Maude Vanhaelen
THE PICO-FICINO CONTROVERSY:
NEW EVIDENCE IN FICINO’S COMMENTARY
ON PLATO’S PARMENIDES *
1. Introduction
Twenty years ago Michael Allen wrote two fundamental articles on Marsilio
Ficino’s Parmenides Commentary.1 In his Ficino’s Theory of the Five Substances
Allen showed that Ficino’s exegesis was heavily indebted to Proclus’ views on
the Parmenides, whether those in the Commentary or in the Platonic Theology.
Ficino knew Proclus’ commentary both in the original Greek and in the medieval Latin translation of William of Moerbeke, the last section of which is not
preserved in the original.2 In addition, autograph marginalia in Riccardianus 70
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual conference of the Renaissance Society of America, San Francisco, March 2006. I wish to thank the organisers Christopher Celenza and Valery Rees. I would also like to thank Prof. Michael Allen for his suggestions and comments. This research was conducted during a post-doctoral Fellowship under
Mr. Nigel Wilson at the University of Oxford funded by the Wiener-Anspach Foundation. I
wish to thank both institutions for their generous support. I am also grateful to Prof. James
Hankins for his support and encouragements.
1
M. J. B. A llen, Ficino’s Theory of the Five Substances and the Neoplatonists’ Parmenides, «Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies», XII, 1982, pp. 19-44 (reprinted in
Plato’s Third Eye. Studies in Marsilio Ficino’s Metaphysics and Its Sources, Aldershot 1995);
Id., The Second Ficino-Pico Controversy, in Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Studi e documenti, a cura di G. C. Gargagnini, 2 vols., Firenze 1986, II, pp. 418-455 (reprinted in Plato’s Third Eye, cit., n. X).
2
Proclus’ commentary is only preserved until the end of the first hypothesis (141e 10142a 8), the final section of which has only come down to us in the Latin translation established by the Dominican William of Moerbeke (c. 1215-c. 1286): see Procli Commentarium
in Parmenidem, pars ultima adhuc inedita, ed. by R. Klibansky and L. Labowski, London 1953
(19732). The full text has since been edited in Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, traduction de G. de Moerbeke, éd. par C. Steel, 2 vols., Louvain-Leiden 1982-85. Ficino used Moerbeke’s translation, at least for the final section, perhaps in Pier Leone da Spoleto’s copy, Vaticanus lat. 11600 (cf. F. Bacchelli, Giovanni Pico e Pier Leone da Spoleto. Tra
filosofia dell’amore e tradizione cabalistica, Firenze 2001, p. 9, n° 29). Ficino almost certainly
used the Greek version of Proclus’ Parmenides Commentary (pace Steel and Segonds). His exemplar, which might have been a copy of Laurentianus Pluteus 85.8 (copied by John Rhosos
in 1489 at the request of Lorenzo de’ Medici) has not been identified. For the Greek text,
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Maude Vanhaelen
indicate that Ficino extensively read and annotated Proclus’ Platonic Theology,
probably as early as 1463.3 As Allen has pointed out, Ficino was familiar enough
with both texts to work back and forth between them. And indeed, as we shall
presently see, the structure of Ficino’s Parmenides commentary follows very closely that of Proclus’ own commentary, but also paraphrases some key chapters of
the Platonic Theology.
In his article The Second Pico-Ficino Controversy, Allen also considered Ficino’s Parmenides in the context of the controversy that took place in the 1490s
between Ficino and his younger colleague Pico della Mirandola on the nature of
the First Principle. This controversy partly arose when Pico wrote a treatise entitled On Being and the One (De Ente et Uno), in which he criticised the Neoplatonic exegesis of Plato’s Parmenides. Given that Ficino’s commentary was closely
following the Neoplatonic tradition, Pico’s treatise was in fact directly attacking
the nature of Ficino’s project of renovatio.
Ficino’s response to Pico’s De Ente et Uno, as formulated in his Parmenides commentary, still awaits detailed analysis.4 In this work Ficino only men-
I use Procli In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria, 3 vols., ed. by C. Steel, Oxford 20072009 (hereafter Proclus, In Parmenidem), and Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides,
translation by G. R. Morrow and J. M. Dillon, Princeton 1987. Secondary literature on the
Neoplatonic interpretation of the Parmenides includes E. R. Dodds, The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One, «Classical Quarterly», XXII, 1928, pp. 129-142; J.
M. Charrue, Plotin, lecteur de Platon, Paris 1978, pp. 43-115; H. D. Saffrey - L. G. Westerink, Introduction to Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, texte établi et traduit par H. D. Saffrey and L. G. Westerink, I, Paris 1968, pp. lxxv-lxxxix; H. D. Saffrey, Recherches sur le
néoplatonisme après Plotin, Paris 1990, and Id., Le néoplatonisme après Plotin, Paris 2000; and
Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, Actes du colloque international en l’honneur de H. D.
Saffrey et L. G. Westerink (Leuven, 13-16 mai 1998), éd. par A.-Ph. Segonds et C. Steel,
Leuven-Paris 2000.
3
H. D. Saffrey, Notes platoniciennes de Marsile Ficin dans un manuscrit de Proclus, cod.
Riccardianus 70, «Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et de Renaissance», XXI, 1959, pp. 161-184;
Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra di manoscritti, stampe e documenti, Catalogo a
cura di S. Gentile, Firenze 1984, pp. 35-37, n° 26, argues that Ficino read and annotated
Ricc. 70 before 1463. Ficino also knew Balbi’s translation (1461-1462), as shown in a letter to
Martin Prenninger in 1489 (Marsilii Ficini florentini … Opera & quæ hactenus extitere &
quæ in lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia … in duos tomos digesta … una cum gnomologia …,
Basileæ, Henricpetri, 1576, en réimpression numérique, suivie et préfacée par S. Toussaint,
Paris 2000, p. 899; hereafter Op.), where Ficino lists the works of Proclus available in Latin:
«Leguntur etiam utcumque traducta Elementa theologiae Proculi atque ipsius Theologia et
liber de providentia simul atque fato». See H. D. Saffrey, Pietro Balbi et la première traduction latine de Proclus, in Miscellanea codicologica F. Masai dicata, éd. par P. Cockshaw et al.,
Gand 1980, pp. 425-437 (reprinted in Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne au Moyen Âge
et à la Renaissance, Paris 1987, pp. 189-201).
4
On Ficino’s exegesis of the Parmenides, see R. K libansky, Plato’s Parmenides in the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, «Medieval and Renaissance Studies», I, 1943, pp. 281-330:
316-325 (reprinted in The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages, London
1981); W. Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen. Studien zum Neuplatonismus und dessen Wirkungsgeschichte, Frankfurt 1985 (Pensare l’Uno, trad. it. di M. L. Gatti, intr. di G. Reale, Milano
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
tions Pico once by name, in a passage that puns on Pico’s surname, Mirandola.
At the end of the 49th Chapter, Ficino wishes that «this wonderful young man
(mirandus ille, i.e. Mirandule) had had the opportunity to consider diligently the
above disagreements and discussions before he had opposed his teacher (i.e. Ficino himself) with so much confidence and publicly held without fear, against
the opinion of all Platonists, that the divine Parmenides is merely a work of logic and that Plato, as well as Aristotle, had identified the One and the Good with
Being».5 This passage has generally been considered as a parenthesis, or a later addition buried in the rest of the commentary.6 A close examination of the
structure of the commentary indicates, however, that this passage in fact constitutes a conclusion to a long and elaborate series of seven «discourses on the superiority of the One over Being», where Ficino effectively refutes Pico’s thesis.
This shows that Ficino structured, at least in some part, his Commentary to respond to Pico’s attacks.
In this paper I will compare the arguments presented in these discourses with
those developed in Pico’s De Ente et Uno. I will demonstrate that Ficino’s discourses constitute a point-by-point rebuttal of Pico’s thesis. Similarly I will argue
that the way in which Ficino works back and forth between Proclus’ Commentary and Platonic Theology is significant in the context of this controversy. As we
shall see, both Pico and Ficino reuse ancient Neoplatonism to defend their own
thesis. Thus Ficino carefully selects from Proclus’ Parmenides Commentary and
Platonic Theology the doctrines, arguments and counter-arguments that enable
1992, part. pp. 192-196 – «L’Uno parmenideo nel Rinascimento»); Id., Plotino e Ficino. L’autorelazione del Pensiero, «Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica», LXXXIV, 1992, pp. 293-324; Id.,
L’interpretazione ficiniana del Parmenide platonico, in Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione, Atti del III colloquio internazionale del centro di ricerca sul Neoplatonismo (Catania,
31 maggio-2 giugno 2001), a cura di M. Barbanti e F. Romano, Catania 2002, pp. 389-410;
S. Toussaint, L’esprit du Quattrocento. Le De Ente et Uno de Pic de la Mirandole, Paris 1995,
pp. 51-75 and 194-212; A. Etienne, Marsile Ficin, lecteur et interprète du Parménide à la Renaissance, in Images de Platon et lecture de ses oeuvres. Les interprétations de Platon à travers
les siècles, éd. par A. Neschke-Hentschke et A. Etienne, Louvain-Paris 1997, pp. 153-185;
A. Malmsheimer, Platons Parmenides und Marsilio Ficinos Parmenides Kommentar. Ein kritischer Vergleich, Amsterdam-Philadelphia 2001; F. Lazzarin, Note sull’interpretazione ficiniana
del Parmenide di Platone, «Accademia», V, 2003, pp. 17-37; Ead., L’Argumentum in Parmenidem di Marsilio Ficino, ivi, VI, 2004, pp. 7-34 (with a critical edition and Italian translation
of Ficino’s argumentum in Parmenidem).
5
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 49 (= Op., p. 1164): «Vtinam mirandus ille iuvenis disputationes discursionesque superiores diligenter consideravisset, antequam tam confidenter tangeret praeceptorem ac tam secure contra Platonicorum omnium sententiam divulgaret et divinum Parmenidem simpliciter esse logicum et Platonem una cum Aristotele ipsum cum ente
unum et bonum adaequavisse!». I use my edition of the text, which is based upon the editio
princeps (Marsilii Ficini Commentaria in Platonem, Florentiae, per Laurentium Francici de
Venetiis, 1496), in the copy preserved in the Bodleian Library of Oxford, Auct. Q 4.27. For
the reader’s convenience, however, I shall refer to the pagination of the 1576 edition.
6
See, for instance, R. Marcel, Marsile Ficin (1433-1499), Paris 1958, p. 533.
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Maude Vanhaelen
him to refute Pico. Similarly, Pico defends his thesis by refuting the theological
interpretation of the Parmenides and the Sophist, two dialogues that constituted
the cornerstone of Neoplatonic metaphysics.7 This is why the Pico-Ficino controversy apparently revives ancient debates, yet is concerned with issues that are
specific to Quattrocento Florence.
2. Pico’s
and
Ficino’s
positions
Ficino’s Parmenides Commentary was published in Florence in 1496.8 Pico’s
De Ente et Uno was already completed and diffused by 1491, although it was
only published in 1496, two years after Pico’s death.9 The issues raised in the De
Ente et Uno were echoing criticisms formulated five years earlier by Pico in another treatise, the Commento sopra una Canzone d’Amore (1486), a commentary
on Girolamo Benivieni’s love poem, where Pico challenged Ficino’s interpretation of Plato’s Symposium. The criticisms contained in the Commento were deliberately suppressed in the printed version by Pico’s contemporaries, and were
rediscovered in modern times in three manuscripts, first by Eugenio Garin, then
by Franco Bacchelli.10 These attacks, as well as the titles of the unrealised works
Pico projected to write before his untimely death, provide substantial evidence
that at the very onset of his career Pico intended to develop an ideological alternative to Ficino’s programme of renovatio.11
7
Pico read Proclus’ Platonic Theology in Bodleianus Laudianus graecus 18 (dated 1358)
as testified by one of the colophons and Pico’s ex libris (cf. Saffrey-Westerink, Introduction,
cit., pp. cxi-cxvi). Pico also read and annotated Ficino’s copy of Proclus’ Commentary on the
First Alcibiades, the manuscript Palatinus gr. 63 (cf. P. Megna, Per Ficino e Proclo, in Laurentia laurus. Per Mario Martelli, a cura di F. Bausi e V. Fera, Messina 2004, pp. 313-362: 325).
8
P. O. Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum, I, Firenze 1937, pp. lxviii, cxvii-cxxiii;
Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra di manoscritti, cit., pp. 155-156, n° 120; P. O. Kristeller, Marsilio Ficino and His Work After Five Hundred Years, Firenze 1987, p. 119.
9
For the text, I use the edition of Toussaint, L’esprit du Quattrocento, cit., pp. 134-189.
10
Garin discovered fragments in Riccardianus 2528 and Estensis V. I. 16 (cf. G. Pico
della M irandola, De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno e scritti vari, a cura di E.
Garin, Firenze 1942, pp. 16-18), while Bacchelli, Giovanni Pico e Pier Leone da Spoleto, cit.,
pp. 103-142, discovered in the 16th century-manuscript C M 328 of the Biblioteca Communale
di Padova twenty new fragments of Pico’s Commento, in which Pico criticises Ficino’s interpretation of Plato’s Symposium. For an analysis of some of these fragments, see also S. Jayne, Pico.
Commentary on a Canzone of Benivieni, New York-Bern-Frankfurt am Main 1984, pp. 21-43.
Both Ficino and Pico draw on Plotinus’ two treatises on Beauty, Enneads, III, 5 (18) and V, 8
(13), as exemplified by Pico’s annotations to Ficino’s translation of both treatises preserved in
Conv. Soppr. E, 1, 2, 562, dated 1486 (cf. S. Gentile, Pico e Ficino, in Pico, Poliziano e l’Umanesimo di fine Quattrocento [Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, 4 novembre - 31 dicembre 1994],
a cura di P. Viti, Firenze 1994, pp. 127-47: 131-133, n° 44; pp. 137-141, n° 48-49).
11
See G. Pico della Mirandola, Commento, précédé de Les Formes de l’Invisible, éd.
par S. Toussaint, Lausanne 1989, pp. 54-55. Toussaint argues that the projected Poetic The-
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
In his Commento Pico directly challenges Ficino’s Neoplatonic reading of
Plato, and tries to establish a distinction between Plato’s definition of love and
that of the Neoplatonists. Pico criticises, for instance, Ficino’s essentially Neoplatonic definition of Beauty as the external manifestation of God’s instrinsic Goodness.12 Pico adopts a similar stance in the De Ente et Uno: he distinguishes between Plato’s Parmenides and its theological interpretation by the Neoplatonists.
According to him, the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being results
from the Neoplatonists’ misinterpretation of the Parmenides. In reality, Pico argues, both Plato and Aristotle have called God One and Being.
In their interpretation of Plato’s Symposium and Parmenides, therefore, Ficino and Pico both focus on two specific issues: the names of God and the ways
in which the soul can achieve mystical union with God. In the context of the
exegesis of the Symposium, the question concerns Love and Beauty – whether
human love is the manifestation of the soul’s participation in the cosmic cycle
of Love, as stated by Ficino, or simply the soul’s desire for earthly or heavenly
beauty, as argued by Pico. In the context of the Parmenides and the theory of
Ideas, the debate concerns the relationship between the Ideal models and the
imperfect earthly beings – between the supreme One and the multiplicity of its
creation, between unity, being, and intellect.
But the controversy between the two humanists also concerns the nature of theology: does theology solely consist in the prisca theologia transmitted by the ancient
theologians (from Zoroaster and Hermes to Plato), as defended by Ficino, or does
it also encompass the doctrine of Aristotle and his scholastic interpreters, as argued
by Pico? As such, the Pico-Ficino controversy concerns the comparatio between
Plato and Aristotle, which had already preoccupied the first successors of Plato,13
ology would have been the antithesis of Ficino’s Platonic Theology; the commentaries on the
Symposium (of which the Commento was initially intended to be a prelude) and on St Paul’s
raptus would have been the counterpart to Ficino’s de Amore and De Raptu Pauli.
