PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
PROPERTY USED FOR RELIGIOUS
Thomas A , B e a l l , J r .
a
1
FOR
PURPOSES
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS
FOR
PROPERTY USED FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
by
Thomas A. Beall, Jr.
Prepared for
Professor Cummins
Texas Tech School of Law
Fall 1979
2
In 1976, Martin A. Larson conservatively estimated
that there was "at least $118 billion" worth of church
owned realty that was exempt from real property taxation.*
Figuring ad valorem taxes to average three and one2
half percent of that value,
Mr. Larson stated "the exemp-
tion of this property constitutes an indirect gift from the
general public of more than $4 billion."-^
While the real
effect of such exemptions are difficult to measure objectively, it seems the fiscal problems New York City and
Cleveland are experiencing would be reduced if their tax
bases included some religious-owned property that is currently exempt.
This paper seeks to examine the judicial
treatment of church owned property and the exemptions granted
or denied to that property.
Such a discussion will include
the reasoning behind exemptions, the basis for granting
exemptions in different circumstances, and the alternatives to best implement a religious property tax exemption.
Real property taxes are assessed to people "according
to their ownership, use or occupation"
of that property.
(It will be later shown that ownership or occupation of
property are not necessarily determinitive in the granting
of exemptions by the courts^ instead, it is the use of
the property that resolves the exemption issue.)
entities own, use, and occupy property.
titiled to property tax exemptions?
Religious
Why are they en-
The revenue gained from
taxation goes to pay for municipal services to all living
3
Beall -1^-
within the taxing jurisdiction.
These benefits include water
and street services, police and fire protection, and other
intangible benefits; all of which benefit religious societies
despite the fact that they make no contribution in the form
of taxes to pay for thetir services.
Again, why are these
religious institutions entitled to property tax exemptions?
The objections to property tax exemptions seem valid.
Any exemption serves to "narrow the tax base, thereby increasing the tax load on owners of taxable property.
Mr. Larson has concluded that if church owned property were
taxed, the total tax levy "for all residential and commer-
n
cial properties could be reduced by at least 12$...."
Other objections are that the exemptions become "an in- o
direct subsidy.. .which ordinarily is renewable annually" , aasif
that they are not equitably granted, and that they are unequal in total dollars between different communities,
"thereby creating disproportionate burdens among local
Q
communities."
As the exemptions are renewable annually,
and usually without any investigation by the assessor as
to the current use of the property, the exemptions "tend
to perpetuate community wishes of an earlier day.
In
addition, the range and extent of exemptions can grow well
10
beyond justifiable limits."
Although the above objections may be valid, little
can be done to alleviate the problems caused by these exemptions.
The United States Supreme Court recently
held
11
in Walz v. Tax Commission ®f City of New York
exemption to churches were
4
/""sic J
that "tax
not violative of the
ueaxi.
Religious Clauses of the First Amendment."
12
Writing for
the majority, Chief Justice Burger suggested that the elimination of exemptions would increase government involvewent
assessments, levies, tax liens and fore-
closures, plus direct confrontation of tax officials with
religious church
officials) to such an extent as to amount
13
to an unconstitutional entanglement. ^
Thus, the tax
savings Mr. Larson feels exist through taxing church
property perhaps cannot be constitutionally realized.
The
majority opinion did not deal with whether the tax exemption amounts to a subsidy? but, in his dissent Justice
Ik
Douglas expressly stated, "a tax exemption is a subsidy."
The problems of unequal valuationsvdisproportionate burdens among different taxing jurisdictions are inherent in a
system where each state authorizes its respective exemptions, and each taxing jurisdiction within that state
has the ability to grant or deny exemptions (until challenged in the courts).
From the standpoint of efficient and
uniform administration of the property tax, the best
solution would appear to be adoption of uniform property
tax code.
While such a proposal has its merits,
the unique circumstances of thousands of nationwide taxing
jurisdictions would make such an undertaking a formidable task*
The last objection mentioned (growth of exemp-
tions beyond justifiable limits) seems to be the- easiest
to overcome.
Any limitation on the growth of exemptions
would require making use of the property the key criteria for exemptions, and a strict interpretation of exemp-
Beall -1^-
tions statutes by the courts.
