Chapter Two
SURVEY FINDINGS
“THERMOMETER” QUESTIONS
As noted in the Preface, South Korean views on current topical issues
were not addressed in any detail. We did, however, ask three “thermometer” questions designed to take the temperature of current
South Korean security anxieties.
The first question asked respondents to evaluate the possibility of a
North Korean invasion of South Korea. The responses, shown in
Figure 1, are interesting. Despite repeated North Korean threats in
recent years to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire” and a series of highly
publicized armed incursions, less than 13 percent of the respondents see a North Korean invasion as “very likely.” To be sure, since
another 46 percent see such an invasion as “somewhat likely,” a solid
majority of 59 percent place themselves somewhere on the “likely”
side of the spectrum. Still, a robust minority of over 38 percent
consider invasion either “somewhat unlikely” or “very unlikely.”
The second question asked whether, in the event of such an attack,
the United States would or would not defend South Korea. As shown
in Figure 2, nearly 90 percent of the respondents indicate their belief
that the United States would help defend South Korea. Less than 7
percent think the United States would not.
A third question addressed security anxieties more indirectly. In
light of the intensified domestic debate over South Korea’s National
Security Law, which successive governments have considered essential to counter North Korean efforts to subvert South Korean society,
7
8
,
,
The Shape of Korea’s Future
7%
2%
13%
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Somewhat unlikely
32%
Very unlikely
Don't know
46%
NOTE: Percentages are
rounded.
Figure 1—Possibility of North Korean Invasion
7%
4%
Would help Korea
Would not help Korea
Don't know
NOTE: Percentages are
rounded.
89%
Figure 2—Likelihood of U.S. Assistance
we asked whether the respondents believe the law should be kept as
is, revised, or eliminated altogether. As shown in Figure 3, fully 60
percent say the law should be modified to eliminate harmful
clauses—a sharp rise from 41 percent in the 1996 poll—with another
8 percent saying the law should be eliminated altogether. The
number of respondents who believe the law should be kept as is fell
from 38 percent in 1996 to 22 percent in the 1999 poll.
Survey Findings
9
70
60
Sept. 1996
Feb. 1999
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
Kept as is
Modified
Eliminated
Don't know
Figure 3—Revision of National Security Law
We can draw several inferences from these “temperature” readings.
First, while South Koreans may be working hard to conciliate North
Korea, they have no feverish illusions: They remain realistic about
the potential threat from Pyongyang and recognize the possibility of
a major military invasion. Second, despite this awareness of potential danger, South Korean anxieties about either direct North Korean
attack or indirect subversion have significantly abated. Third, the
United States has come a long way in assuring South Koreans about
its defense commitment, and with this assurance has helped assuage
long-standing South Korean anxieties about their security.
With these current readings, we turn to longer-term security issues.
We begin with attitudes toward unification.
UNIFICATION
We asked a range of questions to ascertain South Korean views on
their desire for, expectation of, and appropriate domestic policies in
the wake of possible reunification. The first question asked how
eager South Koreans are for full unification. As reflected in Table 1,
not quite 39 percent describe themselves as being either “very eager”
or “somewhat eager.” In contrast, over 59 percent describe themselves as either “somewhat cautious” or “very cautious.”
10
The Shape of Korea’s Future
Table 1
Enthusiasm for Unification
When it comes to Korean unification, would you say you are
eager or cautious about full unification?
Very eager
Somewhat eager
Somewhat cautious
Very cautious
Don’t know
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
25.3
17.0
29.1
21.7
30.3
38.9
13.3
20.4
1.9
1.9
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
This finding suggests that, whatever their emotional commitment,
South Koreans are decidedly hesitant about unification in the 1999
poll. The finding is even more striking, however, when compared
with the answers given to the same question in September 1996. As
also reflected in Table 1, there has been a reversal in the majority and
minority positions. The 54 percent majority who were either “very
eager” or “somewhat eager” for full unification in 1996 have fallen to
39 percent in the 1999 poll, while the 44 percent minority who were
either “somewhat cautious” or “very cautious” have risen to just
under 60 percent. Particularly noteworthy is the decline in those
who are “very” eager for unification, which at 17 percent (vs. 25 percent in 1996) are now outnumbered by the 20 percent (vs. 13 percent
in 1996) who are “very” cautious. Presumably, this change reflects
awareness of the current economic and social realities in both South
and North Korea.
If South Koreans are not particularly eager for unification, they also
have little expectation that it will happen anytime soon. As reflected
in Table 2, less than 15 percent believe unification will happen in less
than five years. Also, more than three times as many Koreans believe
unification will “never” happen (7 percent) as believe it will occur in
one to three years (2 percent). The expected time frames have
moved up somewhat in the last few years, with a larger number (47
percent) now saying they expect unification to happen sometime
within the next ten years than was true in 1996 (when 41 percent of
the respondents held this view). Still, an overwhelming 72 percent of
the respondents continue to believe that it will be five or more years
Survey Findings
11
Table 2
Expectations Regarding Timing of Unification
How long do you think it will be before all Korea is united under
one government?
One to three years
Three to five years
Five to ten years
More than ten years
Never
Don’t know
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
2.5
2.2
8.5
12.3
30.3
32.4
46.5
39.5
8.7
7.4
3.5
6.2
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
before unification occurs, with almost 40 percent believing that
“more than ten years” will be required for unification to happen.
This hardly suggests a sense of imminence.
Bolstering such expectations is North Korea’s unremitting hostility to
South Korea, as well as its resistance to broader political or systemic
change. Given this rigidity and the nature of the North Korean system itself, respondents have minimal confidence that the South Korean government’s new “sunshine” diplomacy will be very effective
in influencing North Korean unification policies. As shown in Figure
4, the majority of respondents (53 percent) believe ROK policies will
either be “not very effective” (47 percent) or “not effective at all” (6
percent); only 6 percent believe they will be “very effective.”
Whatever their expectations, South Koreans overwhelmingly want to
maintain control over the unification process. By a nearly three-toone ratio, as indicated in Figure 5, they prefer negotiating unification
matters directly with North Koreans themselves rather than allowing
other countries to participate.
Among those who see the involvement of other countries as desirable, as reflected in Table 3, nearly all want to include the United
States. The most interesting new finding here is significantly increased support (from 32 percent in 1996 to 45 percent in 1999) for
the involvement of Japan. Indeed, Japan is the only country whose
involvement elicited increased South Korean support. As described
below, this is consistent with other survey findings concerning Japan.
