IN TIIE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR TlIC SORTIERN
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCN DIVISION
REV.
ROY JOXES. 2T AL.,
Plaintiffs
1
1
1
I
1
v.
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-5-76-34
1
CITY 07 LuBaocx. TEXAS, ET
A!.
,
Defendants
)
1
1
I
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor in the above captioned
and nu..bcred
cause move the Court to enter a further order pending
appeal of this casc. under the provisions of Rule 62(cI, Fedrral
Rules of Civil Procedurc. and 28 U.S.C.
52202, rcquiring the full
implencntation by Defendants in November of 1983. of this Court's
remcdial six single member district plan as set forth in the
Court's Final J u d g m n t of March 4, 1983, and requiring that a
forthcoming August 13, 1983, special clection for thc office of
Xayor of the Defendant City of Lubbock be conducted subject to
the Court's approval and under the Court's
supervision in order to
prevcnt any further violation of the applicable rights of Plaintiffs
and Plaintiff-Intervcnur by the Defendant City's use in such spccial
elections of the at-large elcction system which has been found
by this court in its H e m r a n d m Opinion of January 20, 1983. to
be in violation of the voting Rights Act of 1965. Pub. I.
No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (Junc 29. 1982)(codified as amended at
42 U.S.C.
SS1973
s.).
and in violation
of the Fifteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
In support
of this motion, Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor rvuld show
the Court the follainq.
1.
The undersigned counsel for Plaintiffs and P1ain:iff-Intervenor
certify, under Local Rule S.l(c).
Local Rules for the Northern
District of Texas. that before filing this motion they held a
telepbne conference with counsel for the Defendants on July 12,
1983, regarding the subject mstter of this motion in accordance
with the requirements of M c a l Rule S.l(a1, Local Rules for the
Northern District of Texas, that agreement could not be reached,
and that counsel prticipating in such conference were Lane Arthur
on behalf of and acting for Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intcrvenor.
and James P. Brevstsr on behalf of and acting for thc Defendants
herein.
2.
This motion is accompanlcd by a proposed order and a brief,
as separate instruments, setting forth Plaintiffs' and PleintiffIntervenor's contentions of fact and law, pursLant to the
requirements of l a a l Rule 5.1 (c), Local Rules for the Northern
District of Texas.
3.
On o r about J u n e 27, 1983, Defendant B i l l McAlister, m y o r
of t h e Defendant C i t y of Lubbock. d i e d and a vacancy was t h e r e b y
c r e a t e d i n t h e o f f i c e o f Mayor on t h e Lubbock C i t y Council.
By
o r d e r and n c t i c e o f J u l y 5 . 1983,. Defendant Alan Henry, t h e n
d i s c h a r g i n g t h e d u t i e s o f Mayor and a c t i n g p u r s u a n t t o r e s o l u t i o n
of t h e sane d a t e by t h e C i t y C o u n c i l , o r d e r e d t h a t a $ p e c i a l
e l e c t i o n be h e l d i n t h c C i t y of Lubbock. Texas, o n August 13, 1983,
f o r t h c purpose o f e l e c t i n g a Mayor t o complete t h e unexpired
t e r n of Xayor XcAlister.
Subsequently. t h e Defendant C i t y o f
Lubbock forwarded n submission under S e c t i o n 5 of t h e Voting
Rights Act t o t h e United S t a t e s Departcent of J u s t i c e , s e e k i n g
a u t h o r i z a t i o n f o r conducting such s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n , p u r s u a n t t o
t h e r e g u l a t i o n s s e t f o r t h i n 28 C.F.R.
P a r t 5 1 11982).
4.
On J u l y 7 , 1983. Defendant Alan Henry announced a s a formal
c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e o f f i c e of nayor o f t h e Defendant C i t y of Lubbock,
t h e r e b y r e s i g n i c q h i s o f f i c e a s a member of t h e C i t y Council i n
c o n f o r n i t y w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s of Tex. Const. o f 1876, A r t . 11,
511 (1958).
Thus, a vacancy was c r e a t e d i n t h e mfmhership o f
t h e Defendant C i t y Council, i n a d d i t i o n t o t h o vacancy i n t h e
o f f i c e of Mayor on t h e C i t y Council.
By subsequent o r d e r and
n o t i c e , t h e Defendant C i t y o f Lubbock h a s o r d e r e d t h a t a n o t h e r
s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n w i l l be h e l d i n t h e C i t y of Lubbock, Texas, i n
Nove.mber of 1983. f o r t h e purpose o f e l e c t i n g a new merber of
t h e Lubbock C i t y C o u n c i l u n d e r t h e a t - l a r g e m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n
s y s t e m t h a t is t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s l i t i g a t i o n , and t h a t h a s b e e n
found by t h i s C o u r t t o b e i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e Voting R i g h t s Act
o f 1 9 6 5 , a s amended, a n d i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e F i f t e e n t h Amendment
t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e Unite6 S t a t e s .
5.
T h i s C o u r t found and s t a t e d i n i t s J a n u a r y 20. 1 9 8 3 ,
memorandum o p i n i o n , t h a t "it is i n e s c a p a b l e t h a t t h e a t - l a r g e
s y s t e m i n Lubbock a b r i d g e s a n d d i l u t e s m i n o r i t i e s ' o p p o r t u n i t i e s
t o elect members o f t h e i r own c h o i c e a n d t h a t t h e i r o p p o r t u n i t y
is much less t h a n t h a t o f t h e o t h e r nembers o f t h e e l e c t o r a t c . '
a n d t h a t 1-1 v i w o f s u c h c o n c l u s i o n s a n d f i n d i n g s . ' t h e
Voting
R i g h t s A c t o f 1 9 6 5 a s amended, SS 2 ( a ) and 2 l b 1 , p r o h i b i t t h e
f u r t h e r u s e o f t h e a t - l a r g e system f o r t h e e l e c t i o n of C i t y Council
members i n t h e C i t y Of Lubbock.
Texas" (Memorandum O p i n i o n ,
J a n u a r y 20, 1983, a t p. 1 4 ) .
6.
As e s t a b l i s h e d b y t h e e l e c t i o n r e t u r n s i n e v i d e n c e i n b o t h
t r i a l s of t h i s c a s e before t h e Court, t h e white polarized voting
i n Lubbock u n d e r t h e a t - l a r g e s y s t e m w i l l v i r t u a l l y g u a r a n t e e t h a t
a n y p e r s o n elect& t o t h e C i t y C o u n c i l i n t h e f o r t h c o m i n g s p e c i a l
e l e c t i o n i n N o v d e r w i l l be a w h i t e p e r s o n , a n d t h a t no m i n o r i t y
person, whether b l a c k o r Xexican-haerican,
can. a s a ? r n c t i c a l
m a t t e r a n d i n r e a l i t y , p o s s i b l y b e e l e c t e d to t h c C i t y C o u n c i l .
To p e r m i t s u c h a n e l e c t i o n , a n d i t s i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t , would b e t o
-4-
emasculate and r e n d e r i n e f f e c t i v c t h i s C o u r t ' s r c m e d i a l o r d e r s
a s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e C o u r t ' s F i n a l Judgment o f March 4. 1983.
Under t h i s C o u r t ' s o m f i n d i n g a and c o n c l u s i o n s a s s e t f o r t h i n
t h e C o u r t ' s Nemorandum Opinion o f J a n u a r y 20, 1983, such a n
e l e c r i o n under t h e a t - l a r g e system is p l a i n l y i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e
Voting R i g h t s Act o f 1965 a s amended and i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e
F i f t e e n t h Amndment t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n OF t h e United S t a t e s .
7.
P l a i n t i f f s and P l a i n t i E f - I n t e r v e n o r a r c l i k e l y to succeed
on t h e m e r i t s i n t h e a p p e a l o f t h i s c a s e , b o t h a t t h e United
S t a t e s C o u r t o f Appeals Lor t h e F i f t h C i r c u i t and a t tln S u p r e r
C o u r t of t h e United S t a t e s , should t h e c a s e r u c h t h a t l e v e l .
8.
