Financial Aspects of Network Security: Malware and Spam ITU-T Study Group 3

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Financial Aspects of Network
Security: Malware and Spam
ITU-T Study Group 3
Geneva, Switzerland
2 April 2008
Johannes M. Bauer*, Michel van Eeten**, Tithi Chattopadhyay*
Please send comments to:
ITU-D ICT Applications and Cybersecurity Division
<cybmail@itu.int>
* Michigan State University, USA,
** Delft University of Technology, Netherlands
International
Telecommunication
Union
The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the ITU or its Membership.
Objectives of report
ƒ Malware and spam have far-reaching, direct
and indirect, financial effects
¾
¾
¾
¾
Costs for individuals, organizations, nations
Revenues for legal but also illegal players
Direct costs probably 0.2-0.4% of global GDP
Including indirect effects could be as high as 0.5-1%
of global GDP
ƒ Available information is incomplete and
potentially biased by stakeholder interests
ƒ The report aims at documenting the state of
knowledge of these financial aspects
April 2008
2
Overview
ƒ Malware and spam developments
ƒ A framework for analyzing financial
flows related to malware/spam
ƒ Main empirical findings
ƒ A preliminary welfare assessment
ƒ Appendix: the malware/spam
underground economy
April 2008
3
Malware and spam
developments
April 2008
4
Background
ƒ Payoffs of fraudulent and criminal activity are
high and have brought organized crime to
malware and spam
ƒ Division of labor and specialization has
increased sophistication and virulence of
threats from fraudsters and criminals
ƒ Security decisions of some players within the
ICT value net do not fully reflect social costs
and benefits and only sub-optimally mitigate
external threats
April 2008
5
Division of labor
Malware
Writer
Sells credit
cards with
identities
Seller Malware
Credit
Card
Abuser
Drop
Service
Uses
Services
Buys Goods
Sells Malware
Malware
Distributor
Guarantee
Service
Uses Services
Identity
Collector
Sells Identities
Buys
Drop
Site
Template
eShops
Sells Malware
Ships
Goods
Drop
Botnet
Owner
Drop
Drop
Uses Services
Forward Goods
Spammers
Uses Services
Reseller
Drop Site
Developers
Source: MessageLabs, 2007
April 2008
6
Visibility vs. malicious intent
Source: www.govcert.nl
April 2008
Time
7
Malware attack trends
websites as infected
50000
0
2006
RiskWare
ƒ Postini reports 10% of
100000
AdWare
¾ 30% of computers on
Internet infected
¾ About 50% active
150000
MalWare
ƒ As of 3/2008 (Panda)
200000
VirWare
¾ Trojans, rootkits slowing
toward end of 2007
¾ Worms, viruses, AdWare
and other accelerating
250000
TrojWare
ƒ Overall increases
ƒ Monthly growth
2007
Source: Kaspersky Labs, 2008
April 2008
8
Spam trends
1600
1400
267
268
204
189
ƒ Different metrics
ƒ “Abusive” messages
1200
ƒ
1000
800
600
1210
1221
1178
Q3-06
Q4-06
Q1-07
1230
400
ƒ
ƒ
200
0
Abusive
Q2-07
Unaltered
Source: MAAWG 2007
April 2008
ƒ
(MAAWG)
MessageLabs new
and old spam
Symantec
Fairly consistent
numbers (85-90% of
total messages)
Spamhaus Project
(IP addresses)
9
Geography of spam
50
60
2006
45
50
2007
40
35
40
30
25
30
20
20
15
10
10
5
% Internet spam
% Internet mail
south america
north america
europe
australia/oceania
asia
south america
north america
europe
australia/oceania
asia
africa
% Internet mail
africa
0
0
% Internet spam
Source: Symantec, 2007, 2008
April 2008
10
Financial aspects of
malware and spam
April 2008
11
Selected financial flows
Hardware,
Software
4
7
Business
users
8
5
6
Security
service
providers
9
Individual
users
10
12
11
ISPs
3
13
1
2
Legal
Fraudsters,
Criminals
Society at large
Potentially
illegal
Government
April 2008
12
Direct and indirect cost
ƒ Direct cost such as
¾ losses from fraudulent and criminal activity
¾ cost of preventative measures (e.g.,
security software and hardware, personnel
training)
¾ cost of infrastructure adaptation (network
capacity, routers, filters, …)
ƒ Indirect cost such as
¾ cost of service outages
¾ cost of law enforcement
¾ opportunity cost to society (lack of trust)
April 2008
13
Legal and illegal revenues
ƒ Legal business activities
¾ Security software and services
¾ Infrastructure equipment and bandwidth
ƒ Illegal business activities
¾ Writing of malicious code
¾ Renting of botnets
¾ Profits from pump and dump stock schemes
¾ Commission on spam-induced sales
¾ Money laundering (illegally acquired goods)
April 2008
14
Main empirical findings
April 2008
15
Cost of malware
ƒ Worldwide direct damage in 2006:
$13.2 bn (Computer Economics survey of 52
IT professionals)
¾ Decline from $17.5 bn in 2004
¾ Effects of anti-malware efforts and shift
from direct to indirect costs
ƒ U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
estimated cost of computer crime to
U.S. economy in 2005 to $67.2 bn
ƒ No estimates of indirect and of
opportunity costs available
April 2008
16
Direct losses to U.S. business
Average cost per reporting firm
(in 000 $)
3500
ƒ Surveys of Computer
Security Institute (CSI)
members since 1996
ƒ In 2007, 494
3000
respondents of which
194 provided damage
estimates
2500
2000
1500
1000
ƒ Leading categories:
500
¾ financial fraud
0
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
¾ damage by viruses,
worms, spyware
¾ System intrusion
Source: CSI, 2007
April 2008
ƒ Incomplete picture
17
Cost of preventative measures
ƒ Percentage of IT budget spent on
security (2007 CSI Report)
¾ 35% of respondents: <3% of IT budget
¾ 26% or respondents: 3-5% of IT budget
¾ 27% of respondents: >5% of IT budget
ƒ 2006 global revenue of security
providers estimated to $7.5 bn (Gartner
2007)
ƒ TU Delft/Quello Center study: 6-10% of
IT budget dedicated to security
April 2008
18
Cost of spam
ƒ Global cost of spam in 2007: $100 bn,
of which US$ 35 U.S. (Ferris Research)
ƒ Cost of spam management to U.S.
