ESSAY
LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE VISION THING
Timothy W. Floyd*
The 1990s have presented American law schools with their most
serious challenges in decades. After years of steady increase, the
number of law school applicants is declining. Because tuition and
other student costs continue to rise, and placement rates are not
what they once were, default rates on student loans are increasing.
In response to these trends, law schools everywhere are attempting
to "downsize"; they are reducing enrollment, cutting budgets, and
reducing the number of faculty members. The pressures are not
just budgetary: the ABA's Macerate Report1 has strongly criticized
law schools for doing an inadequate job of instructing students in
professional skills and values. In addition, the ABA accreditation
process, for many years the law schools' best friend, has been
sharply attacked from both outside and inside the legal academy.
This is not bad news. Challenges can serve to strengthen
institutions. How well an institution responds to challenges,
however, depends largely upon the clarity of its vision concerning
the purpose and identity of the institution. In the case of legal
education, unfortunately, there is not much reason for optimism.
To quote our forty-first president, law schools flunk the "vision
thing."
We are in trouble because we legal educators are confused about
the purpose of our institution. That is odd, because our purpose
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law.
1 SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND Am-nssIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR AstN, REPoRT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAw SCHOOLS AND THE PRoFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992)
[hereinafter MACeRATE REPoRT].
853
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ought to be obvious. Our primary mission, indeed our v,ery reason
for existence, is to prepare our students to become competent,
ethical practitioners. Yet we do not do nearly enough to prepare
our students to be good lawyers.
The problem is that we legal educators lack a vision ofwhat good
lawyering is. If law schools are to better prepare students for law
practice, legal educators, as teachers and scholars, must take the
practice of law more seriously. Far too many law teachers are
simply not interested in what lawyers do. I am not suggesting bad
faith or conspiratorial intent among law faculties. Most law
professors are conscientious about their teaching and their
scholarship, and most law teachers care about their students.
What we do not care enough about is the practice of law. This
disregard oflaw practice by law professors takes two related forms,
and many professors exhibit both. Some professors would tell you
that law practice is not intellectually challenging and is not a
worthy subject for academic endeavor. Others appear to believe
that law practice is morally corrupt. Most law professors did not
practice for very long, and they did not like it when they did. For
most, their practice experience was as an associate in a large firm,
work which is hardly typical of what most lawyers do.
To be sure, the practice of law is a complex and challenging
endeavor, and I am not suggesting that it is an easy task to
prepare persons to be competent, ethical professionals. The
problem is that American law schools do not really try. Law
schools do not see their mission as preparing their students to be
lawyers, and we have traditionally disclaimed any responsibility to
prepare students for the full range of professional 'Work as lawyers.
For that reason, this problem is not easily resolvable. It cannot be
fixed by tinkering, such as adding a few so-called "skills" electives
to the existing third year curriculum. The problem lies at the heart
of legal education, with the "core" curriculum and the prevailing
pedagogy, starting with the first year. The "core" oflegal education
consists ofcourses based on traditional doctrinal categories, taught
to large classrooms of students facing a professor, who either
lectures or leads a discussion ofappellate opinions from a casebook,
followed by one comprehensive bluebook exam at the end of the
semester. In spite of many changes at the margins, that core is
still what legal education largely is, at virtually every law school,
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as it has been for over a century. But this curriculum and
pedagogy do not adequately achieve law schools' basic purpose and
reason for existence-the preparation ofcompetent, ethical lawyers.
Indeed, the prevailing law school curriculum and pedagogy cannot
possibly achieve that purpose.
What purpose does underlie and animate this curriculum and
pedagogy? At most law schools the curriculum and pedagogy
appear to embody a belief in one of two purposes: either to teach
students a body of knowledge, that is, the "law"; or to teach
students a certain type of analysis called "thinking like lawyers."
The first purpose is woefully misguided, not only because it is
impossible to teach even a fraction of the law that a student vlill
need to know as a lawyer, but also because students need much
more than knowledge of the "law" to be good lawyers. The
curriculum assumes that there is a certain body of "law" that
students must learn in the three years of law school. The problem
is that very little of American law can be covered even in three
years of courses. In addition, much of the law that students learn
while in law school will change several times during a student's
legal career. Some of it, of course, will change before the student
even acquires a license. Besides, even if law never changed, who
could rely on memory?
The second purpose, and one that is often articulated, is to teach
our students to "think like lawyers." On the surface, this reason
makes more sense. It fails, however, because we do not have an
adequate conception of what the practice of law is, and therefore
how one "thinks" as a lawyer. 2 As a result, we are fooling ourselves (although we are less and less fooling anyone else) when we
continue to assert that our curriculum and pedagogy somehow
teach our students to think like lawyers.
We law professors must return to basics. There is too much at
stake for us to continue blindly down the paths we have trod. We
must begin exploring, articulating, and debating what constitutes
good lawyering. Our answers to that question should then dictate
all curriculum and pedagogical choices.
See Robert Coles, The LSAT-Refkdions on an Erperience, 34 J. LEoAL Eouc. 412, 422
(1984) (questioning whether LSATs and law schools have anything to do with good
lawyering). For a proposed definition of good lawyering emphasizing the professional
obligation to promote equality, see Phoebe Haddon, Education for a Publk Calling in the 21st
Century, 69 WASH. L. REv. 573, 574 (1994).
2
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I. TEACHING GoOD LAWYERING
Having said that, I must admit that I'm not sure I can articulate
to my own or anyone else's satisfaction exactly what "good lawyering" is. I do, however, have a sufficient sense of good lawyering to
recognize that law schools do not take seriously their obligation to
prepare students to be good lawyers. To support my case, I offer
ten ways law schools would be different if they were serious about
preparing students to be good lawyers.
1. Legal Education Would Focus on What Lawyers Do. Presently, law school curricula focus on the law rather than on the many
roles of lawyers in our society. The vast majority of courses are
designed to "cover" the law on a particular subject. Very little
attention is paid to what lawyers actually do or to how they do it.
Because most courses are taught through the study of appellate
cases, students are simply not exposed to the work of lawyers,
except for arguments made on appeal. Even the study of appellate
cases focuses more on the judge's role than that of the lawyer.
