamental indicia thereof is what
seems to be a “fair and reasonable” interconnection charge to the
Authority in each case.
29.
What amounts to “fair and reasonable” charge as provided
for in section 47 depends upon a host of several considerations.
Such considerations may include significant market power or
otherwise of the operators, the possibility of revenue sharing by
concerned
operators,
level
of
competition,
benchmarking,
promotion of universal access, interconnect access charge,
consumer
interests;
subscriber
base,
transparency,
cost
orientation; reasonable rate of return on investment, non
discrimination, market structure and the Policy. It is not intended
that the above stated list is exhaustive, nor that all the factors
listed above would necessarily be relevant in any particular
dispute. As stated above, it will be upon the Authority to determine
what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. In addition, the
Authority is mindful of its mandate under section 17 of the Act,
14
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
which
is
the
promotion
and
development
of
efficient
telecommunications services in Botswana.
Telecommunications Policy for Botswana
30.
The Policy recognises interconnection as forming part of the
liberalisation process and development of competition in the
telecommunications sector. It is prudent for me to refer to the
relevant exposition in the Policy where a justification for a
mandatory and mutual interconnection obligation is stated at
paragraph 8.6 page 18 as follows:
“Justification.
present
In order to rationalise the use of
network
and
to
avoid
duplication
of
infrastructure all new and present networks should be
interconnected for national economic benefit as well as
for the benefit of the consumer.”
31.
The Policy further advocates for a fair and reasonable
pricing. In this connection, see paragraph 8.9 at page 20 where it
is stated as follows:
“Prices should be deemed fair and reasonable if they
reflect recovery of the investment in the medium to
long term perspective.”
15
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
32.
An interpretation of the afore-cited Policy guideline reflects or
advocates for a fair and reasonable pricing criteria, taking into
account all the goals enshrined in the Policy, such as recovery of the
investment, promotion of universal access, liberalisation, effective
competition and the interests of consumers.
BTC and Mascom Licences
33.
In respect of BTC’s licence the relevant clause is 5.1, which
embraces the principle of cost orientation for regulated tariffs,
which includes interconnection charges. See also clause 7.2.3 of
the said licence, which obliges the BTC to ensure, that
interconnect elements charged for are sufficiently unbundled and
that they are based on underlying costs. With respect to Mascom’s
licence, the relevant clause is clause 3 dealing with leased lines
and fixed links. Sub clause 3.1.3 thereof provides that for
purposes of establishing interconnection of its public land mobile
network elements and the public switched telephone network of
BTC, Mascom shall use leased lines. Furthermore, sub-clause 3.4
states that in the event of a dispute relating to the reasonableness
of any leased line service or charge, the parties shall refer the
dispute to the Authority for determination.
34.
When reconciling and juxtaposing the two licences of the
parties with the Act, I have no doubt in my mind that Mascom
licence is consistent with the Act in that it requires reasonable
interconnection charges as contained in clause 3 of the licence.
16
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
Concerning BTC’s licence, I have no hesitation in concluding that
it is equally consistent with the Act insofar as it requires cost based
charges, which are an integral component or subset of fair and
reasonable charges. In other words, cost based charges and other
considerations will shed light on what is fair and reasonable. A
licence by its very nature sets out the scope, terms and conditions
that the concerned operator should comply with.
It may be
equated to a contract between the operator and the Authority
under which the operator enjoys rights, duties and obligations. A
violation of those rights, duties and obligations may attract or be
visited by a form of sanction imposed thereon by the Authority. It
therefore follows that the BTC and Mascom are duty bound to
comply with the terms and obligations imposed by their licences.
My finding is that both the BTC and Mascom licences are
consistent with the requirements of section 47 of the Act.
Interconnection Agreement
35.
Appendix C of the Agreement between the parties herein
recognises cost-based charges. At paragraph 1 thereof it is stated
as follows:
“The parties recognise that:
• It is the intention that interconnection charges will
be based on costs (my emphasis), although it is
stated in the cellular tender document that the
costing figures may not be available in the short
term and another method should be used;
17
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
• The charges should:
(a)
compensate the provider fairly for the
services it provides and produced (sic) a
reasonable return on the assets and
resources involved;
(b)
encourage increased networks usage and
in the long run reduce costs of service to
the customers;
(c)
not be prohibitively high to inhibit the
growth of cellular services”.
36.
The Agreement also recognises cost based charges. Not
only that, it also states under (a) above that the charges should
compensate the operator fairly, and in my view this encompasses
fairness as required in section 47. Under (b) above increased
network usage as well as reduction of costs of services to
customers is encouraged when setting interconnection charges
and lastly (c) advocates for charges that are not prohibitively high
to the extent of inhibiting cellular growth. Interpreting all these
three guidelines jointly and cumulatively, I make a finding that they
require fair and reasonable interconnection charges. The said
charges
should
satisfy
what
I
may
term
the
“triad
of
interconnection”, that is to say, the said charges should be fair to
the operators, fair to the end-users or customers and lastly satisfy
the general mandate of the Authority as provided for in the organic
statute and the Policy. In the final analysis, the said three
18
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
guidelines in the Agreement are consistent with section 47 of the
Act, which requires fair and reasonable interconnection charges.
37.
Taking into account all of the analysis and discussion
above, I hold that the legal principle for determining
interconnection charges in Botswana is the “fair and
reasonable” test. It is therefore entirely upon the Authority to
determine whether in the setting of interconnection charges,
cost orientation and or efficiency should be invoked in
addition to or forming part of any other criteria which the BTA
may
deem
appropriate
and
justifiable
to
satisfy
the
fundamental or critical epithet of fair and reasonable pricing.
Interconnection charges may, in appropriate circumstances
be deemed to be fair and reasonable if they approximate
costs or are based on efficiency criteria.
PRICING OF INTERCONNECTION
38.
I have identified the following three principal approaches to
the pricing of interconnection around the world: revenue sharing
arrangements; sender keeps all arrangements (i.e. bill and keep);
and interconnection usage charges (hereinafter referred to as
IUC). However, sender keeps all arrangements are not relevant to
this dispute and hence I shall only discuss revenue sharing
arrangements and IUCs.
19
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
Revenue Sharing Arrangements
39.
Revenue sharing arrangements are relatively simple to
implement.
Historically, they were the result of negotiations
between the corresponding non-competing operators.
Hence,
revenue sharing arrangements are generally not cost-oriented and
therefore they are generally considered to be economically
inefficient. Therefore, the actual revenue share amounts tended to
reflect the bargaining power of the respective operators. As such,
operators often tended to focus on the relative ratio of revenues
being assigned to each operator, rather than the absolute level of
the revenue amounts. Once competition is introduced, as it is in
our jurisdiction, the revenue sharing arrangements becomes
impractical and as well exhibits a number of policy disadvantages.
40.
From a practical perspective, revenue sharing arrangements
introduce a high degree of unpredictability in the revenue flows of
terminating operators, and recurrence of disputes. If an entrant
wants to lower one of its consumer prices that has traditionally
been the subject of a revenue sharing arrangement, the result will
be lower revenue share amounts not just for that operator but for
all the operators involved in carrying the call.
However, these
interconnecting operators have no desire to accept lower
payments in order to support the competitive strategy of the other
operator.
20
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
41
Revenue sharing arrangements have a number of additional
disadvantages.
First, as may be apparent from the discussion
above, revenue sharing arrangements are not conducive to vibrant
consumer
tariff
competition.
Second,
arrangements may also be discriminatory.
revenue
sharing
For example, in
competitive markets, different originating operators may set
different consumer tariffs for a call to the same terminating
network. Hence, the terminating operator may be paid more or
less by different originating operators for exactly the same service
(termination of traffic), depending on the respective consumer
tariffs of the originating operators.
42.
My Ruling (No. 1 of 1999), which established the current
interconnection framework in Botswana, was generally reflective of
a revenue sharing arrangement.
At that time, with the recent
introduction of mobile services by Mascom and Vista, and the
continuing de facto BTC monopoly on fixed services and in order
to promote stability and certainty in the sector, it was necessary to
set termination and origination charges for BTC only. Based on
the fixed consumer tariffs, these BTC termination and origination
charges resulted in fixed corresponding revenue share amounts
for Mascom.
21
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
Interconnection Usage Charges
43.
IUCs are the charges payable between interconnecting
operators for the actual use of each others’ network to originate,
transit or terminate a call. Hence, there may be up to three types
of IUCs: origination, transit and termination. I will now focus on
IUC termination charges, given that IUC transit charges are not
applicable to this dispute and that IUC origination charges are
generally used and are appropriate for situations where the
terminating operator sets the corresponding consumer tariff.
44.
The originating operator would, from the consumer tariff that
it determines and collects, pay a set amount to the corresponding
terminating operator. The amounts paid would generally be
independent of the consumer tariff. The residual amount, that is
the amount remaining from the consumer tariff after termination
charges, is the amount retained by the originating operator
(hereinafter referred to as the retention amount).
45.
I am of the view that IUCs are currently the best practice
approach for the pricing of interconnection in markets where
competition has been introduced, such as in Botswana. This is for
a number of practical and policy reasons.
22
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
46.
From a practical perspective, IUCs have been proven
around the world as the most sustainable approach to
interconnection pricing in competitive multi-operator environments.
From a policy perspective, I find that IUCs have number of
advantages. First, IUCs are more conducive to vibrant competition
in the consumer tariffs. With IUCs, the originating operator has a
more direct control on its retention amount, given that it has to pay
the terminating operators the corresponding (fixed) charges.
Second, IUCs tend to be most equitable under competitive
scenarios. In these instances, a terminating operator will charge
all operators who terminate their traffic on its network the same
non-discriminatory (termination) interconnection charge.
Third,
IUCs are generally more compatible with the principle of costorientation. Because IUC termination charges are independent of
consumer tariffs, they may be set at efficient cost-oriented levels.
47.
Having addressed the advantages and disadvantages
associated with the interconnection pricing methods, I shall now
dwell on the submissions of the parties. In its Initial Submission,
BTC did not address the pricing of interconnection issue directly.
However, I note that BTC appears to include elements of IUCs and
of revenue sharing arrangements.
The BTC Initial Submission
focused on the presentation of the estimates of BTC’s origination
and termination charges of calls to/from the mobile network. This
has elements of IUCs. BTC, however, appears to propose that the
changes in its origination and termination charges be undertaken
23
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
within the context of a fixed consumer tariff. In effect, therefore,
such a proposed increase would appear to result in a reduction in
the corresponding shares received and retained by Mascom,
respectively. This is an element of a revenue sharing arrangement,
with a proposed increase in the share for BTC.
48.
In its Reply Submission, BTC did not address the
interconnection pricing issue directly. It did, however, address the
issue of the relative ratio of fixed to mobile termination charges in
neighbouring African countries, in response to the specific
benchmarking approach proposed by Mascom in its Initial
Submission.
As I pointed out earlier, most of the discussions
associated with the relative ratio of mobile to fixed interconnection
charges are more reflective of revenue sharing arrangements
rather than the IUCs.
49.
In the Oral Hearings, however, BTC appeared to recognise
the relative advantages of the IUC termination charges over a
revenue sharing arrangement. In particular, BTC noted the
benefits of de-linking (wholesale) interconnection charges from the
(retail) consumer tariffs.
50.
In its Initial Submission, Mascom did not address the pricing
of interconnection issue directly. However, based on my analysis,
the Mascom Initial Submission, which places emphasis on the
relative ratio of fixed to mobile charges appears to reflect a
revenue sharing arrangement.
24
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
51.
In the Oral Hearings, Mascom, when presented with a
revenue sharing versus IUC arrangements options by the
Authority, appeared to recognise the relative advantages of the
latter over the former.
52.
My review of the international practice and experience of
interconnection pricing suggests that as sector reforms have taken
place around the world, including the introduction of competition,
an increasing number of regulators have discarded revenue
sharing arrangements in favour of IUCs.
53.
I note that while in their Initial and Reply Submissions BTC
and Mascom do not directly address the pricing of interconnection
issue, once the matter was presented as a clear choice by the
Authority during the Oral Hearings, both parties appeared to
recognise the relative advantages of the IUC termination charges
over revenue sharing arrangements. I further note that in practice,
the parties have already adopted a IUC termination charge
regime.
54.
For practical and policy reasons discussed above, I
consider that an IUC termination charge regime is the most
desirable approach for the pricing of interconnection in
Botswana at this time.
I therefore direct that an IUC
termination charge approach for interconnection pricing
between BTC and Mascom be implemented.
25
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
SETTING OF INTERCONNECTION CHARGES
55.
In considering the substantive issues under dispute I have
carefully reviewed the Initial and Reply Submissions and the
arguments made during the Oral Hearings.
In order to better
understand the dynamics of the dispute, I have undertaken a
thorough analysis and assessment of data provided by both
parties.
I have also reviewed and assessed what I consider
appropriate and efficient interconnection trends and practices in
other countries, especially with respect to the current best practice
of using efficient benchmarks.
56.
an
Given that I have directed BTC and Mascom to implement
IUC
termination
charge
approach
to
the
pricing
of
interconnection, the next fundamental step is to examine the
appropriate methodology for the determination of termination
charges for BTC and Mascom.
I have identified costing
methodologies and benchmarking approaches as the two broad
principal approaches to the setting of interconnection and I
proceed to examine the advantages and disadvantages of these
two approaches.
Costing Methodologies
57.
The cost approaches can be identified into two principal
criteria as follows: (1) historical or backward-looking approach; and
(2) the forward-looking approach.
26
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
Backward-Looking Approach
58.
This approach involves the compilation of accounting and
other historical data to model the actual network in place and to
price it based on what was paid for each network element. The
best-known variation of this approach is fully distributed cost
(“FDC”) or “fully allocated costs”. Due to general lack of detailed
analytical accounting data, however, FDC allocates the relevant
investment across broad service categories.
59.
The main criticism of this approach is conceptual.
In
comparison to the forward-looking approach, the backward-looking
approach does not adequately reflect the dynamics of competitive
markets. Hence, the costs that are calculated by this approach
may not be economically efficient.
60.
There are also a number of practical criticisms to this
approach. One practical criticism of the backward-looking
approach that I find particularly pertinent is that historical costs
may reflect investment, operational or technological inefficiencies
of the operator. These inefficiencies have often been found to be
relatively large, especially in state-owned monopoly operators.
Further, historical costs do not reflect changes in technology or
management methods – such technology and methods, if utilised
today, could imply a much lower cost. Another possible form of
inefficiency is that often the operator may have over-invested in
27
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
the past so that it currently has spare capacity.
Hence, with
respect to the setting of interconnection charges, it is argued that
historically inefficient operators may be “passing on their
inefficiencies” as a result of the adoption of this approach.
Additionally, such inefficiencies could be passed to the consumer
in the form of higher consumer tariffs.
61.
In combination, these criticisms have resulted in a significant
shift. While still being widely used for management purposes,
regulators
are
increasingly
replacing
backward-looking
approaches with forward-looking costing methodologies and/or
benchmark approaches.
Forward-Looking Approach
62.
This approach is generally preferred by most regulators
because it reflects better the dynamics of competitive markets.
Competitive operators are compelled to look forward to set prices
to compete, rather than to look back at prices based on their
historical investments. Accordingly, the costs that are calculated
by this approach, including, in particular, IUC termination costs,
are generally considered to be economically efficient because they
most closely approximate the prices that would otherwise be
present in effectively competitive markets. Therefore I am inclined,
to hold the view that cost orientation, in as much as it leads to
charges that approximate costs, is an appropriate principle to
apply in the current circumstances.
28
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
63.
The forward-looking approach uses current and projected
future prices and attempts to calculate an efficient network to
provide the services in question. The most common and generally
accepted forward-looking approach is long-run incremental costs
(“LRIC”). LRIC are the incremental costs that would arise in the
long run with a defined increment to demand.
64.
LRIC may be implemented in a number of ways, including
the European Commission’s long run average incremental costs
(“LRAIC”)
and
the
United
States
of
America’s
Federal
Communications Commission’s total element long run incremental
costs (“TELRIC”).
These variations are based on the LRIC
standard but differ in terms of the size of the increment and the
treatment of joint and common costs.
All of these variations
include “mark-ups” to cover a portion of joint and common costs.
Benchmarking
65.
Benchmarking is often used by regulators as a transitional or
complementary approach. There are different benchmarking
methodologies. In particular, an efficient benchmarking approach
would use actual or projected efficient prices in other countries.
Efficient prices would result from effective competition or where
the regulator has established prices based on an acceptable
costing methodology. For instance, the European Union (“EU”)
used a variant of efficient benchmarking to ensure the progressive
29
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
reduction of fixed interconnection charges in the transition period
between the general introduction of competition in 1998 and the
implementation of LRAIC and other costing methodologies by
national regulators in the EU. Specifically, the EU’s “best current
practice” approach avoided many of the common pitfalls of
benchmarking. For instance, it did not select an average or the
mid-range of existing charges. Given that at the beginning of this
period there was no effective competition in most EU countries or
that most countries had not implemented efficient costing
methodologies, taking an average or a mid-range of all existing
charges would likely have resulted in inefficient benchmark
termination charges not oriented to costs.
66.
The EU’s “best current practice” approach may be
summarized as follows.
For each level of interconnection, it
reviewed the standardized interconnection prices for its 15
member countries.
The EU has defined three levels of
interconnection charges for fixed termination depending on where
in the network hierarchy the call is terminated and the distance the
call has to be carried: “Local” represents interconnection at the
local exchange; “Single Transit” represents interconnection at the
“Metropolitan” level, including the use of one tandem switch;
“Double Transit” or “National” allows access to all customers on
the network and includes tandem links of at least 200 km. The EU
then ranked the standardized prices for each level from the lowest
to highest. For each level, the EU based its “best current practice”
range on the three lowest interconnection charges in its member
30
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
countries. Hence, the lowest interconnection price constituted the
lower end of the “current best practice” range while the third lowest
interconnection price constituted the upper end.
67.
In its Initial Submission, BTC proposed using the backward-
looking costing methodology it had earlier developed for the
estimation of its own origination and termination charges. Based
on these cost calculations BTC argues that its origination and
termination charges under the current arrangements are too low
and do not allow it to fulfill its obligation of cost-orientation. In its
Reply Submission, BTC insisted that its cost-based approach was
superior to the benchmark approach proposed by Mascom in its
Initial Submission.
68.
During the Oral Hearings, BTC continued to put forward its
cost-based approach to support its proposed interconnection
charges.
It
maintained
its
position
that
the
benchmark
comparisons proposed by Mascom were inferior in principle to the
implementation of a costing methodology.
69.
On the other hand, Mascom in its Initial Submission provides
an extensive international comparison of fixed and mobile
interconnection charges and the relative ratio of fixed to mobile
termination charges. After reviewing world-wide and continental
averages, Mascom also provides data for a number of developing
countries as well as for the 15 member countries of the EU.
Mascom argues that these absolute and relative comparisons
31
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
support the status quo arrangement in Botswana. Commenting on
the EU experience Mascom notes that some regulators have been
significantly reducing mobile termination charges.
However,
Mascom argues that LRAIC-type modelling, especially for mobile
services, is generally at its infancy even in the EU.
70.
In the Oral Hearings, Mascom continued to express its
preference for a benchmark approach to the setting of
interconnection charges.
Mascom further elaborated on its
position with respect to cost methodologies. It noted that it was
not opposed in principle to the development and implementation of
an approved costing methodology. What Mascom rejected was
the imposition of any particular type of methodology by BTC
without BTA approval. It argued that the BTA had not made a final
decision on an approved costing methodology and hence any
specific proposal by BTC was in principle not acceptable to
Mascom. At this point, I wish to acknowledge that the Authority
has not yet developed principles to be applied by operators in the
setting of tariffs as provided for under section 18(1) of the Act and
that shall be done in due course. The Authority is nonetheless duty
bound to make a determination herein on the basis of what it
considerers fair and reasonable.
71.
Based on my review of the Submissions and the Oral
Hearings and my extensive analysis and assessment of
approaches used by regulators around the world to set fixed and
mobile interconnection charges, and taking into consideration the
32
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
policy and practical advantages and disadvantages of each
approach as summarized above, I consider that the current best
practice approach for the setting of interconnection charges is a
forward-looking LRIC methodology, as it tends to result in the
calculation of economically efficient cost oriented charges. I
recognise, however that due to the time required to develop and
implement such a methodology, it would not be feasible or
desirable to implement a forward looking LRIC approach within the
context of the current dispute.