12
,
,
,
The Shape of Korea’s Future
3%
6%
6%
38%
Very
Somewhat
Not very
Not effective
Don't know
47%
NOTE: Percentages are
rounded.
Figure 4—Effectiveness of ROK Government Policies
2%
25%
Only North and
South Korea
Other countries
also
Don't know
73%
NOTE: Percentages are
rounded.
Figure 5—Preferred Negotiating Partners
Table 3
Desired Participants If Others Are Involved
Which of the following countries should be involved in
unification negotiations?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
United States
Japan
China
Russia
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
94.3
32.0
53.2
39.2
93.1
45.2
50.0
27.4
Survey Findings
13
If and when unification occurs, South Koreans anticipate a range of
problems. Figure 6 shows that nearly half expect the biggest problem
to be economic, although many anticipate significant political and
social problems as well. These percentages show little change over
the last few years.
Not surprisingly, Koreans prefer that the costs for dealing with these
problems and rebuilding the North after unification not come out of
their pockets. As reflected in Table 4, a large majority of South Koreans (72 percent) want the government to pay for unification either
through cuts in military spending (44 percent) or by issuing longterm bonds (28 percent). There is very little support (0.8 percent) for
taxing even the wealthy. In general there was not much change on
this question since 1996.
As Table 5 suggests, however, an almost equally large majority (69
percent) are willing to pay higher taxes “if the burden is manageable,” while an additional 6 percent are willing to pay higher taxes
“even if it involves a high burden.” The number of respondents unwilling to pay increased taxes to finance unification “even if the burden is manageable,” moreover, declined from 20 percent in 1996 to
less than 16 percent in the 1999 poll.
60
Sept. 1996
50
Feb. 1999
Percent
40
30
20
10
0
Economic
Military
Political
Social
Figure 6—Unification’s Biggest Problems
No response
14
The Shape of Korea’s Future
Table 4
Preferred Ways to Finance Reconstruction
Rebuilding the North after unification is likely to be expensive.
In your opinion, what is the best way for the government
to pay for rebuilding the North?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Increase taxes
Cut military spending
Borrow from foreign sources
Issue long-term unification bonds
Tax the wealthy
No need to rebuild
Don’t know
12.8
48.4
6.2
25.8
1.2
3.7
1.5
10.4
43.9
5.1
27.7
0.8
4.1
8.0
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
Table 5
Willingness to Pay for Unification
If the government considers the option of raising taxes, to what extent are you
willing to pay taxes for unification?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Willing to pay taxes even if it involves a high burden
Willing to pay taxes if the burden is manageable
Unwilling to pay taxes even if the burden is manageable
Unwilling to pay taxes at all
Don’t know
7.1
65.5
20.4
6.2
0.9
6.1
68.9
15.9
7.7
1.4
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
Once unification happens, South Koreans favor rather lenient—even
generous—policies toward their northern brethren. As reflected in
Table 6, large majorities support giving North Koreans full political
rights (83 percent), equivalent jobs and salaries (75 percent), and the
same pensions as South Koreans enjoy (67 percent in the case of retired soldiers and 64 percent for retired workers). Support for such
measures is generally up since 1996, moreover, while the number of
Koreans who “strongly disagree” with such policies is both low (2
percent to 10 percent) and generally declining.
Survey Findings
15
Table 6
Desired Policies After Unification
Now I’m going to read you some statements about government policies after
unification. For each statement I read, please tell me whether you strongly agree,
somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each statement:
6-1: After unification, North Koreans should have full political rights to vote for the
national government.
Unit: %
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don’t
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
2/99
34.0
48.8
9.5
2.3
5.4
9/96
30.0
53.8
12.1
1.6
2.5
6-2: After unification, teachers and government workers from North Korea should be
given equivalent jobs and salaries in the unified government.
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don’t
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
2/99
21.6
53.7
17.2
2.7
4.8
9/96
18.2
25.6
21.7
3.3
4.3
6-3: After unification, retired soldiers from the North Korean Army (KPA) should
receive the same pensions as soldiers from the ROK armed forces.
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don’t
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
2/99
19.3
47.4
20.8
4.7
7.8
9/96
15.9
42.0
29.7
5.2
7.1
6-4: After unification, there should be war crimes trials for North Korean officials
involved in terrorism and assassination attempts.
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don’t
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
2/99
22.3
34.3
23.9
6.5
13.1
9/96
24.7
37.0
23.3
6.3
8.6
6-5: After unification, retired workers in the North should get the same pensions from
the government as retired workers in the South get.
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don’t
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
2/99
18.5
45.2
21.6
9.5
5.1
9/96
15.1
39.9
32.7
5.3
7.0
6-6: After unification, former Communists should have full rights to work as
government officials.
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
Don’t
agree
agree
disagree
disagree
know
2/99
9.0
30.9
31.8
16.8
11.5
9/96
8.8
32.1
35.6
15.7
7.8
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
16
The Shape of Korea’s Future
There are only two exceptions to this preferred leniency. One concerns allowing “former Communists” to be appointed as government
officials, which a plurality (49 percent) oppose. The other concerns
possible war crimes trials for North Korean officials involved in terrorism and assassinations, which a majority (57 percent) support.
Even here though, there is surprising support for leniency. Nearly 40
percent of the respondents either “strongly” or “somewhat” agree
that even former Communists should have full rights to work as government officials; and 30 percent disagree that war crimes trials
should be held for officials who had been involved in terrorist activities.
Given the continuing belligerence of North Korean rhetoric directed
against South Korea—not to mention Pyongyang’s history of terrorist
activities and refusal to allow even small humanitarian gestures between families separated by the Korean War—such leniency and
even generosity are noteworthy. In the context of South Korea’s
strained economic conditions as a result of the financial crisis, this
leniency and generosity suggest a striking degree of maturity and
self-assurance.
SECURITY
Moving away from unification, we asked a range of questions designed to elicit South Korean views on broader security issues. These
focused on perceived long-term threats to Korea and anticipated
defense requirements after unification.
As they look into the future, South Koreans see China and Japan as
their main long-term rivals. For example, over 74 percent see one or
the other as Korea’s main economic competitor over the next ten
years, as indicated in Table 7; as illustrated in Table 8, nearly 72 percent cite one or the other as their chief military rival. Between the
two, more Koreans worry about China as an economic competitor
than about Japan, but more see Japan, not China, as a military rival.
