Katarzyna Krol
John Atkinson
Iacovos Kirlappos
Nuno Martins
Nadia Abdul-Karim
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MA in Linguistics
(Jagiellonian University Krakow)
BA in Social and Political Sciences
(University of Cambridge)
Research interests:
Human-Computer Interaction
Human factors in cyber-security
Compliance with security procedures
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Securing an election
Threat of physical violence
Well-informed choices
Transparency of voting method
Allow the voice of the public to be heard democratically
Design based on local knowledge
Experience
Culture
Katarzyna Krol
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Spread of information
Election over several days
Citizens ‘personally’ invited to cast their vote
Trust in voting (esp. e-voting)
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Learning from experience with bad design
The infamous butterfly ballot
Katarzyna Krol
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MEng Computer Systems & Software
Engineering with a year in industry at
Sophos Plc.
(The University of York)
Research Interests:
Computer & Information Security
Nonstandard Computation & Bio-inspired
Systems
People & Systems
John Atkinson
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Burma elections early last month
Similar: Estonia 2007
Foreign oversight difficult
No access to:
Government services
News outlets
Other vital services
(e.g. banking, email)
John Atkinson
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System devices making automated but intelligent judgements about threats.
Locating, monitoring and interception of hostile activity.
Not just the obvious kind of network with
PCs attached to it.
John Atkinson
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BA Computer Science
(University of Cambridge)
MSc Human-Computer Interaction with
Ergonomics (UCL)
Research Interests:
Information Security
Usability
Human Behaviour
Iacovos Kirlappos
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Iacovos Kirlappos
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Iacovos Kirlappos
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E-Voting becomes increasingly popular
Things often go wrong
Need to create an interface that eliminates the possibility of error
Voters intentions are accurately communicated
Increases the level of trust on the outcome
Should not be too complex
Time consuming
Unusable
Iacovos Kirlappos
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Principles from Human-Computer Interaction allow accommodating human capabilities
Interaction easier and frustration-free
Minimises potential errors
How to achieve this
Create the system early
User testing is essential
Design – Evaluate – Iterate
Iacovos Kirlappos
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BSc in Forensic Science with a Year in
Industry at Pfizer (University of Kent)
Research Interests:
Use/Development of Mathematical Models with
Applications to Risk Assessment and Management of
Critical Infrastructures
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Scene/Function
Preparation
Entry
Pre-Condition
Intrumental Pre-Condition
Script Action
Select Target
Build IED
Arrange Vehicle
Drive to target location
Parking Space Available
Select Parking Place
Situation Control
• Classify Security Measures in
Place
• Intelligence
• If stolen Vehicle – coordination with relevant authorities
• Divert Traffic from Infrastructure
• Implement ‘No Parking’ Policy near the Infrastructure
• Physical Barriers to avoid Parking
• Area Surveillance (e.g.
Police officers/ satellite imaging)
Instrumental Initiation Arming Vehicle
Instrumental Actualisation Abandon Vehicle • Area Surveillance (Suspicious
Behaviour)
Doing
Post-condition
Exit
Set Off IED
Move Away From Scene
Exit from the Scene
Action possible at different levels of the ‘crime commission sequence’
Several opportunities to mitigate – possibly eliminate – the risk
Nuno Vaz Martins
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BSc (Hons) Forensic Science
(Staffordshire University)
Research Interests:
Analysis of Explosive Residues
Use of Analytical Chemistry
Applications to Forensic Science
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Nadia Abdul-Karim
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Collection of samples (Soil, debris, other items found at the scene (e.g. mobile phones) and clothing from victims
Collected from various radii around the crater
Can items of evidential value / high quality samples be obtained at different distances from the explosion. If so should the radius of examination be extended?
Can evidence from the scene, collected from a further distance, be used to link a potential suspect to the crime?
Nadia Abdul-Karim
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It takes more than one discipline to secure an event as complex as an election.
Various expertise are needed to ensure safe and secure voting.
Encourage public participation
Countering cyber attacks
Voters understanding the system
Risk analysis of a terrorist attack
Investigation after an attack
Thank You for Listening
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