ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION
2001 and 2002 RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE USE OF THE
MILITARY AND DOD ACTIONS
2001 Gilmore Commission Report
Recommendation 11: SecDef seek and Congress approve the authority to establish a new
Undersecretary of Defense position for homeland security.
Status: Implemented. In the FY03 NDAA, Congress established instead the ASD(HD),
which substantially meets the GC recommendation.
Recommendation 2: National Command Authority establish a single, unified C2
structure to execute all functions for providing military support or assistance to civil
authorities.
Status: Implemented nearly in full. NORTHCOM and PACOM provide a unified
military C2 structure for nearly all DSCA functions.
Recommendation 3: SecDef develop more detailed plans for the use of the military
domestically across the spectrum of potential activities, and coordinate with state and
other Federal agencies in the creation of more state- or regional-specific plans.
Status: Substantially implemented. DoD has substantially increased its planning
activities for DSCA, to include, for example, participation in the development of DSCA
scenarios to support planning and capabilities based assessments to help generate DSCA
requirements. Through its expanded EPLO and DCO activities, DoD participates directly
in the development of state and regional plans. A key collaborative forum for planning is
the FEMA “Task Force for Emergency Readiness.” The TFER is a pilot project inspired
by the North Carolina “Military Civilian Task Force for Emergency Readiness”; it has
reps from states, FEMA, and DoD. DoD EPLOs and DCOs are examples of the officials
representing the Department on the TFER. The TFER affords Federal and state officials
an opportunity to engage directly and iterate on evolving plans, solving problems along
the way. This is a very effective approach to planning. However, according to DoD, its
planning objectives cannot be fully met until DHS identifies specific requirements for
Federal military support.
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Numbers associated with recommendations do not reflect enumeration system within
Gilmore Commission reports. These numbers were assigned arbitrarily for RAND
purposes only.
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Recommendation 4: SecDef direct specific training for military units most likely to be
involved in military support to civil authorities.
Status: Partially implemented. As specified in law and policy, several CBRNE-focused
units (CST, CCMRF and CERFP) are specially trained for DSCA missions. DoD also
maintains rapid reaction units for response to civil disturbances; these are specially
trained. NORTHCOM has developed a mission essential task list for the CCMRF.
Recommendation 5: Expand military involvement in exercises with Federal, State, and
local agencies.
Status: Implemented. DoD has substantially increased its training and exercise activities
for the civil support mission area. Example activities include the Vigilant Guard series of
exercises, Ardent Sentry and TOPOFF.
Recommendation 6: SecDef direct specific mission areas for the use of the National
Guard for providing support to civil authorities for combating terrorism.
Status: Implemented. In 2004, National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force
Packages (CERFP) were stood up in each of the 10 FEMA regions to respond to CBRNE
incidents and support local, state, and Federal agencies managing the consequences of the
event.
Recommendation 7: SecDef publish a compendium of the statutory authorities for using
the military domestically to combat terrorism.
Status: Partially implemented. In April 2001, the DoD Center for Law and Military
Operations first published the Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge
Advocates. The CLMO handbook does not represent an official DoD position, but could
serve as the basis for a publication of the type the GC recommended.
Recommendation 8: SecDef improve the full-time liaison elements located in the 10
FEMA regions and assign those elements expanded missions to enhance coordination
with State and local agencies.
Status: Implemented. The DoD has appointed ten DCOs and assigned one to each
FEMA region. If requested and approved, the DCO serves as DoD's single point of
contact at the Joint Field Office (JFO). With few exceptions, requests for DSCA
originating at the JFO are coordinated with and processed through the DCO. The DCO
has a Defense Coordinating Element (DCE) consisting of a staff and military liaison
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officers to facilitate coordination and support to activated Emergency Support Functions
(ESFs).
2002 Gilmore Commission Report
Recommendation 9: SecDef clarify the NORTHCOM mission to ensure it is developing
plans across the full spectrum of potential activities to provide military support to civil
authorities, including counterterrorism operations, meaning, according to DoD,
“offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.”
Status: Implemented. NORTHCOM has developed plans for a range of civil support
activities and for counterterrorism operations, and new plans are under development.
According to JP 3-27, Homeland Defense (2007), describes command authorities for the
CT mission when DoD is in the lead for homeland defense. It says that special operations
forces (SOF) in the U.S. are “normally under COCOM of CDRUSSOCOM. When
directed, CDRUSSOCOM relinquishes OPCON/TACON of US based SOF and
OPCON/TACON is assumed by CDRUSNORTHCOM for HD operations in the
USNORTHCOM AOR.” The Unified Command Plan notes that at direction of the
President or SecDef, NORTHCOM can also be directed to support lead Federal agency
CT operations.
Recommendation 10: NORTHCOM combatant commander have operational control of
all Federal military forces engaged in missions within the Command’s area of
responsibility for support to civil authorities.
Status: Substantially implemented. According to DoD, in most domestic incidents
within the NORTHCOM AOR, Commander NORTHCOM will be designated the
supported combatant commander. However, supporting commanders such as
TRANSCOM and SOCOM will likely still control forces under their purview in
executing DSCA missions.
Recommendation 11: President and Congress amend existing statutes to ensure that
sufficient authorities and safeguards exist for use of the military across the entire
spectrum (CBRNE and cyber) of potential terrorist attacks.
Status: Not yet implemented. Statutes have not been amended to ensure such authorities
and safeguards exist.
Recommendation 12: President and Congress amend existing statutes to ensure that the
authorities (for use of the military across the entire spectrum of terrorist threats) are
consolidated in a single chapter of the Title 10.
Status: Not implemented. Congress has not consolidated in a single Title 10 section the
homeland security-related authorities for the use of the military domestically.