In the long run, the Authority
supports the development and implementation of a forwardlooking
costing
methodology
for
the
determination
of
interconnection charges.
72.
Taking into account the impracticality of implementing a
forward-looking LRIC methodology, I have in the interim,
considered a number of options with respect to the setting of
interconnection charges. Given my findings above, in assessing
these options I will place special emphasis on whether their
implementation is likely to result in efficient termination charges for
BTC and Mascom.
73.
One option I considered was to set the BTC interconnection
charges based on the backward-looking costing methodology
proposed and implemented by BTC. I am of the view that the
backward-looking costing methodology is conceptually inferior to
the preferred forward-looking costing methodology, in that it does
not accurately reflect the workings of competitive markets.
33
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
74
If I were to assume that the costing methodology proposed
by BTC was acceptable to the Authority, its adoption in this
dispute would raise the question of the appropriate methodology to
be applied by the BTA to calculate the termination charges for
Mascom.
Under this scenario, the principle of symmetrical
regulatory treatment and fairness would suggest that the same
backward-looking cost methodology would also be applied to
Mascom. However, due to the time required to actually implement
such a methodology for Mascom, this option does not appear to
be feasible or desirable within the context of this dispute. Hence,
for conceptual and practical reasons, I do not consider this option
to be implementable. From a practical perspective, therefore, the
most appropriate remaining option appears to be an efficient
benchmarking approach.
75.
Based on my analysis and discussion above, I hold that
an efficient benchmarking methodology is the most likely to
result in efficient benchmark termination charges for BTC and
Mascom.
76.
There are two principle variables in implementing an efficient
benchmarking methodology. One is the countries to be included
in the benchmark sample. The other is the selection criteria of the
actual benchmark level or range within that sample. I shall now
discuss these in turn.
34
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
Sample of Countries
77.
In their Submissions, BTC and Mascom presented a number
of different samples.
I found the world-wide or continental
samples presented by Mascom as generally unhelpful, given that
the methodologies used to calculate the interconnection charges
are not known.
Further, many of these samples may include
countries with Receiving Party Pays (RPP) regimes, which would
make the sample inappropriate given the Calling Party Pays (CPP)
regime currently used in Botswana.
78.
Mascom presented some samples of Southern African
countries.
Indeed, I consider that, in principle, the review of
African, Southern African or SADC member countries samples
could be important. However, I was not given any information with
respect to whether any African country has implemented LRICtype costing methodologies for the calculation of fixed and mobile
termination charges.
Further, there does not appear to be a
significant number of countries in Africa where sufficient
competition would result in efficient termination charges.
In
summary, there is nothing to suggest that in Africa there exists a
useful number of countries from which to construct a sample that
would incorporate either efficient charges based on appropriate
costing methodologies or efficient charges that result from
effective competition. In effect, if I were to choose a sample of
35
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
African countries, I would be concerned that much of the sample
would include interconnection charges that are the result of
negotiations, rather than cost-orientation. Hence, I consider that a
comparison with these countries would not promote the efficiency
objective; rather, such a comparison would reflect the relative
negotiating power of the respective operators in each of the
countries. In spite of the intuitive appeal of selecting a sample of
African countries, I consider that African comparisons are not an
appropriate sample.
79.
Mascom also placed some emphasis on the 15 member
countries of the EU. I have researched the experience of the EU
countries with respect to fixed and mobile interconnection. Based
on this review, I consider that the EU countries represent a sample
that is particularly well-suited to meet the BTA objective for the
setting of efficient termination charges for BTC and Mascom, for a
number of reason, some of which I discuss below.
80.
First, EU countries apply a CPP or CPP-like arrangement for
fixed-mobile interconnection. This is consistent with the situation
in Botswana. Second, as part of EU governance arrangements,
all EU countries are required to implement and comply with
European Commission Directives, including with respect to
interconnection and interconnection costing methodologies. This
results in a relatively homogenous regulatory framework in each
country that facilitates intra and extra-EU comparisons. Third, the
EU has developed and implemented for more than four years a
36
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
well-defined and highly-regarded benchmarking methodology for
interconnection charges. This methodology includes the criteria
for ensuring adequate comparability to take into account the level
of physical interconnection (local, metropolitan and national), the
time-of-day that the call is undertaken and the structure of
interconnection charges.
The fact that the EU benchmarking
methodology has been tried and tested ensures that, if I were to
consider it, it would be a reasonable alternative. Fourth, many of
the national regulatory authorities have developed and actually
implemented
costing
methodologies,
including
LRAIC
methodologies for interconnection charges.
81.
For fixed termination, most national regulators in the EU
have implemented costing methodologies to guide interconnection
charge setting.
Of this group, six have implemented forward-
looking LRAIC methodologies and an additional number are in the
process of developing LRAIC to be implemented in the near
future, replacing historical costing methodologies.
Hence, I
consider that the EU provides a good sample of countries that
have reached or are in the process of reaching efficient costoriented termination charges for fixed networks, based on the
implementation of costing methodologies. In fact, in recognition of
this, in 2002 the EU decided to discontinue its “current best
practice” benchmarking because of the progressive reduction of
interconnection
charges
to
the
recommendations.
37
“current
best
practice”
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
82.
With respect to mobile, there is an increasing trend amongst
regulators in favour of the regulation of mobile termination
charges.
In the EU, in particular, the UK and Austria, have
developed and implemented LRIC-based costing methodologies.
Other EU regulators have used other approaches, including
efficient benchmarking, to mandate significant decreases in mobile
termination charges, including in Sweden, France and Belgium.
83.
I recognise that the economic and telecommunications
development conditions in the EU are different from those of
Botswana. One possible risk in this regard is that the selection of
the EU sample may result in benchmark termination charges for
BTC and Mascom that are below their efficient forward-looking
costs. I have fully considered this possibility and have taken the
necessary precautions, including the implementation of a transition
period, to mitigate this risk.
84.
Based on the analysis and discussion above, I hold that
the 15 member countries of the EU provide the most
appropriate efficient benchmarking sample to be used in the
setting of efficient termination charges for BTC and Mascom.
38
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
Benchmarking Selection Criteria
85.
For fixed termination, I am confident that most of the EU
countries have reached or are in the process of reaching efficient
cost-oriented termination charges.
Based on my review of the
data provided by BTC as part of this process, I consider that the
EU-defined
“National”-level
interconnection
comparable to the situation in Botswana.
is
the
most
Hence, for fixed
termination, I hold that an average or mid-range of all the 15
EU countries for “National” interconnection constitutes an
efficient benchmarking methodology and hence a fair and
reasonable basis on which to determine the efficient
benchmark termination charge for BTC.
86.
For mobile termination, I am not confident that most of the
EU countries have reached or are in the process of reaching
efficient cost-oriented termination charges.
Hence, for mobile
termination, I do not consider an average or a mid-range of all the
15
EU
countries
to
constitute
an
efficient
benchmarking
methodology. Instead, I hold that an average or mid-range of
the “current best practice” range, as defined by the EU,
constitutes an efficient benchmarking methodology and
hence a fair and reasonable basis on which to determine the
efficient benchmark termination charge for Mascom.
39
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
DETERMINATION OF BTC AND MASCOM TERMINATION
CHARGES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
87.
I have already decided on a new framework for the pricing of
interconnection (IUC termination charge approach), which is
independent of consumer tariffs and on the methodology for the
setting of these termination charges (based on efficient EU
benchmarking). I now proceed to determine the actual efficient
benchmark termination charges for BTC and Mascom. I do not,
however, intend to enforce immediately the resultant efficient
termination charges.
I consider below a transition period and
volume discounts.
Volume Discounts
88.
In order to facilitate the development of the mobile sector, in
my ruling of 1999, I ordered mandatory volume discounts on the
revenue amount for the termination of traffic on the then largest
operator, BTC. I did not at that time order volume discounts to the
termination of traffic on Mascom. In 2003, however, Mascom is
significantly larger than BTC, at least in terms of subscribers.
89.
Based on the data submitted by the operators as part of this
process, I have confirmed a significant traffic imbalance between
BTC and Mascom. The most recent data available to the Authority
shows that BTC terminates 2.5 to 3.0 times as much traffic on the
Mascom network than does Mascom terminate traffic on the BTC
40
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
network. Given market developments and the continuing traffic
imbalance between BTC and Mascom, I am of the view that the
application of mandatory volume discounts only for termination on
the BTC network is no longer appropriate.
90.
Based on the analysis and discussion above, I direct
that, starting on the effective date of this ruling, the
mandatory volume discounts on the termination of Mascomoriginated calls on the BTC network be discontinued.
Transitional Arrangements
91.
The efficient benchmark termination charges I have
determined for BTC and Mascom are significantly below the
respective current termination charges.
92.
In these circumstances, I consider that a transition period is
necessary as a risk-mitigating measure. Further, I recognize that
a transition period is appropriate to allow both BTC and Mascom to
reasonably accommodate the efficient benchmark interconnection
charges.
regulatory
I also consider that there is a trade-off between
policy
objectives
and
financial
imperatives
in
determining the optimal time period for the operators to reach the
efficient termination levels. The regulatory objectives require a
short implementation timeframe while the financial imperatives
suggest a longer implementation timeframe.
41
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
93.
Based on the analysis and discussion above, I have
decided on the applicable mandatory termination charges for
BTC fixed termination and Mascom mobile termination.
These termination charges are presented in the table below,
which
includes
their
implementation
schedule.
The
termination charges in the table are in nominal (current) terms
and should be treated as ceilings (i.e. the respective
terminating operator may choose to set lower termination
charges).
BTC fixed termination charges and Mascom mobile termination
charges
Operator
BTC
Mascom
Time-of-Day
Period
Peak
Off-Peak
Peak
Off-Peak
Effective date of
Ruling to 29
February 2004
15.0
12.0
85.0
68.0
From 1 March
2004
11.0
8.8
75.0
60.0
Note: Peak and off-peak hours shall have the same meaning as
defined in the Agreement.
42
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
CONCLUSIONS
94.
Under the IUC termination approach, the originating operator
has the right to set and collect the corresponding consumer tariff
and the responsibility to pay a fixed termination charge to the
terminating operator. With this in mind and taking into account the
staged reductions in the underlying termination charges, I expect
that the parties will pass on to the end consumers the benefits of
the reduced termination charges in the form of lower consumer
tariffs.
95.
Before I conclude I wish to address specifically the prayer
raised by BTC under which BTC is requesting that Mascom be
ordered to pay interest at the rate of prime plus two percent on the
losses amounting to thirty million Pula suffered as a result of the
delay in effecting the proposed charges as purportedly agreed by
Vista (Pty) Ltd. In my view, there is no merit in this prayer. The
alleged delay on the part of Mascom was justified in the
circumstances. Mascom was legitimately safeguarding its interests
through proper negotiations, which were also done in good faith.
Furthermore, Vista is not a party to the present proceedings let
alone to the current Agreement between the parties herein. There
is no basis upon which Mascom may be ordered to pay costs,
which may have been suffered by BTC in its dealings with a
non-party. The said prayer is accordingly refused.
43
BTA Ruling No. 1 of 2003
96. This ruling shall remain valid and binding on both parties
for a period of 24 months effective from the date of the ruling.
In the event that the parties herein reach an agreement during
the subsistence of this ruling, the Authority reserves the right
to uphold and confirm such agreement in so far as the
essence of such agreement does not substantially breach the
fundamental framework or tenet as espoused by this ruling.
97.
This ruling takes effect from the date hereof. Any party
aggrieved by this decision may appeal to the High Court in terms
of section 56 of the Act.
Delivered at Gaborone on this Twenty Sixth day of February
2003.
C. M. Lekaukau
Executive Chairman
44
ANEXO 2
EU Public Network Interconnection and Interconnection Charges and Prices for Unbundled Local
Loop, from “Technical Annex of the 8th Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications
Regulatory Package” 3.12.2002.
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/telecoms/implementation/annual_report/8threport/finalr
eport/Annex%201%20-%20Corrigendum%20March%202003.pdf
23.09.2003
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Brussels, 3.12.2002
SEC(2002) 1329
COMMISSION STAFF WORKING PAPER
Technical Annexes of the
Eighth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package
CORRIGENDUM
{COM(2002)695 final}
2 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
ANNEX 1
MARKET OVERVIEW
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 3
4 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
PLAYERS IN THE FIXED MARKET .................................................................................................................7
1.1. LICENSING REGIMES IN THE MEMBER STATES .......................................................................................8
1.2. NUMBER OF FIXED TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS.................................................................10
1.3. INCUMBENTS MARKET SHARE ON FIXED TELEPHONY MARKET .....................................................17
1.4. SHARE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP IN INCUMBENT OPERATORS............................................................20
1.5. ADMINISTRATIVE AND NUMBERING FEES FOR THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC VOICE
TELEPHONY AND PUBLIC NETWORK SERVICES .............................................................................................21
2
CONSUMER’S CHOICE OF FIXED OPERATORS........................................................................................27
2.1. PERCENTAGE OF SUBSCRIBERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS FOR FIXED CALLS.....................27
2.2. PERCENTAGE OF SUBSCRIBERS ACTUALLY USING AN ALTERNATIVE PROVIDER OTHER
THAN THE INCUMBENT .........................................................................................................................................29
2.3. FACILITIES USED BY NEW ENTRANTS TO PROVIDE VOICE TELEPHONY .......................................30
3
PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION AND INTERCONNECTION CHARGES............................33
3.1. FIXED-TO-FIXED INTERCONNECTION CHARGES...................................................................................33
3.2. LEASED LINE INTERCONNECTION CHARGES.........................................................................................35
3.3. FIXED-TO-MOBILE INTERCONNECTION CHARGES ...............................................................................40
4
MOBILE MARKET..............................................................................................................................................45
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
5
MOBILE PENETRATION.................................................................................................................................45
PLAYERS IN THE MOBILE MARKET...........................................................................................................47
OPERATORS’ MARKET SHARES..................................................................................................................49
MOBILE BASKET ............................................................................................................................................51
LOCAL ACCESS AND PRICING ......................................................................................................................55
5.1. BROADBAND ACCESS ...................................................................................................................................55
5.2. PRICES FOR UNBUNDLED LOCAL LOOP...................................................................................................62
6
INTERNET SERVICES .......................................................................................................................................67
6.1. INTERNET MARKET DATA ...........................................................................................................................67
6.2. INTERNET ACCESS PRICING........................................................................................................................69
7
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY TARIFFS ........................................................................................................71
7.1.
7.2.
7.3.
7.4.
7.5.
7.6.
7.7.
7.8.
7.9.
8
LEASED LINES RETAIL TARIFFS ..................................................................................................................91
8.1.
8.2.
8.3.
8.4.
9
CHARGING SYSTEM.......................................................................................................................................72
MONTHLY RENTAL CHARGED BY THE INCUMBENT OPERATORS....................................................74
AVERAGE MONTHLY EXPENDITURE (COMPOSITE CALL BASKET) ..................................................76
FIXED NATIONAL CALLS .............................................................................................................................78
TREND OF THE BASKET FOR FIXED NATIONAL CALLS (NATIONAL BASKET)...............................81
ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL OPERATORS ...................................................................................................82
PRICE OF AN AVERAGE FIXED INTERNATIONAL CALL (INTERNATIONAL CALL BASKET) .......84
PRICE OF CALLS TO EU, JAPAN, USA ........................................................................................................86
ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS .......................................................................................88
INCUMBENTS' NATIONAL LEASED LINES................................................................................................91
NATIONAL LEASED LINES PRICE TRENDS (1 AUGUST 1998 - 1 AUGUST 2002)................................97
INTERNATIONAL LEASED LINES PRICES .................................................................................................98
INTERNATIONAL LEASED LINES PRICE TRENDS (1 AUGUST 1998 - 1 AUGUST 2002)..................102
EXCHANGE RATES..........................................................................................................................................103
9.1. EXCHANGE RATE USED IN SECTION 6 ON INTERNET, SECTION 7 ON PUBLIC VOICE
TELEPHONY TARIFFS AND SECTION 8 ON LEASED LINE TARIFFS. ..........................................................103
9.2. EXCHANGE RATE USED IN SECTION 1.5 ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND NUMBERING FEES ..........103
9.3. EXCHANGE RATE USED IN SECTION 3 ON INTERCONNECTION AND SECTION 5.2 ON PRICES
FOR LOCAL LOOP ..................................................................................................................................................103
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 5
6 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
1 PLAYERS IN THE FIXED MARKET
This section analyses the situation of the market players in the fixed telecommunications market
(voice telephony and network services): number of operators authorised to operate a network and to
provide public fixed voice telephony, number of players actually active in the market, licence fees
for fixed services, market shares and the public ownership in the incumbent operators.
Data are based on the replies to the European Commission questionnaire provided by the national
regulatory authorities and gives the situation as at August 2002.
The following definitions apply:
•
Public network operators are defined as operators that install, manage and operate a
telecommunications transmission network to provide public telephony services or public
network services1 (i.e. provision of leased lines).
•
Public fixed voice telephony is defined as a service available to the public for the direct
transport on a commercial basis of real-time speech via the public switched network, such that
any user can use equipment connected to a network termination point at a fixed location to
communicate with another user of equipment connected to another termination point. Voice
telephone could be provided on an own self-operated network or on a leased network.
•
Public fixed voice telephony (not including the installation of the network): provision of
national and international public voice telephony by service providers that operate, control and
manage the transmission capacity which is leased from other operators. Simple call-back and
calling card services and operators dealing only with marketing, billing, etc., are excluded. The
definition of service provider may differ from that used in the national law of individual
countries (in some countries non-self operated network operators engage exclusively in reselling
activities).
•
Public voice telephony on an own self-operated network (not including network services):
provision of public fixed voice telephony over a network fully controlled, operated and (wholly
or partially) owned by the operator, excluding the provision of network services.
•
Local operators are operators authorised to offer telecommunications services only to users
located in specific areas (to whom they provide local calls as well as long-distance and
international calls through interconnection agreements with other operators).
•
National operators are operators authorised to offer telecommunications services without any
geographical restriction. They may provide all types of telephony services (local, long-distance
and international calls) to users located throughout the national territory.
1
Public fixed network services are defined as the conveyance of calls, messages and signals over a
telecommunications network, including any necessary switching. They may be network interconnection services,
which are provided to other network operators to enable calls and associated functions to be passed through
interconnected networks, or basic retail network services, which are provided to customers such as end-users or
service providers.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 7
1.1.LICENSING REGIMES IN THE MEMBER STATES
A variety of different national licensing regimes can be identified across Member States:
telecommunications operators2 may have individual licences/authorisations or be subject to
registration/notification procedures, or may effectively operate in the market without being subject
to any individual licence or declaration procedure. Furthermore, depending on the national licensing
regime, in order to provide a particular service, the operators may have to hold (and pay for) a
number of different licences or may have to pay for a licence with a wider scope than they require
(i.e. nation-wide), even if they do not make full use of it.
Table 1 shows the licensing regimes in the 15 Member States for the four main categories of fixed
services. The first column indicates whether the national licence regime provides for geographical
restriction on the licence (local or national). The rest of the table shows the type of licence (or
licences) required for four types of telecommunications service (see above for the definitions):
public fixed voice telephony (not including the installation of the network); operation of a public
network and provision of network services (not including voice telephony); public voice telephony
on a owned self-operated network (not including the provision of network services); public voice
telephony and network services on a owned self-operated network.
In the Netherlands and Finland the licence regimes provide for a registration/notification system. In
Sweden both individual licence and registration systems are applied3. The Danish licensing regime
system does not even require a notification.
In Greece public voice telephony can be provided by way of both an individual licence and a
general authorisation, but in the latter case operators are not allowed to use numbers4.
The rest of the countries apply a system of individual licences. In the United Kingdom and Ireland a
single fixed telecommunications licence exists, whatever the types of public service provided (voice
telephony and/or public network)5. In Austria a single licence for voice telephony services exists,
whether or not the operators self-operate a owned or a leased network. Belgium, Germany, Portugal
and Sweden provide only two types of fixed licences (voice telephony services and public network),
while the other countries also provide a single licence which combines several categories of more
limited individual licences (i.e. public voice telephony on a owned self-operated network; public
voice telephony and network services on an own self-operated network)6.
2
In the following, “operators” means both network operators and service providers; “authorised operators” means
operators that have been granted an individual licence/authorisation or are subject to a declaration/notification
procedure.
