Executive Briefing Series Cybersecurity 2013: What Every CIO Should Know

advertisement
Executive Briefing Series
(Volume 6, Number 3)
May 2013
Cybersecurity 2013:
What Every CIO Should Know
An Executive Summary of the April 19 2013 Workshop
written by Melanie Teplinsky and Tom Kellermann
edited by Dr. Gwanhoo Lee and Ms. Marianne Du
Contents
1. Introduction
 Professor William DeLone, Executive Director, Kogod Center for
Information Technology and the Global Economy
 Eric Wenger, Policy Counsel, Microsoft
2. Panel 1: Policy Developments
 David Bodenheimer, Partner, Crowell & Moring LLP
 Eric Wenger, Policy Counsel, Microsoft
 Moderator: Melanie Teplinsky, Adjunct Professor, American University,
Washington College of Law
3. Panel 2: Private Sector Challenges and Opportunities
 Robert A. Parisi, Jr., Managing Director and National Practice Leader for
Technology, Network Risk & Telecommunications, Marsh
 Jeffrey Portis, Cyber Specialist/Assistant Vice President, Financial
Institutions, Chubb Group of Insurance Companies
 Moderator: Tom Kellerman, Vice President of Cyber Security, TrendMicro
4. Group Discussion
 Facilitator: Eric Wenger, Microsoft Policy Counsel
1.
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Introduction and Overview
CITGE’s April 19, 2013 program focused on cybersecurity. Cyber threats have surpassed
terrorism as the number one global threat facing the United States, and cybersecurity poses a
major, ongoing challenge for today’s CIOs. William DeLone, Executive Director of Kogod’s
Center for Information Technology and the Global Economy (CITGE) and Eric Wenger,
Microsoft Policy Counsel, opened the CITGE program with brief welcoming remarks. DeLone
noted that the program would address the core question of how to protect information technology
assets from various types of cyberthreats, and he extended special thanks to the program’s
organizers, sponsors, and host. Wenger acknowledged the expertise in the audience, encouraged
audience participation, and took a moment to note that we are changing the way that we interact
with technology, as evidenced by the various technologies on display in Microsoft’s offices,
where the program took place.
-1-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Panel 1: Policy Developments
The first panel engaged in a lively discussion of recent cybersecurity law and policy
developments. Specifically, the panel addressed: (1) the current cyberthreat landscape; (2) the
business case for cybersecurity; (3) basic cyberhygiene and the cybersecurity executive order; (4)
regulatory compliance obligations; (5) SEC guidance and cyberrisk; and (6) recommended
actions for CIOs.
Current Cyberthreat Landscape
Wenger distinguished two different types of cybersecurity problems: protecting
infrastructure and protecting information. First, Wenger discussed the problem of securing
critical infrastructure so as to prevent the disruption or destruction of IT-reliant systems essential
to our public safety, economic stability, and/or national security. Wenger identified the Saudi
Aramco incident, in which a cyberattack destroyed an estimated 30-40,000 computers at the
Saudi national petroleum company, as the most recent example of a destructive attack on critical
infrastructure. Second, Wenger discussed the problem of protecting trade secrets and intellectual
property (“IP”) from theft whether by cybercriminals or by state-actors seeking to advantage
corporate actors in their countries. While Wenger emphasized the importance of separating the
problem of protecting infrastructure from the problem of protecting information, he noted that
when a cyberattack is occurring, it may be difficult to see the origin of, and motivation for, the
attack.
Wenger also emphasized that cyberrisk must be managed as it cannot be completely
eliminated. Instead of thinking of networks as having a border around them that is impenetrable,
he encouraged the audience to think about resiliency in the face of a successful penetration. For
example, he encouraged consideration of ways to: (1) compartmentalize systems so that if a bad
actor does penetrate a network, we can keep the bad actor from getting elsewhere; (2) rehabilitate
the system; (3) get back up online; etc.
Business Case for Cybersecurity
Before making the business case for cybersecurity at the corporate level, David
Bodenheimer underscored the costs of cybertheft of IP to the U.S. economy as a whole.
Specifically, Bodenheimer noted that: (1) General Alexander (who is dual-hatted as Director of
the National Security Agency and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command) has referred to the loss
of IP and trade secrets from cyberespionage the “greatest transfer of wealth in human history;” (2)
in 2009 remarks, President Obama referenced an estimate placing cybercrime losses at as much
as $1 trillion in one year; and (3) there have been reports of $250 billion in R&D, IP and trade
secrets lost to U.S. businesses annually.
