PLEASE NOTE this is a sample reading list for the 2015-16 academic
year – precise seminar content may change from year to year.
Four topics to be covered :
A Augustine – language learning, names, ostensive definition
Philosophical Investigations §§ 1- 35
M McGinn Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations Chapter 2
W. Goldfarb, ‘I want you to bring me a slab: Remarks on the opening sections of
the Philosophical Investigations’, Synthese 26 1983
S Cavell, ‘Excursus on Wittgenstein’s vision of language’, in Crary & Read
collection, pp.21-37
*G. Baker & P. Hacker ‘The Augustinian Conception of Language’ Wittgenstein:
Understanding and Meaning, volume 1 of An analytical Commentary on the
Philosophical Investigations. Part 1 – Essays, Blackwell 2nd revised edition 2005,
pp.1-28, see also Essay 2 ‘Explanation’.
A Lugg, ‘A Sort of Prologue: Philosophical Investigations, §§1-7’, Philosophical
Investigations, 36, 2013, pp.20-36
D. Stern, ‘Wittgenstein’s critique of referential theories of meaning’, in
Wittgenstein’s enduring arguments, eds, Levy & Zamuner, Routledge
2009, pp.180-208.
M. Williams, ‘Master and novice in the later Wittgenstein’, American Philosophical
Quartley 48, April 2011, pp.199-211
M. Williams. ‘Wittgenstein’s Builders’ Americna Philosophical Quartlery 2014,
M. Luntley, ‘What’s Doing? Activity, naming and Wittgenstein’s response to
Augustine’ in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: a Critical Guide,
Cambridge: C.U.P., ed. A. Ahmed, 2010, pp. 30-48
M. Luntley, Wittgenstein: Opening Investigations, Oxford & New York: WileyBlackwell
C. Engelland, Ostension: word learning and the embodied mind, Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press 2014
B Family resemblance and the teacher/pupil relationship
S Cavell, ‘Excursus on Wittgenstein’s vision of language’, in Crary &
Read collection, pp.21-37
M. Williams, ‘The significance of learning in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy’,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 1994, 173-204
M. Luntley, ‘On the teaching and learning of words’, Wittgenstein’s Enduring
Argument, eds. Zamuner & Levy, Routledge: London & Boston, 2009, 135-55. *M.
Forster, ‘Wittgenstein on family resemblance concepts’, in A.Ahmed (ed.)
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: a Critical Guide, CUP 2010. G. Baker
& P. Hacker ‘Explanation’ Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, volume 1 of
An analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Part 1
– Essays, Blackwell 2nd revised edition 2005, pp.29-44, see also Essay 11
‘Family Resemblance’, pp201-26
W. Huemer, ‘The Transition from Causes to Norms: Wittgenstein on Training’,
Grazer Philosophische Studien, 71, 2006, 205-225.
M. Luntley, ‘Training, training, training: the making of second nature and the roots
of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism’ European Journal of Pragmatism and American
Philosophy. IV(2), 88-104
C rule following
Philosophical Investigations §§ 134 – 242, but especially §§ 185 - 242
S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on rules and private languages
P. Boghossian, ‘The rule-following considerations’ Mind XCVIII 1989, 507-50 (in
Miller & Wright)
*R Fogelin, Taking Wittgenstein at his Word, Princeton University Press 2009, ,
M McGinn Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations Chapter 3
W. Goldfarb, ‘Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules’, Journal of Philosophy, pp.471-88.
(in Miller & Wright)
*J. McDowell,’ Wittgenstein on following a rule’ Synthese 58 1984 (in Miller &
Wright, also in McDowell’s Collected Papers vol II)
J. McDowell, ‘Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy’ in
Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol XVII: The Wittgenstein Legacy Eds. French
et.al. 1992, 40-52 (also in Collected Papers).
J. McDowell, ‘Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein: Comment on Crispin
Wright’ in Puhl ed. 148-169 (also in his Collected Papers)
D. Pears, The False Prison vol 2. Chs.16, 17.
*D. Pears, Paradox and Platitude in Wittgenstein’s Philosophy Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 2006
B. Stroud, ‘Wittgenstein on meaning, understanding and community’ in Haller &
Brandl, 1990, pp.27-36
B. Stroud, ‘Mind, meaning and practice’ in Sluga & Stern, 1996, 296-319
*H. Ginsborg, ‘Primitive normativity and scepticism about rules’, Journal of
Philosophy, CVIII, No.5 May 2011, 227-254.
M. Luntley, Wittgenstein: Opening INvestigations Oxford & New York: Wiley
Blackwell, 2015, Chapter 3.
Further readings on the normativity of meaning/content/belief:
P. Boghossian, ‘Is meaning normative?’in Philosophy, Science, Scientific
Philosophy (Fifth International Congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy,
Bielefeld 2003,) Paderborn, 2005, pp. 215-18
A. Hattiangadi, ‘Is meaning normative?’ Mind & Language, 21 2006, 220-40.
J. Fennell, ‘’The Meaning of “Meaning is Normative”’, Philosophical Investigations,
36, 2013, pp.56-78
D private language
Two key papers:
*D. Pears, The False Prison II, Chapter ‘The disabling defect of the private
language’.
*B. Stround (2001) ‘Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension’, in D.
Charles & W. Child (eds.) Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in Honour of David
Pears, Oxford: OUP, reprinted in Stroud (2002), Meaning, Understanding and
Practice pp.213-232
see also,
M. Luntley (2015) Wittgentein: Opening Investigations, Appendix, ‘What Happens
to the Private Language Argument?’