12
Pico, Commento, II 3, ed. Garin, p. 489: «[…] di che si conclude che il bello dal buono è distinto come una specie dal suo genere e non come cosa estrinseca da una intrinseca,
come dice Marsilio». Cf. Bacchelli, Giovanni Pico, cit., pp. 105 ff.
13
On the Plato-Aristotle comparatio in Antiquity, see P. Hadot, L’harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de Dexippe sur les Catégories, in Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente, Roma 1974, pp. 31-47; A.-J.
Festugière, L’ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux V e/VI e siècles, «Museum Helveticum», XXVI, 1969, pp. 281-296; L. G. Westerink, J. Trouillard et A. Ph. Segongs, Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon, Paris 1990, pp. xliii-lvi; Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. by R. Sorabji, London 1990; I. Hadot, Aristote
dans l’enseignement philosophique néoplatonicien. Les préfaces des commentaires sur les Catégories, «Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie», CXXIV, 1992, pp. 407-425; P. Hadot, La division des parties de la philosophie dans l’Antiquité, «Museum Helveticum», XXXVI, 1979,
pp. 201-223; F. Romano, La défense de Platon contre Aristote par les néoplatoniciens, in Contre Platon, I: Le platonisme dévoilé, éd. par M. Dixsaut, Paris 1993, pp. 175-195; Ph. Hoffmann, L’arrière-plan néoplatonicien de l’École d’Athènes de Raphaël, in Antiquités imaginaires.
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Maude Vanhaelen
as well as the Arabic (Al-Farabi),14 Byzantine (Bessarion and George of Trebizond) and Renaissance thinkers.15 Both Pico and Ficino defend a concord between Plato and Aristotle: instead of opposing the two philosophies, they underline the agreement between the two. They differ, however, on the nature of
the agreement between these two philosophers. Following the Neoplatonic tradition, Ficino considers that Aristotle has only managed to equal the wisdom of
his master Plato up to a certain point, leaving the treatment of divine matters
to Plato. In other words, Aristotle’s thought is only a complement to Platonism;
his wisdom should be subsumed, therefore, under the sacred wisdom of the ancient theologians. In contrast, Pico’s main purpose, as we shall see, is to develop
a new form of concord, where Aristotle is seen as a philosopher per se, and his
philosophy is placed at the same level as that of Plato. As clearly stated at the
beginning of the De Ente et Uno Pico intends to «make a concordant philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle» («concordem utriusque facio philosophiam»).16
In his famous Conclusiones Pico also establishes that «there is no matter natural
or divine in which Aristotle and Plato disagree in thought and in doctrine, even
if they appear to disagree in their words» («Nullum est quaesitum naturale aut
divinum in quo Aristoteles et Plato sensu et re non convenient, quamvis verbis
dissentire videantur»).17
La référence antique dans l’art occidental de la Renaissance à nos jours, Actes de la table ronde
(École Normale Supérieure, 29 avril 1994), éd. par Ph. Hoffmann et P.-L. R inuy, Paris 1996,
pp. 143-158; R. Chiaradonna, Sostanza, movimento, analogia: Plotino critico di Aristotele, Napoli 1992; G. E. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from
Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford 2006.
14
See F. M. Najjar, Al-Farabi’s Harmonization of Plato’s and Aristotle’s Philosophies, «The
Muslim World», XCIV, 2004, pp. 29-44.
15
On the comparatio between Plato and Aristotle in the Renaissance, see Platon et Aristote à la Renaissance, Actes du XVIe colloque international d’Études Humanistes (Tours 1973),
éd. par J.-Cl. Margolin et M. De Gandillac, Paris 1976; J. Monfasani, George of Trebizond.
A Biography and A Study of His Rhetoric and Logic, Leiden 1976, pp. 201-229; J. Hankins,
Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols., Leiden 1990, I, pp. 165-203; N. G. Wilson, From Byzantium to Italy, London 1992; E. Garin, Il ritorno dei filosofi antichi, Napoli 1994, pp. 7995; Toussaint, L’esprit du Quattrocento, cit., pp. 51-75; M. Muccillo, Ficino e Francesco Patrizi da Cherso, in Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Studi e documenti, cit., II, pp. 615-679;
Ead., Platonismo, ermetismo e ‘prisca theologia’. Richerche di storiografia filosofica rinascimentale, Firenze 1996; G. Karamanolis, Pletho and Scholarios on Aristotle, in Byzantine Philosophy and Its Ancient Sources, ed. by K. Ierodiakonou, Oxford 2002, pp. 253-282; J. Monf­ asa­
ni, Marsilio Ficino and the Plato-Aristotle Controversy, in Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His
Philosophy, His Legacy, ed. by M. J. B. A llen and V. Rees, Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002, pp. 179201; Id., Nicolaus Scutellius, O.S.A., as Pseudo-Pletho. The Sixteenth-Century Treatise Pletho in
Aristotelem and the Scribe Michael Martinus Stella, Firenze 2005.
16
Pico, De Ente et uno, Proemium, cit., p. 134.
17
Conclusiones secundum opinionem propriam paradoxae, 1, in G. Pic de la Mirandole, 900 Conclusions philosophiques, cabalistiques et théologiques, éd. et trad. par B. Schefer,
Paris 1999, p. 108.
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
Ficino had also argued several decades earlier that there was an agreement
between Plato and Aristotle. In the early ‘trattatelli Moreniani’, preserved in codex Palagi 199 and dated 1454/1455, Ficino underlines the harmony between
Plato and Aristotle.18 In the De Voluptate, written in 1457, he defends, against the
Aristotelians’ criticisms of Plato, the equivalence between Aristotle’s and Plato’s
doctrines of pleasure.19 Later on, however, after reading the Greek philosophers
in the original, Ficino establishes a distinction between the impious Aristotelians of his time and the pious, i.e. Neoplatonic, interpreters of Aristotle. In this
way, he follows the Neoplatonic tradition, according to which Aristotle is inferior to Plato. Thus, in the famous preface to his 1492 Plotinus commentary, Ficino
condemns Alexandrinists and Averroists alike (i.e. the contemporary theologians
and magistri), whom he holds responsible for transmitting impious and erroneous interpretations of Aristotle. To them he opposes the ‘pious’ interpreters of
Aristotle, such as Theophrastus, Themistius, Porphyry, Simplicius, Avicenna, and
Pletho, of whom Pico, his complatonicus, Ficino adds, is the follower.20 Similarly,
as he states in a letter dated 1488, Ficino had translated Priscianus’ paraphrase
of Theophrastus’ De anima because whilst reading this text he had noticed that
Plato and Aristotle were in agreement concerning the soul; in this enterprise, he
adds, he follows Pico della Mirandola, vir certe mirandus, who has shown that
Plato and Aristotle are in agreement concerning the soul.21
18
Cf. codex Palagi 199 (dated ca. 1455), f. 24, ed. P. O. Kristeller, The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino, in Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Roma 1956, pp. 5596: 78: «Nam intellectus universalitatem facit in rebus, Averrois secundo de anima et Aristoteles secundo de anima, ubi dicit intellectum esse universalium, sensum vero singularium,
quod idem Plato in Phaedro opinatur». See also Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra
di manoscritti, cit., pp. 12-13, n° 11.
19
Cf. De Voluptate, VII (= Op., p. 998): «Quid ergo restat, cur non dicant Platonici Peripateticique unum atque idem de voluptate et dicere pariter et sentire? Quo alio discrepant?».
For the date of the treatise, see Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum, cit., I, p. cxv.
20
Op., p. 1537: «Totus enim ferme terrarum orbis a Peripateticis occupatus in duas
plurimas sectas divisus est, Alexandrinam et Averroicam. Illi quidem intellectum nostrum
esse mortalem existimant; hi vero unicum esse contendunt. Vtrique religionem omnem funditus aeque tollunt, praesertim quia divinam circa homines providentiam negare videntur et
utrobique a suo etiam Aristotele defecisse, cuius mentem hodie pauci, praeter sublimem Picum, complatonicum nostrum, ea pietate qua Theophrastus olim et Themistius, Porphyrius,
Simplicius, Avicenna et nuper Plethon interpretantur».
21
Proemium in Theophrastum de anima, Marsilius Ficinus Philippo Valori (Op., pp. 896897): «Verum non multo post Themistius spem mihi praebuit optimam, affirmans tantos inter se philosophos non sententia quidem dissentire, sed verbis, tandemque de anima Platonis,
Aristotelis [-es Op.], Theophrasti sub diversis verbis esse sententiam. Incidi denique divina
quadam sorte in librum Theophrasti de anima a Prisciano quodam Lydo breviter quidem,
sed tamen diligenter expositum, ea potissimum ratione qua Plutarchus, Iamblicus Platonici
Peripateticique insignes Aristotelicam de anima sententiam explicaverant. Cum igitur in his
legendis Platonicos Peripateticosque esse concordes animadverterem, habui ferme tota quod
mente petebam. […] Neque tamen hac in re duxi in praesentia mihi nimis elaborandum vel
latius evagandum, Ioannes enim noster Mirandulanus, vir certe mirandus, iam hos agit ad
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Maude Vanhaelen
In the Parmenides Commentary, however, Ficino explicitly attacks Pico’s
project of philosophical concord. For, as he states in Chapter 47, the only adequate way to describe the ineffable and absolutely transcendent God is through
the veils and metaphors used by their divinely inspired predecessors. In this context, Ficino insists that, if indeed Aristotle is in agreement with Plato concerning the nature of the first Principle, he is not so as a colleague, but as a disciple who observes a respectful silence before his master. Therefore, he argues,
when Aristotle equates the One and Being, he is not in disagreement with Plato’s doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being, since he is concerned
with the One that can be apprehended by the Intellect, rather than the supreme
One:
«He [scil. Aristotle] will rightly call the Good cause of the causes, as does
his master [Plato], and also give it the name ‘end’, since the final cause precedes
all the others. If he ever makes Being equal to the One and the Good, he might
mean the one and the good that can be perceived by the intellect and comprehended by being. As to the more eminent One, which his master Plato reveals
as completely ineffable and unknowable, he does not approve of with words,
but rather honors in silence».22
In this way, Ficino integrates Aristotle’s thought within an essentially Neoplatonic framework, as a preliminary discourse limited to the visible realm of Being.
Aristotle’s silence towards Plato’s doctrine of the supreme One is an expression
of reverence rather than disagreement. For God, who transcends human words
and knowledge, can only be described through Platonic veils.
In contrast, Pico considers that Aristotle’s doctrine on the First principle, as
well as the medieval discourses on God (Thomas, Scot, as well as Avicenna and
Averroes), constitute doctrines as valid as those of the Platonists. According to
him, both Plato and Aristotle have demonstrated the equivalence between the
four universals one, being, true and good. This fundamental agreement between
Plato and Aristotle was erased, however, by the Neoplatonists: according to Pico,
the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being defended by the Neoplatonists is based upon a misinterpretation of Plato’s Parmenides and Sophist – a
misinterpretation that Ficino was seeking to perpetuate.
Given their opposition regarding the nature of philosophical concord, Pico
and Ficino were also opposed regarding the ways in which God could be desummum, ubi philosophorum omnium de quavis materia mentes diligentissime discutit ac
Platonem Aristotelemque de anima mirabiliter monstrat esse concordes».
22
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1147): «Sic ubi vero ens uni bonoque facit aequale, illi forsan uni atque bono par iudicat, quod et ab intellectu percipi et ab ente capi
potest. Quod autem Plato suus vaticinatur excelsius id, tamquam ineffabile penitus et incognitum, non verbis quidem prosequitur, sed potius silentio veneratur».
~  308  ~
The Pico-Ficino Controversy
scribed. In his exegesis of the Parmenides Ficino followed the Neoplatonic doctrine, later adopted by Pseudo-Dionysius, according to which God is so transcendent that nothing can be said about Him. God can only be described by
means of negations. Negations do not describe what God is, but that which God
is above. Comparisons can also be used, but only as a means to describe God in
relation to the realities that follow him. Ultimately it is by silence, the negation
of negation, that one can be reunited with God.23
Pico also considered that union with God should ultimately be achieved
through silence.24 However, as we will see, Pico developed the notion that the
knowledge of God cannot be reduced to a unique philosophical concept (i.e.
One or Being) or a rigid system of affirmations and negations. Rather it should
be achieved by a progressive purification of the divine names through four degrees described in Chapters 8-9 of the De Ente et Uno. In this context, Pico not
only maintained that God could be designated by the names One, True, Good
and Being, but also that God could be described either through negations of
all attributes (since God is infinitely superior to all perfections), or through affirmations of all attributes (since God unites within Himself all perfections).
In doing so, Pico could establish a concordance between the Neoplatonic doctrine of negations and the scholastic thesis according to which all perfections
are within God.
As we shall see, these are precisely the points that Ficino undertakes to refute in his Parmenides commentary: for Ficino, one can only reach God through
unity.
23
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 79 (= Op., p. 1189): «Iam vero Dionysius Areopagita libri huius summus astipulator in Mystica Theologia longo ordine gradus entium de primo negat, et postquam affirmationes sustulit tamquam dissonas, negationes quoque tamquam non
undique consonas tollit e medio indicitque rationi intelligentiaeque silentium, rationi quidem
quia mobilis, intelligentiae vero quoniam multiformis. Quo velut in caligine lucem luminum
attingamus. Eiusmodi silentium nobis hic imponere Parmenides quoque videtur. Postquam
dixit primum neque cognosci neque dici posse ideoque non solum affirmare de illo quicquam prohibet, sed negationes quoque admonet posthabendas. Vtrobique enim dicimus sive
affirmando sive negando, illud vero dici nullo modo potest. Praeterea quicumque palam negat, interim clam affirmat. Negare enim de primo aliquid est hoc ab illo secernere. Secernere autem hoc ab illo non possumus, nisi prius hoc in seipso firmaverimus atque illud. Si igitur affirmationes tamquam infinitum definientes reprobatae sunt circa primum, negationes
quoque tamquam affirmationum participes non sunt penitus approbandae. Quamobrem non
iniuria Parmenides admonet non tam negationibus quam silentio tranquillo, divino, amatorio
confidendum. Quod quidem Platonici omnes una cum Mercurio et Apollonio Tyaneo pro­cul­
dubio comprobant et propheta David inquit ‘laus tibi, o Deus, est silentium’ (Psalm, 65, 2, in
the first version of the Vulgate)».
24
Pico, De Ente et Uno, V, in Toussaint, L’esprit du Quattrocento, cit., p. 168: «[…] ex
quibus colligi illud potest non solum esse Deum, ut dicit Anselmus, quo nihil maius cogitari
potest, ut vere dixerit iuxta hebraicam literam David propheta: ‘tibi silentium laus’».