3
According to the Swedish licensing regime, a notification is required for the provision (within a publicly available
telecommunications network) of telecommunications services (fixed telephony, mobile services, leased lines, etc.)
which require allocation of capacity from the telephony numbering plan. An individual licence is required for the
provision of telecommunications services if the activity is considered to be of “considerable scope” with regard to
the areas covered, the number of users or other comparable factors.
4
Simple resellers do not need any licence or authorisation.
5
In Ireland a separate licence for Public Network (basic licence) is also provided.
6
But in any case the allocation of the two separate licences for voice telephony and for public networks gives the same
right as the “combined” licence.
8 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Table 1. Licensing regime for public fixed services
Distinction
between
national and
local licence/
registration
Type of fixed telecommunications services
Public fixed voice
telephony services
(not including the
installation of the
network)
Operation of owned public
network and provision of
network services
(not including voice
telephony)
Public voice
telephony over a
owned selfoperated network
Public voice telephony
and network services
over a owned selfoperated network
B
No
VT
NET
VT + NET
General Class Licence for Public Telecommunication Networks and Services
(operators apply only for numbers)
VT (class 4)
NET (class 3)
VT + NET (class 4 + class 3)
DK
No
D
Yes
EL
No
VT
NET
VT and NS on NET 7
E
Yes
VT (type A)
NET (type C1)
VT and NS on NET (type B1)
F
Yes
VT (L34-1)
IRL
No
I
Yes
VT
L
No
VT (type C)
NL
No
VT (registration)
NET (registration)
A
No8
VTonNET9
NET
P
No
VT
NET
FIN
Yes
VT (registr.)
NET (registr.)
S
No
VT (lic./reg.)
NET (lic./reg.)
NET (L33-1)
VT and NS on NET (L34-1and L33-1)
VT and NS onNET (General Licence)
(NET5 (Basic Licence))
VT + NET
NET
VTonNET
(or VTonNET+NET)
NET (type B)
VT and NS on NET (type A)
VT + NET (reg.)
VTonNET
VTonNET + NET
VT + NET
VT + NET (lic./reg.)
Yes
VT and NS on NET (PTO licence)
UK
Legend:
VT (Voice Telephony): individual licence/registration for providing public fixed voice telephony (not
including the installation of the network)
NET (Network): individual licence/registration/notification for operation of a public network and for the
provision of network services (not including voice telephony services)
VTonNET (Voice Telephony on Network): individual licence/registration/notification for providing public
voice telephony on a owned self-operated network (not including network services)
VTandNSonNET (Voice Telephony and Network Services on Network): individual licence/registration/
notification for provision of public voice telephony and network services on a owned self-operated
network
VT + NET; VTonNET + NET; VTandNSonNET + NET: both licences needed for provision of the services
7
The Greek licensing regime provides for a list of 6 types of individual licence, among which those for public fixed networks and
for public voice telephony. Moreover, at the request of the applicant, the NRA can issue a single licence which combines several
categories of individual licence.
8
The legal framework for the licensing regime in Austria does not distinguish between local and national coverage of licences,
although operators can apply for a licence restricted in scope as to the network and/or the services provided.
9
An individual licence is required for the provision of public voice telephony over a self-operated fixed telecommunication
network. The network could either belong to the operators, or could be totally leased from a third-party network operator.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 9
1.2.NUMBER OF FIXED TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATORS
This section shows the number of operators authorised to provide public fixed network services and
public fixed voice telephony, as well as the number of operators effectively active in the market.
The figures include a great variety of operators: fixed network operators, service providers, cable
modem access operators and operators with wireless local loop, mobile and satellite operators (for
the fixed part of their networks and services).
Depending on the national licensing scheme, for some countries data for both local and national
operators are given (see table 1). This does not mean that in the other countries all operators are
national, but only that the licensing scheme does not require a licence limited as to its scope (in
consequence all the operators have to pay for a national licence even if they are only local
operators).
In the following charts, “national operator” means an operator that has been granted either a
national licence/authorisation or a non-geographically limited licence under a licensing scheme
which does not specify the geographic coverage.
The figure reflect the number of operators, rather than the number of licences. This is particularly
true for the cable TV operators that operate their telecommunication licence through local licences
granted to their local franchisees; in this case they have been considered as one single operator.
The number of local operators is not strictly comparable between Member States, since it varies
considerably between countries depending on the division of the national territory into local areas.
Figures for Denmark may be incomplete due to the fact that there is neither a licensing requirement
nor a central register of operators and their activities (operators only apply for numbers).
In Spain, the big increase from last year in the number of operators (46 local and 61 national in
2001) reflects the fact that many cable TV operators have transformed their provisional cable
modem access concession into a B1 licence for provision of telecommunication services (voice
telephony and network services) over a own network.
In Finland, 38 of the 48 regional operators are local incumbents and belong to the Finnet Group.
Data for Sweden include both licensed and notified operators.
In the United Kingdom, the 62 local cable franchise operators, owned by 2 companies, must hold
(inter alia) a standard PTO licence for the provision of cable modem access services which, in turn,
also gives the right to provide public voice telephony/network service. How many of these cable
modem access operators are also providing public voice telephony/network services is unknown.
From January 2001 the geographical restriction on cable companies ceased to exist and any cable
licensee was free to operate outside the area laid down in its licence, but to maintain comparability
with previous Reports we will continue to consider these operators as local. The big decrease in the
number of local operators (cable modem access) for 2001 (134) and 2002 (62) is due to intensive
merger activities in the market.
10 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY SERVICES
Chart 1
Number of EU operators authorised to offer public voice telephony
Total EU: 1231
180
National operators
227*
Local operators
160
139
140
116
120
100
49
62
65
65
15
21
25
28
34
20
24
32
36
45
40
39
60
46
68
72
85
80
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
* Figure not to scale
- Due to the registration system, the number of operators authorised to provide public voice telephony figures for
Denmark has been estimated using the number of operators that have been allocated geographical numbers and/or
access codes. The estimated overall number of operators has declined from 48 in 2001 to 36 in 2002 due to extensive
merging and cornering in the Danish telecommunications market. Moreover, the total number of operators has
diminished due to a couple of bankruptcies among smaller operators.
Chart 2
Number of operators authorised to offer public voice telephony per
million of inhabitants
EU weighted average: 4
20
12,0
13,5
15,6
15
DK
F
IRL
I
3,8
E
2,7
EL
4,1
D
2,1
1,2
B
2,6
0
2,3
3,1
5
2,2
6,7
8,0
10
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
This indicator is not significant for Luxembourg, because of its peculiar characteristic in terms of low percentage of
population in relation to the non-physical inhabitants.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 11
The number of operators authorized to offer public fixed telecoms services indicates only the
potential for competition in the market rather than the current level of competition. For this reason,
where possible, an estimate is given of the number of operators actually active on the market. These
figures do not show to what extent the operators are offering services. Many new entrants initially
provide only services to business users in the main cities, even if they have a national license
allowing them to offer all types of service throughout the country.
Figures in the following three charts should be read on a service by service bases (local, longdistance and international call markets) and not as country totals, since the same operator is usually
authorized to offer more than one type of service.
Chart 3
Operators actually offering local calls
60
Local operators
National operators
43
52
50
33
40
9
4
7
8
10
11
10
9
15
19
20
20
30
0
D
EL
E
F
IRL
L
NL
A
FIN
- Because of its small size, no distinction is made in Luxembourg between local and long-distance voice telephony
services.
- B, DK, I, P, S and UK do not provide separate figure for the operators effectively providing local calls.
12 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 4
Operators actually offering long-distance calls
Total EU: local op.:124; national op.: 476
107
110
100
Local operators
90
National operators
80
75
70
58
60
50
38
30
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
I
L
NL
A
P
14
9
13
IRL
10
0
10
24
26
14
15
10
32
38
26
20
22
30
39
40
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- The figures for B, DK, I, P and S do not distinguish between the type of call provided (local, long-distance,
international); the figure for the United Kingdom does not distinguish between local and national operators.
Chart 5
Operators actually offering international calls
Total EU: local op.:125; national op.: 478
107
110
100
Local operators
90
National operators
75
80
70
9
10
30
13
26
11
25
14
15
10
30
38
26
22
30
20
39
40
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
15
50
39
59
60
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- The figures for B, DK, I, P, S and the UK do not distinguish between the type of call provided (local, long-distance,
international); the figure for the United Kingdom does not distinguish between local and national operators.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 13
PUBLIC NETWORK
The following charts show the number of network operators with a public network licence and/or
authorised to offer network services (conveyance of calls, messages and signals over a
telecommunications network, including any necessary switching).
The distinction between local and national public network operators concerns the geographical
scope of the network, while the provision of network services could be subject to a different
geographical limitation. In the following, “local operators” means operators whose network does
not cover the whole national territory (whatever the geographical scope of the service).
It should be noted that a licence to operate a local/regional public network does not necessarily
imply the existence of local network access to customers (“the last mile”. See local loop access
section for more details).
Figure for Spain does not include 75 local cable modem access operators, that have transformed
their provisional cable modem access concession into a definitive public network licence.
Data for Ireland include both basic and general licences.
In the United Kingdom, the local operators refer to 62 local cable franchise operators, owned by 2
companies.
Chart 6
Number of operators authorised to operate a public network and to
provide public network services
Total EU: 1561
250
386*
Local operators
National operators
227
200
200
L
62
54
43
55
33
I
13
25
43
48
29
25
32
17
27
17
49
50
59
100
67
112
150
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
NL
A
P
FIN
S
* Figure not to scale.
14 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
UK
Chart 7
Number of operators authorised to operate a public network per million
of inhabitants
EU weighted average: 4.2
22,5
25
17,5
18,7
20
15
B
DK
D
IRL
I
NL
3,8
F
3,2
1,4
E
0
2,7
3,6
EL
1,3
1,6
3,2
4,8
5
5,0
8,4
10
A
P
FIN
S
UK
This indicator is not significant for Luxembourg, because of its peculiar characteristic in terms of percentage of
population in relation to non-physical inhabitants.
Chart 8
Operators actually offering local network services
Local operators
60
66
70
National operators
50
43
40
B
D
IRL
I
L
NL
A
2
5
5
10
3
F
5
5
E
7
9
7
EL
4
0
5
181
12
10
15
20
20
25
30
P
FIN
S
UK
- Value for Germany not to scale.
- Denmark does not provide separate figures for the operators effectively providing local network connections.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 15
Chart 9
Operators actually offering trunk connections
Total EU: 59 local op.; 226 national op.
35
National operators
7
1
3
6
5
7
10
11
7
11
10
12
14
14
15
16
17
20
21
22
24
26
25
25
31
Local operators
30
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
Chart 10
Operators actually offering international connections
Total EU: 44 local op.; 193 national op.
35
35
Local operators
30
National operators
24
24
25
25
17
13
14
15
18
20
9
1
3
1
3
4
5
5
5
8
8
9
11
10
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
16 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
UK
1.3. INCUMBENTS MARKET SHARE ON FIXED TELEPHONY MARKET
This section shows the incumbent’s market share for telephony call market on the basis of retail
revenues and outgoing traffic per minute. Unfortunately not all Member States collect both types of
data, and differentiation between the various markets (local, long-distance, international) is not
always available.
Figures have been provided by the national regulatory authorities and give the situation as for
December 2001.
Chart 11
65,7%
53,3%
45,5%
69,0%
43,0%
50%
69%
66%
62,0%
IRL
83,0%
76,0%
F
86,6%
64,0%
74,9%
92,0%
65,0%
74,0%
89,8%
74,3%
67,6%
88,3%
82,0%
82,8%
100,0%
99,6%
97,5%
98,0%
50%
68,0%
61,0%
68,0%
75%
83,4%
100%
99,4%
Estimates of incumbent operators' market share,
retail revenues
25%
0%
B
D
EL
E
Local calls
I
Long-distance calls
NL
A
S
UK
Internat.calls
- Local call market include both phone calls and calls to internet.
- In Belgium, market share for local calls includes local calls to internet only; market share for long-distance calls refers
to "national phone calls", including both local phone calls and long-distance calls.
- Data for Sweden for local calls market share is not available separately. Market share for long-distance calls refers to
the total national calls", including local phone calls, calls to internet and long-distance calls.
- Data for DK, L, P, FIN are not available.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 17
Chart 12
30,0%
54,0%
32,0%
40%
25%
48,3%
76,0%
92,5%
89,9%
70,5%
70%
50%
62,0%
83,0%
76,0%
IRL
72,0%
F
88,6%
88,6%
88,0%
59,0%
66,0%
85,4%
61,6%
63,2%
D
48,0%
63,0%
DK
77,2%
84,2%
81,5%
100,0%
99,1%
96,9%
96,0%
64,4%
52,7%
50%
84,7%
75%
51,5%
100%
99,6%
Estimates of incumbent operators' market share,
outgoing minutes
0%
B
EL
Local calls
E
L
Long-distance calls
NL
A
P
FIN
UK
International calls
- Local call market include both phone calls and calls to internet.
- In Belgium, market share for local calls includes local calls to internet only; market share for long-distance calls refers
to "national phone calls", including both local phone calls and long-distance calls.
- Market share for long-distance calls for Denmark and Portugal refer to the overall national calls", including local and
long-distance phone calls, calls to internet and call to mobile.
- Because of its small size, no distinction is made in Luxembourg between the local and the long-distance call markets.
- Local calls market share for Finland refers to the combined share of the incumbents (Sonera, Elisa and Finnet). Market
share for long-distance and international refers to Sonera only and do not include market share of Kakoverkko Ysi Oy
and Finnet International Ab, that have been designated as SMP
- Local calls market share for DK, A and P are not available separately.
18 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 13
Estimates of incumbent operators' market share for
local calls to the internet
Retail revenues
58%
80%
93%
72%
80%
87%
87%
80%
72%
74%
80%
83%
66%
75%
Outgoing minute
90%
99%
100%
100%
50%
25%
0%
B
E
F
IRL
L
NL
A
FIN
UK
Chart 14
56%
50%
50%
50%
60%
64%
75%
75%
F
Outgoing minutes
76%
78%
77%
E
83%
82%
79%
80%
74%
Retail revenues
65%
78%
78%
75%
99%
99%
100%
93%
Estimates of incumbent operators' market share for
calls to mobile networks
25%
0%
B
D
EL
IRL
I
NL
A
FIN
S
UK
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 19
1.4. SHARE OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP IN INCUMBENT OPERATORS
In order to provide a complete overview of the players in the EU telecommunications market, the
following chart shows the degree of public ownership of the incumbent operators on the fixed
market. Spain, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands have a golden share in the incumbent operators,
that gives the State special rights on strategic decisions.
Chart 15
Share of public ownership in incumbent operators
100%
100%
70,6%
80%
53,1%
20 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
BT 0
Telia
Sonera
Portugal Tel.
6,5%
47,2%
Tel. Austria
34,7%
KPN
P&T Luxemb.
3,46%
Tel. Italia
Eircom 0,4%
54%
France Tel.
Telefonica 1 share
43,1%
33,8%
OTE
Belgacom
0%
Deutsche Telekom
0
20%
TeleDenmark
40%
50%+1 share
60%
1.5. ADMINISTRATIVE AND NUMBERING FEES FOR THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY
AND PUBLIC NETWORK SERVICES
This section provides data on Member States’ administrative and numbering fees for public voice
telephony and public network services licences. The data have been provided by the national
regulatory authorities and give the position as at August 2002.
Administrative fees (table 2) are fees charged to cover the costs of examining an application for a
licence, granting the relevant authorisation and verifying compliance with the terms and conditions
set once the service or network is operational.
The categorisation of administrative fees is closely linked to the general licensing framework
applicable in the individual countries. The categories of administrative fees will depend on whether
market entry is subject to an individual licence or a notification under a general authorisation
scheme (see table 1 for more details).
Numbering fees (table 3) are fees applied by many Member States which reflect the relative
scarcity of numbering resources.
Table 3 sets out for each Member State the different kinds of fees charged for the following
categories of numbers needed by each operator to provide public voice telephony services:
•
standard telephone numbers (ITU-T Recommendation E.164) (for subscribers directly
connected to the operator),
•
carrier selection codes (to select the operator)
•
signalling point codes10 (for interconnection with other networks at national (NSPC) and
international (ISPC) level).
Ireland, Austria, Sweden, Portugal and the United Kingdom do not charge for such numbers,
although often the right to use numbers is implicitly included in the licensing fees.
10
Signalling Point Codes (SPCs) are used in public telephone networks using CCITT Signalling System No 7 (SS7).
SPCs are the addresses of the signalling points. Two types of SPC are usually individually assigned to network
operators: International SPCs and National SPCs. ISPCs are used in international transit networks, e.g. to address
networks which connect the various networks in a specific country or to identify the national gateways of the
various networks.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 21
F
> 5 regions
≤ 5 regions
≤ 1 region
≤ 1 department
≤ 1 city of 100 000
inhabitants
If SMP
Eiv
EL
D
DK
B
Table 2
Annual fee
15 224
Not relevant
38 112
Not relevant
% of turnover
(from 0.5% to
0
0.025%;
min 600)iii
Ind. licence for VT (type A)
0.15% of relevant
0
turnover
Ind. licence for VT (L34-1)
38 112
15 224
38 112
15 224
38 112
15 224
38 112
15 224
Ind. Licence for VT
Ind. Licence for VT
8 000
9 340
if SMP: 13 330
0
0
Ind. Licence for VT (class 3)
Single payment
Public voice telephony over a
leased network
(service providers)
Public voice telephony over a own
self-operated network
(not including network services )
Public voice telephony and network
services over a own self-operated
network
Double fees
7 622
Double fees
3 811
Annual fee
Double fees
45 734
Single payment
Double fees
22 867
Annual fee
Double fees
45 734
Double fees
22 867
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 22
Single payment
Single
Annual fee
payment
Ind. Licence for NET
Individual licence for VT + individual licence for NET
17 329
17 329
9 329
22 667
22 667
13 327
if SMP: 31 988
if SMP: 31 988
if SMP: 18 658
0
0
0
0
0
0
Ind. Licence for NET (class 4)
Individual licence for VT + individual licence for NET
The regulation on licence fees is currently being reviewed by the governmenti
Individual licence for VT + individual licence for NET
Ind. Licence for NET
or individual licence for VT and NS on NETii
% of turnover
% of relevant
% of relevant
(from 0.5% to
turnover
turnover
0
0
0
0.025%. min
(from 0.5% to
(from 0.5% to
600)iii
0.025%. min 600)iii
0.025%. min 600)iii
Ind. licence for NET (type C1)
Ind. licence for VT and NS on NET (type B1)
0.15% of relevant
0.15% of relevant
0.15% of relevant
0
0
0
turnover
turnover
turnover
Ind. licence for NET (L33-1)
Ind. licence for VT and NS on NET (L34-1 and L33-1)
266 785
133 392
304 897
152 449
304 897
152 449
76 224
38 112
114 386
57 168
114 386
57 168
38 112
15 244
76 224
38 112
76 224
38 112
15 244
7 622
53356
26 678
53356
26 678
Operation of public fixed network
and provision of network services
over a own network
(not including voice services)
Administrative fees (August 2002, €)
1.5.1. ADMINISTRATIVE AND NUMBERING FEES FOR FIXED VOICE TELEPHONY
21 840
10 919
≤ 10 million inh.
≤ 200 000 inh.