businesses in 2007: $71 bn (Nucleus
Research)
ƒ Cost of click fraud in 2007: $1 bn
(Click
Forensics)
ƒ Cost to U.S. consumers in 2007: $7.1
bn (Consumer Reports)
April 2008
19
A preliminary welfare
assessment
April 2008
20
Determining welfare effects
ƒ Complicated by the legal and illegal
revenues associated with cybercrime
ƒ Costs of malware and spam
¾ Direct costs (damages, prevention, …)
¾ Indirect costs (law enforcement, trust, …)
ƒ Economic “bads” (e.g., part of security
investment), not welfare-enhancing
ƒ Treatment of illegal transactions
(estimated to total $105 bn)?
April 2008
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Scaling overall effects
ƒ Costs of malware and spam
¾ Most reliable information at country level;
how to scale to global level/
¾ Avoidance of double-counting
¾ Global direct costs probably in 0.2-0.4%
range of global GDP ($66 tr)
¾ Direct and indirect costs could be as high as
0.5-1% of global GDP
ƒ Probably differential effects on national
productivity and growth
April 2008
22
Appendix
The malware/spam
underground economy
April 2008
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Malware/spam
ƒ Players in the underground economy include
¾ Malware writers and distributors (trojans, spyware,
keyloggers, adware, riskware, …)
¾ Spammers, botnet owners, drops
¾ Various middlemen
ƒ Emergence of institutional arrangements to
enhance “trust” (e.g., SLAs, warranties)
ƒ Steady stream of new attacks (e.g., drive-by
pharming, targeted spam, MP3 spam, …)
April 2008
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Software vendors
Security providers
App/Si
App/Sj
App/Sk
Usersi
ISPi
ISPj
ISPk
Governance
Hardware vendors
April 2008
Usersj
Usersk
Fraudulent and criminal activity
Fraudulent and criminal activity
Interdependent value net
25
Efficient & inefficient decisions
ƒ Instances where incentives of players are well
aligned to optimize costs to society
¾ ISPs correct security problems caused by end users
as well as some generated by other ISPs
¾ Financial service providers correct security problems
of end users and software vendors
¾ Negative reputation effects of poor security
disciplines software vendors, ISPs, and other
stakeholders
ƒ Instances where incentives are poorly aligned
¾ Individual users (lack of information, skills, …)
¾ Domain name governance/administration system
April 2008
26
ƒ
More Information: ITU
Development Sector
ITU-D ICT Applications and Cybersecurity Division
¾ www.itu.int/itu-d/cyb/
ƒ
ITU-D Cybersecurity Activities
¾ www.itu.int/itu-d/cyb/cybersecurity/
ƒ
Study Group Q.22/1: Report On Best Practices For A National
Approach To Cybersecurity: A Management Framework For Organizing
National Cybersecurity Efforts
¾ www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/itu-draft-cybersecurityframework.pdf
ƒ
National Cybersecurity/CIIP Self-Assessment Toolkit
¾ www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/projects/readiness.html
ƒ
ITU-D Cybersecurity Work Programme to Assist Developing Countries:
ƒ
Regional Cybersecurity Forums
•
www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/docs/itu-cybersecurity-workprogramme-developing-countries.pdf
¾ www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/events/
ƒ
Botnet Mitigation Toolkit
¾ http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/cyb/cybersecurity/projects/botnet.html
April 2008
27
More Information:
ITU Standardization Sector
ƒ ITU-T Study Group 17 – Lead Study
Group on Telecommunication Security
¾ www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/index.asp
ƒ Question 17/17 - Countering spam by
technical means
¾ www.itu.int/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/sg17-q17.html
ƒ Recommendations for approval on 18 April
2008:
• X.1231 - Technical strategies on countering spam
• X.1240 - Technologies involved in countering email spam
• X.1241 - Technical framework for countering email spam
April 2008
28
International
Telecommunication
Union
Helping the World Communicate
April 2008
29
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