P l a i n t i f f s , Plaintiff-Intervenor.
and b o t h m i n o r i t y c l a s s e s
i n t h i s litigation, will suffer irreparable injury unless t h i s
C o u r t a c t s t o g r a n t t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d i n t h i s motion p n d i n p
a p p e a l of t h i s c a s e , i n t h a t t h e y w i l l o n c e a g a i n be d e n i e d t h e
e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e i r p a r t i c i p a t i o n I n t h e p o l i t i c a l process,
and w i l l be s h u t o u t of any p o s s i b i l i t y o f e l e c t i n g c a n d i d a t e s o f
t h e i r oun c h o i c e t o tha Lubbock C i t y Council under t h e forthcoming
special election.
9.
NO s u b s t a n t i a l harm w i l l
CON
t o Defendants o r any o t h e r
i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s including t h e g e n e r a l public, i f t h i s Court
g r a n t s t h e r e l i e f r e q u e s t e d i n t h i s motion; i n d s e d , i t is
d i f f i c u l t t o imagine hor ham c o u l d f l o u from c o n d u c t i n g a n
-
5-
e l c c t i o n l a w f u l l y i n compliance v i t h an a c t of C o n g t c s s and i n
c o n f o r m i t y v i t h t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e C J n s t i t u t i a n o f t h e
United S t a t e s .
10:
The r e l i e f r e q u c s t e d i n t h i s motion v i l l do no harm t o t h e
p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . b u t on t h e c o n t r a r y v i l l a f f i r m a t i v e l y s e r v e
and advance t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t by upholding t h e law and e n f o r c i n g
t h e F i n a l Judgment p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d by t h e C o u r t i n t h i s case.
11.
On t h e b a s i s o f t h c f o r e g o i n g . P l a i n t i f f s and P l a i n t i f f I n t e r v e n o r m v e t h i s C o u r t t o a c t under Rule 6 2 ( c ) , F e d e r a l Rules
o f C i v i l Procedure, a d under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f 28 U.S.C.
52202
a u t h o r i ~ i n gt h e C o u r t t o g r a n t f u r t h e r n e c e s s a r y o r p r o p e r r e l i e f
based upon a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment o r d c c r e e . and t o e n t o r an o r d e r
r e q u i r i n g t h e f u l l implementation by Defcndants i n November 1983
o f t h i s C o u r t ' s r e m c d i a l s i x s i n g l e mcmbcr d i s t r i c t p l a n a s s e t
f o r t h i n t h e C o u r t ' s F i n a l Judgment o f March 4 , 1983 ( c s c e p t a s t o
t h e o f f i c e of Mayor, v h i c h w i l l have been f i l l e d a t a s p e c i a l
e l e c t i o n t o b e h e l d i n A q u s t o f 1983). a l l s i x mcmbers o f t h e
Lubbock C i t y C o u n c i l t o be o l e c t c d i n a Novcmber 1983 s p e c i a l
e l e c t i o n and t o s e r v o u n t i l t h e r e g u l a r c i t y e l e c t i o n s i n A p r i l o f
1981, a t v h i c h t i m e t h e C o u r t ' s r e m c d i a l p l a n w i l l be c o n t i n u e d
i n f o r c e and e f f e c t a s p r e v i o u s l y o r d c r e d .
The o f f i c e of Mayor,
which is a n a t - l a r g e o f f i c e under both t h c p r e s c n t unlawful
e l e c t i o n system and under t h e C o u r t ' s rcmodial s i x s i n g l c member
d i s t r i c t p l a n , w i l l b e f i l l e d by t h e a l r e a d y schcZuled forthcoming
-6-
August 13, 1983, s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n , s u b j e c t t o t h e a p p r o v a l o f
t h e C o u r t . and t h e p e r s o n e l e c t e d Mayor i n t h a t e l e c t i o n w i l l
s e r v e o u t t h e u n e x p i r e d p o r t i o n of Mayor M c A l i s t e r ' s term, which
e n d s w i t h t h e r e g u l a r A p r i l 1984 c i t y e l e c t i o n s .
It would a p p e a r
t h a t no o r d e r o f t h e C o u r t is n e c e s s a r y a s t o s u c h s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n
f o r t h e o f f i c e of Mayor. b u t t h a t i s a m a t t e r f o r t h e C o u r t ' s
d e c i s i o n a f t e r e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e d u r e s c o n t e m p l a t e d by t h e
Defendant C i t y C o u n c i l f o r t h e h o l d i n g o f s u c h s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n .
PlWYER
Ir?lSREFJE, P l a i n t i f f s and P l a i n t i f f - I n t e r v e n o r
respectfully
pray t h e Court t o g r a n t t h i s motion f o r a f u r t h e r o r d e r pending
a p p e a l o f t h i s c a s e . and t o e n t e r a n o r d e r r e q u i r i n g f u l l
i m p l e m n t a t i o n of t h e C o u r t ' s r e m c d i a l p l a n s e t f o r t h i n t h e
C o u r t ' s F i n a l Judgment o f l a r c h 4, 1983, e x c e p t a s t o t h e o f f i c e
of Rayor s u b j e c t t o whatever m d i f i c a t i o n a o r o r d e r s t h e C o u r t
may deem n e c e s s a r y a s t o t h e s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n f o r t h a t o f f i c e ,
i n t h e h'ovember 1983 s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n t h a t h a s been c a l l e d by t h e
Defendant C i t y Council: and t o o r d e r any f u r t h e r o r a d d i t i o n a l
r e l i e f t o which P l a i n t i f f s and P l a i n t i f f - I n t e r v e n o r may s!mw
M e m s e l v e s e n t i t l e d upon t h e h e a r i n g o f t h i s n o t i o n :
and t h e C o u r t
is r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t e d t o s e t t h i s motion f o r h e a r i n ? , a f t e r
n o t i c e t o Defendants, a t t h e e a r l i e s t a v a i l a b l e d a t e .
Respectfully submitted.
LANE ARTHUR
1216 Avenue I
Lubbock, Texas 79401
ALBERT PEREZ
1 1 1 2 T e x a s Avenue
Lubbock, T c x a s 79401
UARK HALL
ROLAND0 L. RIOS
201 N. S t . n a r y ' s . S u i t c 5 0 1
San A n t o n i o , T e x a s 7 8 2 0 5
MUAS GARZA
1006 1 3 t h S t r e e t
Lubbock, T e x a s 79401
WILLIAU L. GARRETT
8300 Douglas, S u i t e 8 0 0
D a l l a s , T e x a s 75225
ROSERT P. DAVIWW
G c o r g e Mason S c h o o l o f Lsv
3401 N. F a i r f a x D r i v e
A r l i n g t o n , V i r g i n i a 22201
1 4 0 2 T e x a s Avcnue
Lubbock, T e x a s 79401
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIPPS AND PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR
By:
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
By:
ATTOWIEY FOR PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T h i s is t o c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e copy o f t h c f o r e g o i n g m t i o n
was s e r v e d o n D e f e n d a n t s b y d e l i v e r i n g t h e same t o t h c i r a t t o r n e y s
o f r e c o r d , ~lr.
J o h n Ross. C i t y A t t o r n e y o f t h e C i t y o f ~ u b b o c k .
Lubbock C i t y H a l l , Lubbock, T e x a s ,
nr.
J a m e s P. B r e w s t e r , C i v i l
T r i a l A t t o r n e y o f t h e C i t y of Lubbock. Lubbock C i t y H a l l . Lubbock,
T e x a s , Nr. T r a v i s S h e l t o n , 1 8 0 1 Avenue Q, Lubbock, Texas. a n d
Mr. D a l e J o n e s , 1801 Avenue Q, Lubbock, T c x a s . a n t h i s
o f J u l y . 1983.
v:ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-INTERVEXOR
day
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE XURTIIZRS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBDOCR DIVISION
R W . ROY JOIES, ET AL..
)
Plaintiffs
1
1
1
1
v.
CITY OF LUBBOCK, TEY4\S, ET
AL.,
Defendants
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-5-76-34
1
1
1
1
P R O W S E D ORDER
The attached proposed order is submitted to the Court by
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor to accompany their motion
for further order penEing appeal of the above captioned and
nunhered cause, in coniomity to Local Rule 5.lIc).
Local Rd.1
for the Sorthern District of Texas.
Respectfully submitted.