The generally accepted reason for granting property tax
exemptions to religious entities is that such institutions
perform social welfare services that would otherwise be
1
assumed by the government.
J
Despite the populartity of
basing exemptions on benefits conferred to the public, the
concept (or rationalization) has its problems.
In Walz,
the Chief Justice noted
it was "unnecessary to justify
16
the tax exemptions"
on the basis of social benefits;
continuing, he said that such action would "introduce an
element of governmental evaluation and standards
as to the
17
worth of particular social welfare programs" ' that might
eventually become a constitutionally prohibited entanglement »
An exemption is an exception to taxation; therefore
any claim lsS> exemption should be strictly construed
against the claimant, 18
and any doubts should be resolved
against the claimant.
By requiring the claimant to show
the institution is within existing statutory requirements
and entitled to an exemption, the
1 Q basis for granting
emptions will not be expanded.^'
ex-
Religious property tax exemptions are broadly author20
ised in state constitutions,
and then specifically set
out in the statutes.
21
These statutes often grant exemp22
tions for property "used exclusively"
for religious
purposes; the problems for the courts have arisen in trying
to determine whether a use of property is exclusive, and
6
Beall -7-
whether such use is ultimately for religious purposes.
The courts have not been consistent in their determinations of whether to grant exemptions and if
what basis.
on
While different rules could be expected (or
at least understood) from the different states, there are
instances in which the same circumstances yield different
results even in the same taxing jurisdiction.
In City of
East Orange v. Church of Our Lady of the Most Blessed
Sacrament,
J
the Board of Tax Appeals of New Jersey denied
full exemption to the Church.
The property consisted of a
Church with an 1 adjoining residence (the two were connected
by a passageway).
At issue was whether the residence was
a parsonage (and thereby entitled to a deduction off the
assessed value), or a building used exclusively for religious worship and therefore entitled to a full exemption.
The Board of Tax Appeals felt the building was a parsonage;
noting that "in every parsonage there is a certain amount
24
ot Church business conducted,"
but the use of the build-
ing was nonetheless as a parsonage.
Then three years later,
with the same taxing jurisdiction, the same Church and property, and the same attorney's arguing the case for each
respective position, the New Jersey Department of Taxation
and'Finance, Division of Tax Appeals held that the Church
was entitled to a full exemption.
J
There the court notes
the "property was more than actually occupied as a parsonage.
It was actually and exclusively used for religious
9A
purposes."
As the facts did not indicate any signifi-
cant change in the use of the property,
the different
iju
Beall -1^-
ev
holdings can only be explamd through different interpretations of exclusive use by the two courts.
In the second
case, the Division of Tax Appeals noted that the parsonage's
residential use was "incident to the performance of the
27
exempt activities"
and that exemption for such use was
PR
"obviously intended by the Legislature...."
The inability of the New Jersey courts to find an
appropriate definition of exclusive use is not unique.
The California Courts have stated the statutes require
"a strict but reasonable construction,
and that used ex-
clusively should include those uses which are "incidental
to and reasonably necessary for
30the accomplishment of religious or Charitable purposes."^
In granting an exemption to
a parsonage as used exclusively for religious purposes, the
Oklahoma Court
31
32
quotes with approval a South Dakota case;^
the South Dakota Court noted the exemption was " not restricted to property used exclusively for public worship,
but embraces ail property exclusively —
used for religious purposes."-''^
that is, primarily
/"emphasis added
J
In New York, used exclusively means "the primary use of
the realty must be in furtherance of the permitted corporate
purposes....'
As might be expected, when exclusive is
defined as primary an exemption is usually granted.
A strict or literal interpretation of exclusive use
often results in the denial of an exemption.
Thus, the
acquisition of vacant lots in anticipation of future needs
resulted in a denial of tax exemption.^
Although the court
acknowledged the property might be used as a rectory in the
8
ceajLi.
- ( -
future, they pointed out its use at that time did not
serve religious purposes.^
While a strict interpretation of exclusive use would
serve to eliminate exemptions for property that does not
generate a public benefit (such as the vacant lots mentioned above), there is a legitimate question as to where the
line should be drawn.
