1 The Paper
This paper is concerned with philosophical questions which arise out of theories in psychology, the
empirical study of the mind. It differs from the Philosophy of Mind paper in that the topics it covers are
more specialised, and require a certain amount of knowledge of the psychological theories involved.
The paper divides into three sections: the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of cognitive psychology,
and the philosophy of psychoanalysis. You must answer at least three questions, which must be drawn from
at least two sections (i.e. it is not possible to answer questions from one section only). If you are doing the
Philosophy of Mind paper as well, you cannot answer questions from the first section.
2 Basic Reading
A. GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
Anthologies
Rosenthal, David. ed. 1991. The Nature of Mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Perhaps the best anthology
around. Extensive selection, less fashionable than others, so less likely to go out of date. Worth buying.
Borst, C. V. ed. 1970. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: a Collection of Papers. London: Macmillan. Dated but quite
useful collection of essays on the Type Identity theory.
Beakley, Brian, and Stephen Ludlow. eds. 1992. The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/Contemporary Issues.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Interesting collection, with a wide range of historical selections and a good coverage
of issues such as imagery, innate ideas and associationism.
Books
McGinn, Colin. 1997. The Character of Mind: an Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Smith, Peter, and O. R. Jones. 1986. The Philosophy of Mind: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Churchland, Paul M. 1988. Matter and Consciousness: a Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. Rev.
ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Kim, Jaegwon. 1996. The Philosophy of Mind. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
B. PHILOSOPHY OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Anthologies
Block, Ned. ed. 1980-1. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, 2 Vols. London: Methuen. The first volume is
about the mind-body problem, the second is about issues in the philosophy of psychology such as imagery and
intentionality.
Haugeland, John. ed. 1981. Mind Design: Philosophy, Psychology, Artificial Intelligence. Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford
Books. (See also Mind design II. Revised and enlarged ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997). Excellent
collection of articles on the philosophy of cognitive science. Many of the articles are classics.
Lycan, William G. ed. 1990. Mind and Cognition: a Reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Useful collection of recent
articles on issues in philosophy of psychology. The emphasis tends to be on the issues of folk psychology, the
language of thought and eliminative materialism.
Boden, Margaret. ed. 1990. The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Excellent
collection of articles, though many are printed in other anthologies.
Macdonald, C., and G. Macdonald, eds. 1995. Philosophy of Psychology. Debates on Psychological Explanation. Vol.1.
Oxford: Blackwell.
——. 1995. Connectionism. Debates on Psychological Explanation. Vol. 2. Oxford: Blackwell.
Osherson, Daniel N. et al., eds. 1995. An Invitation to Cognitive Science. 4 Vols. Language; Visual Cognition;
Thinking; Methods, Models and Conceptual Issues. 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. All four volumes contain
useful introductory essays by psychologists and some philosophers.
Books
Sterelny, Kim. 1990. The Representational Theory of the Mind: an Introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Clear
introduction to the philosophical approach to cognitive science pioneered by Jerry Fodor.
Johnson-Laird, Philip. 1993. The Computer and the Mind: an Introduction to Cognitive Science. 2nd ed. London:
Fontana. Clear introduction, from a psychologist’s point of view, to the computational theory of the mind (part I)
and its applications to the phenomena of vision (part II) learning and memory (part III) and reasoning (part IV).
Haugeland, John. 1985. Artificial Intelligence: the Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Excellent historical and
philosophical survey and defence of traditional artificial intelligence.
Cummins, Robert. 1989. Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Interesting and
sophisticated account of the various philosophical theories of mental representation.
Clark, Andy. 1997. Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. A
good up-to-date account of issues in the philosophy of psychology and artificial intelligence.
Pinker, Stephen. 1994. The Language Instinct: the New Science of Language and Mind. London: Allen Lane. A lively
introduction to the Chomskian revolution and current cognitive psychological approaches to language.
Dennett, Daniel. 1993. Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin Books. A provocative book which combines
challenging philosophical theses with accounts of suprising results in various areas of cognitive neuroscience.
C. PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
Freud: the most useful volumes to purchase (in the Penguin edition) are Vols. 1-2, Introductory Lectures
and New Introductory Lectures, and Vol. 11, On Metapsychology.