Bodenheimer exhorted that while one cannot control the entire economy, one can control
one’s own organization, and he argued that there is a business case for cybersecurity at the
organizational level. Bodenheimer offered several striking examples of individual corporate
-2-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
losses resulting from cybersecurity breaches, including: (1) a company that lost 38 terabytes of
data – twice the data in the U.S. Library of Congress; (2) the U.S. metals company that lost $1
billion of research and development to a cyberattack; (3) Global Payments Systems’ 9% stock
price dive after their security breach; and (4) deals that fell apart after cyberbreaches (including,
for example, the $2.4 billion Coca-Cola deal). According to Bodenheimer, the significant losses
from cybercrime indicate that there is a business case for corporate cybersecurity, and he urged
CIOs to take this business case back to their CFOs, CEOs, and General Counsel.
David Bodenheimer noted that everybody is a target. To determine whether or not a
company is a target, Bodenheimer suggested three tests. First, the Mueller test (named for FBI
Director Mueller) provides that there are only two classes of companies: those that have been
breached and those that will be. Second, the “Bodenheimer test” provides that organizations
with anything of value are targets. Under the third test, which is an empirical test, a company is
a target if it provides one of the following technologies being targeted for cyberespionage (as
discussed in the report of the National Counter Intelligence Executive, the Mandiant Report, or
the DSS Report): IT, communications, military, aerospace, dual-use, clean technologies,
healthcare, pharma, or agricultural. Bodenheimer noted that while financial institutions are not
on this list, they also are targets, as the recent prolonged attacks on U.S. financial institutions
demonstrated.
Wenger expanded on Bodenheimer’s comments, explaining that different types of
targeting may require different responses. One type of targeting is general targeting, where
threat actors are looking for a specific type of target, but not a specific target. Wenger likened
such cases to a thief going down the street testing doorknobs, and said that, in such cases, you
want to make sure your door is locked so that when the thief gets to your door, he keeps going.
The concept is that basic hygiene that eliminates common points of entry may be effective in
addressing opportunistic threat actors. According to Wenger, organizations also need to consider
how to deal with the more difficult problem of specific targeting, in which there is a specific
threat to a specific organization, noting that there have been cases where specific officials at a
company have been the target of spear-phishing attacks.
Basic Cyber Hygiene & the Cybersecurity Executive Order
Wenger explained that basic cyber-hygiene is part of what the [February 2013] Executive
Order (“EO”) on cybersecurity is attempting to accomplish. Specifically, the EO tasked NIST
with developing a cybersecurity framework to identify what kind of standards may be useful (not
only for protecting CI, but also for protecting operations that are below the critical threshold).
The EO seeks eventually to incentivize voluntary adoption of these standards. Wenger explained
that it is very early in the NIST process, but that it is an accelerated process, with NIST trying to
get a draft of the framework together within an eight month period. Wenger noted that after
some iterations of this process, we will have a better sense of what the final product will look
like.
-3-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Regulatory Compliance Obligations
Bodenheimer pointed out that multiple compliance obligations may come into play as a result
of a cybersecurity breach. As an example of this problem, Bodenheimer discussed the
Department of Defense’s TRICARE breach,1 in which 4.9 million veterans’ and veteran families’
information was lost when backup computer tapes were stolen from a DoD contractor handling
the tapes. Bodenheimer explained that, in the case of TRICARE, one incident involved millions
of records and potentially brought multiple standards into play including those set forth in: (1)
state data breach notification laws; (2) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”) breach notification and information security rules designed to safeguard personal
health information; and (3) the Privacy Act of 1974, pursuant to which plaintiffs sued DoD
seeking $1,000 for each person affected by the TRICARE breach, for a total of $4.9 billion in
damages that DoD presumably tried to shift onto the contractor.
Bodenheimer explained that, as the TRICARE breach suggests, one breach may bring
multiple standards into play since there are different standards for different types of data.
Bodenheimer explained that, as a result of the “multiplicity” of different standards, organizations
“don’t even know how clean they need to be,” making it difficult for organizations even to
achieve basic levels of cyber hygiene.
While Bodenheimer explained that organizations cannot protect all of their information, he
suggested that, as a first step, organizations should begin by identifying the information that the
organization is trying to protect and identifying the most important secrets that the organization
must secure.