Interestingly, though, the percentage of Koreans who see China as
Korea’s long-term military rival (30 percent) is substantially larger
than the percentage of Koreans (20 percent) who consider Japan to
be Korea’s biggest long-term economic competitor. Even more
striking is the movement between 1996 and 1999. Whereas the per-
Survey Findings
17
Table 7
Biggest Future Economic Competitor
In your opinion, which country will be Korea’s major economic
competitor in the next ten years?
China
Taiwan
United States
Japan
Germany
Russia
Thailand (or other Southeast Asian
nation)
Other
Don’t know
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
46.1
53.9
7.8
5.5
6.5
9.2
29.1
20.3
1.5
1.2
0.9
1.1
5.4
2.8
2.4
0.2
0.6
5.5
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
Table 8
Chief Military Rival After Unification
In your opinion, which country will be Korea’s chief military
rival after unification?
China
United States
Japan
Russia
Southeast Asian country
None
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
31.5
29.6
13.8
12.2
47.6
41.9
5.3
6.9
0.1
0.8
1.5
8.6
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
centage of those identifying China as Korea’s main economic competitor went up (from 46 percent to 54 percent), and the number who
see China as Korea’s chief military rival remained relatively stable,
the percentage of those identifying Japan as Korea’s biggest economic competitor and military rival both fell significantly (from 29
percent to 20 percent and 48 percent to 42 percent, respectively).
This movement suggests that Koreans are at least somewhat more relaxed about Japan. In the process, they are becoming somewhat less
certain about Korea’s primary long-term security challenge.
18
The Shape of Korea’s Future
This finding is generally supported by South Korean responses to an
attempt we made to rephrase the threat perception question. When
we asked which country represents “the greater future danger to
South Korea’s military security,” 69 percent identified either China or
Japan. As indicated in Table 9, the responses were closely divided:
37.4 percent said Japan and 31.5 percent said China. There was also
similar movement: Whereas the percentage of Koreans who identified China as “the greatest future danger” in 1996 was more or less
the same as in 1999 (33 percent vs. 32 percent), those identifying
Japan fell sharply (from 54 percent to 37 percent). Presumably, this
more relaxed attitude toward Japan is at least partly a result of the
Kim-Obuchi summit in October 1998. Other factors have probably
also contributed, including generational change in South Korea, the
positive role Japan has been playing in maintaining stability on the
peninsula, and increased cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the
United States on the North Korean nuclear, missile, and other security issues.
The dramatic jump in the number of respondents identifying the
United States as the “greater future danger to South Korea’s military
security” (from 6 percent in 1996 to nearly 19 percent in 1999) is
more difficult to explain. It could reflect a range of things: incipient
concerns about the U.S. “dragging” Korea into a war with North Korea over proliferation or other issues; worries about growing tensions
in U.S.-China relations; or the influence of Chinese views about the
Table 9
Greater Future Danger to Korea’s Military Security
Which of these countries represents the greater future danger
to South Korea’s military security?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
China
Japan
Russia
United States
North Korea
None
No response
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
32.9
54.0
5.0
5.9
1.4
0.9
NA
31.5
37.4
5.4
18.8
1.1
0.4
5.4
Survey Findings
19
alleged dangers of a world dominated by a single power. Alternatively, it could simply be an aberration. While this response is hard
to reconcile with the responses indicated in Tables 7 and 8, other
Korean responses on questions concerning the United States described below make this a view worth monitoring.
Whatever the future threats, South Koreans do not believe they can
focus their attention on only one region. This is reflected in Table 10.
While a plurality (41.5 percent) believe that Korea’s future depends
more on strengthening ties with Asia than with other regions, a
slightly smaller percentage (36.2 percent) believe it is more important to strengthen ties with the United States. A considerably smaller
but still significant percentage (16 percent) even identify Europe as
the most important region. The message: There is no “Asia option”—or any other single region option—for Korean foreign policy.
Unlike many Japanese who have often seen Asia as Japan’s principal
area of interest, South Koreans see a need to maintain close ties with
all major regions.
This message is bolstered by the rise in those identifying ties with the
United States as being the most important to Korea’s future (from 27
percent in 1996 to 36 percent in 1999) and concomitant, if smaller,
decline (from 47 percent to 42 percent) in those emphasizing ties
with Asia. Both suggest an increasingly global outlook or, worded
differently, a perceived inability to put all of Korea’s eggs in one
basket. Both also presumably reflect awareness of the objective
importance of the United States as the world’s only true superpower.
Table 10
Importance of Different Regions
Does Korea’s future depend more on strengthening ties with the
United States, strengthening ties with Europe, or strengthening
ties with Asia?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Strengthening ties with the United States
Strengthening ties with Europe
Strengthening ties with Asia
Don’t know
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
27.3
19.2
47.1
6.4
36.2
16.2
41.5
6.1
20
The Shape of Korea’s Future
If Koreans need to cast their diplomatic net widely, they should also
rely more heavily on themselves to protect their increasingly global
interests. This is the message gleaned from responses to questions
we posed concerning Korea’s future defense requirements. To be
sure, as reflected in Table 11, Koreans are divided on whether a
unified Korea will need a defense budget that is larger than, smaller
than, or the same as the one it has now. A substantial majority (62
percent), however, think that Korea will need a defense budget that is
either the same as or larger than the one it has now. Only 30 percent
believe unification will make a smaller defense budget possible—
despite the North Korean threat ending.
Even more striking is the movement over the past few years. As also
reflected in Table 11, those believing that unification will make a
smaller defense budget possible declined from 39 percent in 1996 to
30 percent in 1999, while those seeing a need for defense spending as
large as or larger than that of 1999 rose by a somewhat smaller
margin (from 57 percent to 62 percent). The decrease in the percentage of Koreans who believe defense spending can be smaller than it
is in 1999, moreover, contrasts with the percentage of those who see
a need for a larger defense budget: While this latter figure also decreased, the decline is both slight (30.7 percent to 28.3 percent) and
well within the margin of error.
Strong public support for, and minimal opposition to, the use of Korean troops abroad bolsters the anticipated need for continued high
defense budgets. As Table 12 shows, Koreans endorse—generally by
Table 11
Required Defense Budget After Unification
If Korea is unified, will the country need a defense budget that
is larger than now, smaller than now, or about the same as
now?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Larger than now
Smaller than now
Same as now
Don’t know
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
30.7
38.8
26.5
4.1
28.3
29.9
34.0
7.7
Survey Findings
21
Table 12
Use of Korean Troops Abroad
Korean troops could become involved in international
conflicts. In each of the following circumstances, please
tell me whether you would support or oppose the use of
Korean troops.