Jerome Frank. suggested long ago that law school should instead
be "lawyer school."3 The basic law school curriculum, however,
still largely ignores the practice of law. The current curriculum
does not give students much of a picture of the world of law
practice. The current curriculum's doctrinal focus is a legacy of
Christopher Columbus Langdell's antiquated notion that law is a
science. Langdell's assumption that law is a science is no longer
accepted by many, but we're still stuck with Langdell's curriculum
and pedagogy.4 Instead of organizing the curriculum around
doctrinal subject matters, the curriculum could be organized around
the various functions oflawyers in society.
Students should understand the various roles that lawyers play
in the community. Lawyers serve as counselors, planners,
mediators, and organizers, as well as advocates. The curriculum
should explore the ways lawyers help to achieve justice and peace,
and also how they fail to do so.
Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907, 915 (1933).
There are many accounts of Langdell's enormous influence on legal education. See
generally RoBERT STEVENS, LAw SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1830S
TO THE 1980s (1983) (analyzing legal education through general history of American law
school as significant force in American legal establishment).
3
4
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Nevertheless, by focusing on practice we need not sacrifice the
traditional skills of doctrinal analysis; that would be a false tradeoff. An emphasis on practice can help students better understand
doctrine and its uses. Doctrine is one way our legal system
resolves disputes, and students need to understand that doctrinal
arguments are an essential persuasive technique in court. In
emphasizingjustice and fairness, we must be careful not to give our
students the impression that doctrinal arguments don't matter. I
have colleagues who express frustration that students do not want
to engage in legal analysis, but instead substitute gut reactions for
careful analysis and argument. My colleagues upbraid these
students for substituting emotion for reason-but the students then
see reason as devoid ofjustice. The real trick in teaching doctrinal
analysis is emphasizing detachment and the ability to see arguments on both sides of an issue, without making students think
their beliefs about justice and fairness do not matter.
Understanding doctrine is essential, but not as an end in itself.
Casebooks, the almost exclusive teaching materials for first year
classes, contribute greatly to students' problems with doctrinal
analysis. The way students read casebooks is nothing like the way
lawyers read appellate opinions. Casebooks would be much better
teaching tools if they were organized around problems of the sort
lawyers actually encounter in practice and if the doctrinal material
were included to help the students solve that problem.6 Students
better understand the role of legal doctrine and precedent in
context, that is, as they help to solve a -client's problem. Students
often struggle in reading the typical casebook to know whether
cases are included as examples of what the law is, as examples of
the "minority view," or as examples of bad reasoning for the
professor to criticize. In my experience, students come away from
the first year very confused about the way lawyers and judges use
precedent.
2. Legal Education Would Focus at Least as Much on People as
on Rules. In addition to ignoring the role of lawyers, law schools
actively hide the clients and other people in the middle of legal
One casebook for first year classes that does preciEely this is MYRON MOSKOVITZ. CASES
LAw (2d ed. 1991). It is an excellent model for the kind of
lawyering-focused casebook that I describe.
5
AND PRoBLEMS IN CRIMINAL
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disputes. Law students are not exposed nearly enough to how law
and the legal system impact people. We study rules and cases, not
relationships between people. The facts are given in a.ppellate
cases. That means the clients and other people involved get lost.
Even organizations are made up of people, and in representing
organizations, lawyers must still deal with the people who make up
the organizations.
Despite the fact that lawyers are professional communicators (in
the sense that they make their living by communicating with other
people), communication and other "people" skills are taught very
little in law schools. Interviewing, counseling, and negotiation are
not required subjects in most curricula; they are not considered
part of the core. The important skills of fact investigation and
proof of facts are also largely ignored.
It is easy in law school to forget that the law is about people and
how they get along (or do not get along) with each other. Law
schools should confront students more directly with queeltions of
justice. But justice gets lost when the people involved aro hidden
from view. The problem is not just that the emotive and affective
dimensions oflaw practice are not fully explored; it is also that the
law students' feelings for the people about whom they are reading
are actively suppressed in the classroom.
3. Legal Education Would Teach More of the Types ofAnalysis
that Lawyers Use. Law study involves too much rote learning and
coverage of material at the expense of creativity and problemsolving. Law schools purport to "teach people to think like
lawyers"; but they do not teach many of the kinds of analysis
lawyers really use. Again, the problem is an inadequate conception
of lawyering.
Anthony Amsterdam delineated many of the modes of lmalysis
used by practicing lawyers which are not taught in law schools. 6
Three examples Amsterdam describes are ends-means thinking,
hypothesis formulation and testing, and contingency planning. 7 In
order to prepare students to "think like lawyers," legal educators
6 Anthony Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL
Enuc. 612, 614-15 (1984). I will not go into Amsterdam's prescriptions here, but the article
is perhaps the best starting point for anyone who cares about real change in legal education.
7 [d.
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must explore more how lawyers actually think, and design the
curriculum and pedagogy to give students the opportunity to
practice those kinds of analyses.8
Even the analytical skills that law schools do purport to teach get
slighted. The focus is far too often on imparting a body of information rather than on learning analytical skills. The curriculum
focuses on coverage of the material, and courses are subject matter
based.9 No matter how much we emphasize to our students that
we care more about analysis than rule memorization, to the extent
we grade by how many issues students can "spot,n our standard
bluebook exams send the opposite message. And legal research and
writing courses, the one first year course at almost every law school
that focuses explicitly on analytical and communication skills, is
treated as a stepchild, not worthy of the time, attention, or (heaven
forbid) teaching of the tenured faculty.
Some may complain that a focus on the practice of law will
neglect "theory." That word, however, is overused in discussions of
legal education. Although I hear students complain that they do
not get enough practical instruction because law schools teach too
much "theory," the fact is that precious little theory is taught in
law schools. Law schools teach debating skills rather than theory;
they teach analytical skills rather than ideas and the critique of
ideas. The practice of law is well served by a good theoretical
grounding in several disciplines. Legal education needs both more
practice and more theory. to
4. Law Study Would Not Be So Individualistic; It Would Prepare
Students for the Cooperative and Relational Dimensions of Law
Practice. Lawyers seldom work in isolation from other people. In
any legal matter they always have a client. In addition, the vast
majority of law school graduates will work together with others in
8 For a wonderful account of "practical wisdom" as the essential lawyerly mode of
analysis, see ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE Losr LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 53-109 (1993). Unfortunately, Kronman assumes that traditionnl appellate case
instruction is sufficient to inculcate practical wisdom in our students. Apart from his
assertions, however, there is no evidence that traditional doctrinnl-based instn1ction will
create better lawyers.