If a strict construction was gener-
ally accepted by the courts, certain property (such as
parsonages, parking lots, and camp grounds) could be held
taxable, as the use of such property would not be exclusively for religious purposes.
Gould such a construction be
extended to deny an exemption to a Church because a
childrens nursery was operated on the property during
worship services, or because members held social meetings
in the Church?
Two courts have considered such an inter-
pretation and both have rejected it.
A Pennsylvania court
pointed out such a construction would "reduce the situation to the absurdity of taxing the space in Church between the bodies of the congregation or between their
heads and the ceiling."-^
An earlier Pennsylvannia court
granted an exemption for the storage (according to the provisions of Jewish lav/) of old books, sketches, scriptures,
38
and belongings of the congregation.
The storage of this
material was equated with the storing of coal or oil in
the basement for heating? taxation for such a use would be
unreasonable, as the "law contemplates no such overliteral
30
construction.7
Exclusive use is not always the criteria for exemption.
S
aeaii -o-
The Minnesota Supreme Court noted the test for exemption
would be whether the property was "primarily —
that is
principally and generally— used for religious purposes...
There the property was found to be primarily used as a
residence, instead of for religious purposes, and ao exemption was denied.
Still other cases have turned on
whether the property was an actual place of religious
worship.
&
kl Bishop Davies
In the Texas case of Davrs v. Meyer,
appealed the trial court's denial of exemption for a onehundred fifty-three acre church camp, (exemption was
granted for two acres on which were located an open air
chapel and the ministers residence); Bishop Davies argued
the camp should be held exempt as an actual place of
religious worship.
ll?
tutes,
In a strict construction of the sta-
the state Supreme Court noted the camp was used
for religious education, not religious worship.
The court
distinguished the two saying " /~w__7 hile worship includes
teaching and education; education, even religious
k'i education, does not necessarily include worship."
In
trying to avoid the extreme of an all or nothing strict
interpretation, the court was careful to point out their
holding was "that the fact finder in this case was supported by the evidence in the conclusion that the greater
part of Camp issilas was used for purposes other than religious worship,"14'^ and not "that any program which is
collateral to religious worship will defeat an exemption..
While the court's decision seemed to turn on the basis of
•oeaj-x - y -
use of the property for religious education (instead of for
religious worship), it should be pointed out that approximately two-thirds of the acreage was unimproved vacant land!
for purposes of tax exemption, it was not used for religious
purposes.
The U. S. Supreme Court denied an exemption for pro-
k6
perty located in the District of Columbia
because the
property was not "reasonably needed" or "actually used for
the convenient enjoyment of the building as a church."
Here the church had intentionally placed its church building
on the side of the property (rather than centering it) so they
could lease the other side of the property they were not
using. The Court concluded such action made the lots
subject to taxation "even before they had been actually so
kg
leased."
Again use is the determinitive factor.
The
property here was owned by the church, and its location was
adjacent to the church building; but the fact that it was
not used for church purposes resulted in taxation of the pro^ferty.
Perhaps the parsonage has created the most confusion for
the courts where statutes do not expressly exempt them.
While the minister living in the parsonage acts to further
the interest of the church and its beliefs, and while religious counseling and even religious events occur in
the parsonage, the fact remains that the use of the property is as a residence.
The Illinois Court in First Congregational Church of
De Kalb v. Board of Review of De Kalb County considered this
n
JrieaJ.i -1U-
issue, and found the parsonage to be taxable.^
There the
court's determination was based on language requiring exelusive use,-'
mary use.
but they had defined this in terms of pri-
Even so, th^court noted "the primary use of a
parsonage is as a home for the pastor and his family....
and it therefore did not meet the requirements for exemption.
A similar conclusion was reached in Township of
Teaneck v, Luthern Bible Institute. J
Relying upon ex-
elusive use language, •J the New Jersey court advised that to
qualify for an exemption "the use to which the property is
devoted is the essential consideration and not the character
or status of the owner. ^
The court concluded the property
in question was not used so as to qualify for an exemption
as its "predominant utility"- ^ was as a residence; the existance of a study
in the home (for religious consultation,
etc.) was not enough to grant an exemption.
