Family Law Institutions and Intimate-Partner Violence
Ana Tur-Prats*
Preliminary draft
February 2013
Abstract
This paper analyses the relationship between intimate-partner violence (IPV) and historical
family law systems in Spain. Survey data shows that those regions that have had historically a
different family law system in which women had a more prominent role in the family have
nowadays a lower IPV rate. I test the causality of this relationship by using the land tenure
structure that arose during the Christian ‘reconquest’ of the Iberian Peninsula (712-1492) as
an instrument for the different family law institutions. Both OLS and IV estimates are
consistent and show a negative and significant relationship.
Keywords: Intimate-partner Violence, Legal Institutions, Family Organization, Long-Term
Persistence.
*
PhD Student, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Affiliate Research Student, University College London.
Contact: Economics Department, University College London. Gower Street. London WC1E 6BT, United
Kingdom. E-mail: ana.tur-prats.09@ucl.ac.uk. I thank Marcos Vera-Hernández for his guidance and
supervision. For comments and discussions, I am also thankful to Prashant Bharadwaj, Gordon Dahl, Mercedes
Fernández-Martorell, Isabel Fernández-Mateo, Amy Finkelstein, Christian Fons-Rosen, Enrique García-Bernal,
Rafael Lalive, Albert Lamarca, Nathan Nunn, Javier Ortega, Luigi Pascale, Jaume Puig-Junoy, Pablo Salvador
Coderch, Michele Tertilt and Felipe Valencia. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from Fundación
Ramón Areces.
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1. Introduction
Intimate-partner violence (IPV) is a social problem of great concern that has serious
consequences for women’s health. It is also widely spread across countries, with reported
lifetime prevalence that varies from 15% to 71% (Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006).
Understanding the factors that cause this kind of abuse is a key question in social sciences,
especially since IPV is a complex and multi-triggered issue.
From the field of economics, in the last decade several studies have tried to tackle this
question. Thanks to these papers we know that emotional cues due to the unexpected defeat
of the football team that the man supports lead to an increase of IPV (Card and Dahl, 2011).
We also know that husbands can use violence to signal their dissatisfaction with the marriage,
and this way extract higher transfers from their wives’ parents (Bolch and Rao, 2002, in rural
Indian context).
Other studies have identified factors that contribute to the decrease of domestic violence: the
introduction of unilateral divorce (Stenvenson and Wolfers, 2006), or the gender wage gap
reduction (Aizer, 2010). Regarding to specific policies, e.g. the cash transfers to women in
developing countries, authors have found that the effect depends on the level of education of
the women and their partners (Hidrobo and Fernald, 2013), and that the total effect on abuse
is ambiguous (Bobonis et al., 2013).
This paper contributes to the analysis of the IPV causes by studying the relationship between
intimate-partner violence (IPV) and historical family law systems in Spain. Data shows that
those regions that have had historically a different family law system (Basque Country,
Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia and Balearic Islands, also known as ‘foral’ territories) have
nowadays a lower IPV rate. In these territories, women had a more prominent role in the
family: wives had greater management of marital goods, widows could appoint the heir, and
they also held the life interest in the property in ‘foral’ territories whereas in the rest of Spain
widows had no legal protection. Map A1 and A2 in the appendix show IPV rates by
provinces and ‘foral’ provinces respectively.
My hypothesis is that these different family law institutions shaped a different gender identity
and that this has had a long-term and persistent impact that is important for explaining
violence against women today. Both the historical origins of countries’ laws (La Porta,
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López-de-Silanes and Shleifer 2008) and the origins of gender roles (Alesina, Giuliano and
Nunn, 2013) have received recent attention in the economics literature.
I then test the causality of this relationship by using the land tenure structure that arose during
the ‘reconquest’ as an instrument for the different family law institutions. The ‘reconquest’ is
a centuries-long period (712-1492) in which several Christian kingdoms repopulated and took
control of the Iberian Peninsula from the Islamic rulers. The uniqueness of this event in the
history of Europe provides an excellent source of exogenous variation to study the
consequences of different family institutions and household organizations.