9 Unfortunately, the bar exams greatly exacerbate this problem. Bar examinations are
another institution greatly in need ofrefonn, but that topic is beyond the scope ofthis Essay.
10 This point has been made by many others. E.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Current State
of the Law School Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 330-32 (1982).
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a law firm. or other organization. In representing clients, lawyers
often work together with lawyers representing other parties.
Legal education, however, tends to be very individualistic.
Students rarely are required to work in groups toward common
goals. Moreover, students tend to be highly competitive with each
other over grades, class rank, and other rewards such as law
review. Law schools need to encourage more cooperation, collegiality, and interpersonal work. Projects in which students collaborate
toward a common goal are essential to foster the ability to work
together. Students also need to be reminded that grades lmd class
rank do not necessarily have much to do with how successful they
will be as lawyers.
In the professor-student relationship, a mentor-mentee attitude
would be a useful model for which to strive. As law professors, we
need to recognize that we are initiating students into a profession
and that we likely are the first role models of professional behavior
for our students. New lawyers will be learning from more experienced lawyers in practice. While the professor-student relationship
cannot truly approximate that type of relationship because the
student-faculty ratio is far too high, the faculty's attitudes of
accessibility and cooperation toward a common goal can be
improved nonetheless.
5. Legal Education Would Give Students an Opportunity to
Learn from Experience. Learning to practice law is a lifelong
educational process. One of the most important insights of the
Macerate Reportll is that the educational process for lawyers is
a continuum that stretches both long before and long after law
school. For that process to be effective, lawyers must acquire the
ability to learn from experience. 12
Yet the current law school curriculum and pedagogy are not
designed to help students learn from experience. In most courses,
students get little feedback during the course; the fmal grade is
typically based on one comprehensive fmal. This is probably
because the student-faculty ratio is too high to permit lmything
else. This is lousy pedagogy for any course, but especially so for
See supra pages 854-855 (discussing gap between legal education and legal profession).
For an excellent statement of the importance of fostering the ability to learn from
experience, see Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 615-16.
11
12
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learning skills. To master any skill (including the prototypical skill
called "thinking like a lawyer") students need to plan for the skill,
perform the skill, receive critique on their performance, and then
reflect on the experience. That simply does not happen in most
courses.
Some law professors might counter that they are not "skills
teachers"; clearly, however, learning to read statutes and cases and
applying that law to fact situations is a skill. Most teachers do try
to teach analysis rather than simply a body of knowledge, but the
lack ofopportunity to practice that skill is a problem. The modified
Socratic dialogue employed by most first year teachers is certainly
.superior to lectures, but even so, there is limited feedback. More
written assignments in which students work through basic legal
analysis, receive feedback from the teacher, and then try again
would be a big improvement. Law students do not write nearly
enough.
Another way in which law schools do not foster the ability to
learn from experience is that law school curricula are generally not
structured in terms ofprogression. The second and third years are
typically composed almost entirely of electives that can be taken in
any order. In terms of analysis and skills development, the
curriculum does not build from simple to more complex. Advanced
courses teach more of the same analysis and skills under a
different doctrinal rubric. For all ofthese reasons, new lawyers are
ill-equipped to learn from experience once they begin to practice.
6. Legal Education Would Focus More on the Law that Matters
in the Real World. Although flawed pedagogy is the biggest
problem with legal education, the selection of substantive law
taught is also flawed. The first year curriculum is virtually
uniform throughout legal education; nearly all first year students
take torts, contracts, property, civil procedure, and criminal law.
The compartmentalization of the curriculum into these doctrinal
cubbyholes leaves students ill-prepared to deal with problems that
cross doctrinal categories. Moreover, it is not self-evident why
these should be the core subjects. It is structured the way it is
because it has always been that way; those are the subjects that
virtually all American lawyers took in their first year. We must
also remember that the curriculum at most law schools is based on
the individual faculty members' preferences. It is easier to teach
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what we have always taught and courses for which there are
already casebooks.
This "core" curriculum, however, is not sufficiently tied to the
legal world of the late twentieth century. For example, torts has
been changed enormously by no-fault insurance and workers'
compensation; property by land use laws and enviI'onmental
regulation; and criminal law and procedure by overcrowdl3d dockets
and plea bargaining. No doubt many teachers try to bring these
realities into the classroom, but they are not dealt with much in
casebooks.
There are more subject matter anomalies: In the advanced
curriculum, there is a pronounced bias in favor of business courses
over family, personal injury, and criminal law-the areal; oflaw in
which ordinary people and lawyers are involved. The curriculum
is designed more for the benefit of those students who will become
associates at large firms representing businesses than for those
students who will represent individuals. 13
7. Legal Education Would Reward the Contributions o)"Teachers
Who Focus on Practice. Teaching for practice competency is
undervalued at every law school. The second class l;tatus (or
worse) of clinicians and legal research and writing teachers is the
best example of my point. Those teachers whose teaching is the
most demanding have the least status. It is no coincidence that
those are the teachers who focus more on law practicl3 than on
specific doctrinal areas.
Creative scholarship is more valued than innovative teaching.
The reputation of law school faculties is a function of their
scholarship rather than their teaching. Yet, for at least ninety-five
percent oflaw professors, the most important impact they can have
is through their teaching rather than their writing for law reviews. 14
13 Sandy D'Alemberte has pointed out how the current structure of le1:al education
benefits the large firms. Talbot D'Alemberte, Keynote Address, in THE MAcCRATE REPORTBUILDING THE EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 4-17 (1994). He goes so far as to label this
arrangement between law schools and large firms a conspiracy. Maybe it is, but I suspect
the problem is more the result of inertia and unthinking commitment to the lItatus quo.
14 John Elson has stated the case against legal scholarship more eloquently and in more
detail than I can here, in The Case Against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must
Publish, Must the Profession Perish?, 39 J. LEGAL Enuc. 343 (1989). Elson's main point, with
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This does not mean that legal scholarship is unimportant.