~  309  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
3. Ficino’s
response to
Pico
in the
Parmenides Commentary
Ficino’s seven discourses correspond to chapters 41 to 47 of the Parmenides
commentary. They are singled out by a separate heading stating that «there follow
the Platonic discourses demonstrating that the One is the principle of all things
and that the One and Good is superior to Being» («Sequuntur discursus Platonici probantes unum esse principium omnium et esse ipsum unum bonumque superius ente»). Six other chapters form part of Ficino’s refutation. Preceding the
seven discourses four chapters (37 to 40) refute Pico’s chapter 2, where Pico attacks the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato’s Sophist and Parmenides. Following
the seven discourses, and immediately before the explicit mention of Pico («Vtinam mirandus ille […]»), chapter 48 refutes Pico’s attack against Olympiodorus’ distinction between being and well-being. Finally, chapter 49 shows that the
first Principle cannot be the Intellect, refuting the equivalence Pico had drawn
between Plato’s Idea of the Good and Aristotle’s Intellect.25
Before examining Ficino’s arguments, a closer look at the way in which Ficino introduces the seven discourses is in order here. The structure of the opening
paragraph of Chapter 38 strikingly echoes Proclus’ commentary, indicating that
Ficino reused Proclus’ structure to integrate his refutation of Pico. In his commentary (VI, 1042-3) Proclus mentions the existence of a doctrine according to
which the subject of the Parmenides, namely the One, should always be understood in the same way throughout the dialogue. Proclus states that he will refute
this doctrine later. And indeed, Proclus does so twelve columns later (VI, 1052),
devoting the intervening chapters to the doctrine of henads. In his own commentary, Ficino reuses exactly the same structure: after alluding to the doctrine
mentioned by Proclus, he states his intention to respond to such a question elsewhere («sed ad hanc quaestionem alibi respondendum»), which he does twelve
chapters later (in paragraph 3 of Chapter 50).26 But rather than describing the
doctrine of the henads as does Proclus, Ficino states that he will demonstrate the
superiority of the One over Being («Nunc vero quomodo ipsum unum sit ente
superius et entis universi principium breviter perstringamus»), a demonstration
that forms the subject of the seven discourses mentioned above and refutes all
Pico, De Ente et Uno, V.
Chap. 50 (= Op., p. 1165): «Putat ergo Proclus, ut supra tetigimus, significationem ipsius unius, quod repetitur ubique, in variis suppositionibus variari quidem, sed interim ipsum
suppositionis antecedens quodammodo idem videri posse, propter mirabilem illam divinarum
unitatum invicem unionem, sed multo magis passim consequentia variari, ut ostendatur interim unitatum earundem sincera distinctio. Quandoque enim in consequenti ponitur ipsum
totum, quandoque pars, quandoque figura, et alias quidem affirmativum consequens est, alias
negativum. Addit alibi quidem unum super ens, ut diximus, pertractari, alibi vero unum et
unitates multas in ente vero ibique per gradus entium late procedi, alibi vero cursim unum in
ente non vero perstringi, unde tamen ad divina commodius subito reddeatur».
25
26
~  310  ~
The Pico-Ficino Controversy
the arguments presented by Pico’s De Ente et Uno.27 In other words, Ficino substitutes to Proclus’ henads his point-by-point rebuttal of Pico’s thesis.
This last point is crucial to understand what distinguishes Ficino’s interpretation from that of Proclus. Proclus’ doctrine of the henads is fundamental to
justify his theological interpretation of the Parmenides: following his master Syrianus, Proclus read in the Parmenides’ second hypothesis the complete series of
the divine henads and of the hierarchy of the gods.28 In contrast, Ficino’s purpose is not to systematically derive a metaphysical system or a hierarchy of gods
from the propositions of the Parmenides (an interpretation he explicitly rejects
in the previous chapter 29), but to refute Pico’s project of philosophical concord,
and find, through the traces of unity that are infused in the Universe, the mystical path that leads to God’s supreme Unity.
In addition, the structure of the section differs significantly from that of the
rest of the commentary. As we have stated above, most of Ficino’s commentary
follows very closely the structure of Proclus’ In Parmenidem. In contrast, in the
first part of the section under discussion (chapters 37-44) Ficino paraphrases another treatise by Proclus, the Platonic Theology. Chapters 45-47 (Discourses 5-7)
do not paraphrase any of Proclus’ works, but reuse Neoplatonic arguments to refute specific points of Pico’s thesis. In the last two chapters (48-49) Ficino draws
upon both Proclus’ Parmenides commentary and Plotinus’ Enneads to demonstrate against Pico that the superiority of the One over the Intellect is the necessary condition for the soul’s supra-rational union with God.
27
Chap. 38 (= Op., pp. 1154-1155): «Oportere enim dicebant in hac ancipiti quaestione
ipsum unum in eadem significatione utrobique sumere, alioquin auctoritatem unius ad consequentiam inde rerum intelligi numquam posse, nisi id certo sciamus ut uno quidem posito, consequenter talia quoque ponantur, eodem vero sublato, talia rursus auferantur. Sed ad
hanc quaestionem alibi respondendum. Nunc vero quomodo ipsum unum sit ente superius
et entis universi principium breviter perstringamus».
28
Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 10, p. 42.2-20, and Id., In Parmenidem, VI, pp.
1061.31-1063.5 and 1049.37-1050.25. On Proclus’ doctrine of henads, see E. R. Dodds, Proclus. Elements of Theology, Oxford 1933, pp. 257-284; Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit.,
III (Paris 1978), pp. ix-lxxvii. See also J. M. Dillon, Iamblichus and the Origin of the Doctrine of Henads, «Phronesis», XVII, 1972, pp. 102-106, and C. Steel, Iamblichus and the Theological Interpretation of the Parmenides, «Syllecta Classica», VIII, 2002 (19971), pp. 15-30
(«Iamblichus The Philosopher»).
29
Chap. 37 (= Op., p. 1154): «Ego vero mediam secutus viam arbitror tantum saltem
theologiae subesse, quantum admittit artificium, ut communiter dicitur dialecticum, ideoque
non ubique omnino continuatas, sed quandoque divulsas de divinis inesse sententias». Ficino also rejects Syrianus’ and Proclus’ interpretation of the second hypothesis. See Chap. 56
(= Op., p. 1170): «Syrianus inter haec et Proclus omnium conclusionum capita deos quosdam
seorsum existentes esse putant, ut et multitudo sit deus quidam, et ipsa pars sit deus alius,
alius quoque totum, rursus recta figura et sphaerica et iuventus atque senectus, similitudo,
dissimilitudo, caeteraque sint numina quaedam, quae per omnes consequentias negativas quidem decernantur inferiora primo, affirmativas autem deinceps suo quoque ordine disponantur. Sed inventum hoc poeticum potius quam philosophicum esse videtur».
~  311  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
Chapter 37: «It is said that ‘the following discussion will be difficult’ (Parmenides,
137b), because it is not only logical but also theological». Cf. Proclus, Platonic
Theology, I, 9.
Chapter 38: The superiority of the One over Being in the Philebus, Book VI of Republic, the Sophist and the Parmenides. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 4 (refutation of Origen the Platonist).
Chapter 39: The ascent towards God, distinction between the Idea of Good and the
Good above the Ideas. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 7.
Chapter 40: The two paths to ascend towards God (comparisons and negations) and
the two names of God («Good» and «One»). Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II,
6.
Chapters 41-47: The seven «Platonic discourses» on the superiority of the One over
Being.
1) First Discourse (Chapter 41): «universal being is either absolutely one, many, or both
one and many». Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 1 et 2.
2) Second Discourse (Chapter 42): «The character common to all things is unity». Cf.
Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 3. This counters Chapter 7 of Pico’s De Ente et
Uno.
3) Third Discourse (Chapter 43): The first and last degrees of realities, i.e., God and
Matter, are one and not being. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 3. This refutes
Chapter 6 of Pico’s De Ente et Uno.
4) Fourth Discourse (Chapter 44): The soul’s ascent towards God. Distinction between
Good and Being. Cf. Proclus, Platonic Theology, II, 11 and 12.
5) Fifth Discourse (Chapter 45): Ficino refutes the possibility of describing God by
means of perfections, whether abstract or concrete. Cf. Chapter 58. Refutes Chapter 4 of De Ente et Uno.
6) Sixth Discourse (Chapter 46): Distinction between being and well-being. Refutes first
part of Chapter 5 and Chapter 8 of De Ente et Uno.
7) Seventh Discourse (Chapter 47): Idem. Refutes Chapter 8 of Pico’s De Ente et Uno.
Chapter 48: The principles of the Sun, Nature and Intellect are the unities within their
respective intellects, which ultimately depend on the One. Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, 1044-1051 (examples of henads).
Chapter 49: The Intellect cannot be the First Principle. Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, 1047; Plotinus, Enneads, 6.7 (supra-intellectual union of the Intellect with
the One).
a) The Introductory Chapters (37-40)
In the first two introductory chapters (37 and 38), Ficino counters Pico’s attempt to dissociate the Neoplatonists’ interpretation from that of both Plato and
Dionysius. In Chapter 2 of the De Ente et Uno, Pico rejects the Neoplatonists’
contention that Plato had defended the superiority of the One over Being in the
Parmenides and the Sophist. For, he argues, in the case of the Parmenides «noth-
~  312  ~
The Pico-Ficino Controversy
ing is being positively asserted» («ego vero hoc de Parmenide primum dixero,
neque toto illo dialogo quicquam asseverari»). «Hence the Parmenides should
not be considered among Plato’s dogmatic works, since it is nothing but a dialectical exercise» («certe liber inter dogmaticos non est censendus quippe qui
totus nihil aliud est quam dialectica quaedam exercitatio») and «there are no
more arbitrary and forced commentaries than those brought in by persons wishing to interpret the Parmenides of Plato in another sense» («[…] ut nullae extent magis et arbitrariae et violentiae enarrationes quam quae ab his allatae sunt
qui alio sensu interpretari Parmenidem Platonis voluerunt»). As to the Sophist,
it only states that the One and Being are equal, rather than demonstrating, as argued by the Neoplatonists, that the One is superior to Being («Enimvero in Sophiste in hanc sententiam potius loquitur esse unum et ens aequalia, quam esse
unum ente superius»).30
Pico invokes both the Parmenides and the Sophist in support of his thesis because the two dialogues constitute the cornerstone of Neoplatonic metaphysics. As E. R. Dodds has demonstrated, the Parmenides is the key dialogue
from which the Neoplatonists derived their ontological system.31 In addition, as
more recent studies have shown, the Sophist is also central to the later Neoplatonists’ theological interpretation of the Parmenides’ first two hypotheses. Plotinus saw the Sophist’s doctrine of the five classes of being (Sophist 248e-249d)
as the equivalent, at the intelligible level, of Aristole’s categories.32 Similarly, as
C. Steel has convincingly shown, the Sophist constituted within Proclus’ system
a proteleia to the Parmenides, namely the preliminary dialogue that Proclus systematically invoked to support his theological interpretation of the Parmenides.33
So Pico was well aware that the Neoplatonists thought that both the Parmenides
and the Sophist contained Plato’s most fundamental ideas on ontology, and was
prepared to defend, against this tradition, that neither the Sophist nor the Parmenides had stated the superiority of the One over Being.
Pico, De Ente et Uno, II, cit., pp. 138-142.
Dodds, The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic One, cit.
32
See the famous opening lines of Plotinus’ second treatise on the Genres of Being (Enneads, VI, 2, 1, ll. 1-5).
33
C. Steel, Le Sophiste comme texte théologique dans l’interprétation de Proclus, in On
Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. by E. P. Bos and P. A. Meijer, LeidenNew York-Köln 1992, pp. 51-64. See also A. Charles-Saget, Lire Proclus, lecteur du Sophiste,
in Études sur le Sophiste de Platon, sous la direction de P. Aubenque, Napoli 1991, pp. 477508 (with the appendix by C. Gérard, Les citations du Sophiste dans les oeuvres de Proclus,
pp. 494-508); J. M. Charrue, Plotin, lecteur de Platon, Paris 1978, Chap. 4, and more recently
M.-A. Gavray, Simplicius lecteur du Sophiste. Contribution a l’étude de l’exégèse néoplatoni­
cienne, Paris 2007. On the importance of the Sophist in the controversy between Pico and Ficino, see M. J. B. A llen, The Ficinian Sophist and the Controversy with Pico, in Icastes: Marsi­
lio Ficino’s Interpretation of Plato’s Sophist. Five Studies and a Critical Edition with Translation,
Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1989, pp. 9-49: 40-48.
30
31
~  313  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
Pico also calls upon Dionysius the Areopagite’s authority in support of his
thesis. Against his opponents, who have distorted the Areopagite’s doctrine (an
implicit allusion to Ficino), he argues that Pseudo-Dionysius had also adopted
the equality between the One and Being («sed et Dionysius Areopagita, quem qui
contra nos disputant fautorem suae sententiae faciunt, non negabit vere a Deo
apud Mosen dici ‘ego sum qui sum’, quod Graece ita legimus ‘g ei mi o wn’, id
est ‘ego sum ens’»).34 This, he adds, will lead to a correct understanding of Dionysius’ works, and will prevent us from relying upon «dreams» and «inextricable commentaries» («somnia et inextricabilia commenta»), an unmistakable reference to Ficino’s exegesis of the Divine Names and the Mystical Theology.35
Against Pico’s position, Ficino demonstrates that the Parmenides is theological rather than logical, and that the superiority of the One over Being is not only
the result of the Neoplatonists’ interpretation, but was also defended by Plato
and Dionysius the Areopagite. Drawing upon arguments Bessarion had used two
decades before against George of Trebizond, Ficino states that Dionysius the Areopagite always places the One above Being and uses Parmenides’ arguments
when treating of divine matters.36 In addition, Ficino argues, the superiority of
Pico, De Ente et Uno, V, cit., p. 146.
Ibid., p. 168: «[…] unde magna etiam aperitur fenestra legitimae intelligentiae librorum Dionysii qui De Mystica Theologia et De Divinis Nominibus inscribuntur in quibus illud cavendum ne aut minora faciamus quam sunt quae ille scripsit (sunt autem maxima) aut
dum parvum existimamus omne quod intelligimus, somnia nobis et inextricabilia commenta
confingamus». On Marsilio Ficino’s translation and interpretation of Dionysius’ Mystical Theology (1490) and Divine Names (1492), see Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum, cit., I, pp.
lxviii-lxix, and cxv-cxvi; M. Cristiani, Dionigi dionisiaco. Marsilio Ficino e il Corpus Dionysianum, in Il Neoplatonismo nel Rinascimento, a cura di P. Prini, Roma 1993, pp. 185-204; S.
Toussaint, L’influence de Ficin à Paris et le pseudo-Denys des humanistes. Traversari, Cusain,
Lefèvre d’Étaples. Suivi d’un passage inédit de Marsile Ficin, «Bruniana & Campanelliana», V,
1999, pp. 381-414; C. Vasoli, L’Un-Bien dans le commentaire de Ficin à la Mystica Theologia
du Pseudo-Denys, in Les platonismes à la Renaissance, éd. par P. Magnard, Paris 2001, pp. 181193. For the diffusion of the corpus dionysianum in the Renaissance, mainly through Ambrogio
Traversari’s translations (completed between 1431 and 1437), and the medieval Latin versions,
see Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage, éd. par P. Chevalier, 2 vols., Bruges 1937; C. L. Stringer, Humanism and
the Church Fathers: Ambrogio Traversari (1386-1439) and Christian Antiquity in the Renaissance,
Albany 1977, pp. 158-162; J. Monfasani, Pseudo-Dionysius The Areopagite in Mid-Quattrocento Roma, in Supplementum Festivum, ed. by J. Hankins et al., Binghamton 1987, pp. 190-219;
D. Luscombe, Denis the Pseudo-Areopagite in the writings of Nicholas of Cusa, Marsilio Ficino
and Pico della Mirandola, in Néoplatonisme et philosophie médiévale, Actes du colloque international (Corfou, 6-8 octobre 1995), éd. par L. G. Benakis, Turnhout 1997, pp. 93-108.
36
Chap. 37 (= Op., p. 1154): «Denique librum hunc esse theologicum non solum caeteri Platonici praecipue probatissimi convenerunt, sed etiam Dionysius Areopagita confirmare
videtur. Quotiens in ipsius unius incidit mentionem, totiens enim enti praeponit, distinguit
unum ens ab ipso simpliciter uno ipsumque unum ait ipsius esse principium entisque unius
procreatorem, utitur quinetiam argumentationibus, negationibus verbisque Parmenidis saepe
quam plurimis in materia divinissima, testificans interea materiam Parmenidis esse divinam.
Bonum quoque similiter ut unum, ipsis Platonicorum rationibus semper anteponit essentiae».