12-1: Protection of sea-lanes vital to Korean security.
Support
Oppose
Don’t know
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
88.5
84.7
8.6
9.0
2.8
6.3
12-2: Securing energy interests in the Middle East.
Support
Oppose
Don’t know
9/96
57.4
27.7
14.9
2/99
62.9
20.8
16.3
12-3: UN peacekeeping operations (PKO).
Support
Oppose
Don’t know
9/96
74.3
15.9
9.8
2/99
87.5
8.0
4.5
12-4: Participation in multinational coalitions approved
by the United Nations.
Support
Oppose
Don’t know
9/96
71.3
17.2
11.4
2/99
83.3
10.1
6.6
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
large and growing margins—the use of Korean troops for a wide
range of contingencies. Particularly notable is overwhelming support for UN-based operations, which outranks even protecting vital
sea-lanes and energy interests as desired overseas missions. This
support, and its sharp rise since 1996, suggests that Koreans increasingly see an active international security role as being part of their
security portfolio. It may also suggest that Koreans regard military
expenditures not only in terms of Korea’s territorial defense but also
22
The Shape of Korea’s Future
in terms of global security. Either way, it reinforces the perceived
need for continued high levels of defense spending.
This strong support for continued high levels of defense spending
appears discrepant with the support indicated in Table 4 for cutting
military spending as a means to finance the rebuilding of the North
after unification. Part of this discrepancy may be resolved by the
findings in Table 5 showing broad support for increasing taxes to pay
for unification “if the burden is manageable.” A broader movement
evident in the poll findings toward increased Korean realism and
self-assurance may also explain part of the discrepancy. Koreans
may be saying, in effect, that they would prefer to see the defense
budget cut as a means to finance unification but would be willing to
endure higher taxes—assuming they are fair and equitable—rather
than cut defense spending or harm other important security interests.
Without a survey question directly addressing such choices, it is difficult to definitively resolve the seeming discrepancy. One inference,
however, seems reasonable: Assuming that the strong support for
the military shown in Tables 11 and 12 continues, actual Korean
willingness to cut defense spending in order to pay for unification
will hinge heavily on popular perceptions of the external security
environment at that time.
The sense that South Koreans see a need to rely increasingly on
themselves as they think about their future security is supported by
two additional findings. The first has to do with Korean views about
nuclear weapons. The conclusion here is inescapable: There is no
nuclear allergy in South Korea. While support for Korea having its
own nuclear weapons has generally declined somewhat since 1996,
as Table 13 illustrates, South Koreans overwhelmingly continue to
believe that they should acquire such weapons should there be a
major deterioration in their security environment.
Such deterioration covers a wide range of potential contingencies.
Koreans agree (either “strongly” or “somewhat”) that they should acquire nuclear weapons if: North Korea has them (82 percent), the
U.S.-ROK alliance ends (86 percent), or Japan acquires nuclear
weapons (87 percent). More than three-fourths of the respondents
Survey Findings
23
Table 13
Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
There are many different views about the future role of nuclear weapons in Korea.
I will read you several views. For each view I read, please tell me if you: strongly
agree, somewhat agree, or disagree strongly.
13-1: If North Korea has nuclear weapons, then South Korea should also acquire
nuclear weapons.
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Strongly agree
58.8
51.9
Somewhat agree
32.4
30.4
Somewhat disagree
6.4
12.6
Strongly disagree
1.8
3.3
Don’t know
0.7
1.9
13-2: If the U.S.-ROK alliance is ended, then South Korea should acquire nuclear
weapons.
9/96
2/99
Strongly agree
53.1
46.2
Somewhat agree
34.4
39.3
Somewhat disagree
7.7
8.8
Strongly disagree
2.1
1.7
Don’t know
2.7
4.1
13-3: If Japan acquires nuclear weapons, then South Korea should also acquire
nuclear weapons.
9/96
2/99
Strongly agree
59.1
54.5
Somewhat agree
33.4
32.4
Somewhat disagree
4.6
8.4
Strongly disagree
1.4
2.0
Don’t know
1.5
2.7
13-4: After unification, Korea should acquire nuclear weapons for protection from
larger Asian countries.
9/96
2/99
Strongly agree
47.6
37.0
Somewhat agree
35.0
38.8
Somewhat disagree
12.6
15.1
Strongly disagree
2.5
4.9
Don’t know
2.3
4.3
13-5: Korea should never have nuclear weapons.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don’t know
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
9/96
5.6
12.1
36.0
42.9
3.4
2/99
4.5
10.5
37.6
45.3
2.0
24
The Shape of Korea’s Future
even agree that Korea should acquire nuclear weapons after unification simply “for protection from larger Asian countries.” In contrast,
only 15 percent of South Koreans either “strongly” or “somewhat”
agree that Korea should never have nuclear weapons; 83 percent disagree.
It is also noteworthy that, of all the views expressed in the 1999 poll,
that in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons is by far the most intensely felt. A majority of 52 percent, for example, “strongly” agree
that South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons if North Korea has
them, whereas only 3 percent “strongly” disagree. Another majority
(55 percent) strongly agree that South Korea should develop nuclear
weapons if Japan does, whereas only 2 percent strongly disagree. A
near majority (46 percent) strongly agree that South Korea should
acquire nuclear weapons if the U.S.-ROK alliance is ended, whereas
less than 2 percent strongly disagree. More than one-third of the respondents, a near plurality of 37 percent, even describe themselves
as “strongly” agreeing that South Korea should acquire nuclear
weapons after unification simply for general “protection.” Again in
contrast, a robust 45 percent “strongly” disagree that South Korea
should never have nuclear weapons (whereas less than 5 percent
“strongly” agree with this statement).
Interestingly, more Koreans now see a need for nuclear weapons (in
the sense of either “strongly” or “somewhat” agreeing that they
should be acquired) if the U.S.-ROK alliance is ended than if North
Korea acquires such weapons. We probably should not read too
much into this comparison: A full 82 percent of the public continue
to believe that South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons if North
Korea does. But, as reflected in the large decrease from 91 percent
who held this view in 1996, it may suggest at least some diminution
in South Korean worries about North Korea. It may also say something about the perceived importance of the United States.
