"
September 7, 2007
Key prospects, risks, and opportunities
This holds mostly for oil and, to a lesser extent, gas.
Large extra-regional emerging economies with rising oil demand (India, China) will
probably increasingly look to Latin America for source-country diversification.
Nonetheless, this factor
should not be overestimated as evidence suggests that even some of the regional
political leaders with anti-business rhetoric will be prepared to engage to some
extent with foreign investors.
Notably, recent estimates on limited current and
planned investment in energy supply infrastructure challenge expectations about
the region's ability to increase supplies.
Much will depend on
whether the energy resource sector will remain dominated by giant national
energy companies, as well as on the openness of these companies to foreign
funding.
!
There is promise in the remaining potential and capacity for established
renewables as well as in the development of new energy technologies.
Author
Georg Caspary*
Editors
Markus Jaeger
+1 212 250-6971
markus.jaeger@db.com
Maria-Laura Lanzeni
+49 69 910-31723
maria-laura.lanzeni@db.com
Technical Assistant
Bettina Giesel
Deutsche Bank Research
Frankfurt am Main
Germany
Internet: www.dbresearch.com
E-mail: marketing.dbr@db.com
Fax: +49 69 910-31877
Managing Director
Norbert Walter
* Georg Caspary has been working for numerous multilateral organisations and private firms on
energy issues in developing countries for ten years. This article expresses his personal views and
not those of any institution he is or has been associated with in the past. As a guest author, his
opinions may not necessarily be those of Deutsche Bank Research.
Current Issues
2
September 7, 2007
The energy sector in Latin America
# $
%
!
Latin America is an important but somewhat volatile player in energy
matters. This volatility is due in part to the region’s frequent political
upheaval as well as to comparably sluggish economic performance
in recent years compared with other developing regions, which have
led to power production below the region’s potential.
!
2006
North
America
(exMexico)
4% LAC
10%
AsiaPacific
3%
Africa
10%
This is, of course, somewhat surprising given the region’s considerable energy assets (charts 1 to 4): Venezuela, Mexico, Brazil,
Colombia, Argentina and Ecuador all have considerable oil reserves;
Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina and Venezuela have natural gas
riches, enabling these countries to be net exporters or, in the case of
Mexico and Brazil, to meet much of their massive domestic energy
demand on their own. These countries have evidently benefited from
the price hikes for fossil fuels of recent years, while the same
situation has posed difficulties in countries with high and rising fossil
fuel demand but limited oil or gas resources of their own (e.g. Chile).
Europe
12%
Middle
East
61%
Source: BP
#
'
Most of the countries with sizeable hydrocarbons resources engage
to some extent in exporting them, notably towards North America
and OECD Europe. However, the large extra-regional emerging
economies (notably China and India) are already representing an
important market for energy resources from Latin America and are
likely to increase further in importance. The two key oil exporters in
the region are Venezuela and Mexico (globally, oil exporters number
6 and 10, respectively) and the region’s export figures remain
healthy (charts 5 and 6). Concerning natural gas, Venezuela has the
largest reserves in the region, but Trinidad & Tobago and Bolivia are
currently the largest exporters.
Thousand million barrels, 2006
20
(80)
15
10
5
Venezuela
Other
LAC
T&T
Peru
Ecuador
Colombia
Brazil
Argentina
Mexico
-
Sources: BP, Cedigaz
%
!
(
!
2006
Asia
Pacific
8%
Africa
8%
Middle
East
41%
North
America
(exMexico)
4%
On the consumption side, Brazil tops the list for the region with an
average of 2.1 to 2.3 million barrels of oil per day over the past
1
years , followed very closely by Mexico with an average of 2.0-2.1
(EIA 2006). This might seem somewhat surprising given that Brazil
has a larger economy and population; however, the agriculture,
cattle ranching and forestry industries in Brazil, which make up a
large proportion of total economic activity, demand comparatively
low hydrocarbon consumption. Other sizeable consumers of
hydrocarbons in the region include Argentina, Chile and Colombia.