Wenger agreed with Bodenheimer’s assessment and urged organizations to ask themselves:
“What are the keys to the kingdom?” “What is the lifeblood of the organization?“ Wenger went
on to emphasize the importance of mapping out the different types of data held by an
organization as well as the obligations associated with that data. He explained that taking such
steps will help the organization to see where there is overlap and where there are differences in
the compliance requirements the organization faces.
Once an organization understands the regulatory obligations associated with its data, Wenger
explained that it is important to understand who is responsible for managing those compliance
obligations. The need to identify compliance boundaries becomes particularly salient as
organizations increasingly move data to the cloud. As an example, Wenger described two
different approaches to HIPAA compliance that cloud providers currently take. Microsoft offers
a business associate agreement in which Microsoft takes on the obligation for ensuring that the
cloud service is operating in a HIPAA compliant manner. Other cloud service providers offer
so-called “HIPAA capable” service, in which the customer is responsible for making sure that
the service is operated in a HIPAA-compliant manner. Regardless of which cloud provider is
1
TRICARE is the military health program.
-4-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
chosen, it is important that organizations understand who is responsible for managing various
compliance obligations.
SEC Guidance & Cyberrisk
Bodenheimer explained that pursuant to SEC staff-level cybersecurity guidance issued in
2011, publicly-traded companies may (1) be required to disclose a material cybersecurity breach
or “incident;” (2) need to disclose material cyber risks; and (3) be at risk for shareholder suits in
the event that they fail to implement safeguards. While the guidance applies to publicly-traded
companies, Bodenheimer expects that it will be a major driver of cybersecurity for all companies,
and that for companies losing substantial IP/trade secrets to cyberintruders, it will be a “gamechanger.”
Wenger discussed Senator Rockefeller’s (D-W.V.) role in the SEC guidance. Wenger
noted that it was Senator Rockefeller’s correspondence with the SEC that led to issuance of the
SEC’s staff level guidance in 2011, and he explained that Senator Rockefeller is now pressing
the Commission to issue a formal SEC rule. He noted that Senator Rockefeller recently sent
letters to the CEOs of every Fortune 500 company in the United States asking them a series of
questions about their cybersecurity practices. According to Wenger, about 200 companies did
not respond, but a congressional report summarizes the types of responses received from those
companies that did respond, including Microsoft.
While speaking about the Rockefeller letter, Wenger noted that companies in the
technology space have been thinking about cyber risks for some time, have been thinking about
what is “material,” and have been making sure that they are reporting material risks. (Wenger
also indicated that Microsoft, which supports risk-based reporting, has some notional concerns
with increasing the complexity of SEC filings. According to Wenger, the larger the filings
become, the more information is packed into them, the less useful the filings become for
shareholders.) However, Wenger noted that for some of the Fortune 500 companies not in the
technology space, it may have been an interesting exercise for CEO’s receiving Rockefeller’s
letter to determine who to talk to; what their company is doing on cybersecurity, and what cyber
risks the company faces.
Wenger concluded with a reminder that the operation of an entity’s IT infrastructure is no
longer something separate and apart from operation of the entity. He cautioned that CEOs must
work with CIO/CISOs because IT is an important part of operating a corporation, and must be
considered in investment and risk management decisions.
Recommendations for CIOs
The panelists were then asked what advice they would give to a CIO or CISO who must
deal with multifaceted threats on a daily basis. What could CIO/CISOs they do in the next six to
twelve months to improve security?
-5-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Wenger began with the notion that there are some things that you can control and some
that you cannot. If a well-resourced state actor specifically targets your operations, there is
probably not a lot that you can do to stop that from happening, but there are things you can
control. First, with respect to compliance obligations, organizations can get a greater sense of
the compliance obligations they face; where those obligations overlap and where they do not;
and who is responsible for managing those obligations. Second, organizations can separate out
the basic hygiene problem and can consider implementing baseline cybersecurity controls (e.g.,
SANS twenty critical controls). Basic cyber hygiene may enable organizations to clean things
up in a way that allows them to identify threats that otherwise might have been hidden. As
Wenger explained, if you can quiet down the “noise in the system,” other threats may be easier
to ferret out.
Bodenheimer began with the observation that, at last count, there were approximately 800
controls in the NIST 800-53 draft (i.e., the Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information
Systems) and Allen Paller identifies twenty critical security controls in the SANS Institute’s
framework for information security. Bodenheimer then offered the following six core
questions/observations for CIO consideration:
(1) Do you have a cyberlawyer who can serve as a thought leader on cybersecurity issues?
