PLEASE NOTE this is a sample reading list for the 2015-16 academic year – precise seminar content
may change from year to year.
General Reading
The following collections of articles each contain material relevant to the course. The first is
particularly highly recommended:

J. Kim, D. Z. Korman, and E. Sosa. (2012), Metaphysics: An Anthology. London, Blackwell.

M. J. Loux, (2008). Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings (2nd ed.). London, Routledge.

P. Van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, (2008), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Oxford,
Blackwell.

M. Rea, (2009), Arguing about Metaphysics. London, Routledge.
The following introductory texts are also helpful:

J. Tallant, (2011), Metaphysics: An Introduction. London, Continuum.

N. Effingham, (2013), An Introduction to Ontology. Cambridge, Polity.

M. Rea (2014), Metaphysics: The Basics. London, Routledge.

M.J. Loux (2006), Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, 3rd ed. London, Routledge.

E. J. Lowe, (2002), A Survey of Metaphysics. Oxford, O.U.P.
Assessment
Essay Titles and Readings for Shorter and Longer Assessed Essays
Lecture Schedule
Further readings will be provided with the essay titles, and in weekly lecture material.
Week 1
Lecture 1: What is metaphysics?
Essential Reading:

M. Rea, (2014), Metaphysics: The Basics. London, Routledge. Introduction. Or:

M. J. Loux, (2006), Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. London,
Routledge. Introduction.
Further Reading:

W. V. Quine (1948), "On What There Is". Review of Metaphysics. 2: 21-38. Reprinted in Kim,
Korman and Sosa. Classic discussion that sets the agenda for much contemporary ontology.

J. Schaffer (2009), "On What Grounds What" in D. Chalmers, D. Manley and R.
Wasserman, Metametaphysics. Oxford, O.U.P. Reprinted in Kim, Korman and Sosa.
Influential statement of the view that metaphysics is the study of what's fundamental.
Lecture 2: An Introduction to the Puzzle of Time
Essential Reading

J.M.E. McTaggart, (1927), "The Unreality of Time" (excerpted from The Nature of Existence,
vol.2) in Le Poidevin and Macbeath (eds.) The Philosophy of Time. Oxford, O.U.P.
Further Reading:

C.D. Broad, (1938). "McTaggart's Arguments against the Reality of Time". From Examination
of McTaggart's Philosophy, Vol.II, Part 1. Cambridge, C.U.P. Reprinted in Van Inwagen and
Zimmerman (eds.) Metaphysics: The Big Questions. 2nd ed. Oxford, Blackwell, pp.124-9.

C. D. Broad (1923), "The General Problem of Time and Change", in Scientific Thought.
London, Routledge. Reprinted in Van Inwagen and Zimmerman (eds.) Metaphysics: The Big
Questions. 2nd ed. Oxford, Blackwell. pp. 141-9.

A.N. Prior (1962), "Changes in Events and Changes in Things". Lindley Lecture by the
University of Kansas. Reprinted in LePoidevin and Macbeath (eds.) The Philosophy of Time.
Oxford, O.U.P. pp. 35-46.
For the Week 1 seminar, please read the McTaggart chapter above.
Week 1 Handout
Week 1 Slides
Week 2
Time: B-Theories
Essential Reading:

M.J. Loux, (2006) Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. London, Routledge. Chapter 7,
"The Nature of Time".

D. C. Williams (1951), "The Myth of Passage". Journal of Philosophy, 48. pp. 457-72.
Reprinted in Van Inwagen and Zimmerman, Rea, and Loux collections.
Further Reading:

D. H. Mellor, (1981), Real Time. Cambridge, C.U.P. Chapter 6. Reprinted, with revisions, as
"The Unreality of Tense" in LePoidevin and Macbeath (eds.) The Philosophy of Time. Oxford,
O.U.P.

J.J.C. Smart (1949), "The River of Time", Mind, 58: 483-494.

H. Dyke (2003), "Temporal Language and Temporal Reality", The Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 53, No. 12, 380-91.
Seminar Reading: McTaggart paper (1927), (linked to above).
Week 2 Handout
Week 3 Slides
Week 3
Time: A-Theories
Essential Reading:

J. Tallant, (2011), Metaphysics, An Introduction. London, Continuum. Chapter 7. Or:

D. Zimmerman, (2008), "The Privileged Present: Defending an "A-Theory" of Time". In T.
Sider, J. Hawthorne and D. Zimmerman (eds.)Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Oxford,
Blackwell, pp. 211-226.
The following short papers by A.N.Prior:

A.N. Prior (1970), "The Notion of the Present". In Studium Generale, 23. New York, Springer.
pp.245-8. Reprinted in Van Inwagen and Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions.
2nd. ed. Oxford, Blackwell. 129-131.

A.N. Prior (1959), "Thank Goodness That's Over". Philosophy, 34: 78-84.