The focus of this report is the prospect for Latin America’s energy
sector, focusing on oil and gas as key assets. Section 2 will
concentrate on the key risks implicit in the energy sector, while
Section 3 will explore some of the key opportunities. A brief
conclusion ends the paper.
LAC
4%
Europe
&
Eurasia
35%
Source: BP
September 7, 2007
Moreover, the distribution of energy resource wealth has led a
number of smaller countries in the region with large energy
resources relative to their size (Bolivia, Ecuador) to develop their
intra-regional hydrocarbons export sector. Finally, beyond fossil
fuels, several countries have large hydropower potential (Brazil,
Venezuela, Colombia), and are already exploiting a good part of it.
&
1
Precise estimates vary slightly by source.
3
Current Issues
(
2.1 Backlashes in regional energy trading
Latin America has a long history of successful inter-country energy
trading and cooperation. Notably during the 1970s and 1980s, large
multinational hydroelectric dams were built, often in border regions,
serving several countries. These included a number of mega dams,
in particular the world’s largest dam to date, the Itaipú Dam, which in
2006 still met 20% of Brazil’s and 95% of Paraguay’s total energy
demand. Nonetheless, a number of these dams have often performed poorly in economic terms; and have had vast environmental
and social side-effects. This has led to some popular resistance to
the projects and has made potential investors hesitant to get
involved.
%
Trn cubic metres, 2006
1.0
(4.3)
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Venezuela
Other
LAC
T&T
Peru
Colombia
Brazil
Bolivia
Mexico
Argentina
0.0
Source: BP
Mbd, 2006
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
Net exports
Asia
Africa
Middle
East
Europe
North
America
LAC
Net imports
Source: BP
)!
,
*
.
/
+
Net oil exports, mbd, 2006
Venezuela
Peru
Mexico
Ecuador
Colombia
Chile
Brazil
Argentina
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
Source: BP
4
-
Hence, there is more promise for a second form of regional energy
integration and trading: namely that of regional transmission grids as
well as pipelines for fossil fuels, which already received increasing
attention during the 1990s and early 2000s. For instance, Brazil, by
far the largest country and energy consumer in the region, during
that period signed various agreements with Venezuela, Uruguay and
Argentina to import / export electricity or various fossil fuels. Other
examples include Colombia’s electricity supply to Ecuador and
Brazil’s gas connections with Bolivia. This process is likely to
continue.
Resource nationalism in Latin America
Compared with other emerging economies, notably in Asia and Eastern Europe,
Latin America has long had a high degree of inequality in the distribution of income
(de Ferranti et al. 2004). Combined with its natural-resource wealth, this has led to
an increasing feeling among the population (in particular in poor but commodityrich countries such as Bolivia or Ecuador) that the region has riches that are not
equitably shared. Several countries in the region have therefore seen a rise of
politicians who have made ‘resource nationalism’ a centerpiece of their policy:
tightening state control on energy assets; increasing royalties for private energy
investors; and redistributing proceeds, be it directly or through publicly-funded
social programmes.
Evidently, this has not remained without consequences in the energy sector. There
are first signs that large international private hydrocarbon operators are shifting
their operations elsewhere, where the political environment (and the financial
payoffs to investments in hydrocarbons exploration) are more favourable. Nonetheless, at the same time, those countries that have recently been prone to
resource nationalism but have more limited reserves and hence less bargaining
power (Ecuador, Bolivia) appear to be re-evaluating their tactics to some extent,
seeking compromise solutions that involve the international private sector, with only
oil-rich Venezuela implementing its initial threats of aiming at outright state-led
hydrocarbons resource exploitation. EIU (2007) argues that smaller and mediumsized foreign operators will likely continue to seek investment opportunities,
particularly in countries that combine hydrocarbons reserves with an attractive
investment framework more broadly.
A key project in this respect is the ‘Blue Corridors’ project, that would
ultimately connect several cities across Latin America, including Rio
de Janeiro in Brazil, Buenos Aires in Argentina, Montevideo in
Uruguay and Santiago de Chile in Chile. Beyond the bilateral level,
broader regional trading arrangements, notably Mercosur, have
provided a setting for greater energy trading.