The movement concerning Japan appears less significant. Korean
support for acquiring nuclear weapons in 1996 was highest (93 percent) in the case of Japan’s acquisition of such weapons (vs. 91 percent in the case of North Korean acquisition), and it continues to
rank highest (87 percent) in the 1999 poll. While the falloff is consistent with our other findings concerning Japan, as described below,
Survey Findings
25
the continued high ranking reflects the public’s extreme sensitivity to
any Japanese nuclearization.
The second finding supporting the sense that South Koreans are
increasingly looking to themselves as they think about their future
security has to do with Korean views on the U.S. regional military
presence. This finding, shown in Table 14, is less direct than that
concerning the perceived need for nuclear weapons and can easily
be interpreted in more than one way.
The good news, from the United States’ perspective, is that a solid
plurality of South Koreans (45 percent) support maintaining the
current number of U.S. troops in Asia well into the future. Adding
this with the 7 percent who believe the number of American troops
should be increased further, a majority of Koreans (52 percent)
would like to see U.S. military forces either increased or kept at the
same level.
The bad news is twofold. First, a relatively large minority of South
Koreans (36 percent) believe that U.S. military forces in the region
should be decreased in the future. With another 6 percent favoring
their elimination entirely, the proportion of Koreans who would like
to see U.S. troops in Asia either decreased or eliminated entirely total
over 41 percent. Second, as reflected in a comparison of this 41 percent figure with the 32 percent of Koreans who held the same views
in 1996, the movement has been toward decreased support for the
U.S. regional military presence. Indeed, the 36 percent of responTable 14
U.S. Regional Troop Presence
Should the number of U.S. troops in Asia be increased, kept at
the same level, decreased, or eliminated entirely?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Increased
Kept the same
Decreased
Eliminated entirely
Don’t know
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
10.0
48.9
28.4
3.8
8.9
6.6
45.0
35.6
5.6
7.2
26
The Shape of Korea’s Future
dents in the 1999 poll who believe U.S. troops in Asia should be reduced represent an increase from only 28 percent in 1996. A comparable reduction may be seen in those favoring the same or increased
U.S. force deployments (from 59 percent in 1996 to less than 52 percent in 1999).
The reason for such movement is uncertain. Perhaps South Koreans
are becoming less convinced of the U.S. rationale for a large regional
troop presence, given a general desire to avoid antagonizing China.
Perhaps they anticipate a reduced need for U.S. military forces in the
context of improved Korean relations with Japan and general regional stability. Or perhaps the apparent erosion of support for U.S.
troops in Asia reflects a greater focus on Korea’s own roles and capabilities as South Koreans think about the long-term security of the
region. Future studies will need to address this issue. At present, the
most that can be said is that there appears to be some erosion in
support for the U.S. military presence in Asia and that the future direction will need to be monitored.
THE MAJOR POWERS
Similar and potentially even more noteworthy signs of change are
evident in South Korean attitudes toward the major powers. We focused our questions on Korean views concerning three main topics:
the United States and U.S.-ROK alliance; Japan and its larger regional
role; and China and its role on the Korean Peninsula.
We began by asking whether Koreans feel that most Americans, and
separately most Japanese and Chinese, “respect” or “look down” on
them. The results, shown in Table 15, suggest a sharp difference in
the way Koreans believe the major countries regard them. In the
case of Americans and Japanese, the view is profoundly negative.
More than two-thirds of the respondents, for example, believe that
Americans “look down” on Koreans. The impression is even worse
concerning Japan: Over 77 percent of the respondents feel the
Japanese look down on them. In the case of China the figures are
almost exactly the reverse: More than two-thirds believe the Chinese
“respect” them, with only 23 percent putting the Chinese in the “look
down” category. Such attitudes undoubtedly derive from a mixture
of historical and contemporary experiences.
Survey Findings
27
Table 15
Impressions of Foreign Views of South Koreans
Do you think most Americans/Japanese/Chinese respect Koreans or do
they look down on Koreans?
Americans
2/99
27.4
67.4
5.2
Respect
Look down
Don’t know
Unit: %
Japanese
2/99
16.0
77.4
6.5
Chinese
2/99
67.4
22.8
9.8
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
That is the bad news. The good news, reflected in Table 16, is that
the situation is improving: South Koreans see at least some positive
change in both American and Japanese views of them. The proportion of Koreans who believe that Americans look down on them, for
example, fell from 73 percent in 1996 to 67 percent in 1999, while the
20.5 percent who felt Americans respect them in 1996 rose to over
27.4 percent in 1999. The changes are even more pronounced in the
case of Japan. The percentage of Koreans who believe the Japanese
respect them more than quadrupled between 1996 and 1999 (from
3.6 percent to 16 percent), while the number of those seeing disrespect fell from nearly 90 percent to 77 percent in the same period.
The fact that South Korean perceptions of the Chinese held more or
less constant over these two and a half years suggests that Koreans
do not perceive national attitudes as a zero-sum proposition, that is,
one where a “gain” for one necessarily results in a “loss” for another.
Table 16
Comparison of Impressions of Foreign Views of South Koreans
Do you think most Americans [substitute Japanese/Chinese] respect Koreans or do
they look down on Koreans?
Respect
Look down
Don’t know
Americans
9/96
2/99
20.5
27.4
73.3
67.4
6.3
5.2
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
Unit: %
Japanese
9/96
2/99
3.6
16.0
89.7
77.4
6.7
6.5
Chinese
9/96
2/99
63.5
67.4
21.9
22.8
14.6
9.8
28
The Shape of Korea’s Future
Following this general question applicable to all three countries, we
asked more specific questions about Korean views concerning each
country. The results are described by country below.
The United States
Building on the relatively condescending attitude that South Koreans
believe most Americans have toward them, we asked first how Koreans perceive the present relationship between Korea and the United
States. Specifically, we asked, “Do you think that the United States
plays the dominant role, or is this relationship one of equal partners?” As shown in Figure 7, responses were virtually the same in
both the 1999 and 1996 polls: 86 percent believe the United States
plays the dominant role and only 12 percent see the relationship as
being one of equals. Thus, it seems fair to say that South Koreans
neither feel well respected by Americans nor see themselves as full
partners.
Despite these feelings, South Koreans are overwhelmingly confident
of U.S. assistance in the event Korea were attacked. As noted in Figure 2 above, nearly 90 percent believe that the United States would
help defend Korea in the event of attack, with only 7 percent disagreeing.