34
35
~  314  ~
The Pico-Ficino Controversy
the One over Being is also asserted in the Philebus, Book VI of Republic, the
Sophist and the Parmenides. These are the examples Proclus had drawn upon to
refute Origen’s thesis according to which the first principle of the Universe is
Being and Intellect (Platonic Theology II, 4).37 According to Proclus («ut Proclus
narrat»), Ficino goes on, the successors of Plato, persuaded by the words contained in the dialogues of their master, have placed the One and the Good before essence and intelligence. According to Ficino, however («ego vero»), Plato
himself had conceived the very doctrine over which all Platonists, the old school
and the new, are in agreement («Ego vero id sensisse Platonem arbitror, in quo
schola illa vetus extra controversiam cum nova consentit»).38 In other words, Ficino not only invokes the Neoplatonic tradition in support of the view that the
One is higher than Being, he also insists, against Pico, that this view is founded
upon a thesis conceived by Plato himself.39
In the last two introductory chapters (chapters 39 and 40), which paraphrase
respectively Chapters 7 and 6 of the second Book of Proclus’ Platonic Theology,
Ficino describes the elevation towards God and defines the two appellations of
the First Principle as ‘One’ and ‘Good’, rather than ‘Being’. Drawing upon the
Philebus and Republic VI, he describes the elevation towards God as an ascent
from the sensible multiplicity to the Ideas, and from the Ideas to the supreme
Good («Proinde Plato in Republica et in Philebo et ubique sensibiles passim
multitudines ad intelligibiles redigit unitates, id est ideas, scilicet unamquamque
multitudinem rerum invicem cognatarum ad ideam unam, deinde unitates intelligibiles ad ipsum simpliciter unum, quod ita saltem intelligibilia superat quemadmodum ab his sensibilia superantur illudque vocat ipsum simpliciter bonum»).
One should distinguish, therefore, between the Idea of Good, cause of good
Cf. K libansky, Plato’s Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, cit., pp. 310-312,
quoting Bessarion, In Calumniatorem Platonis, II, 4, edidit L. Mohler, II, Paderborn 1927,
pp. 87-89. Ficino received a copy of Bessarion’s work at the date of its publication (1469) from
the author himself, as shown by their correspondance preserved in Op., pp. 616-617.
37
On the position of Origen the Platonist and Proclus’ refutation, see Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., III, pp. x-xx.
38
Chap. 38 (= Op., pp. 1155-1156): «Superioribus Platonis verbis persuasi familiares eius
unum bonumque essentiae intelligentiaeque praefecerunt et, ut narrat Proclus, probatissimi
quique Platonici, Plutarchus, Ammonius, Plotinus, Amelius, Porphyrius, Iamblichus, Theodo­
rus, caeterique sectatores eorum. Ego vero id sensisse Platonem arbitror, in quo schola illa vetus extra controversiam cum nova consentit, nova vero a Syriano et Proclo, magnis profecto
viris idem penitus sentientibus ducit originem, in qua post illos Hermias et Damascius Olym­
piodorusque praecipui numerantur».
39
In his Sophist commentary Ficino insists that Plato’s intention is to explain and resolve,
not to refute, the views of the great Parmenides (this enables him to offset the Stranger’s ‘parricide’ against Parmenides’ prohibition to make things that are, not be, cf. Sophist, 258d): In
Sophistam, 27 (ed. & transl. by M. J. B. A llen in Icastes, cit., p. 243.7-8): «quapropter ma­
gnum Parmenidem et quemlibet Pythagoricum hic explicatum et absolutum intellige, non
confutatum».
~  315  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
things, and the Good above the Ideas, which is the cause of all things and superior in dignity and power to essence and the intelligible («nec in essentia est aut
essentia est vel intelligible, sicut idea quaevis, sed essentiam et intelligibile antiquitate, dignitate, potentia superat, sicut sol generationem et oculos et colores»).40
For it is only by analogy to the Idea of Good that Plato calls the First ‘Good’
in the Republic («Cum vero sit prorsus incognitum intellectu atque ideo proprio
nomine designari non possit, ex ideali bono utpote sibi simillimo appellatur idea
boni»). Indeed, when Plato denies in the Republic that the Good is intelligible,
truth, science, knowledge, or essence, he seems to imitate the negations of the
Parmenides («ubi dum probat ipsum bonum quod intellectus omnes cum intelligibilibus unit, non esse intellectum, non intelligibile, non veritatem, non scientiam
vel cognitionem ullam, non essentiam, examussim imitari videtur negationes entium omnium circa unum in Parmenide declaratas»). For the light of Good that
shines through all intelligibles, intellects and universal Being, is the superessential Goodness divinely infused in divine realities («Lumen denique boni in omnibus tam intelligibilibus quam intellectibus et in universo ente vero nihil est aliud
quam superessentialis unitas bonitasque divinis infusa divinitus»).41
Accordingly, Ficino argues in the following chapter, the ascent towards God
can be achieved in two ways: by negations, as in the Parmenides, and by comparisons, as described in the Republic («Plato per duas ad summum vias ascendit,
per comparationes quidem in Republica, per negationes autem in Parmenide»),
each describing God as both the absolutely transcendent principle and the cause
of the Universe («Vtraeque pariter tam comparationes quam negationes declarant
deum esse tum ab omnibus entibus et intelligibilibus segregatum, tum etiam principium universi»). Correspondingly, God can be designated by two names, ‘One’
40
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 39 (= Op., p. 1156). Cf. Republic, VI, 505a-509b; Philebus, 21d 9-22a 3; 61b 5-6; 61d 1-2; Letter, II, 312e 2-3; Parmenides, 137c 4-142a 8. Cf. Proclus,
Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II (Paris 1974), 7, pp. 45.25-48.19, who demonstrates the superiority of the Good over the Idea of Good in the Republic, the Second Letter, and the Parmenides. For Ficino’s reference to the Philebus, see Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 7, 25 and Ficino’s
interpretation of the passage: In Plotinum, VI.7, Chap. XXX (= Op., p. 1792): «Finis intellectualis animae est expeditus et summus actus intelligentiae in ipsum universi bonum prorsus
intentus. Actus eiusmodi beatitudo est, etiamsi nulla huic voluptas exterior adiungatur, neque
tamen ipsa est voluptatis expers. Ipsa enim expedita actionis integritas atque summa est voluptas. Tunc vero maxime et simplex unumque existit, gaudet vero seipsa penitus ex superiori lumine iam formata. Profecto sicut summitas luminis circa speculum concavum iam est
calor, ita summitas essendi est vita. Similiter vivendi sensus, sentiendi imaginatio, imaginandi
ratio, rationis intelligentia, intelligentiae gaudium, gaudii bonum. Nempe ad supremum universi gradum, non per divisionem, sed per unionem ascenditur paulatim. Iam vero sicut elementa eodem naturae nixu, quod sibi consentaneum est, petunt atque fruuntur, ita mens eodem actu, quando summus est vergit in finem ultimum tamquam verum et fruitur tamquam
bono. Sed de fine et intelligentia et voluptate in commentariis Philebi latius disputamus». See
also Ficino, In Philebum, I, 4-5.
41
Chap. 39 (= Op., p. 1156).
~  316  ~
The Pico-Ficino Controversy
and ‘Good’, the former describing the procession of all things from God; the latter describing the conversion of all things towards God («Proinde quemadmodum via duplici Plato noster ascendit ad primum, ita nominibus illud praecipue
duobus appellat. In Republica quidem, ubi per comparationes scandit, appellat
bonum. Comparationes enim ex similitudine rerum ad primum infusa bonitate
ducuntur. In Parmenide vero, ubi per negationes incedit, nominat unum. Negationibus enim deum principium omnium unicum, simplicissimum, eminentissimum esse designat»).42 As we shall see, this introductory section forms the background to the proper refutation of Pico’s arguments on the divine names and the
ascent towards God, as formulated in Discourses 4 and 7.
b) Discourses 1-4
Chapters 41 to 47 correspond to Ficino’s seven «Platonic discourses» on the
superiority of the One over Being. As already mentioned above, Discourses 1-4
are based on Book II of Proclus’ Platonic Theology. Discourses 5-7 do not draw
upon Proclus, but use specific arguments to refute Pico’s thesis.
Ficino’s first two discourses refute Chapter 7 of Pico’s De Ente et Uno. In
this chapter Pico criticises the equivalence the Neoplatonists had established between the opposition One/Many and Non-Being/Being in order to equate One
and Non-Being, Many and Being. Invoking Book X of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
Pico argues that the opposition One/Many is an opposition of privation or contrariety, while the opposition Being/Non-being constitutes an opposition of contradiction; the terms of each opposition (One and Non-Being; Many and Being)
cannot, therefore, be equated.43 In addition, Pico argues, the Neoplatonists, by
adopting the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being, are led to selfcontradiction, since they are forced to admit that the One can be predicated
about «nothing», namely «non-being», which was expressly rejected by Plato
in the Sophist.44
Drawing upon Proclus’ Platonic Theology II, 1 and 2, Ficino opposes Pico’s
argument by demonstrating that universal being is both one and many (first discourse, chapter 41). In the second discourse (chapter 42), he paraphrases Proclus’
Platonic Theology II 3 and shows that the character that is common to all things
Chap. 40 (= Op., p. 1156).
Pico, De Ente et uno, VII, cit., p. 172: «Non enim eo modo opponitur multitudo uni,
quo modo opponitur non ens enti. Haec enim contradictoriam habent oppositionem; illa aut
privativam aut contrariam de qua re late disputant Aristotelici decimo libro primae philosophiae», with reference to Aristotle, Metaphysics, X, 3, 1054a 20 ff, and 6, 1056b 33 ff.
44
Ibid.: «Pari ergo ratione, si sit unum ente communius, fieri poterit ut aliquid sit non
ens sive nihil, quod tamen sit unum atque ita de non ente unum praedicabitur, quod expresse in Sophista confutat Plato».
42
43
~  317  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
is unity. Drawing upon traditional Neoplatonic arguments, he argues that if the
One perishes, all things perish; the ancient philosophers call nothingness oud
(identified as oud’ e n, «not even one») rather than oud’ on («not even being»).45
In the third discourse (chapter 43), Ficino defends, in opposition to Pico,
the Neoplatonic conception of Matter. This doctrine was central to the thesis of
the superiority of the One over Being; it also constituted an attack against Aristotle’s conception according to which Matter cannot be generated by a Form
and is being.46 To refute the doctrine of the superiority of the One over Being,
Pico had reused Aristotle’s contention that Matter is not non-being, and stated
that Matter is simultaneously one, multiple and being: one according to the form
provided by its being, multiple, as origin of all multitude, and being. Plato himself, Pico had argued, testifies that Matter is multiple and being, since he calls it
‘receptacle of Forms’ in the Timaeus and ‘Infinity’ in the Philebus.47
It is precisely this conception that Ficino undertakes to refute in the third
Discourse. Following the final section of Proclus’ Platonic Theology II 3 (pp.
26.7-29.21), Ficino states that the first and last degrees of realities (i.e. One and
Matter) are like the two extremes of a line, two points that are indivisible and
one, but deprived from multitude and being. Matter is formless and thus devoid of division and multiplicity. Matter will therefore be said to be one and not
being.48 Ficino then rejects Pico’s interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus and Philebus
45
Chap. 42 (= Op., p. 1158): «Vnum ergo communiter inest omnibus, quo sublato perditur unumquodque. Quapropter volentes antiqui omnifariam nihilum prorsus exprimere,
dixere oud, id est, ne unum quidem, quasi plus negetur dicendo non unum quam non ens
– perinde ac si munus unius universa posterius quam essentia deserat idque sit in nihil penitus evanescere, videlicet unum prorsus amittere. Hoc igitur unum omnibus communissimum
ab ipso tandem existit simpliciter uno omnium communissimo». Cf. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 3, pp. 23.1-26.6.
46
Aristotle, Physics, A 9 192a 31; Metaphysics, VII, 8, 1033a 23-1033b 29, and VII, 10,
1036a 9-11. See L. Brisson, La théorie de la ‘matière’ dans le Timée de Platon et sa critique par
Aristote dans la Physique, in L’Alchimie et ses racines philosophiques: La tradition grecque et
la tradition arabe, éd. par C. Viano, Paris 2005, pp. 15-35. On Plotinus’ doctrine of the two
matters (intelligible and sensible), see D. O’Brien, Plotinus on the Origin of Matter. An Exercise in the Interpretation of the Enneads, Napoli 1991, with further references to the existing literature on the subject. On Pico’s and Ficino’s conceptions of Matter, see Tr. Dagron,
Ficin et la conception néoplatonicienne de la matière, in Marsile Ficin ou les mystères platoniciens, éd. par S. Toussaint, Paris 2002, pp. 163-178: 170-173.
47
Pico, De Ente et uno, VI, cit., pp. 168-170: «[…] neque enim Plato vult eam esse prorsus nihil, alioquin quomodo receptaculum formarum, quomodo nutrix, quomodo natura quaedam et reliqua erit, quae eam esse in Timaeo ille confirmat? Non est igitur nihil, idest non
omnino entis expers, si Platoni credimus, qui tamen eandem in Philebo vocat non solum multitudinem quae, ut ipsi volunt, opponitur uni sicut nihilum opponitur enti, sed infinitum».
Cf. Timaeus, 49a, and Philebus, 23c.
48
Chap. 43 (= Op., pp. 1158-1159): «Praeterea omnis divisio, differentia, multiplicitas fit
vel per formarum varietatem vel divisionem ad dimensiones numerosve spectantem. Haec omnia formalia sunt. In materia nihil est per se formale, nulla igitur multiplicitas inest. Est itaque maxime unum et, quoniam non habet ullum in se multorum, ideo potentia est ad mul-
~  318  ~
The Pico-Ficino Controversy
(quoting a passage that is not in Proclus): according to him, when Plato calls
Matter ‘infinite’ in the Philebus and ‘receptacle of forms’ in the Timaeus, he
means that Matter is one, infinitely to being formed and to receive a multitude
of forms, not that it is many.49 Since the One is more extensive than Being, Ficino concludes, it is necessarily superior to Being.
In the fourth Discourse (Chapter 44), Ficino describes the soul’s ascent towards God and the way in which God can be conceived. According to him, it is
only through unity (rather than being) that one can reach God: it is only through
the unity infused in our soul by God that one can achieve mystical union. Paraphrasing Proclus’ Platonic Theology, Ficino argues that divine contemplation can
only be achieved in a supra-rational way, by «closing the eyes of intelligence»
(«Proinde, sicut solem conniventibus oculis, sic ipsam boni lucem intelligentia
connivente suscipimus vel potius veneramur»).50 For, Ficino argues, it is sacrilegious to direct the «eyes of the intelligence» towards God, who transcends the
intelligible («Neque enim licet neque fas est intelligentiae aciem in illud um­quam,
quod intelligibili superius est, dirigere»).51 It is possible for the intelligence, however, to form a conception of God, by using that which is most similar to the
activity of the contemplative Intellect, namely the One and Good, two concepts
that refer to one unique principle.52
ta suscipienda, sicut primum, quia multorum nullum est ad multa sufficit facienda. Est certe
materia maxime unum, scilicet formabile, sicut ens primum maxime unum est formale. Neutrum vero est ipsum simpliciter unum. Quis ergo dixerit unum atque ens idem prorsus existere, si modo consideret unum de maximo et de minimo ente pariter praedicari atque quatenus
multitudo formalis negatur de materia, eatenus negari ens et affirmari unum?».
49
Ibid. (= Op., p. 1159): «Ac si ex eo quod infinitas subire formare potest et indefinita
pariter est ad omnes, Plato in Philebo sub ordine infiniti materiam collocet, non tamen propterea eam existimabit esse minus unam, sed maxime unam, siquidem nullum infinitorum naturaliter habeat. Nam et ipsum infinitum ibi saepe nominat unum, quod quidem non ipsa ratione sui multitudinem habeat, immo sub se participantium gradatim contineat multitudinem.
