Threat Evolution in Wireless Telecommunications Frank Quick

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International Telecommunication Union
Threat Evolution in
Wireless
Telecommunications
Frank Quick
Sr. Vice President, Technology
QUALCOMM Incorporated
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
Industry Data (Worldwide)
ITU-T
o In 2002, there were
• 570 million installed PCs (Gartner)
• 1132 new viruses discovered (Symantec)
• 105 computer virus infections per 1000 PCs
(ICSA labs)
o In the same year there were
• 1.1 Billion cellular phone users (Yankee
Group)
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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Today’s Mobile Phone
ITU-T
o 100+ MHz processor
o 10+ Mbytes flash memory
o Medium-bandwidth IP connectivity
o Downloadable applications
• Have access to user data
• Can initiate data connections
• Can send arbitrary IP packets, SMS
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
3
Tomorrow’s Mobile Phone
ITU-T
o 1000+ MHz processor(s)
o 100+ Mbytes flash memory
• More if socket provided
o High-bandwidth IP connectivity
o Broadcast content reception
• Digital Rights Management
o Downloadable applications
• Wider range of functions
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
4
The Mobile as Computer
ITU-T
o Mobile phones can now do most things a
PC can do, therefore:
o Mobile phones will likely become a target
for malicious code, as have PCs.
o To date, only a few such attacks have been
discovered for mobiles; however,
o It would be unwise to assume this is
because mobiles are less susceptible than
PCs.
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
5
Attacks on Computers
ITU-T o Motivation
• Peer prestige, revenge, profit, theft
o Objectives
• Disruption, spyware, trojan software
o Methods
• Self-propagating viruses and worms,
infected files and applications (e.g. games)
o Access
• Internet, messaging, over the air
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
6
How Weaknesses Are Found
ITU-T
o An attack often begins by finding a
repeatable way to crash a platform
• Generally, attacks aren’t created by
analyzing source code – usually not
available
• The binary code, on the other hand is
accessible in the .exe file
• (For many phones, binary code is also
available via diagnostic ports.)
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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How Attacks Develop
ITU-T
o The attackers share information about
weaknesses
o A more sophisticated attacker looks at the
binary code to see what causes the crash
• E.g., if it’s a buffer overrun that overwrites
the stack, it may be possible to modify the
input to execute arbitrary code
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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How Attacks Grow
ITU-T
o Once an exploit is developed, it is often
made widely available on the Web
• Documentation of the vulnerability
• Attack scripts and source code
o This allows many variant attacks to be
created, making prevention difficult
• Virus-checking software updated often
• (Bandwidth limits make this expensive for
mobiles)
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
9
Differences: Mobiles vs. PCs
ITU-T
PCs:
Mobile phones:
o Many PCs use the same
o Diverse OSs, but
brand Operating System
o PCs can run both the code
under attack and the
attack software
converging
o Phones can’t directly run
attack software (special
hardware often needed to
extract binary code)
o Other channels are
available for spread (e.g.,
SMS, false base stations)
o Denial of service can shut
down a cellular system
o Attacks are spread by IP,
email or web access
o Denial of service affects IP
services
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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The Changing Mobile
User Environment
ITU-T
o In the past:
• Attacks on mobile phones were detrimental
to both the user and operator (cloning)
• Attacks targeted individual phones
o In the future:
• Attacks may be initiated by the user
(cloning, defeating security)
• Viral attacks may target a large population
of mobiles
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
11
Why would a user hack
his/her own phone?
ITU-T
o Upgrading
• The user obtains a better phone (perhaps
stolen) and wants to clone the existing
subscription without paying the carrier.
o Digital Rights Management
• Users want to share files, games, etc.
without paying
o Subscription lock
• The user wants to change operators
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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Consequences
ITU-T
o Users increasingly see the operator as an
adversary
o Users may unwittingly become victims of
secondary attacks
• Defeating security features often opens a
path for attack
• Cloning may be accompanied by trojan
installation
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
13
What should manufacturers do?
ITU-T
o Proactively address vulnerabilities
• Automated code reviews
o Develop protocols to update software
after sale
• Preferably by broadcast
o Migrate to secure, trusted platforms
• Prevent core software modification
• Authenticate downloads
• Protect security information
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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Can manufacturer efforts suffice?
ITU-T
o No.
• The defender’s problem: any vulnerability
can open an attack
• A perfectly secure platform may still be
vulnerable to insider attacks
• Software updates may be impractical given
the large numbers of mobiles
o Conclusion: operators cannot rely on
manufacturers to prevent cyber attacks
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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What can operators do?
ITU-T o Install firewalls
• Isolate critical servers from mobile data
• Block direct mobile-to-mobile packets
• Perform ingress filtering: block mobile
packets with bad “from” IP addresses
o Strengthen and automate responses
• Disable infected mobiles
• Isolate infected subnets
• Scan SMS and other network messaging
• Consider using broadcast code updates
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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What won’t work
ITU-T
o Virus scans on phones
• Updating definitions is too expensive
o Virus scans on incoming IP packets
• Encrypted VPN connections prevent
examining the contents of IP packets
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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Will operators take action?
ITU-T
o Operators are reluctant to spend for a
threat that has not yet materialized
• Cloning fraud reached double-digit
percentages of revenues before
authentication was deployed
o It is to be hoped that operators will at
least make contingency plans
• ITU-T recommendations could promote
planning
dates
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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Conclusions
ITU-T
o Mobile phone computing power and
o
o
o
o
dates
connectivity is approaching that of PCs
Self-propagating viruses and worms may be
possible in mobiles in the near future
Manufacturers should strive to minimize
vulnerabilities to such attacks
Operators should prepare to take
defensive measures
ITU-T recommendations may be useful
ITU-T Cybersecurity Symposium - Florianópolis, Brazil, 4 October 2004
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