Koreans also agree overwhelmingly on the importance of the U.S.ROK alliance. As indicated in Table 17, very large majorities believe
90
80
Sept. 1996
70
Feb. 1999
Percent
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Dominant role
Equal partners
Don't know
Figure 7—Present Relationship Between the United States and Korea
Survey Findings
Table 17
Role of U.S.-ROK Security Alliance
There are a number of different views about the role that the
U.S.-ROK security alliance plays today. Please tell me whether
you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.
The U.S.-ROK alliance . . .
17-1: Provides stability in East Asia.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don’t know
17-2: Contains China.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don’t know
Unit: %
2/99
19.0
50.7
20.7
2.2
7.5
11.9
45.8
24.6
3.2
14.4
17-3: Insures against the revival of a Russian threat.
Strongly agree
10.4
Somewhat agree
41.1
Somewhat disagree
29.1
Strongly disagree
5.0
Don’t know
14.4
17-4: Insures against a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Strongly agree
26.2
Somewhat agree
51.6
Somewhat disagree
13.2
Strongly disagree
4.1
Don’t know
6.8
17-5: Prevents Japan from becoming a major military power.
Strongly agree
16.5
Somewhat agree
45.6
Somewhat disagree
23.9
Strongly disagree
4.1
Don’t know
9.9
17-6: Promotes better relations with the United States.
Strongly agree
19.6
Somewhat agree
55.6
Somewhat disagree
16.8
Strongly disagree
3.1
Don’t know
4.9
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
29
30
The Shape of Korea’s Future
that the alliance plays a variety of critical roles today, ranging from
insuring against a crisis on the Korean Peninsula to providing stability in East Asia more broadly. The alliance is perceived as being particularly important for insuring against a crisis on the Korean Peninsula and for promoting better relations with the United States: More
than three-quarters of the respondents either “strongly” or “somewhat” agree with these statements. Smaller but nonetheless very
substantial majorities also agree on the alliance’s importance in providing stability in East Asia (70 percent), preventing Japan from
becoming a major military power (62 percent), and containing China
(58 percent).
Except for the fact that a relatively consistent minority (roughly 20 to
30 percent) of the Koreans sampled either “somewhat” or “strongly”
disagree that the alliance plays these important roles, there is
probably not too much that is surprising in these results. Such views
underpin the close U.S.-ROK alliance.
The interesting aspect of Korean views relates to two other findings.
One emerges from a comparison of the responses in the February
1999 and September 1996 surveys to the question posed above about
the current role of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Table 18 contrasts these
responses. While there are no significant differences concerning
certain roles (insuring against a crisis on the Korean Peninsula, promoting better relations with the United States, and insuring against a
revived threat from Russia), at least three changes in the last few
years are worth noting:
•
The perceived value of the U.S.-ROK alliance in providing for regional stability has noticeably diminished. The 69.7 percent of
respondents who either “strongly” or “somewhat” agree that the
alliance plays this role in 1999—while still a very high percentage—is down significantly from the 82.1 percent who held this
view in 1996. Concomitantly, those who either “somewhat” or
“strongly” disagree that the alliance plays this role almost doubled, from 12.4 percent to 22.9 percent over the same period.
There was a particularly sharp falloff (8 percent) in those who
“strongly” agree in the 1999 poll that the alliance provides stability in East Asia and sharp rise (nearly 10 percent) in those who
“somewhat” disagree with this statement.
Survey Findings
Table 18
Comparison of Korean Views of Role of U.S.-ROK Security Alliance
There are a number of different views about the role that the U.S.-ROK
security alliance plays today. Please tell me whether you agree or
disagree with each of the following statements. The U.S.-ROK alliance . . .
18-1: Provides stability in East Asia.
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Strongly agree
27.2
19.0
Somewhat agree
54.9
50.7
Somewhat disagree
11.0
20.7
Strongly disagree
1.4
2.2
Don’t know
5.6
7.5
18-2: Contains China.
9/96
11.2
38.5
36.0
6.2
8.1
2/99
11.9
45.8
24.6
3.2
14.4
9/96
14.0
41.8
28.8
5.5
9.8
2/99
10.4
41.1
29.1
5.0
14.4
18-4: Insures against a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
9/96
Strongly agree
25.0
Somewhat agree
49.2
Somewhat disagree
13.6
Strongly disagree
3.3
Don’t know
8.9
2/99
26.2
51.6
13.2
4.1
6.8
18-5: Prevents Japan from becoming a major military power.
9/96
Strongly agree
24.9
Somewhat agree
45.7
Somewhat disagree
18.8
Strongly disagree
4.8
Don’t know
5.8
2/99
16.5
45.6
23.9
4.1
9.9
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don’t know
18-3: Insures against the revival of a Russian threat.
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don’t know
18-6: Promotes better relations with the United States.
9/96
Strongly agree
23.4
Somewhat agree
53.8
Somewhat disagree
15.6
Strongly disagree
2.7
Don’t know
4.5
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
2/99
19.6
55.6
16.8
3.1
4.9
31
32
The Shape of Korea’s Future
•
The perceived importance of the alliance in preventing Japan
from becoming a major military power also has diminished, although to a somewhat smaller extent. Whereas 71 percent of the
respondents saw the alliance playing this role in 1996, the figure
in 1999 is down to 62 percent.
•
There is much greater agreement in 1999 that the alliance plays
the role of containing China. In 1996 Koreans were divided
rather sharply: 49.7 percent agreed with this view and 42.2 percent disagreed. Today, the figures are 57.7 percent and 27.8 percent, respectively.
The nature of the interaction among these perceptions, if any, is uncertain. For example, does the decreased agreement that the alliance
“provides for regional stability” reflect at least in part the increase in
the alliance’s perceived role in containing China—a development
that many Koreans see as neither “stabilizing” nor desirable? Is it
linked to changing attitudes toward Japan and perhaps a decreased
perceived need to rely on the United States to prevent Japan from
becoming a major military power? At this point it is hard to know. At
least two things can be said, however. First, although a very large
majority of Koreans continue to agree that the U.S.-ROK alliance
plays an important role in providing for regional stability, the percentage of those holding this view today is noticeably smaller than it
was in the 1996 poll. And second, the closer one gets to home—
namely, preventing a crisis on the Korean Peninsula and promoting
better South Korean relations with the United States—the greater is
the Korean consensus on the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance.
The other finding that reflects movement in Korean views about the
alliance has to do with its future after unification. Here, there is no
question that Koreans overwhelmingly want to see the alliance continue. Over 89 percent of the respondents, for example, believe the
alliance should be maintained in one form or another even after the
two Koreas are unified. But most Koreans would like to see changes.