[…] Quamobrem materia ad ordinem infiniti redacta nec ibi nec alibi a Platone multitudo vocatur, sed unum in Timaeo ad suscipiendam multitudinem susceptaculum, probatque longius
ab ente distare quam formam, quandoquidem forma scilicet materialis ens verum refert velut
imago, materia vero non refert, nisi fortassis ut umbra vel potius ut oppositum, si quidem tam
informis materia sit quam essentia vera formosa. Verumtamen, dum ita probat, eam quam minimum entis habere declarat unius habere non parum, dicens de hac vere pronuntiari posse
‘hoc est istud’ neque propter ingredientia varia umquam e sua identitate mutari».
50
Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 11, and the first paragraph of Chap. 12 (p.
66.1-17). This section refers to Plotinus’ Ennead, VI, 9 (ibid., pp. 119-122), and Ennead, I, 6.
51
Chap. 44 (= Op., p. 1160). The expression aciem intelligentiae dirigere translates Proclus’ antwpen (Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 12, p. 64.22-23: «ou gr mi antwpen
oud allo tn ontwn oudn», cf. Plotinus, Ennead, I, 6, 8-9), and refers to the expression acies
mentis, a notion that is prominent in Christian mysticism. Here it underlines, however, the
supra-intellectual nature of the soul’s union with God, as in Chap. 48-49 below.
52
Chap. 44 (= Op., p. 1160): «Huc autem postremo regressi quidnam de illo potissimum
concipimus aut loquimur? Certe quod simillimum est statui mentis illuc usque progressae.
~  319  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
Ficino then recalls the «consensus of all philosophers» according to which
God is the object of desire for all beings. Such a definition indicates the need
to distinguish the good that is innate to all beings, from the Good that is above
Being, and, as a result, the universal Being which desires the Good, from the
Good itself.53 Here Ficino refers to the doctrine of natural desire («appetitus na­
tu­ralis») according to which all beings naturally tend towards God through the
presence of innate logoi within them.54 He also alludes to the Neoplatonic definition of the Good as the universal object of desire, a definition that is based
upon Plotinus’ reinterpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the individual good.55
As we will see in Discourse seven, Ficino invokes again this definition in order
to demonstrate that Aristotle’s philosophy ultimately derives from the divinely
inspired wisdom of the prisci theologi.
Eiusmodi vero status maxime unus est et simplex atque optimus. Ideo deum ex hoc statu nominamus ut unum penitus atque bonum».
53
Ibid.: «Iam vero communis omnium consensus definiens bonum cuius gratia omnia
et quod appetunt omnia vaticinari videtur illud nec ullius gratia esse nec aliud prorsus appetere, illud itaque nec ens aliquod esse nec aliquod bonum in ente. Omnis enim essentia bonum appetit, id est esse secundum naturam ac bene perfecteque sese habere. Bonum quoque
in essentia forte videri potest illius ipsius substantiae gratia esse quaesitum, ut videlicet secundum naturam perfecte se habeat. Nec est bonum simpliciter omniumve bonum, sed alicuius dumtaxat et in aliquo bonum et propterea quiddam bonum. Ea profecto ratione quaesitum ut per hoc ad ipsum bonum propius accedatur. Itaque praeter bonum, quod vel ens vel
in ente vel entis est, extat bonum eminentius ente. Sicut enim quodlibet ens suum quodque
bonum appetit, tamquam aliud, et suo quoque bono appetit ipsum bonum, sic ens universum
consequenter ipsum bonum exoptat tamquam aliud atque superius».
54
Chap. 78 (= Op., pp. 1187-1188): «Illud quoque Procli saepe nostri valde placet per hoc
nomen unum non ipsum quidem in se unum, sed intimum hoc quod ex illo nobis inest unum
occultumque unius conceptum exprimi. Inest enim cunctis erga primum principium tamquam
omnium finem appetitus innatus. Ergo et ante appetitum sensus quidam, ut ita dixerim, illius
occultus. Quo quidem naturali sensu sensibus aliis prorsus occulto, grave et leve per rectam
lineam locum sibi quasi eligit naturalem respuitve contrarium, radices arborum humorem eligunt ariditate vitata, folia sagaciter umbram fugiunt asciscuntque calorem pariter atque lumen. Hoc itaque sensu appetituque mirabili omnia convertuntur ad primum, etiam non cognoscentia primum. Similiter anima etiam ante notitiam manifestam electionemque consilii,
naturali sensu inclinationeque per unum inde sibi impressum desiderat ipsum unum. Quo
quidem desiderio frequenter admonita unum denique nominat, non tam confidens pronuntiare primum, quam enitens desiderium suum circa primum exprimere suumque unum quasi primi illius proferre conceptum». Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, VII, pp. 54.3-10, and 54.2656.6. For Ficino’s doctrine of appetitus naturalis, see P. O. Kristeller, Il pensiero filosofico di
Marsilio Ficino, Firenze 1953, pp. 180-212.
55
See for instance Plotinus, Enneads, VI, 2, 11; Proclus, Elements of Theology, § 8 and
notes, pp. 194-195; Id., In Parmenidem, VII, p. 54.3-10; Id., Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 22,
p. 101.27; II, 2, p. 20.22-23; II, 6, p. 40.24-25. This Neoplatonic definition is founded upon
a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s definition of the good. Denying the existence of an absolute
Good, Aristotle defines the good as what each being individually desires. In contrast, Plotinus
presents Aristotle’s doctrine as defending the existence of a universal Good, so as to make
it compatible with Plato’s doctrine. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads I, 8. 2.2-3. See Proclus, Théologie
Platonicienne, cit., II, p. 20, n° 2.
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
c) Discourse 5
In the fifth discourse, Ficino interrupts his reading of Proclus’ Platonic Theology. He counters Pico’s attempt to establish a concord between the Neoplatonic negations about the One and the positive attributes used by scholastic philosophers to describe God: according to Ficino, God’s only correct appellation is
‘the One and Good’ («ipsum unum bonumque») and the only way to describe
Him is through negations.
In Chapter 4 Pico establishes a distinction between concrete and abstract
being («ens concretum et ens abstractum»), in order to show that God can be
called both pure (abstract) Being and superior to (concrete) Being.56 He distinguishes between ens, which «has the appearance of a concrete name» («concreti
nomini faciem habet»), and esse, which is the corresponding abstract name. According to Pico, the difference between abstract and concrete names is such that
the former signifies the reality in itself, per se, while the latter means the reality inasmuch as it is caused by another.57 God, as uncaused, cannot be given any
concrete name, and is therefore superior to ens. But God can be given the abstract name of esse; as such, he will be seen as the plenitude of being. As a result, Pico argues, God is simultaneously «the fact of being» («esse»), and superior to being («ens»).58 By using this distinction between ens and esse, which might
ultimately derive from Gerson’s scholastic interpretation of Dionysius’ negative
theology,59 Pico intends to show that God’s transcendence cannot be reduced to
56
On Pico’s distinction between being, essence and existence, see G. Di Napoli, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e la problematica dottrinale del suo tempo, Roma 1965, pp. 217-223;
314-343; Id., L’essere e l’uno in Pico della Mirandola, «Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica», XLVI,
1954, pp. 356-389: 366 ff.; Id., L’essere e l’uno in Pico della Mirandola, in Il pensiero italiano
del Rinascimento e il tempo nostro, Atti del V convegno internazionale (Montepulciano, 8-13
agosto 1968), a cura di G. Tarugi, Firenze 1970, pp. 117-129.
57
Pico, De Ente et Uno, IV, cit., pp. 148-149: «[…] est autem haec vis illorum et diversitas, ut quod abstractum dicitur, id notet quod as se tale est, non ab alio; concretum ex adverso id significet quod non a se, sed alterius beneficio tale est».
58
Ibid., pp. 150-151: «[…] tale autem est Deus qui est totius esse plenitudo, qui solus a
se est et a quo solo nullo intercedente medio ad esse omnia processerunt. Hac igitur ratione
vere dicemus Deum non est ens, sed super ens, et ente aliquid esse superius».
59
See J. Gerson, De simplificatione cordis, passim, where Gerson concludes that mystical theology proceeds by way of abstraction («procedit vero doctrina mystica per abstractionem»). In the Theologica mystica pratica Gerson argues that the negations about God do not
concern pure intelligibles as such, but the intelligible totality in as much as it implies imperfection. Pico reuses this interpretation to equate Dionysius’s negative theology with Aristotle’s theory of abstraction. In contrast, Gerson uses the theory of abstraction to transcend the
Dionyian apophatic mode of describing God: the negative theology ultimately leads to the
affimations of abstract concepts about God, and these affirmations constitute a further step
towards the unio mystica. On Gerson’s mystical theology I am indebted to M. Vial, Jean Gerson. Théoricien de la Théologie Mystique, Paris 2006, pp. 132-139.
~  321  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
a univocal concept or a rigidly fixed system of affirmations or negations; it can
be called both One and Being and can be adequately described by both negations and assertions.
Unlike Gerson, however, who rejected the use of negations to overcome the
apophatic implications of negative theology, Pico establishes an equation between negations and affirmations – between negative theology and theory of
abstraction. In other words, both negations and assertions can be used to describe God:
«Whether one calls God with the names mind, intellect, life and wisdom, or
one places God above these attributes, one states two equally true and consonant propositions; and Plato does not diverge from Aristotle when he calls God
the Idea of Good in Book VI of the Republic and places Him above intellects
and intelligibles […], while Aristotle frequently calls God the intellect, the intelligent and the intelligible».60
Similarly, he argues, the negations used by the Platonists and Dionysius are
equivalent to the affirmations used by the Peripatetics and the Parisians, i.e., the
scholastic philosophers in the universities of Padua and Paris, where Pico had
studied before going to Florence:
«[…] Dionysius, followed by the Platonists, denies that life, intellect, wisdom
or anything similar are within God. But since God Himself, in the unique perfection of His infinity and His divinity, unites and embraces within Himself the
whole perfection which is plural and divided in these attributes, not as a unity
deriving from the many, but as a unity preceding the many, as their principle and
their cause, for this reason some philosophers, especially the Aristotelian and Parisian theologians, admit that these attributes are present in God. When we say
and follow this opinion, we are not only right, but we are also in perfect agreement with the philosophers who deny these attributes».61
60
Pico, De Ente et Uno, V, cit., p. 166: «Evidenter tibi jam patet quonam pacto, cum
aliquando Deus et mens et intellectus et vita et sapientia nuncupetur, rursus aliquando super haec omnia collocetur, utrumque tamen et vere et consone comprobetur, nec propterea
Platonem ab Aristotele dissentire quod ille in VI de Republica Deum quem ibi vocat ideam
boni super intellectus et intelligibilia statuat […], hic autem scilicet Aristoteles saepe Deum
et intellectum et intelligentem et intelligibile vocet».
61
Ibid.: «Quod respicientes et Dionysius et deinde Platonici in Deo et vitam et intellectum et sapientiam atque his similia esse negant. Sed quoniam totam horum perfectionem
quae in his multa et divisa est Deus ipse unica sua perfectione, quae est sua infinitas, sua
deitas quae ipse est, in se unit et colligit non sicut unum ex illis multis, sed unum ante illa
multa, et principium illorum et causa, ideo quidam alii, et praesertim Peripatetici quos quantum licet fere in omnibus imitantur Parisienses theologi, haec omnia in Deo esse concedunt.
Quod dicentes atque credentes non solum recte dicimus et credimus, sed et cum his concorditer qui illa negant».
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
In contrast, Ficino argues in Discourse 5 that it is impossible to describe
God by using assertions, which are inferior to the universality and absolute transcendence of the First Principle. He reuses the distinction Pico had established
between concrete and abstract names. However, he shows that neither concrete
(ens, vivens) nor abstract (vita, essentia) appellations can suitably qualify God.
At most these appellations can denote that God is cause (rather than the Form)
of all perfections, a doctrine, he adds, that is well known to the Platonists and
that has been reused by (usurpatum) the Areopagite.62 God’s names of ‘One’ and
‘Good’ derive from the fact that God possesses all these perfections inasmuch
as He embraces them all in a unique way, but only possesses one proper thing,
its own unity and goodness («Quoniam vero primum haec habet munera, ut et
unice perfectiones omnium complectatur et nihil ultra petat et omnibus suum
impertiat proprium, solum vero id munus ipsum bonum unumque possidet, me­
rito praecipua haec est appellatio primi»).
To understand more fully the implications of this passage, it is worth examining another passage, which appears later in the commentary (in chapter 58), entitled «the opinion that affirms abstractions of abstracts about God, while negations and comparisons around God are safer» («Opinio affirmans abstractorum
abstracta de Deo. Item tutiores sunt negationes relationesque circa Deum»). In
this passage Ficino reuses Proclus’ refutation of some ancient Neoplatonic doctrines to counter Pico’s contention that abstract names can suitably describe God.
As such, Ficino’s arguments appear to revive ancient controversies to respond to
a specific point developed by Pico. Chapter 58 is part of a long digression where
62
Chap. 45 (= Op., pp. 1160-1161): «Quando nominamus primum, solemus quibusdam
perfectionibus communissimis appellare, scilicet essentia, vita, mente, veritate, virtute. Haec
autem accipi velut concreta possunt vel abstracta. Si ut concreta, scilicet ens, vivens et reliqua, non conveniunt simplicitati primi. Si ut abstracta, propter simplicitatem magis convenire videntur, ut essentia vel vita magis quam ens vel vivens. Sed haec rursus abstracta, si considerentur quasi formae quaedam rationesve formales in concretis, primo non competunt; sin
considerentur extra, nec essentia in se numero conducit vitam nec vita mentem, sed et illa ad
istam et ista ad hanc appetitu contendunt. Ideo nec essentia nec vita primo competunt. Sed
forte magis intelligentia? Nec ista quidem, quia non competit omnibus intelligere, et ipsa intelligentia contendit ad veritatem et per hanc ad bonum, bonum vero nusquam vertitur. Summatim vero inter illa superius numerata nec praecedentia primo congruunt, quia non includunt sequentia, sed ad illa nituntur, nec insuper sequentia sunt consentanea primo, quoniam
et primorum participant neque sunt illa, et quoniam deinceps effectus producunt angustiores, neque appellare decet primum hoc nomine, scilicet esse vel vivere, quoniam esse est actus quidam per essentiam suam in ente concreto, vivere actus in vivo per vitam. Si quis autem primum his nominibus appellare voluerit, causali quadam, ut ita dixerim, appellatione
potius quam formali, id quidem libenter accipiemus, tamquam a Platonicis non alienum et a
Dionysio frequentius usurpatum». At the level of Being, however, Ficino considers that both
abstract and concrete terms are interchangeable. Cf. In Sophistam, 34 (M. Ficino, In Sophistam, cit., pp. 255.29-257.1): «Ens quidem videtur aliquid concretum significare, essentia vero
abstractum, saepe tamen sermonis gratia aliud pro alio ponitur». For the theological implications of Ficino’s ambiguous use of the term usurpatum in relation to the Areopagite, see
Toussaint, L’influence de Ficin à Paris, cit., pp. 410-412.
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Ficino addresses issues related to the relation between One and Being, One and
Many and the doctrine of Trinity. After explaining why the multitude is negated about the First Principle, Ficino describes three doctrines that had been refuted by Proclus and reinterprets them in the perspective of the doctrine of abstract names invoked by Pico.