Anthologies
Wollheim, R. ed. 1974. Freud: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books) reprinted as
Philosophers on Freud: New Evaluations, (New York: Jason Aronson, 1985), out of print.
Hopkins, James, and Richard Wollheim. eds. 1982. Philosophical Essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Clark, Peter, and Crispin Wright. eds. 1988. Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Neu, Jerome. ed. 1991. The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Books
Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed., with Supplementary Preface. London: Fontana. Essential reading.
Segal, Hanna. 1979. Klein. London: Fontana.
Wollheim, R. 1984. The Thread of Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Gardner, S. 1993. Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3 Philosophy of Mind
See Philosophy of Mind section. Relevant topics here are: physicalism, functionalism and the reduction of
the mental; the status of ‘folk psychology’; the causal efficacy of mental content; the explanation of
consciousness; psychological laws and psychological explanation; theories of mental content; internalism
and externalism about mental content.
4 Philosophy of Cognitive Science
A. COMMONSENSE PSYCHOLOGY AND
COGNITIVE SCIENCE
What is the relation between commonsense psychological explanation and explanations in cognitive
science? Fodor (Psychosemantics, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), Introduction and chapter 1)
thinks commonsense explanations are backed up by a theory, folk psychology, which posits beliefs and
desires as inner causes of behaviour, and that the success of cognitive science shows that this theory is on
the right track. He calls this position ‘intentional realism’: i.e. realism about intentional states and their
contents. Paul Churchland agrees that folk psychology is a theory, but he thinks it is on the wrong track
(see ‘Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behaviour’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume 62 (1988): 209-221; ‘Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes’,
Journal of Philosophy 78 (1981): 67-90). Daniel Dennett tries to steer an instrumentalist middle course
between Fodor’s and Churchland’s eliminativism (see The Intentional Stance, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1987), especially the essays ‘True Believers’, and ‘Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology’; see also
Dennett’s ‘Real Patterns’, Journal of Philosophy 88 (1991): 27-51, for his latest view). For a good
collection of readings, see John Greenwood, ed., The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and
Cognitive Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
B. THE COMPUTATIONAL THEORY OF
MIND/ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Is the mind, or any part of it, a computer? The claim that the mind is a computer should be distinguished
from the claim that mental processes can be modelled on computers (this is often taken to be the main
claim of artificial intelligence or ‘AI’). An excellent account of the computational theory of mind is John
Haugeland, ‘Introduction’, and ‘The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism’, in Mind Design,
(Montgomery, Vt.: Bradford Books, 1981). See also Ned Block ‘The Computer Model of the Mind’, in
Edward E. Smith and Daniel N. Osherson, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 3, Thinking, (2nd
ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995). For more detail, see Haugeland’s Artificial Intelligence: the Very
Idea, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985); and Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation, (Mass.:
MIT Press, 1989), chapter 8. See also Clark Glymour, Thinking things through: an Introduction to
Philosophical Issues and Achievements, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), chapters 12-13; and
Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind: an Introduction to Cognitive Science, (London: Fontana,
1993), part I. For a critical assessment of the fundamental elements of the computational theory, see D. H.
Mellor, ‘How Much of the Mind is a Computer?’, in his Matters of Metaphysics, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991). The computational theory has been famously attacked by John Searle, ‘Minds,
Brains and Programs’ (in D. Dennett, and D. Hofstadter, eds., The Minds I: Fantasies and Reflections on
Self and Soul, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981) and in Boden, Haugeland and Rosenthal, see the replies by
Dennett, and Fodor in these anthologies); an interesting critique of AI from a phenomenological standpoint
is Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do: a Critique of Artificial Reason, (New York: Harper & Row,
1972). (New edition: What Computers Still Can’t Do, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992)), which also
contains an interesting critical history of the early days of AI research.
C. THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
One of the most influential theories in philosophy of cognitive psychology is Jerry Fodor’s thesis that we
think in a ‘Language of Thought’. The idea is that mental processes have a structure that is best explained
by postulating sentence-like structures realised in the brain. This was first proposed in his book The
Language of Thought, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); the best exposition is the
appendix to Psychosemantics: the Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind, (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1987), reprinted in Lycan’s anthology; and ‘Fodor’s Guide to Mental Representation’, Mind 94
(1985): 55-97, reprinted in his Theory of Content & Other Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990). See also
Hartry Field, ‘Mental Representation’, Erkenntnis 13 (1978): 9-61, reprinted in Block, Vol. II; and (for an
introduction) Sterelny, The Representational Theory of the Mind: an Introduction, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1990). For criticism, see Dennett, ‘A Cure for the Common Code?’, in his Brainstorms:
Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981); Paul and Patricia
Churchland, ‘Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine’, in Lycan; R. Stalnaker, Inquiry, (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT, 1984), chapters 1-2; and C. Peacocke, Sense & Content: Experience, Thought and their Relations,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), chapter 8. Fodor has always maintained that the Language of Thought is
an empirical theory; Martin Davies has argued that it can be defended through a priori philosophical
argument, see ‘Concepts, Connectionism and the Language of Thought’, in William Ramsey, Stephen P.
Stich, and David E. Rumelhart, eds., Philosophy & Connectionist Theory, (Hillsdale, N. J.: L. Erlbaum
Associates, 1991).
D. CONNECTIONISM
Connectionism understands mental processing in terms of the activation and inhibition of many simple
units, connected in various ways. Representation resides in the strengths of the connections between the
units, and the subsequent pattern of activation across the whole network. For a short non-technical
introduction, see Paul Churchland, ‘Cognitive Activity in Artificial Neural Networks’, in Edward E. Smith
and Daniel N. Osherson, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Volume 3, Thinking. (2nd ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1995). William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, Connectionism and the Mind: an
Introduction to Parallel Processing in Networks, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), is a more technical
introduction. Philosophy and Connectionist Theory, edited by Ramsey, Stich and Rumelhart (Hillsdale, N.
J.: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1991) is a good anthology. Connectionists claim that their theory provides a
substantial alternative to ‘classical’ artificial intelligence and cognitive science research. Are they right?
See Paul Smolensky ‘On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism’, Brain & Behavioral Sciences, 1983, for
the affirmative answer; and Cummins, ‘The Role of Representations in Connectionist Explanations of
Cognitive Capacities’, in Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Fodor and Pylyshyn, ‘Connectionism &
Cognitive Architecture’, Cognition, 1988, defend the Language of Thought against Smolensky. See also
Fodor and McLaughlin, ‘Connectionism & the Problem of Systematicity: why Smolensky’s Solution
doesn’t work’, in Cognition, 1990, which is a reply to Smolensky’s ‘Connectionism, Constituency & the
Language of Thought’, in Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, edited by Barry Loewer, and Georges
Rey (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). Some argue that the success of connectionism would support
eliminativism about beliefs and desires posited by folk psychology (see (a) above). See Patricia Churchland
and Terence Sejnowski, ‘Neural Representation and Neural Computation’, in Lycan, ed., Mind and
Cognition; and the papers by Ramsey, Stich and Garon, and by Martin Davies in Philosophy and
Connectionist Theory. Andy Clark, ‘Beyond Eliminativism’, in Mind and Language 4 (1989): 251-279,
argues that connectionists need not be eliminativists.
E. MODULARITY AND THE FUNCTIONAL
STRUCTURE OF THE MIND AND BRAIN
One of the distinctive features of cognitive psychology is an approach to psychological structures and
capacities through functional analysis—on this mode of explanation see Robert Cummins, The Nature of
Psychological Explanation, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983). Both Chomsky and Fodor have argued
for the modularity of various psychological capacities, but the notion of a module has been open to
different interpretations. For Chomsky on these matters see, Knowledge of Language: its Nature, Origins,
and Use, (New York: Praeger, 1985), Chs. 1 & 2; for Fodor, The Modularity of Mind: an Essay on Faculty
Psychology, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), and ‘The Modularity of Mind: A Precis’, in his A
Theory of Content & Other Essays, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1990). Within psychological work itself the
notion of modularity has become of central concern partly through single-case studies of patients with
impairments that reflect dissociations of various psychological capacities from each other: the broadest
overview of the approach, and the methodology behind it can be found in Tim Shallice’s From
Neuropsychology to Mental Strucure, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). For evidence of
modularity in language abilities see Neil Smith and I. Tsimpli, The Mind of a Savant: Language Learning
and Modularity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995). For further application of the notion of modules involved in
psychological capacities see also Simon Baron-Cohen’s Mindblindness for an account of this in our
abilities to ascribe mental properties to ourselves and others; contrast this with the approach of Harold
Wellman in The Child’s Theory of Mind, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990) and Alison Gopnik and
Andrew N. Meltzoff in Words, Thoughts and Theories, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998). One of the
other startling areas in which modularity theses seem strikingly to be confirmed is work on certain
specialised areas of visual recognition, for example face recognition. On this see, Farah in S. M. Kosslyn
and D. N. Osherson, eds., An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, Visual Cognition, (2nd ed., Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), and the chapter on face recognition in Vicki Bruce, Patrick R. Green, and Mark
