Chile and Democracy Promotion
SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
Client: The National Endowment for Democracy
Spring 2016
Professor Sally Shelton-Colby
Rachel Aoughsten, Emily Artalejo, Peter Glover, Hannah LeMoyne, Amy
Newell, Isabelle Rodas, Gigi Singh, Marty Stadtner, and Natasha Wheatley
Executive Summary
This report evaluates the democracy assistance activities of the National Endowment for
Democracy in Chile during the 1980s. Chile was a successful case of democratic transition, in
part due to the assistance of the NED and there are lessons from its assistance, both positive and
negative, that should be incorporated into future democracy assistance activities. Our research
identifies the critical pre-conditions for democratic success that were present in Chile, namely: a
loss of legitimacy of the current government, a unified opposition, and institutional capacity to
sustain democracy after a transition. These pre-conditions need to be present in future scenarios
in order for various types of democracy assistance to be effective on the ground. The report
analyzed five distinct areas of assistance: Voter Registration, Election Monitoring, Media,
Conferences & Think Tanks, and Post-Junta Institutions. Each of these areas was critical to
support to ensure the success of the Chilean plebiscite and the return of democracy to Chile.
Each category relied on the success of one or more of the other areas of activity for its own
success and a multidimensional approach to democracy assistance is necessary for international
actors to be helpful contributors to an internal movement towards democracy. Voter registration
success depended on the assurance of an open process provided by election monitoring activities;
post-Junta institutions were developed and successful because of the discussions that occurred in
conferences and the activities done within think tanks. We recommend that the NED should
continue to provide assistance in all five of the identified areas and ensure that their support
strategy uses a multidimensional approach. That said, not all activities within areas were equally
successful and this report finds that there is room for increased efficiency and efficacy within
each of the areas of democracy assistance. There are also three additional recommendations not
aligned with any of the assistance areas which could improve the democracy assistance provided
by NED: the need to support women’s organizations, the role of support to political parties, and
the importance of improving institutional capacity after a democratic election. In Chile, other
actors were providing support to political parties and the country already had strong institutional
capacity from before the Pinochet regime, however Chile represents a unique case, compared to
other democratic assistance efforts in other locations, and the NED needs to be aware of the
potential need for them to provide that type of assistance. Women were active in leadership roles
around human rights abuses in Chile, made up the bulk of the volunteer base, and contributed to
the new democratic government. All of this was accomplished without any international
attention or support. Had there been support for these activities, it is likely their accomplishments
would have been even greater. Anytime women are taking an active role in some portion of their
fight for democracy, NED should offer assistance and focus attention toward these activities. In
summary, this report finds that the democracy assistant programs of NED played a critical role in
Chile’s democratic transition, and that despite the contextual nature of transitions, many lessons
can be learned from Chile.
Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 2
LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................................................................... 3
Critical Junctures and Critical Actors ............................................................................................................ 4
The 1980 Constitution............................................................................................................................... 5
The 1982 Financial Crisis ........................................................................................................................... 5
US Policy Shift ........................................................................................................................................... 5
The 1988 Plebiscite ................................................................................................................................... 6
Critical Actors ............................................................................................................................................ 6
Political Parties and Coalitions .................................................................................................................. 6
The Church ................................................................................................................................................ 6
Exiles ......................................................................................................................................................... 7
Military ...................................................................................................................................................... 8
Other International Actors ........................................................................................................................ 8
METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................................ 9
PROGRAMMING .......................................................................................................................................... 10
REGISTRATION & GET-OUT-THE-VOTE SUPPORT.................................................................................. 10
Media ...................................................................................................................................................... 12
“NO” CAMPAIGN..................................................................................................................................... 13
MAGAZINES/NEWSPAPERS/PAMPHLETS................................................................................................ 14
RADIO ...................................................................................................................................................... 14
TV ............................................................................................................................................................ 14
OP-EDS AND MEDIA COVERAGE BY NED, NDI AND OTHERS .................................................................. 15
ELECTION MONITORING ......................................................................................................................... 16
NDI .......................................................................................................................................................... 16
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION .............................................................................................. 16
QUICK COUNTS ....................................................................................................................................... 17
CONFERENCES & THINK TANKS............................................................................................................... 17
BEFORE THE PLEBISCITE .......................................................................................................................... 18
POST-PLEBISCITE ..................................................................................................................................... 19
POST-JUNTA SUPPORT ............................................................................................................................ 19
ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................ 21
Women’s Groups .................................................................................................................................... 21
Fund the Political Middle ........................................................................................................................ 22
Support Institutional Capacity ................................................................................................................ 23
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................. 24
References ..................................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................................................... 25
Appendix B .................................................................................................................................................. 26
APPENDIX C ................................................................................................................................................... 27
APPENDIX D................................................................................................................................................. 28
INTRODUCTION
“Democracy is more than elections” Heraldo Muñoz
Dictatorships and authoritarian governments
do not merely decide to transition to
democracy. Holding an election does not
mean democracy has come to a people. The
people under a government have to call for
change, demand a democracy. They must
organize around the cause of democracy,
they must publicize their struggle to receive
the support of international communities,
they must build the institutions and civil
society necessary for a healthy democracy,
and they must strategize how to achieve
their goals. All of these things must be
accomplished for an election to matter.
Otherwise, there will be no election or an
election will bring no change.
Successful, peaceful democratic
transitions are rare. It has been argued that
they are too rare to extrapolate their
experiences to other states. However, it is
precisely because of their rarity that they
must be analyzed, and understood, so that
the characteristics that made these states
successful can be identified. Chile is an
exceptional case of a successful democratic
transition. In the 1980s, with the financial
and technical support of multiple
international actors, including the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED),
Chileans were able to successfully mobilize.
Chileans built real institutions, held open
dialogue, and held their government
accountable for a free and fair plebiscite on
the future of the Chilean government. From
an external standpoint, international actors
must evaluate their contributions to
determine what was successful, what was
not, why these actions did or did not have
impact, and which strategies and actions
should be implemented in future cases of
assisted democratic transition. If NED wants
to learn from Chile’s transition to
democracy, it needs to evaluate which of its
programs in Chile contributed to the
country's successful democratic transition
and why.
To this end, this report consists of a
review of the relevant literature, an
overview of the critical junctures and critical
actors in Chile’s transition, an analysis of
NED’s programing in Chile, and a series of
program specific and more general
recommendations. We broadly seek to
analyze the role played by NED in Chile’s
transition by conveying the voices of key
Chilean actors to NED.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Looking at structural models of
democratization, Chile under Pinochet’s rule
had all, or at least many, of the factors that
contribute to democratic transitions.
Proponents of the conditional model of
modernization analyze economic factors to
assess the likelihood of democratization in a
country. The wealthier a country is, the less
likely institutional changes will occur,
however once institutional changes are
made, the wealthier a country is, the more
likely to democratize. Scholars have
defined institutional change as “a product of
the ability and the interests of groups in
overturning the system. For an actor to push
for democratization, they must have the
opportunity and the means to overturn the
current institutions, and must also have the
motive to support a democratic outcome.”[i]
They identify three levels of economic
development, low, medium, and high, that
each have their own implications regarding
both the ability to overturn the institutions
and the likelihood that democratic changes
will result from that overturning.
At low levels of economic
development, the ability of the state to
maintain control is weak, due to the lack of
resources that it has at its disposal. This
creates a very unstable situation for the
country as overturning the government
becomes relatively easy. After a transition
occurs, there is not enough interest among
the populace to push for political rights
because the next regime will be about as
predatory as the last, as they have very little
property to defend in the first place. When a
country is a little more economically
developed, and reaches the classification of
“medium” under this model, the state’s
capacity is increased allowing it greater
leeway in dealing with problems. This
increased capacity makes it more difficult
for opposition to achieve institutional
change; however, if institutional change is
achieved, the new government will need to
broaden its share of responsibilities and
powers due to the greater resources and
number of people and groups needed to
achieve the change. At high levels of
development, the state’s resources are
numerous and pervasive; overturning the
ruling government in these cases proves to
be a very difficult and costly task as a great
many people within the country are invested
in the current institutions. If, however,
institutional change were to occur, the
change would likely result in
democratization due to the diverse interests
of numerous powerful individuals and
groups.