(2) Are you engaging in discussions with your board of directors, CEO, and general counsel
to ensure that they have a full understanding of cyber risks?
(3) Do you know your organization’s data? You need to know what you have to protect and
the potential consequences of a breach. Knowing what kind of data you have also will
help you determine the cyberstandards you have to meet.
(4) What cyberstandards do you have to meet? It is important to identify the rules applicable
to your organization and any compliance requirements. If you are a federal agency,
FISMA and NIST are the starting points. If you are a health care company, HIPAA is
your starting point. If you are a government contractor, the Privacy Act, FISMA, NIST,
etc. are your starting points.
(5) Coordinate your defenses. Coordination is necessary to ensure that there are no gaps in
the defenses used to protect your organization’s important information and infrastructures,
including personal data; trade secrets; and the IT network.
(6) Do you have support from top management for cybersecurity efforts? Such support often
comes after a major cybersecurity breach, but spending a small percentage up front may
prevent serious losses down the line.
Audience questions:
What’s a reasonable amount of time to fully implement SANS?
Bodenheimer said that the answer depends on the threat level. For an organization that
already has had several major incidents, the time to fully implement SANS was yesterday. He
said that there is no defined industry standard or government standard, noting that it took years
for DoD to get their information system from a grade D to a higher grade. Bodenheimer
emphasized that cybersecurity involves a layered defense and is a never-ending process, but that
-6-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
organizations need to secure their most important data now. CIOs must identify their most
important data and tell the CEO that the company needs to take care of these now.
Wenger reiterated that cybersecurity is a process, stating: “it’s a journey, not a
destination.” He said that the goal is to close gaps, but given the dynamic threat environment in
which we are operating, as soon as we finish our work, we have to start again. Wenger noted
that cybersecurity is a “cycle” and that as long as we rely upon IT, the problem will not go away.
Under my cursory “root cause” analysis, if we allow people to make revenues off of
intellectual property by selling products with known and latent defects with no liability,
then we are going to have to live with the cybersecurity problem. I’m not sure imposing
liability would solve the problem, but has the freedom from liability outlived its usefulness?
Can we reach a better balance between reliability and IP revenues?
Analogizing to the real-world, Wenger argued that if a house was locked and a would-be
intruder figured out a new way to attack that lock, it would be odd to think that we would hold
the manufacturer of the lock responsible for the consequences of the intrusion.
Wenger also noted that software is often used in unintended and unexpected ways. He
said that part of the problem is that we are operating in an environment where technologies
themselves are constantly being exposed to new services. Some of the software that was written
is now being exposed to new services that did not exist when the software was created. Wenger
argued that we want to allow for continued innovation and creation of these technologies and
that imposing liability in the manner suggested might hinder those goals.
Bodenheimer reiterated that no one has perfect security and that the threat is so great and
moving so fast that there will always be gaps in defense. Second, Bodenheimer emphasized the
importance of maintaining incentives to innovate and said that companies will not sell and
support solutions if the potential liability is too great. In support of this argument, Bodenheimer
offered an example from the Homeland Security context. He noted that the SAFETY Act was
passed to encourage companies to develop anti-terrorism technology by protecting said
companies from enterprise-threatening liability in the event that the technology fails. (Wenger
noted later in the discussion that the House Homeland Security Committee is developing a
legislative proposal that would apply the SAFETY Act model – in which government agrees to
absorb some of the risk of failed technology -- to cybersecurity with the idea of incentivizing
cybersecurity offerings). Third, Bodenheimer argued that carrots might yield more cybersecurity
than sticks alone. Finally, Bodenheimer noted that there already is liability, although ad hoc.
Returning to the example of DoD’s TRICARE, Bodenheimer assumed liability in the amount of
$500 per compromised record and multiplied that by the 4.9 billion TRICARE participants who
lost their data. He then asked “Can any company take a $2.5 billion hit?” He argued that $2.5
billion is enough to get the attention of even the biggest companies, and that, in some cases; the
ramifications of security breaches are severe, bordering on draconian. Bodenheimer also
suggested that we need a standard within the public sector that addresses the liability and we
have to be careful how certain risks are shifted.