However, the scholarship that is produced reflects the fact that law
professors do not take practice seriously. Scholarship by law
professors does not contribute much to our understanding of the
legal profession and the legal system.16 One reason for that is
that most law professors are not trained in the social sciences and
empirical research methodology; we generally do not have advanced
degrees in other disciplines. We are most comfortable writing
about the opinions of appellate judges.
Some law teachers feel that if we are to maintain "law" as an
autonomous discipline, we should stick to writing about legal
doctrine. Law can never be a truly autonomous discipline,
however; such autonomy is another of Langdell's conceits.
Practicing lawyers know that the practice oflaw is always interdisciplinary; that is, in representing clients, lawyers must be familiar
with many different fields of knowledge. Legal problems are
always more than just "legal" problems. In focusing more on
practice, law professors must become more familiar with other
fields. 16
Writing is important, even essential, for law teachers. People
who write are better thinkers. All law professors are given the
time and resources to write, and as a group they should be writing
more. The main purpose of writing, however, ought to be to
improve our ability to prepare competent, ethical practitioners.
which I completely agree, is that the focus on scholarship too oRen detracts from the central
purpose of law schools-the preparation of good lawyers. Id. at 354-56.
15 This criticism is akin to that of Judge Harry Edwards, which initiated a remarkable
debate about the purpose of legal scholarship. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MIca L. REv. 34, 75
(1992) ("(T]he growing disarray we now see in the profession is direet1y related to the
growing incoherence in law teaching and scholarship."); Harry T. Edwards, The Growing
Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession: A Postscript, 91 MIca L.
REv. 2191, 2219 (1993) (expressing fear that "without a great effort by the legal community
as a whole ••• concrete, effective, and lasting reforms" will not be brought about). Although
I agree with Judge Edwards's basic premise, I do not agree with the implication that a newer
generation oflaw professors is to blame for the disfunction. AB I hope I have made clear, I
don't believe that legal educators of any generation have done 11 good job of preparing
students for practice.
18 On this point I part company, at least to a small extent, with Judge Edwards. While
I agree that law teachers must pay more attention to law practica, I am not convinced that
the best way to do that is for law professors to write more about legal doctrine.
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More writing about how to prepare students for law practice would
be helpful, as would be more writing directed toward practicing
lawyers. Research into the practice of law could greatly improve
practice education.
8. Law Schools Would Make Admissions Decisions on More Than
LSAT Scores and Grades. The vast majority of students are
admitted to law school based solely on the index of their LSAT
score and undergraduate GPA Conversely, the vast majority of
applicants who are not accepted to law school are rejected on the
basis of this index. Most admissions decisions are made without
regard to the applicant's other qualities. Very few law schools
conduct interviews.
Today, very few law students flunk out of school and most law
school graduates pass the bar exam. Thus, the real gatekeepers to
the profession are law school admissions offices and committees.
Although LSATs and GPAs may be somewhat reliable pr,edictors of
law school performance, we have no idea as to their reliability in
predicting who will be good lawyers. So long as law schools are
judged in relation to their peers on the LSATs and GPAs of their
entering classes, however, they will continue to base admissions
primarily on those numbers.
9. Law Schools Would Focus on the Delivery of Legal Services.
Law schools do very little to educate our students about how clients
obtain access to the services of lawyers. Delivery of legal services
to the poor and the middle class raises significant moral and
professional issues, but those issues are largely ignored. Pro bono
obligations and opportunities should be emphasized more.
Mandatory pro bono for law students as a condition of graduation
is an encouraging trend; just as important would be mandatory pro
bono for law professors.
In addition, placement offices in most law schools aElsume the
large corporate firm as the norm. Law schools assume-and
students are not in a position to question that assumpf;ion-that
students who can work for the larger law firms that represent
corporate America will want to do so. Law schools do not do
enough to help students explore the kind of legal job that would
best suit them. This leads to my last and most important point.
10. Law Schools Would Require Students to Explore Issues of
Professional Identity, Meaning, and Purpose. At no point in the
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curriculum of most law schools are students expected to explore
issues of professional identity and purpose.17 Students should be
pushed to grapple with those questions made famous (if only
briefly) by Admiral Stockdale: "Who am I and what am I doing
here?" We need more reflective practitioners, but the habit of
reflecting on our work as lawyers must begin at the outset of our
career, that is, in law school. Habits ofreflection and introspection
need to begin in law school because the strains and pressures of
law practice make them much more difficult to develop later.
Almost all students take a course in Professional Responsibility,
but that course is too often reduced to learning the Model Rules
and passing the MPRE. The subject of professional regulation and
minimal standards is an important subject; however, we need far
more instruction in the ethics, history, sociology, and philosophy of
lawyering. Students must be confronted with the meaning of their
own calling to this profession.18
The practice of law is a ca]]jng,19 and we should inculcate that
understanding in our students.20 Practicing lawyers make a world
17 In the past decade several law professors have written excellent books on meaning and
morality in the practice oflaw• E.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER L.\WYERS: How
THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PRoFESSION IS TRANsFolWINGAMERICAN 8ocIETY(1994); MICHAEL
J. KELLy, LIvEs OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATION OF PRAcTICE (1994);
ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRoFESSION
(1994): DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ErmCAL STuDy (1988); and THOMAS L.
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNlTIES: Ermcs IN THE LEGAL PRoFESSION
(1991). The problem is that these subjects have not found their way into the heart ofthe law
school curriculum. One book written specifically for law students on these themes is JACK
L. SAMMONS, LAWYER PRoFESSIONALISM (1988). I have assigned this book in several c:lasses;
it works wonderfully in getting students to grapple with questions about professional
meaning and identity.
18 Some seminaries require their students to write a credo, a formulation of their own
beliefs and their understanding of their calling. Perhaps law schools should do something
similar. Most law students write personal essays on this theme as part of the law school
admission process. It would be beneficial for students to refine those essays throughout law
schooL Sandy D'Alemberte has unabashedly called for law schools to retum to their
"seminary mission." D'Alemberte, supra note 13, at 12.
19 See JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETl'I, THE LAWYERS' CAU.lNG: CHRIS'1'W'l FAlTH AND LEGAL
PRACTICE 24-36 (1996) (containing fruitful discussion of concept of "calling").