Michael Miller’s study on the
relationship between economic development
and violent leader removal comes to a
conclusion that reinforces the Conditional
Model. His theory is that “democratization
is most likely to follow from a confluence of
two factors: pro-democratic citizens and a
vulnerable autocratic regime.”[ii] Therefore,
the antecedent economic conditions for
democratic development must be in place so
that when autocratic regime to be
vulnerable, perhaps through the death of a
leader, an economic crisis, natural disaster,
or war, the people in an authoritarian
country can demand change to democratic
institutions.
In response to the arguments in favor
of either endogenous or conditional
democratization, there is the claim that
economic factors have less to do with the
establishment of democracy but everything
to do with the sustainability of a democratic
government once established. The logic of
the argument is that newly democratized
states that have not reached a medium to
high level of economic development will not
have the ability to implement reforms
necessary for pleasing the majority of the
populace. In these instances, instability and
poor infrastructure will contribute to these
new democracies to simply revert back to
authoritarian control. Furthermore, the
marginal benefits that would-be dictators
can accumulate are greater in low income
countries than in richer ones. While the
Pinochet regime was highly capable of
suppressing dissent, applying these
theoretical models to Chile reveals that the
country under Pinochet, which could be
characterized as having medium to high
economic development, was likely to have a
democratic transition. Furthermore, due to
this level of economic development, a
transition to democracy would be
sustainable because the winning coalition
could allocate resources in a way that saw to
the needs of the populace at large.
Levitsky and Way bring the
international community back into
democratization theories when they write
about competitive authoritarianism. They
emphasize that when liberal democracies
have linkage—strong economic, political,
diplomatic, social, and organizational ties—
with rather than leverage over a transitioning
country, the liberal democracies can play a
positive role in the transition. In the case of
Chile, the US had strong linkages with
Chile, and thus had the opportunity to make
a strong and effective push for a truly
democratic transition.
Critical Junctures and
Critical Actors
In this section, we review critical
junctures and critical actors in Chile’s
democratic transition. These junctures and
actors are referred to throughout the report
and bear highlighting. Critical junctures
include the drafting and ratification of the
1980 constitution; the 1982 financial crisis;
the shift in US policy towards Chile,
culminating in the 1987 appropriation of
$1,000,000 for democracy assistance in
Chile; and the 1988 plebiscite. Each juncture
represents a moment at which a major
decision that a key role in shaping Chile’s
transition. While by no means exhaustive,
this list highlights the junctures which
received the most attention from
interviewees and the literature.
The 1980 Constitution
Following the 1973 coup, Pinochet
ruled Chile for sixteen years. Responding to
internal pressure for institutional legitimacy
and external pressure for his repressive rule,
Pinochet designed a new constitution and
held a yes/no referendum on the constitution
in 1980.1 Under accusations of fraud and
unfair practices, 68.5% Chileans voted for
the new constitution.2 The new constitution
concentrated power in the executive branch,
formally shifted the government from a
military to a civil government, set up the
National Security Council, and crucially set
up another plebiscite for 1988, in which
Chileans would vote on whether to continue
under Pinochet’s government or to hold an
election open to political parties.
The 1982 Financial Crisis
In 1982, after years of economic
prosperity under Pinochet, Chile suffered a
deep economic crisis. Spurred by a new
fixed exchange rate regime and increasing
consumer debt, the crisis caused Chile’s
GDP to contract by 14% and unemployment
to rise to 19.6% in 1982.3 Pinochet’s
legitimacy depended on economic
prosperity, and so the 1982 financial crisis
struck a severe blow to the regime.
Unemployment and unrest pushed Pinochet
to undo some of his repressive policies:
loosening his exile policy, lowering the level
of press censorship, and—with the coaxing
of Archbishop Santiago Juan Francisco
Fresno—began a tentative dialogue with
moderate sections of the opposition.4 The
financial crisis ultimately shook the
legitimacy of Pinochet’s regime and gave
the opposition the space essential for any
concerted political action.
US Policy Shift
US government officials, including
President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of
State George Shultz, changed their policy
towards Chile and encouraged the formation
of a truly democratic regime. Shultz and his
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs, Elliott Abrams, pioneered this
change in policy because they viewed
Pinochet’s oppressive regime to be
empowering, rather than containing, the
communists of South America.5 The policies
of the US were important in shaping the
structural conditions for Chile due to the
immense size of the bilateral relationship
between the two countries; the US at the
time was Chile’s largest trade partner,
consuming 26% of the country’s exports and
providing 21% of its imports. Ambassador
Harry Barnes’s attendance at the funeral of
Rodrigo Rojas, a Chilean dissident, was
emblematic of this change in policy. Up
until this point, Chileans viewed the US as
either pro-Pinochet or, at best, neutral. Amb.
Barnes’s arrival in Chile represented the
marked shift in US policy toward Chile, to
one more focused on supporting human
rights, strengthening an open economic
system, and encouraging a return to
democracy.6
The 1988 Plebiscite
The institutional avenue for opposition
created by the mandate for the 1988
plebiscite, the rise in unrest and the opening
of political space caused by the 1982
financial crisis, and the shift of US policy
towards Chile, all contributed to making the
plebiscite the best opportunity for the
opposition to unite to overthrow Pinochet.
The 1988 plebiscite was the catalyst of the
opposition and the Chilean people to
amalgamate and say “No!”
Critical Actors
Moving from critical junctures to critical
actors, we focus political parties and
coalitions, the Catholic Church, exile
communities, the military, and international
actors outside of the US. Our analysis
focuses on organizations, rather than
individuals, as the unit of measurement
because running through a list of critical
individual Chileans would leave us with no
room to report on the programming itself.
Political Parties and Coalitions
There were numerous groups within
Chilean society that favored a transition to
democratic governance. When given the
opportunity that structural factors inside and
outside Chile afforded them, they had the
chance they needed to act. Chief among
these were the many political parties that,
while not agreeing with each other, mostly
agreed that democratic changes needed to
occur. Although the Pinochet regime
curtailed the activities of political parties,
many parties continued gathering in secret
meetings in Chile, and more open meetings
abroad. Maintaining these networks during
the years leading up to the plebiscite was
crucial to the creation of the organization
critical to the mobilization the opposition.
Of these parties, several of them formed
the Democratic Alliance in 1983, a nonCommunist coalition focused on the return
to democratic governance, the restoration of
civil liberties, and the end of the Pinochet
regime’s human rights violations. The
Democratic Alliance contained the political
parties of the Socialist Party-Briones to the
Liberal Party on the spectrum, and it
contained 40-50% of the Chilean electorate.
The signing of the National Accord in 1985
expanded the coalition. The base grew to
encompass 70-75% of the electorate,
spanning from the Christian Left to the
National Union Party on the right.
Leading up to the plebiscite itself,
another coalition, the Concertación, was
formed. In addition to the parties that
formed the Democratic Alliance and those
that signed the National Accord, the
Movement for United Popular Action and
the recently formed Greens Party, Humanist
Party, and Party for Democracy joined. This
left only the parties of the extreme Left, who
were mostly revolutionaries, and extreme
Right, who were mostly supporters of the
regime, outside of this broad coalition.
The Church
Since the start of Pinochet’s rule,
segments of the Catholic Church provided
social services, protection against human
rights abuses, and a safe space for many
Chileans.7 As early as 1976, Church leaders
in the region began coordinating the various
political parties and encouraging a united
opposition against Pinochet. They hosted
several meetings outside Chile to foster this
unity. This opposition to the regime from the
Church was embodied in Cardinal Juan
Francisco Fresno.8 Chile, which was about
90% Roman Catholic, was very susceptible
to influence from this institution. While the
Church, as an institution, took no formal
stance on the Pinochet government, its
support for the activities of the prodemocracy coalitions was vital to the
survival of opposition political parties and
for their initial coalition building efforts.9
Exiles
Due to the repressive nature of the Pinochet
regime, many Chilean nationals lived
outside the country, harbored by
governments sympathetic to their plight.
These political exiles were not inactive
during their years as expatriates, but rather
supported efforts to reshape conditions
within Chile. The exiles’ experiences
abroad, mostly in countries with democratic
regimes, gave them the opportunity to learn
how things worked under democratic
governance and to influence international
actors to supporting their cause.