P
A
x
NL
10 919
27 300
65 519
1 985
if SMP: 1 933 205
0
9 976
9 976
Individual licence for VT
0
Ind. Licence for VTonNETxi
363
Ind licence for VT (type C)
37 184 plus
% of turnover
620
(min. 0.15%
max. 0.30%)
Registration for VT
54 598
L
1 015 or
0.2% of
turnover>635 000
Annual fee
Ind. licence for VT
12 500
Single payment
Public voice telephony over a leased
network
(service providers)
Administrative fees (cont’d)
Whole country
Ivii
IRL
Table 2
Public voice telephony over a
own self-operated network
(not including network services )
Annual fee
27 300
54 598
109 198
4 590
0.14% of turnover
9 976
Ind. licence for VTonNET
19 952
19 952
19 952
19 952
Ind. Licence for VTonNET
Ind. lic. VTonNET + ind. lic. NET
0.14% of
5 087
10 174
0.14% of turnover
turnover
Individual licence for VT + individual licence for NET
363
7 436
16 379
27 300
60 058
1 015 or
0.2% of turnover
>635 000
Annual fee
Ind. lic. for VT + ind. lic. for NET
Or Ind. lic. VTonNET + ind. lic. NET
120 117viii
174 716
65 519
(125 577)ix
43 679 viii
81 893
27 300
(49 139 )ix
21 840 viii
38 219
10 919
(27 300) ix
Ind. licence for VT and NS on NET (type A)
49 578 plus
7 436
49 578 plus
% of turnover
% of turnover
(min. 0.20%
(min. 0.20%
max. 0.35%)
max. 0.35%)
Registration for VT + Reg. for NET
4 590
4 590
if SMP:
363
if SMP: 2 173 775
2 173 775
12 500
Single payment
Public voice telephony and network
services over a own self-operated
network
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 23
9 976
Ind. Licence for NET
5 087
Ind. Licence for NET
363
Ind. licence for NET (type B)
6 197
12 394 plus
% of turnover
(min. 0.10%
max. 0.25%)
Registration for NET
10 919
21 840
65 519
Ind. licence for NET
Single payment
Single
Annual fee
payment
Individual licence for VT and NS on NET (General licence)v
1 015 or
12 500
1 015 or
0.2% of turnover
(3 175 if basic
12 500
0.2% of
>
licence)vi
turnover>635 000
635 000
Operation of public fixed network
and provision of network services
over a own network
(not including voice services)
59 975
11 463
0
new entrants: 4 498
for the first two
years, then 4 498 if
turn. < 7 496 768
- % of turnover to a
max 0.08% if
turnover >
7 496 768
- 1,57 ‰ of
turnover
(min. 5 732/area of
licence)
- SMP operator:
extra 0.5‰ of
voice telephony
turnover (max 11
463 190)
- 115 for turnover
<573 160
- 4 012 for turnover
>573 160
Registration for VT
0
0
Individual lic./reg. for VT
Annual fee
Public voice telephony over a
own self-operated network
(not including network services )
Public voice telephony and network
services over a own self-operated
network
Single payment
Annual fee
Single
payment
Annual fee
Single
Annual fee
payment
Registration for NET
Registration for VT + Reg. for NET
0
0
0
0
0
0
Individual lic./reg. for NET
Individual lic./reg. for VT + Individual lic./reg. for NET
- 106 for turnover
- 115 for turnover
- 115 for turnover
<317 511 for each
< 573 160
<573 160
relevant activity
0
0
0
- 2 646 for turnover
- 4 012 for turnover
- 4 012 for turnover
>573 160
> 573 160
>317 511 for each
relevant activity
- 1,57 ‰ of
- 1,57‰ of turnover
turnover
(min. 100 000 SEK)
(min. 5 732/area of
for each relevant
- 1.57 of turnover
licence))
activity (min. 10 584)
11 463
(min. 5 732)
11 463
- SMP operator:
22 928
- SMP operator: extra
extra 0.5‰ of
0.5‰ of voice
voice telephony
telephony turnover
turnover (max 11
(max 11 463 190)
463 190 )
Individual licence for VT and NS on NET (PTO licence)
new entrants: 4 498 for
new entrants: 4 498
new entrants: 4 498
the first two years,
for the first two
for the first two
then 4 498 if turn. <7
years, then 4 498 if
years, then 4 498 if
496 768
turn. <7 496 768
turn. < 7 496 768
59 975
59 975
59 975
- calculated % of
- calculated % of
- % of turnover to a
turnover to a max
turnover to a max
max 0.08% if
0.08% if turnover >7
0.08% if turnover
turnover >
496 768
>7 496 768
7 496 768
Operation of public fixed network and
provision of network services over a
own network (not including voice
services)
24 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Legend:
VT (Voice Telephony): individual licence/registration for providing public fixed voice telephony (not including the installation of the network)
NET (Network): individual licence/registration/notification for operation of a public network and for the provision of network services (not including voice telephony)
VTonNET (Voice Telephony on Network): individual licence/registration/notification for providing public voice telephony on a owned self-operated network (not including network
services)
VTandNSonNET (Voice Telephony and Network Services on Network): individual licence/registration/ notification for provision of public voice telephony and network services on
a owned self-operated network
VT + NET; VTonNET + NET; VTandNSonNET + NET: both licences needed for provision of the services
UK
Licence
Notificationxii
S
FIN
Single payment
Public voice telephony over a leased
network
(service providers)
Table 2 Administrative fees (cont’d)
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 25
In its judgement of 19 September 2001, the Highest Administrative Court (the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, BVerwG) annulled the regulation on licence fees on the basis that it does
not reflect the principle that licence fees should only cover administrative costs. The regulation on licence fees is currently being reviewed by the government. Pending the
previous proceedings in national courts, operators have been charged licence fees and have been granted suspension of the payment at their request. Since the judgement of the
BVerwG, licence fees are not charged and licences are issued under the provision that licence fees will be fixed on the basis of the forthcoming regulation.
ii
The Greek licensing regime provides for a list of 6 types of individual licence, among which those for public fixed networks and for public voice telephony. Moreover, at the
request of the applicant, the NRA can issue a single licence which combines several categories of individual licence.
iii
The fees are determined based on an interval function with respect of the turnover of the relevant activities, with a minimum of 600 Euro: 0.5% of turnover for the first 300 million
euro, 0.2% for turnover between 300 and 600 million euro, 0.15% for turnover between 600 and 900 million euro, 0.1% for turnover between 900 and 1 200 Meuro, 0.05% for
turnover between 1 200 and 1 500 million euro, 0.025% for turnover over 1 500 million euro.
iv
According to the General Telecommunications Act, the exact amount of the annual fees (percentage value) will be fixed every year by Parliament, taking into account the need to
cover the administrative costs of the licensing management and controls system. The annual fees cannot be higher than 2‰ . For 2001 the value set is 0.15%.
v
In Ireland a separate licence for Public Network (basic licence) is also provided.
vi
Holder of a general licence are permitted to operate a public network and provide voice telephony and network services. A basic licence is sufficient to operate a public network
and provide network services.
vii
Current fees are obtained adjusting original values provided by Ministerial Decree 05.02.1998 on the basis of inflation foreseen in the Documento per la programmazione
economica e finanziaria on a year by year basis.
viii
Corresponding to the combination of licences for provision of voice telephony and for provision of public network services.
ix
Corresponding to the combination of licences for provision of voice telephony on a self-operated network and for provision of public network services.
x
For all types of operator, an annual fee (depending on turnover and market share) is payable to contribute to the overall costs of the regulator. The annual percentage varies between
0.1% and 0.2% of turnover (in 1999 it was 0.12%, in 2000 it was 0.1%). The value for the year 2001 will be communicated in the second half of 2002.
xi
An individual licence is required for the provision of public voice telephony over a self-operated fixed telecommunication network. The network could either belong to the
operators, or could be totally leased from third-party network operator.
xii
A licence is required if an operator’s activity is considered “significant” regarding the area of distribution, the number of users and similar factors. These operators typically have a
market share of 10-15% (never less than 5%).
i
Numbering fees (€)
4 digits
S: 1 333
A: 13 327
A: 25 709.71
4 digits
A: 2 570.97
5 digits
A: 257.10
S: 187.50
S: 375
4 digits
S: 500.00
per block of
1 000 11-digit
numbers
S: 50.00
per block of
1 000 10-digit
numbers
S: 500.00
D
5digit:
S: 1 500
A: 1 500
4digit:
S: 15 000
A: 15 000
reservation:
A: 0.0125
per number:
S: 0.03
A: 0.025
EL
per number
A: 0.34
FIN
26 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
A: 0.7
A: 1680
International
A: 3 digits
90 000
per number
A: 4 digits
A: 0.03 x a factor
18 000
indicating the
A: 5 digits 3 600
number of
Long distance
9-digit numbers
A: 3 digits
occupied in the
45 000
numbering plan
A: 4 digits
9 000
A: 5 digits 1 800
per number
A: 0.03
E
Changes in numbering fees in DK are due to a change in the exchange rate to Euro.
National
Signalling
S: 400
Point Codes
A: 0
(for national
interconnection)
11
DK 11
per block of
10 000
per number
numbers
(8-digit numbers)
A: 0.2571
S: 400
A: 134
International
Signalling
S: 400
Point Codes
A: 13 327
(for
international
interconnection)
Carrier
selection code
Standard
telephone
numbers
(E.164)
B
reservation
A: 4 digits
20 000 A: 1
digit
200 000
attribution
A: 4 digits
40 000 A:1
digit
400 000
per number
A: 0.02
reservation
A: 0.01
F
S: 991
A: 495
S: 991
A: 495
reservation
S: 450
A: 112.5
allocation
S: 450
A: 225
per block of 8
numbers
reservation
S: 450
A: 112.5
allocation
S: 450
A: 225
reservation
S 450
A: 112.5
allocation
S: 450
A: 225
NL
per block of 1000
numbers.
reservation
S: 13.60 61
A: 1.60
allocation
S: 13.60
A: 9.75
L
per number part
of a block of
10 000 numbers
S: 0.12
A: 0.12
per number in
amount < a block:
S 61 97 + n*0.24
A: 61 97 + *0.24
reservation
A: 4 digits
54 598
A:5 digits
27 300
S: 1 239
26 976
allocation A: 1 239
A: 4 digits
109 198
A: 5 digits
54 598
per number
A:
0.0109296
reservation
A:
0.0054648
I
(S = one-off fee; A = annual fee; where relevant: S(r)/A(r) = one-off/annual fee in case of allocation of a number that had been reserved before)
Table 3
2 CONSUMER’S CHOICE OF FIXED OPERATORS
This section analyses the fixed voice telephony market from the point of view of the consumers.
The following indicators have been considered: the percentage of subscribers with choice of
operators and the percentage of subscribers actually using a provider other than the incumbent. The
facilities used by the operators to provide public voice telephony services have also been included.
The data presented below has been provided by the national regulatory authorities and, unless
otherwise indicated, reports the position at August 2002. Figures for countries not included in the
charts are not available.
Figures are not comparable with those published in the 7th Implementation Report, since they are
now based on the percentage of subscribers rather than population.
2.1.PERCENTAGE OF SUBSCRIBERS WITH CHOICE OF OPERATORS FOR FIXED CALLS
The following charts show the percentage of subscribers with choice of operators for local, longdistance and international calls and for direct access. The choice could be between only 2 operators,
between 3 to 5 operators or more than five operators.
Chart 16
Percentage of subscribers with choice of operators
for local calls
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
DK
D
2 operators
8%
3-5 operators
20%
More than 5 op. 95%
5%
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
35%
100% 100%
100% 100% 100%
0%
0%
7,5%
100% 95% 100%
0%
100% 100%
- Data for Belgium and Greece are not available.
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- Figure for France refer to end of March 2002.
- Data for Italy for "more than 5 operators" are not available.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 27
Chart 17
Percentage of subscribers with choice of operators
for long-distance and international calls
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
B
2 operators (21)
100%
3-5 operators (22)
40%
DK
D
E
F
IRL
2,2%
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
100%
More than 5 op. (23) 10% 95% 97,8% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 95% 100% 100% 100% 100%
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- Figure for Greece is not available.
- Figure for France refer to end of March 2002
Chart 18
Percentage of subscribers with choice of alternative operators for direct
access
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
B
DK
D
E
F
I
L
FIN
2 operators
40%
18%
1%
50%
18%
35%
3-5 operators
5%
15%
1%
0%
0%
7,5%
More than 5 op.
0%
1%
0%
0%
0%
95%
0%
100%
- Figure for Denmark, should be read as minimum.
- Figure for France should be read as maximum and refer to end March 2002.
28 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
2.2.PERCENTAGE OF SUBSCRIBERS ACTUALLY USING AN ALTERNATIVE PROVIDER OTHER THAN
THE INCUMBENT
Unlike the previous indicators, that show the theoretic possibility of choice for the consumers, the
following charts show the percentage of subscribers actually using an alternative provider for voice
services.
Chart 19
Percentage of subscribers actually using an alternative provider for local
calls
40%
40%
17,5%
20%
25%
29%
30%
0%
DK
D
EL
E
F
I
5%
6%
8,9%
0,3%
2,1%
10%
L
FIN
UK
- Figure for Spain and France refer to subscribers using pre-selection and/or direct access only, and they should be
considered as minimum
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
Chart 20
Percentage of subscribers actually using an alternative provider for longdistance and international calls
65%
70%
60%
50%
50%
B
DK
EL
27%
F
I
L
19,4%
E
14%
22,5%
0%
2,4%
10%
12,3%
20%
21%
25%
30%
29%
40%
P
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- Figure for Spain and France refer to subscribers using pre-selection and/or direct access only, and then should be
considered as minimum
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 29
Chart 21
Percentage of subscribers actually using an alternative provider for
direct access
17,7%
20%
13%
15%
EL
E
F
I
L
0,01%
5%
0,08%
D
0,5%
DK
0,4%
0%
0,02%
2,1%
5%
5,9%
10%
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Sweden should be considered as maximum.
2.3.FACILITIES USED BY NEW ENTRANTS TO PROVIDE VOICE TELEPHONY
This section provides information on the facilities used by new operators to offer voice telephony,
particularly to residential users.
The following charts show the estimated number of alternative operators using carrier selection,
carrier pre-selection or direct access to provide voice telephony services to residential users.
These figures are estimates provided by the national regulatory authorities and refer to July 2002.
The charts should be read separately and not summed up as country totals, since most operators use
more than one means of providing call services.
As indicated in the section on numbering, at the reference date used for these charts, carrier
selection and pre-selection was not yet available for local calls in Germany, but legislation has been
introduced recently. Furthermore, carrier pre-selection is not yet available in Greece, due to the
deferment granted until 1 January 2003. In the United Kingdom, carrier pre-selection for local calls
is only available via “autodiallers’.
Because of its small size, no distinction is made in Luxembourg between local and long-distance
calls.
The information is not available for Portugal.
30 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 22
Alternative operators using carrier selection for providing
fixed voice telephony to residential users
Local calls
90
99
100
Long-dist./ Internat. Calls
80
70
60
60
45
50
B
DK
D
EL
0
4
4
8
15
22
25
29
20
0
6
1
4
14
10
20
20
29
29
30
32
40
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- Data for France refer to May 2002.
- Figure for Ireland refers to August 2001.
- The United Kingdom estimate refer to residential and business users.
Chart 23
Alternative operators using carrier pre-selection for providing
fixed voice telephony to residential users
60
Local calls
Long-dist./ Internat. Calls
50
50
50
B
DK
D
E
F
IRL
I
L
0
NL
A
16
3
0
4
0
4
9
8
11
10
11
16
19
19
20
20
20
19
19
20
25
25
29
32
30
32
35
40
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- In Germany, carrier pre-selection for local calls is not available yet.
- In Greece, the carrier pre-selection for all types of calls is not available yet.
- Data for France refer to May 2002.
In the following chart, figures refer to all types of calls (local, long-distance and international).
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 31
Chart 24
Alternative operators using direct access for providing fixed voice
telephony to residential users (total EU: 164)
53
60
50
40
27
30
30
17
17
20
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
2
E
1
EL
0
D
3
DK
1
0
B
2
1
1
9
10
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark should be considered as minimum.
- Data for France refer to May 2002.
- Figure for Italy refers to the number of operators that signed a ULL contract with the incumbent, but not all of them
are so far operational.
- Figure for the Netherlands refer to local call; data for long-distance/international call is 2.
32 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
3 PUBLIC NETWORK INTERCONNECTION AND INTERCONNECTION CHARGES
3.1. FIXED-TO-FIXED INTERCONNECTION CHARGES
The following charts show the per-minute interconnection charges for call termination on the
incumbent’s fixed network, based on the first three-minute call at peak rate.
The charts show the absolute value of the interconnection charges (in €-cents) as of 1 August 2002,
in comparison to the value as at August 2001.
The figures may have been approved by the NRA or simply agreed between operators, where the
legal framework does not require NRA approval.
Interconnection charges for Spain refers to a standard single transit, but a different charge is applied
in Barcelona and Madrid (1,05 eurocents/minute)
In the case of France, in order to maintain consistency across Member States, the per minute charge
indicated does not include the per minute charge related to the cost of the 2 Mbit/s port, which,
however, according to ART, provides a better picture of the cost borne by the interconnecting party.
By taking this additional charge into account, per minute charges would be €-cent 0.62, €-cent 1.26
and €-cent 1.76 respectively at local, single transit and double transit interconnection levels.
Charges for Netherlands apply from 1 Sept. 2002.
Figures for Austria are valid until 30.06.2002.
In Finland there are about 50 SMP operators who apply different interconnection charges. The
charts refer to charges applied by the two major operators Elisa (FIN) and Sonera (FIN2).
Charge for Germany for single transit level is not comparable to last year, since the Regio50 and
Regio200 zone rates have been unified in a unique single transit charge.
The EU average is a simple, rather than a weighted average.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 33
Chart 25
Interconnection charges for call termination on fixed network
Local level - EU average: 0,77 €-cents
1,43
0,96
0,49
0,66
0,74
0,65
0,54
0,64
0,76
0,71
0,65
0,44
0,5
0,82
0,91
1,0
1,16
2001
2002
EU aver.
0,84
€-cents per minute
1,5
0,0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
FIN(2)
S
UK
- In Luxembourg there is no distinction between local and long-distance domestic calls.
Chart 26
Interconnection charges for call termination on fixed network
Single transit - EU average: 1,09 €-cents
2001
2002
EU aver.
1,18
1,20
0,89
0,98
1,16
1,05
0,98
1,07
1,16
1,16
1,07
0,72
0,82
1,0
1,20
€-cents per minute
1,39
1,43
1,5
0,5
0,0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
FIN(2)
S
UK
- Figure for Germany for the year 2001 is the simple average between the Regio50 and Regio200 zone rates.
34 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 27
Interconnection charges for call termination on fixed network
Double transit - EU average: 1,74 €-cents
3,5
1,37
1,76
1,01
1,28
1,65
1,33
1,41
1,50
2,22
1,22
1,5
1,91
1,86
2,0
1,0
2,25
2,64
2,5
1,42
€-cents per minute
3,04
2001
2002
EU aver.
3,0
0,5
0,0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
FIN(2)
S
UK
- Data for the United Kingdom refers to a 100-200km connection length. For length less than 100 the interconnection
charges at double level is 1,11184; and for more than 200km is 1,7832
3.2.LEASED LINE INTERCONNECTION CHARGES
This section shows the monthly rental and the one-off charges for short-distance leased lines (local
ends, excluding VAT) up to 2 and 5 km provided by the incumbent operator to other interconnected
operators. An estimate of the total average monthly rental cost (based on the total cost for the first
year) is also presented.
Deviations for the monthly rental from the “recommended price ceiling” set in Commission
Recommendation 1999/3863 of 24 November 1999 are also shown. The recommended price
ceilings are:
•
€ 80/month for a 64 Kbit/s leased line part circuit up to 5 km
•
€ 350/month for a 2 Mbit/s leased line part circuit up to 5 km;
•
€ 1 800/month for a 34 Mbit/s leased line part circuit up to 2 km;
•
€ 2 600/month for a 34 Mbit/s leased line part circuit up to 5 km.
These figures have been provided by the national regulatory authorities through the questionnaire
for the 8th Implementation Report and the replies to the ONP COM02-18 Document. Figures
indicate the position in August 2002.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 35
64 Kbit/s part circuit
Chart 28
Monthly rental for leased line IC of a 64 Kbit/s part circuit
EU average 2 km: 85€
5km: 108€
225
160
124
58
60
58
58
65
42
59
50
50
50
59
80
80
75
100
100
101
119
93
100
120
120
125
118
€-month
150
Recommended price ceiling 5km
169
176
172
175
5km
144
155
2km
200
200
11
11
25
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Greece refer to August 2001.
- Figure for Denmark in force since October 2002.
Chart 29
One-off charge for leased line IC of a 64 Kbit/s part circuit
2.000
1.753
1.750
EU average one-off charge
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
A
690
180
NL
433
L
300
360
250
371
465
540
500
620
750
638
880
1.085
1.000
1.239
€
1.250
one-off charge
1.470
1.500
P
FIN
S
- Figure for Denmark in force since October 2002.
36 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
UK
Chart 30
Average monthly total cost for leased line IC of a 64 Kbit/s part circuit
350
Average monthly total cost 2 km
Average monthly total cost 5 km
295
73
94
94
96
116
117
139
139
100
149
185
197
208
247
205
221
228
164
138
140
140
150
153
153
182
200
222
€-month
250
150
150
303
300
26
26
50
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
- Monthly rental for Greece refers to August 2001.
- Figure for Denmark in force since October 2002.