DANIEL A. B N S O N
School of Law, Texas Tech University
Lubbock, Texas 79409
LANE ARTHUR
1216 Avenue K
Lubbock, Texas 79401
ALBERT PEREZ
1112 Texas Avenue
Lubback, Tcxas.79401
HARK BALL
1402 Texas Avenue
Lubbock, Texas 79401
R O W N D O L. RIOS
201 X. St. Mary's. Suite 501
Snn Antonio, Texas 78205
M . W S CARZA
1006 13th Street
Lubbock, Texas 79401
ROBERT P. DAVIDOW
C c o r g c finson S c h o o l o f Law
3401 N. F a i r f a x D r i v e
h r l l n g t o n , V i r g i n i a 22201
WILLIAU L. GARRETT
8300 Douglas, S u i t e
D a l l a s , T e x a s 75225
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFPS AND PIAlNTIFF-INTERVENOR
By:
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS
By:
ATTORNEY FOR PLhINTIFF-INTERVENOR
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T h i s is t o c e r t i f y t h a t a t r u e copy o f thc f o r e g o i n g
i n s t r u m e n t a n d a t t a c h e d P r o p o s e d O r d e r was s e r v e d on DefcnEnnts
by d e l i v e r i n g t h e snne to t h e i r a t t o r n e y s o f r e c o r d , X r . J o h n Ross,
C i t y A t t o r n e y o f t h e C i t y o f Lubbock, Lubbock C i t y H a l l , Lubbock,
T e x a s , Its. J a m e s P. B r c v s t e r , C i v i l T r i a l A t t o r n e y o f t h e C i t y o f
Lubbock, Lubbock C i t y
n a l l . Lubbock, T e x a s , Hr. T r a v i s S h c l t o n ,
1803 Avenue 0 , Lubbock, Texas. and X r . D a l e J o n e s , 1 8 0 1 Avenue 0 .
lubbock. h x a s , o n t h i s
BY:
BY:
-
d a y o f J u l y . 1983.
ATTORNEY FOR PLAIhTIFFS
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR
IE TIIE U:lXTED STATES DISTRICT COUKF
FOR THE i:ORTLiERS
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUBBOCK DIVISION
REV. ROY JOSfS.
ET I=.,
1
)
Plaintiffs
)
1
V.
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-5-76-34
CITY OF LUBBCCK, TE.US.
ET
)
1
?.L..
)
)
Defendants
ORDER
Tho f o l l o w i n g o r d e r i s e n t e r e d , a f t e r a n e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g
b e f o r e t h e C o u r t w i t h a l l p a r t i e s b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l .
upon t h e m t i o n o f P l a i n t i f f s and P l a i n t i f f - I n t e r v e n o r f o r a
f u r t h e r o r d e r pcnding t h e a p p e a l o f t h i s cause:
1. Comencing v i t h t h e s p e c i a l c i t y e l e c t i o n tha:
h a s been
c a l l e d by t h e Defendant C i t y o f Lubbock t o b e h e l d i n November o f
1983, t h e C i t y C o u n c i l o f t h e C i t y o f Lubbock s h a l l be comprised
o f s i x m n b e r s . e l e c t e d from e a c h o f t h e g e o g r a p h i c a l d i s t r i c t s
a s s e t f o r t h i n E x h i b i t s A and B a t t a c h e d t o t h e C o u r t ' s F i n a l
Judgment i n t h i s c a u s e e n t e r e d o n Aarch 4, 1983, and a nayor.
b e e l i s i b l e Eor e l e c t i o n from any d i s t r i c t .
To
t h e c a n d i d a t e must
b e a bona f i d e r e s i d e n t w i t h i n s u c h d i s t r i c t a t t h e t i m e o f f i l i n g
f o r o f f i c e and. i f e l u t e d , n u s t c o n t i n u e t o r e s i d e t h e r e i n
durina t h e t e r n of h i s o f f i c e .
The members o f t h e C i t y C o u n c i l
who a r c e l e c t e d i n t h c Novczber 1983 s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n s h a l l s e r v e
U n t i l t h c r e g u l a r c i t y e l e c t i o n s o f t h e C i t y o f Lubbock t o b e
h e l d i n A p r i l o f 1984, a t which t i n e t h e i r t e r m s o f o f f i c e s h a l l
e x p i r e , and t h e C i t y C o u n c i l s h a l l b e e l e c t e d t h e n i n a c c o r d a n c e
w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e C o u r t ' s F i n a l Judgment o f Rarch 4, 1983.
I n a l l o t h e r r e s p e c t s , t h e e l e c t i o n and s e r v i c e of C i t y C o u n c i l
menbers e l e c t e d i n t h e Novcmber 1983 s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n s h a l l b e
a s p r o v i d e d i n t h e C o u r t ' s F i n a l Judgment o f Mirch 4, 1983.
2. NO o r d e r is e n t e r e d a t t h i s t i m e a s t o t h e o f E i c e o f Mayor,
w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e November 1983 s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n . s i n c e t h a t
o f f i c e w i l l be f i l l e d by a s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n a l r e a d y c a l l e d f o r
August 13, 1983, an6 t h e p e r s o n s o e l e c t e d i n August o f 1983
w i l l s e r v e o u t t h e b a l a n c e o f t h e u n e x p i r e d term o f h i s p r e d e c e s s o r
which e n d s i n A p r i l o f 1984.
I n t h e A p r i l 1984 r e g u l a r c i t y
e l e c t i o n s , t h e Mayor w i l l b e e l e c t e d a s p r o v i d e d i n t h c C o u r t ' s
F i n a l Judgment of March 4 , 1983.
The C l e r k w i l l f u r n i s h a copy o f t h i s o r d e r t o e a c h
a t t o r n e y of record.
Eh'RED t h i s
day o f
, 1983.
HALEEFT 0 . MODWRRD
Chief J u d g e
Northern D i s t r i c t of Texas
'
IN Tile u:aTED ST,\TES DISTRICT COURT
FOR TilE ::ORTUER.":
DISTRICT OF TEXAS'
LUDBOC1: DIVISION
REV. ROY ';0::£5, ET ,\L.,
Plal:ltiffs
v.
CIVIL ACTION ::0. CA-5-76-34
CIT\" Of LUBBOCK. TEX,\S. ET
At. ••
Oefc:"Idant.s
Pr.,;I::TIFfS·
or
il.~O Pr.,;I::rIFF'-I::TE~V::~:OR'~I~SUPPORT
XOTIO:: FOR FURTHE:R ORDER PESOU:G APPEAL
This brie! is
respcct!ull~'
subQitted on bch3l! of Plaintiffs
and Pl31nti!!-Intcr\·cr.or in the above caption...d and :'lu:nbcrcd cause
ir. support of their motion for furtheJ: order pendin9 appeo11, in
con!or:'liti' with Laco1l Rule 5.l(e). Lac.. l Rules for the Northern
Oist:ict ot Tcx.,s.
~s
set forth in Plaintiffs" .. nc! Pl.3intiff-Intcrvenor's motion
for further order pending appe.:l1. the de<lth of the Mayor of the
Ocfend3:'lt. Cit.y of Lubbock On or .3bout June 27. 1983. c<luscd a
vaC<l:ZCY in the off icc ot :'iayor, and
.l
special election has boen
c.311ed for August 13. 1983. by the Defendant City of Lubbock in
ord.er to fill that v.3C<lnC"l.
In order to become a candid.3te and
run for election to the office of M"yor. Mr. Aliln flenry. one of
t h e Defendant C i t y C o u n c i l membcrs. announced h i s candidacy o n
J u l y 7 , 1983, and t h c r c o y t c m i n a t e d h i s t h e n - p m s e n t o f f i c e c f
C i t y C o u n c i l member, under t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f Tex. Const. of 1876.
A r t . 11, 511 (1958). c r e a t i n g a vacancy o n t h e Defendant C i t y
Council.
The Defendant C i t y C o u n c i l h a s now c a l l e d a n o t h e r
s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n , t o b e h e l d i n November o f 1983, i n o r d e r t o
f i l l t h a t vacancy, and h a s announced i t s i n t e n t i o n t o c o n d u c t
auch s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n u n d e r t h e a t - l a r g e c l z c t i o n system found
by t h i s C o u r t t o b e i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e Voting R i g h t s Act o f 1965,
Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 S t a t . 1 3 1 (June 29, 1982) ( c o d i f i e d a s
arnerded a t 4 2 U.S.C.
551973 % % . I ,
and i n v i o l a t i o n o f the
F i f t e e n t h Rarndment t o t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e United S t a t e s .
