Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Tax Risk and Internal Governance Mechanisms: An Empirical
Analysis in Tunisian Context
Guedrib Mouna*, Rossignol Jean-Luc** and Omri Mohamed Ali***
This paper examines the impact of internal governance mechanisms on tax risk for a sample of
Tunisian listed firms over the 2006 to 2010 period. Four hypotheses arise from the developed
theoretical framework.These hypotheses stipulate that the independence of the board of directors,
the separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board, the tax or accounting expertise of the audit
committee and the tax or accounting expertise of internal audit function influence negatively the
probability of presence of the tax risk. To test these hypotheses, a new measure of tax risk was
conceived based on the financial statements of Tunisian listed firms as well as on a survey. The
results of logistic regression show that the independence of the board of directors and the appeal to
an external tax adviser has a positive and significant effect on the probability of presence of tax risk.
Although, contrary to the hypothesis, these results are understandable by the measure of the tax risk
used in this study. In fact, we captured the presence or the absence of this risk, by applying the
statutory requirements relating to the disclosure of information on this risk in financial statements.
For that purpose, we used a dichotomous variable which is equal to 1 in the presence of a tax
reserve (provision) or any information about the tax risk inserted either into financial statements
notes or into external auditors general reports and 0 if not. The positive relation is understandable by
the dominating existence of the component of the tax reserve in this measure. Although the tax
reserve allows getting the existence of a tax risk, it also represents a way of accounting
management of this risk. So, the independence of the board of directors and the appeal to an
external tax adviser seem to work in favor of the accounting management of the tax risk.
Keywords: Tax risk, Tunisian listed firms, board of directors, internal audit function, tax reserve
Field of research: Accounting (Tax accounting and corporate Governance)
1. Introduction
Studying the link between corporate governance and taxation is a new field of research in recent
years. Few studies were attempted to valid this link in Anglo-Saxon countries (Lanis and
Richardson, 2011, Armstrong and al. 2012…). Specifically, the tax risk is a problematic that can
cause many financial problems but can also compromise firm’s reputation. Tax risk is defined as
a non compliance (voluntary or not) of tax rules but also the misunderstanding of a tax favorable
measure which can generate an important loss of income (Rossignol, 2010). According to the
same author, the tax risk conjugates a penalty risk and a risk of loss of opportunity.
Seen its negative effect, many studies have highlighted that tax risk must be managed inside the
company by governance mechanisms (board of directors, external auditor, ownership structure).
These mechanisms tend to reduce this risk and to avoid tax penalties and lost of reputation (Erle,
2008 ; Desai and Dermapala, 2006…).
The Tunisian context, most probably influenced by the developments lived on the international
level, seems to be a convenient frame for the study of firms tax risk for several reasons. At first,
the guide of best practice of governance of the Tunisian firms developed in 2008 by the Arabic
____________________________________________________________________________
* PhD in Accounting, Assistant at the University of Gafsa, Tunisia, email: guedribmouna@yahoo.fr, postal address:
Cite El Habib 1, Albania Street No. 45, 3052 Sfax, Tunisia, phone: 00216 22 189 615.
**Senior Lecturer, HDR, University of Franche-Comté, France. Associated CRC-LIRSA CNAM member.
***Professor, Accounting Department; College of Business Administration; Northern Borders University; Saudi
Arabia.
1
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Institute of the Business managers in association with Center of International Private Enterprise
raises the role of the tax function, the external tax adviser, the tax authorities and the external
auditor in the management of tax risks.
Moreover, regulatory measures in accounting require the consideration of such a risk in financial
statements by means of a tax reserve or of an information inserted into notes (general accounting
standard and standard 14 relative to the eventualities and to the events later the closing date).
Also, the law of strengthening of the security of financial relations promulgated in 2005 underline
that the annual report on the management of listed companies has to contain, among others,
elements on the internal control and that the auditor's general report has to include a general
evaluation of the internal control.
Finally, other regulatory measures in Tunisia attribute to external auditors as well as to tax
external advisers an important role in the detection of the tax risks of their customers. External
auditors have, according to the law, to clear the tax irregularities and to reveal them. In case of
defect, the control commission of external auditors will be informed by the tax authorities in case
of discovery of these tax irregularities (article 22 of the law 88-108 of August 18th, 1988). The tax
external adviser, whether he is a chartered accountant or a tax consultant, are kept by the law to
respect the tax regulations and to incite the company to respect it. The Tunisian tax regulations
have fixed penalties for the advisors which are collusive in operations of tax fraud (article 99 of
the code of the tax rights and procedures).
Our problematic is so the following one: what is the impact of the internal governance
mechanisms on the tax risk for listed Tunisian firms?
To respond to this problematic, we have employed the governance partnership theory (and
specially the social responsibility theory) as a theoretical framework in this study. We are going to
show that the agency theory does not give a complete explanation of the role played by the
mechanisms of governance in the reduction of the tax risk and that the use of the governance
partnership theory seems good to explain this role.
This study makes several important contributions. At first, it is added to the recent studies which
examine the link between the governance system and tax aggressiveness. It is based, in the
elaboration of the hypotheses, on the governance partnership theory by raising the notion of
corporate social responsibility. Yet, this theory was used, to our knowledge, only by Lanis and
Richardson (2011), in the examination of the impact of the board of director’s composition on the
tax aggressive planning. Second, it also presents the advantage to handle such a problem in a
country which is characterized by an emergent financial market. Then, the measure of firm tax
risk used in this study presents the advantage to include all types of tax risk and it is not limited to
aggressive tax planning. Finally, this study shows that the actors who intervene effectively in the
accounting management of the different tax risk are the independence of the board of directors
and the external tax advisor.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theory and develops our
hypothesis. Section 3 explains the sample formation process, presents the measures of variables
and exposes the regression model. Section 4 reports the empirical results, and Section 5
presents our conclusion.
2. Literature review
First, we present the evolution of the theoretical framework from the study of the link between
corporate governance and tax risk. Then, we present hypothesis developed.
2
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
2.1. Evolution of the theoretical framework from the study of the link
between corporate governance and tax risk
The partisans of the agency theory consider that the presence of a tax risk can creates a
governance problem for firms. Indeed, besides the tax costs (penalties) and non tax costs (Chen
and al. 2010; Lanis and Richardson, 2011; Armstrong and al. 2012), the presence of a tax risk
can create an agency costs for the shareholders. This is due to the existence of a
complementarity between the actions of aggressive tax planning and the managerial opportunism
(Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). In fact, the aggressive tax planning requires complexity and
obscurity to avoid its detection. These characteristics can be in favor with managerial
opportunism. The manager can so realize private profits of this planning. Therefore, the tax
planning does not have to represent a simple transfer of state resources to the shareholders but
rather the managers can appropriate a part of the profits of this planning. The tax risk can so be
harmful to the interest of the shareholders.