2 Mbit/s part circuit
Chart 31
Monthly rental for leased line IC of a 2Mbit/s part circuit
EU average 2 km: 295€
5km: 389€
800
2km
5 km
Recommended price ceiling 5km
685
700
700
310
349
291
311
311
P
222
320
350
286
330
330
430
350
350
360
350
371
A
158
158
82
82
100
NL
175
200
169
300
550
488
525
400
291
€-month
500
576
600
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for 2km for Greece refers to August 2001.
- Figure for Denmark in force since October 2002.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 37
Chart 32
One-off charge for leased line IC of a 2Mbit/s part circuit
3.504
3.500
one-off charge
EU average one-off charge
1.200
558
748
38
500
568
500
639
847
1.000
1.500
1.229
1.500
1.487
1.650
€
2.000
2.348
2.500
2.479
3.000
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
Chart 33
Average monthly total cost for leased line IC of a 2Mbit/s part circuit
2 km
977
1.000
5 km
356
395
225
258
258
294
373
373
445
475
152
152
250
372
372
410
306
397
397
467
554
590
652
629
556
546
509
500
497
€-month
732
754
750
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
- Monthly rental for 2km for Greece refers to August 2001.
38 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
UK
34 Mbit/s part circuit
Chart 34
Monthly rental for leased line IC of a 34 Mbit/s part circuit
EU average 2 km: 1 617€
5km: 2 310€
4.337
4.500
1.917
2.326
606
606
1.538
1.731
2.200
2.200
2.600
1.360
1.536
950
500
881
900
1.000
1.421
1.500
1.800
2.600
2.435
1.800
2.000
2.325
2.357
2.500
2.350
€-month
3.000
2.671
2.671
3.275
3.500
2.332
2.332
2km
5km
Recommended price ceiling 2km
Recommended price ceiling 5km
1.650
1.875
4.000
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark in force since October 2002.
- Figure for Greece refers to 2001
Chart 35
One-off charge for leased line IC of a 34 Mbit/s part circuit
17.500
one-off charge
15.000
12.500
EU average one-off charge
23.152*
EL
E
F
IRL
A
P
FIN
S
2.614
NL
4.292
L
1.500
I
2.775
D
998
DK
480
B
3.000
0
2.226
2.705
2.479
2.500
5.000
5.000
1.085
7.500
6.471
8.804
€
10.000
UK
* Value not to scale
- Figure for Denmark in force since October 2002. One-off charge in the chart refers to 2km. One-off charge for 5 km is
55 458€.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 39
Chart 36
Average monthly total cost for leased line IC of a 34 Mbit/s part circuit
4.876
5.000
2.135
2.543
837
837
1.895
2.089
2.415
2.415
1.775
2.000
2.240
2.240
1.610
1.786
2.690
1.890
1.960
1.107
1.367
1.500
500
5 km
3.500
2.660
3.334
2.534
2.000
2.742
2.500
2.810
3.000
2.557
€-month
3.500
2.857
2.857
4.000
1.000
2 km
4.286
4.500
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
- Figure for Denmark in force since October 2002.
Chart 37
Average EU deviation from price ceiling for leased lines interconnection
100%
82%
2001
2002
80%
60%
40%
50%
35%
24%
23%
20%
11%
-10%
-11%
0%
-20%
64 Kb 5 Km
2 Mb 5 Km
34 Mb 2 Km
34 Mb 5 Km
3.3.FIXED-TO-MOBILE INTERCONNECTION CHARGES
This section shows the per-minute interconnection charges for fixed call termination on the
networks of mobile operators. Charges are for calls originating in the same countries, except for
Finland, where charges for mobile termination of international fixed calls are considered.
The charges are based on the first three-minute call at peak rate, except for Finland, where the
average peak/off-peak rate set by the NRA has been shown. Different charges may apply for call
termination on other mobile networks.
40 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Except for Germany, the figures have been collected by the NRA, and give the position in August
2002. Data for Germany are not publicly disclosed by the NRA and the figure shown in the chart
was provided by Cullen International.
In the following chart figures are shown for a total of 12 operators with SMP in the national market
for interconnection (Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden). Figures for all the major
mobile operators in each country are also shown (24 operators with SMP in the national mobile
market). Denmark and Portugal applied to the non-SPM operators the same interconnection price as
for the SMP operators in the mobile market.
In France, mobile-to-mobile interconnection charges are based on the "bill and keep" principle, so
operators do not define termination charges.
Tariffs for Portugal are valid until 30.09.2002. Then, according to a NRA's decision they will be
progressively reduced to 18.7 cents/min.
Data for Finland indicate the interconnection charges for an international fixed call to a mobile
network (interconnection charges also apply to mobile-to-mobile calls). No mobile wholesale
termination charges exist for call originating on national fixed network; instead, so-called “enduser” charges are levied.. The originating fixed operator charge a customer for a fixed network
retail charge and for a mobile network retail charge (to be forward to the mobile operator). Both
fixed and mobile operators determine the charges of their own segments. Example of fixed-tomobile retail call charge (including VAT at peak rate) is 0,27€ for Sonera and 0,26€ for Radiolinja.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 41
Chart 38
Interconnection charges for call termination on mobile networks (peak)
EU weighetd average: all operators: 18,94 €/cents
SMP-ICl operators: 18,49 €/cents
20,96
UK-Vodafone
24,90
UK-T-Mobil
22,09
UK-Orange
19,83
UK-O2
20,39
S-Tele2 Mobil(*); Vodafone(*)
9,87
S-Telia(*)
13,2
FIN-Radiolinja(+)
12,8
FIN-Sonera(+)
P-Telecel (Vodaf.); Optimus
20,7
P-TMN(+)
20,7
19,6
A-Tele.ring
13,8
A-One; T-Mobil
11,3
A- Mobilkom
22,0
NL-Ben; Dutchtone;O2 NL; Vodafone
19,0
NL-KPN Mobile (+)
13,4
L-ETP(+); Millicon(+)
23,6
I-Wind
18,9
I-Omnitel(*)
19,9
I-TIM(*)
17,8
IRL-Meteor
14,9
IRL-Vodafone(*)
14,5
IRL-O2 (*)
22,4
F-Bouygues Tlc
18,2
F-Orange(*); SFR(*)
24,0
E-Retevision Mov.
21,0
E-Telefonica Mov.(*); Airtel Vodafone(*)
25,0
EL-Q Telecom
23,0
EL- Stet Hellas
21,0
EL-Vodafone(+)
19,7
EL-Cosmote(+)
17,9
D-Eplus; O2
14,3
D-T-Mobil; Vodafone
DK-Telia DK; Orange(Mobilix)
16,15
DK-TeleDK(+); Sonofon(+)
16,15
20,3
B-Base
23,0
B-Mobistar (+)
16,9
B-Belgacom Mob.(*)
0
5
10
€-cents per minute
15
20
Legend:
(*) SMP operators in the national interconnection market
(+) SMP operators in the national mobile market
42 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
25
Charge for the SMP operator Telia in Sweden refers to a weighted peak/off-peak average rate, set
out by the NRA. Charges for the other operators refer to a per minute peak rate. The SMP
designation for Tele2 Mobil and Vodafone has not taken effect due to pending court proceedings.
The following chart shows the mobile termination charges for the year 2001 and 2002 for the main
EU operators. EU weighted average trend is also shown.
Chart 39
23
22,1
20
19,8
21
24,9
21
21,0
20,7
24
18
9,9
13
14,5
13
13,4
16
14,9
19,0
23
19,9
18
23
18,9
20
21
21,0
21
21,0
17
16,9
16
16,2
13,1
10,0
11,3
14
15,0
5,0
UK-Vodafone
UK-One-to-one
UK-Cellnet o2
UK- Orange
S-Telia
P- TMN
NL-KPN
L-P&T
IRL-O2 (digifone
IRL- Vodafone
I Tim
I Omnitel
FIN Sonera
FIN Radio
F SFR
F Orange
EL-Cosmote
E Telefonica
E- Airtel
DK-TDC mob
B- Belgacom
0,0
A- Mobilkom
€-cents per minute
20,0
2002
12,8
2001
19,7
19
18,2
20
18,2
21
25,0
23
Fixed-to-mobile termination charges 2001-2002
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 43
44 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
4 MOBILE MARKET
4.1.MOBILE PENETRATION
The following charts estimate for each Member State the number of mobile subscribers and the
penetration rate in 2002 for second generation mobile services (DCS-GSM). Growth in the
penetration rate since August 2001 is also shown.
Subscriber figures are taken from FT Mobile Communications (August 2002) except for Germany,
Austria and the Netherlands, where updated figures were provided by the respective NRAs. Data
show the situation as at August 2002 and include both post-paid card and pre-paid subscribers.
EU average is a simple, rather than a weighted average.
The following chart shows the absolute number of mobile subscribers in each Member State
(columns) and their penetration rate (dots), expressed in terms of % of total subscribers over
population.
Figures for Italy, Spain, Sweden and Finland include analogue subscribers.
Chart 40
Mobile subscribers and penetration rate
Total EU subscribers: 284 millions
120%
70
Subscribers 2002(millions)
77%
71%
71%
79%
83%
78%
79%
87% 84%
51,0
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
7,6
4,4
DK
8,9
B
6,5
0
40%
20%
13,2
0,4
3,0
7,5
4,2
36,0
20
10
80%
86%
60%
31,0
30
61%
99%
47,0
78%
68%
100%
Penetration rate
55,9
50
40
Penetration
88%
7,3
Millions of subscribers
60
0%
S
UK
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 45
Chart 41
Mobile penetration and growth 2001-2002
EU average penetration (2002): 75%
EU av. penetration growth rate (2001-2002): 6%
August 2001
August 2002
100%
20%
Growth rate 2001/2002
16%
15%
Penetration rate
12%
80%
12%
12%
10%
60%
40%
9%
6%
9%
7%
7%
7%
10%
11%
5%
6%
0%
2%
20%
Growth
120%
-1%
0%
-5%
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
According to the Austrian NRA, the decline in the number of Austrian subscribers is due to a
revision in the definition of active subscriber. Non-regular users are excluded from these figures.
Chart 42
EU mobile subscribers and average penetration
80%
300
Subscribers
Penetration rate
250
75%
70%
200
50%
265
150
31%
18%
20%
10%
69
50
40%
30%
194
100
284
52%
115
Million of subscribers
60%
0
0%
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
46 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
EU average penetration rate
70%
Chart 43
EU average penetration rate
100%
90%
6%
EU average penetration
80%
36%
70%
69%
70%
60%
50%
68%
75%
52%
40%
30%
31%
20%
10%
18%
0%
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
- EU average is a simple, rather than a weighted average.
4.2. PLAYERS IN THE MOBILE MARKET
This section shows the number of mobile licences granted in each Member State for the provision
of analogue, GSM 900, DCS 1800 and UMTS services.
The data on the number of licensed operators have been provided by the national regulatory
authorities and indicate the position in October 2002.
Chart 44 shows the number of operators licensed to provide digital mobile services (secondgeneration) rather than the number of licences issued in each country. The number of operators
indicates the real magnitude of the choice of operators for customers of digital mobile services,
since very often operators have licences for both GSM 900 and DCS 1800. Mobile network
operators have been identified as having only GSM 900 or only DCS 1800 frequencies, or both (in
which case they have usually been granted a GSM 900 licence which has subsequently been
extended to the DCS 1800 band).
Information on mobile service providers12 has been included where available (without distinction
between local and national coverage).
In Finland, 21 local telephone companies have been awarded licences to operate local DCS 1800
services, but spectrum has been allocated to two mobile operators, Radiolinja and Suomen 2G, in
which those companies participate. Only 8 of these local companies are actually providing services.
The figure does not include 1 local GSM operator belonging to the Finnet Group (Alands) and 1
local GSM and 2 local DCS operators not belonging to the Finnet group. Only 3 mobile service
providers have started commercial operations.
Figure for France does not include 2 analogue, 6 GSM local and 6 DCS local licences granted to
the subsidiaries of the licensed mobile operators for the overseas departments13.
12
Mobile service providers are defined as entities authorised to offer mobile service under their own brand name
(dealing with marketing, billing, etc.), using a third party’s mobile network.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 47
Figures for Italy does not include the license of BLU since this has been withdrawn.
Chart 44
Operators authorised to provide digital mobile services
Total EU: 54 network operators
100 mobile service providers
20
Service providers
GSM and DCS
DCS or GSM only
15
13
14
10
12
47*
10
1
5
3
B
DK
D
EL
E
3
3
F
IRL
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
L
NL
A
3
3
I
2
2
2
S
UK
1
2
1
0
3
1
3
4
1
4
P
FIN
* Values not to scale
The following chart shows the number of analogue licences still active in Europe and the date on
which the phasing-out of these networks is expected to be completed. All the analogue licences
have been granted to the subsidiary of the incumbent fixed network operator.
Chart 45
Analogue licences and phasing out
Total EU: 4 licences
FIN: 1 lic.
I: 1 lic.
E: 1 lic.
S: 1 lic.
2001
13
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Département de la Réunion, Antilles Françaises, Guyane; Île de Saint Martin et Saint Barthélémy)
48 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
2007
Chart 46 shows the number of UMTS licences granted in Europe. The great majority of licences
have been granted to players still active in the second generation market, and 14 licences have been
granted to new entrants.
Figure for Finland does not include a local service provider.
Chart 46
UMTS licences
Total EU: 62 licences
8
2
1
2
4
1
2
IRL
3
4
F
1
E
2
1
EL
2
3
1
4
3
DK
3
3
B
3
3
3
1
4
5
2
5
4
2
6
2
Operators with UMTS licence only
Operators with UMTS and GSM/DCS licences
7
1
0
D
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
4.3.OPERATORS’ MARKET SHARES
The following charts show the market shares, in terms of subscribers, of the main competitors in the
second generation mobile market.
Since in four countries the incumbent’s subsidiary is still providing the analogue service on the
basis of a de jure or de facto monopoly, the operators’ market shares have been calculated on two
different relevant markets: the overall mobile market (including analogue, DCS 1800 and GSM 900
subscribers) and the digital market only (DCS 1800 and GSM 900).
Data concerning shares of the mobile market are based on estimates of the number of mobile
subscribers, taken from FT Mobile Communications, and refer to August 2002. They have been
compiled on the same basis in each country, and are therefore comparable. However, different
figures might be obtained if the underlying raw data were collected/estimated on a different basis
(number of subscribers, pre-paid card, minutes of conversation, etc.) or if a different method of
calculation was used.
Apart from the United Kingdom, the leading operator is a subsidiary of the incumbent fixed
network operator.
Chart 47 shows the shares of the leading operator, of the main competitor and of the other
competitors on the digital mobile market only (100%).
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 49
Chart 47
P
12,5%
47,5%
25,2%
37,7%
29,8%
16,4%
27,3%
A
45,9%
NL
57,7%
22,2%
45,3%
32,5%
25,2%
43,5%
31,2%
30,5%
44,1%
61,0%
25,5%
33,8%
39,0%
20,3%
4
16,4%
34,6%
19,0%
24,1%
39,1%
45,9%
EL
56,7%
D
49,0%
DK
56,9%
24,4%
43,4%
32,2%
20,6%
38,1%
36,7%
41,8%
54,4%
50%
39,6%
23,7%
30,1%
100%
15,5%
Digital mobile market share
(GSM 900/DCS 1800)
0%
B
E
F
Leading operator
IRL
I
L
Main competitor
FIN
S
UK
Other competitors
The following chart shows the share of the overall mobile market held by the mobile subsidiary of
the incumbent fixed operator. Where the incumbent still operates the analogue service, the shares of
the overall mobile market of their analogue and digital services are indicated separately.
Chart 48
Overall mobile market share of the
subsidiary of the incumbent fixed operator
70%
GSM 900/DCS 1800
60%
Analogue
0,7%
0,4%
50%
1,8%
2,7%
P
23,8%
45,3%
A
45,1%
43,5%
NL
57,3%
44,1%
61,0%
44,7%
EL
56,7%
D
49,0%
43,4%
DK
56,7%
41,81%
20%
39,6%
30%
54,4%
40%
10%
0%
B
E
F
IRL
I
L
FIN
50 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
S
UK
Chart 49
EU average mobile operators' market share
100%
Leading operator
Competitors
80%
0,64
0,56
60%
0,50
0,50
40%
0,52
0,53
0,48
0,47
0,44
0,36
20%
0%
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
4.4.MOBILE BASKET
The analysis of national (as opposed to roaming) mobile services is based on the OECD baskets for
GSM/DCS services, as provided by Total Research Teligen in the August 2002 T-Basket. Due to
significant changes in usage patterns the OECD baskets have been redefined with effect from
August 200214.
Since the results from the ‘new’ baskets are not finalised yet, the ‘old’ OECD baskets will be used
in this section.15
The ‘old’ OECD baskets cover calls to local (70% of national calls) and distant (20% of national
calls) fixed line phones, mobile phones in the same network (10% of national calls), and
international calls.
All packages analysed are post-paid packages. The analysis is based on packages from the leading16
operator in each country. Other providers may offer lower prices.
The low intensity basket will be typical for personal usage, with a weight towards afternoon and
evening, and a lower number of calls (total 202 calls per year, of these 2 are international).
The high intensity basket is more typical for professional usage, with a heavy weight towards
business hours, and far more calls than the low intensity basket (total 1272 calls per year, of these
72 are international).
The baskets cover all relevant charges, i.e. 1/5 of the activation charge, annual rental charges, and
call charges as defined above.
14
The ‘new’ baskets are not compatible with the “old” ones, in that they contain an SMS element, they include calls to
several mobile networks, and they do not cover international calls. The new baskets will cover more than one
operator per country, and a range of packages per operator. This means that the results from the new baskets will
come out very different from the results obtained in previous years.
15
A full description of the methodology can be found in the document ‘OECD Telecommunications Basket
definitions’, June 2000, available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00005000/M00005340.pdf
16
In terms of number of subscribers.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 51
The packages from each operator have been selected as appropriate for each of the two baskets,
based on an analysis of the range of packages offered.
Several packages offer an amount of free calls, included in the package price. These free calls are
subtracted from the usage charges.
Chart 50
Average mobile monthly expenditure –personal profile
40
2000
35
31,00
2002
16,46
12,59
15,47
17,73
14,27
10,44
10
21,12
21,46
19,86
20,69
19,58
15
19,95
20
21,04
25,49
25
16,38
€, including VAT
30
2001
5
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK EU15
Chart 51
Average mobile monthly expenditure –business profile
140
120
2000
2001
2002
81,72
20
57,63
40,59
46,76
42,94
41,98
59,55
67,09
67,58
44,73
20,56
40
51,58
62,49
65,75
60
54,74
80
80,72
€, excluding VAT
100
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
52 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
UK EU15
Chart 52
Variation in the average mobile expenditure, personal profile
8%
3%
28
27,42
-2%
26
-7%
26,28
-12%
24
-23%
-17%
22
21,12
20
% Reduction since 2000
€ per month, including VAT
30
-22%
-27%
2000
2001
2002
Chart 53
Variation in the average mobile expenditure, business profile
70,00
68,54
-2%
66,00
64,77
64,00
-7%
62,00
-12%
60,00
-20,1%
58,00
54,74
56,00
54,00
-17%
% Reduction since 2000
€ per month, excluding VAT
68,00
-22%
52,00
50,00
-27%
2000
2001
2002
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 53
54 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
5 LOCAL ACCESS AND PRICING
5.1.BROADBAND ACCESS
This section provides data on the number and type of broadband lines supplied by both incumbent
operators and new entrants in the EU. It also contains information on access lines provided by
means of alternative technologies such as wireless access (WLL), satellite and cable modems.
Information have been collected from the national regulatory authorities though the ONP COM0218 questionnaire on data for local broadband access. Given the rapid developments in this sector, it
has been agreed with NRAs to update the ONP questionnaire data on a regular basis in January,
July and October. Unless otherwise stated data below refer to the situation as at 1st October 2002.
