Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support
of Civil Authorities After Certain Incidents
MEETING MINUTES
DAY ONE: MARCH 17, 2010
LOCATION: 1200 SOUTH HAYES STREET, ARLINGTON, VA
PERSONS PRESENT1:
Panel Members:
Steve Abbot
Jim Carafano
Dennis Celletti
Jim Greenwood
Jerry Grizzle
Ron Harrison
Frank Keating
Tim Lowenberg
Jim Metzger
George Nethercutt
Fred Rees
Dennis Reimer
Erv Rokke
OSD Staff:
Cathy Polmateer, Designated Federal Officer (OASD-HD&ASA)
Manny Aponte (OASD-HD&ASA)
Mike Shane (OASD-HD&ASA)
RAND Staff:
Mike Wermuth
Gary Cecchine
Andrew Morral
Scott McMahon
Nate Shestak
1
The following list includes all persons who were present in an official capacity,
regardless of whether or not they stayed for the entire day’s session.
1
Several members of the public were also in attendance
The meeting commenced with welcoming remarks and a call to order by
Chairman Steve Abbot. He addressed a few administrative details, noting that
the next meeting would likely be held at RAND in the first week of June. He then
introduced Andrew Morral as the Director of RAND Homeland Security and
Defense Center.
Mike Wermuth of RAND then offered his welcoming remarks and called the
panel’s attention to items in the Resource Books, especially to two written public
statements and the subpanel minutes from the November meetings at
NORTHCOM.
The Chairman then asked for a motion to approve the subpanel meeting minutes
and for any additions or corrections. There being no additions or corrections, on
motions made and seconded, the panel sequentially and unanimously approved
the minutes from the meetings of subpanels 1, 2, 3, and 4 at NORTHCOM.
The Chairman then turned to the members of subpanel 1 and asked if there were
any comments from the previous day’s subpanel meeting.
Speaking first for subpanel 1, George Nethercutt stated that their goal was to
glean whether there needed to be any substantive changes to the range of DoD
authorities that exist in the event for a CRBRNE incident. After speaking with
witnesses, they reached the conclusion that authorities that exist are generally
adequate, but there may be some fine tuning that needs to happen. He also noted
a need for additional training and exercises in an effort to improve awareness of
the authorities as they exist now.
Tim Lowenberg then followed, concurring that the authorities are basically
adequate but that they key exception is inability under current law to involuntarily
mobilize Title 10 forces. He also noted that unity of effort continues to be a
concern.
The Chairman then asked the entire panel whether or not there were any
questions or comments for subpanel 1.
2
James Metzger asked subpanel 1 whether, in the worst case scenario, the DoD
would swiftly and efficiently be given authority. Lowenberg responded that he
believed that based on the testimony that their subpanel received from witnesses,
such authorities would granted with efficiency.
James Carafano asked subpanel 1 if the witnesses that they spoke with had a
preference for how to mobilize the reserve component. Lowenberg said that they
refrained from asking any questions related to which policies would be preferred
and they stuck to questions related to what officials could and not do under the
existing authorities.
The Chairman then noted that it might be possible to separate authorities question
into two parts: (1) are they adequate? (2) are they easy to use? He then stated
that it is possible that one part of the question is satisfactory and the other is not
The Chairman then moved to subpanel 2 and asked if there were any comments
from the previous day’s subpanel meeting.
Speaking for subpanel 2, Dennis Celletti noted that their goal was to ensure that
the training plan documents that exist are adequate and synchronized. He also
addressed the change regarding CCMRFs and HRFs, noting that it would require
an assessment of these new units’ training requirements.
The Chairman then asked the rest of the panel whether or not there were any
questions or comments for subpanel 2.
Lowenberg stated that he would be happy to provide subpanel 2 a copy of Army
Field Manual 3-28, which is currently in its sixth draft edition.
The Chairman then noted two points:


DCSA is heavily Army centric and questioned whether there might be some
method to better incorporate all of the services.
International elements might come into this country as a result of a crisis,
and we need to incorporate them into our response.
3
In response to the Chairman’s first point, Celletti noted that many of the existing
forces, including CSTs and CERFPs, are already joint in nature. In response to the
Chairman’s second point, Lowenberg stated that the most likely foreign forces
would be Canadian and we have a standing plan out there that places Canadian
forces under U.S. control. Carafano, however, cautioned against overreliance on
Canadian military assistance, noting the decline in Canadian military capacity.
The Chairman then moved to subpanel 4 and asked if there were any comments
from the previous day’s subpanel meeting.2
Ronald Harrison stated that their subpanel met with representatives from the
National Guard Bureau (NGB), the J-3, and the J-5 to discuss how we can
adequately scale our response, specifically citing Haiti. He also spoke about the
role of the DCO in the process and its interaction with the NGB. Carafano
questioned whether the DCO is best instrument to deal with the coordination for
large scale disasters. Harrison then discussed the role of NGB in the interagency
process. Finally, he concluded by noting the need for states to share their plans
with the federal government.
Frank Keating then highlighted the problem that many states—perhaps as many
as 60%—have neglected to share their plans with the NGB. Jerry Grizzle
concurred that this was a major problem, and noted the difficulty in acquiring city
plans and sharing them with state and federal authorities. There was a discussion
as to why this is the case, with some positing that fear of criticism is a primary
impediment to sharing them. Carafano noted that he’s unaware of any single
point of contact in DoD that has an inventory of state and city plans.
Next, the Chairman brought up the topic of the Economy Act and Purpose Act and
how they theoretically might make federal departments cooperate with each other.
He highlighted those pieces of legislation for subpanel 1.
RECESS—10 minutes
Upon reconvening, the Chairman turned to Gary Cecchine, who presented a
briefing on the following emerging issues questions and research topics, based on
inputs provided by Panel members previously:


