FOOD SECURITY IN ETHIOPIA: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE
PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME
BY: KIERRA ZOELLICK, APRIL 30, 2014
I.
Introduction
One of Ethiopia’s primary roadblocks to sustained poverty reduction is food insecurity.1
Ethiopia’s history of famine has demonstrated that a significant portion of the population is in a
perilous position with regards to their access to food. As a result, the Ethiopian government is
attempting to address several of the components of food insecurity through the Productive Safety
Net Programme (PSNP), which is designed to make people’s access to food more consistent and
therefore lead to greater resilience for when shocks hit.2 When people’s access to food is
assured, they are able to save and invest their income during the good times, which in turn will
help to pull them out of poverty and protect them from later food shocks. The program began in
2005 and still continues today.3 It has generally been hailed as a success, and it can teach
development agencies lessons about the value of complementary activities, the methods of good
targeting, the importance of the governance of the recipient country, the positives and negatives
of cash transfers as opposed to food transfers, and the impact of a good program structure.
This report begins by giving an overview of the country context for Ethiopia; section two
discusses poverty and economic progress, while section three examines the role of drought in
Ethiopia. The following two sections give an overview of the PSNP, explaining its goals and its
implementation as well as its impact. Section six discusses lessons practitioners can take away
from the PSNP experience. Section seven concludes.
II.
Poverty in Ethiopia
A significant issue Ethiopia must address in its poverty reduction efforts is food
insecurity. Many Ethiopians rely on rainfed agriculture – it accounts for almost half of the
1
Daniel O. Gilligan, John Hoddinott and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, “The Impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety
Net Programme and Its Linkages,” Journal of Development Studies, 45 (2009), 1684–1706 (p. 1684)
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220380902935907>.
2
Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Stephen Devereux, “Cash Transfers and High Food Prices: Explaining Outcomes on
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme,” Food Policy, 35 (2010), 274–85 (p. 275)
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2010.01.001>.
3
“Catching Ethiopians Before They Fall | U.S. Agency for International Development”, 2012
<http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/frontlines/aid-action-delivering-results/catching-ethiopians-they-fall>
[accessed 17 April 2014].
1
livelihood for 80-85% of the population.4 However, rainfed agriculture is highly dependent on
the weather. That fluctuation in weather patterns means that the income of a significant portion
of the population also can fluctuate wildly.5 If Ethiopia experiences a drought and people’s
crops fail, then many households experience a crisis. In the past, Ethiopia has relied on
emergency food aid to help alleviate the crisis.6 Between 1994 and 2003, more than five million
people received emergency food aid, and emergency food aid has been the primary type of aid
given to Ethiopia.7 However, this ad hoc aid has been unpredictable and often late.
International donors would send vast amounts of food without regard for the effect of a sudden
influx of food on local economies and without considering its implication (or lack thereof) for
development goals.8 More recently, international aid donors have recognized the need to have
steady, predictable transfers if long-lasting development is going to occur.
That being said, Ethiopia has made great strides in eradicating poverty in the recent past.
From 2004-2011, Ethiopia averaged 10.6% economic growth.9 The poverty rate has also
declined regardless of which measure is being used. Table 1 below, from Ethiopian Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), outlines the poverty reduction nationally as well
as in the urban and rural contexts.10
Table 1 – Change in Poverty Over Time
4
“Africa - Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP)”
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21072837~menuP
K:1804110~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html> [accessed 2 April 2014].
5
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse.
6
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse.
7
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 275.
8
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1685.
9
The World Bank, Ethiopia Economic Update, 2012, p. 1.
10
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Development and Poverty in Ethiopia 1995/96-2010/11, 2013,
p. 32.
2
Over the entire country, consumption also rose by 20% between 2004/5 and 2010/11.11
However, though both rural and urban areas have experienced economic growth, urban centers
continue to have lower poverty rates than rural areas.12 The consumption growth rate also varies
significantly from region to region.13
MoFED also tracks “food poverty.” From 1995/96 to 2010/11, food poverty has in fact
fallen significantly, though as is true for poverty, food poverty is higher in rural than urban
areas.14 Table 2, also from MoFED, shows trends in food poverty.15 Theoretically, the PSNP
should help decrease the number of food poor in Ethiopia and food poverty has fallen over the
course of the project’s existence (though of course many factors beyond PSNP may contribute to
the drop). 16
Table 2 – Changes in Food Poverty Over Time
11
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, p. 31.
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, pp. 31–32.
13
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, p. 35.
14
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, p. 30.
15
Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, p. 34.
16
Food poverty indices relate to a bundle of food. Whereas the values in Table 1 take into account all consumption,
food poverty (and, by extension, the values in Table 2) only accounts for the amount of money a household needs
for food. All other calculations are the same: the headcount index is how many people fall below the line, the
poverty gap is how far away from the line people are, and the poverty severity index accounts for inequality below
the line. In 2010/11, the food poverty line (in birr, the Ethiopian currency) was 1,985 birr/adult person/year, and the
total poverty line was 3,781 birr/adult person/year.