Estimates on the number of Chilean
exiles range from 200,000 to almost
1,800,000.10 The range in estimates is so
large because no strong data on Chilean
exiles exist. Llambias-Wolff estimates that
47% of the exiles ended up in other Latin
American countries, while 40% were in
Western Europe, and only 1.3% were in the
United States.11 The exile community played
a major role in Chile’s democratic transition
in three key ways. First, the exile
community was a factor in the shift of US
policy towards Chile. Elliott Abrams and his
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for South America Robert Gelbard both
asserted that meeting with Chilean exiles
helped to solidify Secretary Shultz’s
conviction that Chile needed democracy.12
According to Assistant Secretary Gelbard,
Secretary Shultz pushed President Reagan
into shifting policies by attesting to the fact
that there were many impassioned moderate
Chileans standing between Pinochet and
communism in Chile.13 Speaking with
Chileans hosted by other countries, many
verified that as exiles they were able to
influence their host governments’ policies
toward Chile as well.
Second, living in exile afforded Chileans
political space that was not available in
Chile itself. Given this space, exiled
Chileans not only reached out to host
governments, but also built networks with
local political parties, businesses,
universities, and other Chilean exiles.14
They founded think tanks, such as Chile
Democratico in Rome and Stockholm and
the Instituto para el Nuevo Chile in
Rotterdam. With this space, exiled Chileans
were able to keep Chile’s political parties
and pluralism alive and well, despite high
levels of political repression in Chile. The
exile community was the strongest political
front against Pinochet, especially prior to
political opening caused by the 1982
financial crisis.15
Finally, experiences from living in exile,
especially in Europe, helped to transform the
Chilean Left. In the late 1970’s and 1980’s,
Europe itself was going through a political
transformation as Leftist political parties
increasingly became disenchanted with the
Soviet Union and shifted to an embrace of
social democracy. This transformation
influenced the Chilean exiles living in
Europe: Chilean communists living in East
Germany became jaded towards ideological
extremes and Leftists in West Germany,
Sweden, Spain, and Italy moved closer to
the center as well.16 As exiles coordinated
with people still in Chile and eventually
returned to the country, the transformation
of the Left towards greater moderation made
the unification of the opposition more
likely.17
In sum, the exile community helped shift
international policy towards Chile, created
space for political activities no longer viable
in Chile, and acted as an incubator for the
transformation of Chile’s Left.
Military
Despite the fact that Chile was under
military rule, there were divergences within
the military leadership of the country. Most
notably, of the four-man junta, General
Fernando Matthei, the Chief of the Chilean
Air Force, expressed “grave concerns” about
the direction that Chile was going under
military rule.18 Gen. Matthei maintained
communication with United States embassy
officials and supported the US efforts to
transition to civilian rule.19 This became of
much greater consequence, after the
plebiscite had been conducted, in
influencing the military regime to transfer
power peacefully.
Other International Actors
Among non-US international actors,
Germany played the largest role, with most
of their support for democracy assistance
coming in the form of programming
supportive of the Chilean Christian
Democrat party. The German federal
government supplied money earmarked for
overseas democracy assistance to German
foundations unofficially associated with
German political parties.20 Little data on the
exact nature and size of these contributions
is publically available; however, based on
what is available, German foundations
provided $26.05 million USD of political
funding to Chile from 1984 to 1988.21 Of
this, about $24 million USD was supplied by
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which
was associated with the Christian
Democratic Union.22 The relationship
between the German and the Chilean
Christian Democrat parties dates back to the
1950’s, with funding for democracy
education starting in 1962.23 These programs
consisted of trainings, courses, seminars,
publications, university funding, think tank
funding, unions, business organizations, and
cooperatives.24 Many of these programs
continued after the 1973 coup, although
many of the materials were subject to heavy
censorship.25
Other, smaller sources of
international democracy assistance came
from Canada, Sweden, France, and the
Netherlands. Canada provided funding
through the International Development
Research Center (IDRC) and the Canadian
International Development Agency, which
focused on economic and public policy
research.26 Funding from Sweden was
supplied by the Swedish International
Development Agency (SIDA), the Swedish
Agency for Research Cooperation with
Developing Countries (SAREC), and
unions.27 The Netherlands redirected
funding allocated for assistance to the
Chilean government through Oxfam to
support the opposition.28 Finally, the French
government provided relatively low levels
of funding to think tanks.29
METHODOLOGY
This programming assessment is a
qualitative analysis based on series of
interviews with leaders and regular
participants in the opposition to Pinochet’s
regime leading up to, and including, the
1988 plebiscite. The infrequency of data
collection in democracy promotion during
that time means that a quantitative analysis
would have an inconclusive result at best.
Additionally, the unique circumstances in
Chile mean that there is no real baseline
comparison for quantitative data. These
interviews seek to understand what NED
programming meant to those working
towards a democratic Chile. Information
taken from these interviews was used to
determine the most important parts of
NED’s contribution as well as areas where
more attention could be given in future
situations.
Semi-structured interviews were
conducted between January 20, 2016 and
April 9, 2016. These interviews all focused
on the work done in Chile during the 1980’s
and perceptions of current attitudes, as well
as questions regarding a hindsight
evaluation of successes and failures during
that period. Questions were typically geared
toward the individual’s specific area of
knowledge or role in Chilean politics during
Pinochet’s rule. A list of questions asked is
available in Appendix A. These interviews
were conducted through several different
means: by phone, in-person, and via Skype.
Between March 4, 2016 and March 11,
2016, six members of our team were on
location in Santiago, Chile to conduct
interviews with Chilean opposition leaders.
To protect from bias, interviews were
conducted across a large cross-section of
actors including those who at the time were
NED and National Democratic Institute
(NDI) staff, senior Reagan administration
officials, leaders of the Chilean opposition,
and other Chileans activists. A cross-section
of opinions was also maintained by ensuring
interviewees came from a variety of
different backgrounds: retirees, current NED
staff, Chilean government officials,
academics, American government officials
and staff from other relevant non-profits
were all represented. A complete list of
interviews is available in Appendix B. Due
to the large time gap between actual
program execution in Chile and the time of
this assessment, many actors were no longer
able to be interviewed due to death or the
lack of contact information.
This assessment also relies on a
thorough review of documents regarding
NED activities in Chile during that time
period that were available at the US Library
of Congress and NDI’s independent
archives. These documents provided details
on programs and program funding that were
addressed in interviews regarding
interviewees’ experiences and attitudes
toward the various areas of NED activities.
PROGRAMMING
The analysis and assessment breaks NED
assistance in Chile into five categories:
Registration & Get-out-the-Vote Efforts,
Election Monitoring, Media, Conferences &
Think Tanks, and Post-Junta Institutional
Support. Each of these categories played
some role in a successful democratic
transition. This assessment provides an
overview of the activity in each of those
programmatic categories, followed by an
analysis of its strengths, weaknesses, and
overall contribution. Recommendations
regarding future activity in these categories
immediately follow the analysis.
REGISTRATION & GET-OUT-THE-VOTE
SUPPORT
Overview
After the Pinochet government announced
the plebiscite, the opposition began to
register Chileans to vote. Immediately after
the coup, the military burned all the voter
register cards so there were zero registered
voters in Chile when the plebiscite was
announced. It was determined that the
opposition would need to register seven
million people in less than a year and a half
in order to win the vote. A large voter
registration and outreach effort incorporated
several different groups from the right and
left of Chilean politics. Programs funded
through the NDI, by NED, included (in US
Dollars): over $110,000 to the Movement
for Free Elections, $47,000 on technical
seminars on voter registration and electoral
processes, $515,000 to the FLACSO & the
Committee of Personalities, and $275,000 to
urge citizens to register to vote through
various outreach efforts. Additional
programs funded by NED were $106,000 to
Central Democratic Workers.
In many cases, citizens were averse
to registering out of fear of the government.
The belief that the government was
omnipresent permeated Chilean society.
Elites and the middle class worried about
physical violence, arrest, etc. while poorer
communities believed that the government
would pull its assistance if it found out they
were registering to vote. NED funded
several different programs in order to fight
back against this fear through educational
materials, organizing local meetings, and
training volunteers to speak to other citizens.