A possible obstacle in the near future is the recent emergence of
resource nationalism and the associated political tensions (see box).
For instance, the nationalisation of the Bolivian gas sector in 2006
was not well received in neighbouring countries (gas imports from
Bolivia represent almost 50% of Brazil’s total consumption). While
September 7, 2007
The energy sector in Latin America
other countries heeded the Bolivian call for an upward renegotiation
of prices, further expansion (e.g. the earlier planned partially foreignfinanced expansion of pipelines) is now less likely as Bolivia is seen
as a politically more risky and possibly financially more costly
supplier.
USD bn p.a. in 2005 dollars, 2005-2030
China
Many commentators view resource nationalism as a bad omen for
the region’s energy trading environment, especially when considered in conjunction with the hard-hitting rhetoric in foreign policy
of regional leaders including, most notably, Chavez (Venezuela, the
region’s key oil provider) and Morales (Bolivia, a major gas exporter)
and their willingness to use disruptions in supply (or threats of disruption) as a political weapon.
Middle
East
Latin
America
Russia
This fear is, however, exaggerated for several reasons.
India
Coal
Oil
Gas
Power
Brazil
0
1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
Sources: IEA 2006, Min. Minas/En. Brasil 2006,
Min.Minas/En. Colombia 2005, Sec. En. Mexico 2006
0
,
Change in output over 2000-2005
relative to total output in 2000
Venezuela
Firstly, populists in the region are balanced by liberals such as
Bachelet in Chile, Calderón in Mexico or Uribe in Colombia. The
leaders of the two biggest South American countries, Lula in Brazil
and Kirchner in Argentina, may be placed somewhere in the middle
of these two extremes but have mostly adhered to surprisingly
orthodox policies in recent years, both in the broader economic
spheres and on energy matters.
Secondly, the rhetoric has so far been stronger than the action,
although Venezuela and Bolivia did resort to nationalisation of
energy assets. Thus, while the anti-liberal rhetoric has notably
stalled an extension of the region’s domestic liberalisation or free
trade agenda, cooperation on energy trading continues unabated
(e.g. Petrobras-PDVSA accord, gas pipeline between Venezuela
and Brazil, Argentina-Venezuela energy accord).
2.2 Insufficient energy supply infrastructure
Mexico
Ecuador
Colombia
Brazil
Bolivia
(152)
Argentina
-50
0
Private sector
50
100
150
Public sector
Sources: By the author based on IMF 2006 data
2
1
Thus, recent estimates of current and planned investment in energy
supply infrastructure in the region confirm that there is likely to be
underinvestment in energy supply infrastructure. Current and
planned energy supply infrastructure investments in Latin America
are lower than in all other developing regions (including Africa) on
coal, oil, gas and in total. Only power investments are likely to be
sizeable in the coming years (see chart 7).
(33/ (3&3
Mbd
Middle East
Russia
Other Latin America
Brazil
If we link the recent mixed performance in the hydrocarbon sector
(see chart 8) to the expected willingness to provide the relevant
investments, then underinvestment by the Argentine public sector
and by the Brazilian private sector ought to be seen as particularly
problematic, with the Ecuadorean public sector and the Mexican
private sector at the opposite end of the scale.
Mexico
India
Japan
China
OECD Europe
OECD North
America
2030
2005
-20
0
20
Source: By the author based on IEA data
September 7, 2007
Overall, Latin America has considerable fossil fuel reserves, albeit
with limited scaling-up of production and investment. This limited
scaling-up is surprising given the price increases in recent years.
Several major producers in the region have faced declines in
production, linked with (in the case of Mexico and Colombia)
questions over the size of their remaining reserves. Given limited
local capacity, attracting private know-how and funds is key in
further fossil fuel production. However, prospects for this are slim
and measures explicitly targeted at barring involvement of foreign
investors will not help matters.