Empirically, recent studies tried to examine the link between tax risk and the corporate
governance mechanisms. Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Armstrong and al. (2012) and Rego
and Wilson (2012) examine the link between the incentive remuneration for managers and the
risked tax planning in the American context and found different results. Other researches study
the impact of ownership structure of firms on their risky tax planning (Chen and al. 2010,
Deslandes and Landry, 2011) and find a negative relationship between ownership concentration
and aggressive tax planning.
Richardson and al. (2012) examine the impact of the quality of the external auditor on the firm tax
aggressiveness for a sample of listed Australian companies for period 2006-2009 (812
observations firms).The results of the study show that if the company makes appeal to an auditor
among the BIG 4 and if the services of the external auditor contain a small proportion of non audit
services, it may be less tax aggressive.
Other researches examined the link between the attributes of the board of directors and the risky
tax planning (Deslandes and Landry, 2009; Deslandes and Landry, 2011; Richardson and al.
2012; Armstrong and al. 2012). These studies are going to be presented with detail during the
study of the role of the board of directors in the management of the firm tax risks.
Thus, these studies emphasize the role of diverse governance mechanisms (internal and
external) in the reduction of the tax risk planning, which is a component of the tax risk. These
mechanisms are supposed to play the same role in the reduction of the firm tax risks and in the
protection of the interests of the shareholders.
However, the tax authorities constitute a main actor with the firm in the study of the tax risk. This
partner possesses a part in the profit of companies and has a power of control which exceeds
even that of the majority shareholders. According to Desai and Dharmapala (2008), by means of
the corporate tax, the State is generally the biggest claimant on cash-flow before tax and
consequently the biggest shareholder in most of the companies. In the presence of a tax risk for
the company not or badly managed, the interest of this partner will be hurt as far as it is not going
to receive the exact amount of tax. So, according to Sikka (2010) and Erle (2008), the pursuit of
profit requires for the managers to balance the interests of the diverse stakeholders, including the
obligation to pay taxes to the State and to the society.
Within the framework of the governance partnership approach, the notion of social responsibility
of the company finds its place. The latter means "that there is an implicit contract between the
3
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
firm and the society stipulating that the firm has obligations to the society which has the right to
control it" (Le Ray, 2006, p 49). According to Smerdon (2004), the social responsibility indicates
that it is necessary for the firms to meet the expectations of groups other than the shareholders,
even if the managers are responsible formally only towards the latter.
Freise and al. (2008) stipulate that the social responsibility of the company is represented by a
set of standards which define his ethical behavior. Indeed, large companies can exercise
disproportionate powers in the society generally such as the power to pollute the environment, to
cheat the creditors and to evade taxes. According to Rossignol and Chadefeaux (2001, p. 12), "to
respect this contribution is a matter of the tax public-spiritedness and demonstrates the
membership of the company to the social community, by participating in the cover of the public
spending. This tax duty which becomes integrated into a citizen social vision is on the basis of
the ethical behavior of the company, as a moral agent responsible for her actions ".
So, if the adoption of the politics of tax aggressiveness by companies can have negative effects
on the society generally, those having a good governance system have to reduce their tax
aggressiveness to legitimize their existence (Lanis and Richardson, 2011). Lanis and Richardson
(2011) also indicate that the different results found by the researchers during the examination of
the link between the corporate governance and the tax aggressiveness (Desai and Dharmpala,
2006; Hanlan and Slemrod, 2009) can be justified by the fact that the agency theory does not
give a complete explanation of this link and that the appeal to the theory of the corporate social
responsibility allows to explain better this link. This theory takes into account several other
partners in the society such as the tax authorities. The mechanisms of governance should so
favor the respect of the tax laws and of their spirit to allow the company to exist in the society
(Lanis and Richardson, 2011). These mechanisms have to assure the reduction of the tax risk to
protect the interest of all the partners, including that of the tax authorities.
Empirically, the study of Lanis and Richardson (2011) is the only one who examines the link
between a governance mechanism (the board of directors) and the aggressive tax planning
basing it on the governance partnership theory by raising the notion of firm social responsibility.
2.2. Board of directors and tax risk
The board of directors plays in theory an important role in the management of tax risks. It has to
make sure of the existence of appropriate controls of the tax risks and of the tax function… It also
has to establish a system of communication which informs in an adequate way the partners and
which reassures the tax authorities also. The annual report of the company constitutes one of the
vehicles in which the board of directors gives the tax strategy of the company, shows the internal
control process of tax risks and mention the structure and the training of the tax department. The
board must send the message to the diverse partners that the firm is commited to complying with
tax obligations and another message to the investors than, under this respect, the company
makes the most efficient tax choices (Erle, 2008).
Empirically, few studies examined the role of the board of directors in the reduction of firms tax
risk. More specifically, this research focuses on a particular type of tax risk: risky tax planning
(Deslandes and Landry, 2009; Lanis and Richardson, 2011; Richardson and al. 2012; Armstrong
and al. 2012). These studies were all conducted in the Anglo-Saxon context and have tested the
effect of diverse characteristics of the board of directors on the tax planning but the results are
little conclusive. Indeed, only the variables of the percentage of independent directors and the
financial expertise seem to have to reduce this risky tax planning.
4
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
The examination of the role of the board of directors in the reduction of tax risk depends widely
on its characteristics. We develop the hypotheses to be tested in the Tunisian context for some of
the characteristics of the board of directors.
2.2.1. Independence of the board
The board of directors is composed of internal and external members. Outside directors provide,
according to the agency theory, an effective control of the managers. They combine two
important characteristics to guarantee the efficiency of this function of control which are the
competence and the independence (Charreaux and Pitol Belin, 1992).
Several studies highlight the role of the outside directors in reducing fraud in the financial
statements (Beasly, 1996, Uzun and al., 2004). Also, the recent studies led in the Anglo-Saxon
context validated the hypothesis that the presence of a high percentage of independent directors
in the board helps to reduce risky tax planning (Lanis and Richardson, 2011; Richardson and al.
2012; Armstrong and al. 2012).
In Tunisia, several studies on listed Tunisian firms and over different periods highlight the
existence of a positive effect of the percentage of external directors on corporate performance
(Louizi, 2006; Ben Taleb Sfar and Léger-Jarniou, 2012). These results clearly show the
effectiveness of the role of outside directors in monitoring managerial actions. These results also
allow us to align with studies in Anglo-Saxon countries and advocate the important role that
independent directors can play in reducing the tax risk in the Tunisian context. Our first
hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: the probability of the firm tax risk decreases with the independence of the board.