12
3
Overall, Ethiopia has made great strides recently in its efforts to eradicate poverty, and it
has experienced impressive economic growth. However, there is still plenty of work to be done
in poverty reduction, especially in the rural regions.
III.
Drought and Famine in Ethiopia
The 1980’s Famine
Ethiopia is no stranger to famine. For the past forty years or so, Ethiopia has experienced
recurring drought that has wiped out crops across the country. Because Ethiopia’s economy is
particularly connected to agriculture (about 45% of its GDP comes from farming activities)17,
drought hits Ethiopians particularly hard. Ethiopia experienced several droughts and famines
from the 1970s to the present.18 The most well-known of these throughout the world was the
famine of 1983-1985.
It is well-known for good reason, as that famine was particularly devastating to the
Ethiopian people. In 1984 alone, 300,000 people died as a result of the famine, twice the number
that died in the worst year of the famine in the 1970s.19 In 1985, 2.4 million people spread
across 12 of the 14 provinces were starving, and almost 20% of the population was at risk.20 All
told, many estimates place the death toll of the famine at around one million people.21
The famine began with a failure of the rains in 1982.22 Ethiopia also experienced a lack
of rain in 1983, and in 1984 the rain was “erratic and late.”23 It was only in 1985 that Ethiopia
finally experienced a good rain, and the number of people affected by famine finally began to
decline in 1986-1987.24
However, a lack of rain was only one component of the famine (albeit a rather large one).
Several other factors exacerbated the already dangerous drought circumstances. First of all, and
possibly most importantly, Ethiopia was fighting a civil war at the time, a civil war that
eventually led to the creation of the new state of Eritrea in the early 1990s and the overthrow of
17
The World Bank, “Africa - Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP)”
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21072837~menuP
K:1804110~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html> [accessed 4 April 2014].
18
Paul Dorosh and Emily Schmidt, “The Rural-Urban Transformation in Ethiopia,” Food Policy, ESSP II Working
Paper, 13 (2010), 48 (p. 32) <http://www.ifpri.org/publication/rural-urban-transformation-ethiopia>; Edmond J.
Keller, “Drought , War , and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 30 (1992), 609–24.
19
Keller, p. 616.
20
Keller, p. 616.
21
Keller, p. 616.
22
Keller, p. 617.
23
Keller, p. 617.
24
Keller, p. 617.
4
the Menjistu regime.25 In the war, restricting already meager food supplies became a weapon –
each side would burn fields, bomb food stores, and stop food aid from crossing into each other’s
territory.26
On top of the civil war, at the beginning of the drought, major aid donors significantly cut
food aid – in the case of the United States, food aid went from 8,172 metric tons in 1982 to 0 by
1984.27 This is true for a variety of reasons. Primarily, international aid donors were concerned
that the Ethiopian government did not have the capacity (or inclination) to properly distribute
food aid.28 Additionally, some world leaders, such as President Reagan, were questioning the
effectiveness of food aid.29 Eventually, aid did begin to arrive, but it was fraught with problems
of distribution in large part due to the civil war.30
Finally, the effects of the drought were much worse because households were still
recovering from intermittent droughts that began in the 1970s.31 In earlier droughts households
had lost a lot of livestock, either through death or sale to cover basic food expenses. So when the
next drought came in the 1980s, they did not have any buffer against the famine. All of these
factors together conspired to create one of the worst famines Ethiopia has ever seen.
Food Security Today
Not all of Ethiopia is especially susceptible to drought. The regions most affected by
drought are those that are in the eastern portion of the country. Oromiya and the Southern
Nations Nationalists and Peoples region (SNNP) are particularly prone to frequent drought.32 In
addition to the drought-prone regions of the east, there are also small pockets of drought-prone
areas in other regions. In fact, with the exception of Addis Ababa, every region has a pocket that
is susceptible to drought. The map below, from a report co-authored by USAID, WFP, and
FEWS NET, shows where food insecurity was predicted in April-June 2012.33 Though this map
is specific to one time, the map tends to look similar for a wide range of dates.
25
Stephen Devereux, “FOOD INSECURITY IN ETHIOPIA: A Discussion Paper for DFID”, 2000, p. 4.
Keller, p. 620.
27
Keller, p. 615.
28
Keller, p. 615.
29
Keller, p. 615.
30
Keller, p. 621.
31
Keller, p. 615.
32
Christophe Béné, Stephen Devereux and Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, “Shocks and Social Protection in the Horn of
Africa: Analysis from the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia,” IDS Working Papers, 2012 (2012), 1–120
(p. 14) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2012.00395.x>.
33
USAID, WFP and FEWS NET, ETHIOPIA Food Security Outlook February through June 2012, 2012, p. 1.
26
5
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34
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www.fews.net/ethiopia
34
Devereux.