As reflected in Table 19, a plurality of 40 percent believe that while
the alliance itself should be maintained, the level of U.S. troops
should be reduced. Another 32 percent agree that the alliance
should be maintained but feel that the U.S. troop presence in Korea
would no longer be necessary. This totals over 71 percent that believe the alliance should be maintained after unification but that the
Survey Findings
33
Table 19
Future of U.S.-ROK Security Alliance After Unification
There are also different views on what should be the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance
after unification. Please tell me which of the following views is closest to your own.
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
1. The alliance should be maintained and the number of U.S.
troops should be kept at their present levels.
2. The alliance should be maintained but the level of U.S.
troops should be reduced.
3. The alliance should be maintained but the U.S. troop
presence in Korea would no longer be necessary.
4. The alliance would no longer be necessary.
5. Don’t know.
27.4
17.7
40.4
39.5
24.8
2.2
5.3
31.9
8.4
2.5
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
U.S. military presence should be either reduced or eliminated altogether. Another way to look at it: Slightly over 40 percent believe
either that a U.S. troop presence (32 percent) or the alliance itself
(8 percent) would not be necessary.
These findings are even more noteworthy when compared with the
results of the 1996 survey. As also shown in Table 19, there has been
a substantial increase—from one-fourth to nearly one-third—in the
percentage of Koreans who believe that the U.S. troop presence
would no longer be necessary after unification. In contrast, the proportion of Koreans who believe the alliance should be maintained
and the number of U.S. troops should be kept at present levels declined by nearly 10 percent (from 27.4 percent to 17.7 percent). Together with the 8 percent—quadruple the 2 percent in 1996—that
now believe the alliance itself would no longer be necessary, this
suggests a strong desire for change after unification.
Japan
As noted above, South Koreans feel even less respect from the
Japanese than they do from the Americans. Also as noted above,
however, the Korean view has notably improved in the past couple of
years. This is true not only on the “respect” and “threat” dimensions
described above, but also on a broader range of issues. As indicated
34
The Shape of Korea’s Future
in Figure 8, for example, although a plurality of South Koreans (46
percent) consider Japanese investment in East Asia as being negative
for Korea, this number is down significantly from the 65 percent of
respondents who held this view in 1996. Conversely, those who
consider such investment as positive for Korea rose from less than 27
percent to just over 41 percent over the same period.
These changes reflect not only a more relaxed attitude toward Japan
but also much broader South Korean acceptance of Japan as a bilateral partner and regional actor. The 1999 poll provides several
striking examples.
We asked, for example, how Koreans believe Japan should respond to
North Korea’s development of long-range missiles, noting the intensified Japanese debate over the adequacy of their defense capabilities
in the wake of North Korea’s surprise ballistic missile launch over
Japan in August 1998. The responses are interesting. As indicated in
Table 20, less than 7 percent of the respondents believe that Japan
should not respond at all, with another 10 percent believing that
Japan should rely on the UN rather than respond itself. In contrast,
over 80 percent feel that Japan should take at least some measures. A
majority of 59 percent want this response to involve expanded cooperation with both the United States and South Korea, while another 5
percent think Japan should expand defense cooperation with the
United States.
70
Sept. 1996
60
Feb. 1999
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
Positive
Negative
Don't know
Figure 8—Japanese Investment in East Asia
Survey Findings
35
Table 20
Preferred Japanese Response to North Korean Missile Development
There is a debate in Japan about the adequacy of Japanese defense capabilities in the
wake of North Korea’s long-range missile/satellite test in August 1998. What best
characterizes your view about how Japan should respond to North Korea’s
development of long-range missiles?
Unit: %
2/99
Japan should take appropriate defense measures.
Japan should significantly increase its defense capabilities.
Japan should rely on the UN rather than respond itself.
Japan should expand defense cooperation with the United States
Japan should expand defense cooperation with both the United States
and South Korea.
Japan should not respond at all.
Don’t know.
10.2
5.9
10.2
5.4
59.0
6.5
2.9
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
This large majority can probably be interpreted as reflecting a desire
for Japan to emphasize defense cooperation rather than its own defense efforts. As such, it undoubtedly reflects the continuing Korean
sensitivity to almost anything that might suggest renewed “militarization” in Japan. Still, the implicit acknowledgment of the legitimacy of increased Japanese defense efforts—and desire for expanded defense cooperation between Japan and the ROK—are worth
noting.
We should also note that another 16 percent of the respondents believe Japan should increase its own indigenous defense capabilities,
either through “appropriate” measures (10 percent) or “significantly”
(6 percent). This 16 percent is more than double the percentage of
Koreans (6.5 percent) who believe that Japan should not respond at
all.
The responses to a question about Japanese assistance in the event
of a North Korean invasion represent another example of the greater
acceptance of Japan as a bilateral partner and regional actor. We focused the question “What support (if any) should Korea accept from
Japan if North Korea invades South Korea?” on the Koreans themselves. The answer, as indicated in Table 21, suggests that a majority
of South Koreans are now prepared to accept an active Japanese con-
36
The Shape of Korea’s Future
Table 21
Preferred Japanese Role in North Korean Invasion
If North Korea invades South Korea, what support (if any) should Korea accept
from Japan?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Should accept financial assistance.
Should accept noncombat support for ROK and U.S. troops.
Should accept Japanese troops.
Should accept all possible assistance including financial,
noncombat, and combat assistance.
Should not accept any assistance at all.
Don’t know.
37.0
39.0
17.4
10.0
21.6
6.9
NA
NA
6.5
36.8
21.4
2.9
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
tribution. Just short of one-third of the respondents want the
Japanese role to be limited to either financial assistance (10 percent)
or noncombat support only (22 percent). But a substantial plurality
of nearly 44 percent believe that Korea should accept either Japanese
troops (7 percent) or “all possible assistance including financial,
noncombat, and combat assistance” (37 percent). Only 21 percent
feel Korea should not accept any assistance at all.
The movement on this question since 1996 is difficult to fully measure because the 1999 poll inserted two response options (“should
accept all possible assistance including financial, noncombat, and
combat assistance” and “should not accept any assistance at all”)
that were not available in the 1996 survey. Nevertheless, two things
seem safe to say based on the available data: Substantially more Koreans are willing to countenance at least some Japanese military involvement than was true in 1996; and many fewer Koreans are inclined to limit any potential Japanese role exclusively to noncombat
assistance.