2.2.2. Separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board
According to the agency theory, the separation between CEO and chairman of board constitutes
a guarantee of the independence of the board and the effectiveness of its control function (Fama
and Jensen, 1983; Baliga and al., 1996). The accumulation of these two posts gives the manager
an undivided formal authority and increases its power within the company. This accumulation can
thus promote the entrenchment of the manager and question the disciplinary role of the board
(Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). Thereby, separating the positions of CEO and Chairman of the
Board helps to promote better control of managerial actions, including those of a tax nature.
In Tunisia, several studies have examined the impact of duality on the performance of listed
companies, but the results are mixed (Turki and Bensedrine, 2012; Mhamid and al. 2011; Louizi,
2006 ; Bouaziz and Triki, 2012 ...).
On the tax front, few studies have examined the impact of duality on aggressive tax planning
(Deslandes and Landry, 2009; Rego and wilson, 2012). However, no significant results were
identified. We consider that duality promotes management entrenchment and allows him to follow
his own interests to the detriment of all partners. It is thus a sign of a weak governance system as
mentioned by Rego and Wilson (2012). For this, there must be the separation of CEO and
Chairman of the Board of Directors in order to reduce the firm’s tax risk. We therefore put forward
the following hypothesis:
5
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Hypothesis 2: the probability of tax risk decreases with the separation of CEO and chairman of
the board.
2.2.3. Accounting or tax expertise of the audit committee
The Audit Committee is responsible for overseeing the internal control system. This committee
shall, as Maders and Masselin (2009), examine the quality of internal control system and its
effectiveness in the management of firm risks. According to IFA and IFACI (2009), the "Audit
Committee ensures that the major risks are under control and have been properly treated by
management, that the major risks are monitored by a competent person and there is a link
between the risk and the work programs of the internal audit " (p. 31). To exercise its oversight of
internal control, the audit committee must have members with financial expertise (Abbott and al.,
2004; Bédard and al., 2004). In this context, studies show the effectiveness of the financial
expertise of the audit committee in the reduction of aggressive management results (Bédard and
al. 2004; Carcello and al. 2008), accounting irregularities (Abbott and al., 2004; Agrawal and
Chadha, 2005), and internal control failures related to financial reporting (Zhang and al., 2007).
On the tax side, the audit committee is responsible for the development and control of the overall
strategy of tax risk management (OCDE, 2008). In this context, Deslandes and Landry (2009)
examine the impact of the presence of one member with accounting expertise within the audit
committee on the risk of aggressive tax planning. The results demonstrate the existence of a
negative impact and thus raise the important role of the accounting or tax expertise of the audit
committee in reducing planning. Similarly, Armstrong and al. (2012) find that financial expertise of
the board of directors has a negative impact on tax planning when it is at high levels.
In Tunisia, audit committees were made mandatory for all listed companies with the promulgation
of the law to strengthen the security of financial relations in 2005 (Law 2005-96 of 18 October
2005). However, the Tunisian regulations do not require the presence of members with
accounting or tax expertise in the audit committee. The presence of such a member may promote
a better management of tax risk and will eventually reduce the extent of this risk. In this sense,
and in a recent study in the Tunisian context and for listed firms (26 firms listed on the TSE for
the period 2007-2010), Bouaziz and triki (2012) found that the proportion of members of the audit
committee with accounting and financial expertise is positively associated with the financial
performance of these firms. The hypothesis regarding the accounting or tax expertise of the audit
committee is thus the following:
Hypothesis 3: the probability of tax risk is negatively related with accounting and tax expertise of
the audit committee
2.3. Internal audit function and tax risk
The internal audit function is considered as one of the cornerstones of the corporate governance
system. In collaboration with the Audit Committee and the external auditors, the internal audit
function control manager and is to safeguard company assets against misappropriation and
embezzlement (Prawitt and al., 2009; Christ and al. 2012). According to Christ and al. (2012), the
internal audit function has a clear advantage with respect to the external auditor and the audit
committee since it is embedded in the company and can therefore serve as a permanent leader
controller. Since the tax risk can promote managerial opportunism and may have negative effects
6
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
on society in general, the internal audit function plays as a governance mechanism to reduce this
risk.
The internal audit function plays an important role in the evaluation process of risk management.
This function gives an assurance that major risks have been identified and that the internal
control systems are well designed and operating effectively (Nigel, 2002). In the particular case of
tax risk, the internal audit function needs to be ensured that there is a policy of tax risk
management within the company and the tax among the major costs in company is properly
managed and that the risks inherent in the tax position of the company are understood and
controlled (Elgood and al. 2004).
Internal auditors can lead, according to Chadefaux (1987), a tax internal audit mission. The tax
audit is a mission that directly addresses the tax risk through a double check of regularity and
efficiency. According to the same author, "a tax internal audit mission seems also have various
advantages over a mission conducted by a team of external auditors, benefits that can really be
reflected if the internal audit service otherwise satisfies a number of requirements" (p.199). The
main advantage of conducting a tax audit mission by the internal auditors is their knowledge of
the company. Permanence in-house internal audit department promotes frequent recourse to the
services of internal auditors in the field of taxation. In addition, internal auditors have the
advantage of conducting a tax audit mission with more flexibility compared to the external
auditors. However, Chadefaux (1987) emphasizes that "the tax audit performed as part of an
internal mission must have a number of safeguards to ensure the reliability of the tax mission" (p.
200). This is primarily to ensure a high level of competence of the internal auditor. It must be a
tax specialist. Second, there is the real independence of the internal tax auditor.
To our knowledge, no research has attempted to examine the impact of the presence and
characteristics of the internal audit function on the tax risk. However, some studies have
investigated the effect of the presence and characteristics of the internal audit function on
earnings management (Davidson and al., 2005; Prawitt and al., 2009; Garcia and al., 2012) and
find a negative effect.
The study sample will focus on listed Tunisian firms. These firms must have an internal audit
function. It is, in fact, one of the conditions for admission to stock market. Despite the lack of
research done on the relationship between the existence and characteristics of internal audit
function and the tax risk, we argue, in accordance with Chadefaux (1987), the important role of
accounting or tax expertise of the internal audit function in reducing firms tax risk. The hypothesis
advanced shall be as follows:
Hypothesis 4: The probability of tax risk is negatively related with accounting or tax expertise of
the internal audit function.