2Il To those who are uncomfortable with the notion of"incu1cation" in law school, I would
point out the inevitability of communicating certain values in law schooL We ought to be
self-conscious ofour own views ofprofessional identity and meaning, and honest in conveying
our own ideas to our students. For the best discussions of this topic. soo Roger C. Cramton,
Beyond the Ordiruuy Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUc. 509 (1987): Roger C. Cramton, The
Ordiruuy Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EOUc. 247 (1978).
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of difference in how just our society is. If law schools do not
adequately prepare students, justice suffers. Although lawyers are
called to serve justice, we can legitimately disagree about: how just
our current society and legal system are. Lawyers and law
students need not necessarily be devoted to existing "law" and
current legal institutions, but there is nothing wrong with requiring
devotion to justice.
I realize that talk of "devotion" and "calling" makes some people
nervous. Paul Carrington, in a noted article in 1984, stirred up a
firestorm of protest when he suggested that law professors who do
not have faith in "law"-persons whom Carrington termed "legal
nihilists"-should leave the law schools.21 He reasoned that law
schools are more like seminaries than graduate depar1;ments of
religion, and as such have an obligation to the students not to hire
the legal equivalent of "atheists."22
Carrington was off the mark in his criticism of critical legal
scholars or "crits" (the legal "nihilists" to which he referred). I have
represented many poor people, and I know how unjust our existing
legal system often is. For that reason, the crits' insistencE~ that law
serves to safeguard the powerful and that doctrine alone cannot
constrain power is entirely accurate and necessary. Thus, Carrington's criticism of critical legal scholars seems misguided.
Nonetheless, Carrington was on to something. Because law
schools have an obligation to prepare students for a profession, they
are more analogous to seminaries than to graduate school. The
"faith" that I believe is necessary, however, is not faith in "law" or
legal institutions-that has always struck me as idolatry. Sometimes law serves justice; sometimes it serves injustice. InBtead, the
faith that is essential is faith in justice itself. At the deepest level,
the just and the holy are one. Our calling as lawyers is to work for
justice. We do not have to agree about what justice is in our
society, nor about how much or how little justice exists in our
society, but we should all agree that lawyers have responsibilities
beyond their narrow self-interest.
21 Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).
Correspondence generated by Carrington's essay appears in Peter W. Martin el; aI., "OfLaw
and the River," and ofNihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985).
22 Carrington, supra note 21, at 227.
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I worry that the individualistic and narrow law school curriculum
and pedagogy do nothing to encourage students to see themselves
as having any obligations beyond themselves or their clients. Law
schools should focus more on their institutional purpose of preparing competent, reflective practitioners, and students must explore
their individual purposes in becoming lawyers as well. Most
students come to law school expecting to become lawyers so they
can make a difference in the world. During their three years in
law school they become more cynical, suspicious, dogmatic, and
authoritarian-and also more lonely and depressed.23 Why? In
part, this is because law school is too impersonal, abstract, and
competitive. Most importantly, however, it is because students lose
sight of why they came to law school in the first place.zc Law
schools must encourage students to explore their own calling to the
legal profession.
II. OBSTACLES TO CHANGE
Criticism of law schools on the grcund that they inadequately
prepare students for practice is nothing new. For decades, people
have been pointing out that this particular emperor has no clothes.
My criticisms and prescriptions for legal education are not original. 25 Over the years, there have been many essays like this one.
In spite of these criticisms, however, the core curriculum and
23 For a good discussion of the deleterious effects oflegnl education on law students. see
John Mixon & Robert Schwerk, The Personal Dimenswn ofProfesswMl Responsibility. 58
LAw & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 87 (1995).
24 Is the current professional malaise related to this? I suspect lawyers are dissatisfied
for the same reasons that law students are. They have lost sight of their purpose. They do
not perceive that their work adds meaning to their lives; their work is no better than a
necessary evil. Since so many enter the profession because they do seek meaning in their
work, and since. in any event, work is such a big part of our lives. it is no wonder that 80
many lawyers are dissatisfied.
There are many lawyers who are grappling with questions ofmeaning and identity in their
practice. The Texas Tech Law Review recently published a special symposium issue on
"Faith and Law." containing personal essays by 44 lawyers. Symposium. FaiJh and Law. 27
TEx. TEcH L. REv. 911 (1996).
25 It would take several pages to provide citations to every article in the Journal ofLegal
Education alone that has been critical of legal education. Instead. here is my personal "top
three" list ofworks about the problems with legal education: THOMAS 1.. SHAFFER & RoBERT
S. REDMOUNT. LAWYERS. LAw STuDENTS. AND PEoPLE (1977) (now unfortunately out of
print); Amsterdam. supra note 6; and Elson. supra note 14.
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prevailing pedagogy of legal education have changed very little in
at least a century, since that curriculum and pedagogy were
"discovered" by Christopher Columbus Langdell at Harvard and
then spread throughout American law schools.26
What is striking (and a little discouraging) is how little real
change has resulted in response to these criticisms. The discerning
reader may wonder, therefore, why one would bother to write, or
read, another one. The answer lies in the challenges I roferred to
at the outset of this Essay.27 It is an appropriate time to review
what we know of our failings. I even see some glimmer of hope
that, in response to those challenges, we just might re-examine
some of our fundamental and cherished assumptions about legal
education.
Nonetheless, as I said at the outset, there is not much reason for
optimism. It would be very difficult for law schools to change in
the directions I have suggested. Many obstacles stand in the way
of law schools attempting to redirect their focus toward preparing
competent, ethical lawYers. What are those obstacles? ]~ollowing
is a list of ten reasons we might hear in opposition to such a
change in focus. After each, I suggest why that reason is really an
excuse that will not hold up under scrutiny.
1. "It's Not Our Job." Some law professors do not believe that
the principal purpose of law schools is to prepare students to
become lawYers. Schools are university departments; as such, their
primary mission is to seek knowledge. These professors argue that
law study has intrinsic value, as does liberal education generally,
and that it is therefore a mistake for law schools to perform any
gate-keeping role for the profession. According to that view, legal
education should ignore any suggestions that law schools could
better prepare persons to be lawYers, because that is simply not
their purpose.28
26 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (describing Landell's influence on legal
education).
27 See supra page 853 (discussing declining student application, law school "downsizing,"
and Macerate Report's criticisms oflaw schools).
28 Owen Fiss has stated this view quite baldly: "Law professors are not paid to train
lawyers, but to study the law and to teach their students what they happen to discover."