2. Historical background
The so-called ‘foral’ territories –i.e. Vizcaya (in Basque Country), Navarre, Aragon (formed
by 3 provinces: Huesca, Zaragoza and Teruel), Catalonia (formed by 4 provinces: Lleida,
Girona, Barcelona and Tarragona) and Balearic Islands-, all have in common the age-old
existence of a house; namely a stable peasant broad family together with the farm that
supports their living. The small size of the farm would only assure the family and future
generations’ survival if it was undivided. This kind of peasant family remained very stable
throughout the centuries until the industrialization.
Their family and inheritance legal systems’ rationale was thus to guarantee the conservation
and continuity of the family heritage. This is shown in specific institutions that were distinct
from the ones established in the rest of Spain, where Castilian law was in force. In this
regard, the most paradigmatic family institution of the ‘foral’ regions is the single heir/heiress
as opposed to the equal division of bequest between offspring that was promoted under
Castilian law.
For its economic feasibility the farm in ‘foral’ territories required all family members’
participation and cooperation. This family structure fostered greater organization to reinforce
cohesion. Moreover, women had a more prominent role in the family: wives had greater
management of marital goods, widows could appoint the heir/heiress, and they also held the
life interest in the property in ‘foral’ territories whereas in the rest of Spain widows had no
legal protection.
Since societies that were initially more pro-women could had selected into this kind of
household structure and family law system we need an instrument to try to establish causal
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effects. Therefore, I use the land tenure structure that arose during the ‘reconquest’ as an
instrument for the different family law institutions. The reconquest is a centuries-long period
(712-1492) in which several Christian kingdoms repopulated and took control of the Iberian
Peninsula from the Islamic rulers.
In the north, where the reconquest started, the resettlement was more spontaneous and had a
less official nature. It favoured small and private land ownership by free and independent
peasants. This is known as “presura” in the northwest and “aprisio” in the northeast. As time
went by, towards the south, state structure was developing and clergy and nobility
participation in the reconquest were rewarded with vast extensions of land.
Therefore, the way resettlement took place gave rise to a different land tenure structure. In
the north there were more small holdings owned by free peasants. These small farms were
mainly subsistence-oriented and they needed to be undivided in order to sustain the family. In
the south, however, more large states owned by nobles or church were found. These large
plots are known as latifundia, and they hired landless peasants or day labourers to work the
land.
3. Data
IPV data comes from the four cross-sectional surveys on violence against women in Spain “macroencuesta sobre la violencia contra la mujer en Espana”. The first three surveys were
conducted by phone in 1999, 2002 and 2005 (sample sizes 20552, 20652 and 28423,
respectively). The last survey was conducted through a personal interview in 2011 (n=7898).
The advantage of these surveys is that they contain a broad sample of women living in Spain
(n=77,525) and different IPV measures: self-reported and objective. In this paper I use the socalled objective measure since self-reported measures tend to underestimate domestic
violence and the degree of bias can be non-random. In the questionnaire there are 26
questions specifically designed to detect this kind of violence; 13 of them are considered as
an indicator of domestic violence. I then construct an IPV variable that takes the value 1 if the
woman answers “often” or “sometimes” to at least one of these 13 questions, and 0
otherwise.
These surveys also include information at the individual level on the woman’s and partner’s
level of educational, woman’s job status, household’s reference person, marital status and
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religious and political beliefs. We also know in which province they live. Regional data on
provinces’ per capita GDP and unemployment rate from the National Institute of Statistics
are added.
To quantify the instrument, I use the time in which each province was reconquered. Based on
the map of the Spanish reconquest by Lomax (1978), I assign to each province a date from a
set of 7 categories: 914, 1080, 1130, 1210, 1250, 1480 and 1492. Map A3 in the appendix
shows the different stages of the reconquest.
4. Results
OLS estimates show that having the ‘foral’ family system is associated with 2 percentage
points less intimate-partner violence, which amounts to 20% of the national average rate.