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample description
Our sample is composed of 39 Tunisian firms listed on the TSE (Tunisian Stock Exchange). The
data for this study were collected through financial statements and a questionnaire sent to all
listed firms. We have collected 39 questionnaires from 56 Tunisian listed firms in 2010. The
questionnaire was sent and filed with all listed firms. However, 17 firms have failed to complete
7
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
the questionnaire or told to return it duly completed despite repeated reminders on-site visit, by
phone or e-mail.
The response rate to the questionnaire is thus 69.64 % and is, in our opinion, an adequate
response
rate
for
conducting
multivariate
analyzes.
Companies that responded to the questionnaire operate in various sectors. The financial sector is
represented in the sample by 19 companies representing a rate of 48%. The response rate for
financial firms is 79.17 % or 19 out of 24 firms. The response rate for non-financial corporations
was
62.5
%
or
20
companies
out
of
32.
Data on Tunisian listed companies were collected for the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and
2010. We have, in total, 177 observations firms. We have collected the necessary data in our
study through a survey. It contains specific information about the firm tax function (existence of a
tax service, the existence of a tax provision...), the board of directors (the number of independent
directors, the duality, the presence of the audit committee, accounting or tax expertise of this
committee...), the internal audit function (existence, tax expertise...) and the tax external advisor
(existence, title of the external consultant, nature of the mission...).
3.2. Definition and measurement of variables
3.2.1. Dependant variable: Tax Risk
Our definition of tax risk includes both the risk of non-compliance that the risk of opportunity.
Some studies who have examined the issue of tax risk are rested on a sample of firms that have
suffered tax adjustments (Hanlon and al., 2005; Lanis and Richardson, 2011) and another control
sample. Using this same measure in our study seems to be difficult due to the confidentiality of
firm recovered data.
Tax risk was measured differently by other researchers which are interested in the study of
aggressive or risky tax planning and are engaged in the study of our second component of tax
risk (the risk of opportunity). This risky tax planning was measured by classic measures of tax
management which are the effective tax rate (Lanis and Richardson, 2011; Armstrong and al.,
2012; Rego and Wilson, 2012; Chen and al., 2010) or differences between accounting income
and taxable income (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Rego and Wilson, 2012; Chen and al., 2010).
However, these measures have been considered by other authors (Chadefaux and Rossignol,
2006) as measures of fiscal performance. Therefore, these measures do not seem to be able to
capture only the risky tax planning but represent all tax planning measures adopted by firms and
may
naturally
contain
acceptable
measures.
In addition, and following the implementation of FIN 48, some recent research has rested on the
information disclosed by U.S. companies, which focuses on the estimation of uncertain tax
benefits for the tax measure risk (Armstrong and al. 2010 ; Rego and Wilson, 2012).
Since the contexts of study of tax risk are widely different, we tried to design an appropriate
measure to the Tunisian context and which is reflected in its regulatory framework. To do this, we
focused on the obligations of Tunisian firms to consider tax risk in the financial statements and
referring mainly to the general accounting standard and the standard 14 on contingencies and
subsequent
events
to
the
closing
date.
The general accounting standard provides that the probable tax expense should be recognized in
the financial statements through a provision or a reserve. Also, the standard 14 focuses on
contingencies and events after the closing date and which may have an impact on the financial
position of the company and must therefore be assessed and recognized in the financial
statements. This standard so emphasizes the tax risk which can arise from an eventuality or from
8
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
an event later the closing date and it applies for all the not financial and financial firms. Given that
the financial statements of listed Tunisian companies are published on the website of the TSE,
we will rely on tax risk disclosures made by these companies to measure risk. An overview on the
financial statements disclosed concluded that some companies do not give the details of the item
“provisions”. To remedy this problem, we asked all companies, through the survey, mention us if
they have or not a tax provision for each year of study. Also, the report of the auditors is
appended to the financial statements. So, through content analysis of this report, we checked if it
contains information on the existence of a tax risk. Thus, we measure the tax risk by a
dichotomous variable. This variable is equal to 1 if the firm has a tax provision or disclosing
information to the tax risk in the financial statements notes or if there is information on the risk in
the general report of the auditor, and 0 if not.
3.2.2. Independent variables
- Board of director independence: In this study, we retain independent directors as members
of the Board with the following characteristics (Peasnell and al. 2003; Whidbee, 1997): Are not
officers or executives of the company, do not have family ties with the CEO of the company and
are not former employees of the company and do not have a business relationship with the
company (consultant, lawyers, suppliers, creditors ...). Given that the information published by
the Tunisian listed firms does not distinguish affiliated and independent directors, we asked its
firms in the survey and tell us to distribute members of the Board according to their nature:
internal, affiliated and independent.
- The separation of CEO and Chairman of the Board: Separating the positions of CEO and
chairman of the board will be measured using a dichotomous variable. This variable is equal to 1
in case of separation of the positions of CEO and chairman of the board and 0 otherwise
(Deslandes and Landry, 2009).
- Tax or accounting expertise of audit committee: The accounting or tax expertise will be
measured using a dichotomous variable (Deslandes and Landry, 2009; Bédard and al., 2004;
Abott and al., 2004). This variable is equal to 1 if there is a member of the audit committee that
has expertise in accounting or taxation and 0 if not. Since it is difficult to obtain such information,
we considered that a person has the accounting or tax expertise when it pursued a specialized
academic training in accounting or taxation. Our definition approaches that adopted by Bédard
and al. (2004) although it is less restrictive.
- Tax or accounting expertise of internal audit function: because the disciplines of tax and
accounting are interrelated, we will hold the following dichotomous variable to measure the tax or
accounting expertise of internal audit function. This variable takes the value of 1 if there is a
member in the internal audit function having acquired a university degree in accounting or
taxation and 0 if not. This is one of the factors representative of the internal audit function
competence which is the degree (Prawitt and al. 2009), the experience and the training. The
retention of this factor alone is justified by the difficulty of obtaining data related to other factors.
3.2.3. Control variables
Control variables that will be adopted in the context of this study are the firm size (Log of total
assets), the existence of a tax service in the firm, the use of an external tax advice, external
auditor quality (Big 4 or not) and the financial sector.
9
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
3.3. Regression model:
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we have used the logistic regression to test the
impact of the attributes of the board and the internal audit function on the probability of tax risk.
Our analysis model is as following:
RISFit =α0 + α 1 INCAit + α 2 SEPit + α 3 EXCAit + α 4 EXAIit + α 5 TAILit + α 6 SERFit +α7 COEXit +
α 8 QUEXit + α9 SECFit + Σ.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 shows that 46.89% of the firms in the sample support at least one tax risk. Thus, nearly
half of the cases, the tax risk is present either through a provision or tax information inserted in
the financial statements notes or in the general report of the auditor. 27.71% of tax risks in our
sample are related to control of a tax authority. Identified tax risks have led to tax provision in
85.54% of cases, whereas in 14.46% of cases, the risk is disclosed in the financial statements
notes and / or in the auditor's report but not covered through a tax provision.
