Bibliography
Alston, W. P. 1993. The Reliability of Sense Perception. Ithaca, NY.: Cornell
University Press.
Anscombe, G. E. M, 1962. ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: a grammatical feature’.
In R. Butler (ed.), Analytic Philosophy, second series. Oxford: Blackwell.
Armstrong, D. M. 1968. A Materialist theory of the Mind. London: Routledge.
—
1973. Belief, Truth and Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
1991. ‘Intentionality, Perception and Causality: Reflections on John Searle’s
Intentionality’. In E. LePore and R. Van Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His
Critics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ayer, A. J. 1956. The Problem of Knowledge. London: Macmillan.
—
1963. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan.
Ayers, M. 1993. Locke, 2 vols. London: Routledge.
—
1997. Locke: Ideas and Things. London: Phoenix.
Baldwin, T. 1992. ‘A Projective Theory of Sensory Content’. In T. Crane (ed.), The
Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Berkeley, G. 1975a. Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous. In M. Ayers
(ed.), George Berkeley: Philosophical Works. London: Everyman.
—
1975b. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. In M.
Ayers (ed.), George Berkeley: Philosophical Works. London: Everyman.
Beitmayer, B. and Ogmen, H. 2006. Visual Masking, 2nd edn. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Block, N. 1996. ‘Mental Pain and Mental Latex’. Philosophical Issues, 7, 19-49.
—
1998. ‘Is Experiencing Just Representing?’. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 58, 663-70.
—
2003. ‘Mental Paint’. In M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and
Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Brewer, B. 1995. ‘Mental Causation: Complusion by Reason’. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 69, 237-53.
—
1998. ‘Levels of Explanation and the Individuation of Events: a difficulty for
the token identity theory’, Acta Analytica, 20, 7-24.
—
1999. Perception and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2004. ‘Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience’. Philosophical
Issues, 14, 61-77.
—
2005. ‘Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content’. In E. Sosa and M.
Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Broad, C. D. 1925. The Mind and its Place in Nature. London: Routledge and Keegan
Paul.
Burge, T. 1986. ‘Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception’. In P. Pettit and J.
McDowell (eds.), Subject, thought and Context. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
—
1991. ‘Vision and Intentional Content’. In E. LePore and R. Van Gulick
(eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
1994. ‘Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice’. In J. Heil and A.
Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Byrne, A. 2001. ‘Intentionalism Defended’. Philosophical Review, 110, 199-240.
—
2005. ‘Perception and Conceptual Content’. In E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds.),
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
2009. ‘Experience and Content’. Philosophical Quarterly, 59, 429-51.
Campbell, J. 1993. ‘A Simple View of Colour’. In J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.),
Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2002a. ‘Berkeley’s Puzzle’. In T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.),
Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2002b. Reference and Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2009. ‘Consciousness and Reference’. In B. McLaughlin and A Beckermann
(eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Cassam, Q. 2007. The Possibility of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
Forthcoming. ‘Knowing and Seeing: Responding to Stroud’s Dilemma’.
European Journal of Philosophy.
Chalmers, D, Manley, D and Wasserman, R. 2009. Metametaphysics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Charles, D. 2000. Aristotle on Meaning and Essence. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Conee, E. and Feldman, R. ‘The Generality Problem for Reliabilism’. Philosophical
Studies, 89, 1-29.
Crane, T. 1988. ‘The Waterfall Illusion’. Analysis, 48, 142-7.
—
1992. ‘The Non-Conceptual Content of Experience’. In T. Crane (ed.), The
Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cussins, A. 1990. ‘The Connectionist Construction of Concepts’. In M. Boden (ed.),
The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davies, M. 1992. ‘Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience’. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 92, 21-45.
—
1997. ‘Externalism and Experience’. In N. Block, O. Flanagan and G.
Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Demopoulos, W. and Friedman, M. 1985. ‘Russell’s Analysis of Matter: Its
Historical Context and Contemporary Interest’. Philosophy of Science, 52,
621-39.
Descartes, R. 1986. Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. J. Cottingham.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dretske, F. 1969. Seeing and Knowing. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
—
1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Oxford: Blackwell.