For the collection of data the following concepts have been used:
•
“New entrants” refers not only to alternative telecommunications operators, but also include the
internet service providers (ISPs);
•
In the case of full unbundling, the copper pair is rented to a third party for its exclusive use;
•
As fully unbundled lines (ULL) supplied by incumbent to new entrants could in principle be
used for services other than broadband the total number of ULL for access to internet will be
lower than the total number of ULL;
•
In the case of shared access, the incumbent continues to provide telephony service, while the
new entrant deliver high speed data services over the same local loop;
•
Bitstream access refers to the situation where the incumbent installs a high speed access link to
the customer premises (e.g. by installing its preferred ADSL equipment and configuration in its
local access network) and then makes this link available to third parties, to enable them to
provide high speed services to customers. The incumbent may also provide transmission
services to its competitors, to carry traffic to a “higher” level in the network hierarchy where
new entrants may already have a broadband point of presence;
•
In contrast to bitstream access, simple resale occurs where the new entrant receives and sells on
to end-users - with no possibility of value-added features to the DSL part of the service - a
product that is commercially similar to the DSL product provided by the incumbent to its own
retail customers, irrespective of the ISP service that may be packaged with it;
•
Retail broadband access refers to the access provided to the end users;
•
Incumbents’ DSL lines refers to the lines provided to end users by the incumbent, its
subsidiaries or partners;
•
Other means of accessing the internet indicates connections by means of satellite, fibre optic,
powerline communications, etc;
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 55
5.1.1. Wholesale access
This section shows the availability of wholesale access supplied by incumbents to new entrants.
Separate figures are provided for full unbundled lines, shared access and bitstream access
(wholesale DSL lines.
Table 4 Number of agreements for full ULL, shared access, bitstream access and resale.
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
N. of agreements
on fully unbundled
lines
7
16
91
2
6
9
1
31
n.a.
10
12
4
180
33
53
N. of
agreements on
shared lines
4
5
3
0
6
9
1
2
n.a.
10
0
n.a.
80
33
5
N. of agreements
Wholesale DSL lines
supplied. Bitstream access
4
5
2
0
38
4
0
50
n.a.
n.a.
24
4
60
4
309
N. agreements
Wholesale DSL lines
supplied. Simple resale
12
1
52
0
n.a.
5
0
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0
n.a.
35
5
0
455
158
504
110
Tot. EU
Chart 54
Availability of wholesale access in the EU
Incumbent's PSTN activated main lines: 186,68 million
1.600.000
1.348.617
1.400.000
1.200.000
1.050.740
1.000.000
800.000
600.000
400.000
200.000
27.700
0
Fully unbundled lines
Shared access lines supplied by the incumbent to new entrants
Wholesale DSL lines
56 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 55
Wholesale access. Number of full unbundled lines
100.000
855.404
90.000
82.100
80.000
N° of lines
70.000
60.000
50.000
44.061
40.000
35.000
30.000
18.629
20.000
10.000
1.556
93
0
B
DK
D
EL
1.181 1.043
E
F
7.300
26
IRL
2.818
1.509
S
UK
20
I
NL
A
P
FIN
D not to scale
Chart 56
Wholesale access. Number of shared access lines supplied by the
incumbent to new entrants
10.478
10.000
8.000
7.500
N° of lines
6.960
6.000
4.000
2.000
1.568
1.039
0
B
DK
13
0
0
61
62
19
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
NL
0
0
A
P
0
FIN
S
UK
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 57
Chart 57
Wholesale access. Number of DSL lines supplied by the incumbent to
new entrants (bitstream access)
220.000
200.000
210.000
180.000
160.000
N° of lines
165.820
166.413
140.000
120.000
100.000
105.217
80.000
60.000
40.000
20.000
0
22.100
140
250
B
DK
8.000
0
D
EL
E
F
0
IRL
I
A
5.633
2.000
2.000
P
FIN
S
UK
UK not to scale
58 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
5.1.2. Retail broadband access to internet
This section show the availability of broadband access to internet for end-users provided by
incumbents (its subsidiary or partners) and by new entrants (alternative telecom operators or
Internet Service Providers).
Internet broadband access can be provided through different means: DSL lines, wireless local loop
(WLL), cable TV access (cable modem), dedicated leased lines and other access (like satellite, fibre
optic powerline communications, etc..)
New entrants’ DSL lines can be provided to end users by means of full unbundled, shared access,
bitstream access or resale.
Chart 58 shows the total number of broadband access to internet for each Member States provided
by both incumbents and new entrants and including all means of broadband connections.
Chart 58
Total number of retail broadband access lines to internet
1.300.000
1.226.343
1.200.000
1.126.695
3.376.013
1.050.783
1.100.000
985.339
1.000.000
Nº of lines
900.000
800.000 753.834
740.630
700.000
600.000
500.000
428.750
404.000
359.876
400.000
206.500
300.000
200.000
128.460
100.000
3.476
686
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
D not to scale
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 59
Chart 59
Availability of incumbent's and new entrants' retail broadband access to
internet, EU 15
7.000.000
5.863.090
6.000.000
Nº of lines
5.000.000
4.000.000
2.791.919
3.000.000
1.656.700
2.000.000
1.000.000
479.676
0
Incumbent's DSL lines
Incumbents' access lines by other means
New entrants' DSL lines on PSTN
New entrants' access lines by other means
Chart 60
Availability of incumbent's and new entrants' DSL lines, EU 15
5863090
6.000.000
Nº of lines
5.000.000
1656700
4.000.000
871044
3.000.000
477573
2.000.000
282837
1.000.000
Total
Resale
25246
0
Full ULL
Incumbents
New
entrants
Bitstream
access
Shared
access
60 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 61
Availability of incumbent's and new entrants' retail broadband access to
internet by alternative means, EU 15
2791919
2577968
3.000.000
Nº of lines
2.500.000
479676
2.000.000
1.500.000
224998
112015
1.000.000
500.000
235664
89905
12031
Total
19007
0
7
New entrants
Incumbents
Other
Leased
lines
Cable
modem
WLL
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 61
Chart 62
Availability of incumbent's and new entrants' retail DSL access to internet
D not to scale.
DT:2,580,000
New Op: 691.013
F
IRL
I
A
P
FIN
NL
232014
167329
E
264000
82000
EL
112000
19500
D
5155
5653
DK
113900
25976
B
221676
1714
183
0
29107
147502
201104
93
100.000
216000
51271
69556
200.000
166413
370728
400.000
300.000
New entrants DSL lines
475000
500.000
Nº of lines
Incumbent's DSL lines
579903
600.000
691000
700.000
S
UK
Chart 63
Availability of incumbent's and new entrants' retail broadband access to
internet by alternative means
500.000
NL not to scale.
Value: 800.000
Incumbents' access lines by other means
New entrants' access lines by other means
450.000
400.000
UK not to scale.
Value: 667.000
300.000
F
NL
A
FIN
160000
P
58000
0
L
0
I
0
IRL
45400
29600
E
75104
42548
EL
0
D
0
593
DK
0
0
B
19000
86000
0
73328
88151
50.000
953
100.000
330
117798
150.000
1
1578
200.000
47560
187031
239023
250.000
220000
312597
Nº of lines
350.000
S
UK
5.2.PRICES FOR UNBUNDLED LOCAL LOOP
This section show the charges per unbundled loop (monthly rental and connection) in case of full
unbundled and shared access of the loop. Estimates of total average monthly rental cost (based on
the total costs for the first year) is also presented.
62 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
In the following we assume that the loop is active and will be used to provide DSL services. In fact
some Member States (Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal) charge a different price for the loop,
depending on if it is used for the voice telephony services or for DSL services. Furthermore,
Belgium applied a different price for non-active loop and in some Member States charges are
different in case of subsequent access.
5.2.1.
PRICES FOR FULL UNBUNDLED LOCAL LOOP
In Belgium a supplementary fee of 28.29 for disconnection is also charged. It should be noted that a
disconnection fee is not charged to the incumbent's own retail market.
Data for the connection fee in Germany refers to a unique payment option.
The connection charge for Italy, also includes the charges for the "verification/preparation of the
copper line for the provision of ADSL service", that is always paid by the OLOs, except in the case
of an existing customer changing from the incumbent to the OLO.
Data for Finland refer to a weighted average of 44 SMP operators providing ULL. Prices vary
between 10 -31 € for the monthly rental and between 105 - 303 € for the connection fee.
Data for connection fee in Sweden refers to the first access. Charges for the following access is 85€.
Figure for the United Kingdom refer to an average based on determined price of 194€ per annum
for the monthly rental and on a price of 140€ per annum for connection fee.
Chart 64
Prices per full unbundled loop
EU avg.: monthly rental: 12.8 €
connection: 103.6 €
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
I
L
NL
P
FIN
11,3
14,7
140,3
82,9
A
13,8
10,9
54,5
13,5
15,8
79,0
91,4
IRL
11,1
16,8
10,5
78,7
0,0
12,6
20,0
11,5
70,6
12,5
8,3
45,4
13,3
50,0
79,9
100,0
121,5
123,4
€
150,0
165,2
185,6
Connection
S
16,2
Monthly rental
200,0
216,0
250,0
UK
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 63
Chart 65
Monthly average total cost per full unbundled loop
I
NL
P
22,6
B
21,8
20,7
D
20,1
18,7
17,1
14,3
18,4
10,0
12,1
15,0
15,4
€
20,0
19,9
27,9
26,9
25,0
25,0
31,3
30,0
32,7
35,0
5,0
0,0
DK
E
A
F
EL
EU
S
IRL
UK
L
FIN
- Estimates are based on the total cost for the loop for the first year.
5.2.2. PRICES FOR SHARED ACCESS LOCAL LOOP
In Belgium a supplementary fee of 28.73€ for disconnection is also charged. It should be noted that
a disconnection fee is not charged to the incumbent's own retail market.
Connection fee in Denmark decrease to 57€, when taking over an existing shared access connection.
Data for the connection fee in Germany refers to a unique payment option.
Data for Finland refer to a weighted average of 44 SMP operators providing shared access to local
loop. According to the Telecom Market Act, monthly rental for shared access may add up to
maximum half the price for full unbundling. Prices for connection fees vary between 57€ and 260€.
Data for Sweden for connection fee refers to the first access. Charges for the following access is
85€.
Data for the United Kingdom refer to an average based on determined price of 84€ per annum for
the monthly rental and on a price of 186€ per annum for connection fee.
64 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 66
Prices per shared access
EU avg: .monthly rental: 5,6 €
connection: 121,6 €
B
DK
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
186,5
160,0
FIN
S
7,0
5,4
118,0
P
7,0
7,9
109,0
5,5
5,6
7,5
81,0
2,8
9,0
78,7
D
2,9
4,8
27,0
6,9
4,8
4,1
3,2
0,0
89,2
123,4
141,9
74,9
86,5
€
100,0
50,0
173,8
Monthly rental
Connection
178,4
150,0
196,2
200,0
UK
Chart 67
Monthly average total cost per shared access
IRL
P
UK
23,9
22,6
DK
20,3
EL
15,8
14,5
19,3
B
19,0
10,4
I
18,7
9,6
F
7,0
5,0
9,4
10,0
11,0
13,0
€
15,0
15,2
20,0
22,4
25,0
0,0
E
D
NL
A
S
EU
FIN
L
- Estimates are based on the total cost for the loop for the first year.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 65
66 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
6 INTERNET SERVICES
6.1.INTERNET MARKET DATA
This section provides information about the penetration of the internet in European households as
well as about the number of Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
The following chart shows the percentage of households having internet access, irrespective of the
technologies used: normal public switched telephone network (PSTN) or broadband access (DSL,
cable modem, ISDN, WLL).
The source of the data on internet penetration is the Flash Eurobarometer ‘Internet and the public at
large’ carried out for the Commission by EOS GALLUP Europe between May and June 2002.
A new survey will be carried out in November 2002 for which data will be available in December
2002.
The data on the number of ISPs and the availability of broadband access have been provided by the
national regulatory authorities.
Chart 68
Household penetration of internet access 2001-2002
58,5%
65,5%
A
58,9%
64,5%
46,2%
49,1%
IRL
S
DK
NL
55,0%
46,2%
47,9%
37,9%
43,7%
34,7%
40,9%
35,5%
UK
26,2%
P
32,9%
35,4%
E
46,5%
45,0%
10%
11,7%
9,2%
20%
23,4%
30,8%
30%
23,4%
29,5%
40%
43,6%
JUNE 2002
50%
48,1%
53,7%
JUNE 2001
60%
64,3%
64,2%
70%
0%
EL
I
F
B
D
FIN
L
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 67
Chart 69
Estimated number of ISPs
900
800
800
700
700
600
500
401
400
300
250
200
200
100
105
99
32
16
50
20
0
B
DK
EL
E
F
I
L
A
P
FIN
UK
Chart 70
Market share of incumbent operators acting as an ISP
60%
50,85%
50%
50%
46,50%
38,90%
40%
34%
35,00%
33%
30%
23%
20%
20%
10%
0%
DK
EL
E
F
I
A
FIN
S
- Data for B, D, IRL, L, NL and P are not available.
68 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
UK
Chart 71
Availability and penetration rate of incumbent's and new entrants' retail
broadband access to internet
D: Not to scale.
Value:3,376,013
1.400.000
8%
7%
Nº of lines
6%
7%
1.000.000
4%
800.000
5%
4%
5%
4%
8%
7%
1.200.000
4%
600.000
9%
3%
2%
400.000
2%
1%
200.000
2%
2%
1%
1%
0
% of population with broadband
access
1.600.000
0%
EL
IRL
P
FIN
A
S
DK
I
B
E
NL
F
UK
D
Availability of incumbent's and new entrants' retail broadband access to internet
Broadband penetration
6.2.INTERNET ACCESS PRICING
This section deals with the cost of internet usage for residential (20 hours off-peak time usage) and
business (40 hours peak time usage of 40 ) through dial-up modems for access.
The figures and information are taken from a study carried out for the European Commission by
Total Research Teligen and give the position as at 1 May 2002.
For each profile of usage, the following charts show the lowest prices of dial-up services to ISPs via
a standard telephone line in each country. This has required the analysis of the telephony charges in
the 15 countries, in addition to the actual ISP charges, in order to find the best overall option for the
types of access described by the basket profiles..
The overall summary of the dial-up access information collected covers 92 different providers with
253 packages in the 15 countries.
The criteria for selecting the ISPs were that:
•
The top 5 ISPs in each country should be covered;
•
Fewer ISPs could be covered as long as the combined market share was at least 80%;
•
If the top 5 ISPs had less than 50% of the market, additional ISPs should be covered up to
around 80% combined market share.
The analysis of dial-up access includes:
•
PSTN line rental charges for residential users. Any additional charges related to the selection of
the most appropriate tariff package for internet access is also included. This may for example be
a telephony charge related to a certain access option;
•
PSTN call charges as applicable for internet access, either using the standard local call charges,
or charges defined in special internet access tariffs. Additional discounts are also analysed in
this context, where they may provide even lower access call charges, for example after a certain
period of access time. It should be noted that with many ISP services there are no call charges,
or different call charges from the carrier, as determined by the ISP;
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 69
•
ISP monthly rental and/or connection charges for each ISP package. Most ISPs identify their
packages for use by residential and/or business users;
•
ISP charges related to usage. Such charges are normally given on a per hour basis, and are
accumulated to the number of hours or minutes of usage per month. Any amount of inclusive
time offered with the monthly rental charge is deducted from the actual usage. Many ISP
services do not have such charges;
Many operators or ISPs will have special dial up tariffs for internet access, and these have been
used where appropriate.
Chart 72
Lowest internet access cost for 20 hours at off-peak time (residential users)
40
ISP fixed
PSTN Rental
20 h access
15,06
11,92
14,57
11,65
18,48
16,42
13,36
13,46
13,54
P
FIN
S
11,10
13,86
12,00
14,00
18,40
13,63
19,60
12,55
6,86
13,54
8,47
DK
9,99
7,31
B
13,33
10
5
14,64
15,10
12,50
11,78
10,68
15
15,73
20
16,20
€
25
5,01
30
10,37
-
35
0
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
UK
Chart 73
Lowest internet access cost for 40 hours at peak time (business users)
90
ISP fixed
80
PSTN Rental
40 h access
70
21,7
7,3
12,8
23,9
20,8
10
15,4
14,4
16,2
-11,0
F
-11,9
E
23,3
EL
17,6
D
28,0
DK
13,8
37,1
19,7
B
-11,4
8,5
5,9
16,0
38,6
17,2
10,5
10,0
23,3
0
6,4
10
13,4
20
10,5
11,5
30
3,6
12,6
10,9
40
11,7
€
50
62,6
60
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
70 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
7 PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY TARIFFS
INCUMBENTS’ RETAIL TARIFFS FOR PUBLIC FIXED VOICE TELEPHONY
This section examines the charging system, the line rental charges and the main tariffs for public
fixed voice telephony charged by the incumbent operators in each Member State17 in August 2002.
The price trend over the past four years is also analysed.
The incumbent operators still retain a large market share, but new entrants are increasingly gaining
market shares by offering cheaper prices for certain types of calls (usually long-distance or
international) or destination. The prices charged by incumbents do not necessarily, therefore,
represent the lowest prices available. A comparison between the rates charged by incumbents and
alternative operators for a sample of countries is shown at the end of this section.
The figures and information are taken from a study carried out for the Commission by Total
Research-Total Research Teligen. The data are collected from primary sources (i.e. directly from
the incumbent operators).
Different sets of charges for fixed national voice telephony services are shown in the following
sections:
- the minimum costs for different types of calls (local, long-distance, international calls and calls
towards mobile networks), depending on the charging system adopted;
- the monthly rentals charged by incumbent operators;
- the charges for a composite basket of calls (local, long-distance, international fixed calls and calls
to mobile), that gives an estimate of the average monthly spending by a typical “European
business/residential user” for the whole range (national and international) of calls;
- the charges for a basket of national calls, that gives an estimate of the average monthly spending
by a typical “European business/residential user” for fixed national calls;
- the basket of international calls for each country that indicates the average price of a single call
from the originating country to all other OECD destinations. In addition, the price of individual
calls to specific destinations are also shown.
- the price of some individual calls (3- and 10-minute local, long-distance and international calls) at
peak time, inclusive of any initial charge. Furthermore, for incumbents which apply unit-based
charging, the price of a whole unit is calculated.
For the various types of calls, a benchmark based on a comparison with US and Japan is also
included. For the USA, the prices for national calls are those charged by Nynex/Bell
Atlantic/Verizon (in New York city)18 and the prices for international calls are those charged by
17
18
The incumbent operators considered are the following: Belgacom for Belgium, Tele Denmark for Denmark,
Deutsche Telekom for Germany, OTE for Greece, Telefonica for Spain, France Telecom for France, Eircom for
Ireland, Telecom Italia for Italy, P&T Luxembourg for Luxembourg, KPN for the Netherlands, Telekom Austria
for Austria, Portugal Telecom for Portugal, Sonera for Finland, Telia for Sweden, British Telecom for the United
Kingdom.
The operator has changed name twice during the past five years. Prices for the same operator may vary depending
on the specific user location in the area covered by the local operator. We have taken the prices for New York city.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 71
AT&T. For Japan, the national call prices are those charged by NTT and the international call prices
are those charged by KDD.
The EU average tariffs shown in the charts are weighted average (by population of the Member
States in 1999) rather than simple averages.
7.1.CHARGING SYSTEM
The billing system for public voice telephony services usually comprises two components: an initial
charge applied at the beginning of a call and a charge for the remainder of the call (that may not
depend on the type of initial charge used).
7.1.1. Initial charges
There are different types of charges applied at the beginning of a call, either alone or in
combination. The charging method used for the remainder of the call may not depend on the type of
initial charge used. The types of charges are:
Call set-up charge raised at the start of the call (when the call is answered). This charge does not
offer any call time.
Initial charge that is used in the same way as call set-up, but in addition includes a certain number
of seconds call time before normal time-based charging starts.
Unit charge does in effect work the same way as the initial charge. A full unit is charged at the
beginning of the call, providing a certain number of seconds call time until the next unit is charged.
Depending on the principle used by the operator (synchronous / asynchronous) the number of
seconds call time in the first unit may be less than the specified unit duration.
Minimum charge is normally used with per second billing, to ensure the operator minimum revenue
per call. If the call duration is short, the actual call charge may be less than the minimum charge. In
such cases the minimum charge will be applied.
7.1.2. Charging system during the call
There are in principle 3 ways of charging calls. The fact that most operators tend to publish the
duration charges on a per minute basis does not itself indicate which system is used. The 3
principles are:
Real time charging (also known as per second billing) allows the cost of the call to be calculated to
the exact duration of the call (normally nearest second). Call set-up charge, initial charge or
minimum charge may be applied to this structure, in addition to the duration charge.
Unit based charging uses a fixed price unit. The duration of this unit will vary with the destination
of the call and time of day. Call duration will always be raised to a multiple of whole units, so the
user will nearly always pay for more time than is used. Call set-up charge may be applied to this
structure, but is relatively rare.