Tax risk is present with the same frequency in the years 2006, 2007 and 2010. The year 2009
has the lowest frequency. Identified risks vary slightly from one year to the other between the
financial and non-financial firms, to achieve a nearly identical total for the two sub-samples: 42
tax risks for non-financial firms against 41 in the financial sector and throughout the study period.
The percentage of independent directors on the board is, on average, 12.02% and from 0 to
33.33% (table 2 below). Only 37.85 % of the sample firms adopt dual structure with separation of
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board (table 1). For the variable relating to accounting
or tax expertise of audit committees, information collected through the questionnaire show that
some firms in the sample do not have a permanent audit committee even in 2010 despite
regulatory requirements for all Tunisian listed companies. The size of the audit committee varies
from 3 to 6 with an average of 3.51. Table 1 shows also that 68.36 % on average of firms have
one member with expertise in accounting or tax in audit committee. For the remaining 31.64%,
the audit committee does not include people with accounting or tax expertise or firm does not
have an audit committee. As well as for variable EXCA, some Tunisian listed companies do not
have an internal audit function (for 22 observations). In table 1, 75.71% of companies have a
member with accounting or tax expertise. For the rest, companies do not have an internal audit
function or the internal audit function does not have such a member. 42.94 % of companies have
a tax service and 71.19 % of firms use the services of an external tax advice (table 1). Also,
descriptive statistics show that in 40.11 % of cases, one of the auditors of companies is one of
the BIG 4. Financial and non-financial sectors are represented in an almost equal manner in our
sample.
10
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Table 1: descriptive statistics for binary variables
Table
RISF
SEPA
Frequency
94
83
177
110
67
0
1
Total
0
1
Proportion
53,11
46,89
100
62,15
37,85
2:
EXCA
0
56
31,64
1
121
68,36
EXAI
0
43
24,29
1
134
75,71
SERF
0
101
57,06
1
76
42,94
COEX
0
51
28,81
1
126
71,19
QUEX
0
106
59,89
1
71
40,11
SECF
0
90
50,85
1
87
49,15
With RISF : 1 if the company recorded a tax provision or disclosed information to the tax risk
in the financial statements notes or in the auditor general report and 0 otherwise; SEPA:1 if
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board are separated and 0 otherwise ; EXCA : 1 if
an audit committee member has an expertise in accounting or tax and 0 otherwise ; EXAI : 1
if a member in the internal audit function has an accountant or tax expertise and 0 otherwise;
SERF : 1 if there is a tax service in the company and 0 otherwise ; COEX: 1 if the company
uses the services of an external tax advisor and 0 otherwise ; QUEX: 1 if the firm uses a BIG
4 auditor and 0 otherwise ; SECF:1 if the firm is part of the financial sector and 0 otherwise.
descriptive statistics for metric variables
TAIL
INCA
Mean
19.15108
12,02
Variance
3.717803
0,0121717
Median
18.258
11,11
Minimum
16.523
0
Maximum
22.633
33,33
With TAIL : log total assets; INCA: Number of independent directors / total number of directors
4.2. Bivariate analysis
Before presenting the results of the multivariate regression, we should conduct a bivariate
analysis in order to assess in a preliminary way the validity of our assumptions. In this context,
two statistical methods are used: the contingency table and the equality of the means test (tables
3 and 4).
Table 3 shows that there is an independence between, on the one hand, the tax risk variable
and, secondly, the variables separation, expertise of the audit committee, existence of a tax
service, quality of external auditor and belonging to the financial sector. This preliminary result,
found for each variable in isolation, shows that the probability of tax risk does not depend on
these variables. For variables accounting or tax expertise of the internal audit and the use of
outside tax advisor, Chi 2 test shows a significant probability that allows to reject the hypothesis
of independence between the variables. There is thus a link between the variable tax risk and
11
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
these two variables. The presence of such expertise decreases the probability of tax risk,
confirming preliminary our fourth hypothesis. However, using the services of an external tax
advice is likely to increase the probability of tax risk, which seems contrary to expectations. Table
4 shows no difference between companies that have a tax risk and those who have no tax risk in
firm size. The results in Table 5 show a difference between companies that support a tax risk and
those that do not support this in view of the independence of the board. However, the percentage
of independent directors is higher for companies with a tax risk which is contrary to predictions.
Table 3: Independence test in contingency table
RISF
Binary independant variables Chi 2 test
SEPA
Total
0
1
0 60
Pearson chi2(1) =
34
94
1 50
Pr = 0.623
33
83
Total 110
67
177
EXCA
Total
0
1
0 29
Pearson chi2(1) =
65
94
1 27
Pr = 0.811
56
83
Total 56
121
177
EXAI
Total
Pearson chi2(1) =
0
1
Pr = 0.089
0 18
76
94
1 25
58
83
Total 43
134
177
SERF
Total
0
1
0 57
Pearson chi2(1) =
37
94
1 44
Pr = 0.306
39
83
Total 101
76
177
COEX
Total
Pearson chi2(1) =
0
1
0 34
Pr = 0.021
60
94
1 17
66
83
Total 51
126
177
QUEX
Total
0
1
0 56
Pearson chi2(1) =
38
94
1 50
Pr = 0.928
33
83
Total 106
71
177
SECF
Total
0
1
0 48
Pearson chi2(1) =
46
94
1 42
Pr = 0.951
41
83
Total 90
87
177
*** significant at 0,01 ; ** significant at 0,05 ; * significant at 0,10.
0.2413
0.0575
2.8850*
1.0463
5.2892**
0.0082
0.0038
12
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Table 4: difference of means test for variable TAIL
Group Observations
mean
Std.Err
Std.Dev
95%Conf
0
94
19.08064 .2006498 1.945372
18.68219
1
83
19.23087 .2104327 1.917133
18.81225
Combined
177
19.15108 .1449294
1.92816
18.86506
Diff
-.1502292 .2910273
-.7246043
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -0.5162
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
175
Ha: diff < 0
Ha: diff = 0
Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.3032
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6064
Pr(T > t) = 0.6968
Interval
19.47909
19.64949
19.43711
.424146
Table 5: difference of means test for variable INCA
Group Observations
Mean
Std.Err
Std.Dev
0
94
.106817
.010949 .1061549
1
83
.1354602 .0124683 .1135918
Combined
177
.1202486 .0082926 .1103255
Diff
-.0286432 .0165234
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)
t = -1.7335
Ho: diff = 0
degrees of freedom =
175
Ha: diff < 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0424
95%Conf
.0850744
.1106568
.1038829
-.061254
Interval
.1285596
.1602637
.1366143
.0039676
Ha: diff != 0
Ha: diff > 0
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0848
Pr(T > t) = 0.9576
4.3. Logit regression results
The correlation test shows the absence of multicollinearity between the board independance and
the firm size. Logistic regression can thus be conducted. The results of this regression are shown
in Table 6.