Eilan, N., Hoerl, C., McCormack, T. and Roessler, J. 2005. Joint Attention:
Communication and Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
1980. ‘Things Without the Mind’. In Z. Van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical
Subjects. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fine, K. 1994. ‘Essence and Modality’. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1-16.
Fodor, J. 1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of
Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
—
1998. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Foley, R. 1985. ‘What’s Wrong with Reliabilism?’. Monist, 68, 188-202.
Forster, K.I. and Davis, C. 1984. ‘Repetition Priming and Frequency Attenuation in
Lexical Access’. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and
Cognition, 10, 680-98.
Foster, J. 1985. ‘Berkeley on the Physical World’. In J. Foster and H. Robinson,
(eds.), Essays on Berkeley. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2000. The Nature of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Frege, G. 1993. ‘On Sense and Reference’. In A. Moore (ed.), Meaning and
Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. 2002. Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Goldman, A. 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’. Journal of Philosophy, 64, 357372.
Goldman, A. and Olsson, E. 2008. ‘Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge’. In D.
Prichard, A. Millar and A. Haddock (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Grice, H. P. 1962. ‘The Causal Theory of Perception’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volume, 35, 121-68.
—
1989a. ‘Logic and Conversation’. In his Studies in the Way of Words.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—
1989b. ‘Further Notes on Logic and Conversation’. In his Studies in the Way
of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gupta, A. 2006a. Empiricism and Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2006b. ‘Experience and Knowledge’. In T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne
(eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
Forthcoming. An Account of Conscious Experience.
Harman, G. 1990. ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’. In J. Tomberlin (ed.),
Philosophical Perspectives, 4. Ridgeview Publishing Company.
Hawthorne, J. 2001. ‘Intrinsic Properties and Natural Relations’. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 63, 399-403.
Heck, R. G. 2000. ‘Non-Conceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”’.
Philosophical Review, 109, 483-523.
Hofstadter, D. 1979. Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid. New York: Basic
Books.
Hornsby, J. 1985. ‘Physicalism, Events and Part-Whole Relations’. In E. LePore and
B. McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
1986. ‘Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour’. In P. Pettit and J.
McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
—
1994. ‘Agency and Causal Explanation’. In J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental
Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huemer, M. 2001. Scepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman
and Littlefield.
Hume, D. 1978. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, revised by P. H.
Niddich. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackson. F. 1977. Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Jastrow, J. 1900. Fact and Fable in Psychology. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Johnston, M. 2004. ‘The Obscure Object of Hallucination’. Philosophical Studies,
120, 113-83.
—
2006. ‘Better than Mere Knowledge? The Function of Sensory Awareness’. In
T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford:
Oxford University Press
Kant, I. 1929. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan.
Kaplan, D. 1989. ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics
and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals’. In J. Almog, J.
Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kelly, S. D. 2001. ‘Demonstrative Concepts and Experience’. Philosophical Review,
110, 397-420.
Kennedy, M. Forthcoming. ‘Explanations in Good and Bad Experiential Cases’. In F.
Macpherson and D. Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Kripke, S. 1980. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kvanvig, J. L. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Langton, R. 1998. Kantian Humility. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Langton, R. and Lewis, D. 1998. ‘Defining “Intrinsic”’. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 58, 333-45.
—
2001. ‘Marshall and Parsons on “Intrinsic”’. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 63, 353-5.
Lewis, D. 1980. ‘Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision’, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, 58, 239-49.
—
1983a. ‘Extrinsic Properties’. Philosophical Studies, 44, 197-200.
—
1983b. ‘New Work for a Theory of Universals’. Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 61, 343-77.
—
1998. ‘The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics: an Excerpt from On the
Plurality of Worlds’. In P. Van Inwagen and D. W. Zimmerman (eds.),
Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
2009. ‘Ramseyan Humility’. In D. Braddon-Mitchell and R. Nola (eds.),
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Locke, J. 1975. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P. H. Nidditch.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacBride, F. 2005. ‘The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of
Metaphysics?’. Mind, 114, 565-614.