Daniel O. Gilligan and others, “Can Social Protection Work in Africa? Evidence on the Impact of Ethiopia’s
Productive Safety Net Programme on Food Security, Assets and Incentives,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009, p. 3
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1457172>.
36
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux.
35
6
another crisis hits.37 In order to try to break that cycle, Ethiopia has implemented the Productive
Safety Net Programme (PSNP).38 The PSNP is designed to make consistent and predictable
transfers to participating households that ideally insulates them against shocks but also allows
them to plan ahead.39
Goals
The PSNP has two closely related major objectives.40 The first is to prevent household
asset depletion.41 The second is to address some of the root causes of food insecurity by creating
community assets through public works.42 These “community assets” generally consist of
infrastructure improvements such as roads, irrigation plans, watershed rehabilitation, and
schools.43 By pursuing these two objectives, the PSNP is trying to achieve four goals:44
1.
2.
3.
4.
Support the rural transformation process;
Prevent long-term consequences of short-term food inaccessibility;
Encourage households to engage in production and investment; and
Promote market development by increasing household purchasing power.
In theory, these objectives and goals will ultimately lead to households having the ability to
support themselves, even in leaner times, which will eventually decrease poverty in Ethiopia.45
Implementation
The PSNP targets those that are “chronically food insecure.”46 In order for a household
to be chronically food insecure, they must (1) have reported having difficulty filling their need
for food for at least three of the last twelve months, and (2) have received food aid for three
37
Devereux.
Gilligan and others, p. 2.
39
Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Jeremy Lind and John Hoddinott, “Implementing Social Protection in Agro-Pastoralist
and Pastoralist Areas: How Local Distribution Structures Moderate PSNP Outcomes in Ethiopia,” World
Development, 50 (2013), 1–12 (p. 1) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.04.005>.
40
Amdissa Teshome, “Agriculture , Growth and Poverty Reduction in Ethiopia : Policy Processes Around the New
PRSP ( PASDEP )”, 2006, p. 18.
41
The United Nations, “The Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia The Public Works Component Situation
Analysis Cont ….”
42
The United Nations.
43
Camilla Andersson, Alemu Mekonnen and Jesper Stage, “Impacts of the Productive Safety Net Program in
Ethiopia on Livestock and Tree Holdings of Rural Households,” Journal of Development Economics, 94 (2011),
119–26 (p. 2) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2009.12.002>.
44
World Food Programme, Productive Safety Net Programme ( PSNP ) Productive Safety Net Programme ( PSNP ),
2012, p. 1.; Evans and Ralyea.
45
Teshome.
46
World Food Programme.
38
7
consecutive years.47 Target households receive support for six months (January-June) for up to
five years.48 The idea is that at this point, households will “graduate” and be able to support
themselves without the help of the program.49
Essentially, the PSNP consists of two separate programs, a public works program and a
direct support program.50 The public works program pays households in exchange for labor on a
public works project. The direct support program pays households that, for whatever reason,
have no person who is able to work. Most households are in the public works program.51 In that
program, participants are required to work for five days a month per household member on a
public works project in exchange for a set amount of food (or cash) per family member. 52 The
work requirement, though calculated on a per-member basis, can be worked by any person
within the household.53 In other words, one person in a three-person household (for instance)
could work fifteen days to cover the work requirement. Over the course of the project, this work
requirement has evolved so that there is now a cap on the amount of work a family can be
required to provide, especially since children are prohibited from working but still factor into the
work requirement.54
In 2012, the PSNP covered 7.64 million people across eight of Ethiopia’s nine
administrative regions (the PSNP operates in Afar, Amhara, Dire Dawa, Harare, Oromiya,
SNNP, Somali and Tigray).55 Ultimately, it is the regional governments that implement the
PSNP, but the central government oversees the process. Within the central government, the
Ministry of Agriculture’s Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector runs the
program.56 Depending on the public works program involved, other governmental departments
may be involved.57
While the Ethiopian government implements the program, The PSNP is funded by a wide
variety of international donors, including the European Commission, the World Bank, USAID,
and several other bilateral donors.58 In 2011, the program cost US$500 million a year.59
47
Sarah Coll-Black and others, “Targeting Food Security Interventions: The Case of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety
Net Programme” <http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/essprn26.pdf> [accessed 2 April 2014].
48
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux.
49
Teshome.
50
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 275.
51
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux.
52
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 1.
53
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1690.
54
Stephen Devereux, Rachel Sabates-wheeler, and others, ETHIOPIA ’ S Productive Safety Net Programme ( PSNP
): 2008 Assessment Report, 2008, p. 32 <http://www.cashdividend.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Devereux-et-al.2008.pdf>.
55
World Food Programme, p. 1-2.
56
World Food Programme, p. 1.
57
World Food Programme, p. 1.
58
World Food Programme, p. 2.
59
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 2.