These programs were typically intertwined
in voter registration programs and their
funding was linked.
There was a fee for registering to
vote in the plebiscite which presented a
significant barrier to voting for low-income
citizens. To alleviate this barrier to voting,
the NED funded a program which
subsidized the costs by providing the
required ID photographs for those with
financial need. Although this did not cover
the registration costs, it did reduce the
overall cost to voting by eliminating the
need to pay for photographs. The program
was funded through the Center for Youth
Development in the amount of $26,000. It
provided for approximately 200,000
photographs throughout the life of the
program. NED also spent $154,000 funding
a failed attempt to pressure the government
into open elections instead of a plebiscite
and to train an independent election
monitoring system.
Analysis
Voter registration in Chile was
incredibly successful. In a limited amount of
time, Chilean activists were able to register
seven million voters throughout the
country.30 NED’s funding of these programs
allowed organizations to purchase the
necessary materials, publicize and frame a
message, support travel for trainers, and
provide technical assistance. Without
funding from NED, the reach of these
programs would have been significantly
diminished and it is possible that a large part
of the country would have remained
unregistered. That outcome would have
affected the Chilean democracy movement
in two ways: 1) democratic participation
would have been out-of-reach to a larger
portion of the country, and 2) low
participation would have affected the
legitimacy of the outcome of the plebiscite.
A key element to the success of these
programs was the existence of grassroots
groups in Chile ready and independently
preparing to take on these challenges that
the international donors like NED could
support: 35,000 volunteers were involved at
the grassroots level in registering, educating,
and supporting voters. A naturally
developed organization can be successful by
using outside funding in a way in which
synthetically created groups funded by
outside interests cannot. First, a synthetic
program would not have had the same
legitimacy with voters and second, a
synthetic program would not have had as
wide of a reach without the support provided
by volunteer labor which would not have
been present.
The programs and support designed
to combat registration fear work in tandem
with the registration program itself.
Registration efforts would not have been
successful if volunteers had not also been
trained and prepared to address fear. The
success of these programs was helped along
by several other key contributors, namely:
the positivity of the “No” Campaign’s media
advertisements, the implementation of an
election monitoring and a parallel vote
count, and the success of volunteer
recruitment to the tune of 35,000
volunteers.31 The wide reach enabled by
trained volunteers meant that voters could
feel that the positive message being
distributed nationally could be verified by a
local source, and the promise of an election
monitoring system separate from the official
government oversight helped reassure voters
that voting would not be corrupted nor their
information tracked.
The program to pay registration fees
had limited reach. The number of people
who were able to take advantage of the
assistance was minimal compared to the
number of people in need and it could not
even cover the complete costs of registering
but was only a subsidy. Many of the
recipients of free photographs may still not
have had the funds to pay the registration fee
and it is unclear how many people who
received the subsidized photographs actually
registered in time for the 1988 plebiscite.
The $154,000 grant yielded mixed results.
The campaign for open elections failed,
however, the independent election
monitoring system became a critical tool for
the successful democratic transition
Recommendations
The massive voter operation in Chile
was a great success. NED should continue to
support voter registration efforts as part of
democracy promotion activities in three
ways: 1) by providing financial support for
administrative, promotional, and educational
activities as well as for logistical needs of
groups performing registration activities, 2)
by offering technical assistance to train
leaders and grassroots volunteers who would
be completing the fieldwork, and 3) by
providing space for different groups to
coordinate efforts and avoid overlap and
inefficiency. These types of support can
only be provided when there are existing
organizations (formal or informal) present,
which are capable of engaging in public
outreach. It is preferable to diversify support
to several organizations in order to both
increase the capacity and scope of activities,
in addition to continuing to maintain NED’s
image as politically neutral and non-corrupt.
In places like Chile, where
democracy was absent for a generation and
human rights abuses were rampant, efforts
to “protect (citizens) from their own fear”32
must be a key element of any successful
voter registration program and subsequent
election. Any outreach program designed to
engage the public in the push for democracy
must include messaging and volunteer
training that mitigates the power of fear
citizens have of the repercussions of
challenging the existing power structures
and highlights the progress that could be
made by active participation in democracy
efforts. NED should encourage any partners
to incorporate plans to address this challenge
in their efforts. It is recommended that plans
to counter fear be incorporated as a criterion
for grant proposals to NED.
The program to subsidize registration
costs had limited reach. The number of
people able to take advantage of the
assistance was small and made little impact
on the results. This does not take away from
the importance of removing barriers to
voting to poorer communities; however, if a
program like this is going to be impactful
rather than simply symbolic, it needs to be
launched on a larger scale according to the
number of people in need and the sources of
financial roadblocks to voting. In areas
where there is no registration fee, this type
of assistance should be refocused on
transportation support to get voters to
polling locations.
Media
Overview
Freedom of speech implies freedom of press
and media and the allowance of
underrepresented voices to be heard. A true
democracy is a country well informed and
allowed access to consume and then
comment on information provided without
censorship. As part of the campaign to
create an environment for a fair plebiscite,
NED supported Chileans in creating an
atmosphere that allowed for an informed
voter population. To create this
environment, NED supported different
programs such as, creating opposition press,
pamphlets, advertisements, radio, and NED
op-eds and articles.
The importance of the media was
twofold: firstly, media was utilized to
encourage people to register and vote, while
the second campaign was to get people to
vote “No.”
The media’s role in inspiring
registration came in the form of
advertisement campaigns, pamphlets, radio
spots, and television advertisements. The
campaign focused on getting voters to both
register and vote. With 8.2 million eligible
voters and only a quarter of them registered
to vote, the need to inspire the disillusioned
population proved to be a daunting task.
The media played a second role in
the plebiscite, which was represented by the
“No” campaign. This campaign assisted the
opposition to create advertising spots that
would stand up to the Pinochet
government’s “Yes” campaign, which could
balance the scales, and thus create a morefair election. While fortunate to have
assistance from organizations like the NED,
the opposition still faced barriers such as
government oversight on the content of the
advertisements and restricted air time.
Analysis
NED incorporated a media assistance
campaign into their support to the
opposition. This campaign developed two
main goals, firstly to get voters to register
and secondly to boost the “No” campaign’s
efforts against the advantage of the
government. This assistance focused on
maximizing the utilization of all forms of
media. The two goals of the campaign were
simultaneously implemented through
different forms of media. The forms used to
get voters to register were press, radio, and
television, while the primary source of
media for the “No” campaign was through
television advertisements.
“NO” CAMPAIGN
Leading up to the “No” campaign and prior
to the involvement of NED, Gabriel Valdés,
a prominent leader in the Christian
Democratic Party, and other opposition
leaders were encouraged to think strongly
about pushing for a fair election and using
the plebiscite as a platform to begin to roll in
democracy. This encouragement led to the
meeting of Valdés and George Soros.33 This
meeting culminated in Soros’ donating
money to the campaign for preliminary
polling that sought target audiences for the
campaign. This particular type of targeted
polling encouraged campaign managers to
focus on the youth and men, and less on
older women who had children and might
fear going up against the dictatorship.
Leading up to the vote, NED and key
actors in the media/publicity field united to
join the campaign. These players created
one of the best advertisement campaigns that
not only was a great campaign, but also
defeated the odds. The campaign overcame
media censorship, restrictions on civil and
political freedoms, and having to go against
human nature by getting people to vote
“No.”
MAGAZINES/NEWSPAPERS/PAMPHLETS
In an attempt to create a more-fair
environment for the “No” campaign, NED
supported the creation of press outlets like
opposition newspapers, magazines, and
pamphlets. To do this, funding and support
was given for the creation of opposition
magazines which served to create a press
with many viewpoints.34 The media, until
that point, was controlled by right-wing
organizations, which supported the Pinochet
regime. Therefore, only favorable opinions
and views of the dictatorship were
represented in the main media outlets. With
the help of NED, a more well-rounded news
coverage began to emerge. While these
outlets were open for the opposition to use
and for the campaigning for a free election,
there was still government oversight on
these outlets. While the ability to create
press/news was there, it had to go through
the scrutiny of the regime before being
published.35 Consequently, much of what
was written was presented as non-partisan.