Table 6: Results of logistic regression (RISF)
Variables
Constant
Expected sign
INCA
-
SEPA
-
EXCA
-
EXAI
-
SERF
-
COEX
-
QUEX
-
SECF
?
TAIL
+
Year_Dum_1
?
Year_Dum_2
?
Year_Dum_3
?
Coefficients
-.4387379
(0.873)
3.292621**
(0.039)
-.0381776
(0.909)
.0828401
(0.830)
-.4156002
(0.326)
.2626656
(0.563)
.9669315**
(0.024)
.347216
(0.366)
.0848501
(0.865)
-.0425045
(0.799)
.4396595
(0.381)
.2861768
(0.561)
-.2653899
(0.585)
13
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Year_Dum_4
?
-.3615324
(0.459)
Number of obs =
177
LR chi2 (13) = 15.95
Prob > Chi 2 =
0.2519
2
Log likelihood = -114.37076
Pseudo R
= 0.0652
RISF =α0 + α 1 INCA + α 2 SEPA + α 3 EXCA + α 4 EXAI + α 5 TAIL + α 6 SERF +α7 COEX + α 8 QUEX + α9 SECF +
Σ.
*** significant at 1% ; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10%.
Variables that appear to have a significant effect on the probability of tax risk are the
independence of the board and the use of an external tax advice. These two variables have a
positive effect on the probability of tax risk which is contrary to our expectations. Recall our first
hypothesis which states that “the probability of tax risk decreases with the independence of the
board”. The results disprove the hypothesis 1. According to our prevision, the use of an outside
tax advice is likely to increase the regulatory compliance and thereby reduces the tax risk.
However, the results are contrary to expectations. Both results found can be explained by the
measurement of tax risk which largely includes the component of tax reserve or provision
(85,54%). This provision identifies firms’ tax risks but is also a way to manage this risk.
The variables separating CEO and Chairman of the board, accounting or tax expertise of the
audit committee, accounting or tax expertise of the internal audit function do not have a
significant effect on the probability of tax risk. Our hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 are also not validated.
For the control variables, the presence of a tax service, external audit quality, firm size and sector
have
no
significant
effect
on
the
probability
of
tax
risk.
In addition, dichotomous variables were introduced in our regression to represent the years of
study. The aim is to examine whether differences in the probability of tax risk between the fiveyears. However, the results of the logistic regression show that none of these variables
representing years of study has significant effect on the probability of tax risk.
4.4. Additional analysis
In the descriptive statistics presented above, tax risks that led to the record of tax provisions are
of the order of 71 or 85.54% of total identified risks. To examine the role of stakeholders in the
management of tax risk, it is useful to conduct another logistic regression. The dependent
variable is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 in the presence of a tax provision and 0
otherwise. Through this regression, the objective is to study the role of internal governance
mechanisms (board of directors and internal audit function) and others actors (tax department,
outside counsel, external auditor) in the management or tax risk through tax reserve or provision.
In table 7 (below), the results show that variables relating to the independence of the board and
the use of an external tax advice positively influence the probability of a tax provision. The same
result is found for the first regression examining the determinants of tax risk. This shows that the
results of the first regression are explained by the inclusion of the tax provision in the measure of
tax risk and thereby justifying the positive relationship found between these two variables and the
probability of this risk. Thus, the independence of the board and the using of tax external
consultants play in favor of the use of a tax provision to manage tax risk.
Moreover, 72.29 % (60) of cases of tax risks identified are not related to operations of a tax
authority control. This demonstrates the tendency to proactively manage tax risk. These cases
14
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
will be used to measure the tax risk and to renew again our logistic regression. The dependent
variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 in the presence of a tax risk not related to a tax
authority
control
and
0
otherwise.
The new regression highlights the significant impact of new variables on the probability of tax risk
(table 8). Indeed, in addition to the variables relating to the independence of the board and use of
tax external advice, this logistic regression identify a significant relationship between external
auditor quality and size of the business, on the one hand, and the probability of presence of the
tax risk, on the other hand.
Table 7: Model results on tax provision (PROV)
Variables
Expected sign
Constant
INCA
+
SEPA
+
EXCA
+
EXAI
+
SERF
+
COEX
+
QUEX
+
SECF
?
TAIL
?
Year_Dum_1
?
Year_Dum_2
?
Year_Dum_3
?
Year_Dum_4
?
Coefficients
1.685932
(0.549)
3.76552**
(0.022)
.0340596
(0.921)
.3395005
(0.393)
-.331659
(0.438)
.3009071
(0.512)
1.028786**
(0.021)
.5454843
(0.167)
.3013785
(0.553)
-.2065325
(0.228)
.4854045
(0.341)
.586408
(0.242)
-.0578629
(0.908)
-.1602434
(0.751)
Number of obs =
177
LR chi2 (13) =
16, 42
Prob > chi2 = 0,2273
Log likelihood= -110.99453
Pseudo R2
= 0.0689
PROV =α0 + α 1 INCA + α 2 SEPA + α 3 EXCA + α 4 EXAI + α 5 TAIL + α 6 SERF +α7 COEX + α 8 QUEX + α9 SECF + Σ.
With PROV = 1 if the company recorded a tax provision during the year and 0 otherwise ; INCA = Number of independent
directors / total number of directors; SEPA = 1 if the positions of CEO and chairman of the board are separated and 0 otherwise ;
EXCA = 1 if an audit committee member has an expertise in accounting or tax and 0 otherwise ; EXAI = 1 if a member in the
internal audit function has an accountant or tax expertise and 0 otherwise , TAIL = Log ( total net assets ), SERF = 1 if there is a
tax service in the company and 0 otherwise ; COEX = 1 if the company uses the services of an external consultant and 0
otherwise ; QUEX = 1 if the firm uses a BIG 4 auditor and 0 otherwise ; SECF = 1 if the firm is part of the financial sector and 0
otherwise ; Year_Dum_1 : Year 2006; Year_Dum_2 : Year 2007 ; Year_Dum_3 : 2008; Year_Dum_4 : Year 2009.
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10%.