Where there is exclusive use language in the statutes,
and an exemption for a parsonage is granted, the courts
seem to rely on a broad definition of exclusive use.
The
Oklahoma Court (who accepted the definition of exclusive
as "incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment*'^ of religious purposes) granted an exemption
for a parsonage; as the pastor of the church was "engaged
in full time ministerial work" which served "various reli<7
gious purposes,"-'' the property was exempt from taxation.
For provisions exempting a parsonage, the question
becomes how many ministers of the church are entitled to
a "parsonage"—with its accompanying exemption.
In 1970,
Beall -li-
the Texas Supreme Court found the residence of a District
Superintendent for the Methodist Church exempt from taxation.-'®
Although the Superintendant's duties included administrative functions, he was an ordained minister whose job also
included serving the various churches in his district.
The court concluded that a party seeking an exemption would
not have to serve one particular church (as opposed to all
churches in the district), but would have to work in the
ministry of the church.
The Superintendant did so, and
was therefore entitled to an exemption.
Relying on this de-
cision, the eourt of Civil Appeals later granted an exemption to the residence of a church's Minister of M u s i c . ^
Neither court identified factors v/hich would result in the
granting of an exemption, but discussion in the McCreless
60
case
seems to indicate the claimant must be involved in
the ministry of the church in order to receive an exemption.
A parking lot (from a property tax standpoint) is
much like a parsonage.
Neither are essential in the worship
process, but both serve to accomodate the member of the
church; and, in certain circumstances,.the absence of either
might seriously affect the continued existance of a church,
An exemption was granted from taxation of a parking lot
located in downtown Miami by the Florida Supreme Court in
Central Baptist Church of Miami, Florida, Incorporated v^
Dade County 61 because the property was "used for church or
religious purposes." 62
The additional fact that the church
rented the parking spaces during the week (using the proceeds for religious purposes) was not enough to deny an exemption; the court felt these rentals were "reasonably
Beall -1^-
incidental to the primary use of the church property... for..
63
e
religious purposes.... * "' This case was decided in 1968;
Increasing parking problems in a downtown metropolitan area
may have been a significant problem.
Eleven years earlier, the Pennsylvania court was not
willing to accept the arguement that our modern society
made the church parking lot necessary either as a convenience or as anl'ad;junct...to the church's fulfilling its
purpose as a place of worship."
As the parking lot was
not used for worship purposes, it was deemed taxable.
Even
though the church was located in Philadelphia, parking and
traffic problems (if any) in 1959 may not have been significant.
If use of the property is to be the deciding
factor in granting an exemption, then the existance of
parking problems should have no bearing on the exemption
issue; but the Florida Court seems to believe otherwise.
Churches and religious institutions have also sought exemptions for large tracts of acreage; the property is held
for use as church camp1; retreats, and alternative meeting
places for worship services. Like parking conditions, the
size of the property (in terms of acreage) should rot be
a factor in considering whether property is taxable; but,
the courts seem more consistent in ca?r 5 of this type.
Perhaps the courts feel comfortable in cases oi this nature
because they can grant a partial exemption for property
used
for religious purposes , and still impose taxes
on portions of the acreage not used for religious purpose
within the respective statutes.
14
£eai±-ij)
Two interesting cases will be considered; in both
the use of the acreage was the decisive factor in determining whether an exemption should be granted.
A partial
exemption was granted in Franciscan Fathers v. Town of
Pittsfield6^ for property used and occuppied in "actual
service"66
The land included orchards, vegetable gardens,
hayfields, pasture laud, and a twenty-six acre artificial
pond.
The pond and the thirty acre hayfield were found to
be taxable, as the court noted the "use of land for hunting,
hiking, and fishing is not the type of activity related to
religious activities which the Legislature
67
empt from taxation."
sought to ex-
All other land (the orchards, veg-
etable gardens, and pasture land) was exempt.
The Fran-
ciscan (who lived on the 68property) had taken vows of
poverty; having no money
their own.
to purchase food, they grew
As the Franciscans made no profits from their
produce, (all was either consumed, or traded in exchange
for other necessaries^, the court concluded such use was
in furtherance of their religion.