To p e r m i t auch s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n under a n unlawful and u n c o n s t i t u t i o n r l
e l e c t i o n system would b e t o v i o l a t e t h e C o u r t ' s r c m c d i a l o r d e r and
plan e n t e r t d t o c o r r e c t such s y s t c n a s cnbodicd i n t h e C o u r t ' s
F i n a l Judgment of I(arch 4 , 1983, and would a l l o w t h e s e Defendants
t o c o n t i n u e , o n c e a g a i n , u s i n g t h e a t - l a r g e system t h a t h a s c a u s e d
t h e legal h a m t o Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-Intervenor,
and t h e tw
minority classes i n t h i s litigation.
Although t h i s C o u r t o r d c r c d t h c r e m e d i a l p l a n t o b e p l a c e d
i n t o e f f e c t a t t h e n e x t r e g u l a r c i t y e l e c t i o n i n A p r i l o f 1984,
t h e C o u r t ' s F i n a l Judgment d i d n o t p r o v i d c For t h c s i t u a t i o n now
confronting t h e p a r t i e s : t h e d e a t h and/or r e s i g n a t i o n of one o r
more members o f t h e C i t y Council and n s p e c i a l e l e c t i o n cr: e l e c t i o n s
t o f i l l such v a c a n c i e s .
C l e a r l y , the Court cannot p e m i t t h e s e
Defendants t o u t i l i z e f u r t h e r a p l a n a l r e a d y d c t e r m i n e d t o b e i n
-2-
v i o l a t i o n o f t h e V o t i n g R i g h t s Act o f 1965 a s amended and t h e
F i f t e e n t h Amndnen:
t o t h c C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e Unitcd S t a t e s .
A c c o r d i n g l y . n f u r r h c r o r d e r o f t h e C o u r t is r e q u i r e d t o d e a l w i t h
t h i s new s i t u a t i o n c a u s e d by t h o ' u n c x p e c t e d d e a t h o f t h e f o r m e r
Xayor and t h e s u b s c q u c n t resignation o f o n e o f t h e Defendant C i t y
Council m n b c r s .
2.
Rulc 6 2 ( c ) . F c d c r a l R u l c s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e . a u t h o r i z e .
a t r i a l c o u r t t o s u s p e n d . modify, o r g r a n t a n i n j u n c t i o n d u r i n g
/
Tb
<#p<
c~'*''
7$
$:
11 C. W i g h t i A.
t h e pcndescy o f a n n p p o a l i n i n j u n c t i o n c a s e s .
M i l l e r , F e d c r a l P r a c z i c c L P r o c c d u r c 52904. I n j u n c t i o n Pending
Appcal. a t 315 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ; 1 % C ~ c l o o c d i ao f F e d e r a l P r o c e d u r e S62.04,
Powers o f D i s t r i c t C o u r t Pending Appeal, a t 265-267
( 3 r d e d . 1177).
The r u l e c o d i f i e s t h e i n h e r e n t power o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o make
@
w h a t ~ v e ro r d e r i s d e e n c d m c e s s a r y to e s s u r e t h e e f E e c t i v e n - s
g 62e05
o f t h c judgment t h a t h a s been e n t e r e d , and t h e r a t i o n f o r s u c h
114901
a n o r d e r is a d d r e s s e d t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t .
'
11 C. Wright c A. M i l l e r ,
s i d e r a t i o n s are:
-,
a t 315-316.
The g o v e r n i n g con-
(1) t h e a p p l i c a ? t f o r s u c h a n o r d e r mst make a
s t r o n g s h o r i n g t h a t h e is l i k e l y t o p r c v a i l o n t h e m e r i t s Of t h e
a p p e a l ; (2) i r r e p a r a b l e i n j u r y w i l l r e s u l t t o t h e a p p l i c a n t w i t h o u t
t h e rcquestcd order:
( 3 ) n o s u b s t a n t i a l h a m w i l l r e s u l t t o any
other interest& parties:
and.
harz t o t h c public interest.
316.
(41 t h e request&
11 C. W r i g h t
6 A.
o r d e r w i l l d o no
Hiller.
-.
at
A11 f o u r c o n s i d e r u t i o n s a r e p r e s e n t i n t h e i n s t a n t m a t t e r ,
and indicate that the Court should grant the order requested.
3.
The trial Court is also authorized by 28 U.S.C.
52202 to
grant further necessary or proper relief based upon a declaratory
judgment or decree, after reasonable notice and hearing, against
any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such
judgment.
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervanor, by thcir complaints
in this caae, sought declaratory relief as against the unlawful
and unconstitutional at-large election system previously used by
the Defendants, and this Court has declared that such at-large
system is unlawful and unconstitutional.
~lthough the Court did
not specifically designate any part of its Memorandum Opinion
of January 20, 1983, as "declaratory relief' in deciding this case,
the Court has granted declaratory relief and has declared the
rights of the parties.
Accordingly, the provisions of 28 U.S.C.
52202 apply and further authorize this Court to grant the requested
further order pending the appeal of the case.
4.
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor will be likely to prevail
on the merits on the appeal of this case.
Thc Court's Henorandum
Opinion and Final Judgment emtady correct statements of thc
applicable constitutional and statutory law, and
a
careful. correct
application of such In, to the facts of this case.
Whilc no result
in litigation is ever certain, it is clear that within the neaning
of the law applicable to this requested furrhcr order, thcrc is
a strong probability that Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervcnor will
prevail on the merits on appeal.
5.
Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-intervenor, and the two separate minority
classes whose constitutional rights are at stake in this litigation
will be irrcpsrnblg damaged without the requested order.
By an
at-lar~cclcction, they will once again be deprived of their
applicable constitutional a.ld statutory rights that they have been
litigating now to securc over somc seven years' time, and as this
Court's findizgs and the cvidcnce of record clearly show no minority
candidate can or will bc elected in any such at-large election.
Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-Intervenor, and the t w minority classes
involved would once again be subjected to being governed by
City Council from which they have been effectively and completely
excludcd since the origin of the City of Lubbock.
6.
No substantial harm will result to Defendants if the order
requested is grantcd.
Even in the unlikely event that Defendants
finally prcvail on appeal in this litigation. the election of
candidates held under a single k m b e r district system as ordered
by this Court cannot possibly h a m any legitimate interest of
any of the Defendants, and further at-large elections w u l d restore
the all-white municipal government of the City of Lubbock in due
course.
This Court did not order imedietc measurcs. or an
imcdiate election, to correct the dcfccts in the at-large systan,
but instead ordered the c h a m e s to be made at the next regularly
-5-
scheduled c i t y elections.
The C o u r t ' s a c t i o n i n t h i s r e s p e c t is
t y p i c a l o f t h e r e l i e f o r d e r e d by o t h e r D i s t r i c t C o u r t s i n s u c h
c a s e s , e.q.,
Lodqe v. Buxton, 639 F.2d 1358, 1361-1362 ( 5 t h
C i r . 19811: N e v e t t v. S i d e s , 533 F.2d
1361, 1371-1372,
C i r . 1 9 7 6 ) ; Bolden v. C i t v o f W h i l e . Alabama.
404 (S.D.
Ala.
1976).
1375 ( 5 t h
423 F.Supp.
384,
The C o u r t ' s F i n a l Judgment oE March 4 . 1 9 8 3 ,
W u l d b e e n t i r e l y a d e q u a t e and s a t i s f a c t o r y b u t f o r t h e u n e x p e c t e d
v a c a n c i e s c r e a t e d i n t h e Defendant C i t y Council.
However. t h e
understandable i n t e r e s t o f p r e s e n t o f f i c e h o l d e r s on t h a t C i t y
Council t o c o n t i n u e i n o f r i c e cannot outweigh t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
a n d s t a t u t o r y r i g h t s o f t h e P l a i n t i f f s end P l a i n t i f f - I n t c r v e n o r .
a n d t h e tw l a r g e m i n o r f t y c l a s s e s i n t h i s c n s c .
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
Plaintiffs,
a n d t h e tro m i n o r i t y c l a s s e s a r e e n t i t l e d
n o t t o be a g a i n s u b j e c t e d t o a n u n l a w f u l and u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
e l e c t i o n o f C i t y C o u n c i l members i n t h e C i t y o f Lubbock.