Letter from Owen M. Fiss to Paul D. Carrington, in "OfLaw and the River," ana! ofNihilism
and Academic Freedom, supra note 21, at 26.
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That argument is hard to take seriously. Why do the vast
majority of students come to law school? In order to enter the
profession. An overwhelming percentage become licensed attorneys. Even for those students who go to law school solely out of an
academic interest in the legal system with no intention of practicing, the curriculum and pedagogy must be especially disappointing.
The near exclusive doctrinal focus ofmost of the curriculum hardly
serves to educate about the role of law and lawyers in our society.
I concede that a good legal education may serve to hone students'
analytical skills-skills that serve students well even if they do not
intend to practice-but while there may be students who attend
law school solely in order to hone their analytical skills, I have yet
to meet one in thirteen years of teaching law. Moreover, legal
education is far too expensive to attract many students who have
only an "academic" interest in the law.
To be sure, many law professors are wary of practice-focused
education. They fear that it would dilute the academic character
of legal education, turning a university discipline into a trade
school. This attitude rests upon a fundamental misconception of
the nature of law practice. If professors would only pay attention,
they would find that the practice oflaw is an enormously challenging intellectual endeavor. Indeed, the most fascinating intellectual
questions concerning the law relate to practice rather than
doctrine. The philosophical, political, moral, sociological, and
psychological issues associated with law practice are much more
intellectually sophisticated and challenging than the usual
doctrinal riddles we pose to our students.
In its focus on legal doctrine, legal education is curiously behind
the intellectual times. Langdell's world view was decidedly
"modern." Current intellectual life across the campus reflects much
more of a "post-modern" world view. Post-modernism emphasizes
context rather than universal rules, narrative accounts rather than
generalizations, and the particular over the abstract. A postmodern account oflaw will inevitably focus on practice rather than
doctrine.
The claim that law is an academic discipline is no excuse for
ignoring practice. As members ofthe university community, faculty
members have a scholarly commitment to researching and teaching
the truth about reality. In focusing primarily on the written
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opinions of appellate courts, however, law schools ignore large
chunks of reality. Langdell believed that the law consisted of
principles that could be found in appellate decisions. 'The law in
action is much more than that. Legal doctrine is simply not a selfcontained body ofknowledge in the "modern" sense. A post-modern
sensibility would look to the context of the rules and principles
discerned in opinions. Decisions made by lawyers and clients in
the law office can be just as momentous as decisions in the courts
of appeals.
We legal academics do not commonly ask fundamental questions
about the nature oflaw practice. Two examples ofpossible avenues
ofexploration oflaw practice follow. First, Alasdair MacIntyre, one
ofthe leading moral philosophers ofour time, has written about the
nature of a "practice." According to MacIntyre, it is through
engaging in a practice that one acquires virtues.29 Whether law
practice constitutes a practice in the Maclntyrean sense, and can
therefore lead to the development of virtues, is a fascinating, but
largely unexplored, question. Second, Donald Schon has written
extensively about professionals' "knowledge in action"; that is, a
professional's art of applying technical knowledge and expertise to
practice. 3o Again, the law school curriculum and pedagogy largely
ignore such insights about professional knowledge.
2. "Let the Practicing Bar Do It." A second response would
acknowledge the gate-keeping function of law schools, but would
argue that law schools currently teach the only skills that can be
taught in the traditional classroom setting. The other practice
skills are best left to post-law school experience.31 It is misguided,
according to this point of view, to try to teach anything other than
legal doctrine and policy and the analytical skills that lawyers use
to make legal arguments.
One problem with this argument is the assumption that practice
skills cannot be taught effectively in law school. The experience of
ALAsDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VmTUE 175-89 (1981).
DONALD A. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: TOWARDS A NEW
DESIGN FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING IN THE PROFESSIONS (1987); DONALD A. SCHON, THE
REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: How PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION (1983).
31 See Jonathon Rose, The MacCrate Report's Restatement ofLegal Education: The Need
for Reflection and Horse Sense, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 548, 560·61 (1994) (assesuing validity of
statements in MacCrate Report).
'
29
30
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the clinical movement and of courses on professional skills has
disproved that assumption,. Of course, the practice skills learned
in law school will only be a start; those skills will be continually
refined for years. That is just as true, however, of the analytical
skills.
The other problem with this argument is the assumption that
students will practice under careful supervision until they are
competent to represent clients on their own. Many law graduates
will not work for lawyers who take the time to mentor new lawyers
in good lawyering. Our students are licensed to practice without
any experience requirement. All persons with a J.D. who pass the
bar exam are licensed to do anything that any licensed lawyer may
do. Many will not work for anyone-they will go out on their own
from day one. We have to teach our students as ifwe are their last
teachers, not their first. Graduates should know how to play
music, not just read music.
Perhaps the most valuable aspect of the MacCrate Report is its
concern about the obligation of law schools to our students' future
clients.32 We must do more to ensure that those clients are not
the victims of the law schools' failure to prepare lawyers for
practice.
3. "We Are Already Doing It.» Many law teachers contend that
legal education has already undergone significant change in the
direction that I urge. The last twenty-five years have seen the
development of clinics and simulation skills courses. As the
MacCrate Report acknowledges, the biggest changes in legal
education have been in the skills curriculum.33 Many law teachers, and even some schools, do focus on teaching for practice
competency.
Real change, however, has not occurred. All of the changes have
come at the margins; the "core" has changed very little. For most
students graduating from law school today, the vast majority of
their credit hours were spent in courses that "cover" a body oflegal
doctrine, are taught through casebooks, and conclude with comprehensive final exams. Courses that focus on law practice rather
32 MACCRATE REPoRT, supra note I, at 124-25.
For an excellent discussion of the
obligations law schools owe to the future clients ofour students, Bee THOMAS SHAFFER, FAInJ
AND THE PROFESSIONS 260 (1987).
331fAcCRATE REPoRT, supra note I, at 237.
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than legal doctrine made up less than 20% of the courseload. It is
not unduly pessimistic to see that the glass is not 20% full; it is
80% empty.
4. "If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It." There are tho~le in legal
education who feel that we should not tamper with success. We
should not assume so readily, however, that legal education has
been "successful." When we assert that legal education is successful, we should be careful to specify for whom and how.