A perhaps even more interesting case is Greater New
York Corporation of Seventh-Day Adventist v. Town of Dover.
Here, following a partial exemption, the New York court exempted the entire two-hundred acre tract.
Even more
surprising than such a large exemption is the fact that
the property consisted of a golf course, tennis courts,
swimming pool, lake frontage, and various cabins and farmhouses.
The previous owner used the property as a country
69
Beall -1^-
club.
Exemption was granted because the
. . . Seventh—Day Adventist believe that the
whole man must be ministered to, not only the
spiritual but the physical and mental as well,
and that the rural acreage provided by the
camp was necessary to the church's program because it is only in the quietness of the countryside that a person can meet his God and
communicate with him in prayer. 70
As the Seventh-Day Adventists needed rural acreage to
conduct aspects of their worship (and used it to that end),
an exemption was granted.
Without intending to criticize
the decision of the court, their decision nonetheless
seems to imply if a thousand or two thousand acre tract
were involved, an exemption could still be granted to
groups such as the Seventh-Day adventist whose worship includes prayer in the privacy of the countryside.
Df use is to be the prime consideration in granting
of exemptions, then the fact that income is received should
be of no consequence; but, a literal interpretation of use
should be controlling.
No one has ever suggested that
tithings during a worship service would destroy a property
tax exemption; but, the rental of church owned property to
another should prevent an exemption.
As discussed earlier,
the U.S. Supreme Court felt property could not be rented
71
and still enjoy an exemption.
As might be expected, the state courts are not in
full agreement on this issue either.
We have already
seen that the Florida court permitted a downtown Miami Church
to lease its parking lot during the week. Even though the
72
court acknowledged this was a "commercial use,"' it was
16
x;ea s.J.
not "sufficiently divergent"^ to prevent a tax exemption.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals permitted a Jewish
synagogue to rent a portion of its building to "civic or74
ganizations, schools and other churches "
even though an
income of approximately $10,000, a year was realized.
Noting
that the income was "devoted exclusively to
7 ethe maintenance
of the actual place of religious worship,
the court con-
cluded an exemption was proper because "the primary and overwhelming preponderant use of the property...
/"was J
7 f>
actual place of religious worship..."'
as an
Considering the two
cases above, one begins to wonder if a church could operate
a commercial enterprise so long as the proceeds (and profits) were used to further that church's beliefs.
Many
religious seek to "minister to others," or "spread the
word" , and in so doing often send representatives to underdeveloped nations to carry out this goal.
It seems logi-
cal that if a religion can lease its premises and use the
proceeds to maintain the physical building that they should
also be permitted to engage in a commercial business and
use the proceeds to perpetuate their religion.
Or does it?
(No one has seemed to question the use of church property
for"bake sales" or "car washes.")
In light of this discussion, it is somewhat surprising
that property used to disseminate religious programs for radio
stations, and tjn
to distribute written religious
ey Q material was
held taxable.' '
Just as the Dayj.es court'
distinguished
religious education from religious worship, the Sfourt of
Civil Appeals here distinguished religious work from religious worship.
The court felt exemption statutes must
Beall -16-
be strictly construed against exemption, and "in favor of the
79
&SBL state and taxation."'7
Should there be doubts as to
what is exempt, such doubts "must operate against
PA the owners
of the property and m
favor of the public...."
When con-
sidered by itself this opinion seems fair and proper, but
when compared to the cases discussed above it seems unjust.
Alternatives to property tax exemptions (in general)
ftl
have been proposed.
Since the state (through its
legislature) grants exemptions, but the local taxing jurisdictions lose the revenue, it was suggested that all prop perty be taxed and then have
senior levels of government
82
issue offsetting grants.
Such a plan would aid the
budgets of local taxing jurisdictions, but it seems that
taxpayers in general would still be paying the same amount
in taxes—only to a different entity.
Another alternative
would be to grant exemptions for the use of the property,
but impose "user charges" for essential services such as
St .ice protection,
fire and pi
water and sewage services, and
Oo
garbage disposal.
With the Supreme Court's decision in
Walz, however, such options are no longer available.
In
trying to minimize governmental entanglements with religion, the court felt such grants (or subsidies) "would
be a relationship pregnant with involvement and..,could
encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of...standards."