The NED also assisted in creating
citizen manuals and publishing books
through Editorial Andante. Examples of
these books are “Conversaciones con el
Comandante” Miguel Castellanos in 1986.
“Manual del ciudadano: Los partidos
políticos chilenos,” by Abraham Santibanez,
in 1988 and “Sindicalismo y democracia,”
by E. M. Beauchemin in 1987.
RADIO
Radio served to encourage voter registration
by reaching a wide audience,36 particularly
Chileans with an otherwise limited access to
media, specifically people of lower social
classes, with lower literacy rates, and in
rural areas. This brought a voice of hope and
encouragement to the voter registration
campaign and introduced the idea that there
was an inkling of change happening.
TV
TV was crucial in the “No” campaign. The
opposition was given 27 spots over the
course of two months, 15 minutes a day at
11:45 p.m. each night to play an
advertisement that would promote the
campaign for the “No.”37 The TV blitz
convinced many wavering Chileans that the
“No” was legitimate and acceptable. This
campaign was integral in planting the seed
for people throughout Chile to know that not
only was there an opposition group but also
an option that was not the dictatorship.38
These advertisements also inspired hope in
the population by showing a new
progressive Chile. The television
advertisements gave the impression that an
opposition was mobilizing and that the
campaign was in fact legitimate.39 This
legitimization created a sense of security and
camaraderie among voters. The heavyhanded imagery of the “Yes” was being
combatted by the “rainbow’s symbolism of
joyous pluralism of the ‘No’” which also led
to the success of the campaign.40
Another key to the opposition's
success was its disciplined unity. Ironically,
the plebiscite structure helped cohere an
incredibly diverse and fragile coalition
around the one thing on which they totally
agreed: No to Pinochet and his regime.
There was very tight coordination on every
official speech, strategy, tactic, and
contingency plan.
OP-EDS AND MEDIA COVERAGE BY NED,
NDI AND OTHERS
Media was not only used within the country
by Chileans, it was also used abroad and by
international players and Chileans in exile. It
was also used in Chile by international
players. This was done in the form of
interviews, articles, op-eds, and journal.
Leading up to the plebiscite, articles
began to pour out of outlets like the New
York Times, Christian Science Monitor, and
the Washington Post. This was very
important, as we heard in many interviews,
in letting the Chilean people know that the
US and international players were involved
in the plebiscite, it was being watched, and
there was strong international support in
promoting a clean and fair election. It also
suggested that there was international
presence in Chile observing the plebiscite.
Many influential Chileans, like Arturo
Valenzuela, published articles informing
international actors of the plight of the
Chileans. This not only showed that
international media was interested in the
story but that it was also being read and
observed by people in other countries.
Recommendations
When introducing a media campaign
to promote democracy, it is important to
address three key points. First, create an
environment of opposition unity through the
media that gives a presence of strength,
courage, hope, and ability. Second,
use public relations and media professionals
to create messaging. Third, show strong
support, vigilance, and oversight by
international players.
The campaign for the “No” as well
as the voter registration campaign was so
successful because, not only did it display
political unity among parties, but it also
focused on a singular mission. NED were
critical in unifying the parties as mentioned
in other sections, but this unity was
displayed through the one voice that the
campaign suggested, a single unified Chile
free of the Pinochet dictatorship. The
strength of a single message permeated
through all media outlets.
Both campaigns were composed of
strong players, where professionals were
brought in to design and create the
advertisements vis-a-vis focus groups which
were utilized to concentrate the
advertisements’ message toward a
particular, key audience. This degree of
professionalism was displayed through the
clear concise campaign. The NED was
critical in building support and introducing
the right players for the team.
The strong media presence overseas and
by international players, through the
publication of interviews, op-eds, and
articles not only spotlighted the issue within
Chile, but also gave Chileans a sense of
security knowing that they were not alone in
the battle. The importance of this form of
media is crucial in showing solidarity and
giving a sense of unity that is greater than
the individual.
Though the opposition had won the
right to a plebiscite, rather than another
eight-year continuation of the Pinochet
regime, and had already successfully
registered seven million voters who were
obligated to vote in the plebiscite, the
opposition still faced the challenge of
preventing potential election fraud on the
part of Pinochet’s government. The
opposition was convinced that their only
hope in winning the plebiscite would be to
create a “foolproof” way to count the
votes.41
and logistics of election observer
delegations, but also to demonstrate a
successful international example. In July of
that same year, the NDI mission visited
Chile to analyze the voter registration
procedures and assess the capacity and
needs of the free election campaign. In 1988
NDI funded the development of an
electronic system to allow for independent
vote counting operations, and commissioned
a national public opinion survey. From
August 17-24, 1989, eight representatives
visited Chile to prepare for the international
observer delegations, where NDI officially
informed the government that they would
hold an observer delegation, prepare
logistics, and meet with leaders of the “Yes”
and “No” campaigns. These meetings with
both campaigns were crucial in emphasizing
that NDI’s goal in the observer delegations
was to hold a free and fair plebiscite.
Analysis
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION
ELECTION MONITORING
Overview
The NED granted the NDI $91,933
dollars for its election observer delegation to
the October 1988 presidential plebiscite.
Additionally, the NED granted Facultad
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
(FLACSO) and Centro de Estudios del
Desarrollo (CED) a $154,000 grant for a
two-part project in training an independent
election monitoring system, in addition to
support for public opinion polling.
NDI
Analysis
In May 1987, four Chileans attended
the NDI observer delegation to the
Philippine legislative elections. This initial
effort was especially significant in not only
giving Chileans experience with the process
On October 5, 1988 the International
Observer Delegation consisting of fifty-five
individuals from 22 countries observed the
Chilean presidential plebiscite. The
delegates were present in more than 15
Chilean cities, visited 150 polling sites on
plebiscite day and observed the electoral
process at 12 percent of the polling sites.
Delegates were either “selected because of
prestige, credibility and expertise” or chosen
on the basis of exposing members from
certain countries to democratic
developments.42 The international members
represented a range of political ideologies,
and the US component was bipartisan.
Delegates were prepared with NDI training
and a book of reference tailored to specific
missions. Ten teams left Santiago for other
provincial capitals around the country where
their purpose was to inform Chileans that
observers were present, give information
about the local campaign, and identify
polling places; they also sometimes met with
local media to explain the objective of the
delegation. This visibility was crucial,
because it went beyond pressuring the
government to give the electorate
confidence in a form of voting free from
corruption, in the plebiscite.
QUICK COUNTS
In addition to the parallel voting count, NDI
worked with the NED-funded Committee
for Free Elections to create “quick counts”
of the vote through a sample of the
population. The quick count process was
developed prior to voting day in conjunction
with the government, in publicly choosing
numbers at random to decide from which
“mesas” the sample of votes would be
collected from. The quick count estimates,
intended to identify the overall trend by
recording approximately ten percent of the
vote, were actually quite accurate in
predicting the final result.
The quick counts were crucial in the
case of Chile, because according to Chilean
law, official results are not announced until
at least 10 days after the plebiscite and the
National Electoral Service would not
announce the semi-official results from the
scrutinizing boards until between three to six
days after the plebiscite. Tabulating the
quick counts kept the electorate informed
and decreased the opportunity for election
fraud on the part of Pinochet’s government.
Election observer delegations are one
of NED’s most effective contributions to the
democratic transition in Chile. Because of
the assistance provided by NED, NDI was
able to successfully provide the technical
capacity for quick count votes through the
NDI observer delegation. The transparency
reflected by their ability to explain their
connections and previous contribution to the
opposition, helped to bolster their legitimacy
as an honest and fair election monitoring
delegation among concurrent election
monitoring mechanisms from both the
“Yes” and “No” campaigns.
Recommendations
The role of the NDI observer delegations
in Chile was twofold: (1) to provide
technical assistance and capacity for the
parallel vote and quick counts, and (2) to
exert pressure on the government to run a
completely fair plebiscite. The international
community was “watching” Chile, and
NDI’s presence in the country prior to and
during the plebiscite showed the government
and the people of Chile that nothing less of a
free and open plebiscite would be tolerated.
Future observer elections should make
conscious, concerted efforts to travel beyond
the capital into the more rural and remote
areas of a country, in order to become
visible to as many voters as possible.