2
Lack of integrated national planning
Command and control (10/32/State status)
Subpanel 3 did not meet on March 16.
4






Common Operating Picture and System for all Federal Agencies,
coordinated with States and Localities
Expanded Authority for Access to Title 10 Reserve Components
Requirements generation for CBRNE DSCA
Enhanced regionalized approach
Designate a single Federal agency to coordinate man/train/equip for
Federal CBRNE response (from NORTHCOM)
Include DSCA requirements in DoD PPBES
The Chairman emphasized that all of the points in the briefing were preliminary
and nothing had been finalized. He then asked the panel if they believed that any
topics should be added to Cecchine’s presentation. Fred Rees noted his concern
about the lapse in the national integrated planning system (IPS). Discussion
ensued regarding planning, sharing of plans, and the integrated planning system
in particular.
The Chairman then introduced Dennis McCarthy, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Reserve Affairs as the meeting’s first witness. McCarthy stated that his primary
role involves force generation rather than force deployment. He noted that the
National Guard is most likely the first responder in just about any domestic
situation that can we can envision and described two of its key strengths: its
dispersion and its survivability. He applauded the recent establishment of the
Council of Governors and noted that the DoD will work closely with it.
The Chairman thanked McCarthy for his opening remarks and opened the floor
for questions.
Keating questioned the witness first, inquiring about the permanency of the
Council of Governors. McCarthy responded by noting that the President signed
an executive order that created this council and that it will be a relatively
permanent institution.
Lowenberg then asked about the training of senior officers in the various
components of DCSA. McCarthy responded by saying that he would prioritize
training the National Guard and then some Title 10 forces. He would not
prioritize training active component commanders, but he understood that not
everyone would share this view.
Lowenberg followed up by asking if the witness would alter his view in light of
something truly catastrophic McCarthy responded by saying that it would be hard
for him to envision something so catastrophic where national guard forces
5
augmented with Title 10 forces would be insufficient. He stated that we should be
organized so that the National Guard is called upon first and then reserve
component forces are drawn as needed. He felt that the likelihood of the need to
go beyond this is small.
Dennis Reimer spoke next, highlighting ongoing problems with command and
control, citing Katrina specifically and asking the witness how he would address
that issue. McCarthy responded by saying that he has worked with Paul Stockton
in the past few months on unity of effort. In addition, Secretary Gates has tried to
authorize direct liaisons between federal and state forces. The witness
emphasized a need to come to an agreement that is satisfactory to both the
governors and the president. He posited that one idea might be some sort of
“supported” and “supporting” commander structure that would leave command of
Title 10 forces to the President. Finally, the witness suggested the best solution was
to rely on the Council of Governors to help broker an agreement.
Keating then asked the witness about the effects of deployment demands at a time
of two wars. McCarthy responded by stating that recruiting and retention are at
the best level that they have been eight over the course of the past eight years. He
also noted that the quality of the people they are recruiting remained extremely
high. He stated that he believed that we are not overusing reserve components
right now. However, as far as rotational readiness is concerned, he remained
concerned and suggested that the panel investigate this as a topic. The witness
noted that one can’t be “first up” for everything because if one “first up” for DSCA
activities and then gets deployed to Afghanistan, a serious problem arises.
James Greenwood then asked the witness to address what the response to a
biological attack on Washington, D.C. might look like. McCarthy noted that there
were perhaps other people in the room that could speak to the question better than
he could. However, in terms of the federal response, the military chain would run
through NORTHCOM. Their plans would involve CCMRF forces. In the case of a
chemical or a biological attack, reserve forces would also play a role. Finally, the
joint task force commander would marshal federal forces and they would be in
support.
Erv Rokke then asked the witness if the increased prevalence of domestic terrorist
threats would change his view on National Guard forces being the force of first
choice in a response. McCarthy responded saying that his overall answer is
probably a qualified “no.” Overall, the military forces—whether they are NG,
reserve, or active—would bring to the table in a domestic setting is what they
would bring to the table anywhere. He believed that we should not focus too
6
much on overspecialized training. We need to avoid counting on the same
people to do the same thing at the same time.
Celletti then asked if National Guard forces are adequately equipped to meet the
task as the first responder. McCarthy speculated that if one were to do a real
count of all critical dual use equipment, it would likely reveal some shortfalls, but
that they are making progress. Because of the two wars, they have depleted a lot
our stocks of their equipment, but they are working on replenishing them.
Carafano then asked the witness to comment on the specific proposals in QDR
that discuss force structure and what implications these proposals may have in
terms of military’s capability to ramp up to a catastrophic incident response.
McCarthy stated that is still probably too early to know the implications yet.
However, he believed that the QDR puts us on the right path to understand how
the reserve component relates to the active component in the overall response in
the years ahead.
Carafano then highlighted the witness’ testimony about his time in the New York
State Naval Militia. He mentioned that a number of states have similar outfits,
specifically citing Texas and Maryland. He then suggested it might be something
the panel might consider examining. McCarthy concurred.
Reimer then discussed voluntarily mobilization. Volunteering can be a useful tool,
but it also needs to be structured. He cautioned that for everyone that volunteers,
they leave a hole behind them. McCarthy concurred.
McCarthy was then thanked for his time by the Chairman and the rest of the
panel.
The Chairman then covered a few more administrative details, highlighting the
fact that the next panel meeting would likely be June 2-3—in lieu of April 28-29—
at RAND in Arlington, Virginia. He then opened the floor up to any final
comments before the break for lunch.
James Grizzle discussed Title 10 forces and stated that while focusing on
equipment is important, it is equally important that the panel focus on personnel.
The Chairman asked him to present a scenario where this was an issue. Harrison
noted that in the case of Hurricane Andrew, they ran out of funds for personnel
and could not access equipment. Rees noted that much has changed since
Hurricane Andrew and progress has been made in terms of prepositioning
equipment and personnel.
7
The Chairman then asked if there were any other questions or comments. There
being none, the panel broke for lunch.
RECESS—60 Minutes
Following the break, the Chairman welcomed the Former Chairman of the
Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, Arnold Punaro.
Punaro offered testimony on the following topics:





He offered a brief bit of background on the commission and forthcoming
work in conjunction with the New American Security Center.
He noted that the need for reform is urgent. Currently, the witness believed
that we are not ready for a CBRNE incident.
He highlighted three large points:
o First, it is critical that DHS produce civil support requirements and
request the DoD validate them as appropriate and put them into the
funding chain. He then tied this point to a need for a broader
statutory recognition by Congress of this DoD role.
o Secondly, we are currently not ready for a CBRNE attack. We do
not have highly specialized forces in place. We need to man, train,
and equip our forces to be ready.
o Third, the nation needs to sort out, in advance, command and
control issues. Thus, there should be protocols by which governors
should be able to direct Title 10 forces within his state. This is an
admitted redline to DoD.
He touched on the creation of the Council of Governors, crediting Paul
Stockton for his role in its establishment.
He noted that we must work further on identifying a proper role for
NORTHCOM. While its outward facing NORAD mission is easy, its DSCA
mission is difficult.
The Chairman thanked Punaro for his opening remarks and opened the floor for
questions.
Nethercutt asked the witness what is behind the gap in readiness. Punaro
responded by ultimately concluding that there are a number of overlapping
causes: insufficient funds, excessive bureaucracy, poor planning, poor training,
and poor command and control.
8
Carafano asked the witness for his thoughts on the recommendations in the QDR
on force structure, specifically citing how two CCMRF forces are being
restructured. Punaro responded by saying that he was skeptical of the ability of
small forces on the order of 2,000 – 3,000 men to deal with larger CBRNE
incidents. He did not view this restructuring as sufficient.
Keating then asked then addressed the witness from the perspective of a civilian
authority at the state level and noted that many of these authorities may not be
competent. Punaro noted that it is important to assess the competency of such
local leaders through training scenarios.
The Chairman then asked whether the authorities, as they exist now, are
adequate. Punaro responded by saying that the governors’ authorities are
inadequate. He also highlighted his perceived overall complacency of
government in the face of CBRNE matters.
Rokke then asked the witness whether we should be specializing more in our
training in response to these incidents. Punaro responded that he believes we
should be and cautioned on any assumption that if our troops can fight in
Afghanistan and Iraq, they can adequately perform DSCA operations here at
home.
Lowenberg then engaged in a discussion about DSCA requirements and whether
or not the DoD should identify them on its own. Punaro said that there while there
is not any reason the DoD cannot do it on its own, such a move might be viewed
as controversial since DHS is in the lead. He then asserted that if such a truly
large CBNRE incident were to occur, the DoD would be the first to know and
relied upon heavily. Discussion about the capacity of the DoD and the DHS in the
event of a CBRNE incident ensued between the panel and the witness.
Reimer then discussed the issue of training with the witness, saying that training
should involve all of the nation’s capabilities, including those beyond the nation’s
military capabilities, citing medical capabilities specifically. He noted resource
constraints as well. Punaro agreed, saying that we should give the governors all
of the resources that our federal government can give. However, to implement the
vision, we may need fundamental changes in the way we do personnel
management.
Rees then discussed the witness’s criticisms of the organization at NORTHCOM.
Punaro agreed stating that perhaps we should consider putting a National Guard
9
official in charge of the combatant command since they have experience with
DSCA. He also discussed the possibility of splitting NORTHCOM from NORAD.
Keating then discussed the challenge of balancing the role of the federal
government and the state government in the response to CBRNE events. He also
lamented the fact that so few states have submitted their plans to the National
Guard Bureau. Punaro argued for centralized policy but decentralized execution.
He agreed that status of the sharing of plans was a serious cause for concern.
The Chairman then thanked the witness for his time, and he as he was departing,
Punaro advocated that the panel be very candid in their recommendations.
RECESS—15 Minutes
After the break, the Chairman welcomed Department of Defense Office of
General Counsel representative, Carl Wagner. He invited him to offer an
opening statement, and then stated the panel may begin asking comments.
For his first remarks, the witness wanted to clarify a previous day’s conversation
with subpanel 1. If the question ever arose over who must pay for operations in
the wake of a CBRNE incident and how much they must pay, under the Stafford
Act, the President can compel activities to be undertaken on either a reimbursable
or a non-reimbursable basis. This applies not just to DoD but other federal
government agencies.
Nethercutt started the discussion by asking for comment on how the witness sees
the existing set of legal authorities for DSCA and to what extent would he suggest
that the panel consider alterations to existing law or regulation. Wagner
responded by stating that if a situation arose that, in fact, came about because of
an attack, the president, under Article II of the Constitution, has the inherent
authority to defend the United States. In that role, the DoD would not be in
support. It would be in the lead in defending the United States. In specific regard
to defense support to civil authorities, 10 USC § 382 and18 USC §831 provide
that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense can determine that a
situation exists whereby DoD assets can engage in activities that would otherwise
be in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act. Furthermore, he noted that the Posse
Comitatus Act is not applicable to the National Guard when it’s either in Title 32
or state active duty status.
The Chairman then asked how the witness’ responses regarding funding might
change in light of a non-CBRNE event. Would the Stafford Act still apply?
10
Wagner responded in the affirmative, stating that the Stafford Act would set aside
any requirement for reimbursement included in the Economy Act. He and
Lowenberg discussed this point.
Wagner then discussed the definition of homeland defense with Lowenberg,
stating that he cannot recall seeing a specific definition of that term, but that it
generally refers to defense, by the military, of the United States, potentially using
lethal force.
Following this, he discussed the use of lethal force on behalf of the United States in
the context of the military defense of the United States with Rees.
Keating then asked if any of the provisions that exist are in conflict with another.
Wagner responded by characterizing them as “blended.” He noted that
depending on the focus, the Posse Comitatus Act may or may not apply. He also
noted 10 USC § 371 and its role in the relationship between military and law
enforcement personnel. He further discussed Chapter 18 of Title 10 and the limits
placed on the DoD under that title.
Keating then asked if the witness feels that there should be any additional
amendments to the statutes to make things more efficient and effective. Wagner
responded that he could not think of any.
Reimer then asked the witness about the difference between homeland defense
and homeland security. Wagner responded that while he cannot quote anything
directly, homeland defense deals with preventing attacks and responding to
external threats, and homeland security deals primarily with response activities.
Reimer asked the witness about trouble with regard to Title 10 and Title 32 and
unity of command. Wagner cited our federal system establishes “separate levels
of sovereigns,” noting that both states and the federal government have separate
responsibilities. He then noted that the President and the governors each have
some of the same authorities. Discussion then ensued about this topic between the
panel and Wagner.
Lowenberg then discussed NORTHCOM’s memorandum of agreement with the
Canadian military and TACON. Wagner noted that the agreement with the
Canadians on TACON, while constitutional, is a legally flawed agreement. OSD
General Council reviewed and questioned the agreement. Discussion surrounding
this topic and dual-hat command then ensued between the panel and Wagner.
11
Finally, Carafano asked if there was any advantage to having a legal distinction
between defense and “homeland defense.” Wagner responded that he did not
think so, and further discussion between the distinction between homeland security
and homeland defense ensued.
The Chairman thanked the witness for his time.
Next, the Chairman welcomed General Craig McKinley; accompanied by
Director of the Air National Guard, Lieutenant General Harry Wyatt III; Director,
National Guard Bureau Joint Staff, Major General Michael Sumrall; and Deputy
Director of the Army National Guard, Brigadier General Timothy Kadavy
McKinley first discussed the National Guard Bureau’s new charter. He discussed
the importance of communications, noting that the adjutants general work for the
governors, not for him. The witness noted that he would challenge the assumption
that either the DoD is complacent or that it takes this issue lightly. To further
emphasize this point, he noted that he meets regularly with Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates and attends sessions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His predecessor
did not have that opportunity. He then highlighted three issues emphasized by
Deputy Secretary Lynn when he spoke to the adjutants general at the National
Governor’s Association meeting in DC regarding the National Guard’s priorities.