The percentage of independent directors on the board has a positive and significant influence on
the probability of tax risk which is unrelated to a tax authority control. The quality of the external
auditor, as measured by the use of BIG 4, is positively and significantly associated with the
likelihood of the presence of risk unrelated to tax control operations. The use of a tax external
advisor also has a positive and significant impact on the probability of this risk. The results for
these three variables are explained by the fact that almost all of these risks have been identified
through a tax provision (97,67%). Therefore, these three actors play for covering tax risks and
15
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
thus ensure proactive management of these risks.
Table 8: model results relating to tax risk not related to control
Variables
Constant
Expected sign
Coefficients
2.762458
(0.351)
4.000117**
INCA
(0.022)
SEPA
.4519248
(0.201)
EXCA
.5446398
(0.200)
EXAI
-.4455902
(0.322)
SERF
.3577634
(0.452)
.8628348*
COEX
(0.062)
1.109381***
QUEX
(0.009)
SECF
?
.5229833
(0.326)
-.3099554*
TAIL
+
(0.088)
Year_Dum_1
?
.4844065
(0.373)
Year_Dum_2
?
.4205409
(0.430)
Year_Dum_3
?
.3533203
(0.501)
Year_Dum_4
?
.114279
(0.831)
Number of obs =
177
LR chi2 (13) =
20.20
Prob > chi2 = 0.0902
Log likelihood = -103.24168
Pseudo R2
= 0.0891
RFNC=α0 + α 1 INCA + α 2 SEPA + α 3 EXCA + α 4 EXAI + α 5 TAIL + α 6 SERF +α7 COEX + α 8 QUEX + α9 SECF + Σ.
with RFNC=1 in the presence of a tax risk not related to a tax control and 0 otherwise.
*** significant at 1% ; ** significant at 5% ; * significant at 10%.
Table 8 also shows that the firm size has a negative and significant effect on the probability of tax
risk not related to tax authority control. The probability of tax risk not related to control decreases
with firm size, which is contrary to expectations. However, this result should be interpreted with
caution because the presence of tax risk not related to control operations is identified through
provisions (58 cases out of 60). Thus, large firms use less provision for managing prospectively
tax risk; larger firms feel they do not have to disclose such information and that they able to
manage the tax risk curatively if necessary.
5. Conclusion
The study considers the impact of internal governance mechanisms on tax risk in Tunisian
context. Based on a sample of Tunisian listed firms for the period 2006-2010, we have conducted
a logistic regression to test hypothesis that independent board, separation of CEO and president
of the board, tax or accounting expertise of audit committee and tax or accounting expertise of
internal audit function reduce the probability of tax risk. We find, contrary to our previsions, that
16
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
independent board and the use of an external tax advice influence positively the likelihood of tax
risk. This result is justified by the greater presence of the tax provision in our measure of tax risk.
While the tax provision identifies the tax risk, it constitutes a means to manage this risk. So the
results found can be interpreted as follows: firms that have an independent board and that use an
external tax advisor use provision to manage the tax risk. This interpretation is confirmed by our
additional analysis.
We have found also that the external auditor, with board independence and use of external tax
advisor, help to manage proactively the tax risk (before tax authority control).
Overall, our study helps to extend the literature on the topic of corporate governance and
taxation. To our knowledge, it provides the first study conducted in the Tunisian context about the
topic of tax risk. Moreover, we have conceived a new measure of tax risk which is adapted with
Tunisian context and regulation.
Our study is subject to several limitations. First, our sample is limited to Tunisian listed firms so
we can’t generalize the results to all Tunisian firms. But this limitation is justified by the availability
of publicly information for these firms. Second, although the measure of tax risk in our study has
the advantage to take into account various types of tax risks (non-compliance risk and
opportunity risk) and to be adapted to the Tunisian context, it does not capture the extent or level
of tax risk. However, the lack of published data on the level of risk and the difficulty of obtaining
data from firms or tax authority justified the use of a dichotomous measure of tax risk.
Future research into corporate governance and tax risk could examine several important matters.
Taking into account the attributes of the manager in the study of tax risk would possibly enrich
the study. Indeed, taking into account its share in the capital of the company, its attitude vis-a-vis
the general risk and the type of remuneration can influence the level of tax risk.
Finally, in the study of tax risk, the importance is increasingly given to the notion of social
responsibility by focusing on tax transparency obligation of the company. According to De Boer
(2012), "tax responsibility must go through a change of mentality, for greater transparency
through communication of tax strategy and detailed country-by-country figures (name, object,
assets and tax liabilities of different entities)"(p. 74). According to the same author, “the idea of
imposing for companies more transparency through new disclosure requirements is in progress”
(De Boer, 2012, p. 75). This raises increasingly the question of interaction between governance
system and taxation.
References
Abbott, L. J., Parker, S., Peters, G.F. 2004. “Audit committee characteristics and restatements.
Auditing. A Journal of Practice & Theory”, vol. 23, pp. 69-87.
Agrawal, A., Chadha, S. 2005. “Corporate Governance and Acccounting scandals. Journal of
Law and Economics”, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 371- 406.
Armstrong, C.S., Blouin, J.L., Jagolinzer, A.D., Larcker, D.F. 2012. “Corporate governance,
incentives and tax avoidance”. Working paper. 35 pages.
Baliga, R., Moyer, C., Rao, R.1996. “CEO duality and firm performance: What's the fuss?
Strategic Management Journal”, vol. 17, pp. 41-53.
Beasly, M.S.1996. “An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director
composition and financial statement fraud. The Accounting Review”, vol. 71, no. 4, pp. 443-465.
Bédard, J., S. M. Chtourou, and L. Courteau. 2004. “The effect of audit committee expertise,
independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice
& Theory”, vol. 23, pp. 13-35.
17
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Ben Taleb Sfar, D., Léger-Jarniou, C. 2012. “L'impact des administrateurs externes et la taille du
conseil d'administration sur la performance des entreprises: application au contexte tunisien.
Revue des Sciences de Gestion”, vol. 2, no. 254, pp. 81-87.
Bouaziz, Z., Triki, M. 2012. “The impact of the board of directors on the financial performance of
Tunisian companies. Universal Journal of Marketing and Business Research”, vol. 1, no. 2, pp.
56- 71.
Carcello, J. V., C. W. Hollingsworth, A. Klein, and T. L. Neal. 2008. “Audit Committee Financial
Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Methods, and Earnings Management”.
Chadefaux, M. 1987. L’audit fiscal. Librairie de la cour de cassation.
Chadefeaux, M., Rossignol, J.L. 2006. “La performance fiscale des entreprises. Revue de Droit
Fiscal”, pp. 1450- 1456.