Any
i n j u r y t o p r e s e n t o f f i c e h o l d e r s i s i n s u b s t a n t i a l when compured
t o t h e constitutional r i g h t s t h a t these Plaintiffs.
the Plaintiff-
I n t e r v e n o r , a n d t h e t w o m i n o r i t y c l a s s e s have b e e n s o l o n g d e n i e d
by t h e Defendants.
7.
The r e q u e s t e d f u r t h e r o r d e r w i l l d o no harm t o t h e p u b l i c
i n t e r e s t , b u t on t h e contrary w i l l advince t h e public i n t e r c s t
by u p h o l d i n g t h e l a w o f t h e l a n d .
s e r v e d when t h e l a w is upheld.
of Labor,
/-
485 F.Supp.
Thc p u b l i c i n t c r e s t is b e s t
-
D c c k ~ rv. ' J n i t c d S t a t e s Deoar=
837, 845 (E.D. Wisc. 1980) o r d e r a f f i r m e d
a n d remanded, 6 6 1 F.2d 598 ( 7 t h
cir.
1980).
F o r a l l o f t h c foregoing r e a s o n s , a n d o n t h e b a s i s o f t h e
f o r e g o i n g autboority.
t h e Court should g r a n t t h c motion o f
P l a i n t i f f s and P l a i n t i f f - I n t e r v e n o r
and e n t e r t h e f u r t h e r o r d e r
t h e r e i n requested.
Respectfully s u b m i t t e d .
DiLUIE?? !I. BESSON
S c h o o l o f Law
~ e s a T
s ccb L'nivcrsity
L u b m c k . T e x a s 79409
W E ARTHUR
1216 a v e n u e I(
Lubbock. T e x a s 79401
ALBERT PEREZ
1112 Texas Avenue
~ u b b o c k , T e x a s 79401
HARK fIALL
140: T e x a s Avenue
Lubbock. T e x a s 79401
ROLANM) L. RIOS
201 S. S t . x a r y ' s . S u i t e 5 0 1
S a n A n t o n i o , T e x a s 7SZ05
TO-S
GARZA
1006 1 3 t h S t r e e t
Lubbock. T e x a s 79401
WILLIA. L. GaRRETT
8300 Douglas. S u i t e 800
D a l l a s , Texas i5225
ROBERT P. DAVIDOY
George Mason S c h o o l o f Lsv
3401 N. E a i r f a x D r i v e
A r l i n g t o n , V i r g i n i a 22201
ATMR':EYS FOR PLh1:ITIEFS AND PSIXTIFF-INTERVENOR
By:
ATIORNEY FOR P S I N T I F P
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
T h i s is to c e r t i r p t h a t a t r u e copy o f t h e f o r e g o i n g b r i e f
was s e r v e d upon D e f e n d a n t s by d e l i v e r i n g t h o same to t h e i r
a t t o r n e y s o f r e c o r d . Xr. J o h n Ross. C i t y A t t o r n f y o f t h e C i t y o f
-7-
Lubbock, Lubbock C i t y I l a l l , Lubbock, Texas, Mr. James P. B r w s t e r ,
C i v i l T r i a l Attorney of the C i t y o f Lubbock, Lubbokk C i t y H a l l ,
Lubbock, Texas. Mr. T r a v i s S h e l t o n , 1801 Avenue Q , Lubbock, Texas.
and Hr. Dale Jones, 1801 Avenue Q , Lubbock, Texas, on t h i s t h e
-day o f J u l y ,
1983.
By:
ATTORNEY FOR PLAIMIFFS
By:
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR
:
,
LO.,"..
.
-8
::c1,2m
PIYl
'"
I....
FILED
I
: TIIE USITED STA'i'ES DISTRICT COURT
FOR TIIC NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TESAS
'! 0
LUBDOCR DIVISION
IUJIm WLL 03ntRlY, CLERR
w3
RLV.
w
I
ROY JOSES, ET AL,
RM
I
Plaintiffs,
v.5
I
X
X
.
CITY OF LUBSOCh. TESAS, ET AL
CIVIL ACTION NO. CA-5-76-34
I
I
I
Defcndants.
X
UEFEADIIXTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
OF PLAIlTlFFS AND PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR
FOR FURTHER ORDER PENDING APPEAL
The plaintiffs and plaintiff-intervenor (hereinafter collectively referred to as plaintiffs] have filed a motion which in
effect requests the Court to alter in a significant and material
way the judgmcnt previously entered by the Court in this case on
.':arch 4, 1983.
The motion professes to be filed under the pro-
visions of Rule 62(c), Federal Rules of Civil Proccdure, and 28
U.S.C.
Section 2202.
In accordance with the Or-ler of this Court
Bated July 28, 1983, this brief is submitted on behalf of the
defendants in response to plaintiffs' motion and requested order.
In view of the request of the Court, this response will be divided
into two main sections.
The defendants assert that thr jurisdic-
tional question must be determined against the plaintiffs, and
that issue will be considered first, followed by a discussion of
the practical effects of requiring the implementation of the six
me;n);er plan in the Xovember special election.
A. JURISDICPION
The filing of a proper and timcly notice of appeal Iron a
.
final judgment imediately transfers jurisdiction of a case from
.
hp~fl'
thc District Court to thc Court of Appeals.
$$24m.
f'
#
Exchnnqe
v. ~ n v e s t o r sSecur. Corp., 560 F . 2 d 561 (3rd Cir. 19771.
t~wfiin w r :
thc iasc or proceed further except
Smith v. m i a n , 588 F.2d
,"(r'6&)Apcal
'
&
"The trial court thereafter has n o power to modify its judgment
?</in
J("
Securities
c#~oorcos
3
4 leave of thc court of
1304, 1307 (9th cir. 19791; 7
Fedcral Practicc 60.30121 [Zd ed. 19001_J) In the .'latter
Construction, et 01, Bankrupts, 1.b
r.2.
119, 124
n. 6 (9th Cir. 1961).
Plainti"'
acknowledge that the judgment entored .arch 4,
1162.~5
f l S 1983. is a final judgment for purposes of appeal. It is undis-
*,CJ
puted that the defendants filed a proper and timely noticc of
appeal t o the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. and that appcal is
n w awaiting oral argument in the Fifth Circuit.
If the plaintiffs were dissatisfied rith the judgment entered
o n narch 4, 1983, they had an opportunity under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure to request additions o r alterations.
No post
trial notions were filed by the plaintiffs, nor did they file a
notice of appeal f r m the judgment, and all time limits for such
filings are past.
Plaintiffs apparently recognize thc procedural problcnt they
would have rith asking the Court directly for a aa,or
of the narch 4th judgment.
modification
Under thc wall cstablishcd general
rule8 of jurisdiction set out above, thc Court sixply has no power
to nodify the juilgnant nt tllis time.
In an cffort to circumvent
the general rulc. plaintiffs attempt to disguise their rcquest
for a modification by applying under the provisions of Rule 62(e)
and 28 u.5.c.
section 2202.
~ h c s eprovisions are available in
only the most restricted circumstances, an4 are not proper in
this case.
Rule G2(c) deals solely vith the pover of the District Court
to grant an injunction pending appeal in a cane where an appeal
is taken from a final judgment which g m n t s , dissolves or denies
an injunction.
The provisions of 28 U.S.C.
Section 2202 provide
the District Court vith thc povcr to issue further orders to impleacnt a declaratory judgnent where the declaration o f rights
in the judgment does not otherwise provide an implementation
process.
I h their amended complaint filed in this cause on N o v m h a r
8, 1982, plaintiffs requested a declarrtory judgment, injunctive
relief. and affirmative relief in the form o f a new system of
elections.
As the plaintiffs adnit in their
o m brief, the final
judgment entered by this Court contains no injunction and makes
no refarence to declaratory relief in the forn of a declaratory
judgment.
Emfendants contend thatthoserequests for declaratory
relief and injunction were denied by the Court in favor of a
judgment bas*
lawsuit.
on the affirnative relief requested as in any other
It is also significant to point out that while tln
plaintiffs requested that the trial court retain jurisdiction to
monitor implementation Of the judgment, the Court chose not to do
so.
- 3 -
A d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n i s an c q u i t n b l e remedy w i t h a
l i m i t e d scope which is w i t h i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l
c o u r t and i s cumulative w i t h o t h e r remedies.