For law professors? Certainly so. We law professors make more
money and teach fewer hours than our colleagues in other departments of the university. For universities? Yes. They gain a lot of
money and prestige from their law schools.
But successful for whom else? Do we have a just society? For a
great many Americans, their caste makes. statistically certain their
disproportionate subjection to crime, joblessness, homelessness,
prejudice, miseducation, ill health, and early death. 34 Lawyers
can and should do much more to make ours a more jusf; society.
The legal profession? Many have documented the malaise within·
the ranks of lawyers today.35 The professionalism movement,
while subject to some valid criticism, is a legitimate expression of
concern about the lack of a sense of service for the common good.36
For our students? Over the course of three years, our graduates
become more cynical, suspicious, dogmatic, and authoritarian.
They also become more lonely, depressed, and prone to addiction
and substance abuse. They also graduate greatly in debt, and
without the necessary competence to be successful lawyers.
Sure, I am being somewhat hyperbolic here, but my point is that
it is not obvious in what sense legal education is a success. And
there is ample evidence that law schools are failing in their
obligations to our students, the profession, and society.
5. "We Aren't Competent to Teach Lawyering." Many law
teachers do not have much experience in law practice. The common
Elson, supra note 14, at 358 nA1.
See, e.g., BENJAMIN SELLS, THE SOUL OF THE LAw 19 (1994) (discuBsin~: psychological
problems facing law and individual lawyers).
36 For a sympathetic description of the professionalism movement, including a responso
to its academic critics, see Jack L. Sammons, The Professionalism Movement: The Problems
Defined, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y 269 (1993).
34
35
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attitude among law professors is that too much experience somehow taints a candidate for a faculty position. We need to place
more value on practice experience in hiring decisions.
I am not asserting that extensive practice experience must be a
prerequisite to law teaching. Some of the best law teachers I know
have little or no practice experience. What is crucial, however, is
an attitude that law practice is important. Extensive practice
experience is of little value if the professor then turns his or her
back on the world of practicing lawyers. The MacCrate Report
noted "the apparent lack of participation by law professors in the
organized bar.,,37 When they do participate, it is usually on the
national level, not the county or state level. Law professors have
much to contribute to the bar and the judiciary; this participation
can in turn greatly improve their teaching.
6. "Fd Like to Do More, But It Will Ruin My Reputation. n
Fundamental changes such as I suggest, even for those who agree
that they are necessary, carry large risks for individual faculty
members and individual law schools. To enhance their reputation
and move up in the rigid hierarchy of legal education, individual
law schools must emulate those above them in the hierarchy. The
same is true for individual faculty members. The safe course is to
do things the way they have always been done, especially at the
elite institutions. For that reason, newer law teachers are
sometimes warned not to teach so-called "skills" or clinical courses.
7. '7 Have Tenure, and You Can't Make Me Do It. n As a practical
matter, we must recognize that the people in charge of legal
education-the law professors-do not have much incentive to
change. Legal education is the way it is in part because it is a good
deal for professors. As I said, law professors are paid more and
teach fewer hours than most of their colleagues in other schools
and colleges in the university. A realist would expect law professors to resist change. That is why pressure from outside the
academy is a good thing for legal education. That, however, leads
to the next obstacle.
8. "We Shouldn't Respond to COutside' Pressures. n Some have
raised the banner of academic freedom against any suggestions of
37
MACeRATE REPORT, supra note I, at 5.
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change from outside the academy.3s They believe that only fulltime law teachers know what is best for legal education.
Those who complain grossly misunderstand th.e fiduciary
obligations of law schools to society and to their students. Law
schools are obliged to prepare students for practice--obliged to
society because law schools are the gatekeepers of a public
profession, and to students because they come to us expecting
professional preparation. Law schools have a covenant with these
constituencies, a fiduciary obligation and a position off;rust. When
we fail to prepare students adequately for practice, we hreach those
fiduciary duties. In failing to prepare students for the practice of
law, law schools have abused their position of trust; they have
broken the covenant.39
Because society has entrusted law schools with the gate-keeping
function, law professors are public personages who have special
responsibilities to the public. This is especially true Bince we are
virtually immune from removal from office.40
These changes are possible, but orily if those outside legal
academia continue to push legal education toward preparation for
practice. Some academics have cautioned against treating the
MacCrate Report as an accreditation standard and worry about
threats to academic freedom. 41 They also warn that implementing
the MacCrate Report's recommendations will stifle innovation.42
Obviously, innovation is crucial; experimentation as to different
38 See Wallace Loh, Introduction: The MacCrate Report-Heuristic or PrescriptilJe?, 69
WASH. L. REv. 505, 513 (1994) (arguing that law school should serve all "laboratory for
curricular experimentation").
39 The notion offiduciary obligations arising from a covenantal relationllhip is a familiar
one to the law. Because of the fiduciary nature of the covenantal obligat.ion, it is a much
better concept than the analogous notion of contract. ALLEGRETl'I, supra note 19, at 37-50.
For a description of the concept of covenant in the context of physicians' ethics, sea
WILLIAM MAy, THE PHYsICIAN'S COVENANT (1983). May discusses tho advantages in
exploring physicians' ethics under the metaphor ofcovenant as opposed to notions ofcontract
or philanthropy. [d. at 116-27. Another work of ethics that takes covenant as a central
theme is JOSEPH ALLEN, LoVE AND CONFLICT (1984). I mention these booku in part becauso
I believe legal ethics could benefit greatly from further exploration oftha concept ofcovenant.
40 See Leslie E. Gerber, Can Lawyers Be SalJed?: The Theological Legal Ethics o/Thomas
Shaffer, 10 J.L. & RELIG. 347, 359 (1994) (discussing professional disEJngagement and
avoidance of accountability).
41 E.g., Rose, supra note 31, at 561-64.
42 E.g., Loh, supra note 38, at 513-14.
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means of professional preparation is much needed. However, it is
ironic for the leaders of legal education to argue for innovation.
The accreditation guidelines as to curriculum are extremely
general, yet law school curricula at most schools could not be much
more cookie-cutter than they are now. Mandates from outside the
academy are not necessarily a bad thing, if that is what it takes to
cause the necessary changes. It would certainly be preferable for
law schools to change their curriculum and pedagogy on their own,
but I do not see it happening without "external" pressure.