8
USAID’s Involvement
USAID has been involved in the PSNP since its inception.60 USAID, other international
donors, and the Government of Ethiopia worked together after a drought in 2003-2004 to create a
program that would help make people more resilient to shocks by making them more food
secure.61 Today, USAID’s support of the PSNP is done through the Food for Peace office.62 It
provides 20-30% of the total budget for the PSNP through four NGO partners.63 The budget
support is in both food and cash form, which is unique among international donors.64
V.
Overall Impacts
Safety net programs (such as the PSNP) in general have been shown to have a positive
effect on poverty reduction.65 They prevent households from selling productive assets in order to
meet current expenses, which better equips them to handle crises in the future. They also
facilitate new investment, since households can afford to take more risks with their income since
they are secure in their access to food in future hard times. All of this together helps households
break out of poverty.
The PSNP also appears to have had many positive effects. From 2006-2008, the real
income of beneficiaries increased by fifty percent.66 The program has improved infrastructure as
well as food security for households.67 From 2010-2012, the PSNP has contributed to reductions
in stunting and an increase in household food provisions.68 As a result of increased food
security, the use of educational and health services has increased and agricultural productivity
has improved.69 PSNP beneficiaries have also been shown to have greater wellbeing and higher
food security in the face of new shocks.70 There is also some evidence that asset creation and
protection has improved, but that evidence is more mixed.71 That being said, the long-term
income earning potential of targeted household has increased.72 It is also important to note that
60
Lara Evans and Bridget Ralyea. Personal Interview. April 23, 2014.
Evans and Ralyea.
62
Evans and Ralyea.
63
Evans and Ralyea.
64
Evans and Ralyea.
65
Rachel Slater and Anna McCord, “Learning from The PSNP: The Influence of Ethiopia’s Social Protection
Experience in Sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond,” in Food Security, Safety Nets, and Social Protection in Ethiopia,
ed. by Dessalegn Rahmato, Alula Pankhurst, and Jan-Gerrit van Uffelen, 2013, pp. 39–65 (p. 55).
66
Slater and McCord, p. 51.
67
World Food Programme, p. 1.
68
Evans and Ralyea.
69
World Food Programme, p. 2.
70
Béné, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, p. 22.
71
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 120., Béné, Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, p. 19.
72
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 7.
61
9
in the same 2006-2008 time frame, the real income of non-beneficiaries decreased by 20%.73
For a summary of more specific statistical results, see Appendix 1.
Despite the PSNP’s positive effects, it has not been a universal success. The program
seems to work well in the highland regions, where it originated in 2005.74 In around 2008, it was
retrofitted for the lowland regions, but it has been less effective in these areas.75 The primary
reason for this is a difference in livelihoods; in the highlands, almost everyone is a farmer, but in
the lowlands there are a lot of pastoralists.76 Therefore, in the highlands those that work on the
public works projects are able to enjoy the benefits of those projects, which is not necessarily the
case in the lowlands, where people are constantly moving.77
VI.
Lessons Learned
Though the PSNP is an ongoing project, the Ethiopian government and donors have
completed periodic assessments about how the program is working. The government’s first
commissioned evaluation took place after “Phase I” of the project had been completed; it was
designed to direct the changes made to the program prior to the beginning of Phase II, which
began in 2007.78 A second evaluation was completed in 2008 to see if the changes were having
an impact on the program’s effectiveness. These changes provide a nice way for us to determine
what lessons we can pull from the project; Ethiopia determined the weaknesses of its own project
and sought to fix them. As we are now six years removed from the 2008 evaluation, we can see
whether the changes Ethiopia chose to make impacted the effectiveness of the PSNP. From
these evaluations as well as research done by those outside the project, we can draw several
lessons. The five lessons discussed here revolve around: (1) complementary activities; (2)
targeting; (3) governance and capacity; (4) cash vs. food transfer; and (5) program structure.
Though they are the only lessons in this report, they are not necessarily the only lessons that can
be drawn from the Ethiopian experience. However, they are perhaps four of the more universal
concepts in poverty reduction programs.
Complementary Activities
The PSNP was in reality only one component of a much larger food security initiative.79
The use of complementary programs proved critical for the success of the Ethiopia strategy. The
73
Slater and McCord, p. 51.
Evans and Ralyea.
75
Evans and Ralyea.
76
Evans and Ralyea.
77
Evans and Ralyea.
78
Stephen Devereux, Hailemichael Taye, and others, ETHIOPIA ’ S PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME (
PSNP ) Trends in PSNP Transfers Within Targeted Households Final Report, 2006, p. 3.
79
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 2.