Continue to be a full spectrum force
Continue to maintain readiness
Provide homeland defense and civil support
The Chairman thanked McKinley for his opening remarks and opened the floor
for questions. He posed the first question to the witness related to Title 10 and Title
32 status. McKinley responded by saying that it is a contentious issue and hopes
that the concept of “supported” and “supporting” forces could best mitigate any
problems with it.
Celletti then asked the witness whether the number of CSTs currently available is
sufficient. McKinley credited his predecessor for bringing the number up to 55
from its original 9. Sumrall noted that he felt 55 was sufficient but highlighted the
need to ensure adequate funding and have that funding be controlled by the
adjutant generals.
Lowenberg then asked about resourcing of different DSCA requirements.
McKinley noted the US Army and USAF do the programming for 90% of their
equipment and that most of the equipment in their domestic use portfolio (i.e. not
12
dual use) usually falls below the line. Both McKinley and Wyatt noted that
overseas focus takes priority. Kadavy noted that the Army is forced to compete as
well. Finally, Sumrall offered an explanation of National Guard funding sources
and the intricacies of the funding process.
Grizzle then asked about the differences in standardization and resulting
challenges in deploying CSTs by states and whether or not every state required a
CST. McKinley responded that every state needs a CST, citing the white power
incident of six months ago. In response to the first question posed, Sumrall said
that progress is being made on standardizing the CSTs.
The Chairman then asked Sumrall about the connection between authorities and
funds for the authorities. He responded by saying that he believes that they have
sufficient authority, but do not always have the necessary resources. Wyatt also
spoke to this point, noting the stress placed on their strategic lift capabilities with
the ongoing surge in Afghanistan.
Carafano then discussed the Missile Defense Agency model, especially with
regard to material development, with the witnesses. McKinley seemed somewhat
receptive to the idea, and noted that such an idea represented the sort of creativity
that he would like to see in the panel’s report. Regardless of the type of structure
created, the witness noted that such a structure must be sustained in the budgeting
process, otherwise it will become an orphan.
Rokke then asked how the witnesses would characterize the guidance that they
receive with regard to the kind of training that should take place. McKinley noted
that the aside from some specific courses that have been jointly created between
NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau, there is probably a dearth of
training environments. Kadavy responded by stating that much of the core skills
come from the Army. He also noted that since much of the equipment they receive
is commercial, they train to the equipment and the training manual that comes with
it.
Rees then raised his concerns that there was perhaps excessive focus on the Army
component to many of these publications and wondered if a truly joint publication
was being developed. McKinley responded that many of the DoD Instructions are
documents that date back to the early 1990s and are in need of an update. He
noted that joint doctrine is being developed.
13
Keating then discussed Katrina and asked the panel for key lessons learned.
McKinley responded by listing the following key problems:



They sent inappropriate amount of relief efforts in an ad hoc fashion
Command and control of the resources sent was ineffective
There were no pre-mission scripts that they could apply to a natural disaster
Sumrall noted that he was in the region during Katrina. He stated the following
three observations:



They did not have a common operating picture, not just across the DoD, but
across the entire spectrum. Progress is being made in this area.
They struggled with communications
In the future, they will need to augment state response forces with command
and control assets much more quickly
Wyatt echoed what was said by Sumrall and McKinley and made the point that
during the Katrina, the key questions and obstacles that emerged surrounded the
magnitude of the help and how they were going to pay for it. McKinley added
that he believed that ultimately one of the largest problems was that there were two
chains of command.
Kadavy then offered four key observations from Katrina:




Katrina exposed challenges surrounding airspace management
Katrina highlighted the need for timely Title 32 authority.
There was insufficient unity of effort and they generally lacked a common
operating picture. He cited the exampled of brigade patrols with the 82nd
and 45th running into each other on a block in New Orleans. He noted
that progress is being made in this area.
For something of an emergency of such magnitude, they struggled with the
tracking of requirements and the approval and funding of the requirements.
Harrison then turned to the topic of state plans and highlighted the fact that only
about 60% of states have supplied their plans to the National Guard Bureau. In
light of this fact, he discussed truly catastrophic incidents and asked if there was
anything ongoing at the National Guard Bureau that is geared to address
something catastrophic. McKinley highlighted the fourth slide of his briefing,
which depicted how responses are scaled so that eventually 18,000 people
respond. He then turned to Sumrall, who noted that they would simply pile on the
problem until they get enough capacity to solve the problem. He noted that one of
14
the advantages of the HRF over the previous CCMRF is that they now have ten of
them, and thus they are more flexible. He noted that while the construct is a little
different, they feel like they have more capability.
Harrison then asked how state guard elements fit into this picture. Kadavy
responded that it varies by state. The degree to which the state is set up will
dictate just how much the guard and reserve components are drawn in. Speaking
for Nebraska, all of the ability to plan is based off of grants provided by the
federal government.
Harrison then asked about the Task Force for Emergency Readiness. Sumrall
responded by saying that he really liked the concept, but did not have a lot of
detailed knowledge of it.
Celletti then commented that the mandate for the HRFs in the QDR would likely
help the funding piece of the equation since it is a mandatory requirement in the
QDR. McKinley concurred with the comment.
Nethercutt posited that the depth of knowledge of legal authorities is not widely
understood in the hierarchy and asked the panel whether or not they would
welcome additional legal training. McKinley stated that complete clarification of
legal authorities is always warranted and that he relies heavily on his legal staff.
Rees noted the recurring theme of the inability to get the funding of authorities’
mission requirements and noted there appears to be little progress being made on
that front. In response, McKinley stated that he hoped that an outcome of this
panel would be clarification on how to best apply resources to these sorts of
situations. He also hoped that the panel could help offer insight as to how to best
streamline and standardize this process. Sumrall cited slide three of their briefing,
which depicted the choices before a governor in the event of one of these incidents
and the two separate funding streams—DoD or DHS—that they can draw upon to
address the problem.
Lowenberg then asked about organic air lift and the speed of response between
each state. Sumrall noted that it varies by state. Kadavy stated that a part of the
problem involves the definition of an emergency and the response. Declarations
help address this problem.
Lowenberg pointed out the issue that many of the response forces—CSTs, the
CERFPs, the CCMRFs, the HRFs—are joint in nature but there still seemed to be
issues regarding the “color” of the money used to fund these forces. Sumrall
15
stated that he was trying to emphasize the incremental cost to obtain or do things
that are not traditional Army or Air Force tasks and the resistance that arises when
this scenario presents itself. McKinley noted that the money is there; it is mostly an
issue of getting it to the proper place. Kadavy also noted that since all of these
forces are joint in nature, disaggregating them is difficult. Thus, the financial
picture is complicated.
Reimer then emphasized his concern about the requirements-resources mismatch in
the QDR, and his concerns that we do not have an integrated planning system that
allows DoD to interface with DHS. McKinley concurred with Reimer’s comment.
He noted that many states are in a dire financial state and resourcing is going to
be a looming issue in the future. He noted an increased need to streamline
funding and prescript their missions. Regarding the DHS-DoD relationship, he
noted that a lot of work still needs to be done in that area. Sumrall noted that
another challenge involves the fact these issues are a DHS issue, but much of the
money is coming from DoD. Perhaps some portion of the funding should come
from the DHS. McKinley agreed that some of the emergency response funding is
in the incorrect pot. He noted that he and Secretary Stockton have discussed this
problem.
The Chairman then thanked the witnesses for their time, and after McKinley
thanked his colleagues and his staff.
The Chairman then noted that, subject to FACA provisions, the public is invited to
the panel meetings. He called attention to two comments in the panel’s resource
books. He then called forward Michael Kozeliski, a member of the public, to
address the panel.
Kozeliski brought up the issue of water distribution security at fire hydrants. He
stated that an agent could easily be added to the water supply, contaminating
100 million gallons of water with relative ease.
Keating, in turn, asked him for his proposed solution. Kozeliski stated that there
are two approaches to combat the problem:


First, there is the issue of communication. It should be made known that it is
illegal to hook up to a fire hydrant without a permit.
Secondly, there are technological devices that you could hook onto these
hydrants to stop this problem.
Kozeliski was then thanked for his time.
16
Celletti then highlighted the second written comment from the Newport, VA fire
chief. He felt that it was especially relevant to the train and equip subpanel. He
highlighted the potential important uses of unmanned aerial vehicles in the
aftermath of a catastrophic incident, but FAA restrictions exist.
The Chairman then asked if there was a motion to recess. On motion made and
seconded, the panel stands in recess until September 18.
RECESS UNTIL MARCH 18 AT 8:30 A.M. EASTERN DAYLIGHT TIME
17
DAY TWO: MARCH 18, 2010
LOCATION: 1200 SOUTH HAYES STREET, ARLINGTON, VA
PERSONS PRESENT3:
Panel Members:
Steve Abbot
Jim Carafano
Dennis Celletti
Jim Greenwood
Jerry Grizzle
Ron Harrison
Frank Keating
Tim Lowenberg
Jim Metzger
George Nethercutt
Fred Rees
Dennis Reimer
Erv Rokke
OSD Staff:
Cathy Polmateer, Designated Federal Officer (OASD-HD&ASA)
Manny Aponte (OASD-HD&ASA)
Mike Shane (OASD-HD&ASA)
RAND Staff:
Mike Wermuth
Gary Cecchine
Andrew Morral
Scott McMahon
Nate Shestak
Several members of the public were also in attendance
The Chairman welcomed everyone back and called the panel back into session.
He then introduced Lieutenant General John Paxton Jr., Director of Operations, J3, The Joint Staff.
3
The following list includes all persons who were present in an official capacity,
regardless of whether or not they stayed for the entire day’s session.
18
Paxton opened by thanking the panel for their time and stating that the issue of
defense support to civil authorities in the event of CBRNE incident often does not
get the level of attention that it needs. He also noted that he brought Brigadier
General John Tracy and Lieutenant Colonel Scott Estes.
Paxton noted to that the J-3 understands the mission and the command
relationships. However, improvement could be made in answering the following
questions regarding response operations for CBRNE incidents:



For how long?
To hand over to who else?
To measure with what degree of effectiveness or success?
Paxton noted that the J-3 has a good relationship with NORTHCOM and PACOM.
He then discussed command relationships and the need for unity of effort between
state authorities and federal authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident. Finally,
the witness noted that he would be happy to talk about new initiatives like the
HRFs.
The Chairman thanked Paxton for his opening remarks and opened the floor for
questions.
Harrison offered the first question, asking about the J-3’s work with the states and
the Council of Governors. Paxton responded that he works with the Council of
Governors and that the J-3 also works with other agencies, including DHS and
FEMA. He noted that their goal is for the HRFs to be responsive to each of the
FEMA regions. He highlighted the challenge of trying to balance the need to be
prepared for DSCA missions with the demands placed by the current wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Harrison then followed up by asking about the relationship between DoD and
DHS. Paxton characterized the relationship as frequent and positive. He said
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano speak often. However, Paxton highlighted that improvement could be
made in planning between the two departments. He noted that one needs to
identify the end state and then plan backwards.
Rokke then asked about the training and equipping of forces for DSCA, especially
in light of assertions that the basic skills that DoD forces employ in Afghanistan
19
and Iraq will be sufficient for DSCA missions. Paxton said that his biggest concern
is the availability of forces for training. He stated that almost all CBRNE forces are
high demand and low density and how the availability of forces are tracked is
critically important.
Lowenberg then asked about the impetus behind the creation and regionalization
of the HRF. Paxton responded by noting two issues:


Reorganization is a result, in part, of planning processes at NORTHCOM
The reorganization reflects a recognition of what is realistic in terms of force
development, force generation, and force management. Homeland
security, while priority number one in the QDR, still remains subpriority
three, below Iraq and Afghanistan.
Lowenberg then followed up and asked about DoD’s capacity to operate in a
CBRNE degraded environment. Paxton responded by saying that level of
attention paid to chemical and biological incidents has oscillated over time,
spiking after attacks on the homeland. He then noted that DoD does not pay
enough attention across the board to preparing for operations in chemically and
biologically contaminated environments.
Reimer then asked Paxton what his recommendations to the panel would be with
regard to CBRNE incidents. Paxton responded by saying that DoD needs more
resources, especially people. They lost a tremendous number of people to stand
up the first CCMRF and it took two years to build it back up. The witness stated
that if he were on the panel he would ask the following questions: Do we need to
task OSD-CAPE with doing an additional study that assesses readiness in the event
of an incident? Is the density and size of the force right? Do we need to develop
more of a specific capability?
Lowenberg then asked if making DCSA into a statutory responsibility would be
helpful. Paxton stated while in the long term such a mandate would be positive, in
the short term it would present a problem because it would be an unresourced
mandate.
Grizzle then asked the witness the best method to get CSTs adequate funding
without relying on the military departments to do so. Paxton responded by saying
that building such units always takes people and resources away from other units.
The key is try to avoid funding what cannot be predicted. Funding these units in a
responsive fashion (after an incident) presents a challenge.
20
Celletti then asked about the funding and resourcing of these organizations, now
that the have been mandated under the QDR. Paxton responded that he felt very
comfortable about this process and how it relates to the POM process and QDR
guidance.
Lowenberg then asked about the impact of the hold placed on the interagency
planning process in HSPD-8 (Integrated Planning System, IPS). Paxton stated that
he believed that the impact has been minimal. There is a lot of substantive
dialogue between various units. He did not think that they suffer too much from
the delay in implementing that directive. Tracy concurred and added that they
have a very robust liaison officer component to that serves as an integral asset
when it comes to collaboration and planning between DoD units and FEMA. The
Chairman followed on, asking if DoD was receiving liaison officers from other
agencies. Paxton stated that the capacity of agencies is not robust enough and
expeditionary enough.
Harrison followed up on the theme of working with the interagency process in the
context of losing continuity of government, citing Haiti specifically. Paxton
responded that they are slowly absorbing the lessons of Haiti and that it raised a
number of interagency questions and prompted robust debates within the National
Security Council.
The Chairman continued the line of questioning about Haiti, asking about the
ability of the present system to integrate international assistance and support.
Paxton noted that he did not have great visibility on the question, but noted that
that NORTHCOM would play a key role in answering this question. He noted that
GEN Renuart is on speed dial to the J-3. Further discussion on this point between
the witness, the Chairman, and the panel ensued.
Reimer then turned to the issue of future DoD funding and the additional
requirements it faces under the new QDR, stating that the panel’s final report
cannot ignore impending resource constraints. Paxton agreed and suggested
focusing on low-cost alternatives such as improving the CRBNE curricula,
tightening up the planning processes and bolstering high demand/low density
forces.
Rokke then asked the witness if enough attention is being paid to strategic
communications. Paxton responded that while NORTHCOM is doing a good job
of communicating with state and local authorities, the J-3 needs to do a better job
of communicating with state and local authorities.
21
Harrison then asked about the difference between homeland security and
homeland defense. Paxton turned to Tracy, who noted that homeland defense is
uniquely war-centric, while homeland security, in contrast, involves law
enforcement and response operations. Discussion then ensued between the panel
and the witness about this issue.
Keating then noted the cultural challenge posed by having so few governors with
military experience and commended the J-3 for reaching out to NORTHCOM.
Paxton concurred.
Following this comment, the Chairman thanked the witness for his time.
RECESS—10 MINUTES
Following the break, the Chairman noted that Rand Beers (Undersecretary, DHS)
will not be appearing as scheduled. Instead, Bill Carwile, (Associate
Administrator, FEMA) will be appearing. The Chairman then invited the entire
panel to discuss issues that should be addressed in the panel’s final report.
The following issues were discussed amongst the panel.








DoD authorities – Specifically, are they nebulous? Are they satisfactory?
o There is a need for additional training, education, and emphasis on
understanding authorities.
o The authorities need to be communicated more effectively
Should the panel affirm The Commission on The National Guard and
Reserves’ recommendations that have still not been implemented?
Resourcing specialized units such as CERFPs, CCMRFs, and HRFs.
o Is the resourcing built into the POM process?
o What, if anything, needs to change in regard to how they are
resourced?
Are homeland security and homeland defense on par with the other
warfighting requirements that exist for the nation? If not, ought they be?
Is there a threat? If there is what do we do about it? The panel ought to be
able to speak to the threat, perhaps citing Graham-Talent.
How does the prevention piece fit into the panel’s discussion and findings?
Should the panel examine the “whole of government” in its response or just
DoD’s role?
Should the panel investigate both the Gilmore report and Commission on
The National Guard and Reserves report to investigate unfulfilled
recommendations?
22


Should NORTHCOM’s culture be altered to further prioritize DSCA? If yes,
how so?
How should the issues regarding command and control of Title 10 and Title
32 forces be resolved?
RECESS—60 MINUTES
Following a break for lunch, the Chairman welcomed Dr. Paul Stockton, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.
The witness’s opening statement included the following three main points:


DoD’s efforts to strengthen its DSCA capacity with specific regard to
CBRNE incidents
o Today, advance elements of the CCMRF can move within 48 hours,
with it requiring 96 hours to get all of the capabilities to the site.
Under a new construct, 2,000 people will arrive on the ground
within 24 hours. The remaining 3,000 people will arrive within the
next 48 hours. This will save lives.
o The second and third CCMRFs are going to be downsized to
become primarily command and control elements that assist the
coordination of Title 10 forces in the event of a CBRNE incident.
o Ten HRFs will be created and regionally distributed. Because of this
regional reorganization, they will be able to respond more quickly.
They are a part of the integrated federal response that occurs when
governors request assistance.
o Bottom line: DoD will be able to get forces to the site much more
quickly in a way that will save more lives. The DoD modeled this
with OSD-CAPE’s assistance to respond to an attack involving a 10
kiloton nuclear device, an earthquake, and a plague outbreak.
Unity of effort with governors and states
o Currently, there is insufficient unity of effort between federal and
state forces. Progress has been made with advances like the Council
of Governors, but there is still work to be done.
o In the witness’s view, both the President and the governors are
sovereign. So, in his view, there are two independent chains of
authority. Thus, any solution will have to recognize this fact and
work out its planning in advance with pre-scripted mission
assignments.
o Each state would have emergency management compacts with DoD
to manage HRF responses.
23

Unresolved policy challenges
o With specific regard to the use of HRFs, what is the appropriate
balance to strike between natural hazards preparedness versus
CBRNE incidents?
o How will DoD structure the training of the HRFs to ensure that they
are effective?
o How can DoD best devise a well-run exercise system that functions
smoothly and coordinates effectively with the states and FEMA?
The Chairman thanked Stockton for his opening remarks and opened the floor for
questions.
Lowenberg asked about the Task Force for Emergency Readiness, its cancelation,
and planning. Stockton said that it would be important for FEMA to capture the
lessons learned from the program.
Rees then asked about pre-scripted mission assignments for response operations.
Stockton agreed that they are imperative and that Haiti served as a reminder of
this. He cited a need to build an effective construct for them at home.
Rokke asserted that defense culture, perhaps NORTHCOM in particular, doesn’t
fully appreciate the threat to the homeland. He then asked if we need to further
specialize our training and tailor forces to CBRNE events. Stockton responded
that he disagreed with the first assertion, and stated that from senior leadership on
down through the ranks, the military takes the need for preparedness very
seriously. He agreed with Rokke’s second point, stating that specialized training is
useful, but it is going to cost money and it is going to take to take time. He
suggested the panel make recommendations about this important question of
resources.
Reimer then asked if HRFs are going to be in Title 32 status and asked how these
sorts of requirements should be funded. Stockton noted that the first military
responders to any catastrophe are going to be the National Guard and they are
going to be in state active duty status. In response to the second question, the
witness stated that there are too few federal resources chasing too many
requirements. Thus, state forces will relied upon heavily and the DoD (Title 10) will
be in support in the vast majority of cases.
Christine Wormuth then discussed the HRF issue further and noted that 90% of the
time, state governors and not federal government will be in the lead. HRFs reflect
this. The HRF construct is a shared responsibility, shared risk approach.
24
Governors are incentivized to send assets forward so that the next time an incident
arises, they get assets sent to them. In peacetime, HRFs will work aggressively on
regional planning and managing risk. The state emergency manager and the
defense coordinating officer would be the appropriate individuals. Exercises also
serve as a useful gauge for assessing readiness. He stated that there is not a
single major CBRNE catastrophic event where he feels confident we are where we
need to be.
Celletti noted through his work with the National Guard and the exercises that he
participates in, he feels confident with the HRFs and the FEMA regions. He then
asked if we have enough CSTs. Stockton felt that we do.
Lowenberg then asked whether or not making homeland defense a statutory
responsibility of the DoD, as recommended by The Commission on The National
Guard and Reserves, would be helpful. Stockton stated that he did not have an
opinion on the question but stressed the need to balance responsibilities between
the warfighting overseas and at home. He welcomed an opinion from the panel.
Grizzle then discussed the lack of sharing of state plans with the federal
government. He asked to whom the plans should submitted. Stockton responded
that FEMA and DHS are in charge. They are in the lead at the federal level. DoD
is in support of them and would be willing to help Secretary Napolitano build the
plans they need at a state and local level.
Nethercutt then asked the witness when he believes the nation will be ready for a
CBRNE incident and asked if a recommendation from the Panel that offers a
deadline would be helpful. Stockton responded that while deadlines can be
helpful, our nation’s readiness depends on organizations besides the DoD.
Moreover, one must be cautious about dictating timetables to the governors.
Harrison then asked about whether planning for a truly massive incident is being
handled at a level beyond merely scaling up an all hazards plan. Stockton
responded by emphasizing that such a question underscores the need to maintain
the momentum that was built through the Task Force for Emergency Readiness
program. Wormuth noted that the interagency planning process continues to be
improved and there is consistent dialogue with FEMA.
Keating then asked about how the witness sees the HRF structure being compatible
with the urban search and rescue activities undertaken by FEMA. Stockton
emphasized that HRFs are in FEMA regions for a reason and leaders must
leverage the co-location of the HRFs with the FEMA regional leaders.
25
Carafano then asked for the witness for his thoughts on the Missile Defense
Agency model and then highlighted the homeland defense staff done through Ft.
Leavenworth. Stockton appreciated the suggestions and noted that they intend to
leverage the army center for lessons learned.
The Chairman then asked about the nation’s capacity to absorb external foreign
assistance, specifically citing Haiti. Stockton responded by saying that one of the
lessons learned from Haiti is that we need manage our airspace to ensure that the
massive flow of assistance does not become part of the problem. He also
highlighted the MENUSTA model in Haiti as positive example of a response
persevering in light of and almost total incapacitation of civil government.
Reimer then asked the witness why he thought there is such a great struggle with
unity of effort. Stockton stated that until the Council of Governors was stood up,
they had no partner on the other side. And now, they can build consensus. He
felt that the problem is imminently solvable.
The discussion then concluded with Lowenberg, Carafano, and the witness further
discussing the need to sustain the lessons learned from the Task Force for
Emergency Readiness.
The witness made a final point of thanking his staff and emphasizing that the
panel’s recommendations will be listened to carefully. The Chairman then thanked
the witness for his time.
The Chairman then introduced Bill Carwile, FEMA Associate Administrator for
Response and Recovery.
Carwile’s opening remarks discussed the following major points:



One of DHS’s largest partners is the DoD. DHS acknowledges that it will
need some significant assistance from the DoD. This relationship is taken
seriously, and he recently met with both Wormuth and Stockton
There is an acknowledged need to have a DoD dialogue with DHS
partners, especially in terms of pre-scripted mission assignments. These
mission assignments should address extremely large challenges and should
include the appropriate cost sharing structures.
The real interface between DHS and DoD on DSCA operational matters
occurs under provisions of the Stafford Act and with FEMA.
26
The Chairman thanked Carwile for his opening remarks and opened the floor for
questions.
Rees asked if the pre-scripted mission planning applies to truly large scale events.
Carwile responded that their pre-scripted mission planning, does, in fact apply to
truly large scale events.
Harrison then asked about the lack of sharing of state plans with the National
Guard Bureau. Specifically, he asked what the DHS is looking for in a plan from
a state and what triggers states to share their plans. Carwile stated that DHS is
putting out a catastrophic planning guide, but this process is augmented by
allowing governors themselves to enter into an agreement with the FEMA that
helps develop a disaster plan. The trigger ends up being the request from the
governor under Stafford.
Carafano then asked the witness if he knew of any individual in the government
that has full visibility of all continuity of government plans. Carwile responded
that he could not think of anyone, but suggested talking to Damon Penn, who was
a former DCO in Florida and Mississippi who eventually entered government.
Reimer asked if the witness felt the fifteen planning scenarios were satisfactory.
Carwile responded that he felt the plans had been over-engineered. The National
Security Council staff, including Richard Reed, is going to be rewriting HSPD-8, the
directive which created the integrated planning system (IPS).
Reimer then asked if the National Incident Management System and the National
Response Framework are still useful. Carwile responded that while both are in
use, there are still issues standardizing both pieces of equipment and
standardizing procedures.
Rees then asked the witness if he felt 30,000 people would be a sufficient number
to respond to a truly catastrophic CBRNE incident. Carwile responded that he
believed that such a figure would be in the ball park. He noted that he liked the
HRF concept.
Lowenberg then discussed benchmarks and the overall planning process.
Carwile responded that much of their work involves generating requirements
based planning using the process set forth in the Emergency Support Function
Leadership Group. He hopes that the funding and the resourcing part of this will
eventually work its way into the POM process. However, he acknowledged that
they have not yet articulated to Congress what they are planning against.
27
Carafano followed up asking if at some point there would be a document from
DHS that states the requirements for DoD for civil support that they could put into a
POM. After some discussion, it was ultimately concluded that this is theoretically
possible, but unlikely given the differing levels of planning among states.
Carafano then asked about a potential 23,000 man gap between CBRNE forces
such as CCRMFs and the 30,000 troops required to respond to an incident. He
asked if DHS was working under the impression that this gap will be filled by
general purpose forces. Carwile noted that DHS has not done any analysis on
this question yet.
Lowenberg and the witness then discussed biological incidents in the context of
the Stafford Act. Carwile stated that he felt that it would be fair to assume that an
invocation of the Stafford Act would happen quickly.
Finally, Keating asked the witness to share his reflections and recommendations
for the panel in the wake of Katrina, with particular attention paid to the private
sector. In response, Carwile highlighted three items:



Northrop Grumman has a significant presence in the U.S. Gulf Coast
region, and the ability of the DHS to assist in Katrina was tied to their
overall functionality.
The government does not need to be involved in delivering food to people.
The supermarkets already do this task quite effectively. The question then
becomes how to best and most fairly incorporate such private institutions
into operations without entangling the government in any legal
complications.
The government also needs to get visibility over what the private sector is
doing as it stands back up so that it can get out of the way. On this note, a
private sector office in FEMA has been stood up recently.
Reimer and Carwile then discussed horizontal coordination and its importance in
disaster response.
The Chairman then thanked the witness for his time.
28
Following the testimony of Carwile, the Chairman invited the panel to continue its
discussion of issues and research question that the report should potentially
consider. The follow specific topics were discussed:








What is the efficacy of giving a timeline or a deadline for readiness to
Secretary Stockton?
How can the planning process be improved? DHS appears to be on a
requirements based system and DoD seems to be operating on a scenario
based system. RAND will be relied upon to help answer this question.
How should continuity of government be addressed in the event of a
CBRNE incident?
How should the private sector be leveraged, if at all, in the overall
response?
How should we create a repository of state and local plans in DoD?
Should the Missile Defense Agency be considered as a model in the context
of CBRNE incident response and DSCA?
How do we define “catastrophic”?
How do we define homeland defense and homeland security? Should
distinctions even exist?
The Chairman and the panel then thanked the RAND staff for their considerable
and valuable efforts in supporting the meeting.
He then asked the panel for any final research topics to pursue. The following
issues were discussed:




How will HRFs be used outside of the realm of CBRNE incidents?
What is the role of the DoD in non-CBRNE incidents?
How can lessons learned from Katrina be applied to the research agenda
of the panel?
How much of the responding force needs to be specialized forces and how
much should be general purpose forces? The QDR assumes that the
overwhelming number will be general purpose forces. Is that the right
answer (i.e. should the majority be general purpose forces)?
Following this discussion, Harrison asked if the panel will receive testimony from
any witnesses from the Department of Health and Human Services at the June
meeting. Wermuth responded that they would and that they will also host senior
representatives from the Department of Justice and the Department of Energy.
Reimer then asked about getting the FEMA Administrator. Wermuth stated that he
believed getting such a witness would be possible and that a representative from
29
the Coast Guard was being considered as well. Finally, Nethercutt, Carafano,
and Wermuth discussed getting representatives from the first responder community
to meet with the panel. Carafano noted Steve McGraw of Texas as particularly
good candidate. Wermuth asked the panel to relay any other recommendations
for potential witnesses for the June meeting.
The Chairman then asked if there was a motion to adjourn. On motion made and
seconded, the panel stands in adjournment sine die, subject to the call of the chair.
ADJOURN at 5pm EDT
CERTIFIED AS CORRECT:
____________________________
Steve Abbot, Chairman
________________
Date
30