Ficino first describes the opinion of the ancient Platonists who advocated
the use of affirmations to describe God. According to these commentators, since
God is the cause of all things, He necessarily possesses within Himself the powers
and roots («vires radicesque») of these things. Therefore, they argue, God can be
said to be certain things – not concrete or even abstract things, but, if it is possible to say and hear these appellations without laughing («si pronuntiari possit
vel extra risum audiri»), «abstractions of abstract things», such as «essentiality,
vitality, and intellectuality» («essentialitas, vitalitas, intellectualitas»).63 According to the ancient Platonists, Ficino argues, these «abstractions of abstracts» are
within God in the most united and secret way, known only to God, so that they
do not hinder the absolute perfection of God. Moreover, while the abstracts essentia, vita et intelligentia are distinct and separate from each other, the abstractions of abstracts contain within themselves all the others. As such, they were
thought to manifest the unique and perfect power of God.64
In contrast, Ficino goes on, the later Platonists (i.e. Syrianus and Proclus)
only used negations to describe God. In this way, they were maintaining God’s
63
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 58 (= Op., p. 1173): «Antiquiores nonnulli Platonici absolutis quibusdam affirmationibus utebantur circa deum, existimantes cum deus omnino sit
omnium causa praecipue amplissimorum atque priorum, merito vires radicesque horum in
se prorsus habere, per quas affirmari de deo absolutissima quaeque possint – nullo quidem
pacto concreta, videlicet quod deus sit ens aut vivens aut intelligens, neque rursus proxima
his abstracta, ceu quod deus sit essentia vel vita vel intellectus, sed abstractorum potius abstractiones ipsae, ut (si pronuntiari possit vel extra risum audiri) essentialitas, vitalitas, intellectualitas caeteraque similiter generatim perfectissima quaeque».
64
Ibid.: «Esse autem haec in deo ratione quadam, ut aiunt, quam unitissima, quam secretissima nobis soli deo cognita. Opinabantur forsan abstracta concretis proxima nonnullas concretorum conditiones habere, abstracta vero remota sive abstractorum abstractiones ab omnibus concretorum passionibus absolutissimas esse, ut affirmata de deo nihil ibi angustiae, nihil
mutabilitatis, nihil multiplicitatis vel divisionis compositionisve ullius afferant, sed eminentissimam ad optima quaeque perficienda significent potestatem, ut cum essentialitatem dicunt,
non formam quandam sive speciem intelligant a vita, vel vitalitate distinctam, similiter cum
vitalitatem nominant, non speciem fingant ab essentia vel intelligentia differentem, rursus cum
intellectualitatem aiunt, non speciem ab essentia et vita discretam. Haec enim tria et praeter
haec sapientia veritasque et virtus et similia his abstracta ita se habent, ut unumquodque horum distinctum sit a caeteris neque sit id ipsum quod sunt illa. Vnumquodque igitur definitum est certumque bonum, non simpliciter omne bonum. Volunt ergo per illa quae diximus
abstractorum abstracta significari non bonum in hoc genere aut illo nec rursus bonorum cumulum differentium, sed absolute, singulariter, eminenter, omne bonum. Quod generum omnium limitibus omnino subtractis omnique adempta multiplicate omnium generum bona producat, per unicam videlicet potestatem ad essentias, ad vitas, ad mentes, sapientias, veritates,
virtutes efficiendas. Haec inquam antiquiores Platonici forsan meditabantur».
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
absolute transcendence. Although they sometimes used comparisons to describe
the ways in which things are related to God, they rejected «absolute affirmations» (i.e. the «abstractions of abstracts» mentioned above), on the ground that
the latter contradicted the Platonic doctrine according to which one should neither name nor qualify God.65
What Ficino characterises as the opinion of the «first Neoplatonists» results from the combination of three different doctrines described and refuted by
Proclus in the Parmenides commentary. According to Proclus, three authorities
considered that one should attach some «nature and characteristic» (tina fsin
ka i dita) to the One and therefore make use of affirmations to express God’s
transcendence.66 The first commentators postulated the existence, above Intellect (no), the existence of something considered ‘simpler’ than Intellect and
called intellectuality (noth), which Ficino translated as intellectualitas. Others
made a distinction between God and the «state of being God» (t eö einai),
the latter being the proper designation of the One. Finally, a third group of commentators considered that the One contains within itself the causal principles
of Being, Life, and Intellect, and indeed of all the Forms, as «paradigms prior
to paradigms», the One itself being «a whole prior to wholes». Proclus rejects
these doctrines on the ground that negations are the only correct way of expressing the One’s absolute superiority; comparisons can only be used to describe
God in relation to the things that come after Him. This last statement evidently corresponds to what Ficino calls the opinion of the later Neoplatonists, who
used only «relative affirmations» (i.e. comparisons) and negations to describe
God.67
65
Ibid.: «Posteriores vero Platonici post negationes quas cum Platone prae caeteris eligunt, non absolutas quidem affirmationes admittunt, sed solummodo relativas. Non absolutas, inquam, quia verentur ne quid penes deum forte definiant, ne quid interim deo adhibeant naturae nostrae cognatum, quod quidem in Epistola ad Dionysium Plato providentissime
prohibet, asserens hunc circa deum errorem errorum omnium originem esse. Relativas autem affirmationes tradunt non significare quid vel qualis sit ipse deus neque nomen eius notitiamve exprimere (haec enim nobis impossibilia Parmenides inquit), sed quo pacto res ad
deum se habeant declarare, ut quando principium dicimus et medium atque finem intelligimus res a deo fieri, servari, perfici, quando bonum tamquam finem ab omnibus expeti omnium perfectorem. Quid vero? Si etiam quando unum videmur affirmare, tunc vel ad ipsum
nostra referimus quasi haec uniantur inde, vel forte negamus ipsum esse multiplicem vel aliqua ratione compositum».
66
Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1106.1-1108.19, and Hadot’s analysis of this passage
in Porphyre et Marius Victorinus, I, Paris 1968, pp. 355-375.
67
Ficino might have known these doctrines from Marius Victorinus, an author who was
well known by Bessarion (cf. H. D. Saffrey, Notes autographes du cardinal Bessarion dans un
manuscrit de Munich, «Byzantion», XXXV, 1965, pp. 536-563: 547-548). Ficino’s terms essentialitas, vitalitas, intellectualitas, are strikingly similar to the terminology used by Marius Victorinus. The text is Adversus Arium, IV, 5.31-48 (Marius Victorinus, Traités théologiques sur
la Trinité, éd. par P. Henry et P. Hadot, Paris 1960, p. 514): «Deus, inquam, primo universalium universales existentias substantiasque progenuit. Has Plato ideas vocat, cunctarum in
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Maude Vanhaelen
What is striking here is that Ficino also characterises these appellations as
«abstractiones abstractorum», thus using a scholastic terminology to describe the
ancient doctrine refuted by Proclus. This certainly echoes Lorenzo Valla’s criticism of the scholastic use of words ending with -itas, on the ground that these
terms were attested neither in Aristotle nor in classical Latin authors.68 But above
all, it alludes to Pico’s use of scholastic affirmations as a legitimate means to describe God. It opposes Pico’s contention that God, who is above the concrete
names ens, unum, verum and bonum, is said to be plenissima entitas, individua
unitas, solidissima veritas, beatissima bonitas.69 In contrast, Ficino considers the
scholastic doctrine of abstraction as a mere preliminary to the Platonists’ via negativa. For elsewhere in the commentary he compares Thomas Aquinas’ method
of abstraction with what Proclus considered as the Parmenides’ logical, ‘maieutic’ exercise whereby Parmenides initiates Socrates to the truth about the whole
structure of the Universe.70 In chapter 11 of his commentary on the second hypothesis, Ficino argues that it is to exercise Socrates that Parmenides sometimes
leads his disciple to concede false statements, or to use abstractions, since, as
Thomas Aquinas put it, «abstraction does not falsify».71 In other words, Ficino
exsistentibus specierum species principales; quod genus in exemplo est: ontth, wth, noth,
et item tautth, eterth, atque hoc genus genera. Genera igitur generum profonduntur a deo
et omnium potentiarum potentiae universaliter principales. Ergo ontth, id est essentialitas
vel essentitas, sive wth, id est vitalitas, id est prima universalis vitae potentia, hoc est prima vita, fonsque omnium vivendi, item noth intelligendi vis, virtus, potentia vel substantia
vel natura, haec tria accipienda ut singula, sed ita ut qua suo plurimo sunt, hoc nominentur
et esse dicantur». See also Ad Candidum, § 7.4-5 (ibid., p. 22): «[…] sunt quaedam eius quod
sit natura manifesta, sicuti sunt, quae vere sunt, et omnia supracaelestia, ut spiritus, no, ani­
ma, cognoscentia, disciplina, virtutes, lgoi, opiniones, perfectio, exsistentia, vita, intellegentia, et adhuc superius exsistentialitas, vitalitas, intellegentitas et supra ista omnia on solum
istud ipsum quod est unum et solum on». Bessarion’s autograph manuscript identified by Saffrey contains at f. 356v the following passage: «existentialitas, vitalitas, intellegentias», quoting the same terminology that Ficino uses in his own commentary.
68
L. Valla, Retractatio totius dialecticae, I, 4, a cura di G. Zippel, Padova 1982, I, pp.
30 ff., where Valla rejects the use of the terms such as quidditas, perseitas, entitas, «e barbarie
quodam gurgustio prolata», since «primum hae ab Aristotele non traduntur, deinde a substantivis deduci nequeunt, postremo nec ab omnibus adiectivis, nisi ab iis quae exeunt in ‘us’
[…] aut in ‘er’ […] et quae in ‘is’ […]».
69
Pico, De Ente et uno, V, cit., p. 160: «[…] haec enim nomina ens, verum, unum, bonum, concretum quid dicunt et quasi participatum. Quare rursus dicimus Deum super ens,
super verum, super unum, super bonum esse quia scilicet ipsum esse est, ipsa veritas, ipsa
unitas, ipsa bonitas»; IX, p. 182: «Deus ergo plenissima entitas, individua unitas, solidissima
veritas, beatissima bonitas». This echoes the scholastic doctrine of transcentals according to
which ens, unum, verum et bonum convertuntur.
70
On this exegetical method, see Morrow-Dillon, Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, cit., p. 209.
71
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Secunda suppositio, Chap. 11 (= Op., p. 1193r): «Iam vero si
rerum formas in mutua rerum communione contueamur, certe cum Anaxagora omnia quodammodo in omnibus contuebimur. Si rursum eas per intelligentiam exactissimam in for-
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
integrates, as in the case of Aristotle, the scholastic method of abstraction within a Neoplatonic framework, as a preliminary exercise to the apprehension of
the Platonic mysteries.
d) Discourses 6-7
After rejecting Pico’s equivalence between the concepts of One and Being,
Ficino undertakes to refute the equivalence between the names Good and Being. Pico had argued that there is a multiplicity of beings, just as there is a multiplicity of goodnesses («sicut multiplex et est esse, ita multiplicem esse bonitatem»). For instance, there is natural being (the fact of being a man, a lion or a
stone) and accidental beings (the fact of being wise, beautiful etc.). Natural being and good are equivalent, since everything that is good is good inasmuch as
it is («unumquodque quod est eatenus esse bonum quatenus est»).72 This position had led Pico to attack explicitly Olympiodorus’ famous distinction between
good and being («similiter autem et bonum est, quia quicquid est, quatenus est,
bonum est. Et longe errat Olympiodorus, mea quidem sententia, sic credens probare aliud esse bonum et ens, quoniam bonum simpliciter desideramus, non autem esse simpliciter, sed bene esse, ideoque fieri posse ut, si male sit nobis, non
esse desideremus»).
In contrast Ficino, implicitly drawing on pseudo-Olympiodorus’ Phaedo
commentary, states in Discourse 6 that one does not seek being, but well-being («quod non eligitur esse, sed bene esse atque bonum»), which indicates that
Good is superior to Being.73 Thus, Ficino argues, perfections such as life, knowlmalibus suis eminentibusque rationibus, tamquam iam abstractissimas, inspexerimus iterum
cum Anaxa­gora intellectum ipsum esse discretorem omnium confitebimur. Qui autem discretionibus eiusmodi uti nescit non est Platonicus nec umquam utitur intellectu. Quamobrem
Parmenides ad hoc ipsum exercitaturus ingenui adolescentis ingenium passim per angustissima quae­que cogit eum vel concedere falsa vel eiusmodi abstractionibus uti, in quibus, ut ille
quoque quem nosti fatetur, non est mendacium» (=T homas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q.
VII, a. 3, obj. 1: «Abstrahentium non est mendacium»).
72
Pico, De Ente et Uno, VIII, cit., pp. 176-179.
73
Chap. 46 (= Op., p. 1161). Ficino refers to Olympiodorus’ distinction in Platonic Theology, XII, 3, 7 (ed. A llen-Hankins, IV, p. 38): «Item, bonum omnia simpliciter appetunt,
esse vero non simpliciter, sed bene esse dumtaxat. Forte etiam si bene esse omnino ne­queant,
esse non appetant, ut probat Olympiodorus, utpote quae esse appetent gratia boni». Cf. ps­ od
­ orus (=Damascius), In Phaedonem, edidit W. Norvin, Lipsiae 1913, 1, 179 and 1,
Olympi
189. Ficino read and annotated Olympiodorus’ Phaedo commentary and Damascius’ Phaedo and Philebus commentaries in Riccardianus 37 (cf. L. G. Westerink, Ficino’s Marginal
Notes on Olympio­dorus in Riccardi Greek Ms 37, «Traditio», XXIV, 1968, pp. 352-378; Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone. Mostra di manoscritti, cit., pp. 110-111, n° 86). Ficino followed one branch of the textual tradition, in ascribing to Olympiodorus the whole content
of the manuscript, including the sections that are now attributed to Damascius: see L. G.
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Maude Vanhaelen
edge, desire and action do not constitute degrees of essence («ut non sint quidam quasi gradus essentiae»), but only formal additions («formalia quaedam addita»); they are essential perfections that ultimately depend on the supreme Good
(«tamquam perfectiones eius et bona quaedam a bono superiore pendentia»).
Every essence tends towards something; each desires this thing, non qua being,
but qua good. In other words, the elevation towards God cannot be achieved
by a purification of the four universals such as described by Pico, but through
an innate desire towards the Good.
In the seventh and last discourse (Chap. 47) Ficino defines the difference
between being and good («quae differens ratio entis atque boni»).74 To prove
this point Ficino uses Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine according to which substance
(unlike accidents) does not admit a variation in degree.75 According to Ficino,
essence (unlike the good) is not susceptible to more or less («Essentia ipsa, qua
ratione essentia est, magis minusve non suscipit. Bonum vero, tamquam aliud,
magis suscipit atque minus»). Therefore, «more being» or «having more essence»
are not degrees of being, but are «more» in the sense of «better», i.e. thanks to
God’s supreme Goodness. Similarly, one seeks a thing because this thing is better, not because it has more being («saepe etiam quod magis essentiale est in rebus appetit ut finem aliquem quod in his est minus essentiale, id est actionem
motumque aliquem, tamquam melius aliquid vel tamquam per quod melius quandoque se habeat quasi essentia et bonum non sint idem»). In addition, the opposites of being and good, namely, non-being and evil, are different: evil and
non-good are not only privations of being, but also defects («praetera oppositum
quidem entis est non ens, oppositum vero boni malum, sed malum non idem penitus atque non ens. Malum enim dicitur non solum omnimoda, ut ita dixerim,
essendi privatio, sed etiam defectus quidam boni»).
Similarly, Ficino demonstrates against Pico that knowledge and pleasure do
not constitute an end, but depend ultimately on the Good. The formal perfection of essence is the intellectual form of which the perfection is the actual intelligence («intelligentia actualis») and intelligence has most being when it
is most certain («haec vero plurimum sui entis habet quando certissima est»).
In both intellectual activity (such as intellectus or certitudo) and supra-intellectual activity («voluptas»),76 Ficino argues, the end is the Good, rather than
Westerink, The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo. II. Damascius, Amsterdam-OxfordNew York 1977, pp. 15-18.
74
Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1161).
75
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 5, a. 1, obj. 3.
