Reading List
Topics and Papers
Learning
• H.P. Young, “The Evolution of Conventions,” Econometrica, vol. 61, pp. 57­
84,1993.
• M. Kandori, G.J. Mailath, and R. Rob, “Learning, mutation, and long run
equilibria in games,” Econometrica, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 29–56, January 1993.
• E. Kalai and E. Lehrer, “Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium,”
Econometrica, vol. 61, no. 5, 1993, pp. 1019-1045, 1993.
• J. Hofbauer and W. Sandholm, “On the Global Convergence of Stochastic
Fictitious Play,” Econometrica, vol. 70, pp. 2265–2294, 2002.
• J.S. Shamma and G. Arslan, “Dynamic fictitious play, dynamic gradient play,
and distributed convergence to Nash equilibria,” IEEE Transactions on Au­
tomatic Control, March 2005, pp. 312–327.
• J.R. Marden, H.P. Young, G. Arslan, and J.S. Shamma, “Payoff based dy­
namics for multi-player weakly acyclic games,” to appear in SIAM Journal
on Control and Optimization, special issue on Control and Optimization in
Cooperative Networks, 2008.
• D. Fudenberg and D. Levine, “Conditional Universal Consistency,” Games
and Economic Behavior, vol. 29, pp. 104–130, 1999.
• D.P. Foster and R.V. Vohra, “Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilib­
rium,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 21(1-2), pp. 40-55, October 1997.
• D.P. Foster and R.V. Vohra, “Regret in the On-Line Decision Problem,”
Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 29(1-2), pp. 7-35, October 1999.
• S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell, “A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Cor­
related Equilibrium,” Econometrica, vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 1127-1150, 2000.
Repeated Games
• D. Abreu, D. Pearce, and E. Stachetti, “Towards a theory for discounted
repeated games,” Econometrica, vol. 58, no. 5, pages 1041-63, September
1990.
Games with special structure (Supermodular and potential games)
• J.R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J.S. Shamma, “Joint strategy fictitious play
with inertia for potential games,” preprint, 2006.
1
• Rosenthal, “A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria,” 1973.
• D. Monderer and L. Shapley, “Potential Games,” Games and Economic Be­
havior, vol. 14, pp. 124–143, 1996.
• D. Monderer and L. Shapley, “Fictitious Play Property for Games with Iden­
tical Interests,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 1, pp. 258–265, 1996.
• D. Monderer and M. Tennenholtz, “Distributed Games,” Games and Eco­
nomic Behavior, vol. 28 , pp. 55–72, 1999.
• Topkis, “Equilibrium points in nonzero sum n-person submodular games,”
1979.
• P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, “Rationalizability, learning and equilibrium in
games with strategic complementarities,” Econometrica, vol. 58, no. 6, pp.
1255–1277, November 1990.
• P. Milgrom and C. Shannon, “Monotone Comparative Statics,” Economet­
rica, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 157–180, January 1994.
• X. Vives, “Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities,” Journal of
Mathematical Economics, vol. 19, issue 3, pp. 305-321, 1990.
Wireless Network Games
• S. Adlakha, R. Johari, and A. Goldsmith, “Competition in wireless systems
via Bayesian interference games,” preprint, 2007.
• J. Huang, R. Berry and M.L. Honig, “Auction-based Spectrum Sharing,”
ACM Mobile Networks and Applications Journal, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 405-418,
June 2006.
• J. Huang, R. Berry and M.L. Honig, “Distributed Interference Compensation
for Wireless Networks,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 1074-1084, May 2006.
• J.-W. Lee, A. Tang, J. Huang, M. Chiang and A.R. Calderbank, “Reverse En­
gineering MAC: A Non-Cooperative Game Model,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 6, August 2007.
• A.H. Mohsenian-Rad, J. Huang, M. Chiang and V.W.S. Wong, “UtilityOptimal Random Access: Reduced Complexity, Fast Convergence, and Ro­
bust Performance,” submitted to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communi­
cations, 2007.
• A.H. Mohsenian-Rad, J. Huang, M. Chiang and V.W.S. Wong, “UtilityOptimal Random Access: Optimal Performance Without Frequent Explicit
Message Passing,” submitted to IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communi­
cations, 2007.
2
• U.O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Competitive
Scheduling in Wireless Collision Channels with Correlated Channel State,”
Proc. of GameNets, 2009.
• U.O. Candogan, I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Near-Optimal
Power Control in Wireless Networks: A Potential Game Approach,” Proc. of
INFOCOM 2010.
Existence and Computation of Nash Eq., Correlated Eq., and Wardrop Eq.
• S. Hart and D. Schmeidler, “Existence of correlated equilibria,” Mathematics
of Operations Research, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 18–25, February 1989.
• C. Papadimitriou, “Computing correlated equilibria in Multi-Player Games,”
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2005.