McCauley R. N. and Henrich, J. 2006. Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer Illusion,
Theory-Neutral Observation, and the Diachronic Penetrability of the Visual
Input System’. Philosophical Psychology, 19, 79-101.
McDowell, J. 1982. ‘Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge’. Proceedings of the
British Academy, 68, 455-79.
—
1985a. ‘Functionalism and Anomalous Monism’. In E. LePore and B.
McLaughlin (eds.), Actions and Events. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
1985b. ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’. In T. Honderich (ed.), Morality and
Objectivity. London: Routledge.
—
1986. ‘Singular thought and the Extent of Inner Space’. In P. Pettit and J.
McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
—
1991. ‘Intentionality De Re’. In E. LePore and R. Van Gulick (eds.), John
Searle and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
1994. Mind and World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
—
1998. ‘Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant and Intentionality’. Journal of
Philosophy, 95, 431-491.
—
2008a. ‘Responses’. In J. Lindgaard (ed.), McDowell: Experience, Norm and
Nature. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
2008b. ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a
Transcendental Argument’. In A. Haddock and F. Macpherson (eds.),
Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Magidor, O. Forthcoming. ‘The Last Dogma of Type Confusions’. Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society.
Marshall, D. and Parsons, J. 2001. ‘Langton and Lewis on “Intrinsic”’. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 63, 347-51.
Martin. M. G. F. 2002. ‘The Transparency of Experience’. Mind and Language, 17,
376-425.
—
2004. ‘The Limits of Self-Awareness’. Philosophical Studies, 120, 37-89.
—
2006. ‘On Being Alienated’. In T. Szabo Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.),
Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2010. ‘What’s in a Look?’. In *
—
Forthcoming. Uncovering Appearances.
Mather, G., Verstraten, F. and Anstis, S. (1998). The Motion Aftereffect: A modern
perspective. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
Mill, J. S. 1867. A System of Logic. London: Longmans.
Moore, G. E. 1953. Some Main problems of Philosophy. London: George, Allen and
Unwin.
Newman, M. H. A. 1928. ‘Mr. Russell’s Causal Theory of Perception’. Mind, 37,
137-48.
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Brien, L. 2007. Self-Knowing Agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Shaughnessy, B. 2003. ‘Sense Data’. In B. Smith (ed.), John Searle. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Owens, D. 1992. Causes and Coincidences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
2009. ‘Mental Actions and the No-Content Problem’. In L. O’Brien and M.
Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pautz, A. Forthcoming. ‘Why Explain Visual Experience in terms of Content?’. In B.
Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World: new essays on perception. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Peacocke, C. 1983. Sense and Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
1989. ‘Perceptual Content’. In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.),
Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press.
—
1992. A Study of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
—
2001. ‘Does Perception have a Nonconceptual Content?’. Journal of
Philosophy, 98, 239-264.
—
2006. ‘Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)’. In J. Cohen and B.
McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind.
Oxford: Blackwell.
—
2009. ‘Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II): Epistemology’. In L. O’Brien
and M. Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettit, P. and McDowell, J. 1986. ‘Introduction’. In P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.),
Subject, Thought and Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Phillips, I. Draft. ‘Illusion and Content’. Paper presented at the 2005 Warwick
University Mindgrad Conference.
Plantinga, A. 1993. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Price, H. H. 1950. Perception, 2nd edn. London: Methuen.
Putnam, H. 1978. Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge.
Ramsey, F. P. 1990a. ‘Knowledge’. In his Philosophical Papers, ed., D. H. Mellor.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
1990b. ‘Universals’. In his In his Philosophical Papers, ed., D. H. Mellor.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Robinson. H. 1994. Perception. London: Routledge.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism: a solution to the problem of
universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2008. ‘Nominalism in Metaphysics’. In E. N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/nominalismmetaphysics/>.
Rudder Baker, L. 1994. ‘Metaphysics and Mental Causation’. In J. Heil and A. Mele
(eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Russell. B. 1917. ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’. In
his Mysticism and Logic. London: Allen and Unwin.