CONFERENCES & THINK TANKS
“The Concertación changed the course of
history for Chile: it knew how to interpret
the national culture and consolidated a
political mind-set in favor of gradual
reforms.” -Sergio Bitar
“Analyzing the situation together enabled us
to reduce prejudices and build trust.” Patricio Aylwin
Overview
In the years leading up to the
plebiscite, Chile’s political parties built a
strong and enduring coalition. The Group of
24 began as a meeting of academics of
different political backgrounds to plan for a
new constitution and map out what the new
democracy should look like. By forming a
coalition founded on constitutional reform,
the Group of 24 was able to overcome the
distrust of the past and build mutual respect
via its successful ability to overlook
ideological differences and focusing on
conditions that would support human
dignity.43 Subsequently, political alliances
emerged through the Civic Assembly and
then the Democratic Alliance, which
ultimately became the Concertación.
They insistently advocated replacing
the plebiscite with open elections, but the
government would only allow for a
plebiscite. International ideological support
was crucial in the opposition’s decision to
accept the plebiscite; it gave them the
leverage to reinforce that if the minimal
conditions of a fair plebiscite were not met,
Chile and the international community
would denounce it as fraudulent.44 The
plebiscite consolidated and unified the
Concertación toward 20 years of unity that
may not have been reached otherwise in a
precocious, competitive election. Think
tanks and conferences funded by NED, also
helped to support the unity of the
Concertación both before and after the
plebiscite.
Analysis
Think tanks and academic
conferences were particularly important in
the case of Chile because they allowed
intellectuals to teach and influence the
decisions of opposition leaders.45 The
academic setting of these seminars also
helped to build a bridge between the
experiences of exiles and of those who
remained in Chile. In addition to creating the
space to keep the democratic opposition
afloat, support for foreign democratic groups
was considered essential in keeping the
democratic opposition unified, rather than
fragmented.46
BEFORE THE PLEBISCITE
NDI began its activity with Chile in 1985.
NED hosted the “Democracy in South
America” conference in Washington, D.C.
Chilean political party leaders and their
Latin American counterparts attended with
the intention to discuss practical strategies
regarding the democratic transition. Through
this conference NED articulated their
programmatic objectives, which included:
supporting the creation of Latin American
foundations to strengthen private volunteer
organizations, increasing contact between
US foundations and existing Latin American
foundations, strengthening communication
among varying sectors in Latin America,
increasing dialogue with the military sector
in Latin America, and increase direct grants
to Latin American organizations rather than
intermediary US-based ones.
In May 1986, the NDI, the Acción
Democratica, and the Socialist Christian
Party of Venezuela hosted an international
conference in Caracas, “Transition to
Democracy: Chile.” The conference took
place when the National Accord was
undermined by anti-government violence in
Chile and by a potential schism due to a
divergence in tactics between members.47
Twelve representatives of different Chilean
parties were present, in addition to
international democrats from Argentina, the
Philippines, Spain, Uruguay, the US, and
Venezuela. Representatives of new
democracies shared common experiences on
the transition process with Chilean
counterparts. The conference is credited
with providing support for the National
Accord signatories during a potentially
divisive period. Testimonies from Chilean
party leaders indicated that the conference
served as a space to lay out the concerns of
the opposition, which included: open
universities, freedom of press and
expression, accepting cooperation but
rejecting intervention from international
community, the importance of unity among
parties post-dictatorship to avoid violence,
plan for the post-junta armed forces, and that
the problems among Chilean parties must be
solved by the Chilean people themselves.48
POST-PLEBISCITE
While many international think tanks
have been credited with “liberalizing the
democratic transition,” the think tanks
funded by the NED were also able to
strengthen the center after the plebiscite, and
moderate hardliners on both the
conservative and liberal ends. The joint
project, administered by Georgetown
University, encouraged discussion between
foreign and Chilean democratic activists by
partnering with two think tanks: the liberal
Facultad Latinoamerica de Ciencias
Sociales (FLACSO) and the conservative
Centro de Estudios Publicos (CEP).
Recommendations
Think tanks and conferences helped to
build bridges between academics and party
leaders in Chile. NED’s efforts provided a
platform for the Chilean opposition to
invigorate its vision and increase coherence
prior to and following the plebiscite. The
NED should continue to fund and support
think tanks and host conferences among
countries facing democratic transition, in
order to promote engagement and consistent
opportunities for coalition-building among
those who represent, and otherwise
influence, citizens. However, it should be
noted that the Concertación had already
been formed before the NED had yet
established a true influence in the country.
NED programs worked because political
parties were already collaborating to end the
Pinochet regime. NED’s work bolstered this
coalition by supporting it during periods of
violence and when it diverged on tactics.
Supporting conferences or seminars is futile
without commitment and organization of
dissidents themselves. In addition to
sponsoring conferences before democratic
transition, NED can continue to support and
fund dissidents’ attendance at conferences
held by universities and other academic
institutions.
POST-JUNTA SUPPORT
Overview
After the opposition victory in 1988
and the Concertación candidate Patricio
Aylwin’s inauguration in 1990, Pinochet
still remained a fixture in the Chilean
government under the privileges granted in
the 1980 Chilean Constitution. He would
remain the Commander in Chief of the
Army for the next ten years, and his senatorfor-life position gave him immunity from
prosecution. He maintained support from
loyal senators and fused himself with the
military so that attacks on him would be
considered attacks on the institution itself.
The national government of Chile still had
authoritarian influence, and the NED
continued its democracy assistance through
the support of local and municipal
institutions.
Analysis
The year between the plebiscite of
1988 and the presidential and parliamentary
elections of December 1989 was an
awkward time for the transition. Most of the
focus had been on the plebiscite and people
were not poised to focus on institutions.
Even as newly-elected President Patricio
Aylwin’s presidency began, the citizenry
had to adjust to the new, post-authoritarian
democracy after 17 years of military rule.
During the 1989 election year, NED
funded Participa through Delphi
International, which held forums and
seminars for political party commissions to
develop platforms on the role of social
policy in the democratic process.
From 1989-1993 the NED
contributed $386,000 to the Free Trade
Union Institute to fund Chilean trade unions.
The grants were crucial in teaching workers
the techniques of political participation in
the new pluralist system and the practical
implications of legal reform on unions. The
programs were effective in supporting the
democratic labor movement secure a place
in the Chilean government and to benefit
from the economy.
The funding of Instituto Libertad
strengthened the municipal government.
Though Chilean elections were now free,
1,500 of the 2,000 newly elected officials in
1992 did not have any type of governance
training. Instituto Libertad conducted
training courses with workshops on the role
of municipal government and community
building, offered technical courses on
administration and finance, and advised
local government officials. The Institute
helped to strengthen the effectiveness of
municipal government, which remains
essential for a democratic government to
function.
The NED also funded political party
training through the International
Republican Institute (formerly the National
Republican Institute) to promote strong
parties, which are necessary for a
functioning pluralist system. From 19901991 the IRI trained center and center-right
parties on communications, organization,
membership recruitment, and member
development.
Through NED funding, NDI returned
with another observer delegation to the
December 1989 elections to continue to
deter misconduct by the government and to
utilize Chile as an example for others in
transitioning countries.
Through the NDI, the Committee of
Free Elections conducted conferences,
seminars, and forums for citizens and
political leaders to debate on the legislative,
administrative, electoral, and constitutional
reforms prior to the elections. Post-plebiscite
public polling was particularly significant in
its ability to increase the accountability of
politicians in addressing the concerns of the
electorate. NDI was also significant in
reforming local government through its
partnership with IRI. They sponsored
consultations for local government experts
from the US, Europe, and Latin America to
meet with Chilean legislators to develop
reforms, including one to establish elections
for mayor and city councilmembers. The
partnership also supported Participa’s
seminar on women’s political leadership
where female leaders from Chile, and other
countries, met to discuss the techniques to
successfully participate in local government.
Through its programs, the NED and
NDI assisted Chileans in the return to
democratic processes and institutions in a
way that increased the strength of citizens’
voices and their role in the government.
Recommendations
The Concertación’s and President
Aylwin’s decision to honor the post-regime
institutional framework once they were in
power was necessary to lay the groundwork
for the transition to democracy. Rather than
battling the national institutional framework
set by the 1980 Constitution, the NED
focused on strengthening political parties
and reforming municipal institutions to
reflect democratic processes, which was
appropriate in the context of Chile. NED
should continue to support efforts that
inform the electorate, increase workers’ and
women’s participation, and strengthen
democratic institutions at a local level.