A. N. Prior (1996), "Some Free Thinking about Time". In B.J. Copeland (ed.) Logic and Reality:
Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior. Oxford, O.U.P. pp.47- 51. Reprinted in Van Inwagen and
Zimmerman (ed.) Metaphysics: The Big Questions. 2nd. ed. Oxford, Blackwell.
Further Reading:

N. Markosian (1993), "How Fast Does Time Pass?". Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 53: 829-44.

J. Bigelow (1996), "Presentism and Properties", Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 35- 52.

N. Markosian (2004), "A Defence of Presentism". In D. Zimmerman, (ed.) Oxford Studies in
Metaphysics I. Oxford, O.U.P. pp.47-82. Reprinted in M.Rea (ed.) (2009), Arguing about
Metaphysics. London, Routledge.
Seminar Reading: For week 3, please read Prior 'The Notion of the Present' and 'Some Free Thinking
about Time'. (Links to papers above)
Week 3. Handout
Week 3. Slides
Week 4
Substance, Bundles and Substrata
Essential Reading:

M. J. Loux (2006), Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction. London, Routledge. Chapter 3,
"Concrete Particulars I".

M. Black, (1952), “The Identity of Indiscernibles”, Mind, 6, 153- 64. Reprinted in Loux
(ed.) Metaphysics, Contemporary Readings. London, Routledge. (Link below).

E. Allaire, (1963), “Bare Particulars”. Philosophical Studies, 14, 1/2. Reprinted in Loux
(ed.) Metaphysics, Contemporary Readings. London, Routledge.

J. Van Cleve, (1985). “A Third Version of the Bundle Theory”. Philosophical Studies, 47, No.1.
Reprinted in Loux (ed.) Metaphysics, Contemporary Readings. London, Routledge.
Seminar Reading:
M. Black (1952), The Identity of Indiscernibles, Mind, 6, 153- 64.
Week 4. Handout
Week 4. Slides
Week 5
Substance, Kinds and Sortals
Essential Reading

M. J. Loux. (2006). Metaphysics. London, Routledge. Ch. 3 (section on Aristotelian
substances)

D. Wiggins (2005). "Substance" in Grayling, A.C. (ed.) Philosophy: A Guide Through the
Subject. Oxford, O.U.P.
Seminar Reading:
D. Wiggins (2005), 'Substance' (link above).
Week 5. Handout
Week 5. Slides
Week 6
Reading Week
Week 7
Problems of Constitution
Essential Reading:

Introductory M. Rea (2014), Metaphysics: The Basics. London, Routledge. (pp.102-111).

N. Effingham, (2013), An Introduction to Ontology. Cambridge, Polity. Chapter 9.

D. Wiggins, (1968), “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time”, The Philosophical
Review, 77; 90-95.

M. Burke, (1997), “Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the
Relations Among Objects, Sorts, Sortals, and Persistence Conditions.” In M. Rea
(ed.) Material Constitution: A Reader. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield.
Further Reading:
M. Burke (1992), "Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard
Account", Analysis, 52: 12- 17.
E.J. Lowe (1995), "Coinciding Objects: In Defence of the Standard Account", Analysis, 55: 171- 8.
Seminar Reading:

D. Wiggins, (1968), “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time”, The Philosophical
Review, 77; 90-95. (On JSTOR)
Week 7. Handout
Week 7. Slides
Week 8
Persistence and Temporal Parts
Essential Reading:

J. Tallant, (2011), Metaphysics: An Introduction. London, Continuum. Chapter 8.

K. Hawley (2001), How Things Persist. Oxford, O.U.P. Chapters 1 and 2.

T. Sider (1996), “All the World’s A Stage”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433- 53.

D. Lewis (1986) On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford, Blackwell. Excerpt from pp.202-5.
Further Reading: (See reading lists above for more detailed reading on this topic)
T. Sider (2001), Four-dimensionalism. (Oxford, O.U.P.). Chapter 5. "In Favour of Four-dimensionalism
2: The Best Unified Treatment of the Paradoxes of Coincidence" (This is a long chapter. It contains
interesting criticisms of a number of the purported solutions to the problem of material constitution
and Sider's own 'four-dimensionalist' solution.)
K. Hawley (2001), How Things Persist. Oxford, O.U.P. Chapter 1.
D. Zimmerman (1998), 'Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism'. From, Metaphysics: The Big Questions,
edited by Van Inwagen and Zimmerman. Oxford, Blackwell.
Seminar Reading:

David Lewis (1986) Excerpt from On the Plurality of Worlds. (Link above)
Week 8. Handout
Week 8. Slides
Weeks 9 and 10
The Special Composition Question
Essential Reading: For the week 9 lecture, focus on Tallant and Van Inwagen.

J. Tallant, (2011), Metaphysics: An Introduction. London, Continuum. Chapter 2.

Van Inwagen, (1987), “When are Objects Parts?”. In James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical
Perspectives I: Metaphysics. Atascadero, Ridgeview. Reprinted in Kim, Korman and Sosa. J.
(Link below)

Van Cleve, (2008), “The Moon and Sixpence: A Defence of Mereological Universalism”. In T.
Sider, J. Hawthorne and D. Zimmerman, (eds.)Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics.
Oxford, Blackwell.

N. Markosian, (2008), “Restricted Composition”. In T. Sider, J. Hawthorne and D.
Zimmerman, (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Oxford, Blackwell.
Week 9 Notes
Week 9 Slides
Seminar (in Week 9)
Please read: Van Inwagen (1987), "When are Objects Parts?
Week 10 Lecture Reading:
Michael Rea, (2014), Metaphysics: The Basics. London, Routledge. pp.132-140.
Anna Marmadoro, (2013) 'Aristotle's Hylomorphism without the Reconditioning', Philosophical
Inquiry, Vol. 36, No.1-2.