• McKelvey and McLennan, “Computation of Equilibria in Finite Games,”
1996.
• B. Von Stengel, “Computing Equilibria for Two-Person Games,” 1999.
• R.J. Lipton, E. Markakis, and A. Mehta, “Playing large games using simple
strategies,” Proc. 4th ACM conf. Electronic Commerce, 2003.
• A. Fabrikant, C. Papadimitriou, K. Talwar, “The Complexity of Pure Nash
Equilibria,” In Proc. of STOC 2004, pages 604–612.
• P.A. Parrilo, “Polynomial Games and Sum of Squares Optimization,” Pro­
ceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, December
2006.
• N.D. Stein, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Separable and Low-Rank Con­
tinuous Games,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 37, no. 4, pp.
475-504, 2008.
• N.D. Stein, P.A. Parrilo, and A. Ozdaglar, “Characterization and Compu­
tation of Correlated Equilibria in Infinite Games,” Proceedings of the 46th
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, December 2007.
• N.D. Stein, A. Ozdaglar, and P.A. Parrilo, “Structure of Extreme Correlated
Equilibria,” submitted for publication, 2010.
• M. Kearns, M. Littman, S. Singh, “Graphical Models for Game Theory,”
Proceedings of UAI, 2001.
• M. Kearns and L. Ortiz,“Nash Propagation for Loopy Graphical Games,”
Proceedings of NIPS, 2002.
• S. Kakade, M. Kearns, and L. Ortiz“Graphical Economics,” Proceedings of
COLT, 2004.
Equilibrium Selection
3
• H. Carlsson and E. van Damme, “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,”
Econometrica, vol. 61(5), pp. 989-1018, 1993.
• M. Yildiz and J. Weinstein, “A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with
Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements,” Econometrica, 75(2), pp.
365-400, 2007.
Network Pricing and Cost Sharing
• K. Jain and P. Varaiya, “Combinatorial exchange mechanisms for efficient
bandwidth allocation,” 2004.
• J. Feigenbaum, C. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker, “Sharing the Cost of Mul­
ticast Transmissions,” Journal of Computer and System Sciences, vol. 63, pp.
21-41, 2001.
• L. He and J. Walrand, “Pricing and Revenue Sharing Strategies for Internet
Service Providers,” IEEE JSAC, May 2006.
• J. Musacchio, G. Schwartz, and J. Walrand, “Network Neutrality and Provider
Investment Incentives,” preprint, 2007.
Network Design and Formation
• M. Jackson, “Network Formation,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Eco­
nomics and the Law , MacMillan Press, forthcoming.
• E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler, and T.
Roughgarden“The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allo­
cation,” 2004.
• E. Arcaute, R. Johari, and S. Mannor, “Network formation: bilateral con­
tracting and myopic dynamics,” preprint, 2007.
• R. Johari, S. Mannor, and J.N. Tsitsiklis, “A contract-based model for di­
rected network formation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 56(2):201224,
2006.
• E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, E. Tardos, and T. Wexler, “Near-Optimal Net­
work Design with Selfish Agents,” 2003.
• A. Fabrikant, A. Luthra, E. Maneva, C.H. Papadimitriou, and S. Shenker,
“On a Network Creation Game,” 2003.
Price of Anarchy
• E. Koutsoupias, C.H. Papadimitriou “Worst-case equilibria,” STACS, 1999.
• T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, “How Bad is Selfish Routing?” JACM, 2002.
• T. Roughgarden, “The Price of Anarchy is Independent of the Network Topol­
ogy,” JCSS, 2003.
4
• T. Roughgarden and E. Tardos, “Bounding the Inefficiency of Equilibria in
Nonatomic Congestion Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 47, no.
2, pp. 389–403, May 2004.
• J.R. Correa, A.S. Schulz and N.E. Stier Moses, “Selfish Routing in Capac­
itated Networks,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 29, no. 4, pp.
961–976, 2004.
• J.R. Correa, A.S. Schulz and N.E. Stier Moses, “A geometric approach to the
price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games, ” to appear in Games and
Economic Behavior, 2008.
• R. Cominetti, J.R. Correa and N.E. Stier Moses, “The Impact of Oligopolistic
Competition in Networks,” to appear in Operations Research
• P. Maillé and N.E. Stier Moses, “Eliciting Coordination With Rebates,”
preprint, 2008.
• D. Acemoglu and A. Ozdaglar, “Competition and Efficiency in Congested
Markets,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 1–31,
February 2007.
• D. Acemoglu, R. Johari, and A. Ozdaglar, Partially Optimal Routing,” IEEE
Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on Non-cooperative
Behavior in Networking, vol. 25, no. 6, 1148–1160, August 2007.