Actions f o r d e c l a r e -
.
.
t o r y judgment a r e i n t h e n a t u r e of s u m a r y a c t i o n s and a r c or-
d i n a r i l y l i m i t e d t o c a s e s where f a c t s a r e s i m p l c o r s t i p u l a t e d .
t o s e t t l e d i s p u t e s r e l a t i n g t o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s t a t u t e s and
c o n s t r u c t i o n o f w i l l s and c o n t r a c t s .
Alumni Research Foundation,
New Discoveries v. Wisconsin
1 3 F. Supp. 596 (D.C. W i s .
1936).
Much m r e t h a n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a s t a t u t e was involved
i n t h e t r i a l of t h i s c a s e , and d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was n o t t h e
a p p r o p r i a t e remedy.
said
Every judgment e n t e r e d by a c o u r t could be
to l n c l u d e elements of a d e c l a r a t o r y judgn~cnt, b u t t h a t does
n o t c o n v e r t t h e judgment t o such o r a u t h o r i z e t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of
Rule 6 2 ( c ) and S e c t i o n 2202 t o s judgment w h i l e an appeal i s
pending.
"The e s s e n t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n between a d e c l a r a t o r y judg-
n r n t a c t i o n and an a c t i o n s e e k i n g o t h e r r e l i e f i s t h a t i n t h e
former no a c t u a l wrong need have been c o m i t t c d o r l o s s have
occurred i n order t o s u s t a i n t h e action.
l c i t a t i o n omitted1
The purpose o f t h e D e c l a r a t o r y Judgment Act is t o s e t t l e a c t u a l
c o n t r o v e r s i e s b e f o r e t h e y r i p e n i n t o v i o l a t i o n s o f law o r a
breach o f duty..
United S t a t e s v. F i s h e r
496 F.2d 1146. 1151 110th C i r . 1974).
-
O t i s Comuanv. Inc.,
I n t h e c a s e now b e f o r e t h e
C o u r t , a c t u a l v i o l a t i o n s of law and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l - i s h t s a r e
a l l e g e d , and t h e r e l i e f sought by p l a i n t i f f s goes f a r beyond t h e
scope and purpose o f t h e D e c l a r a t o r y Judgment Act.
The r e l l a f
sought and t h e r e l i e f g r a n t e d were n o t e s s e n t i a l l y d e c l a r a t o r y i n
nature.
Rule 6 2 ( c t and 28 U.S.C.
S e c t i o n 2 2 0 2 were intended f o r
a totally different purpose and do not apply to thc present
circumstanccs.
Finally, plaintiffs misconstruo the p u r p s c Of Rule 62(c).
The purposc of the rule is to allow the trial court to issue an
injunction to prcscrve the status quo until the court of appeals
has acted on an appeal from an order granting or denying an injunction.
rtlaus v. tii-Shear corporation. 528 F.2d 225, 235,
19th Cir. 1 9 7 5 ) : United States v. El-O-Pathic Pharmacy, I92 F.2d
62, 79 (9th Cir. 1951).
positc result.
Plaintiffs' motion seeks just the OF-
Rather than preserving the status quo, plaintiffs
seck to radically alter the present situation by having the Court
enter an order implementing the new election system before the
jud5ment becomes final after co.npletion of the appellate process.
Even if thc judgncnt of Plarch 4, 1983, is seen as overruling
plaintlffs' request for a pcrmancnt injunction, Rule 62 does not
help them because they did not appeal the denial of their request,
and :he
time for appeal is past.
Jurisdiction of this case has passed to the Fifth Circuit.
The District Court has no present authority to enter any order
of the type requested by the plaintiffs.
Rule 6 2 1 ~ )and 28 U.S.C.
Section 2202 do not provide the basis for an exception to the
general rule in this case. and plaintiffs' motion musc be denied
for lack of jurisdiction.
8.
TllE I'IIACTICAL
liFPliCT 01: GHASTING 'Tllli OIIIIER
T h e Plaintiffs scek t o treat a vacancy in o f f i c e a s a
"significant"
c h a n g e in c i r c u n s t ~ n c e which would justify t h e
entry o f n completely different Final Judgnont by the Court.
.
T h i s "significance" d o e s not cxist.
.
Ilcfendants nre conpcllcd
hy the mandntcs o f the City Charter. Art. 1%. Section 5 , the
T e x a s Election Code. Art. ?.Olb(b),
and 4.09. and the T e x a s
Constitution, Art. XI, Section 11, t o proceed t o fill the
rncancy caused by t h e resignation o f the Nayor Pro Tcnpore.
r h o resigned t o seek elcction t o t h e Rayor position vacated by
t h e death o f Bill IlcAlister.
At c o m m o n lax a vacancy in term o f office was unknown.
When e vacancy in fact happened hocaure o f death, rcsignation.
o r removal. the term r a s gone and the o f f i c e reverted to the
king t o be fllled agoin for thc full t e r n prescribed.
Modern common law still upholds this general principle
~xceprthat the o f f i c e nor reverts. upon a vacancy,
pepFle t o be fllled again upon like conditions for the full
term prescribed,
unlcrl by
express provision o r nanifest intent
the Constltution (or City Chirter) has limited o r restricted
t h e term o f the n e w incumbent.
Accordingly. it dcpcnds upon
t h e intent o f t h e framers o f the Constitution (or Chnrrcr) a s
t o whether t h e vacancy is In the office, a s at common Inr, and
reverts t o the people t o fill for thc full tern prescribed, o r
whether t h e vacancy is only in the tern a n d linitcd to filling
f o i the unexpired portion.
.
T h r C o n s t i t a t i o n o f t h c St;ltr o f Tcxns. Art. 16. S c c t i o n
i , ~ x p r r r s l y p r o v i d e s that "in all c l c c t i o n s to fill vacancies
o t o f t i c e in this Stat@.
*.''
( I . n p h ~ z i sadded).
it shnll hr t o fill t h e unexpired term
S c c a l s o Art. 2 0 , Y.A.C.S.
The
.
.
.
C h a r t e r o f the City o f Luhbock is consistcslt r i t h t h e c o m m o n l a w
and Art. 16. S e c t i o n 2 7 .
consists o:
T h e Municipal G o v e r n m e n t o f t h e City
the Cit:. Council. r h i c h shnll b e c o m p o s e d o f a M a y o r
and f o u r Councilarn.
Charter, ,\rt. 1%. S e c t i o n 1.
\'acancies
shall be filled hg a special e l e c t i o n
in t h e
rcnaindar o f t h e unexpired term, ("nr prorirled by t h l s C h a r t e r
o r by Ordinance").
Art. lX. S e c t i o n S.
At every special (or
rryular) c l e c t i o ~called to fill o n e o r m o r e
racnnt c l e c t i v e
offices. e l e c t i o n to e a c h o f f i c r sh:lll be by a n a j o r i r y o f t h e
roles cast t o r such o f f i c r at stlch clection. Art. IX S e c t l o n 6A.
rith thc clection to bs conducted at large.
he
Art. I S . S c c t i o n 5.
challenged Sorenber. 1983. e l e c t t o n will c r e a c c n o n e w
rights that did not exist at t h e time o f t h e Final J u d l m c n t a s
entered.
No new o f f i c c is created.
T h c e l e c t l o n i s t o fill t h e
vacancy in a n e x i s t i n g term, a term r h i c h w a s in e x i s t e n c e a t t h e
d a t e o f Final Judgment.
T h e r e is no c o n c e i v a b l e way i n w h i c h
the o n e elected i n S o v e m b e r c o u l d escape c o a p l i n n c e wlth the
Final J u d g m e n t in r h l s cause. w h e n and if it bccomet final.
T h e practical effects o f t h i s drastlc a c c e l e r a t i o n o f t h e
remedy ordered by t h e Court, would include t h e following:
I.
Such
8
c h a n g e v i o l a t e s t h e understanding o f t h e p a r t l o
in acceleration o f trial prepnration without d e l a y o r d i l a t o r y
effort t o reach J u d g m e n t in t i m e for t h o losing party. whichever
it proPcd to bc. to hrvo tho opportunity to :oppoal lrrior to the
April. 1884. regular cicctions.
T h e requested order would require the i n a t i t u t ~ o n o f the
2.
conplctc remedy c v e n when that remedy is a s yct not fin.!.