Fixed period charging uses a variable price, but fixed duration unit. The call is normally charged on
a per minute basis, or per 6 seconds. The price for the period will vary with destination and time of
day. The charged duration of the call will be raised to a multiple of whole periods. A call set-up
charge or initial charge is often implemented in the form of a higher charge for the first minute or
period. This initial charge may vary with destination and time of day.
72 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
In August 2001 only the incumbents in Greece, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany (for local and
international calls19) still use a unit-based charging system. No changes are reported since the
situation in August 2001.
Call set-up charges may vary according to the type of call (local, long-distance, international, calls
to mobile), and for international calls according to destination. In the case of international calls, the
minimum cost of a call may change according to the destination.
The following charts show the minimum cost, due to initial charges, for local, long-distance and
international calls and calls to mobile charged by the incumbent operators. The free call time (i.e.
the number of seconds of call time before normal time-based charging starts) is shown in brackets.
Values are expressed in €, including VAT. It should be noted that while some operators apply
identical set-up charges to local and long-distance calls, the free call times can vary, as is the case in
Austria and Portugal.
Chart 74
Minimum cost of local and long-distance calls
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
L
NL
A
P
13,35012594
FIN
S
8,04400978
8,04
5,78 (60 sec.)
2,76 (30 sec.)
3,36 (30 sec.)
4,857355656
4,86
7,56
13,57 (60 sec.)
13,57 (10 sec.)
12,6148
I
4,1412
5,00
7,87
6,192
6,2928
6,29
IRL
3,19 (60 sec.)
3,19 (60 sec.)
0
9,66
12,30 (60 sec.)
2
9,69 (160 sec.)
4
3,357732859
3,36
6
4,04 (60 sec.)
4,04 (25 sec.)
8
6,00 (90 sec.)
10
4,9489
4,95
€-cents, VAT included
12
9,37 (60 sec.)
11,59 (39 sec.)
Local call
Long distance call
14
5,40 (180 sec.)
6,35 (45 sec.)
16
UK USA JAP
- Austria: Peak time
19
National calls and calls to mobile are charged per minute rather than the normal unit.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 73
Chart 75
Minimum cost of a call to a mobile phone
37,98
40
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
9,53
8,04
4,86
7,56
9,60
5,00
7,87
5
6,29
10
3,36
15
13,35
18,60
20
25,00
24,60
25
26,97
34,22
30
9,91
€-cents, VAT included
35
UK USA JAP
- Austria: Peak time
Chart 76
Minimum cost of an international call
40
DK
D
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
5,72
8,04
4,86
7,56
11,88
4,52
0
B
12,36
14,36
6,29
11,24
6,13
5
3,36
10
13,77
15
12,59
18,84
20
24,29
24,60
25
29,54
30,98
30
9,91
€-cents, VAT included
36,52
Min
Max
35
USA JAP
- Data for EL not available
7.2.MONTHLY RENTAL CHARGED BY THE INCUMBENT OPERATORS
The following charts show the incumbent’s monthly line rental charges for residential and business
users in August 2002 and the variation in nominal terms in each country since August 1998. In
order to reflect the real charges actually paid by users, values are expressed in €, including VAT for
residential users and excluding VAT for business users.
The incumbent operators in Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom apply different monthly line
rental charges for residential and business users. In the Netherlands and Austria two different
74 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
packages have been chosen for residential and business users, hence different charges. In the other
countries the differences between the types of users are due only to the exclusion of VAT for
business users.
Chart 77
Residential monthly rental
25,00
Aug 2001
13,49
13,49
FIN
S
P
FIN
16,28
15,48
13,79
13,46
P
11,30
11,03
A
13,86
14,10
18,49
15,98
NL
11,85
11,85
16,43
17,20
12,83
14,88
18,42
18,40
18,24
19,60
12,55
13,00
11,45
13,54
DK
9,70
11,78
B
10,00
12,69
13,33
15,22
15,71
15,00
Aug 2002
16,20
16,20
€, VAT included
20,00
5,00
0,00
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
UK
Chart 78
Business monthly rental
25,00
NL
12,52
12,52
L
17,44
17,44
15,73
15,73
I
16,01
16,00
13,10
IRL
10,49
9,87
11,68
8,22
9,98
10,94
11,49
12,18
12,57
10,00
13,39
13,39
15,00
14,62
15,20
Aug 2002
15,07
16,20
€, VAT excluded
21,43
22,14
Aug 2001
20,00
5,00
0,00
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
A
S
UK
The following charts show the EU weighted average variation in nominal terms of the residential
and business monthly line rental charge.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 75
Chart 79
Chart 80
Residential rental per month
Business rental per month
EU15 weighted average
EU15 weighted average
16,00
16,00
15,46
15,00
14,72
14,50
14,00
13,77
13,50
13,00
12,50
13,52
15,00
14,50
14,25
14,00
13,50
12,92
15,64
15,50
€, VAT excluded
€, VAT included
15,50
14,59
14,13
13,43
13,00
12,00
Aug 1998
Aug 1999
Aug 2000
Aug 2001
Aug 2002
Aug 1998
Aug 1999
Aug 2000
Aug 2001
Aug 2002
7.3.AVERAGE MONTHLY EXPENDITURE (composite call basket)
The figures presented in this section are intended to provide an estimate of the average monthly
expenditure of a “standard” European consumer (business and residential). The Basket
Methodology for Telecommunications Cost Comparison has been devised by the OECD and
accepted in most countries as the most stable and neutral method of comparison20.
The user is assumed to have a contract for the provision of voice telephony services with the
incumbent operator, and to use only this operator for all types of calls (local, long-distance,
international, calls to mobile). Since consumers are making increasing use of call-by-call carrier
selection, in particular for specific highly discounted types of calls (i.e. international and longdistance), the figures given below are purely indicative, and do not necessarily reflect the cheapest
solution available.
The charts below show the average monthly expenditure for standard residential and business users
as of August 2002, expressed in €, based on the standard tariffs charged by the incumbent operators
(i.e. excluding any discount packages). This means that lower costs can be achieved if the user
subscribes to one or more discounted packages.
The basket of calls used to estimate average monthly expenditure is the new “composite OECD
basket”21, which includes not only fixed national calls (as did the old basket), but also fixed
international calls and calls to mobile networks.
The OECD residential/business baskets are defined as follows (on an annual basis):
The fixed (i.e. non-recurring) charges include the annual line rental charge plus the charge for the
installation of a new line (depreciated over 5 years). Fixed charges for residential users include
VAT, while for business users VAT is excluded.
The usage charge for residential users refers to a basket of 1.200 national calls to fixed lines, plus
120 calls (with an average duration of 2 minutes) to mobile networks22, plus 72 international calls23.
The usage charges for national calls to fixed lines are calculated with a weighted distribution24 over
14 distances from 3 to 490 km, at representative times of day (4 calls during the week and 2 during
the weekend). The call duration varies from 2.5 to 7 minutes, depending on time and distance. The
20
A full description of the methodology can be found in “Performance indicators for public telecommunications
operators”, ICCP Series No.2.2, OECD 1990.
21
The revised OECD baskets were adopted in May 2000.
22
Representing 10% of the number of calls to fixed lines.
23
Representing 6% of the number of calls to fixed lines.
24
A full description of the revision to the baskets and the weighted distribution (distances, time and day points and call
duration) can be found in the document ‘OECD Telecommunications Basket definitions’, June 2000, available at
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00005000/M00005340.pdf
76 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
usage for residential users is weighted towards off-peak hours, and with typically long calls. Only
36% of the calls are within normal business hours; 64% are for distances below 10 km; 9% are for
distances above 100 km.
The usage charge for business users refers to a basket of 3 600 national calls to fixed lines plus 360
calls (with an average call duration of 2 minutes) to mobile networks22, plus 216 international
calls23. The usage charges for national calls to fixed lines are calculated with a weighted
distribution24 over 14 distances from 3 to 490 km, at representative times of day (4 calls during the
week and 2 during the weekend), and with a call duration of 3.5 minutes regardless of time of day
and distance. The usage for business users is weighted towards business hours, and with typically
short calls. Over 86% of the calls are within normal business hours; 64% are for distances below
10km; 12.5% are for distances above 100 km.
Chart 81
Average monthly expenditure (composite basket)
Residential users
Fixed
44
60
16
B
UK
FIN
P
15
10
14
15
20
21
29
15
31
28
17
30
12
EL
25
29
14
F
18
26
15
I
21
E
27
DK
25
21
18
A
16
20
18
NL
25
19
18
19
30
14
40
15
50
38
Usage
33
70
19
€/ month, incl. VAT
80
0
L
S
D
IRL EU15
USA JAP
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 77
Chart 82
Average monthly expenditure (composite basket)
Business users
Usage
140
Fixed
€/month, excl. VAT
160
132
180
85
104
120
77
77
74
79
84
85
16
20
16
12
13
F
15
IRL
79
EL
13
10
E
72
13
NL
17
15
DK
69
57
66
71
57
14
S
51
14
L
43
60
17
80
17
100
FIN
B
I
A
EU15
D
P
0
23
20
24
35
40
USA UK
JAP
7.4.FIXED NATIONAL CALLS
7.4.1. Prices charged by the incumbent operators for individual fixed national calls
This section shows the prices charged by the incumbent operators for individual fixed calls (the
same call prices apply to business and residential users). Where the incumbent operator uses a unitbased charging system, the price of calls of different duration and/or distances may in some cases
be identical, where both calls are charged the same number of units. Any call set-up charges,
minimum charges and/or call specific duration allowances have been taken into account.
Prices refer to peak hours (weekdays 11.00) and are expressed in € including VAT. Except where
otherwise specified, the figures refer to August 2002.
Prices are indicated for three-minute and 10-minute calls over two distances: 3 km (equivalent to a
local call) and 200 km (equivalent to a national call). In several countries the tariff changes at
exactly one of these distances: in these cases, the rates for the lower distance band are used.
The price of a three-minute call is more affected by the magnitude of the call set-up charge than the
price of a 10-minute call.
Where different tariff packages exist (Austria and the Netherlands), the basic, residential package is
selected25.. Otherwise the standard tariff is used. No discount packages are taken into account.
The EU average value is the average of the EU countries weighted according to population in 1999.
25
The ‘Tik-Tak Privat’ Tariff Package offered by Telekom Austria has been used in this corrigendum for the 2002
values. In the initial version of this annex the ‘Standard Tariff’ was used.
78 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
€-cents, VAT included
20
FIN
I
50
40
E
S
EL
P
L
NL
70
Aug. 2001
Aug. 2002
15,8
15,8
FIN
F
DK
F
EU15
D
IRL
B
19,3
19,3
19,8
19,8
A
64,4
64,4
69,1
15,6
15,7
IRL
16,8
15,2
15,2
P
56,0
DK EU15
14,0
14,3
23,0
Aug. 2001
Aug. 2002
54,4
54,4
50,7
50,7
NL
14,1
13,8
15
42,9
42,0
S
40,9
40,1
D
39,3
39,2
12,0
12,4
I
14,6
13,4
12,3
12,3
L
12,3
12,0
EL
11,9
11,9
E
41,0
36,9
31,8
31,5
0
31,0
30,9
10
30,3
30,9
30
36,4
30,7
60
29,7
29,7
9,3
9,3
20
28,4
28,4
0
10,9
9,2
5
8,9
8,9
10
25,2
25,2
22,7
22,7
€-cents, VAT included
Chart 83
Local call charge, 3 min
25
UK
B
Chart 84
Local call charge, 10 min
A
UK
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 79
Chart 85
National call charge, 3 min
E
P
42,3
UK
36,8
EU15
39,1
39,8
F
38,7
38,7
FIN
35,4
IRL
37,4
35,4
EL
32,6
32,6
A
28,1
28,1
B
29,1
24,5
DK
23,0
20,1
14,6
13,4
S
17,5
17,9
12,3
12,3
10,0
9,3
9,3
20,0
19,8
19,8
30,0
31,6
31,6
40,0
42,8
48,8
Aug. 2001
Aug. 2002
50,0
€-cents, VAT included
55,2
60,0
0,0
L
NL
I
D
Chart 86
National call charge, 10 min
L
54,4
54,4
P
142,7
122,7
EU15
122,5
144,2
96,5
96,2
95,6
93,7
93,7
112,6
114,6
S
115,5
109,0
31,0
30,9
20
29,7
29,7
40
47,9
47,8
60
76,7
67,0
80
76,7
98,2
100
87,6
87,6
120
41,0
36,9
€-cents, VAT included
140
159,7
Aug. 2001
Aug. 2002
160
128,9
128,9
180
0
DK
NL
B
A
EL
FIN
IRL
E
F
I
UK
80 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
D
Chart87
Local and national call charge, 10 min
EU 15 weighted average
EU 15 weighted average
250
66,6
60
€-cents, VAT included
€-cents, VAT included
70
Chart88
Local and national call charge, 3 min
53,1
50
42,2
37,4
40
35,4
30
20
13,1
12,7
12,9
13,8
14,1
10
200
216,0
168,9
150
134,4
115,5
50
41,1
41,0
40,7
1998
1999
2000
40,9
40,1
2001
2002
0
0
1998
1999
2000
Local call charge, 3 min
2001
2002
109,0
100
Local call charge, 10 min
National call charge, 3 min
National call charge, 10 min
7.5.TREND OF THE BASKET FOR FIXED NATIONAL CALLS (NATIONAL BASKET)
The following charts show the variation of the monthly expenditure of residential and business
users on fixed national calls between August 2000 and 2002 (in order to maintain consistency over
time, the “old” OECD basket26 is used, which, unlike the “composite”, does not include
international calls).
The variation in the international basket is shown in section 7.
Chart 89
Variation in average monthly expenditure of national calls (national
basket)
25%
L
Residential, EURO, Incl. VAT
Business, EURO, Excl. VAT
20%
15%
P
10%
5%
0%
UK
-5%
-10%
A
IRL
B
D
EU15 weighted
E
FIN
NL
F
S
DK
I
USA
-15%
EL
-20%
-25%
-30%
26
JAP
A full description of the methodology can be found in “Performance indicators for public telecommunications
operators”, ICCP Series No.2.2, OECD 1990.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 81
Chart 90
National basket development
90,0
80,0
80,0
71,9
65,6
70,0
64,4
62,6
€ per month
60,0
50,0
34,7
40,0
32,2
30,6
30,4
30,0
30,0
20,0
Residential, Incl. VAT
Business, Excl. VAT
10,0
0,0
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
7.6.ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL OPERATORS
This section compares the prices charged for public voice telephony services by the incumbent
operators in a sample of EU Member States and by the biggest competitor in each Member State.
Chart 91
3 min local calls, incumbent and competitor's price
0,4
Incumbent, 3 min.
Competitor, 3 min.
0,19
0,21
0,12
0,11
0,16
0,16
0,14
0,17
0,14
0,12
0,11
0,09
0,09
E
0,12
0,10
EL
0,15
0,19
0,09
0,09
0,16
0,16
0,09
0,08
0,12
0,13
0,12
0,1
0,23
0,28
0,20
0,2
0,15
€, Including VAT
0,3
0,0
B
DK
D
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
82 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
UK
Chart 92
10 min local calls, incumbent and competitor's price
1,1
Incumbent, 10 min.
1,0
0,92
0,9
0,8
0,30
0,26
NL
0,23
0,24
L
0,31
0,32
0,29
0,25
0,22
E
0,1
0,31
0,29
0,51
0,55
0,39
EL
0,28
0,28
0,27
0,2
0,31
0,28
0,3
0,42
0,4
0,37
0,33
0,5
0,56
0,48
0,6
0,64
0,57
0,71
0,7
0,54
0,50
€, Including VAT
Competitor, 10 min.
0,0
B
DK
D
F
IRL
I
A
P
FIN
S
UK
Chart 93
3 min. national calls, incumbent and competitor's price
0,6
0,23
0,20
0,16
0,12
0,11
0,18
0,16
A
0,09
0,09
NL
0,39
0,40
0,36
0,29
0,28
0,32
0,23
0,33
0,42
Competitor, 3 min.
0,32
0,34
0,52
0,35
0,25
0,18
0,13
0,12
0,1
0,20
0,28
0,3
0,2
Incumbent, 3 min.
0,43
0,4
0,15
€, Including VAT
0,5
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
P
FIN
S
UK
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 83
Chart 94
10 min. national calls, incumbent and competitor's price
1,6
1,15
1,19
1,22
0,88
0,92
1,05
0,94
0,99
0,57
0,52
0,48
0,43
0,30
0,26
0,2
0,31
0,29
0,37
0,33
0,52
0,59
0,6
0,67
0,77
0,96
0,92
0,8
0,4
0,96
1
0,54
0,50
€, Including VAT
1,2
Competitor, 10 min.
1,29
Incumbent, 10 min.
1,50
1,43
1,4
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
FIXED INTERNATIONAL CALLS
The following charts show the prices of the international call basket (an estimate of the average cost
of an international call in each country) and the actual price of a 10-minute call to specified
destinations (within Europe, to Japan and to the USA).
7.7.PRICE OF AN AVERAGE FIXED INTERNATIONAL CALL (international call basket)
The basket of international calls for each country provides an estimate of the average cost of an
international call.
For the basket comparison of international PSTN call charges, the OECD Traffic weight basket
methodology is used. The basket27 calculates an average charge for calls to all OECD destination
countries.
The residential basket includes VAT. Call charges are weighted between peak and off-peak hours:
25% for peak hours and 75% for off-peak hours. The business basket excludes VAT. Call charges
are weighted 75% for peak hours and 25% for off-peak hours. The average price of an international
call is lower for business users than for residential users because of the heavier weighting given to
three-minute peak-hour calls, which are on average cheaper than five-minute off-peak calls, and
because VAT is excluded for business users but included for residential users.
International call charges vary widely with the destination, and the basket results are based on a
weighted average call charge. Traffic weighting is used, as defined by the OECD for the destination
weighting, as per the revision in 2000. This method applies a weight to each destination based on
the traffic volumes reported on that route (ITU statistics).
The EU average value is the average of the EU countries weighted according to population in 1999.
27
A full description of the revision to the baskets and the weighted distribution (distances, time and day points and call
duration) can be found in the document ‘OECD Telecommunications Basket definitions’, June 2000, available at
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00005000/M00005340.pdf
84 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 95
Average price for an international call, business users
3,50
3,18
3,18
3,25
Aug. 2001
Aug. 2002
3,00
2,75
2,50
€, VAT excluded
2,25
2,00
1,75
1,50
1,36
1,36
1,25
0,88
0,89
IRL USA EU15
0,88
0,88
DK
1,03
0,88
B
0,87
0,87
D
0,81
0,81
L
0,89
0,80
S
0,56
0,61
0,47
0,47
F
0,58
0,58
0,42
0,42
NL
0,57
0,57
0,39
0,39
0,00
0,38
0,38
0,25
0,35
0,35
0,50
0,55
0,57
0,75
0,76
0,73
1,00
E
P
A
I
EL
FIN
UK
JAP
Chart 96
Average price for an international call, residential users
3,50
3,21
3,21
3,25
Aug. 2001
Aug. 2002
3,00
2,75
2,50
€, VAT included
2,25
2,00
D
F
IRL
A
EU15 USA
P
FIN
E
1,33
1,34
0,80
0,80
B
1,27
1,16
0,75
0,75
S
1,14
1,15
0,71
0,71
L
1,00
1,11
0,65
0,67
NL
1,12
1,06
0,61
0,61
0,25
0,56
0,56
0,50
0,52
0,51
0,75
0,91
0,91
1,00
1,01
1,32
1,25
1,09
1,11
1,50
1,50
1,27
1,86
1,86
1,75
I
EL
0,00
DK
UK
JAP
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 85
Chart 97
International basket development
2,00
1,80
1,71
1,47
1,60
1,40
1,12
1,06
1,20
€
1,35
1,24
1,06
1,00
0,96
0,80
0,76
0,60
0,40
0,73
Residential, Incl. VAT
Business, Excl. VAT
0,20
0,00
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
7.8.PRICE OF CALLS TO EU, JAPAN, USA
The following two charts show the prices of a 10-minute international call (including VAT) during
peak hours (weekday 11.00) to four different destinations: neighbouring country28 (near EU), more
distant country29 (far EU), Japan and the USA.
Figures are expressed in € at August 2002 values, including VAT, and they refer to the European
incumbent operators and the EU weighted average.
28
29
The neighbouring countries are defined as: France for Belgium (and vice-versa);, Germany and the United
Kingdom; Sweden for Denmark and Finland; Italy for Greece (and vice-versa); Portugal for Spain (and viceversa); the United Kingdom for Ireland, the USA and Japan; Germany for Luxembourg, the Netherlands and
Austria.