-7-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Bodenheimer suggested that allocation of risk is going to be one of most interesting
issues we face in next ten years. How will risk be shifted? For example, if a $40 billion deal is
scuttled after a security breach that comes through a law firm, who will be responsible? Can any
law firm take a $40 billion risk? He suggested that we will face similar risk-shifting issues with
cloud technologies.
Finally, Bodenheimer discussed cyberinsurance, suggesting that cyberinsurance markets
may drive cybersecurity. He noted that if an organization does not have adequate cybersecurity,
it may not be able to afford insurance or may not be eligible for coverage.
How can CIOs operationalize the legal/policy developments discussed in today’s program?
Teplinsky noted that we are witnessing a shift in mindset. She argued that where we
once were focused only on perimeter defense (i.e., keeping bad guys out of our networks), we
now are coming to accept the idea that adversaries are in our networks and are beginning to
develop strategies to address that reality. She suggested that CIOs need to bring this new
mindset to the C-Suite. The other panelists noted that this question would be addressed more
fully in the second panel.
-8-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Panel 2: Private Sector Challenges and Opportunities
The second panel began with a threat landscape overview by Tom Kellermann, Vice
President of Cybersecurity at Trend Micro Inc. It was noted that 96% of Capital is in digital
form and that organized crime has indeed migrated their operations online. Attacks have become
targeted in nature and thus criminals can bypass perimeter defenses like virus scanner and
firewalls.
These realities are exacerbated by the adoption of virtualization and mobility by enterprises. In
his presentation Kellermann depicted a shadow economy which had become an economy of
scale which is service based e.g. Hacking services for hire. The hacking trends of 2013 which
were noteworthy are: mobile attacks; virtualization attacks; cross platform attacks; watering hole
attacks (e.g. attacks which infect trusted web portals and mobile applications and finally attacks
on Mac users.
-9-
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Kellermann concluded by highlighting an 11 step risk assessment methodology for enterprises:
1. Has the cyber security posture of all third parties been audited?
2. Is access to all sensitive systems and computers governed by two factor authentication?
3. Does a log inspection program exist? How frequently are they reviewed?
4. Does file integrity monitoring exist?
5. Can vulnerabilities be virtually patched?
6. Is MDM and Mobile Application Reputation software utilized?
7. Do you utilize a DLP?
8. Can you migrate your layered security into the cloud?
9. Do you maintain multi-level rule-based event correlation? Is there custom sandbox
analysis?
10. Do you have access to global threat intelligence?
11. Can you transfer your risk e.g. are you cyber insured?
The panel begins with two significant discussion tracks: First, Bob Parisi, Managing
Director for Marsh and Jeff Portis, Vice President for Chubb and Sons Insurance were asked
which cyber-attack trends were most worrisome? Both panelists concurred and stated that the
Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDOS) attacks and “island hopping attacks” which transit
through trusted third parties were the most problematic for their constituencies. Bob Parisi
stressed that DDOS attacks impact both the reputational risk “headline risk” of enterprises as
well as inhibits their ability to function much like a fire would impact a facility in the real world.
The subsequent panel discussion revolved around the cyber insurance and how organizations
might best transfer risk. Bob Parisi depicted exactly what losses are covered under
Cybersecurity insurance. These were typically third party costs associated with notification
expenses due to the 42 State data breach laws; legal expenses and the expenses associated with
incident response and recovery. He stressed that the insurance industry does not cover direct
losses e.g. financial loses. Bob Parisi noted that the market for Cybersecurity cover now
exceeds $1B and is experiencing the highest growth of all insurance products.
Jeff Portis stressed that Chubb does not insure everyone and the underwriting process is not
only rigorous but it is updated on an annual basis. The Financial sector represented the largest
insured industry with Education and Healthcare in second and third respectively. Jeff stated
that of the top four red flags for underwriting were:
- 10 -
Executive Briefing
1.
2.
3.
4.
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Size of organization and industry
The existence of an updated Information Security Policy and Program
The existence of an Incident Response Plan
The existence of awareness training for employees
(See: http://www.chubb.com/businesses/csi/chubb822.html)
The panel conversation then coalesced into a conversation regarding best practices for
awareness training and management of third party risk. On the former, the panel highlights the
need for ongoing education and training of employees to prevent spear-phishing attacks. This
thread focused on behavioral based systems wherein users are tested for their susceptibility to
social engineering via email. Tom Kellermann stressed that these tests should be tied to HR
policy and promotion. In addition it was noted that IT professional within enterprises should
attend cyber security conference so as to stay “current”.