A. Georgeson, Visual Cognition: Physiology, Psychology, and Ecology, (Hove: Psychology Press, 1996).
See also A. Karmiloff-Smith, Beyond Modularity: a Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science,
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992); and Jay L. Garfield, ed., Modularity in Knowledge Representation
and Natural-language Understanding, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987).
F. THE THEORY OF VISION
The main example of a psychological theory used by contemporary philosophers is the theory of vision.
David Marr’s theory has been one of the most influential, see his Vision: A Computational Investigation
into Human Representation and Processing of Visual Information, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co.,
1982), chapter 1, for an account of the project. John Fisby, Seeing: Illusion, Brain, and Mind, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1979); Philip Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind, (2nd ed., London:
Fontana, 1993), provide non-technical introductions, and philosophical accounts of Marr’s theory can be
found in Sterelny, The Representational Theory of the Mind, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) and in
Michael Tye’s The Imagery Debate (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). A number of papers discuss
internalist versus externalist interpretations of Marr’s theory: Gabriel Segal, ‘Seeing What is Not There’,
Philosophical Review 98 (1989): 189-214; Tyler Burge, ‘Individualism and Psychology’, Philosophical
Review 95 (1986): 3-45; Martin Davies, ‘Individualism and Perceptual Content’, Mind 100 (1991): 461484; and Gabriel Segal, ‘In Defence of a Reasonable Individualism’, Mind 100 (1991): 485-494; Frances
Egan, ‘Must Psychology be Individualistic?’, Philosophical Review (1991): 179-203, and ‘Individualism,
Computation & Perceptual Content’, Mind 101 (1992): 443-459.
For accounts of recent developments in vision research see S. M. Kosslyn and D. N. Osherson, eds., An
Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, Visual Cognition, (2nd ed., Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), in
particular the essays by Nakayama, et al.; Goodale; Kosslyn; and Spelke, et. al. You might also look at
Irvin Rock’s The Logic of Perception, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983), and his posthumous
collection, Indirect Perception, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997); Stephen M. Kosslyn’s Image &
Brain: the Resolution of the Imagery Debate, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994); and possibly Shimon
Ullman’s High Level Vision: Object Recognition and Visual Cognition, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1996). For a very different approach to perception and psychology as a whole see J. J. Gibson, An
Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1979), and his earlier The
Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966). Gibson’s approach is
emphatically anti-representational, yet his views have influenced some of the best recent work in visual
cognition. Further issues about visual cognition are raised in an interdisciplinary volume, Perception,
edited by Kathleen Akins, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), the introduction of which is a good
starting point—some of this work discusses ideas raised in Dennett’s Consciousness Explained, particularly
those of chapter 5; also have a look at Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy, and Bill Brewer, eds., Spatial
Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), see in particular
essays by O’Keefe, Cooper, Spelke, et al., Meltzoff, Atkinson, Braddick, and McCarthy, for psychologists
on various aspects of visual perception and spatial perception in general, and contributions by Campbell,
Peacocke, and Eilan, among philosophers for relevant material.
G. THE EXPLANATORY AND CAUSAL ROLE OF CONTENT
What explanatory or causal role does the content of representational states play in psychological theories?
