PLEASE NOTE this is a sample reading list for the 2015-16 academic year
– precise seminar content may change from year to year.
1. Introduction
Organizational meeting; overview and registration for student presentations.
2. Reasons and value
Core reading:
Scanlon, Thomas. 1998. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
chapters 1 and 2.
Additional Reading:
Heuer, Ulrike. 2006. “Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?” in Journal for Ethics and
Social Philosophy, Vol 1:3.
Olson, Jonas. 2004. “Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.” Philosophical Quarterly 54: 295300.
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen. 2004. “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐
attitudes and Value.” Ethics 114 (3): 391 – 423.
Schroeder, Mark. 2012. “The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons.’ Ethics 122(3): 457-488.
3. Realism about reasons
Core reading:
Parfit, Derek. 2011. On What Matters, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 24 – 26.
Additional Reading:
Dancy, Jonathan. 2002. Practical Reality. New York: Oxford University Press, chapters 1, 2, and 5.
Raz, Joseph. 2010. “Reason, Reasons, and Normativity.” In Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.) Oxford Studies
in Metaethics, Vol. 5.
Scanlon, Thomas. 2014. Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, lecture 1.
Schroeder, Mark. Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1, 2, and 4.
4. Constitutivism about reasons
Core reading:
Korsgaard, Christine. Self-constitution. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapters 1, 2, and 7.
Additional Reading:
Enoch, David. “Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of
Action.”Philosophical Review 115: 169 – 198.
Katsafanas, Paul. 2014. “Constitutivism about Practical Reasons.” Unpublished. Draft available
here:http://people.bu.edu/pkatsa/constitutivism.pdf.
O’Neill, Onora. 1989. “Constructivism in Ethics.” In O’Neill Constructions of Reason. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, chapter 11.
Street, Sharon. 2008. “Constructivism about Reasons.” In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in
Metaethics,Volume 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. Second-personal reasons
Core reading:
Darwall, Stephen. 2006. The Second-Personal Standpoint. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, parts
1 and 2.
Additional Reading:
Enoch, David 2011: “Giving Practical Reasons.” Philosopher’s Imprint 11(4): 1 – 22.
Korsgaard, Christine M. 2007. Autonomy and the Second Person Within. Ethics 118(1): 8 – 23.
Pauer-Studer, Herlinde. 2010. “The Moral Standpoint: First-Personal or Second-Personal? European
Journal of Philosophy 18(2): 296 – 310.
Wallace, R. Jay. 2007. “Reasons, Relations, and Commands: Reflections on Darwall.” Ethics 118: 25 –
36.
6. Intuitionism
Core reading:
Audi, Robert. 2004. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, chapter 5.
Additional Reading:
Cowan, Robert. 2013. “Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism.” European Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
Huemer, Michael. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 5.
Parfit, Derek. 2011. On What Matters, Volume 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, chapter 32.
Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism. New York: Oxford University Press, chapter 11.
7. Reflective equilibrium
Core reading:
Rawls, John. 1975. “The Independence of Moral Theory.” In Rawls Collected Papers. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, chapter 15.
Additional Reading:
Daniels, Norman. 1979. “Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics.” Journal of
Philosophy76(5): 256 – 82.
Kelly, Thomas and Sarah McGrath. 2011. “Is Reflective Equlibrium Enough?” Philosophical
Perspectives 24(1): 325 – 359.
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, §9.
Scanlon, Thomas. 2014. Being Realistic about Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, lecture 4.
8. Political constructivism
Core reading:
Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism, paperback edition. New York: Columbia University Press,
lectures 2 and 3.
Additional Reading:
Larmore, Charles. 1999. “The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism.” The Journal of Philosophy, 96(12):
599–625
Nagel, Thomas. 1987. “Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 16: 215
– 240.
O’Neill, Onora. 2003. “Constructivism in Rawls and Kant.” In Freeman, Samuel (ed.) Cambridge
Companion to Rawls. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapter 9.
Peter, Fabienne. 2013. “Epistemic Foundations of Political Liberalism.” Journal of Moral
Philosophy 10(5): 598 – 620.
Raz, Joseph. 1990, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence.” Philosophy & Public
Affairs 19(1): 3 – 46.
9. Moral contractualism
Core reading:
Scanlon, Thomas. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, chapters
4 and 5.
Additional Reading:
Arneson, Richard. 2002. “The End of Welfare As We Know It? Scanlon versus Welfarist
Consequentialism.” Social Theory and Practice, 28(2): 315–336.
Ashford, Elizabeth. 2003. “The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism.” Ethics, 113(2): 273–
302.
Darwall, Stephen. 2006. The Second-Personal Standpoint. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
chapter 12.
Wenar, Leif. 2003. “What We Owe to Distant Others.” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 2: 283–
304.
10. Perfectionism
Core reading:
Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon Press, chapters 1 & 15.
Additional Reading:
Arneson, Richard. 2000. “Perfectionism and Politics.” Ethics 111: 37 – 63.
Brink, David. 2007. “The Significance of Desire.” In Shafer-Landau (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics,
Vol. 3.
Chan, Joseph. 2014. Confucian Perfectionism: A Political Philosophy for Modern Times. Princeton
University Press.
Dorsey, Dale. Forthcoming. “Three Arguments for Perfectionism.” Noûs.
Hurka, Thomas. 1993. Perfectionism. New York: Oxford University Press, part 1.
Wall, Stephen. 1998. Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, part 1.