While the Court
did not specifically consider user charges, they did conclude appellant Walz. had not established a "correlation
between the payment of an ad valorem property tax and
.tseaii -17-
the receipt of these /"fire and police protection J
muni-
cipal benefits.
It seems clear that, as a constitutional matter,
tax exemptions for property owned by religious institutions
are here to stay.
The granting of an exemption is the
government action which would involve the least amount
of
prohibited entanglements between church and state.
That being the case, the question remaining is how to
best administer property tax exemptions for religious
institutions?
This writer has consistently taken the position that
the use of tax property should be the determinitive factors in the decision of whether to grant an exemption
to church or religion—owned property.
To avoid problems in
strict constructions of statutes, the exemption granting
use should not be "exclusive"; rather, it should be the
primary use to which the property is put.
Under the stri-
dent interpretation of exclusive use, with all considerations of equity and fairness aside, a. court could find
a church building taxable because non-religious or non?
worshiping activities (such as a children's nursery) were
permitted in the building.
Such a result seems unreason-
able .
Relying on a primary use standard, parsonages should
be deemed taxable (unless statutes specifically exempt
them), as the primary use is as a residence.
Similarly,
a parking lot is merely a storage area for cars of those
IS
Beall -18-
who corns to the church to worship.
The same principal can
be extended to church camps and similar large tracts of
acreage? size should not be a factor.
If the entire tract
is used for religious worship, or statutorily approved purposes, as it was in the Seventh-Day Adventists case
an exemption should be grantedj but, if the tract
property not used for religious purposes,
87
* then
included
or according
88
to statutory requirements,
an exemption should be denied.
Income producing property would be subject to the same
test.
Thus, a parking lot which
89 is leased during the week
for income should be taxable,
parking cars.
as its primary use is for
"Meeting halls" are no different.*^0
A
church exists to provide forum for religious worship, not
to provide a meetingI Vplace for local civic organizations.
Churches which pEsasEEfc others to use part of their property
for meetings should be presumed to have waived any entitlements to an exemption.
It is recognized that in determining the primary use
of property, (i.e. as a place of worship or as a public
meeting hall), the local tax assessors might become
91 involved in an administrative evaluation which Walz 7
to prohibit.
Such a possibility could exist.
seems
However, to
grant an exemption, the tax assessor must determine if the
property is being used for religious purposes according
to statute.
This determination would necessitate a review
of all property owned by the religion claiming exemption;
in conducting this review of the property, the tax assessor
could determine the primary use of all the property,
jjeaxi —x y —
Although making the primary use of property the standard in
exemption situations will not end municipal monetary pro|*Meras, nor will it end litigation in this area, it nonetheless seems to be the proper alternative.
Earlier in
this paper, the problem of exemptions growing beyond
justified limits was presented.
If such a problem is to be
ceased, or at least minimized,/vthe primary use of property
should determine whether it is entitled to a tax exemption.
NOTES
^Martin A. Larson and C. Stanley Lowell, The Religious
Empire (Washington -- New York* Robert B. Luce Co., Inc.,
1976), at 18.
2
Id.
''Id.
4
Frederic H. Finnis, An Introduction to Real Property
Taxation (Canada: Sir Issac Pitman Limited, 1972J", at 2.
^As a practical matter, the courts do not grant exemptions,
the tax jurisdiction does. Disputes arise when the taxing
jurisdiction assesses taxes on property the religious entity
feels should be exempt, and they go to court for resolution
of their disagreements.
^supra note 4, at 89.
7
supra note 1, at 19*
g
supra note 4, at 89.
9
H.
10
Id #
11
397 U.S. 664 (1970).
12
Id. at 680.
13
14Id. at 674.
Id. at 704, (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Jur
* M s t a t e and Local Taxation I 362 (1973) •
For a historical~perspective, see "Tax Exemptions of American
Church Property" 14 Mich. L. Rev. 646 (1915-16). The author
suggests exemptions were originally granted because the church
served as the town meeting place, and was effectively a
municipal building, and therefore exempt.
16
supra note 1 1 , at 674.
17
M'
18
Annot., 55 A.L.R.3d 356 (1974) at 395-96.