ADDITIONAL
RECOMMENDATIONS
Women’s Groups
During the Chilean plebiscite, women were
an active part of the movement and
comprised the majority of the grassroots
foot-soldier volunteers for both the
opposition and independent pro-democracy
groups.49 Women’s groups were also the
lead drivers of the movement for human
rights and awareness during the years
leading up to the plebiscite, frequently
drawing attention to the disappearances of
key political figures and assassinations by
the Chilean government. Furthermore,
several women’s groups were instrumental
in developing language and policy during
that time that would become important
elements of the new democratic government.
For example, the National Service for
Women in Chile was a concept developed
by women’s groups in the mid-1980s during
the Pinochet regime and implemented by the
new government as the result of successful
lobbying efforts from those same groups.50
Despite the incredible magnitude of the
contributions made by women and women’s
groups to a successful democratic
transitions, women, women’s groups, and
women’s issues received little funding or
attention from the international community
including NED. These groups would lose
momentum and power within a few years
after the transition due to a lack of strong
fundraising ability and burnout from
activists.
Chile is not unique in terms of the role
female citizens played in its democratic
transition. In neighboring Argentina, women
and women’s groups had a very similar
structure of involvement, starting with
addressing human rights in the wake of
government abuses and moving to building
greater involvement from women in politics
and the mass mobilization of women was a
decisive factor in the success of Argentina’s
democratic movement.51 In Indonesia,
women worked in conjunction with Muslim
groups as active partners in democracy
education, election monitoring, and
strengthening religious freedom which
resulted in a successful campaign to
incorporate democratic values into
Indonesian society.52 Mongolian women’s
groups have been funded by foreign donors
as part of a larger strategy for political and
economic development since the early 1990s
and the results have been promising.53
Women in Mongolia had already begun to
become more politically engaged and active,
and funding formal groups representing the
movement has played a big part in not only
addressing women’s issues but in expanding
voter education and in supporting a civil
society watchdog for government
behavior.54
It is the recommendation of this research
group that NED look for active women's
organizations to support in states that are
determined to be a possible location for
increased democracy. We recognize the
support NED has given to empowering
women and incorporating women's’ issues
into democracy programs but women's
groups can play a larger part in pushing for
democracy when presented with the
appropriate resources and a political
platform to discuss their related views and
ideas. Women’s groups in Chile were given
more license to speak out against the
government than regular political
organizations and their room to function
along with their widespread legitimacy
among the public could have been a larger
contributor to democracy if they had been
properly supported. Looking forward, key
factors for ensuring efficacy in women’s
group funding are 1) women’s groups have
some existing space for activism, 2) these
groups have widespread legitimacy at the
grassroots level inside the state, and 3) there
are women’s issue grievances with high
crossover in governance issues, for example,
human rights’ abuses or a lack of women in
government roles. Women’s groups are an
underused asset in promoting and assisting
the transition to democracy around the world
and NDI should direct resources to helping
these groups achieve their full potential in
the mission for greater democracy.
Fund the Political Middle
As discussed above, countries other than the
US, especially from Germany, were also
active in Chile, and their assistance was
critical to building a working political
sphere in Chile during Pinochet’s rule.
Pinochet suppressed Chile’s broad spectrum
of political parties, leaving little space for
political parties to act or to raise money
inside Chile. As a result, international
support was critical for political parties as
they formed a coherent opposition, and later,
after the plebiscite, prepared to govern.55
Absent a well-funded political middle, many
of NED’s programs would not have been
effective as they required established
political parties as the on-the-ground
executors of NED programming. Structured,
internationally supported, politically centrist
parties were influential players at many of
NED’s conferences in convincing other
opposition parties to join together and create
the “Coalition” that ran the campaign for
“No” during the plebiscite. The “Coalition”
was the eventual answer to presenting Chile
with a true, viable alternative to Pinochet.56
In the case of Chile, NED did not need to
play the role of a political party funder, but
that does not indicate that they will not need
to play that part in the future.
A wide spectrum of actors in the Chilean
transition recognized the key role of political
party funding in having a successful
democratic transition. Elliott Abrams views
political funding as one of the most
important democracy promotion activities
moving forward,57 and Sergio Bitar
recommended looking at political parties as
places for the investment of resources.58 It is
our recommendation that NED evaluate the
status of political parties in a nation,
specifically parties in the political center as
they are most able to create a stable coalition
after an election. If there is not a sufficient
political party structure on the ground, then
NED must evaluate whether other groups
are contributing to building those structures.
If no structure exists and the establishment
of that structure is not currently being
funded by other actors, then NED should
incorporate political party building activities
into its strategy if it wants to see an increase
in democracy in that country.
Support Institutional Capacity
A key factor in Chile’s transition was its
history of democratic institutions. Prior to
Pinochet’s coup, Chile’s presidential
democracy lasted for 150 years—second
only to the longevity of the US’s
presidential democracy. As a result, Chile’s
democracy was and is buttressed by
effective political institutions. These
institutions range from the concrete to the
conceptual: office space for legislators and
legislative committees, legislative staffers to
help them perform research and respond to
constituent concerns, horizontal
accountability across the government, and a
history of rule of law.
Over the past thirty years, scholars have
developed a deeper understanding of how
institutions shape democratic outcomes
through their focus on institutions such as
the rule of law,59 horizontal accountability,60
and legislative effectiveness.61 Many of
these scholars point to cases of the
breakdown or failure of democratic
institutions as the cause of democracy’s
recent decline. The presence of concrete and
conceptual democratic institutions in Chile
make it an exceptional case—in most
countries strong democratic institutions are
absent.
We recommend that NED consider the
importance of Chile’s institutions in its
transition when planning programs in other
countries. For example, in cases where
legislatures lack the physical space and
support resources, NED should consider
programs that train legislators to organize
and demand more funding from the
executive branch. Although, NED, as an
outside actor, cannot directly strengthen
more conceptual institutions such as the rule
of law or true horizontal accountability, it
can give lawmakers the tools to do so
themselves. These activities would maintain
NED’s neutrality as they would be provided
to all elected officials regardless of
affiliation and would not prop up a
particular government, as the supported
activities would solely finance the resources
necessary for governance, and not any actual
government programming.
CONCLUSION
NED support was crucial in enabling
Chilean leadership to conduct a successful
campaign for Chilean citizens to choose
democracy, and in providing the means to
build the groundwork to have their 1988
plebiscite actually result in a peaceful
democratic transition. The case of Chile is
complex, but there are many lessons that
NED can take from this success and apply to
future scenarios. It is most important to
recognize that a precondition to success for
any democracy assistance work is that the
movement for democratic change is an
organically developed grassroots movement
organized and led by the members of a
concerned population within a country. If
that condition is met, then NED can
contribute to the success of that movement
by recognizing other existing conditions on
the ground and responding appropriately.
Potential courses of action exemplified by
the work in Chile are election monitoring,
voter registration support, the creation of
space for dialogue, support for media and
public relations efforts, and assistance for
emerging democratic institutions after an
election. There is also the potential to
employ strategies not used in Chile or
conducted by other supporters: the funding
of political parties, support for women’s
groups, and support for institutional
capacity. “A transition requires actors,”62
and the NED can be one of the actors that
serves as a functional, financial, and
symbolic intermediary for democratic
movements across the globe, if it
incorporates the lessons offered by one of its
first and largest success stories: Chile.
APPENDIX A
List of Standardized Questions:
1) How were you directly or indirectly involved in the Chilean plebiscite in the late 80s?
2) Can you talk about your personal experience during this period in Chile?
3) Were you aware of the role of Ned/NDI?
4) Were NDI’s or the NED’s democracy assistance programs more or less important than other
levers?
5) We saw that you worked through a grant from the NED. Can you talk at all about what the
grant process for NED funding was like? What sort of things NED wanted included in your
proposal, timeline of the process, etc?
6) Was there any sort of feedback loop between NED/NDI and the said organization?
7) Was there an approved framework for NED/NDI activities?
8) What would you consider the successes of their programs? What about their failures?