74
10
other main food security program is aptly named the Other Food Security Programme (OFSP).80
The OFSP is generally designed to encourage households to increase income and build up
assets.81 It includes things such as access to credit, agriculture extension services, technology
transfer, and irrigation projects.82 In other words, the PSNP alone was not designed to pull
people out of poverty – it was designed to work in concert with OFSP. However, OFSP does not
cover nearly as many people as the PSNP – in 2006, only 32.7% of the PSNP beneficiaries also
received support from OFSP.83
In Ethiopia, these complementary programs have been shown to have significant positive
effects on households that are a part of them.84 Perhaps more significantly, complementary
programs together have been shown to have a greater positive impact than any of the programs
alone.85 After eighteen months, while households that only participated in the PSNP did not
show a significant improvement in food security, households that benefited from both the PSNP
and other programs (such as OFSP) did show improvement.86 According to some studies,
households that participated in multiple programs were also the only households to show an
increase in asset accumulation, one of the major goals of the PSNP.87 Appendix 2 contains the
partial results from a statistical analysis of this phenomenon.
Complementary programs allow households to cope with multiple risks. Therefore,
programs should be planned to work in tandem with each other in order to heighten the effect on
any one household. However, programs need to be careful that benefiting from one program
does not inadvertently make a household ineligible for another and end up leaving the household
worse off than it was before. The PSNP ran into this problem early in its implementation.
Households would receive loans from OFSP and would then use that loan to purchase livestock
or some other productive asset. However, when applying for the PSNP, that productive asset
would make their level of assets too high for them to participate in the program, despite the fact
that the asset was not paid off.88 In other words, the PSNP did not consider debt when
determining eligibility for the PSNP. After the evaluation of 2006, eligibility was tweaked so
that participating in complementary programs did not render them ineligible for the PSNP.89 The
problems of targeting will be discussed in a later section, but practitioners should pay attention to
the effect one program can have on another and be aware of possible adverse effects if programs
are not coordinated properly.
80
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1684.
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1685.
82
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1685.
83
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1685.
84
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1685.
85
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 125.
86
Gilligan, Hoddinott and Taffesse, p. 1686.
87
Gilligan and others, p. 23.
88
Devereux, Sabates-wheeler, and others, p. 5.
89
Devereux, Sabates-wheeler, and others, p. 5.
81
11
In addition to the complementary programs housed in the OFSP, USAID and NGOs are
conducting other complementary activities, such as nutrition programs, hygiene and sanitation
training, and maternal and child health programs.90 NGOs are also working on projects related
to natural resource management.91 All of these complementary activities are designed to help
participating households make the most of their involvement in the PSNP, as many of the
programs are related to healthy food or healthy practices. USAID is currently designing its next
phase of complementary activities, with a possible emphasis on livelihood activities like savings
groups, which provide rural households with access to savings and credit.92
Targeting
Deciding which households would be included in any program is a crucial step. This step
is particularly difficult in the face of limited resources; in Ethiopia, it is estimated that 12-16
million people need assistance from the PSNP, but only about 7 million are currently covered.93
In the next iteration of the project, Ethiopia expects to target about 10 million.94 In the PSNP,
the Ethiopian government had to go through some trial and error before settling on a system that,
for the most part, actually targeted the households most in need.95 In the beginning of the
program, households tended to be chosen based on how easily they could “graduate” from the
program.96 However, using this criterion clearly meant that the poorest households, the
households most in need of support, were excluded. Therefore, Ethiopia changed its targeting
process so that support went to the households that needed it most.
The major change to the process was the fact that households were chosen at the
community level with guidelines from the central government.97 These guidelines are outlined in
the Programme Implementation Manual, and the central government also created training
programs for implementers.98 The actual designation of households as eligible for PSNP support
is done at the kebele level, which is lowest administrative level in Ethiopia.99 Each kebele is
comprised of approximately 1,000 households.100 Each kebele sets up a community committee,
called a “Food Security Task Force” (FSTF), to determine which households should receive
support.101 The general assembly then reviews, amends, and endorses the list.102
90
Evans and Ralyea.
Evans and Ralyea.
92
Evans and Ralyea.
93
Evans and Ralyea.
94
Evans and Ralyea.
95
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 2.
96
Teshome, p. 18.
97
Coll-Black and others, p. 1.
98
Coll-Black and others, p. 1.
99
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 2.
100
The United Nations.
101
Gilligan and others, p. 3.
91
12
After the tweaks and changes to the PSNP’s targeting mechanisms, it is now generally
successful in providing support for the poorest households; the one area where targeting may still
be imperfect is related to pastoral households.103 However, the PSNP’s success in communitybased targeting does come with a caveat; Ethiopia has strong community structures, even in rural
areas. This is not the norm in many developing countries, which may make implementing
community-level targeting difficult in other contexts.