Managing third party risk was the final conversational topic. According to ISACA 81%
of organizations who suffered a breach due to the lack of security in a trust partner system, still
had not updated their Service Level Agreement in 2012.
At issue here is that SLA’s are outdated and overly focused on the “uptime/resiliency” of
your data not the security. The panel noted that the lack of proper contracts and security audits
of third parties contributed to systemic risk and it is fundamental that General Counsel’s learn to
modernize SLA’s so as to manage this cyber exposure. Bob Parisi note that a minimum these
- 11 -
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
agreements should define security to the same standard as your organization. He stressed the
viability of the PCI standard. (See: https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/). Tom Kellermann
noted that is an organization care to develop robust security they should refer to the twenty
critical controls as defined by the SANs Institute and mandate that these controls be active within
managed service provider networks.
(See: http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/). In conclusion, the panel stressed the
importance of risk assessments and risk transfer via Cybersecurity insurance.
- 12 -
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Presenter Bios
David Z. Bodenheimer
Partner
Crowell & Moring LLP
David Z. Bodenheimer is a partner in the law firm of Crowell & Moring LLP where he heads the
Homeland Security Practice and specializes in Government Contracts, Cybersecurity, and Privacy.
Resident in the DC office, he joined the firm in 1988 after six years with the U.S. Navy Department and
many years as a University of North Carolina Tarheel (JD, MBA, BA, 1974-82).
Representing all sizes of technology clients for 30 years, Mr. Bodenheimer litigates, counsels and
resolves the full range of issues confronting clients in selling to the Government. See, e.g., Wynne v.
UTC, 463 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (defeated $299 million defective pricing claim after 33-day trial and
Federal Circuit appeal); Health Net Federal Services, 2009 CPD 220 (successful protest of $16 billion
award after 5-day hearing). He authored the Defective Pricing Handbook (Thomson West, 2012-13 ed.)
and regularly lectures on Government contracting, pricing, and fraud matters.
As the head of C&M’s Homeland Security practice, Mr. Bodenheimer focuses upon acquisition,
technology, and cyber risks confronting government contractors, including information security, privacy,
data breach, and federal regulatory issues.
He has testified before Congress regarding military cybersecurity, as well as other hearings on antiterrorism technology and homeland security acquisition practices.
As Division Chair (Security, Privacy & Information Law) and Committee Co-Chair (Cybersecurity &
Homeland Security), he has led ABA initiatives and panels on emerging issues and risks in the
cybersecurity, privacy, and homeland security arenas.
To cope with rapidly changing risks driving information technology, he advises, trains, and supports
clients on information security (FISMA, FIPS, NIST, DIACAP, and security breach), privacy
requirements, and electronic surveillance issues.
- 13 -
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Tom Kellerman
Vice President of Cyber Security
Trend Micro
Tom Kellermann served as a Commissioner on The Commission on Cyber Security for the 44th
Presidency and serves on the board of the National Cyber Security Alliance, The International Cyber
Security Protection Alliance (ICSPA), and the National Board of Information Security Examiners Panel
for Penetration Testing. Tom is a Professor at American University's School of International Service and
is a Certified Information Security Manager (CISM).
Formally holding the position as Chief Technology Officer at AirPatrol Corporation, Tom Kellermann
spent five years as Vice President of Security Awareness for Core Security. Previously, Tom was the
Senior Data Risk Management Specialist for the World Bank Treasury Security Team, where he was
responsible for internal cyber-intelligence and policy and for advising central banks around the world
about their cyber-risk posture and layered security architectures. He co-authored the book "E-safety and
Soundness: Securing Finance in a New Age."
Tom Kellermann frequently speaks on the topics including cyber security, policy creation, risk
management, and advanced persistent response.
Melanie J. Teplinsky
Adjunct Professor
American University, Washington College of Law
A graduate of Princeton University (A.B., cum laude, '96) and Harvard Law School (J.D., cum laude, '99),
Ms. Teplinsky has written and spoken extensively on cyberlaw issues and currently serves on the
Advisory Board for CrowdStrike, Inc., an innovative cybersecurity technology company.
Prior to joining American University Washington College of Law as an adjunct professor, Ms. Teplinsky
practiced cyberlaw at Steptoe & Johnson LLP, where she counseled leading financial services,
telecommunications, and other multinational clients on a wide array of issues including cybersecurity,
data protection, and electronic surveillance.