T h e requestad order would n c c e l a r ~ t e npplication o f the
3.
remcdy by special clcction rhcn. a s Plaintiffs :hcmselrcs
have
noted. other cares have uniformly phased in the inposition o f the
rencdy at tho next resular eicction.
Innupurrtion o f t h e new remcdy in X o v c ~ h c rwould require
4.
either that all six positions elected in Kovember again run in
April.
1884. (to avoid endless conflict with the City Charter's
designation, ns authori:ed
hy TEX.liLEC.COUZ.
Art. .Olh[o)(c).
o f April o f even years as the date for regular general elections).
o r to avoid this, that tho Court issue additional urders. not
currently In t h e Final .ludgnent. changing thr Charter with regard t o the regular election date for the future.
5.
T h e r e addltlonal orders r ~ g n r d i n g a Final Judgmcnt nor
o n appeal, even if allorable at tnr. would scrcrly conpiicate
the appeal and surely delay finnl dctcrmin.ntion by thc Fifth
Circuit.
6.
Potential c.ndidntcs
for all six positions would be ex-
posed t o t h e ordeal and Expense o f campaigning for
a.
position
required by a Judgment which is not yet finnl and which could be
reversed.
This reversal could
come
points of Defendants appeal, hut
as
not only u p o n thr major
sell upon chrllcngcs to the
specific plan adoptcd by the Court a s bring i l \'iolation of "one
man one rote."
Since the Suprenc Court dccizinn in E ~ r c h e r . et
at v . na::gett.
ct a1. $1 L.U. 4 5 5 3 ( U . S .
Sup. Ct..
J u n e 22.
l!lsj) no :tpportionncnt plan c a n be considered hcyond qucrtion.
7.
Imposition o i thc sir mcmhcr Cotlncil in November.
. 1983,
.
rould, ii the e 2 s c is rcverscd [if only for a more balnnccd apportionment o f raters botrccn the districts). leave t h e City o f
Lubhoci rich 3 % best only a da facto hovernine body.
t o bc again
replaced by a new body at a special election when a new plan is
ordcred.
8.
,
Idc
fact0 only body could S u b J e c t the City t o repeated
and extensive litigation to support (or defend) t h e legality o f
all ordinancss. contracts, hond irsvcs. nnnexstions. land acquisitions. condemnations, etc. in ench and crery activity a s
undartakrn by this de facto Council.
9.
T h e sudden imposition o f the remedy rould be self de-
featink even to thc minority candidates, daprivinp the.
o f the
opportunity to develop n broad follorinp in their districts and
t o raise sufficient contributions for a rinble campaign.
10.
T h e City also elects its tra Wunicipal Judges (at large)
for two year constitutionnl terms at the ropular Aprll elections
under 1200gg. \'.A.C.S.
in Sove=ber.
Implementation o f the Council election
1913. o n a regular basis rould require the City t o
shoulder the cxpense of peneral elcctlon every year. o n e for the
Councll vacancies (odd years) and o n e for just tho two Uunicipal
Judges (in even years).
11.
Elections pro cxpcnsive t o conduct.
November elections by the City rould eliainate the
savings enjoyed through joint t-lections with the Lubbock Independent School District a s authorired by TEX.ELEC.CODE.
Art. 2.01c.
12.
"'hile the jullicial deteJ'"S:lin ... tion of the Court. a!" re-
flccted b)' the Final JIIIlCJ:lcnt, docs not h:l\'e to be clc-areJ with
the Justice IJcpartQent prior to entr)',
nonethelcss the Cit)' ellst
submit for Scction 5 preclearance (prior to an)' subsequent elec-'
~)
• .:Ill subsequent ch.:lnges necessitated by thc Court's ordcr,
Changes affecting voting that arc specifically ordered by a
Federal Court
3S
a result of the Courtts equitable jurisdiction
O\'er an ad\'er5ary proceedinc
cle:lr:lnce.
not suhiect to Section 5 pre-
~,subsequent
changes nrocessit;ltcd b)' the Court
order. but decided upon b)' the jurisdiction. are subject to preclearance.
For example, ... hile the Court-ordered districtinc
pl3n C13)' not be subject to preclearance, ch:1n};es that result
froQ the phn such 35 changes in \'ot\n& p:-ecincts, polling
places. etc ••
rec;ain subject to Section S.
18 CFR Section S1.16.
These u 3ux iliary" ch3ngcs cannot be suboittcJ I)rior to final
actDent or 3dClinistrative decision.
~s
CFR Section 51.20.
enIt
vould be impossible to l:Iakc soae of these final changes for a
six Qeaber Council election no .... without subjecting the Defendants to the contention that their issues on :lpt"'a1 had hecoCie
_oot I
13.
The requested changes risk pla)'ing "r.lUsicOlI chairs"
with the electoral process and the aspirations of those ... ho would
seek to represent the citi:ens on their Council. b)· i=posing a
Vi an not )'et finall)' 3pproved
br the judicial process.
the dancers of an iJ1eC31 Council anJ the
cicity of their actions.
"~h;ldo .... s"
h'e risk
of aut hen·
t\e jcoparc.1i:e thl' orderly conduct of
-
10 -
maniciprl ;tifairs for a n uluccrtain ~ ~ r i u d .,\I1 this uo are
asicd to facc t o rxprditr the proposcd rcmrdy hy fire months.
14.
h'hilr pl.ainriffs seek to hrush past the effect o f such
. .
.
e l ~ l n g ro n thr rca;lilbing ncnhers o f tho prcsent city coaocil
hy claiming n o harm.
it is not so simple.
T h c present 'council
was rlectcd by the people oC Lublrocl t o serve at lonst until
,\pril. 19SJ.
Onc ncmher's
April. 1956.
To isplesenl thc neu plan in Sorembcr. 1983, would
t e r n does not nctually expire
until
rcquirc that thcsc cxistinp terms bc cut short and that t h e
council acmhers run for office (with a11 the inherent expcnses
and cxpenditllr~so f time and effort) and win election in order
to $errs out the balnnee o f the term for which they have already
h a e n e1ec:ed.
T h e n in four months they rill b e rcqulrcd r o re-
pear thc p r o c r s z and the expense if they wish t o continue on the
cotlncil.
~ i n t r a r y to the plaintiffso nllopations. t h e practical difficulties o f requiring implcnentation o f r n e w clsction system
in Soresher. 1983. for outreifh any imagined harm 'rising
filing o n c vacancy on thc council for
t h e existing st large system.
n
from
fire month period under
T h e arch 4 . 1983, Judp=cnt Is
not final. and the new SIX district plan should not be imposed
until the appellate courts hare completed their consideration of
the aatter and Issued n mandzte.
Respectfully submitted.
JOllS C. ROSS. JR.
CITY ATTORNEY
Post Orficr Box Z O O 0
Lubbock. Texas 79457
'TRAVIS U. SIIEI.TON
T. n,\I.C; JOKES
SIIEI.TOW G .IOSES
lRUl ~ \ v e n u c 0
u
ATTORNEYS FOR I1T;FEh'DANT-AFPELLASTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that two true and corrcct copies o f the
foregoing brief rere hand dclirorcd to Hr. llaniel I!. Renson. a s
designated attorney for plaintiffs. on this thc 10th day of
August, 1883.
L.:.L,:Is*c.O.IU "2."
OI
I...,
F I L E D
..
~MLLUmmw,cua
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O U R V
. o l u. r .
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FOR THE NORTHCm
LUBBOCK DIVJSIOfl
I
REV. ROY JOXES, £T A t . ,
Plaintiffs
I
I
I
1
1
V.
CITY OF LUBBOCK, TEXAS, !ZF
AL.,
Defendants
*
CIVIL ACTIOR
IR).
CA-5-76-34
1
!
1
-
PLAINTIFFS' AND PUINTIW-INTEWEW3R.b
REPLY BRIEF ON UOTION
This reply brief is respectfully subaitt.d by Plmintiffs
and Plaintiff-Intervenor in response to the Defendants' brief in
oppsition to the pending motion for further orders during ap.1
of this case, for the purpose of providing +he Court with
supplennntal citations of authoritv on points raised by the
Defendants in their brief in opposition.
1. JURISDICTIOR PENDIIOG APPEAL
W i s Court has jurisdiction to enter further orders under
Rule 61(e), ~ d e r a lRules of Civil Procedure, even though th. case
is now on appa.1.