A final example of the greater acceptance of Japan as a bilateral partner and regional actor is increased Korean support for a permanent
Japanese seat on the UN Security Council. As indicated in Table 22, a
plurality of 46 percent now either “strongly” or “somewhat” support
permanent Japanese membership. This represents a significant rise
from 38 percent in 1996. It also represents a reversal of the situation
Survey Findings
37
Table 22
Permanent Japanese Membership on UN Security Council
Would you support or oppose permanent Japanese
membership on the UN Security Council?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
Don’t know
4.9
33.3
34.1
14.0
13.7
7.8
38.3
27.0
14.8
12.1
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
in 1996 (when 38 percent of the respondents supported Japanese
membership and 48 percent were opposed). As a result, the proportion of Koreans who support a permanent Japanese seat (46 percent)
now outnumber those who do not (42 percent).
China
As noted above, China starts out with a substantial advantage: Unlike the case regarding both the Americans and the Japanese, South
Koreans overwhelmingly see the Chinese as respecting them and
valuing their interactions. They also see China more as an economic
competitor than as a military threat. Less than one-third (as noted
above in Tables 8 and 9) see China as either Korea’s chief military rival after unification or greatest future danger to South Korea’s military security, although the gap with those who identify Japan in either of these terms is narrowing.
Not surprisingly, South Koreans heavily favor active ROK-PRC interactions, as indicated in Figure 9. In thinking about the future, for example, nearly two-thirds of South Koreans see growing economic ties
with China as being positive for Korea, with only 8 percent seeing
such ties as negative. These views, moreover, have remained relatively constant over the past two and a half years.
Also not surprisingly, South Koreans overwhelmingly see China as a
positive force on the Korean Peninsula. Asked to characterize China’s role in maintaining peace, as shown in Table 23, a huge majority
38
The Shape of Korea’s Future
70
Sept. 1996
60
Feb. 1999
Percent
50
40
30
20
10
0
Positive
No difference
with present
Negative
Don't know
Figure 9—Future Economic Ties with China
Table 23
China’s Role on the Korean Peninsula
Overall, how would you characterize China’s role in
maintaining peace on the peninsula?
Unit: %
2/99
Very helpful
Somewhat helpful
Neither helpful nor harmful
Somewhat harmful
Very harmful
23.9
53.2
14.2
6.7
1.9
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
of 77 percent describe China as either “very helpful” (24 percent) or
“somewhat helpful” (53 percent). Less than 9 percent see China as
either “somewhat” or “very” harmful. Since this was the first time we
asked this question, we cannot compare it with previous findings,
but we suspect the response would likely also have been relatively
constant.
This favorable perception undoubtedly results from more than just
cultural affinities and economic complementarities. China has been
extremely skillful in its diplomacy toward the Korean Peninsula over
Survey Findings
39
the past decade, carefully repositioning itself as South Korea’s
“partner” without either appearing heavy-handed or abandoning its
historically close ties with Pyongyang. Beijing has probably also
been helped by repeated statements out of Washington and Seoul
publicly characterizing China’s current role as very helpful. Given
this record, it is also probably not surprising (as noted above in Table
3) that China ranks second behind the United States among the
countries South Koreans believe should be involved in unification
negotiations.
ECONOMICS
On the economic questions we raised, South Koreans show a striking
maturity and self-assurance, particularly given the extreme difficulties of the past year. As reflected in Table 24, for example, a huge
majority of 78 percent believe that Korea should take an active leadership role in the world economy “even if it means some sacrifices
for Korea.” Moreover, those “strongly” agreeing with this view rose
from less than 17 percent in 1996 to 27 percent in 1999, while the
total of 78 percent either strongly or somewhat agreeing represents a
rise from less than 65 percent two and a half years earlier. In contrast, those either “strongly” or “somewhat” disagreeing with this
view fell from 31 percent to 17.5 percent over the same period.
Similarly, as reflected in Table 25, Koreans continue to overwhelmingly support Korean investment overseas despite mounting unemTable 24
Korean Role in World Economy
Do you agree or disagree that Korea should take a more active
leadership role in the world economy, even if it means some
sacrifices for Korea?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Strongly agree
Somewhat agree
Somewhat disagree
Strongly disagree
Don’t know
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
16.7
47.9
26.8
4.2
4.4
27.0
51.2
15.6
1.9
4.3
40
The Shape of Korea’s Future
Table 25
Korean Investment Overseas
Thinking about the future, is Korean investment overseas
good or bad for the country?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Very good
Somewhat good
Somewhat bad
Very bad
Don’t know
32.7
55.3
5.5
0.6
5.9
27.0
54.3
11.8
2.3
4.7
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
ployment at home as a result of the financial crisis. While support is
down somewhat and opposition considerably up since 1996, as
might be expected, the ratio of those who see such investment as either “very good” or “somewhat good” for the country is still above 81
percent. Less surprising, perhaps, as shown in Table 26, 85 percent
of the respondents see foreign investment in Korea as being good for
the country, a question we asked for the first time.
On questions of access to Korean markets, as shown in Table 27, one
thing has not changed: South Koreans remain opposed to opening
Korea’s agricultural sector. The responses to a broader question
about Korean restrictions on the sale of foreign goods in Korea,
reflected in Table 28, are more interesting. For the first time, more
Table 26
Foreign Investment in Korea
Thinking about the future, is foreign investment in Korea
good or bad for the country?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Very good
Somewhat good
Somewhat bad
Very bad
Don’t know
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
27.2
57.6
10.7
1.7
2.8
Survey Findings
41
Table 27
Access to Korean Farm Markets
Do you support or oppose letting the United States and
Europe have more access to Korean markets for their farm
products?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
Don’t know
5.8
20.7
44.5
25.7
3.3
3.6
26.0
41.1
26.9
2.5
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
Table 28
ROK Restrictions on Sale of Foreign Goods
How much do you think Korea’s government now restricts
the sale of foreign goods in Korea: a great deal, some, not
much, or not at all?
Unit: %
9/96
2/99
A great deal
Somewhat
Not much
Not at all
Don’t know
7.6
39.5
40.8
8.4
3.8
9.1
40.1
40.0
7.4
3.4
NOTE: Percentages are rounded.
Koreans indicate that they believe their government restricts such
sales either “somewhat” or “a great deal” (49 percent) than believe
the government does so either “not much” or “not at all” (47 percent). This represents a reversal of the 1996 situation.