Ms. Teplinsky has worked on information technology policy issues in the Executive Office of the
President (dividing her time between OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information
Technology Branch and the Office of Science and Technology Policy). At EOP, Ms. Teplinsky reviewed
proposed federal information technology legislation, and worked on digital intellectual property initiatives,
authentication, encryption, PKI and privacy issues. Ms. Teplinsky also has worked at NIST's Computer
Security Laboratory and SAIC's Center for Information Strategy and Policy.
- 14 -
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Ms. Teplinsky began her career in 1991 as an analyst at the National Security Agency (NSA) and
continued her technical work at the Institute for Defense Analyses' Center for Communications Research,
a federally-funded research and development center supporting NSA's mission.
Ms. Teplinsky is a Harry Truman National Scholarship recipient (1995) and served as a law clerk to the
honorable Judge Rya W. Zobel in the U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts (1999-2000 Term).
Ms. Teplinsky lives in Bethesda, MD with her husband and 6-year-old daughter and enjoys playing the
violin.
Eric Wenger
Policy Counsel
Microsoft
Eric Wenger serves as Policy Counsel for Microsoft’s U.S. Government Affairs team where he leads the
company’s efforts to shape and pass federal cyber security and cyber crime legislation.
Eric joined Microsoft in May 2009 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where
he served as a trial attorney in the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section and as a Special
Assistant United States Attorney in the District of Columbia. In this capacity, Eric prosecuted computer
crimes, including phishing, hacking, and credit card theft. He advised and trained federal prosecutors and
law enforcement agencies on the federal laws that limit government access to electronic communications.
He also helped draft the federal government’s strategic plan to address identity theft crimes. Prior to DOJ,
Eric served as an attorney at the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, where he
prosecuted complex Internet fraud cases, including the first FTC phishing cases. In his final year at the
FTC, Eric was an Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Thomas B. Leary. Before the FTC, Eric worked in
the Office of the New York State Attorney General and became Deputy Chief of the Internet Bureau. He
prosecuted consumer protection litigation aimed at deceptive online practices, including the
misrepresentation of privacy policies, and chaired a staff-level Internet Privacy Subcommittee for the
National Association of Attorneys General.
Eric did his undergraduate work at Cornell University and received his J.D. with honors from the George
Washington University Law School. He lives in Bethesda with his wife and two children. In his spare
time, Eric raises funds and awareness to fight brain cancer in memory of his late daughter, Kayla.
- 15 -
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Robert A. Parisi, Jr.
Managing Director & National Practice Leader for Technology,
Network Risk & Telecommunications
Marsh
Robert Parisi is a Managing Director and National Practice Leader for Technology, Network Risk &
Telecommunications specialist in Marsh’s New York City headquarters. His current responsibilities
include advising clients on issues related to intellectual property, technology, privacy, and cyber related
risks as well as negotiating with the carriers on terms and conditions.
Prior to joining Marsh, Robert was the senior vice president and Chief Underwriting Officer (CUO) of
eBusiness Risk Solutions at AIG. Robert joined AIG in 1998 as legal counsel for its Professional Liability
group and held several executive and legal positions, including CUO for Professional Liability and
Technology. While at AIG, Robert oversaw the creation and drafting of underwriting guidelines and
policies for all lines of Professional Liability. Robert was also instrumental in the development of
specialty reinsurance to address aggregation of risk issues inherent in cyber, privacy and technology
insurance. In addition to working with AIG, Robert has also been in private practice, principally as legal
counsel to various Lloyds of London syndicates.
While at Marsh, Robert has worked extensively with Marsh clients in all industries, assisting them in
analysis of their risk as well as in the placement of coverage for cyber and privacy risks.
Jeffrey Portis
Cyber Specialist / Assistant Vice President, Financial Institutions
Chubb Group of Insurance Companies
Mr. Portis is based out of Atlanta, Georgia. He is an assistant vice president and part of the DFI Large
Account Team working on bank and insurance business. Mr. Portis focuses on accounts out of the
southeast. Mr. Portis has been active as a Subject Matter Expert for Cyber for four years and was involved
in managing a cyber book in the Southeast for financial institutions and commercial accounts. Mr. Portis
was appointed as a cyber specialist in August 2010 for the Eastern Territory. He is very active in setting
strategy for the Chubb CyberSecurity Product and serves as a referral point for deals throughout the
Eastern Territory. In addition, he conducts training on an internal basis as well as an external basis to
help increase the awareness with the exposures and how to address them with CyberSecurity.