-5. 416 F.2d
Plaqumines Parish Comission Council v. Vnitd
952. 954 15th Cir. 1969).
Rule 62(c) cadifie. th.
inherent p o w r of ;riel courts to make whatever orders .re
dead
mcessary m ensure the effectiveness of the eventual judglnt in
.
a case, protect the public interest, enforce orders previously
entered by the trial court, and prevent irreparable injury to
the rights of litigants from continuing violation of thcir 'applicable
Plaquenines Parish Carmission Council v.
constitutional rights.
United States, 416 F.2d 952, 954 15th Cir. 1969): Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pi*
CO., 411 P.2d 998, 1003 (5th Cir. 1969). rehcarinq
w,415 F.2d
1376 (1969); United States v. E l - O - P a t e Phafrmay.,
192 F.2d 62, 79-80 (9th Cis. 1951).
The status quo to be preserved
in the instant case is the present condition now existing by virtue
of this Court's prior decisions and orders in this case whereby the
unlawful and unconstitutional at-large election system of the
Defendant City of Lubbock can no longer be used. in violation of
the rights of Plaintiffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor and the t m
minority classes involved, to clect city council members.
The
preservation of the status quo, in this sense, will also enforce
the prior orders of this Court, will prevent irreparable injury
to Plaintiffs, Plaintiff-Intervenor and the two minority classes,
and will be in thm public interest by upholding the statutory and
constitutional Ian of the land.
Although the issue in the present case does not arise in
prUiSely the s
th-e.racia1
m procedural context, the present case is like
s.gr.gation
cases in which remedial orders are entered
by the trial courts, and enforcement of such orders is required
during the course of the appeals, because of the important
constitutional rights of the racial minorities involved.
a,
Lucy
v. A d a m ,
350 V.S.
-,
1 (1955); llarris v. Gibson, 322 F.2d
780, 782 (5th Cir. 1963). certiorari denied. 376 U.S. 908; Stell V.
Savannah-Chathas County Board of Education, 318 F.2d 425, 427-428
15th Cir. 1963); McCoy v. Louisiana Statc Board of Education, 332,
F.2d
915. 917 15th Clr. 1964); Coppcdqe
V.
of Education, 293 F.Supp. 356, 362 (E.D.N.C.
Jefferson Parish School Board. 4 0 1 U.S.
Circuit Justice Iarshsll).
Franklin County Board
1968); Dandridse v.
1219 (197l)lopinion of
The teaching of these cases is that
suspension or delay of rcmedial orders and plans in cases which
involve deprivation of constitutional rights because of race, is
not ordinarily tolerated, even though appeals nay be pending.
TO
permit the present Defendants to hold yet another unlavful and
unconstitutional at-large election, in the f a n of this Court's
prior decision and judgment in this care, merely bccause the case
is on appeal, would be contrary to well-established precedent in
the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States in
cases involving deprivation of constitutional rights buause of
race.
As it
has been put before, t h e w has been 'too much
deliberation and not enough speed in enforcing
rights.
. . ..in such cases.
. . . constitutional
accw v. louisiana State m a r d of
Education, 332 F.2d 915, at 917 15th Cir. 1964).
Not only does the trial court have the authority to enter
further orders in such cases pending appeal, but the trial court
is the court h a t suited to entar such orders, as the Fifth Circuit
has repeatedly mad* clear.
Stell v. Savannah-Chatham County Ward
of Education, 318 r.26 425, at 417-428 (5th Cir. 19631: WcCov v.
Louisiana State m u d of Education, 332 F.26 915, at 917 15th Clr.
1964).
'
2. THIS CASE INVOLVES AN INJUNCTION
Defendants argue that this is not an injunction case. :TO :
:
the contrary, this is a case in which the Court has entcred a
j u d g m n t in the nature of a mandatory injunction, although no
formal instrument designated .injunctionm has been issued.
It
is true that not every order of a Court constitutes an injunction,
bui one that is determinative, as a final order, or the issues
litigated in the case, and that affirmatively requires the doing
I
Of sane act or acts. is certainly a mandatory injunction.
1
I
42 Aa. Jur. 2d. Iniunctions, 516,
p. 745, S18, p. 749 (1969); 14R
Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, Kinds of Injunctions
1
I
7 3 . 4 at
.
See
-
Mandatory,
See also, CI'Hctllev v. Chzysler or..
23-28 1 6 ) .
160 P.2d 35, 37 (7th Cir. 1947).
,
In sane federal courts, an actual
instruent entitled "injunction. is issued along with the decision
and order in l case,,but in other federal courts the decision and
order are usad for that purpose without a specific instrument
desipnated as an injunction.
14A Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure,
Writ of Inlunction, 173.81, pp. 311-312 (1965).
absence of the word .injunction.
The presence or
does not determine whether the
relief affordad in a particular case is injunctive relief, and the
relief in this cese clearly is, in part, in the nature of a mandatory
injunction ccqmlling the changes required in this Court's final
judgmmnt with respect to the Lubbock municipal clection system.
3. THIS CASE INVOLVES DECLARATORY RELIEF
As in the cese of injunctions. discussed above, it is not
!
essential that a court designate relief as "declaratory" relief in
-4-
order to accord such rclicf to parties in a case who, as in the
instant case, have sought such relief in their pleadings.
This:
.
Court was spccifically asked to declare the rights of the parties,
and to do so by declaring that the at-large voting scheme in
Lubbock, Tcxas. is unlawful and unconstitutional.
so dcclared in its decision of January 20, 1983.
This Court has
The racre fact
that injunctive relief was also granted to Plaintiffs and PlaintiffIntervenor does not mean that this case contains no declaratory
relief.
In an action for a declaratory judgment, the trial court
is not restricted to giving declarator relief only.
,590.d j
15A Cyclomdia
e e d e r a l Procedure. S90.04, 590.83 (19651. For example, injunctions
A
against racial segregation in public schools and state institutions
of' higher learning have been
U.S.
In nmerous declaratory
B r o m v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347
judgment cases.
483, 455 (1954liBrom 11: B r o m v. Board of Education of Tomka.
349.U S. 294, 298, 300-301 (19551iBrown 111: C o o w r v. Aaron, 358
U.S.
1 (19581.
the t.331
The obvious purpose of 28 U.S.C.
52202 is to give
court the nec9szary p o w r to mate sure that :k ?.&?htd
declard in tha litigation are not diluted or destroyed during th.
course of an appeal, and that is what Plaintiffs md PlainciffIntervrr~orare nov seeking frcm this Court, a further ordex to
protect, in prictical application, the abstract declarations that
the Court has properly and correctly made with respect to the
illegality and unconstitutionality of the at-large election Systin Lubbock, Texas.
,
COltCLUSIOR
This Court has the necessary authority
-5-
to grant the furth-
order pending appeal sought by Plaint-.iffs and Plaintiff-Intervenor,
both under the provisions of Rule 62 (c), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 52202.
Respectfully submitted.
DANIEL H. BENSON
School of Law, Texas Tech Uni v.
Lubbock. Texas 79409
LANE ARTHUR
ALBERT PEREZ
1112 Texas Avem.'e
Lubbock, Texas 79401
MARK HALL
ROLANOO L. RIOS
201 N. St. Mary's. Suite 501
San Antonio, Texas 78205
TOf>1AS GARZA
1006 13th Street
Lubbock, Texas 79401
WILLIAM L. GARRETT
8300 Douglas. Suite 800
Dallas, Texas 75225
ROBERT P. DAVI&JOW
Geo, Mason Uni v .• School of Law
3401 N. Fairfax Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22201
1216 Avenue K
Lubbock, Texas 79401
i4:i~ ·~_·E:./dS
A·... em.•e
Lubbock, Texas 79401
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS AND PLAINTIFF-INTERVENOR
By'
By,
~/;f' vi
.{~~
~y~~~:f.
CERTIFIC"TE' OF St:'qVICF
This i . to certify that a t'rue copy of the foregoing brief
served on the attorneys for Defendants by delivering the same
to Mr. Dale Jones, 1801 Avenue O. Lubbock. Texas. and to Mr. James
P. Brewster, Ci'ty Attorney's Office, Lubbock City Hall, Lubbock,
::~a~YZ::983.
By,
:;g;::g:~&~~
-6-