Charreaux, G; Pitol-Belin, J.P. 1992. "Le conseil d'administration, lieu de confrontation entre
dirigeants et actionnaires. Revue Française de Gestion”, vol.87, pp. 84-92.
Chen, S., Chen, X., Cheng, Q., Shevlin, T. 2010. “Are family firms more tax aggressive then nonfamily firms ? Journal of Financial Economics”, vol. 95, pp. 41-61.
Christ. M.H, Masli, A., Sharp, N.Y., Wood, D.A. 2012. Using the Internal Audit Function as a
Management Training Ground: Is the Monitoring Effectiveness of Internal Auditors
Compromised? SSRN Working Paper Series. Octobre.
Davidson, R., Goodwin-Stewart. J., Kent.P. 2005. “Internal governance structures and earnings
management. Accounting and Finance”, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 241-267.
De Boer, S.N. 2012. “De la nécessité de replacer la fiscalité au coeur de la RSE. Analyse
Financière », vol. 44, pp. 73- 75.
Desai, M.A., Dharmapala, D. 2006. “Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives.
Journal of Financial Economics”, vol.79, pp. 145-179.
Desai, M.A., Dharmapala, D. 2008. “Tax and Corporate Governance : an Economic Approach”. In
Tax and Corporate Governance (Eds, Drexl, J., M.Hilty, R., Schön,W., Straus, J) Springer : pp.
13- 30.
Deslandes, M., Landry, S. 2009. “Risque d’agressivité fiscale, réputation et gouvernance”. Juin
2009, 8ième Conférence Internationale de Gouvernance.
Deslandes, M., Landry, S. 2011. “Risque d’atteinte à la réputation, composition du conseil
d’administration et agressivité fiscale. Revue française de gouvernance d’entreprise”, vol. 9, pp.
25-45.
Elgood, T., Paroissien, I., Quimby, L. 2004. Tax Risk Management. Pricewaterhouse-Coopers,
64 pages.
Erle, B. 2008. “Tax Risk Management and Board Responsibility”. In Tax and Corporate
Governance (Eds, Drexl, J., M.Hilty, R., Schön,W., Straus, J).Springer : pp. 205- 220.
Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C. 1983. “Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and
Economics”, vol. 26, pp. 301-325.
Finkelstein, S., D'Aveni, R. 1994. “CEO duality as a double-edged sword: how boards of directors
balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal”.
Vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 1079-1108.
Freise, A., Link, S., Mayer, S. 2008. “Taxation and Corporate governance – the state of the art”.
In Tax and Corporate Governance (Eds, Drexl, J., M.Hilty, R., Schön,W., Straus, J). Springer :
pp. 357- 425
Garcia, S.L., Barbadillo, R.E., Pérez, O.M. 2012. “Audit committee and internal audit and the
quality of earnings: empirical evidence from Spanish companies. Journal of Management and
Governance”, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 305-331.
Hanlon, M., Mills, L., Slemrod, J. 2005. An empirical examination of corporate tax noncompliance. Working paper.
18
Proceedings of World Business Research Conference
21 - 23 April 2014, Novotel World Trade Centre, Dubai, UAE , ISBN: 978-1-922069-48-1
Hanlon, M., Slemrod, J. 2009. “What does tax aggressiveness signal ? evidence from stock price
reactions to news about tax shelter involvement. Journal of Public Economics”, vol. 93, pp. 126141.
IFA., IFACI. 2009. Le rôle de l’audit interne dans le gouvernement d’entreprise. Paris, 60 pages.
Lanis,R., Richardson, G. 2011. “The effect of board of director composition on coroprate tax
aggressiveness. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy”, vol. 30, pp.50-70.
Le Ray, J. 2006. Gérer les risques, Pourquoi ? Comment ? Editions afnor, 392 pages
Louizi, G. 2006. Impact du conseil d’administration sur la performance des banques tunisiennes.
15ème conférence internationale de management stratégique. Annecy/ Genève, 13-16 juin, 38
pages.
Maders, H.R., Masselin, J.L. 2009. Contrôle interne des risques : cibler, évaluer, organiser,
piloter, maitriser. Editions d’organisation, 261 pages.
M’hamid, I., Hachana, R., OMRI, A. 2011. “Diversite Genre Dans Le Conseil D’administration Et
Performance Des Enterprises Tunisiennes Cotees. Global Journal of Management and Business
Research”, vol. 11, pp. 93-101.
Nigel, P. 2002. “The role of internal auditor in relation to risk management. Accountancy SA”, july
1.
OCDE. 2008. Etude du rôle des intermédiaires fiscaux, 95 pages
Peasnell, K.V., Peter, F.P., Steven, Y. 2003. “Managerial equity ownership and the demand for
outside directors. European Financial Management”, vol. 9, pp. 231-250.
Prawitt, D.F., Smith, J.L., Wood, D.A. 2009. “Internal audit characteristics and earnings
management. The Accounting Review”, vol. 84, no. 4, pp. 1255-1280.
Rego, S.O., Wilson, R. 2012. “Equity risk incentives and corporate tax aggressiveness. Journal of
Accounting Research”, vol. 50, pp.775-810.
Richardson, G., Taylor, G., Lanis, R. 2012. “The Impact of Risk Management and Audit
Characteristics on Corporate Tax Aggressiveness: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Accounting
and Public Policy Conference at the London School of Economics”.
Rossignol, J.L. 2010. “Fiscalité et responsabilité globale de l’entreprise. Revue Management &
Avenir” vol. 33, pp.156 – 167.
Rossignol, J.L., Chadefaux, M. 2001. “Ethique et comportement fiscal de l’entreprise. Entreprise
Ethique”, vol. 15, n° spécial Fiscalité et Ethique, pp.12 – 21.
Sikka, P. 2010. “Smoke and mirrors: Corporate social responsibility and tax avoidance.
Accounting Forum”, vol. 34: pp. 153-168.
Turki, A., Ben Sedrine, N. 2012. “Ownership structure, Board characteristics and Corporate
Performance in Tunisia. International Journal of Business and Management”, vol. 7, n° 4, pp.
121- 132.
Uzun, H., Szewczyk, S.H., Varma, R. 2004. “Board composition and corporate fraud. Financial
Analysts Journal”, vol. 60, no. 3, pp. 33- 43.
Whidbee, D.A 1997. "Board composition and control of shareholder voting rights in the banking
industry" Financial Management.
Zhang, Y., Zhou, J., Zhou, N. 2007. “Audit committee quality, auditor independence, and internal
control weaknesses. Journal of accounting and public policy”, vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 300-329.
19