19m-
20
Tex, Const« art. 8, § 2 .
" 1 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann, art. 7150, i 1 (Vernon i 9 6 0 ) .
QQ
at § 1(a).
23
2
21 N.J. Misc. 374, 34 A.2d 29? (1943).
^Id. at 298.
25
City _of East Orange v. Church of Our Lady of the Most
Blessed Sacrament, 25 N.J. Misc. 58, 50 A.2d 390 H W T T .
26
Id. at 392.
27
Id.
28Id,
t ,
29
Serra Retreat v. Los Angeles County, 35 Cal.2d 775,
221 P.2d 59, 5l~(T950y.
30
Id.
31
Immanuel Baptist Church v. Glass, 497 P.2d 757, 55
A.L.R.3d 349 (1972).
32
State ex rel. Eveland v. Erickson, 44 S.D. 63, 182 N.W.
315 (192577"
33
supra note 31. at 759.
34
Greater New York Corporation of Seventh -- Day
Adventists v. Town of Dover, 29 App. Div. 2d 861, 288 N.Y.S.
2d 335 (2d Dep T tT appeal dismissed,23 N.Y.2d 682, 243 N.E.2d
150, 295 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1968).
3
j^ector, Wardens and Vestrymen of Christ Church in
Short Hills v. Millburn Tg., 29 N.J. Misc. 123, 57 A.2d 506
(1948).
36
I d . at 508-09.
37
-^'Second Church of Christ Scientist of Philadephia v.
City of Philadelphia, 398 Pa. 65', 15? A. 2d 54, 75 "A.L.R. 2d
1103 U959T.
38
Chevra Achewa Chased Anshe Chevarl v. City of Philadelphia,
116 Pa, Super. 101, 1 T^TT. 779" (1935)7™"
39
Id. at 782.
40
Ramsey County v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 45 Minn.
229, 4? N.W. ?83, ?84 (1891).
4l
Pavies v. Meyer, 541 S.W.2d 827-(Tex. 1976).
supra note 21, at § 1(a).
iseaxx
^ s u p r a note 4l, at 830.
46
Gibbons v. District of Columbia. 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
at 40?.
48
49
5
Id.
2 5 4 111. 220, 98 N.E. 275 (1912).
°Id. at 276.
51
Id,
52
2 0 N.J. 86, 1 1 8 A.2d 809 (1955).
53
Id. at 810.
J
Id. at 811.
Id.
supra note 31» at 760.
58
Mo
Creless v. City of San Antonio, 454 S.W.2d 393 (Tex,
1970).59
~~
" '
City of Amarillo v. Paramount Terrace Christian Church
of Amarillo, 530 S.W.2d 323 (Tex, Civ^ App. — Amarillo"
1975. writ ref. n.r.e.).
supra note 58.
61
216 So. 2d 4 (1968).
62
Id.
6
at 6.
3ld.
64
supra note 37.
65
9 7 N.H. 396, 89 A. 752 (1952).
66
Id. at 756.
67
Id.
* 4
68
The Franciscans held the property open for all wishing
religious guidance. Retreats were conducted, with no charge,
but donations were accepted. All donations received were
used in the upkeep of the property, and for purchase of necessary goods. The amounts received were nominal.
^ s u p r a note 34.
?0
Id. at 335.
71
supra note 46.
72
supra note 6l, at 6.
?3
74Id.
V
Davis v. Congregation Agudas Achim, 456 S.W.2d 459 (Tex,
Civ, App, ~
75
San Antonio 1970, no writ.)7
J
Id. at 465.
77
Radio Bible Hour. Inc., v. Hurst — Euless Independent
School District. 341 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. Civ. App. -- Fort Worth
I960/" writ ref. n.r.e .).
nO
supra note 4l.
79
7
supra note 77, at 469.
80
id.
8l
supra note 4.
'Id. at 90.
82.
83
Id. at 88-89.
84f*
supra note 11, at 675,
85
Id. at 676.
86
supra note 34,
87
88
see supra note 65.
see supra note 41.
89
' Mi _s.ee jn^ra. note 61.
90
But see supra note ?4.
91
supra note 11.
,<•'
U