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Recommendation 13: DoD prepare a legal “handbook” to ensure that military and
civilian authorities better understand the legal authorities governing DSCA.
Status: Partially implemented. In April 2001, the DoD Center for Law and Military
Operations first published the Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge
Advocates. The CLMO handbook does not represent an official DoD position (Fourth
Report, p. 94), but could serve as the basis for a publication of the type the GC
recommended.
Recommendation 14: President direct DHS to coordinate a comprehensive effort among
DoD and Federal, State, and local authorities to identify the types and levels of Federal
support (including military) that may be required to assist civil authorities in homeland
security efforts, and to articulate those requirements in the National Incident Response
Plan.
Status: Partially implemented. The DHS continues to coordinate a national effort with
DoD to identify civil support requirements. Significant progress has been made through,
for example, the National Response Framework which specifies how military capabilities
can be applied in the emergency support functions and through the civil-military effort to
complete capabilities based assessments for emergency response.
Recommendation 15: SecDef direct that all military personnel and units under
NORTHCOM, or designated for NORTHCOM use in any contingency, receive special
training for domestic missions, including training for support to law enforcement.
Status: Not fully implemented. It is not clear that all units and personnel under or
designated for NORTHCOM receive specialized training. However, as specified in law
and policy, several CBRNE-focused units (CST, CCMRF and CERFP) are specially
trained for DSCA missions. DoD also maintains rapid reaction units for response to civil
disturbances; these are specially trained. NORTHCOM maintains training and readiness
oversight over CCMRF. NORTHCOM has developed a mission essential task list for
CCMRF.
Recommendation 16: SecDef clarify NORTHCOM’s combatant command authority to
ensure that Commander NORTHCOM can direct subordinate commands to conduct preincident planning, training, and exercising of forces required to conduct civil support
missions.
Status: Implemented. Commander NORTHCOM can, in principle, direct its subordinate
commands ARNORTH, NORTHAF, NAVNORTH, and MARNORTH to conduct preincident planning, training, and exercising of forces required to conduct civil support
missions. It is not clear that the Command can similarly direct subordinate components,
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such as JTF-CS. Note that in this case the GC was apparently concerned that Commander
NORTHDCOM’s COCOM authority only applied to his homeland defense mission area.
Recommendation 17: Commander NORTHCOM have dedicated, rapid reaction units
with a wide range of response capabilities for DSCA in the event of a terrorist attack.
Examples of such capabilities include ability to support implementation of a quarantine,
support to crowd control activities, provide CBRNE detection and decontamination,
provide emergency medical response, perform engineering, and provide communication
to and among leadership.
Status: Partially implemented. The CCMRF is “allocated” to NORTHCOM, but does
not have the full range of capabilities recommended by the GC.
Recommendation 18: Congress expressly authorize SecDef to provide funds to the
governor of a State when such funds are requested for civil support planning, training,
exercising and operations by National Guard personnel acting in Title 32 status.
Status: Implemented. In general, requests that support NG planning, training, exercising
and operations in a Title 32 status are considered for funding. DoD funds “Vigilant
Guard” and other exercises conducted in a Title 32 status. DoD programs and funds
support the fifty-four NG JFHQ-State, which engage in civil support planning and
training activities.
Recommendation 19: SecDef collaborate with State Governors to develop agreed lists
of National Guard CS activities for which the DoD will provide funds.
Status: Not implemented. An agreed list of CS activities has not been established.
However, Title 32 sections 901-908 authorize DoD to pay for certain homeland defense
activities by the NG, to include critical infrastructure protection. More generally, DoD
considers requests for Title 32 funding on a case-by-case basis.
Recommendation 20: President and governors of the several States establish a
collaborative process for deploying National Guard forces in Title 32 status to support
missions of national significance at the President’s request.
Status: Implemented. Title 32 sections 901-908 authorize DoD to pay for certain
homeland defense activities by the NG, to include critical infrastructure protection.
Funding is also authorized for emergencies covered by a Stafford Act declaration, which
can include multi-state National Guard operations for disaster response.
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Recommendation 21: Congress provide new authority under Title 32 to employ the
National Guard (in non-title 10 status) on a multi-State basis, and with governors’
consent to conduct homeland security missions.
Status: Not implemented. Congress has not provided new Title 32 authorities for
employing the National Guard on a multi-State basis.
Recommendation 22: SecDef define clearly the appropriate command relationships
between the DoD and the National Guard.
Status: Partially implemented. DoD and the NG have improved coordination to ensure
unity of effort during civil support operations; coordination efforts are ongoing. A 2004
change to Title 32 permitted the commander of a Guard unit to be in dual status. For
example, a commander familiar with a state and local area of operations could serve in
both Title 10 and 32 status, providing a unified federal and state effort. This allows a
Guard commander to retain a state commission after an order to active duty while
exercising command authority in a mutually exclusive manner. The statute requires
presidential authorization and the governor's consent for dual status. This authority has
been used at the G8 Summit in Savannah, Ga., the Democratic National Convention in
Boston, the Republican National Convention in New York City, and Operation Winter
Freeze supporting immigration and customs enforcement.
Recommendation 23: Congress and DoD promote and support the development of a
system for National Guard CS activities that can deploy forces regionally, in coordination
with DoD, to respond to incidents that overwhelm the resources of an individual State.
Status: Partially implemented. DoD facilitates the execution of operations conducted
under EMAC auspices, which include NG operations. DoD funds and certifies the NG
CERFP, which are regionally organized, specialty forces focused on CBRNE
consequence management.
Recommendation 24: SecDef direct that certain National Guard units be trained for and
assigned HS missions as their exclusive missions and provide resources consistent with
the designated priority of their HS missions.
Status: Not Implemented. The NG has not dedicated forces exclusively to the general
civil support mission, other than the small, specialized Civil Support Teams.
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