40
4
Latin America will not be a net exporter for hydrocarbons in the next
few years (see chart 9), but neither will the major regional powerhouses (Mexico, Brazil) see the energy shortages that other major
emerging economies (notably China and India) will soon experience
5
Current Issues
due to surging domestic demand. Rather, Brazil and Mexico will be
near self-sufficiency levels over the years to come, with the rest of
the region likely being minor net exporters.
Key net importers in the region are Argentina, Chile and Colombia;
key net exporters are Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru (which probably
have reserves vastly outstripping regional demand, leaving room for
extra-regional export). Successful intra-regional gas trade will
crucially depend on whether the relevant planned pipelines will be
built.
2.3 Poor investment environment
8
%
Country
Ranking
Chile
28
Mexico
43
Colombia
79
Argentina
101
Brazil
121
Venezuela
164
Source: IFC 2007
%
Another constraint affecting the prospects of the energy sector in
Latin America is a weak investment environment in some parts of
the region, which has led to lower and more volatile FDI inflows
compared with other emerging market regions. The ‘Doing Business
Report’ by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) provides
some reasons for this lack of enthusiasm by investors (IFC 2007).
Key Latin American countries – and indeed the region’s key energy
producers – perform worse than average in this report, with
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela all found clearly in the lower half of
all 175 countries (see chart 10). For all the lesser-performing
countries in Latin America, tax issues were particularly important
contributors to the poor rating.
(3305
#3
98
High FDI
performance
Low FDI
performance
High FDI Chile
potential
Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico
Low FDI
potential
Colombia,
Uruguay,
Paraguay
Bolivia
Source: UNCTAD FDI Indices
##
Further evidence of Latin America’s woes in attracting foreign
investment are provided by the UNCTAD FDI Indices, which pit FDI
performance against potential (see chart 11). The UNCTAD FDI
Indices state that there is only one “front-runner” in Latin America,
namely Chile.
This weak general FDI attractiveness already by itself bodes ill for
the prospects of the region’s energy sector, especially when
combined with the resource nationalism and anti-investor rhetoric.
Nonetheless, reform efforts have also pushed the sector in a
direction that benefits foreign investors, notably by permitting greater
private participation and ownership of assets; allowing an increasing
number and range of entities to participate in the sector; and
stronger antitrust regimes and arbitration, thus ultimately bringing
some major world energy players into Latin America (Wamukonya
2003). Charts 12 and 13 provide data on private investment in
energy infrastructure. LatAm has the highest number of all regions
(even outscoring East Asia by a considerable margin), in particular
in the “Divestiture” and “Greenfield Project” categories.
%
6(33-7
5
Investment in projects by region and type, USD bn
160
120
80
40
0
East Asia
& Pacific
Europe &
Central
Asia
Concession
Greenfield project
Latin
America &
the
Caribbean
Middle
East &
North
Africa
South Asia
SubSaharan
Africa
Divestiture
Management and lease contract
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database
6
#(
September 7, 2007
The energy sector in Latin America
<
However, chart 13 also shows the remaining high country risk of
Latin America by indicating that the region also has the highest
incidence of projects being cancelled or considered ‘under distress’.
=
Projects cancelled or under distress, 2006
Region
Project
count
Total investment, USD m
11
4,724
5
1,082
49
21,097
East Asia &
Pacific
Europe &
Central Asia
Latin America &
the Caribbean
South Asia
3
2,829
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Grand Total
9
1,072
77
30,805
Considerable work remains to be done in the key energy resourcerich countries in the region to make the institutional environment
more conducive to investment in the energy sector. In many of these
countries, the energy sector is wholly or partly dominated by the
state (with limited scope for involvement by private and / or foreign
investors), often through one or few giant national energy
companies whose way of operating often does not maximise longterm opportunities (e.g. Venezuela, Mexico).
%
6(33-7
5
Number of projects by region and type
Source: World Bank Private Participation
in Infrastructure Database
500
400
300
200
100
0
#&
East Asia
& Pacific
Europe &
Central
Asia
Latin
America &
the
Caribbean
Concession
Greenfield project
Middle
East &
North
Africa
South Asia
SubSaharan
Africa
Divestiture
Management and lease contract
Source: World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Database
#.