In addition to providing lessons about the first-time targeting of a household, the PSNP
can also teach practitioners about when people “graduate” from a poverty reduction program. In
the original iteration of the PSNP, graduation was vague and unspecific.104 As a result,
graduation was not well-understood or evenly applied. Often, once a household was no longer
among the poorest in the community, it would no longer be eligible for benefits.105 However,
their shortened time on the PSNP may not have been long enough for them to build up sufficient
assets to withstand shocks, which after all is one of the goals of the PSNP in the first place.106
Ethiopia somewhat resolved graduation problems with the release of the Programme
Implementation Manual (PIM), which clarified the criteria for graduation. However, graduation
issues have not disappeared. Some regions, such as Amhara, have implemented quotas for
graduates.107 In order to meet these quotas, the government in Amhara promotes “selfgraduation,” or having households decide that they no longer need the PSNP support.108 But
“self-graduation” implies that a household would not otherwise be eligible to graduate, which
creates the same problems as graduating too early does. The government of Ethiopia and
USAID are currently looking into the issue of self-graduation,109 but in the meantime it is
important to remember that it really is crucial that households stay on the program for the full
term, even if it makes the program look less successful. In other words, there is a difference
between demonstrating success (this many people graduated) and achieving success (true selfsufficiency for supported households).
Governance
The government of Ethiopia places a lot of the responsibility for the implementation of
the PSNP at the sub-state level. As a federal state, Ethiopia is divided into regions, which are
then subdivided into woredas and then kebeles. The Programme Implementation Manual (PIM)
for the PSNP lays out responsibilities for each of those three levels as well as at the community
102
The United Nations.
Sabates-Wheeler, Lind and Hoddinott, p. 10.
104
Slater and McCord, p. 50.
105
Devereux, Sabates-wheeler, and others, p. 26.
106
Devereux, Sabates-wheeler, and others, p. 23.
107
Evans and Ralyea.
108
Evans and Ralyea.
109
Evans and Ralyea.
103
13
level. For example, as mentioned above, deciding which households will receive support is done
at the kebele level.110 Kebeles and communities work together to decide which public works
projects beneficiaries will work on.111 Kebeles are responsible for tracking households that are
eligible for and are receiving support from the PSNP.112 Woredas are responsible for negotiating
with USAID’s NGO partners to determine how much support is needed for the woreda. Further
responsibilities at each level are outlined in the PIM. In short, the PSNP shares responsibility for
implementation with all levels of government. This sharing of responsibilities sometimes leads
to vast differences in implementation between regions. This works well for a federal system
with fairly high capacity, but this type of power sharing may not work in all contexts, especially
in those countries with low local capacity.
This capacity at the local level is critical – local level governments need to have the
resources to carry out all of the functions that the PIM outlines for them.113 As a result, the
Ethiopian government regularly assesses the capacity of lower level governments and then tailors
the implementation scheme to the context.114 For instance, the context helps the government
determine whether to transfer food or cash to beneficiaries (this decision is discussed in further
detail below). Additionally, the PSNP has mechanisms to increase budget allotments to regions
that have capacity problems.115 This flexibility based on capacity allows the PSNP to be
efficient and responsive to low capacity contexts.
In addition to questions of capacity at lower levels of government, the PSNP also deals
with issues of transparency, especially in the targeting process. In areas with a small amount of
resources but a high number of eligible households, transparency can help alleviate any internal
conflict between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.116 How transparent the process is in the
PSNP has varied from woreda to woreda, but it has improved since the start of the program.117
That being said, many woredas have suffered from the same constraints on transparency. One is
the high turnover rate of administrators working on the project, while another is the irregularity
of monitoring and reporting on the project.118
110
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Productive Safety Net Programme Programme Implementation
Manual, 2006, p. 18.
111
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, p. 18.
112
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, p. 18.
113
The United Nations.
114
The United Nations.
115
The United Nations.
116
Devereux, Sabates-wheeler, and others, p. 16.
117
Kay Sharp and Taylor Brown, “TARGETING ETHIOPIA ’ S PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME (
PSNP )”, 2006, p. 47.
118
Sharp and Brown, p. 47.
14
Cash Transfers v. Food Transfers
The PSNP provides transfers to targeted households in two ways, through cash transfers
and food transfers. Each type of transfer has its benefits and drawbacks, and the fact that the
PSNP uses both types allows us to better compare the two. Some of the PSNP’s success can be
attributed to the use of different transfers in different situations.119 In the PSNP, the default
transfer is cash; however, several factors can lead to food transfers instead.120 For instance, some
markets do not have a high capability to deal with an increase in demand that a sudden cash
influx would create. If the supply cannot rise to meet the demand, then the price of food can
skyrocket quickly and erode the value of the transfer.121 In this way, cash transfers can both
contribute to and be affected by inflation.122 As the price of food goes up, the set cash transfer
may not be enough to purchase the entire amount of food the program intended to provide.123
Therefore, many households tend to prefer food transfer because food will not change in
value.124 In the case of weak markets, the Ethiopian government starts with food transfers and
slowly phases in cash transfers in order to help build local monetary economies.125 Cash
transfers can also be problematic if local government does not have the capacity to deal with
large amounts of cash.126
The PSNP also has a couple of practical considerations when deciding whether to transfer
cash or food. First of all, the PSNP does take local people’s preferences into account.127 In
some cases, this leads to a somewhat complicated distribution. For instance, in some areas, cash
is distributed early in the season, when food is plentiful, and food is distributed later in the
season when food is rarer and more expensive.128 In some particularly remote areas, the PSNP
distributes food simply because no food is really available for purchase.129 Second, the PSNP
must also consider the resources donors provide; if donors provide food aid, then the PSNP will
need to transfer more food.130 If donors provide cash, then the PSNP has a little more flexibility
with the type of transfer to make. Generally, food is more expensive for donors to send than
cash, which may also impact donor preferences.131 However, as mentioned before, USAID
sends both food and cash to support the PSNP. USAID is different from other donors because
119
The United Nations.