76
The theme of pleasure as an element of the supreme Good rather than Intellect is
discussed by Plotinus (Enneads, 6.7, 25-26) and Proclus (Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 4, p.
36.7-11); it derives from Plato’s Philebus 66c. Here Ficino uses voluptas in the sense of gaudium
or furor, just as Pico refers to insania in De Ente et Uno, V, as the ultimate stage in the mystical union with God. In the De Voluptate, an early treatise written in 1457 (cf. Kristeller,
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
Being.77 Indeed, Ficino goes on, expressions such as «magis essentiae» and «magis
entis» cannot refer to a degree of magnitude, number, time, or any degree of
quality, since these do not befit any substance. Magis ens, therefore, necessarily refers to what is more desirable (optabile).78 The Good itself cannot be equivalent to what is «most being» (maxime ens), for just as within each thing wellbeing and being are distinct, similarly Being and Good are different. Moreover,
what is maxime ens is by no means simple being (simpliciter ens), but being provided with «an essential addition» («addimentum essentiale»), which makes being maxime, namely best (optime), that is, dependent on the Good. Finally, perfection, or Goodness, is either formal or final. Yet, if one can object that formal
goodness is an essential addition, one cannot possibly do so in the case of final
Goodness, i.e. the goodness that constitutes the end for each substance.79
Supplementum Ficinianum, cit., I, p. cxv), Ficino distinguishes laetita/gaudium from voluptas
(«Plato igitur, ut ab eorum principe initium faciam, cum animum in duas partes distri­buis­set,
mentem scilicet ac sensum, menti laetitiam et gaudium attribuit, sensibus voluptatem»; Op.,
p. 937), but also argues that both terms can be used interchangeably (Op., p. 997): «Quinetiam interdum et ipse Plato voluptatis et gaudii nomina confundit, utroque vocabulo utens
ad utrumque significandum. Nomine igitur vel nullo modo, vel vix, ac minimo discrepant, ex
vero re congruant testes esse possunt nonnulli Platonis libri necnon Platonici plerique haud­
quaquam philosophi contemnendi […]».
77
Cf. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 4, p. 36.7-11.
78
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1162): «[…] at si etiam susciperis quod
magis essentiae vel entis habet, id magis expeti, equidem non putabo te magis essentiam suspicari quasi mole maiorem vel numero plurem vel tempore diuturniorem vel gradibus quasi
qualitatis intentiorem. Essentia enim suapte natura a magnitudine, numero, tempore, qualitate simpliciter est abstracta et haec quae modo narravi nonnumquam minus eliguntur quam
opposita. Neque rursus substantialiorem, ut ita loquar, eam vocas. Magis enim atque minus
non pertinent ad substantiam. Reliquum est ut illud magis ens et optabile magis iudicaturus
sis quod ens est melius. Melius autem, per ipsam bonitatem, melius esse censetur. Sed quae
bonitas est in essentia qualitas est essentiae entisque conditio. Super hanc igitur extat ipsum
absolute bonum».
79
Ibid.: «Si vero dixeris bonum ipsum esse id omnino quod maxime ens est, respondeo primo quidem sicut in quolibet ente alia quidem est essendi ratio, alia vero bene essendi, sic aliam esse rationem ipsius maxime entis, aliam ipsius boni. Deinde quod maxime ens
appellabas non fore simpliciter ens, sed cum additamento quodam per quod non simpliciter quidem sit, sed sit quam maxime, id est quam perfectissime, id est quam optime, scilicet
per aliquam perfectionem bonitatemque ab ipso simpliciter bono prorsus infusam. Cum vero
dicimus ipsum simpliciter bonum, dicimus omne sine limitatione vel compositione bonum.
Item perfectio bonitasve est gemina. Alia quidem formalis, alia vero finalis. Si quis ergo convicerit formalem bonitatem esse quasi quoddam augumentum essentiale, non tamen de finali quae est potissima et optima, idem dicere poterit. Igitur bonum praeter essentiam censetur
existere, idque saepe facit ut quod quasi accidentale est in re, vel circa rem optabilius sit et
melius eo quod essentiale magis, quod quidem fieri nequit absque condimento boni (sive id
quidem formale sit, sive sit finale), praesertim quia quod quasi accidentale est ideo optabilius
est quod circa bonum ipsum agit externum, alioquin optabilius numquam foret. Non enim
potest accidens esse substantiae finis. Igitur finis eius est ipsum bonum penes quod substantia per illud accidens sese versat. Praeterea essentia, vita, intellectus differunt inter se ratione
formali, differentes enim definitiones habent, nec idem haec inter se sunt, scilicet non ens,
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Maude Vanhaelen
Ficino also refutes Pico’s distinction between accidental and natural being.
According to him, an accidental thing (i.e. which has less being) can be more
desirable than a thing that has more being («idque saepe facit ut quod quasi accidentale est in re vel circa rem optabilius sit et melius eo quod essentiale
magis, quod quidem fieri nequit absque condimento boni (sive id quidem formale sit, sive sit finale), praesertim quia quod quasi accidentale est ideo optabilius est quod circa bonum ipsum agit externum, alioquin optabilius num­quam
foret»).80
Ficino then rejects Pico’s doctrine of plurality of beings as contrary to the divine Providence: the triad of being, life, and intellect differs formally, since their
respective opposites are different; however, there are no degrees of being as there
are degrees of heat. One could also object, Ficino goes on, that there are no degrees of essence as such, but that in each composite there are different modes of
being. For instance, our soul would first have its natural being, then the being
of tranquillity, then of wisdom, then of felicity («forte vero dicet aliquis essentiam quidem non magis minusve qualitatis modo suscipere, sed in quovis composito multos essendi modos esse posse, ut anima nostra primo quidem habet
suum esse naturale, secundo suscipit esse tranquillitatis, tertio sapientiae, quarto felicitatis»), with an equal number of degrees of being and goodness («totidemque procedere bonitatis gradus quot essendi modos»).81 In that case, Ficino
argues, being and good should remain formally different at every level, for being always seeks the good; therefore, when the soul desires, beyond its natural
being, knowledge, it does so because knowledge is good rather than «more being» («essentiae magis compotem»).
Finally, Ficino refutes Pico’s contention that being precedes unity and good
within the creation, just as the efficient cause precedes the paradigmatic and the
final causes.82 According to Ficino, things created by the First are ‘being’ inasmuch as they are created by God (efficient cause), and ‘good’ inasmuch as they
are naturally inclined towards Him (final cause). Thus, the final cause provides
things with their individual good, while the efficient cause provides them with
their essence. Such a distinction, Ficino concludes, demonstrates that the Good is
superior to Being («Res vero, sicut diximus, ab ipso deo tamquam effectore sornon vivens, non intelligens, et pluribus alia quam alia competunt. Neque per magis minusve
differunt, quasi essentia primum gradum et secundum habeat atque tertium, sicut calor, est
enim substantiale, sed forte differunt sicut siccitas et calor et lumen. Profecto nisi aliter ens
distinguamus quam more qualitatis, per primum eius gradum et secundum atque tertium latenter eo deveniemus, ut solam unam essentiam substantiamve fingamus ceu calorem unum
modo remissiorem, modo vehementiorem, tollemusque substantialium formarum gradus distinctionesque rerum ad providentiam pertinentes».
80
Ibid., Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1162).
81
Ibid.
82
Pico, De Ente et Uno, VIII-IX, cit., pp. 172-185.
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
tiuntur essentiam et tamquam fine praecipue adipiscuntur bonum. Ipsum itaque
bonum, ut dicebamus, ipso ente praestantius iudicandum»).83
Aristotle himself, Ficino argues, would not fail to accept this distinction between final and efficient causes, if he remembers that he has received from the
ancients the definition of the good as the object of desire for all things («Quod
et Aristotelem non arbitror negaturum, si modo meminerit se descriptionem
boni hanc a veteribus accepisse: bonum est quod omnia entia appetunt»). Neither will Aristotle fail to concede that there is a difference between the object
of desire and the things that desire this object and, as a result, that the Good is
different and superior to all beings («Cum enim alia quidem sint appetentia, aliud vero atque praestantius sit appetibile, certe bonum cunctis entibus expetendum, ab Aristotele concedendum est esse tota entium universitate superius»).
Aristotle’s definition of God as the prime Mover, which moves all things as an
object of desire and love, is therefore in agreement with Plato’s definition of the
Good as the final cause («Propterea deum inquit regere movereque omnia non
aliter quam ut appetibile et amabile, id est, ut bonum atque finem. Nec iniuria causam causarum una cum praeceptore suo nominabit bonum, finis videlicet
cognomento, si quidem finalis causa caeteras antecellit»), whilst the equation he
draws between one and being actually concerns the one that can be apprehended by intellect, rather than the simple One («Sic ubi vero ens uni bonoque facit aequale, illi forsan uni atque bono par iudicat, quod et ab intellectu percipi et ab ente capi potest»). Only Plato has been able to describe the supreme
One through veils and metaphors, while Aristotle has venerated the doctrine of
his master in silence («Quod autem Plato suus vaticinatur excelsius id, tamquam
ineffabile penitus et incognitum, non verbis quidem prosequitur, sed potius silentio veneratur»).84
By invoking the Neoplatonic definition of the Good as the universal object
of desire, a definition that is based upon Plotinus’ reinterpretation of Aristotle’s
definition of the individual good, Ficino intends to demonstrate that Aristotle’s
final cause, far from being an innovation, is in fact a re-appropriation of a definition established by the ancient theologians. In other words, Ficino’s aim is to
subsume Aristotle’s thought under the divine wisdom of the prisci theologi, which
is the only theological discourse capable of describing the ineffable and unknown
God. With the two introductory chapters (chapters 39 and 40) as a background,
this passage clearly intends to refute Pico’s equivalence between Plato and Aristotle. More specifically, it counters Pico’s contention that God’s appellations of
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 47 (= Op., p. 1163).
Ibid. On the distinction between Good and Being, the object of desire and the things
that desire it, see Plotinus, Enneads, V, 5, 13, and Proclus, Elements of Theology, § 8. For
the comparison between Aristotle’s and Plato’s definition of the Good, see In Parmenidem,
1169.4-11.
83
84
~  331  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
the One and Good above Being do not constitute a mystery uniquely reserved to
the (Neo)Platonists, but had also been explicitly adopted by Aristotle. Invoking
the famous passage of Metaphysics L where Aristotle quotes the Homeric verses
«let there be one commander, one king»,85 Pico stated that Aristotle, like Plato,
had called God the One and the Good.86
e) The Concluding Chapters (48-49)
Two more chapters conclude Ficino’s refutation and precede the explicit
mention of Pico. Here Ficino develops against Pico a key argument he had briefly alluded to in the seventh discourse: the superiority of the One over Intellect
is the very condition for the soul’s supra-rational, ecstatic union with God. It is
only through unity that one can attain God. Like Ficino, Pico’s major preoccupation was the soul’s apprehension of God through divine madness (insania) and
love (amando): 87 as he concluded at the end of the De Ente et Uno, the ultimate
goal of his discussion is the attainment of beatitude and the soul’s inner possession of unity, truth and goodness, through divine voluptas, and the love of celestial realities.88 Yet unity, truth and goodness, together with the soul’s being, constitute, in Pico’s mind, the four universals present in all things («verissima ergo
sententia est quattuor esse quae omnia ambiunt, ens, unum, verum et bonum»),
including God («examinemus rursus qualiter haec sunt in deo»).89
Aristotle, Metaphysics, L, 1076a 1-4, with reference to Iliad, II, 204-205.
Pico, De Ente et Uno, IV, cit., pp. 152-153: «Adiciam et hoc injuria gloriari quosdam
Platonicos qui mysterium habeant Aristoteli ignotum, cum dicunt duas esse proprias Dei
appellationes, unum scilicet et bonum, atque ita bonum et unum ante ens esse. Sicut enim
ostendimus non latere Peripateticos quo modo supra ens Deus intelligi posit. Possumus et hoc
ostendere duo in primis haec nomina boni scilicet et unius Deo Aristotelem dedisse. Nam
duodecimo libro primae philosophiae postquam de toto ente separatisque mentibus disputavit, quaerit postremo, quasi post omnia ad Dei solius proprietates investigandas conversus,
an praeter bonum quod quasi in exercitu in entium universitate est, sit bonum aliquod separatum quasi in duce hujus exercitus, idque esse determinat, quod bonum Deus est. De quo
consequenter eodem capite unitatem probat, in eius testimonium, post validas rationes, illud
etiam Homeri: ‘ei korano estw, ei basile’. Vbi ergo falsus? Vbi discors a Platone est Aristoteles? Vbi prophanus? Vbi de Deo minus quam deceat honorifice sentiens?».
87
Pico, De Ente et Uno, V, p. 166 and note 45, p. 344: «Sed vide mi Angele quae nos insania teneat. Amare Deum dum sumus in corpore plus possumus quam vel eloqui vel cognoscere. Amando plus nobis proficimus, minus laboramus, illi magis obsequimur».
88
Ibid., X, p. 186: «[…] admonere autem in primis nos praesens disputatio videtur ut, si
esse beati volumus, beatissimum omnium imitemur Deum, unitatem in nobis, veritatem bonitatemque possidentes […]. Fugiamus hinc ergo idest a mundo qui positus in maligno. Evolemus ad Patrem ubi pax unifica, ubi lux verissima, ubi voluptas optima. Sed quis dabit pennas ut illuc volemus? Amor eorum quae sursum sunt».
89
Ibid., VIII («In quo declarat quomodo quattuor haec ens scilicet, unum, verum et bonum in omnibus sint quae sunt post Deum») and IX («In quo declarat quomodo illa quattuor in Deo sint»).
85
86
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
In contrast, Ficino shows that the principle of each being is what is most unitary in them, an innate unity (unitas) which is the character of the simple and absolute One («character illius simpliciter unitatis»), and in virtue of which each of
these realities is a god and is united to the supreme and absolute God. It is only
through its unity, Ficino states, that the Intellect can communicate with the supreme One and can therefore be a god and a principle.90 In this context, Ficino
reinterprets Proclus’ doctrine of the henads in a very specific context. In the first
chapter, Ficino paraphrases a section of Proclus’ Parmenides commentary, where
Proclus demonstrates through the examples of light, nature and knowledge, that
any class of things ultimately derives from a unitary principle, i.e. a divine henad, which is an intermediary between the One and the Ideas.91 But while Proclus considers that the henads are intermediaries between the One and the Intellect, they become in Ficino’s commentary unities within the intellectual part of
the soul («unitas intellectuali illi animae praeest, quasi character illius simpliciter unitatis, quae est universi principium»).92 In doing so, Ficino reinterprets Proclus’ description of henads in the light of the Neoplatonic doctrine of the «one
of the soul» («unum animae»), a concept that is also prominent in Christian mysticism («apex mentis») and central to Ficino’s thought.93 This position leads Fi-
90
Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 48 (= Op., p. 1163): «Quae quidem unitas intellectuali illi animae praeest, quasi character illius simpliciter unitatis, quae est universi principium,
cui et intellectus ille per unitatem suam maxime est unitus. Per eandem est diciturque deus.
Haec igitur divina solis unitas est uniformis luminis mundani principium, quemadmodum
et ipsa simpliciter unitas atque bonitas est luminis intelligibilis auctor. […] Cum vero in hac
rerum semina sint quam plurima, unum autem oporteat esse principium, merito per principalem unitatem suam, per quam et ipsa divina est summoque deo prorsus unita, est generationis omnis mundanae principium. […] Investigantibus praeterea quid primum cognitionis
omnis principium sit, perfectissima cognitio, id est intellectus primus, protinus occurret ut
princeps. Verumtamen non per multas species conceptionesque suas primum erit cognoscendi principium, nam unum tandem hoc esse debet, sed per unitatem suam, qua deus existit,
tam sibi quam caeteris virtutem cognoscendi largitur».