The challenges to the ABA accreditation process were brought
about by the arrogance of legal educators. The entire process has
embodied an assumption that only full-time law professors know
what is best for legal education. Site inspection teams from the
ABA have been overwhelmingly made up of law professors and
deans. Thus, we should not be surprised that accreditation has
reinforced the status quo. Of course an accreditation process is
necessary for the protection of students and the public, but the
ABA should involve more evaluators from outside the academy.
9. "We Can't Afford It." Some who otherwise might agree that
law schools should do a better job of professional preparation say
that we cannot afford it.43 That is correct; it is true that law
schools cannot continue to do everything the way they do now and
just add on a "skills component." The student-faculty ratio is not
going to improve so as to allow for many more small classes. There
will not be new money to hire a new group of professors.« We
must therefore change much of what we do now.
We do need more clinics and skills courses. Small courses in
which students perform lawyering activities in role, receive
extensive feedback and critique from the teacher, repeat the
performance, and reflect upon the experience are the best way to
43 See. e.g., John J. Costonis, The Macerate Report: OfLoaves, Fishes, and the Future of
American Legal Education, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157, 189-97 (1993) (arguing that we have
problem, not crisis, and that we cannot achieve vision oC competence at nlllevels oflegal
proCession unless society, legal proCessionals, and university centrnI administratioOll are
willing to pay price).
44 David Barnhizer has recently suggested several ways to mise additional money to pay
for implementing the Macerate Reports goals. David Barnhiz.er, Of Rat Time and
Terminators, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 49, 56-59 (1995). I am all for his recommendatioOll, but I
also insist we must change the core curriculum and pedagogy whether or not those additional
resources are obtained.
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teach good lawyering. I wish most courses in law school could be
like that. In my own experience as a law teacher for over thirteen
years, I have been a full-time clinical teacher, have taught small
simulation skills courses, and have taught large required doctrineoriented classes. I have no doubt that clinical and other small class
role-based teaching is the best pedagogy for legal edu(:ation.
I also know, however, that we will continue to havl~ very large
classes in law school. The relatively high student-faculty ratio in
law schools is a big problem. Close supervision of individual
student work is very difficult when the size of the average class is
between fifty and sixty. Law schools have been successful in the
university because of the high ratio and low overhead.. The ratio
is not likely to get any better in the near future; if anything,
declining resources for legal education will force the ratio even
higher.
It is also clear that the curriculum will continue to consist of
largely the same courses. That is why it is so important to change
the teaching of the "substantive" courses.46 In the large courses
at the "core"· of the curriculum, especially the required fIrst year
courses, we can focus on the role of lawyers who pra(:tice in that
area of law. We can employ student role-playing on simulated
problems. We can focus on clients and on the human relationships
involved. We can employ more group exercises. We can teach our
students the kinds of analyses lawyers actually use in helping
clients with their problems. We can structure our COW7ses and the
curriculum as a whole to allow students to learn from their
experience. Most importantly, we can focus on justice, on the role
of lawyers in achieving justice, on public service, and on the
meaning of our professional calling. All of this can and must be
accommodated within our existing resources and in tho traditional
"substantive" courses.
10. "We Don't Know What Good Lawyering Is." As I hope I have
made clear by now, this is our basic problem. We should not expect
law schools to be effective at preparing good lawyers until we
45 I have a pet peeve about calling certain courses "substantive," as a wa:( to differentiato
doctrine-oriented courses from practice-oriented courses. Substantive as opposed to a course
~th no substance? Or substantive as opposed to trivial? I realize that I am too sensitive
about this; it probably stems from years of teaching courses that are considered peripheral
to the enterprise.
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develop a VISIon of what good lawyering is. Our curriculum
decisions should be driven by that vision. We law teachers,
however, rarely articulate or debate our vision of good lawyering.
One reason may be that it is a difficult task. The MacCrate
Report made an effort at describing good lawyering. The centerpiece
of the Report is the Statement of Skills and Values (SSV),46 which
purports to be those skills and values possessed by minimally
competent and ethicallawyers.47 Unfortunately, as a statement
of "good lawyering," the SSV is not entirely satisfying. On one
level, the SSV is hard to quarrel with-of course lawyers should be
competent at counseling, communication, negotiation, etc., but the
list implies that good lawyering is primarily a matter of technique.
To that extent, it gives ammunition to the critics of a more
professional orientation for legal education by implying that
professional preparation involves teaching technique without any
broader framework. Good lawyering, however, is much more than
technique. Good lawyering is more a matter of practical wisdom,
goodjudgment, empathetic understanding, and a passion for justice
than it is a mastery of a certain number of "skills and values."
The MacCrate Report was asking the right questions, however.
What we need in legal education is more consideration and debate
of questions such as "What do lawyers actually do?" and "What are
the characteristics of a good lawyer?" Those questions may seem
basic, but that is where we need to start. Thinking about and
discussing those questions is much more important than the
answers we ultimately give.
CONCLUSION
Our task as law professors must be to redirect our focus, as
teachers and as scholars, toward the practice oflaw. This will take
a fundamental change in law professors' ideas about the meaning
of their jobs. I am suggesting that law teachers must be prepared
to re-examine their deepest assumptions about the current
curriculum and pedagogy of law school.
MACCRATE REPoRT, supra note I, at 121 passim.
On this point, I agree with and follow Carrie Menkel·Mendow, Narrowing the Gap by
Narrowing the Field: What~ Missing from the MacCraIe Report-OfSkills, Legal Science
and Being a Human Being, 69 WASH. L. REv. 593, 607-15 (1994) (indicating thllt -difficulty'"
with Macerate Report is its scientific and deductive description of law and lawyering).
4S
,47
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Of course that kind of change will be very difficult, but there is
too much at stake in legal education to leave it as it is. r;rhe quality
ofjus~ce is dependent on our lawyers. Lawyers and law professors
must together rediscover our public calling and public rE~sponsibili·
ties. We legal educators must do our part by doing all we can to
educate students to be good lawyers.48
48 I am grateful to Daisy Hurst Floyd, Jack Sammons, Tom Shaffer, and Roy Simon for
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Essay. They should not, however, be hold
responsible for everything I say here. In other words, if this Essay has made you mad,
please do not blame them.
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