The United Nations.
121
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 276.
122
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 275.
123
Devereux, Sabates-wheeler, and others, p. 20.
124
Evans and Ralyea.
125
Andersson, Mekonnen and Stage, p. 2.
126
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 276.
127
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 276.
128
Devereux, Sabates-wheeler, and others, p. 20.
129
Evans and Ralyea.
130
The United Nations.
131
Emebet Kebede, “Moving from Emergency Food Aid to Predictable Cash Transfers: Recent Experience in
Ethiopia,” Development Policy Review, 24 (2006), 579–99 (p. 580) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.14677679.2006.00349.x>.
120
15
Food for Peace, an office designed to distribute food, is the office that handles the PSNP for
USAID.132
Another consideration for those deciding whether to transfer cash or food is how these
two resources are distributed within a household. The gender ramifications of the PSNP could
be the subject of an entire report all its own (for more on this subject, see Holmes, et. al 2011133)
but for purposes of transfers, practitioners should be aware that cash tends to go to the man of the
household and food tends to go to women.134 As a result, food transfers more often benefit
women and children directly, but cash to men is more often diverted to uses other than food (and
to uses that do not benefit the entire household).135
Program Structure
Some of the success of the PSNP can be attributed to the structure of the project itself.
The PSNP is driven by the government of Ethiopia, but the international donors are working in
tandem with the government to ensure the best outcomes.136 While the government has the final
decision on anything, the international donors have knowledge and expertise that they can share
with the government.137 The funds from the international donors go into a trust fund managed by
the World Bank.138 In short, this project has done a good job bringing donors and the
government together to ensure that the program runs as smoothly, effectively, and efficiently as
possible.
In addition to the actors working well together, the PSNP also has very clear guidelines
and very clear scheduling as to when things are supposed to happen thanks to the publishing of
the Programme Implementation Manual.139 There is no ambiguity about when assessments will
be performed.140 Such a well-publicized and well-structured chain of events increases the
accountability and transparency of the program to the people, which can also help improve its
effectiveness.141
132
Evans and Ralyea.
Rebecca Holmes and others, “Addressing Gendered Risks and Vulnerabilities through Social Protection:
Examples of Good Practice from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Peru,” Gender & Development, 19 (2011), 255–70
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13552074.2011.592637>.
134
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 275.
135
Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux, p. 275.
136
Evans and Ralyea.
137
Evans and Ralyea.
138
Evans and Ralyea.
139
Evans and Ralyea.
140
Evans and Ralyea.
141
Evans and Ralyea.
133
16
VII. Conclusion
In the end, Ethiopia has made significant progress in eradicating poverty, and some part
of that success can be attributed to the PSNP. Through its evolution, the PSNP has been flexible
and able to change; in fact, the Ethiopian government and its donors are in the process of once
again re-evaluating and re-designing the program.142 As a result of its flexibility, the program
has improved in many aspects, which makes it more effective in the fight against poverty.
During the program’s almost ten-year existence, it has worked to make poor households more
food secure, allow those households the opportunity to build up their asset base, and ideally
eventually graduate from the program entirely into self-sufficiency. Though the program is not
perfect, it has provided many lessons for practitioners and donors who are looking to implement
similar programs in other places. The PSNP has: (1) worked with other, complementary
programs in order to have the greatest impact on households; (2) refined targeting practices so
that the households receiving support are the ones that need it most; (3) worked to build capacity
and establish best practices at all levels of government; (4) worked through some of the tricky
considerations that go into deciding whether to use cash or food transfers in a poverty reduction
program; and (5) established an effective program structure. As a result of the efforts of the
Ethiopian government and international donors, the PSNP has had a positive impact on poverty
reduction in some of the most vulnerable areas of the country.
142
Evans and Ralyea.