The more distant countries are defined as: Greece for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the USA and Japan; Denmark for Greece, Spain,
Italy and Portugal.
86 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 98
10 min. call to near EU country
5,0
4,5
IRL
B
FIN
2,91
2,95
EU15
2,60
2,65
I
2,47
E
2,97
2,65
2,31
1,23
1,23
L
2,24
DK
1,80
1,84
NL
1,84
1,83
0,77
0,77
0,5
0,73
0,76
1,0
1,07
1,07
1,5
1,54
1,54
2,0
2,20
2,5
2,34
2,79
3,0
3,07
3,63
3,5
1,44
1,44
€, including VAT
4,0
4,63
4,63
Aug 2001
Aug 2002
D
F
A
P
EL
UK
5,79
5,79
S
5,67
5,64
0,0
FIN
UK
Chart 99
10 min. call to distant EU country
6,5
5,5
Aug 2001
Aug 2002
B
NL
3,83
3,83
3,77
4,32
F
3,44
3,13
D
2,91
2,95
L
2,89
2,94
2,63
2,78
I
2,58
2,58
E
2,97
2,50
1,5
2,45
2,46
2,0
2,24
2,5
2,43
2,43
2,79
3,0
3,63
4,0
3,5
4,40
4,40
4,5
2,20
€, including VAT
5,0
4,83
4,83
6,0
1,0
0,5
0,0
P
EL EU15
A
S
DK
IRL
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 87
Chart 100
10 min. call to USA
5,5
5,0
3,77
EU15
2,91
2,95
I
2,72
2,72
E
2,89
2,94
IRL
2,70
2,30
B
2,24
D
1,91
1,90
S
1,84
1,83
1,23
1,23
0,5
0,78
0,76
1,0
1,11
1,11
1,5
1,44
1,44
2,0
2,20
2,5
2,34
2,79
3,0
2,97
3,5
P
EL
3,85
3,85
4,25
4,0
€, including VAT
4,32
4,80
4,84
Aug 2001
Aug 2002
4,5
EU15
IRL
UK
FIN
12,15
12,36
D
A
12,13
11,02
DK
10,99
10,99
F
8,58
8,58
L
8,53
7,97
NL
7,98
7,97
0,0
UK
E
P
Chart 101
10 min. call to Japan
14,0
Aug 2001
Aug 2002
12,0
2,91
2,95
3,16
3,38
2,0
2,43
2,43
EL
NL
A
9,44
9,44
8,99
8,96
4,95
S
4,93
4,93
4,0
4,32
3,77
6,0
7,35
7,34
7,75
8,0
3,83
3,83
€, including VAT
10,0
0,0
L
B
F
FIN
I
DK
7.9.ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL OPERATORS
The equivalent prices for competitor providers in the EU countries are shown in the charts below.
One competitor per country has been analysed. The prices are shown for a 10 minute call, at peak
time weekdays.
Prices include VAT and are applicable for August 2002.
88 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
4,18
3,72
3,34
2,92
2,79
2,35
2,33
3,34
1,90
NTL
UK
0,0
3,28
1,54
2,5
Retevision
E
Forthnet
EL
Infostrada
I
EU15
Esat
IRL
1,48
1,39
1,23
1,19
3,0
EU15
NTL
UK
Tele2
S
2,18
Elisa
FIN
Telenet
B
Arcor
D
Oni
P
1,11
1,05
2,0
Elisa
FIN
Oni
P
UTA
A
1,82
1,49
4,50
4,83
Tele2
L
UTA
A
0,97
0,95
0,71
€, Including VAT
1,5
Tele2
NL
Tele2
L
Infostrada
I
Esat
IRL
Cegetel
F
3
3,28
Tele2
S
Cegetel
F
Tele2
DK
0,55
1,0
Retevision
E
2,35
Forthnet
EL
0
2,45
1,55
1
Arcor
D
4
4,05
Tele2
NL
0,5
Tele2
DK
2,23
2
Telenet
B
€, Including VAT
Chart 102
10 min international call to near EU country by alternative operators
4,0
3,5
Chart 103
10 min international call to distant EU country by alternative operators
6
5
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 89
2
90 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Retevision
E
Elisa
FIN
Tele2
DK
Forthnet
EL
2,38
2,35
2,33
2,13
1,91
1,77
3,18
3,0
9,55
9,03
8,58
8,23
Infostrada
I
Oni
P
Esat
IRL
EU15
1,71
3,83
3,5
Retevision
E
Tele2
DK
Esat
IRL
NTL
UK
7,98
Arcor
D
8
7,91
6,88
6,60
NTL
UK
1,39
1,31
1,23
1,11
1,01
2,0
Infostrada
I
Elisa
FIN
EU15
6
6,18
Telenet
B
UTA
A
Arcor
D
Tele2
L
Tele2
S
0,95
€, Including VAT
1,5
Oni
P
3,97
4
Telenet
B
3,72
3,49
UTA
A
Tele2
S
3,26
Cegetel
F
2,35
0
Forthnet
EL
Cegetel
F
0,46
0,0
1,11
Tele2
NL
0,5
0,46
1,0
Tele2
L
Tele2
NL
€, Including VAT
Chart 104
10 min international call to USA by alternative operators
4,5
4,0
2,5
Chart 105
10 min international call to Japan by alternative operators
12
10
8 LEASED LINES RETAIL TARIFFS
This section contains an overview of prices charged by incumbent operators in each Member State
for national and international leased line services as at 1 August 2002 to end users. Figures do not
cover wholesale prices. Price developments are also analysed over the period August 1998-2002.
The figures and the information are taken from a study carried out by Total Research-Total
Research Teligen for the Commission. Data on standard retail prices charged by incumbent
operators have been collected in each country.
8.1.INCUMBENTS' NATIONAL LEASED LINES
National leased line data is provided from 1998 onwards. 2 distances are covered: 2 km (local
circuits), and 200 km. Tariffs are taken from the incumbent operator in each country. Other
operators may offer other prices.
In order to properly reflect the tariff structures used in some countries the circuits may be
considered in one of two different ways, depending on tariff structure. The one to apply will differ
from carrier to carrier. The principles used in this report for calculating the price of a full circuit are:
1: When tariff specifies local tail prices
separately, in addition to main circuit.
2: When tariff specifies a single price for the
circuit, end to end, including local tails.
Local tail length
Main circuit length
Local tail length
Main circuit length
2 km circuit
1 km
0
0
2 km
200 km circuit
2 km
196 km
0
200 km
Note: The local tail length is per tail, i.e. there will be 2 such tails with each circuit.
Where several tariff options exist depending on type of location, the criteria for choice is as follows:
•
2 km circuits are always within a major city (usually the Capital)
•
200 km circuits are between a major city and a “minor” city
As the definitions vary between countries, the type of tariff option chosen will also vary. The
countries where the price may vary with location or other non-distance related definitions, are:
Belgium, France, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the UK.
Some operators apply termination charges per local end, without necessarily covering the local tail
circuit within that charge.
4 types of circuits are covered: 64 kb/s, 2 Mb/s, 34 Mb/s and 155 Mbit/s. As not all carriers publish
tariffs for all these bitrates and all years, there may be some gaps in the information, especially for
higher bitrates.
Some carriers offer 2 Mb/s circuits as both structured and unstructured. In this analysis only
unstructured circuits are included.
Also, some carriers offer different types of leased lines, often in the form of “basic circuits” and
circuits in a managed network. Only “basic circuits” are included in this analysis, as the managed
network services are not comparable between carriers.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 91
Lately a few carriers have decided not to publish their prices for some or all types of leased lines.
This makes it increasingly difficult to present a full overview of the prices in all 15 EU countries.
For the USA the prices of Verizon intra-LATA circuits for New York state have been used. The
bitrates of leased lines offered in some countries may be different from the ones found in most EU
member States. Some operators may offer 56 kb/s instead of 64 kb/s, 1.5 Mb/s instead of 2 Mb/s, 45
or 50 Mb/s instead of 34 Mb/s, and 140 or 150 Mb/s instead of 155 Mb/s. Prices shown in the
tables and graphs in this section of the report have been adjusted according to the difference in
capacity.
All prices are presented in EURO per month, excluding VAT.
National leased lines prices as at 1 August 2002.
92 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
8.1.1. 64 Kbit/s
Chart 106
Price for 64kb/s, 2 km circuits
9000
2001
8000
2002
7000
6000
5000
B
DK
D
EL
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
2.069
1.489
3.064
2.352
1.389
0
2.439
2.920
1.728
F
2.479
2.766
E
1.544
2.655
2.112
1000
1.104
2000
1.186
3000
1.200
4000
2.374
€ per year, VAT excluded
9.770
10000
S
UK USA USA JAP EU14
-NY -CA
S
UK
- Data for Finland not available.
Chart 107
Price for 64kb/s, 200 km circuits
2001
16000
2002
17.764
18000
12.314
12000
10000
P
5.862
6.760
A
7.959
6.792
6.344
F
3.756
2000
6.677
6.627
E
4.456
6.599
5.736
4000
3.066
6000
7.581
8000
11.645
14000
6.466
€ per year, VAT excluded
20000
0
B
DK
D
EL
IRL
I
L
NL
USA USA JAP EU14
-NY -CA
- Data for Finland not available.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 93
8.1.2. 2 Mbit/s
Chart 108
Price for 2 Mb/s, 2 km circuits
47.222
50000
40000
2001
35000
2002
30000
25000
20000
B
DK
D
EL
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
S
6.680
6.080
8.244
6.194
7.461
3.600
13.363
7.772
4.571
7.500
10.200
E
6.072
0
1.956
5000
6.559
10000
9.864
15000
4.080
€ per year, VAT excluded
45000
UK USA- USA- JAP EU14
NY CA
- Data for Finland not available.
Chart 109
Price for 2 Mb/s, 200 km circuits
2001
120000
2002
135.004
140000
36.292
78.315
44.833
12.737
50.818
27.120
33.489
19.872
54.576
35.345
53.615
39.504
20000
30.048
40000
16.315
60000
58.893
80000
61.676
100000
30.922
€ per year, VAT excluded
160000
0
B
DK
D
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
S
UK USA- USA- JAP EU14
NY CA
- Data for Finland not available.
94 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
8.1.3. 34 Mbit/s
Chart 110
Price for 34 Mb/s, 2 km circuits
0
B
DK
18.000
12.600
8.112
10000
D
E
F
IRL
I
L
A
31.601
38.503
19.667
20000
33.948
30000
36.420
49.580
37.076
49.028
45.836
40000
20.302
€ per year, VAT excluded
2002
53.464
2001
50000
46.870
60000
S
UK
USA- USA- JAP EU11
NY CA
- Data for EL, NL, P and FIN not available.
Chart 111
Price for 34 Mb/s, 200 km circuits
450.000
84820
50.000
319346
226113
124525
194400
62532
100.000
112620
150.000
193674
200.000
250644
F
250.000
335778
321414
E
300.000
306942
317556
2002
350.000
138250
€ per year, VAT excluded
419255
2001
400.000
0
B
DK
D
IRL
I
L
A
S
UK USA- USA- JAP EU11
NY CA
- Data for EL, NL, P and FIN not available.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 95
8.1.4. 155 Mbit/s
Chart 112
Price for 140/155 Mb/s, 2 km circuits
160000
2002
136.345
140000
120000
138.815
2001
159.817
180000
100000
80000
B
DK
D
F
I
L
58.810
36.000
A
30.828
0
41.161
20000
13.200
43.226
40000
56.412
60000
12.300
€ per year, VAT excluded
200000
S
UK
JAP
EU9
- Data for E, EL, IRL, NL, P and FIN not available.
Chart 113
Price for 140/155 Mb/s, 200 km circuits
1400000
959.064
424.716
181.817
559.795
104.064
200000
121.020
400000
417.525
600000
388.800
796.006
800000
294.351
€ per year, VAT excluded
2002
1000000
1.204.596
2001
1200000
0
B
DK
D
F
I
L
A
S
UK
JAP
Data for E, EL, IRL, NL, P and FIN not available.
96 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
EU9
8.2.NATIONAL LEASED LINES PRICE TRENDS (1 AUGUST 1998 - 1 AUGUST 2002)
Chart 114
EU average price variation since 1998, 64Kb
0%
% change since 1998
-5%
-10%
-13%
-15%
-13%
-18%
-21%
-20%
-20%
-20%
-19%
-23%
-25%
-28%
-30%
-30%
-29%
-30%
-35%
1998
1999
2 km
2000
2001
50 km
2002
200 km
Chart 115
EU average price variation since 1998, 2 Mb/s
0%
-5%
-10%
% change since 1998
-10%
-17%
-15%
-20%
-17%
-25%
-31%
-26%
-30%
-32%
-35%
-40%
-38%
-39%
-45%
1998
1999
2 km
2000
50 km
2001
2002
200 km
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 97
Chart 116
EU average price variation since 1998, 34 Mb/s
0%
-2%
% change since 1998
-5%
-10%
-17%
-15%
-15%
-20%
-25%
-25%
-25%
-30%
-27%
-35%
-40%
-45%
-44%
-45%
-50%
1998
1999
2000
2Km
2001
2002
200Km
8.3.INTERNATIONAL LEASED LINES PRICES
This section examines the standard retail prices (annual rental) for international leased line services
(half-circuits in each country) charged by the incumbent operators in each Member State. An
analysis of the price development over the period from August 1998 to August 2002 is also
included.
Three destinations are covered: international half circuits to the nearest EU country (hereafter “near
EU”), to the most distant EU country (“far EU”) and to the USA.
Three types of circuits are considered: digital 64 Kbit/s, 2 Mbit/s and 34 Mbit/s. Given that price
information on 155 Mbit/s international lines is only available for a few Member States, the analysis
of these circuits is omitted.
The data is presented with the following parameters:
•
All charges in Euro per month
•
Excluding VAT
•
Germany is not included in the analysis because Deutsche Telekom does not publish prices
for international half circuits.
•
The years from 1998 are covered
•
Variable / 1 year contract (shortest term available).
•
AT&T prices are used for USA
Data refer to January for A, February for EL, F, I, NL and FI, April for B and DK, May for E, June
for S and UK, and July for IRL, L, and P.
98 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
8.3.1. 64 Kbit/s
Chart 117
64 kb/s half-circuit prices to near EU country
2001
70.000
2002
85.487
80.000
60.000
48.088
50.000
40.000
DK
EL
E
F
I
L
NL
FIN
9.548
15.829
P
5.009
A
5.220
9.096
4.404
10.827
5.142
IRL
10.920
B
12.354
0
6.769
10.000
12.982
20.000
4.384
30.000
9.600
€ per year, VAT excluded
90.000
S
UK
USA JAP EU14
- Data for D not available.
Chart 118
64 kb/s half-circuit prices to distant EU country
2001
80.000
2002
67.598
70.000
60.000
50.000
40.000
DK
EL
E
F
IRL
I
NL
FIN
S
UK
16.011
21.133
P
20.444
A
15.924
12.000
8.304
L
17.280
B
17.442
0
16.361
13.777
8.415
10.000
13.023
20.000
14.352
30.000
22.800
€ per year, VAT excluded
85.487
90.000
USA JAP EU14
- Data for D not available.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 99
Chart 119
64 kb/s half-circuit prices to USA
80.000
2001
65.503
2002
60.000
50.000
B
DK
EL
E
F
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
17.605
19.784
26.240
15.600
16.068
26.162
15.816
16.361
IRL
8.808
0
8.781
10.000
12.636
20.000
12.126
31.692
30.000
21.997
40.000
14.400
€ per year, VAT excluded
70.000
JAP EU14
- Data for D not available.
8.3.2. 2 Mbit/s
Chart 120
2 Mb/s half-circuit prices to near EU country
2001
549.576
2002
500000
400000
DK
EL
E
F
IRL
I
NL
FIN
S
103.220
63.646
P
55.093
A
48.024
81.276
59.976
L
150.120
B
159.880
0
117.492
44.441
132.448
100000
30.687
200000
180.304
300000
110.400
€ per year, VAT excluded
600000
628.389
700000
UK
USA JAP EU14
- Data for D not available.
100 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
Chart 121
2 Mb/s half-circuit prices to distant EU country
900.000
800.000
2002
628.389
600.000
500.000
B
DK
EL
E
F
IRL
I
L
NL
A
P
FIN
S
UK
191.656
229.130
250.791
190.836
240.000
144.240
109.236
0
178.047
142.326
100.000
206.628
211.200
200.000
163.796
300.000
218.019
400.000
117.204
€ per year, VAT excluded
700.000
788.093
2001
USA JAP EU14
- Data for D not available.
8.3.3. 34 Mbit/s
Chart 122
34 Mb/s half-circuit prices to near EU country
2001
4.000.000
2002
4.525.285
4.500.000
3.500.000
3.000.000
2.500.000
B
DK
E
IRL
L
NL
FIN
606.137
356.246
230.556
704.933
I
919.488
0
279.342
500.000
1.262.125
1.000.000
263.031
1.500.000
285.108
2.000.000
1.154.400
€ per year, VAT excluded
5.000.000
UK
JAP
EU9
- Data for D, EL, F, A, P and S not available.
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 101
8.4.INTERNATIONAL LEASED LINES PRICE TRENDS (1 AUGUST 1998 - 1 AUGUST 2002)
Chart 123
EU average price variation since 1998, 64 Kb/s
0
% change since 1998
-0,05
-0,1
-15%
-18%
-0,15
-22%
-0,2
-23%
-0,25
-27%
-26%
-33%
-0,3
-38%
-0,35
-32%
-0,4
-41%
-36%
-0,45
-43%
-0,5
1998
1999
to near EU
2000
2001
to far EU
2002
to USA
Chart 124
EU average price variation since 1998, 2 Mb/s
0%
% change since 1998
-5%
-11%
-10%
-15%
-12%
-23%
-20%
-29%
-25%
-30%
-35%
-29%
-35%
-40%
-40%
-45%
-46%
-50%
1998
1999
to near EU
2000
2001
2002
to far EU
102 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
9
EXCHANGE RATES
This section explains the exchange rates used in Annexes I and II.
9.1.EXCHANGE RATE USED IN SECTION 6 ON INTERNET, SECTION 7 ON PUBLIC VOICE TELEPHONY
TARIFFS AND SECTION 8 ON LEASED LINE TARIFFS.
Table 5 Exchange rates, national currency to Euro
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
UK
USA
Exchange rate to Exchange rate to
euro <= 2001
euro => 2002
EURO
EURO
0.07267283
1
0.02478935
1
0.13430931
0.13430931
0.16818878
1
0.15244832
1
0.51129972
1
0.0029347
1
1.26968004
1
0.00051646
1
0.00925189
0.00925189
0.02478935
1
0.45378228
1
0.00498798
1
0.00601012
1
0.10794124
0.10794124
1.62999185
1.62999185
1.14495077
1.14495077
9.2.EXCHANGE RATE USED IN SECTION 1.5 ON ADMINISTRATIVE AND NUMBERING FEES
The exchange rate to Euro used in section 1.5 on administrative and numbering fees are the same as
in table 5, except for the following:
Denmark
Sweden
UK
EURO
0.1346058
0.1146319
1.4993537
9.3.EXCHANGE RATE USED IN SECTION 3 ON INTERCONNECTION AND SECTION 5.2 ON PRICES FOR
LOCAL LOOP
The exchange rate to Euro used in section 3 on interconnection and section 5.2 on price for local
loop are the same in table 5, except for the following:
Denmark
Sweden
UK
EURO
0.13460581
0.10729038
1.59387950
Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003 - 103
104 - Telecommunications Regulatory Package - VIII Implementation Report – Annex I – Corrigendum March 2003
ANEXO 3
Cuadro comparativo entre las tarifas de interconexión propuestas y las tarifas establecidas por el BTA
(pula de Botswana):
Operator
Tarifas propuestas
Tarifas
propuestas por
Mascom
Tarifas
propuestas por
(en efecto
la BTC
durante el
conflicto)
Tarifas establecidas por el BTA
Fecha efectiva
hasta el 29/02/04
A partir del
01/03/04
Terminación en
la red de la BTC:
- Hora punta
- Hora no punta
24.0
19.1
35.0
25.0
15.0
12.0
11.0
8.8
Terminación en la
red de Mascom:
- Hora punta
- Hora no punta
96.0
76.9
75.0
58.0
85.0
68.0
75.0
60.0
Nota: 1,00 BWP = 0,20 USD
23.09.2003