It has been suggested that content plays no causal role in producing behaviour if a computational theory of
cognition is true, since in a computational system the form, but not the content, of representations
determines how they are processed. See Cummins, Meaning and Mental Representation, (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), chapter 10; and G. Segal, ‘The Causal Efficacy of Content’, Philosophical
Studies 67 (1991): 1-30. Does psychology use or need to use an internalist notion of content, according to
which the content of psychological states supervenes on intrinsic properties of their bearers, or an
externalist notion, according to which content is partly determined by environment? Chapter 2 of Fodor’s
Psychosemantics, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), argues for internalism, while Burge’s
‘Individuation and Causation in Psychology’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1989): 303-322, defends
externalism. See also the papers on internalist and externalist interpretations of Marr’s theory of vision (f),
especially the paper by Burge.
H. LINGUISTICS
Linguistics is the empirical study of language. The theories of Noam Chomsky, arguably the leading
practitioner in the field, have been of particular interest to philosophers. Chomsky rejects any conception
of language as an abstract object or a social practice. Instead, he sees language as a faculty of the mind, and
linguistics as a branch of cognitive psychology which studies the properties of the language faculty. On this
view there are no linguistic facts over and above the psychological facts about individual language users: so
the theory of grammar offers both a description of the structure of a language and a model of a speaker’s
competence (i.e. his or her knowledge of the language). Here we have the much disputed claim for the
psychological reality of grammar. This is of interest to philosophers both because it raises questions of how
to tell which is the correct grammar of a speaker’s language, given his or her linguistic behaviour, and
because competence, as understood by Chomsky, is a species of tacit knowledge.
Furthermore, Chomsky argues that a speaker’s ability to acquire native competence depends upon an
innate knowledge of the principles of universal grammar: a common species-specific inheritance due to the
initial state of the language faculty. Philosophers have contested this innateness hypothesis and questioned
the grounds for postulating tacit knowledge of grammar. For a guide to Chomsky’s views on the above
issues, the nature of rule-following, and non-existence of shared public languages, see his Knowledge of
Language: its Nature, Origins, and Use, (New York: Praeger, 1985), and his ‘Language and Nature’, Mind
104 (1995): 1-61, reprinted in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000). For platonist and behaviourist alternatives to Chomsky’s mentalism, see J. J.
Katz’s useful anthology,The Philosophy of Linguistics, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985). For a
detailed philosophical discussion of Chomsky’s views, there is Fred D’Agostino’s Chomsky’s System of
Ideas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), and a collection of philosophical essays edited by A. George,
Reflections on Chomsky, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989). For an accessible introduction to the empirical
issues surrounding the study of language see Lila R. Gleitman, and Mark Liberman, eds., An Invitation to
Cognitive Science, Vol. 1, Language, (2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press , 1995).
5 Philosophy of Psychoanalysis
This part of the paper examines the central psychoanalytic concepts and issues in the philosophy of
psychoanalysis, with reference to general issues in the philosophy of mind and special attention to the
grounds of legitimation of psychoanalytic claims. Central topics are: the view that psychoanalysis is
continuous with commonsense psychology, the critique of psychoanalysis as a science, the concept of the
divided mind, the concepts of Kleinian theory, the relation of psychoanalytic theory to connectionism (see
above), the psychoanalytic theory of sexuality, and the concept of unconscious mental states.
A. SELECTED WORKS OF FREUD
Editions
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, translated under the general editorship of
James Strachey, in collaboration with Anna Freud, 24 Volumes, (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, c1964). In all libraries.
Pelican Freud Library, translation originally published as ‘The standard edition of the complete psychological works of
Sigmund Freud’, 15 Volumes, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, c1984).
(Volume numbers are to each in turn.)
Texts
You should aim to read as many of as possible; essential reading is starred.
Studies on Hysteria, (1895d [1893-95]) (with Josef Breuer) SE 2/PFL 3, Ch.1, ‘Preliminary communication’.
*
The Interpretation of Dreams, (1900a) SE 4-5/PFL 4, Chs.2-3.
*
On Dreams, (1901a) SE 5.
Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, (1905d) SE 7/PFL 7.
‘Fragments of an analysis of a case of hysteria’, (‘Dora’) (1905e [1901]) SE 7/PFL 8.
‘Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis’, (‘The Ratman’) (1909d) SE 10/PFL 9.
*
Five Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, (1910a [1909]) SE 11 (and in Penguin, Two Short Accounts of Psychoanalysis,
1962).