- 16 -
Executive Briefing
Volume 6 / Number 3
May 2013
Confirmed Attendees (ordered by affiliation)
Name
Organization
Title
Kamalika Sandell
Gwanhoo Lee
Alberto Espinosa
Mike Carleton
William DeLone
American Univeristy
American Univeristy
American University
American University
American University
Melanie Teplinsky
Stephanie DaCosta
David Silberman
Sarah Ryan
Jade Bernad
Urjita Sudula
Fang Zou
Margaret Weber
Suzanne McGann
Sarah Ryan
Molly Kerrigan
Keyvan Gheissari
Caitlin Dunn
Maddy Gregory
Will Maner
John Hoysgaard
Frank Armour
Stephanie Toussaint
Andrew E. Olson
Jeffrey Portis
Larry Fitzpatrick
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University
American University &
Bentley University
American University &
Executive Insights
American University,
Washington College of Law
American University,
Washington College of Law
American University,
Washington College of Law
American University,
Washington College of Law
Aruba Networks
Bully Pulpit Interactive
Chubb Group of Insurance
Companies
Computech, Inc.
Chris Bursenos
David Z. Bodenheimer
Computech, Inc
Crowell & Moring LLP
Mary Culnan
Rich Schroth
Claudia D. Cuccia
Peter Frechette
Pasha Sternberg
Alex Zerden
Riad Muwakki
Jennifer Nedeau
- 17 -
Associate CIO
Associate Professor and Director
Professor
Research Fellow
Professor and Executive Director
Adjunct Professor of Law,
Washington College of Law
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Student
Research Fellow
Student
Student
Senior Research Fellow and Professor Emeritus
Executive-in-Residence & CEO
Student
Student
Student
Student
National Account Manager
Director
Cyber Specialist / Assistant Vice President,
Financial Institutions
President
Cybersecurity Assessment & Compliance
Manager
Partner
Executive Briefing
Joseph Kraus
Volume 6 / Number 3
Mohamoud Jibrell
Steve Kaisler
Toni McDermott
Holocaust Memorial Museum
Howard Hughes Medical
Institute
i_SW Corporation
Marriott
Robert A. Parisi, Jr.
Sharon Solomon
Greg Lankler
Eric Wenger
Curtis Generous
Marsh
Medimmune
Mercury/Clark & Weinstock
Microsoft
Navy Federal Credit Union
Jimmie Owens
Steve Cooper
Tom Kellerman
Jungsu Song
Navy Federal Credit Union
The Strativest Group
Trend Micro
WorldBank
- 18 -
May 2013
CIO
Vice President for Information Technology
Senior Scientist
IT Planning and Enterprise PMO
Managing Director & National Practice Leader
for Technology, Network Risk &
Telecommunications
CIO
Managing Director
Policy Counsel
CTO
Manager, Information Security Architecture &
Vulnerability Management
Partner
Vice President of Cyber Security
Senior ICT Policy Specialist
CITGE Executive Team
Dr. William H. DeLone
Executive Director, CITGE
Professor, Kogod School of
Business, American University
Dr. Gwanhoo Lee
Director, CITGE
Associate Professor, Kogod
School of Business, American
University
Dr. Richard J. Schroth
Executive-in-Residence, Kogod
School of Business, American
University
CEO, Executive Insights, Ltd.
Michael Carleton
Senior Research Fellow
Former CIO, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services
Dr. Frank Armour
Research Fellow
CITGE Advisory Council
Steve Cooper
CIO, Air Traffic Organization,
Federal Aviation Administration
Bill DeLeo
Director of Release Engineering
Architecture, SAS
Associated Faculty and Research Fellows
Dr. Erran Carmel
Professor, Kogod School of
Business, American University
Mohamoud Jibrell
CIO, Howard Hughes Medical
Institute
Dr. J. Alberto Espinosa
Associate Professor, Kogod
School of Business, American
University
Joe Kraus
CIO, U.S. Holocaust Memorial
Museum
Dr. Peter Keen
Distinguished Research Fellow
Chairman, Keen Innovation
Ed Trainor
former CIO, AMTRAK
Dr. Mary Culnan
Senior Research Fellow
Slade Professor of Management
and Information Technology,
Bentley College
Susan Zankman
SVP of Information Resources
Finance and Management
Services, Marriott International
Download