& :
;
3.1 Energy demand growth
Million barrels per day
OECD
North
America
Europe
Transition
economies
Developing
countries
China
Middle
East
Latin
America
2005
India
2010
2015
Brazil
2030
0
20
40
Source: By the author based on IEA 2006
60
#/
Projected regional demand for both oil and gas is the second-lowest
of any region in the world, with the exception of Africa (chart 15 and
16), with close to half of the projected demand coming from Brazil
and another vast part from Mexico. China already needs more oil
and gas than the entire Latin American continent, and indeed its
demand will be more than twice as high as Latin America’s by 2030.
This means, notably, that if fuel production from Latin America is to
be raised, this rise ought above all to come from a surge in demand
external to the region. In view of the projected rise in demand from
2
China and India (close to threefold increases for both oil and gas
demand for both countries before 2030, with China’s gas demand
almost quadrupling by then), the opportunities for doing so should
be evident. To be sure, a large part of the surge in demand from
countries like China will be met by the Middle East, which is set to
boost its refining capacity to twice the rate seen in the last decade
(Cambridge Energy Research Associates 2007b). Nonetheless,
while some commentators predict a swing back to concentrated
sourcing of oil to the Middle East and only expect Brazil to add
significantly in capacity (Cambridge Energy Research Associates
2007c), calls by key policy advisors e.g. in the US to diversify
energy sources (Yergin 2006) may also represent a boost to ‘nontraditional’ suppliers, including the smaller Latin American oil and
gas exporters.
2
September 7, 2007
See also Auer, Josef (2004).
7
Current Issues
3.2 External demand and funding
;
China and India ought not only to be seen as providing opportunities
in terms of markets for energy exports, but also as a source of
funding or for tapping new resources – thereby bridging the
production gap. Both China and India – but also other emerging
economies that are likely to be long-run net oil importers, such as
South Africa – are promising export markets for Latin American
hydrocarbons. Moreover, the ‘Resource Nationalism’ addressed in
the box on page 4 also means that left-leaning, energy resource-rich
countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador or Bolivia will be keen to
diversify oil and gas export markets away from the US.
Mtoe
OECD
Europe
Transition
economies
Developing
countries
Conversely, for countries such as China, India or South Africa, the
Latin American region arguably represents a diversification
opportunity compared with their established supplier countries (e.g.
for China the current top three oil-supplying countries are Angola,
Saudi Arabia and Iran). Most of the evidence so far suggests that
the main interest is in Latin America’s oil reserves rather than in
other forms of energy supply.
China
Middle
East
Latin
America
2004
India
2010
2015
Brazil
2030
0
1000
2000
3000
Source: By the author based on IEA 2006
!
>
3.3 Progress with promising new energy technologies
Total
primary
energy
Share of
renewables
A (%) B (%)
supply1
Argentina
#-
Mtoe2
64
7.5
4.1
205
1609
40.0
15.6
13.5
1.9
Germany
348
3.8
1.3
India
573
38.8
1.3
Mexico
166
9.8
4.8
Brazil
China
UK
USA
This interest of large emerging economies in Latin America’s energy
resources is likely to materialise in various forms – direct stakes in
energy companies wherever national laws allow to do so, or otherwise joint ventures with state companies. However, while the
pledges for investments from these countries have so far easily
been in the three-digit billion range, only part of it has been
delivered. This should serve as a reminder that while Latin America
is a welcoming energy resource supplier for risk diversification
purposes, it is unlikely to become China’s or India’s main energy
partner anytime in the short to medium term.
234
1.5
0.3
2326
4.2
1.5
1
Using the physical energy content methodology
2
Million tons oil equivalent
A: Share of total renewables in TPES
B: Share of renewables excluding hydropower and
waste in TPES
*2004 figures, which are the latest available by the IEA.