• D. Acemoglu and A. Ozdaglar, “Competition in Parallel-Serial Networks,”
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, special issue on Non­
cooperative Behavior in Networking, vol. 25, no. 6, 1180–1192, August 2007.
• D. Acemoglu, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Price and Capacity Competi­
tion,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 1-26, May 2009.
• A. Ozdaglar, “Price Competition with Elastic Traffic,” to appear in Networks,
2008.
• R. Johari and J.N. Tsitsiklis, “Efficiency loss in a network resource allocation
game,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 29(3):407435, 2004.
• G. Perakis, “The price of anarchy when costs are non-separable and asym­
metric,” 2004.
• A. Vetta, “Nash equilibria in competitive societies with applications to facility
location, traffic routing, and auctions,” Proceedings of the 43rd Symposium
on the Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 416–425, 2002.
• E. Friedman, “A Generic Analysis of Selfish Routing,” 2004.
• A. Hayrapetyan, E. Tardos and T. Wexler, “The Effect of Collusion in Con­
gestion Games,” ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), 2006.
Social Networks
5
• A. Banerjee, “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior,” Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, vol. 107, pp. 797-817, 1992.
• A. Banerjee and D. Fudenberg, “Word-of-mouth Learning,” Games and Eco­
nomic Behavior, vol. 46, pp. 1-22, 2004.
• S. Bikchandani, D. Hirshleifer, I. and Welch, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion,
Custom, and Cultural Change as Information Cascades,” Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 100, pp. 992-1026, 1992.
• G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, “Rules of Thumb for Social Learning,” Journal
of Political Economy, vol. 101, no. 4, pp. 612-643, 1993.
• G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, “Word-of-mouth communication and social
learning,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 110, pp. 93-126, 1995.
• M.O. Jackson and A. Wolinsky, “A Strategic Model of Social and Economic
Networks,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 71, pp. 44-74, 1996.
• M.O. Jackson and A. Watts, “The Evolution of Social and Economic Net­
works,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 106, pp. 265-295, 2002.
• L. Smith and P. Sorensen, “Pathological Outcomes of Observational Learn­
ing,” Econometrica, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 371-398, 2000.
• B. Golub and M.O. Jackson, “Naive Learning in Social Networks: Conver­
gence, Influence, and the Wisdom of Crowds,” preprint, 2007.
• V. Bala and S. Goyal, “Learning from Neighbours”, Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 595–621, 1998.
• D. Kempe, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, “Maximizing the Spread of Influence in
a Social Network,” Proceedings of KDD, 2003.
• D. Acemoglu, M. Dahleh, I. Lobel, and A. Ozdaglar, “Bayesian Learning in
Social Networks,”, preprint, 2008.
• D. Acemoglu, A. Ozdaglar, and A. ParandehGheibi, “Spread of (Mis)information
in Social Networks,” to appear in Games and Economic Behavior, 2009.
• D. Acemoglu, K. Bimpikis, and A. Ozdaglar, “Communication Information
Dynamics in (Endogeneous) Networks,” LIDS report 2813, 2009.
Game Theory for Cooperative Control
• G. Arslan, J.R. Marden and J.S. Shamma, “Autonomous vehicle-target as­
signment: A game theoretical formulation”, ASME Journal of Dynamic Sys­
tems, Measurement, and Control, special issue on Analysis and Control of
Multi-Agent Dynamic Systems, September 2007, pp. 584–596.
• J.R. Marden, G. Arslan, and J.S. Shamma, “Connections between cooperative
control and potential games ilustrated on the consensus problem”, Proceedings
of European Control Conference, July 2007.
6
Mechanism Design and Auctions
• J. Gallien, “Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce,” 2004.
• E. Friedman and D. Parkes, “Pricing WiFi at Starbucks – Issues in Online
Mechanism Design,” 2003.
• N. Nisan and A. Ronen, “Algorithmic Mechanism Design,” Proceedings of
31st ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1999.
• B. Edelman, M. Ostrovsky, and M. Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the
Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Key­
words,” American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 242-259, March 2007.
• A. Mehta, T. Roughgarden, and M. Sundararajan, “Beyond Moulin Mecha­
nisms,” EC, 2007.
• T. Roughgarden and M. Sundararajan, “Is Efficiency Expensive?”, 3rd Work­
shop on Sponsored Search, 2007.
• J. Feigenbaum, C. Papadimitriou, R. Sami, and S. Shenker, “A BGP-based
Mechanism for Lowest-Cost Routing,” Distributed Computing, vol. 18, pp.
61–72, 2005.
• D.C. Parkes, “Online Mechanisms,” in Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge
University press, 2007.
• I. Menache, A. Ozdaglar, R. Srikant, and D. Acemoglu, “Dynamic OnlineAdvertising Auctions as Stochastic Scheduling,” Proc. of NetEcon, 2009.
7
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6.254 Game Theory with Engineering Applications
Spring 2010
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