‘Repression’, (1915d) SE 14/PFL 11.
‘The unconscious’, (1915e) SE 14/PFL 11.
*
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (1916-17 [1915-17]) SE 15-16/PFL 1.
‘From the History of an Infantile Neurosis’, (‘The Wolfman’) (1918b [1914]) SE 24 /PFL 9.
The Ego and the Id, (1923b) SE 19/PFL 11.
*
New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, (1933a [1932]) SE 22/PFL 2.
An Outline of Psychoanalysis, (1940a [1938]) SE 23/PFL 15.
B. REASON EXPLANATION AND
PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPLANATION
Dreams and symptoms; the nature and scope of commonsense explanation by reasons.
Smith, P., and O. R. Jones. 1986. The Philosophy of Mind: an Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
See esp. chs. 9 and 17.
Davidson, D. 1980. ‘Actions, Reasons, Causes’. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Lepore, E., and B. McLaughlin. 1985. ‘Actions, Reasons, Causes, Intentions’. In E. Lepore, and B. McLaughlin, eds.,
Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sayre-McCord, G. 1989. ‘Functional Explanation and Reasons as Causes’. In James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophy of
Mind and Action Theory, Philosophical Perspectives 3, Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Pub. Co.
C. PSYCHOANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION BY REASONS
i. The applicability of the belief/desire model to psychoanalysis
Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Supplementary Preface, pp. xxvi-xxxviii.
Hopkins, J. 1982. ‘Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’. In R. Wollheim, and J. Hopkins, eds. Philosophical
essays on Freud. Cambridge University Press. See esp. pp. xix-xxvi.
Cavell, M. 1986. ‘Metaphor, Dreamwork, and Irrationality’. In E. LePore ed.,Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on
the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford: Blackwell.
Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, ch.2, ‘Analysis of a Specimen Dream’.
Freud, On Dreams, (1901a) SE 5.
ii. Psychoanalysis as an extension of commonsense psychology
The nature of the extension, and its consequences for methodology.
Sketches of the mode of extension
Hopkins, J. 1982. ‘Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’. In R. Wollheim, and J. Hopkins, eds. Philosophical
essays on Freud. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hopkins, J. 1988. ‘Epistemology and Depth Psychology: critical notes on The Foundations of Psychoanalysis’. In Peter
Clark and Crispin Wright, eds., Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Science. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hopkins, J. 1991. ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’. In Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge companion to Freud.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Methodological critiques of psychoanalysis
Popper, K. 1969. ‘Conjectures and Refutations’. In Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge.
3rd ed. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. See esp. pp.33-9.
Grünbaum, A. 1986. ‘Précis of The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique’. In Clark and Wright,
eds.; also (with Commentary and Response) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1986, or, at length, The Foundations
of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pts. I-II.
Methodological defense of psychoanalysis
Hopkins, J. 1992. ‘Psychoanalysis, Interpretation, and Science’. In J. Hopkins, and A. Savile, eds., Psychoanalysis,
Mind, and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim. Oxford: Blackwell.
D. CASE HISTORIES AND
THEIR INTERPRETATION
Dora
Freud, ‘Fragments of an analysis of a case of hysteria’, (‘Dora’) (1905e [1901]) SE 7/PFL 8.
Cummins, R. 1983. The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.4, sec.3, pp.142-61.
The Ratman
Freud, ‘Notes upon a case of obsessional neurosis’, (‘The Ratman’) (1909d) SE 10/PFL 9.
Hopkins, J. 1982. ‘Introduction: Philosophy and Psychoanalysis’. In Wollheim and Hopkins, eds., pp.xxx-xxxvi.
Gay, P. 1988. Freud: A Life for Our Time. London: Dent. See index.
Glymour, C. 1982. ‘Freud, Kepler and the Clinical Evidence’. In Wollheim and Hopkins, eds.
E. FREUD AND CONNECTIONISM
The text of Freud’s which this topic is concerned with is his ‘Project for a scientific psychology’, Standard
Edition 1 (not in Pelican Freud Library).
Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Ch.1.
Glymour, C. 1991. ‘Freud’s Androids’. In Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
F. PSYCHOANALYSIS, AKRASIA AND SELF-DECEPTION
Davidson, D. 1980. ‘How is weakness of the Will Possible?’. In Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Pears, D. 1984. Motivated Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chs. 1-3, and, optionally, Chs. 6-10.