Source: IEA 2007
#0
Finally, leadership on promising new energy technologies represents
an opportunity for the energy sector in Latin America. Already, the
share of renewable energies in Latin America is considerable (chart
17), reaching 40% in the Brazilian case due to Brazil’s vast use of
hydropower. Moreover, the region is at the cutting edge with respect
to some of the most advanced technologies.
The example of biofuels in Brazil is particularly noteworthy in this
respect. Firstly, Brazil has the highest rate of biofuel consumption in
the world by a massive margin. It is already the largest ethanol
producer in the world and has a range of relevant R&D programmes
3
on its production and use. Brazil’s ethanol production has grown at
no less than 8% per year over the past 5 years, and its production
costs are the lowest in the world. The penetration of ethanol in the
transportation industry has already reached 40% of light car
demand. Nonetheless, even though Brazil is currently the biggest
ethanol exporter worldwide, the expansion of the global ethanol
trade still faces significant obstacles, including protectionism, the
limited number of alternative suppliers, insufficient transport
infrastructure, and an insufficient economic advantage over gasoline
(Cambridge Energy Research Associates 2007a).
Overall, most analyses suggest that Brazil will likely benefit from an
increasing competitiveness of ethanol worldwide (both in terms of
quality and cost, see Lin et al 2006) as well as from developments in
3
8
Ethanol can be produced from corn, barley and wheat but also from "cellulosic
biomass" such as trees and grasses. Ethanol is most commonly used to increase
octane and improve the emissions quality of gasoline. US Department of Energy,
Alternative Fuels Data Center: www.eere.energy.gov/afdc/
September 7, 2007
The energy sector in Latin America
international carbon markets and rising prices of carbon emission4
intensive fuels. While its experience of many years in ethanol
production and application is likely to benefit Brazil to generate
income from that fuel, the country is also well-placed to benefit from
the likely scale-up in biodiesel use (the second most important
biofuel globally), given a high degree of Brazilian R&D and
experience in applications of that biofuel as well.
Biofuel demand in road transport, Mtoe
World
Europe
A dramatic rise can be expected in biofuel demand in the coming
5
years , particularly in Europe (chart 18). Brazil has achieved the feat
of positioning itself as one of the very prime supplying countries in
the world and is poised to remain in this position for some time to
come.
North
America
OECD
Developing
countries
Brazil
.
China
2004
India
2030
0
50
100
150
Source: IEA estimates
#1
The risks regarding the energy sector in Latin America are varied
and substantial. Notably, energy bottlenecks will cause considerable
problems, as will the persistence of obstacles to investment in the
sector from outside the region. Nonetheless, the overall picture
gives reason for cautious optimism. Firstly, the most important risk of
all (unfavourable political developments leading to backlashes in
regional energy trading) is unlikely to materialise in full force.
Secondly, energy demand growth, vast demand and investment
potential from China and India and progress in some countries in
positioning themselves at the cutting edge of energy technology
development should mean that the sector will remain reasonably
attractive and successful in the short to medium term. This will be
particularly the case, of course, for those countries that manage to
put adequate regulatory policies in place – notably policies
addressing current gaps in local capacity and finance through
provisions for targeted foreign participation to maximise the
considerable long-term potential of the Latin American energy
sector.
Georg Caspary
4
5
September 7, 2007
Such price rises are highly likely under most prediction scenarios as governments
are expected to increasingly penalise carbon emission-intensive fuels. Such
penalties would therefore have to be added to medium-term expectations for
medium to high price levels of fossil fuels.
See also Auer, Josef (2005).
9
Current Issues
$
Auer, Josef (2004). Energy prospects after the petroleum age.
Deutsche Bank Research. Current Issues. Frankfurt am Main.
Auer, Josef (2005). Bioenergies after the petroleum age. Deutsche
Bank Research. Current Issues. Frankfurt am Main.
Cambridge Energy Research Associates (2007a). Ethanol-powered
Brazil: The Land of Green Gold? February 7, 2007. Cambridge
Energy Associates. Cambridge.