—
1927. The Analysis of Matter. London: Routledge.
—
2001. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Salmon, N. 1986. Frege’s Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Schellenberg, S. Forthcoming. ‘Perceptual Content Defended’. Nous.
Searle, J. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
1991. ‘Response: Reference and Intentionality’. In E. LePore and R. Van
Gulick (eds.), John Searle and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Sellars, W. 1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Sider, T. 1993. ‘Intrinsic Properties’. Philosophical Studies, 83, 1-27.
—
2001. ‘Maximality and Intrinsic Properties’. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 63, 357-64.
Siegel, S. 2004. ‘Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal’. Philosophical Studies, 120,
91-112.
—
2006. ‘Direct Realism and Perceptual Consciousness’. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 73, 378-410.
—
2008. ‘The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination’. In A. Haddock and F.
Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2010. ‘Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?’. In B. Nanay (ed.), Perceiving
the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, A. D. 2001. ‘Perception and Belief’. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 62, 283-309.
—
2002. The Problem of Perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Snowdon, P. 1992. ‘How to interpret “Direct Perception”’. In T. Crane (ed.), The
Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sosa, E. 1991. ‘Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue’. In his Knowledge in Perspective.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
2007. A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Soteriou, M. 2000. ‘The Particularity of Visual Perception’. European Journal of
Philosophy, 8, 173-89.
—
2009. ‘Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking and Phenomenal Character’. In L.
O’Brien and M. Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Spener, M. In preparation (a). ‘Phenomenal Adequacy and Introspective Evidence’.
—
In preparation (b). ‘The Two Claims of Transparency’.
Steward, H. 1997. The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Stoneham, T. 2002. Berkeley’s World. Oxford University Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1959. Individuals. London: Methuen.
—
1980. ‘Reply to Evans’. In Z. Van Straaten (ed.), Philosophical Subjects.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stroud, B. 2000a. ‘Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge’, in Understanding
Human Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2000b. ‘Understanding Human Knowledge in General’, in Understanding
Human Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2001. ‘Sense-Experience and the Grounding of Thought’. In N. Smith (ed.),
Reading McDowell on Mind and World. London: Routledge.
—
Forthcoming. ‘Explaining Perceptual Knowledge: Reply to Quassim Cassam’.
European Journal of Philosophy.
Travis, C. 2004. ‘The Silence of the Senses’. Mind, 113. 59-94.
Tye, M. 1992. ‘Visual Qualia and visual Content’. In T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of
Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
—
1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
—
2000. Consciousness, Colour and Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
—
2002. ‘Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience’. Nous, 36,
137-51.
Vogel, J. 2000. ‘Reliabilism Leveled’. Journal of Philosophy, 97, 602-23.
Weatherson, B. 2001. ‘Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles’. Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research, 63, 365-80.
Wiggins, D. 1995. ‘Substance’. In A. C. Grayling (ed.), Philosophy: a guide through
the subject. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Williams, B. 1978. Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. London: Penguin.
Williamson, T. 1996. ‘Cognitive Homelessness’. Journal of Philosophy, 93, 554-73.
—
1998. ‘The Broadness of the Mental: some logical considerations’,
Philosophical Perspectives, 12, 389-410.
—
2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
—
Forthcoming. ‘Can Cognition be Factorized into Internal and External
Components?’. In R. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive
Science. Oxford: Blackwell.
Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell.
—
1974. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Routledge.
Wright, C. 1981. ‘Rule-Following, Objectivity and the Theory of Meaning’. In
Hotzman S. and Leich, C. (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. London:
Routledge.
—
2008. ‘Comment on John McDowell’s “The Disjunctive Conception of
Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”’. In A. Haddock and
F. Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Yablo, S. 1999. ‘Intrinsicness’. Philosophical Topics, 26, 479-505.
Zöllner, F. 1860. ‘Ueber eine neue Art von Pseudoskopie und ihre Beziehungen zu
den von Plateau und Oppel beschrieben Bewegungs Phaenomenen’. Annalen
der Physik, 186, 500-25.