This effect persists after controlling for socio-demographic variables, regional economic
development, religious and political beliefs, current institutions and share of immigrants. It
remains stable through the different specifications and statistically significant as shown in
table 1.
Table 1: OLS estimates.
‘Foral’ family law system
Economic development
Religious and political beliefs
Current institutions
Immigrantˠ
N
(1)
(2)
-0.017***
(0.0037)
No
No
No
No
54,332
-0.017***
(0.0040)
Yes
No
No
No
54,332
(3)
(4)
-0.019*** -0.021***
(0.0050)
(0.0064)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
32,533
32,533
(5)
-0.016**
(0.0071)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
15,394
Model (1) includes age, children, woman’s and partner’s level of education, woman’s job status,
household’s reference person, marital status, habitat size and year when survey was conducted.
Model (2) adds provinces’ per capita GDP and unemployment rate. Model (3) adds a categorical
variable indicating if the woman is a catholic and a measure (1-5) of political ideology (1: left wing, 5:
right wing). Model (4) adds a dummy variable for provinces with separation of property marriage
regime. Model (5) adds information on women's nationality. Standard errors, in brackets, computed
applying a cluster structure by province.
*** Statistically significant at 1%, ** 5%.
ˠ Information on immigrant status is only available in 2005 and 2011 survey.
I then test the causality of this relationship by using the year in which each province was
reconquered (seven categories) as an instrument for family law institutions. I also use an
alternative instrument based on the percentage of the province surface with large plots
5
(greater than 500 hectares), and finally I report estimates combining both instruments. Table
2 shows the IV estimates; these are consistent with OLS estimates. I find a negative and
statistically significant effect of having the ‘foral’ family law system on IPV of
approximately 3 percentage points.
Table 2: IV estimates
(a)
‘Foral' family law system
Time in which province was reconquered
% of surface with large plots
N
-0.030**
(0.0131)
Yes
No
54,332
(b)
(c)
-0.037***
(0.0116)
No
Yes
52,367
-0.029***
(0.0084)
Yes
Yes
52,367
Model (a) uses the time in which the province was resettled as an instrument for having a
different family law system. Model (b) uses the % of the province’s surface occupied by
plots larger than 500 hectares as an instrument. Model (c) combines both instruments.
Control variables are age, children, woman’s and partner’s level of education, woman’s
job status, household’s reference person, marital status, habitat size, provinces’ per capita
GDP and unemployment rate, and year when survey was conducted. Standard errors, in
brackets, computed applying a cluster structure by province. *** Statistically significant at
1%, ** 5%.
5. Conclusions
This paper analyses the relationship between intimate-partner violence (IPV) in Spain and
historical family law systems. My hypothesis is that different family law institutions shaped a
different gender identity and that this has had a long-term and persistent impact that is
important for explaining violence against women today.
Survey data shows that those regions that have had historically a different family law system
(Basque Country, Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia and Balearic Islands, also known as ‘foral’
territories) have nowadays 2 percentage points less intimate-partner violence. This effect
persists after controlling for socio-demographic variables, regional economic development,
religious and political beliefs, share of immigrants and current institutions. I then test the
causality of this relationship by using the land tenure structure that arose during the Christian
reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula (712-1492) as an instrument for the different family law
institutions. Both OLS and IV estimates are consistent and show a negative and significant
relationship.
6
This study contributes to the understanding of how history can help to explain family
organization and how legal institutions can have a persistent and long-term impact on
interpersonal relations.
7
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Appendix
Map A1. IPV rate, by provinces
Source: Own elaboration from survey data on violence against women in Spain (1999, 2002, 2005 and 2011)
Map A2. ‘Foral’ provinces (in dark grey)
Source: As listed in Castán Tobeñas (1988), core group formed by 10 provinces: Vizcaya, Navarre, Huesca,
Zaragoza, Teruel, Lleida, Girona, Barcelona, Tarragona and Balearic Islands.
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Map A3. Stages of the reconquest.
Source: Lomax (1978), p.ix.
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