Katarzyna Krol John Atkinson Iacovos Kirlappos Nuno Martins

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 Katarzyna Krol

 John Atkinson

 Iacovos Kirlappos

 Nuno Martins

 Nadia Abdul-Karim

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Scenario

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Katarzyna Krol

 MA in Linguistics

(Jagiellonian University Krakow)

 BA in Social and Political Sciences

(University of Cambridge)

 Research interests:

 Human-Computer Interaction

 Human factors in cyber-security

 Compliance with security procedures

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A Volatile Election

 Securing an election

Threat of physical violence

Well-informed choices

Transparency of voting method

 Allow the voice of the public to be heard democratically

 Design based on local knowledge

 Experience

 Culture

Katarzyna Krol

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Social engineering to encourage participation

 Spread of information

 Election over several days

 Citizens ‘personally’ invited to cast their vote

 Trust in voting (esp. e-voting)

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 Learning from experience with bad design

 The infamous butterfly ballot

Katarzyna Krol

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John Atkinson

 MEng Computer Systems & Software

Engineering with a year in industry at

Sophos Plc.

(The University of York)

 Research Interests:

 Computer & Information Security

 Nonstandard Computation & Bio-inspired

Systems

 People & Systems

John Atkinson

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Allowing an Informed Decision

Burma elections early last month

Similar: Estonia 2007

Foreign oversight difficult

No access to:

 Government services

News outlets

Other vital services

(e.g. banking, email)

John Atkinson

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Counter- Network Intrusion

 System devices making automated but intelligent judgements about threats.

 Locating, monitoring and interception of hostile activity.

 Not just the obvious kind of network with

PCs attached to it.

John Atkinson

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Iacovos Kirlappos

 BA Computer Science

(University of Cambridge)

 MSc Human-Computer Interaction with

Ergonomics (UCL)

Research Interests:

 Information Security

Usability

Human Behaviour

Iacovos Kirlappos

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Iacovos Kirlappos

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Iacovos Kirlappos

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Usable Security

 E-Voting becomes increasingly popular

 Things often go wrong

Need to create an interface that eliminates the possibility of error

Voters intentions are accurately communicated

Increases the level of trust on the outcome

 Should not be too complex

Time consuming

Unusable

Iacovos Kirlappos

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Usable Security

 Principles from Human-Computer Interaction allow accommodating human capabilities

 Interaction easier and frustration-free

 Minimises potential errors

 How to achieve this

 Create the system early

 User testing is essential

 Design – Evaluate – Iterate

Iacovos Kirlappos

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Nuno Vaz Martins

 BSc in Forensic Science with a Year in

Industry at Pfizer (University of Kent)

 Research Interests:

 Use/Development of Mathematical Models with

Applications to Risk Assessment and Management of

Critical Infrastructures

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Crime Scripts as a Tool for Risk Mitigation

Scene/Function

Preparation

Entry

Pre-Condition

Intrumental Pre-Condition

Script Action

Select Target

Build IED

Arrange Vehicle

Drive to target location

Parking Space Available

Select Parking Place

Situation Control

• Classify Security Measures in

Place

• Intelligence

• If stolen Vehicle – coordination with relevant authorities

• Divert Traffic from Infrastructure

• Implement ‘No Parking’ Policy near the Infrastructure

• Physical Barriers to avoid Parking

• Area Surveillance (e.g.

Police officers/ satellite imaging)

Instrumental Initiation Arming Vehicle

Instrumental Actualisation Abandon Vehicle • Area Surveillance (Suspicious

Behaviour)

Doing

Post-condition

Exit

Set Off IED

Move Away From Scene

Exit from the Scene

 Action possible at different levels of the ‘crime commission sequence’

 Several opportunities to mitigate – possibly eliminate – the risk

Nuno Vaz Martins

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Nadia Abdul-Karim

 BSc (Hons) Forensic Science

(Staffordshire University)

 Research Interests:

 Analysis of Explosive Residues

 Use of Analytical Chemistry

 Applications to Forensic Science

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Bomb Scene Investigation

8 4

5

1

3

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Nadia Abdul-Karim

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6

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Evidence and Analysis

 Collection of samples (Soil, debris, other items found at the scene (e.g. mobile phones) and clothing from victims

 Collected from various radii around the crater

 Can items of evidential value / high quality samples be obtained at different distances from the explosion. If so should the radius of examination be extended?

 Can evidence from the scene, collected from a further distance, be used to link a potential suspect to the crime?

Nadia Abdul-Karim

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Securing an Election...

It takes more than one discipline to secure an event as complex as an election.

Various expertise are needed to ensure safe and secure voting.

Encourage public participation

Countering cyber attacks

Voters understanding the system

Risk analysis of a terrorist attack

Investigation after an attack

Thank You for Listening

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