Models of caregiving in
nuclear accidents.
Enrico M. Staderini
Models of caregiving
in nuclear accidents
Enrico M. Staderini
Haute Ecole d'Ingénierie et de Gestion du Canton de Vaud – HES-SO
Western Switzerland University of Applied Sciences
Route de Cheseaux, 1
CH-1400 Yverdon les Bains (Vaud) Switzerland
enrico.staderini@heig-vd.ch
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• Not so long time
ago, radioactive
elements were
considered
curative…
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
Ouch! Those cosmic
rays are killing me…
• Now
radioactivity is
considered with
a bit too much
attention…
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• An incredibly complicated problem
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• Place of accident
• nuclear power plant / military facility
• possibly restricted access
• hospital/research nuclear facility
• neighbouring (isolated-populated area)
• pre-existent health facilities
• pre-existent nuclear accident health
care facilities (included accident plans)
•  Efficacy of health care to affected people
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• irradiation vs. contamination
• kind of irradiation/contamination
• released activity
• physical/biological behaviour of
radioactive contaminant
• biological effects of irradiation
•  Seriousness of health consequences
in the short or long period
•  Need for evacuating people
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• number of affected people
• professional people
• general population
•  Level and efficacy of health care
•  Level of problems in evacuating people
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• affected area
• confined area
• open area
• accessible / not accessible area
• limited / unlimited area
•  Possibility of delivering health care on site
•  Need of evacuating people
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• affected resources and infrastructures
• water supply
• food supply
• health care facilities
• roads
• telecommunication systems
•  Decision about area extension or
number of people to evacuate
•  Problems in alerting or caring for the
affected population
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• what’s the difference between an accident
and a disaster?
• number of people affected
• area extension affected
• infrastructures affected
• time required to restore to normality
• costs to restore to normality
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• what are the differences between a
nuclear disaster and a “conventional”
disaster?
• increased / unpredictable risk for
caregivers and rescuers
• more difficult rescue operations
(due to increased level of safety
required)
• longer time consequences
• higher psychological impact on
populations and the general public
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• how telemedicine can help in the case of a nuclear
disaster or a nuclear accident?
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• prerequisite for telemedicine is a
telecommunication infrastructure
• use existing infrastructure (if it
survived the accident)
• fast deploy new infrastructure
(mobile phone base stations)
• one way communication (alerting,
counselling, giving evacuation
directions)
• two way communication (caring
and specific help)
•  Plan ahead!!!
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• If a thing may go wrong it will go.
•
Geneva, 30 August 2011
(Murphy’s rule)
Radioactivity safety and security
• What may go wrong:
• (never an exhaustive list)
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
telecommunication facilities destroyed
electric power discontinued
emergency power not available or not usable
telecommunication facilities contaminated
telecommunication facilities not reachable
people trapped under rubbles (or within shelters)
shortage / unavailability of technical personnel
common people not able to establish a link
long range telecommunication systems not
available (satellite TV broadcasting may be)
• shortage / unavailability of health personnel
• aged people with cognitive problems
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• Any good news?
• No.
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• a general purpose telecommunication alert system
still unavailable in most countries (at best they still
rely on sirens)
• a general (robust) telemedicine infrastructure are
still unavailable as well
• robust emergency plans for the general population
are still based on eighteen century demography
• standards for telemedicine operation still missing
despite the number of mobile phones is
approaching that of the population on the planet
• still not addressing the cognitive performances of
the general population
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• So what?
• Only good news:
• We know the risks!
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security
• “Perhaps radium has something to do
with these troubles, but it cannot be
affirmed with certainty.”
Geneva, 30 August 2011
•
From the letter of Marie Sklodowska Curie to
her sister Bronya (November 1920)
•
Marie Curie died of aplastic anemia on July 4th
1934.
•
Her papers from the 1890s are still considered
too dangerous to handle, even her cookbook is
highly radioactive. They are kept in lead-lined
boxes, and those who wish to consult them
must wear protective clothing.
Radioactivity safety and security
Enrico M. Staderini
Haute Ecole d'Ingénierie et de Gestion du Canton de Vaud – HES-SO
Western Switzerland University of Applied Sciences
Route de Cheseaux, 1
CH-1400 Yverdon les Bains (Vaud) Switzerland
enrico.staderini@heig-vd.ch
Geneva, 30 August 2011
Radioactivity safety and security