——. 1975. ‘The Paradoxes of Self-deception’. In Questions in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Duckworth.
G. DIVISION OF THE MIND
Freud, ‘The unconscious’, SE 14/PFL 11.
Freud, ‘The dissection of the psychical personality’, New Introductory Lectures, Lecture 31.
Sartre, J.-P. 1958. Being and Nothingness: an Essay on Phenomenological Ontology. Translated by Hazel E. Barnes.
London: Routledge. pp.50-4.
Davidson, D. 1982. ‘Paradoxes of Irrationality’. In Hopkins and Wollheim, eds.; or ‘Deception and Division’, in Jon
Elster ed., The Multiple Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Pears, D. 1984. Motivated Irrationality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Ch.5; or ‘Goals and Strategies of Self-deception’, in
Elster, ed., The Multiple Self..
Cummins, R. 1983. The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Ch.4, sec.3, pp.142-61.
H. FREUD’S THEORY OF SEXUALITY
Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, (1905d) SE 7/PFL 7.
Freud, Introductory Lectures, SE 16/PFL 1, Lectures 20 and 21.
Wollheim, R. 1991. Freud. 2nd ed. London: Fontana. Ch.4.
Neu, J. 1991. ‘Freud and Perversion’. In Jerome Neu, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Freud. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Klein, M. ‘The Development of a Child’, and ‘Personification in the play of Children’, in her Love, Guilt and
Reparation, and other works, 1921-1945. London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1975. (see
below, topic 8).
I. INTERNAL OBJECTS
Freud, ‘Mourning and melancholia’, (1917e [1915]) SE 14/PFL 11.
Hinshelwood, R. 1991. A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. 2nd ed. London: Free Association. See the entries on Internal
Objects.
J. KLEIN
Mitchell, J., ed., The Selected Melanie Klein, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986) contains a good selection. Melanie
Klein’s complete works (Hogarth Press, 1975) are available in libraries. Klein’s most important papers can also be
found in the Virago paperback editions, Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921-1945 (LGR), and Envy
and Gratitude and Other Works 1946-1963 (EG) (London: Virago, 1988).
Essential reading
‘The development of a child’, in LGR.
‘Early development’, in LGR.
‘Personification in the play of children’, in LGR.
‘A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states’, in LGR.
‘The importance of symbol-formation in the development of the ego’, in LGR.
‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’, in EG.
On Klein
Segal, H. 1973. Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth. New enl. ed. London: Karnac and the
Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1988; or
Segal, H. 1979. Klein. London: Fontana.
Hopkins, J. 1987. ‘Synthesis in the Imagination: Psychoanalysis, Infantile Experience and the Concept of an Object’. In
J. Russell, ed., Philosophical Perspectives on Developmental Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hinshelwood, R. 1991. A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. 2nd ed. London: Free Association. To be consulted for its
entries on individual Kleinian concepts.
Segal, H. 1981. The Work of Hanna Segal: A Kleinian Approach to Clinical Practice. New York: Aronson. See esp.
‘The importance of symbol-formation’.
——. 1991. Dream, Phantasy and Art. London: Routledge. See esp. ch.3, on symbolism.
Projective identification
Klein, ‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’, in EG.
Hinshelwood, R. 1991. A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought. 2nd ed. London: Free Association. ‘Projective Identification’,
‘Projection’, ‘Splitting’.
Spillius, Elizabeth. ed. 1988. Melanie Klein Today: Developments in Theory and Practice. London: Routledge. Part
Two, especially Introduction, Betty Joseph, and Herbert Rosenfeld.
Wollheim, R. 1984. The Thread of Life. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, pp.270-5.
——. 1982. ‘The Bodily Ego’. In Wollheim and Hopkins, eds.
K. UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL STATES
Freud, ‘The unconscious’, (1915) SE 14 /PFL 11, Pt. I, ‘Justification for the concept of the unconscious’.
Searle, J. 1989. ‘Consciousness, Unconsciousness, and Intentionality’. Philosophical Topics 17: 193-209.
See also Philosophy of Mind on Consciousness and Experience.