17
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“Africa - Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP)”
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,content
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Taffesse, and William Wiseman, “Targeting Food Security Interventions: The Case of
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme”
<http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/essprn26.pdf> [accessed 2 April 2014]
Devereux, Stephen, “FOOD INSECURITY IN ETHIOPIA: A Discussion Paper for DFID”, 2000
Devereux, Stephen, Rachel Sabates-wheeler, Rachel Slater, and Taylor Brown, ETHIOPIA’S
Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP): 2008 Assessment Report, 2008
<http://www.cashdividend.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Devereux-et-al.-2008.pdf>
Devereux, Stephen, Hailemichael Taye, Indak International Pvt L C, and Addis Ababa,
ETHIOPIA’S PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET PROGRAMME (PSNP) Trends in PSNP
Transfers Within Targeted Households Final Report, 2006
Dorosh, Paul, and Emily Schmidt, “The Rural-Urban Transformation in Ethiopia,” Food Policy,
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Social Protection Work in Africa? Evidence on the Impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety
Net Programme on Food Security, Assets and Incentives,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1457172>
18
Gilligan, Daniel O., John Hoddinott, and Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse, “The Impact of
Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme and Its Linkages,” Journal of Development
Studies, 45 (2009), 1684–1706 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00220380902935907>
Holmes, Rebecca, Nicola Jones, Fouzia Mannan, Rosana Vargas, Yisak Tafere, and Tassew
Woldehanna, “Addressing Gendered Risks and Vulnerabilities through Social Protection:
Examples of Good Practice from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Peru,” Gender & Development,
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Kebede, Emebet, “Moving from Emergency Food Aid to Predictable Cash Transfers: Recent
Experience in Ethiopia,” Development Policy Review, 24 (2006), 579–99
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Keller, Edmond J., “Drought , War , and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 30
(1992), 609–24
Kumar, Neha, and John Hoddinott, The Implementation of the Productive Safety Net
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Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, Development and Poverty in Ethiopia
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Sabates-Wheeler, Rachel, Jeremy Lind, and John Hoddinott, “Implementing Social Protection in
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PROGRAMME (PSNP)”, 2006
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Around the New PRSP (PASDEP)”, 2006
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20
Appendix 1
Below is a table that summarizes the results of the PSNP from a variety of sources. Many of the
results are from the same source as it has the most current analysis. This is just a sampling of
available conclusions; many authors have also done studies on other issues related to the PSNP,
such as livestock holdings or the effects on pastoralists.
Statistic*
Source
Notes
From 2006-2008, the real
income of beneficiaries rose
by 50%
Slater and McChord 2013
This figure varies slightly
depending on which sources is
cited; Devereux (2008) has
real income rising by 59% for
PW** beneficiaries and 52%
for DS beneficiaries.
From 2006-2010, those that
participated in public works
for five years had a reduction
in their food gap*** of 1.05
months
Kumar and Hoddinott 2013
While there is positive effect
for households on the program
for less than five years, that
effect is not as large and the
statistical confidence is not as
high.
From 2011-2012, participants
in the public works program
saw a reduction in their food
gap of 1.48 months
Kumar and Hoddinott 2013
The difference between the
2006-2010 number and the
2011-2012 number is largely
due to the increase in the size
of the transfers.
From 2011-2012, participants
in the direct support program
saw a reduction in their food
gap of 1.93 months
Kumar and Hoddinott 2013
From 2011-2013, participants
in the public works program
were 12% more likely to have
a food gap of 3 months or less
Kumar and Hoddinott 2013
From 2011-2012, participants
consumed a higher number of
food groups by 0.46 food
groups
Kumar and Hoddinott 2013
Essentially, this statistic
means that the PSNP has led
to more diverse diets among
participants.
From 2011-2012, nonfood
expenditures by PW
beneficiaries increased by 43
birr/month
Kumar and Hoddinott 2013
The change is primarily in
spending on clothing, medical
expenses, and ceremonies.
21
Male-headed households
Kumar and Hoddinott 2013
experienced a food gap
decrease of 1.34 months while
female-headed households
experienced a food gap
decrease of 2.65 months
Male-headed households did
start at a higher point.
Additionally, male-headed
households made up 79% of
the sample whereas femaleheaded households comprised
21%.
The PSNP raises long-term
earning potential
Andersson and others 2011
This study indicates that the
increase in long-term earning
potential is, oddly, not caused
by increased livestock but by
increased tree-planting.
From 2008-2012, 495,995
people have graduated from
the PSNP
World Food Programme 2012
This statistic should be taken
with caution, as “graduation”
is not well-defined, and “selfgraduation” is promoted in
some areas, both of which
may skew this statistic.
* Many of these statistics vary from region to region. These statistics are national averages.
**PW stands for “Public Works” and DS stands for “Direct Support.”
***The food gap is defined as the number of months in a twelve-month period that a household
is unable to meet its basic food needs.
22
Appendix 2
This table is from Gilligan, Hoddinott, Kumar, and Taffesse (2009), where they analyze
how low transfers from PSNP only, high transfers from PSNP only, and transfers from both
PSNP and OFSP affect beneficiary households. In nearly all dimensions they measured related
to food security, Gilligan et. al found a higher benefit to those that participated in both programs.
For a more in-depth study by three of the four same authors, see Gilligan, Hoddinott, and
Taffesse (2009), The Impact of Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme and its Linkages.
23