Cambridge Energy Research Associates (2007b). Lightening Up:
The New Wave of Middle East Refining Capacity . June 22,
2007. Cambridge Energy Associates. Cambridge.
Cambridge Energy Research Associates (2007c). The O15:
Powerhouses of Production Capacity Growth. June 5, 2007.
Cambridge Energy Associates. Cambridge.
Economist (2006). The explosive nature of gas. The Economist. 9
February 2006.
Economist Intelligence Unit / EIU (2007). Resource nationalism in
Latin America.
Energy Information Administration / EIA (2006). International Energy
Annual.
Energy Information Administration / EIA (2007). International
Petroleum Monthly. March 2007 Edition.
de Ferranti, David M., Guillermo E. Perry; Francisco H.G. Ferreira,
and Michael Walton (2004). Inequality in Latin America: Breaking
with History? World Bank. Washington.
Fuentes, Rolando (2007). Mexico’s energy dilemma: resource
nationalism vs. market liberalisation. Oxford Institute for Energy
Studies. March 2007.
Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries / OPEC (2005).
Annual Statistical Bulletin. OPEC. Vienna.
International Energy Agency / IEA (2006). World Energy Outlook
2006. IEA. Paris.
International Energy Agency / IEA (2007). Renewables in Global
Energy Supply. IEA. Paris
Lin, Yan and Tanaka, Shuzo (2006). Ethanol fermentation from
biomass resources: current state and prospects. Applied
Microbiology and Biotechnology. Volume 69, Number 6.
February, 2006.
Ministério de Minas e Energia do Brasil / Empresa de Planejamento
Energético do Brasil (2006). Balance Energetico 2006. [Brazilian
Ministry of Mines and Energy / Brasilian Energy Planning
Institute (2006). Energy Balances 2006.]
Ministerio de Minas y Energía de Colombia (2005). Plan de
Expansión – Generación y Transmisión, 2005 – 2019.
[Colombian Ministry of Mines and Energy (2005). Generation
and Transmission Investment Plan, 2005 – 2019.]
Secretaría de Energía de Mexico (2006). Prospectiva del Sector
Eléctrico; del Mercado de Gas Natural; del Mercado de Gas
Licuado de Petróleo; y de Petrolíferos, 2006 – 2014. [Mexican
Energy Ministry (2006). Prospects for the Electricity, Natural Gas
and Petroleum Sector.]
Yergin, Daniel (2006). Ensuring Energy Security. Foreign Affairs.
Mar/Apr2006. Vol. 85 Issue 2, pp. 69-82
10
September 7, 2007
The energy sector in Latin America
Wamukonya, Njeri (2003). Power sector reform in developing
countries: mismatched agendas. Energy Policy, vol. 31, issue
12, September 2003, pages 1273-1289.
World Bank (2006). Agua Prieta Solar Thermal Hybrid Power Plant −
Official Communication. World Bank, Washington.
September 7, 2007
11
The growing scarcity of fossil fuels must be addressed with intelligent, future-proof strategies. In the longer run,
securing energy supplies will be possible only with a broad range of measures. Every available option has to be
exhausted – the diversification of energy carriers and technologies and the mobilisation of all conservation,
reactivation and efficiency-boosting strategies. One issue closely linked with the energy sector is the global
challenge posed by climate change. Over the coming years a variety of measures will be taken to slow the
pace of climate change and mitigate its negative consequences. All this will have a tangible impact on many
aspects of business and society.
Climate change and sectors: Some like it hot!
Current Issues .........................................................................................................................................July 5, 2007
EU energy policy: High time for action!
EU Monitor 44 ...................................................................................................................................... April 17, 2007
EU emission trading: Allocation battles intensifying
Current Issues ..................................................................................................................................... March 6, 2007
Technology to clean up coal for the post-oil era
Current Issues .................................................................................................................................February 6, 2007
The US’s new energy policy – barely a start!
Current Issues ............................................................................................................................ December 14, 2005
Bioenergies after the petroleum age
Current Issues ..................................................................................................................................August 15, 2005
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