9) What improvements do you think could/should have been made to the NED/NDI strategy?
10) What are the lessons learned from our engagement in Chilean politics, specifically the
referendum and election?
11) What were the roles of other international organizations at the time?
12) What strategies, tactics, messaging did you find most effective?
13) What were your greatest challenges?
14) Where do you see the role of NED/NDI in future democratic transitions?
15) What lessons learned can be taken away from this event?
Appendix B
Elliott Abrams (former Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 19811985; former Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 1985-1989), telephone
interview by authors, February 7, 2016.
Sergio Bitar (Partido por la Democracia leader), interview by authors, March 10, 2016.
Claudia de Solar (Journalist; Professor), interview by authors, March 11, 2016.
Maria del Carmen Dominguez (Director of Strategic Planning of the Chilean Foreign Minister),
interview by authors, March 11, 2016.
Mark Falcoff (scholar, Latin America), interview by authors, February 10, 2016.
Robert Gelbard (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South America 1985-88; former
Ambassador to Bolivia 1988-91), interview by authors, March 2, 2016.
Carl Gershman (President of the National Endowment for Democracy), interview by
authors, January 27, 2016.
Claudio Grossman, Claudio (Dean of American University Washington College of Law),
interview by authors, March 16, 2016.
Barbara Haig (Deputy to the President for Policy & Strategy, National Endowment for
Democracy), interview by authors, January 27, 2016.
Maria Eugenia “Kenny” Hirmas (Media Analyst), interview by authors, March 23, 2016.
Marilyn McAfee (Former Ambassador to Guatemala), telephone interview by authors, February
24, 2016.
Heraldo Muñoz (Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs; co-founder of Partido por la
Democracia), interview by authors, March 11, 2016.
Carlos Portales (Professor, FLASCO), interview by authors, March 9, 2016.
Jim Swigert (Senior Associate and Regional Director Latin America and Caribbean
Programs, National Democratic Institute), interview by authors, January 19, 2016.
Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chilean Ambassador to the United States), interview by authors, February
17, 2016.
Arturo Valenzuela (Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs), interview by
authors, March 30, 2016.
Kenneth Wollack (President of National Democratic Institute), interview by authors, January
19, 2016.
APPENDIX C
Parties: (spectrum of left to right, descending)
-Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR)
-Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Chile, PCCh)
-Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, FPMR)
-Socialist Party-Alemeyda faction (Partido Socialista de Chile, PS-Alemeyda)
-Movement for United Popular Action (Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario, MAPU)
Divided into: a workers and peasants wing, and a Christian left wing
-Christian Left (Partido Izquierda Cristiana de Chile, IC)
-Socialist Party-Mandujano (Partido Socialista de Chile, PS-Mandujano
-Socialist Party-Briones (PS-Briones)
-Socialist Party-Nunez (PS-Nunez)
-Radical Party (Partido Radical, PR)
-Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC)
-Social Democratic Party (Partido Social-Democratico, PSD)
-Republican Party (Partido Republicano, RP)
-Liberal Party (Partido Liberal, PL)
-National Party (Partido Nacional, PN
-National United Movement (Movimiento de Unión Nacional, MUN)
-National Union Party (NU)
-Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI
APPENDIX D
References
David Altman, Rafael Piñeiro, and Sergio Toro, “Chile: Coordinating a Successful Democratic
Transition,” in Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Kathryn Stoner and Michael
McFaul (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 198.
2
Ibid., 200.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid., 200–201.
5
Interviews with Amb. Robert Gelbard and Elliott Abrams.
6
“Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, Jr.” Interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy. The Association for
Diplomatic Studies and Training. N.p., 25 Apr. 2001.
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Barnes,%20Harry%20G.%20Jr.toc.pdf. 2 Apr. 2016.
7
Randy B Reiter, M V Zunzunegui, and Jose Quiroga, “Guidelines for Field Reporting of Basic Human
Rights Violations,” Human Rights Quarterly 8, no. 4 (1986): 628–53.
8
David Altman, Rafael Piñeiro, and Sergio Toro, “Chile: Coordinating a Successful Democratic
Transition,” in Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Kathryn Stoner and Michael
McFaul (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 203.
9
Interview with Amb. Juan Gabriel Valdés.
10
Jaime Llambias-Wolff, “The Voluntary Repatriation Process of Chilean Exiles,” International
Migration 31, no. 4 (October 1, 1993): 579–99.
11
Ibid.
12
Interviews Amb. Robert Gelbard and Elliott Abrams
13
Interview with Amb. Robert Gelbard.
14
Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger, “Exile Communities and Their Differential Institutional Dynamics:
A Comparative Analysis of the Chilean and Uruguayan Political Diasporas ,” Revista de Ciencia Política
(Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. Instituto de Ciencia Política , 2007).
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Morris H Morley and Chris McGillion, Reagan and Pinochet : The Struggle over U.S. Policy toward
Chile, 2015.
19
Interview with Amb. Robert Gelbard.
20
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and Their US
Counterparts,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 1991, 33–63.
21
Ibid., 40.
22
Ibid.
23
Mario Fernández Baeza, “The Landmarks of Half a Century of Solidarity: The Konrad-AdenauerStiftung In Chile (1962-2012)” (Berlin, 2012), 40.
24
Ibid.; Pinto-Duschinsky, “Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and Their US
Counterparts,” 34.
25
Fernández Baeza, “The Landmarks of Half a Century of Solidarity: The Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung In
Chile (1962-2012),” 40.
26
Altman, Piñeiro, and Toro, “Chile: Coordinating a Successful Democratic Transition,” 206.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Interview with Sergio Bitar.
31
Interviews with Sergio Bitar and Carlos Portales.
32
Interview with Carlos Portales.
1
33
Interview with Amb. Juan Gabriel Valdés.
Interview with Amb. Maria del Carmen Dominguez
35
Interview with Amb. Juan Gabriel Valdés..
36
Interview with Amb. Maria del Carmen Dominguez
37
Paul. Drake and Arturo Valenzuela, The Chilean Plebiscite : A First Step Toward Redemocratization
(Pittsburgh, PA: Association of Latin American Studies, 1989), 7.
38
Interview with Carlos Portales.
39
Interview with Carlos Portales.
40
Interview with Arturo Valenzuela.
41
Drake and Valenzuela, The Chilean Plebiscite : A First Step Toward Redemocratization.
42
National Democratic Institute. Chile's Transition to Democracy: The 1988 Plebiscite.Washington DC,
1988.
43
Genaro Arriagada, “Chile’s Successful Transition to Democracy,” in Democratic Transitions:
Conversations with World Leaders, ed. Sergio Bitar (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2015).
44
Ibid.
45
Jeffrey. Puryear, Thinking Politics : Intellectuals and Democracy in Chile, 1973-1988 (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
46
Interview with Marilyn McAfee.
47
Edgardo Boeninger, “The Chilean Road to Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 64, no. 4 (1986): 812–32.
48
National Democratic Institute, Proceedings of Transition to Democracy: Chile (Caracas, 1986).
49
Interviews with Claudia de Solar and Kenny Bitar.
50
Interview with Kenny Bitar.
51
Elisa María Carrío, “The Challenges of Women’s Participation in the Legislature: A New Look at
Argentina,” Women in Parliament: Beyond the Numbers, 2002.
52
Robin Bush, “Lessons from Indonesia’s Democratic Transition,” Asia Foundation, 2011,
http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2011/05/04/lessons-from-indonesia%E2%80%99s-democratictransition/.
53
Katherine S. Hunter, “Strengthening Democracy Through Women’s Political Participation”
(Washington, DC, 2012).
54
Ibid.
55
Interviews with Sergio Bitar and Carlos Portales.
56
Interview with Amb. Juan Gabriel Valdés.
57
Interview with Elliott Abrams.
58
Interview with Sergio Bitar.
59
Larry Jay Diamond, Leonardo Morlino, and American Political Science Association, Assessing the
Quality of Democracy (Cambridge Univ Press, 2005); Adam. Przeworski and José María. Maravall,
“Democracy and the Rule of Law” (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
60
Guillermo A O’Donnell, “Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy 9,
no. 3 (1998): 112–26.
61
Joel D Barkan, Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 2009).
62
Interview with Carlos Portales.
34