Department of Security and Crime science UCL SECReT Industry Engagement Day Scenario • A terrorist group have infiltrated a biochemical laboratory •e.g. universities that have viral testing laboratories • Acquire a lethal virus • Introduce into the mass public • e.g. a large public event (Olympics) Viral & Rickettsial Disease Laboratory, California Department of Security and Crime science Talk Outline ➡Intelligence and risk analysis ➡Access control security systems ➡Computer security systems ➡Radar detection and monitoring Mohamed Gaballa Sami Richardson Matthew Moroz Saumil Desai Rammah Shami ➡Detection Emma Newton ➡Bio-marker detection Department of Security and Crime science Mohamed Gaballa Intelligence And Risk Analysis Analytical Models: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (hypotheses generation and evaluation, diagnostic evidence, sensitive evidence, backward analysis, etc). Failure modes and effects analysis. Forecasting terrorism. • Elements: Terrorist capabilities. Terrorist intentions. Target vulnerability. Outcome: The likelihood of several scenarios. The expected consequences of each scenario. The suggested strategy to reduce the risk. Department of Security and Crime science Sami Richardson Access Control Security System In our scenario the Laboratory is protected by electronic access control system • RFID contactless smartcard required for access • Very common method of securing building access and ticketing on public transport e.g. UCL, Oyster. Terrorists gain unauthorised access to lab • By Cloning a contactless smartcard Department of Security and Crime science Sami Richardson Access Control Security System • MRes project – security of smartcard systems – I plan to use Proxmark3 to • Monitor wireless communications between smartcard and reader • Evaluate security of system • Reproduce known attacks e.g. how easy is it to clone a card? – Will analyse various “Mifare” smartcard systems, including: • “Mifare Classic”. Very insecure. Used by older Oyster cards. • “Mifare Desfire”. Better cryptography. More secure. Now being used for new Oyster cards. • Security of smartcards is a possible area for PhD research next year. • A range of possible PhD areas include: – Computer security, networking, cryptography and telecommunications (before UCL I was a Principal Software Engineer at Alcatel-Lucent). Department of Security and Crime science Matthew Moroz Cyber Breach/Malware Detection Possible Stuxnet Virus used to breach computer security • Malware injected in the months preceding the physical attack • Where do our computer vulnerabilities lie, how did this intrusion avoid detection? Computer Security Usability • Employees rejection of computer security/warnings • Employee education and awareness of types of attack Department of Security and Crime science Saumil Desai Radar System Overview • Detecting and Monitoring Target • Using two potential solutions • Active System • Passive System • Used extensively for Land, Air and Maritime Surveillance • Ideal for security and defence applications 7 Department of Security and Crime science Saumil Desai Challenges And Advantages • Challenges • Detecting small targets • Detection problems in targets at short range • Calculating measurement parameters (Range Resolution) • MRes Project – feasibility study using novel radar techniques to • to detect small target • Advantages • Low CAPEX and OPEX cost • Robustness to stealth targets • Physically small and can be deployed easily 8 Department of Security and Crime science Rammah Shami Crossing Borders A step ahead • After modeling several events biolaboratory has recognized need for assessment • Different methods of detection using new imaging techniques Port Security (Airport) • Existing security ➥ Capability of Body scanners • Ability to integrate ➥ Optimizing (Short term) • New solutions (Long term) Controversial body scanner ➠ Purpose of my research Metal detectors (not suitable) Image courtesy of BAA and google Department of Security and Crime science Rammah Shami New Solutions Today’s research, tomorrow’s solutions • Range of unutilized energies ➥ THz scanning • Depth perception (sonar) ➥ Harmless radiation (emitted by the sun) Compromise (mass panic) Chemical Biological Image courtesy of ANU news (USA) L. A. Vanderberg. Detection of biological agents : Looking for bugs in all the wrong places. Applied Spectroscopy, 54:376A, 2000. Image courtesy of TeraView Ltd. Department of Security and Crime science Emma Newton Gas Sensors • Detection tool • Mass screening of patients – Biomarkers – i.e. Gas in lungs due to infection of virus • Breathalyser Device • Gas makes contact with metal oxide • Change in electrical conductivity signals presence of particular gas Department of Security and Crime science Emma Newton Gas Sensors Benefits: •Small & lightweight •Robust •Inexpensive to produce Challenges: 1. Mobilisation 2. Understand chemical interactions 3. Signal Processing (identification) 3 2.8 WO3 WO3+LTA WO3+ZSM-5 2.6 •Quick assessment of patients •Faster treatment time Response, G 2.4 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1 2000 3800 5600 7400 Time (s) 9200 11000 12800 14600 Department of Security and Crime science Conclusion • Range of different approaches & skills • Never one technology – holistic approach • Any questions please ask • Thank you for your attention Department of Security and Crime science Additional Slides