91
Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1044-1051. As participated unities, «summits»
of the chains of all beings, the henads are intermediaries between the One as totally simple
and transcendent, and the One as the source of all being. The fullest presentation of Proclus’ doctrine of divine henads occur in the Elements of Theology, §§ 113-165, and in Platonic Theology, III, 1-6.
92
Chap. XLVIII (= Op., p. 1163).
93
Cf. Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1047, 1071-1072 and 1080, and Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. 78 (= Op., pp. 1187-1188). See P. O. Kristeller, Il pensiero filosofico di Marsilio Ficino, Firenze 1953, pp. 400-403. On the Neoplatonic doctrine of the «one in the soul»,
see J. R ist, Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatonism, «Hermes», XCII, 1964, pp.
213-225; W. Beierwaltes, Der Begriff des ‘unum in nobis’ bei Proklos, in Proklos. Grundzüge
seiner Metaphysik, Frankfurt 1965, translated in Italian, Proclo. I fondamenti della sua metafisica, Milano 1990, pp. 396-411; for the reception of the doctrine in medieval mysticim, see
L. Reypens, Âme (son fond, ses puissances et sa structure d’après les mystiques), in M. Viller
et al., Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, I, Paris 1937, pp. 434-469; E. Von Ivànka, Apex mentis, in
Plato Christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter, Einsiedeln
~  333  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
cino to underline, against Pico, that the soul’s union with God is only possible
through its innate unity; postulating, as did Pico, the existence within us of any
other entity superior to unity renders mystical union impossible.
Similarly, in the following and last chapter Ficino demonstrates that the first
principle is the unity and goodness above intellect, life and essence («Primum
rerum principium est unitas bonitasque super intellectum, vitam, essentiam»).
Ficino’s main argument is that the first Intellect is not god qua intellect, life or
essence, but qua one, and depends therefore on the supreme One. This echoes
a long Neoplatonic tradition that culminates with Proclus’ famous refutation of
Origen the Platonist’s equivalence between the First principle and the Intellect
in Book II of the Platonic Theology.94 But here Ficino paraphrases another text
of Proclus, Proclus’ description of the henad of knowledge in the Parmenides
commentary, and links it with the final section of Plotinus’ Ennead 6.7, How the
Multitude of Ideas came into Being, and on the Good (chaps 15-47), where Plotinus describes the genesis of Intellect and multiplicity from the One and places
the One above life, intellect and essence.95 According to Ficino, the first Intellect cannot be the absolute, simple Principle, since it is determined by an intellectual condition and order («Existimabit forte aliquis primum intellectum esse
simpliciter primum. Tametsi opporteret eum qui sic existimat animadvertere se,
dum dicit primum intellectum, significare id ipsum quod dicit non iam esse simpliciter, sed certa quaquam conditione et definito quodam ordine, scilicet intellectuali, primum»). In addition, the Intellect is related by proportio to individual intellects, while this type of relation does not befit the First («Similiter neque
quod ipsum intelligibile nominatur poterit simpliciter esse primum, praesertim
cum proportionem habeat quandam cum intellectu quolibet a primo principio
alienam»). The Intellect cannot be the first and supreme God, since all realities do not possess the character of intelligence or knowledge («Sed dic quaeso,
qui intellectum vis esse primum summumque deum, quanam ratione id munus
habebit? Non qua intellectus est, alioquin cum omnia primi potentissimi auctoris
omnium debeant reportare characterem, intelligentiam vel cognitionem quan-
1964, translated in French, Plato Christianus. La réception critique du platonisme chez les Pères
de l’Église, Paris 1990, pp. 299-334.
94
Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., II, 4, and Id., In Parmenidem, Chap. VI, pp.
1064.21-1066.16.
95
Cf. Ennead, VI, 7, 17.11. On Plotinus’ doctrine of the genesis of multiplicity from the
One, see M. Atkinson, Plotinus: Ennead V 1. On the Three Principal Hypostases, Oxford 1983,
pp. 124-184; A. C. Lloyd, Plotinus on the Genesis of Thought and Existence, «Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy», V, 1987, pp. 155-186; J. Bussanich, The One and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus, Leiden 1988; C. D’A ncona, Determinazione e indeterminazione nel sovrasensibile secondo Plotino, «Rivista di storia della filosofia», XLV, 1990, pp. 437-474; Ead., La
doctrine de la création dans le Liber de Causis, «Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques», LXXVI, 1992, pp. 209-233.
~  334  ~
The Pico-Ficino Controversy
dam omnia possidebunt»). Drawing on Proclus’ description of the henad of Intellect, Ficino argues that there is as much difference between the Intellect and
the First as there is between creation and contemplation («Quantum vero interest inter facere atque contueri, tanto intellectus intervallo saltem a primo rerum principio distat»). For it is the proper role of Intellect to contemplate the
realities that already exist, whilst the role of God is to create, preserve and perfect all things («intellectus ille primus, qua ratione est intelligens, ad intelligibilia
iam existentia et ad ipsa quae dicuntur entia sese confert, nec aliud habet proprium, nisi illa quae iam sunt perspicue contueri. Non igitur hac ratione rerum
principium esse potest, cuius proprium est omnia facere, servare, perficere»).96
Finally, the individual intellects are, like the first Intellect, intelligent souls, and
as such are either demons or angels, but not gods, unless they also possess the
gift of universal providence («Denique intellectus etiam sunt particulariter intelligentes animae, sive daemones, sive angeli, neque tamen dii sunt, nisi praeterea
universalis providentiae munus habeant»).
Ficino then draws upon the last section of Plotinus’ Ennead VI, 7. He argues
that the Intellect cannot be a principle qua life or essence, since life and essence
do not constitute universal characters («Sed numquid intellectus ille primus, qua
ratione vita est, appellandus est princeps? Minime, nam omnia viverent. Forte
vero qua est essentia, sunt enim omnia? Neque id quidem. Perfectior enim est,
qua intellectus existit aut etiam vita, quam qua essentia. Si igitur non illa, neque ista ratione deus»). The Intellect, therefore, is a principle only in virtue of
the unity and the goodness within itself, which ultimately depend from the simple Unity and Goodness («Quanam igitur conditione primus intellectus habet,
ut sit principium aliquid atque deus, qua videlicet ferme cuncta sibi quodammodo similia reddit? Per unitatem bonitatemque omnibus distributam»). Unity
and Goodness above Intellect are the names of the first principle, since the First
is both incomparable simplicity, whereby it is called unity («incomparabilis ipsa
simplicitas quam ipsam dicimus unitatem»), and all-pervading diffusion, whereby it is called goodness («communicabilitas per omnia se diffundens quam bonitatem ipsam cognominamus»).97
It is not surprising that Ficino compares Plotinus’ and Proclus’ descriptions
of mystical union. Before commenting upon Plotinus’ Ennead VI, 7, Ficino had
read and translated excerpts of Proclus’ commentary on the First Alcibiades,
where Proclus describes the unity of the soul’s intellect in a mystical context as
the supra-intellectual unity that enables the soul to unite with the One.98 Ficino
See Ficino, In Parmenidem, Chap. VI (Op., p. 1047).
Chap. 49 (= Op., p. 1164).
98
In Alcibiadem, 246.21-248.4 (Proclus. Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon, ed. & transl.
by A.-Ph. Segonds, II, Paris 1986, pp. 294-295). Ficino’s translation is in Op., p. 1922, under
the title Multi gradus per quos a multitudine ad unum ascendimus contemplando. On Ficino’s
96
97
~  335  ~
Maude Vanhaelen
had already underlined in his commentary on Plotinus’ ‘last’ treatises the similarity between Proclus’ description of the soul’s inner unity, the ‘flower’ of human essence in the First Alcibiades commentary («per unum et tamquam essentiae nostrae florem attingere licet, per quod sane nostrum unum divino maxime
iungimur») 99 and the soul’s unity described in Ennead VI, 7, 35 («in anima quoque est unitas intellectu superior per quam deo fruitur visione quadam intelligentiam superante»).100 In this way, he underlines the affinity between Plotinus’ and Proclus’ descriptions of the soul’s elevation towards God, as also
noted by John Bussanich.101 Indeed, beyond the fundamental differences between
Plotinus’ and Proclus’ doctrines, and Proclus’ sharp criticisms of Plotinus,102
which Ficino was at least partially aware of,103 both philosophers describe a
state of ecstatic, pure thought that transcends the Intellect.104 Proclus himself
frequently alludes to Plotinus’ famous reference to the Symposium’s «intoxica-
translation, see Kristeller, Supplementum Ficinianum, I, cit., pp. cxxxiv-cxxxv; Megna, Per
Ficino e Proclo, cit., who identified Ficino’s exemplar as Palatinus gr. 63.
99
Op., p. 1922.
100
Op., p. 1793.
101
Cf. J. Bussanich, Non-Discursive Thought in Plotinus and Proclus, «Documenti e studi
sulla tradizione filosofica medievale», VIII, 1997, pp. 190-210; Id., Mystical Theology and Spiritual Experience, in Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne, cit., pp. 291-310. It should be noted,
moreover, that both doctrines are linked to the problem of the creation by the One of the Intellect and Multiplicity, a problem that was central to Plotinus and Proclus, but also, through
the Pseudo-Aristotelian Theology and the Liber de Causis, in Avicennian philosophy: see C.
D’Ancona Costa, La doctrine de la Création ‘mediante intelligentia’ dans le Liber de Causis,
«Revue des Sciences philosophiques et théologiques», LXXVI, 1992, pp. 209-234.
102
Proclus rejects the Plotinian doctrine of the direct derivation of the Intellect from the
One on the ground that it introduces multiplicity within the One. His own solution is to multiply the hypostatic degrees between the One and multiplicity, by placing between the One
and Intellect the universal principles of Limit and Unlimited and the henads, and by establishing a distinction between the intellects and the intelligibles. See Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus, cit., I, pp. 99-100; A. H. Armstrong, The Background of the Doctrine ‘That the Intelligibles are not outside the Intellect’, in Fondation Hardt. Entretiens sur l’Antiquité classique, V:
Les sources de Plotin, Genève 1960, pp. 391-413; J. Pépin, Éléments pour une histoire de la relation entre l’intelligence et l’intelligible chez Platon et dans le néoplatonisme, «Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger», LXVI, 1956, pp. 34-64; C. D’A ncona, Primo principio e mondo intelligibile nella metafisica di Proclo: problemi e soluzioni, «Elenchos», XII, 1991,
pp. 271-302. Proclus also criticises the Plotinian conception of the soul’s only partial descent
from the realm of the divine: cf. Plotinus, Ennead, IV, 8 and In Parmenidem, IV 948; In Timaeum, III, 334.3 ff.
103
Ficino rejects Proclus’ criticism of Plotinus’ conception of the second hypothesis as
describing the intelligible world as a whole (cf. Proclus, Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 10,
p. 42.2-20). More specifically, Ficino rejects Proclus’ distinction between intellect and intelligible, and follows Plotinus’ argument that intellect, intelligible, being, essence and life constitute a unique substance. See Chap. 56 (= Op., p. 1170).
104
Plotinus, Ennead, VI, 7 35.19, and Proclus, In Parmenidem, IV, pp. 1071.16-19;
1072.3-5; VII, p. 48.12-19.
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
tion with nectar» when describing the Intellect’s supra-rational phase of union
with the One.105 Given his deep interest in mysticism, as well as what he saw as
his mission of unveiling Plotinus’ oracles through the exploration of other Neoplatonic authors, Ficino could not fail to be struck by the similarity between
Plotinus’ and Proclus’ doctrines and terminology. In this way, it is safe to assume that Ficino’s Parmenides commentary represents an attempt to enlighten,
through the exploration of Proclus’ exegesis of the Parmenides, Plotinus’ theory of the One and the Intellect. In the context of the controversy with Pico, this
enables Ficino to underline once again the fact that the supra-intellectual union with God necessarily implies that the First Principle transcends Being and
Intellect.106
4. Conclusion
To conclude, a close comparison between Ficino’s and Proclus’ commentaries, regarding both the structure and the nature of the arguments, is crucial
to determine the purpose of Ficino’s exegesis. Buried among Neoplatonic arguments, some significant discrepancies enable us to determine the specific issues
Ficino was addressing in his commentary. In the context of the present article,
this analysis provides us with new evidence about the nature of Ficino’s and Pico’s controversy and the relation of Ficino’s commentray with that of Proclus.
As I have shown, the way in which Ficino works back and forth between Proclus’ Parmenides commentary and his Platonic Theology is significant in that it
enables Ficino to respond point by point to Pico’s thesis. Ficino integrates his
refutation within his paraphrase of Proclus’ works, reusing the arguments of ancient controversies to defend his own position. In doing so, Ficino demonstrates
a remarkable insight into the Platonic tradition as described by Proclus. Similarly, Pico was aware of some key Neoplatonic doctrines, such as the importance
of the Sophist and the Parmenides within Proclus’ metaphysical system, and reused these to demolish Ficino’s Neoplatonic exegesis.
But the Pico-Ficino controversy does not simply repeat ancient debates.
While the Neoplatonic controversies on the nature of the Parmenides were pri-
105
Plotinus, Ennead, VI, 7, 35, 19-27, quoted in Proclus, In Parmenidem, VI, pp. 1047;
1071-1072 and 1080; Id., Théologie Platonicienne, cit., I, 14, pp. 65.26-66.2. The expression
mewn t nktari ultimately derives from the myth of Poros in Plato’s Symposium (203b 6).
106
In the Commento, Pico describes divine beatitude as occurring in the soul’s intellect (Pico, Commento, III 4 and Stanze VI, VII e VIII, ed. Garin, pp. 530 and 569); in the
Conclusiones, however, he states that it occurs in the soul’s unity (Conclusio paradoxa XLIII:
«[…] actus quo felicitatur natura angelica et rationalis ultima felicitate non est actus intellectus, nec voluntatis, sed unio unitatis, quae est in alteritate animae cum unitate, quae est
sine alteritate»).
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Maude Vanhaelen
marily concerned with describing the world in the most adequate and systematic way, Pico and Ficino were rather concerned with the nature of the concord
between Plato and Aristotle and between Neoplatonism and Scholastic philosophy. In this context, I would argue that Ficino’s commentary on the Parmenides represents the ultimate stage in his understanding of Neoplatonism as a
unified tradition, and of a fundamental harmony between Plato, Plotinus and
Proclus,107 while Pico’s De Ente et Uno rejects any attempt to reduce God and
the divine realm to a univocal system of thought. This controversy was also
concerned with the definition of the most appropriate theological discourse to
describe God: whilst Pico argued that any tradition could lead to the soul’s
union with God, Ficino demonstrated that only henology and apophatic mysticism could lead to God, since union could only be achieved through the unity
within us.
As a last blow against Pico and his legacy, Ficino chooses to praise later
in the commentary the doctrine of Beauty of another complatonicus, his disciple Francesco Diacceto, «whom the nature and genius seem to have trained to
the apprehension of Platonic wisdom», rather than referring to Pico’s exegesis
of Benivieni’s poem.108 In the fifth Chapter of his interpretation of the Parmenides’ second hypothesis, regarding the derivation of the intelligible world from
the One, Ficino describes the intelligible world as a double forma totalis. The
first form, which precedes the multitude, is the «superessential unity and goodness» («superessentialis unitas bonitasque») and the «summit of the intelligible
world» («mundi illius intelligibilis apex»). The second, which «follows or accompanies the multitude» is called Beauty and consists in «the continuous and ordered series of Ideas» («secunda vero pulchritudo, id est contextus quidam et
ordo ac series idearum»).109 Characterising the relation between Unity and Being
in terms of Goodness and Beauty, Ficino argues that Prime Being and Intellect,
as Beauty, is the external manifestation of God’s Unity and Goodness. In doing
107
Cf. S. Toussaint, L’individuo estatico. Tecniche profetiche in Marsilio Ficino e Giovanni
Pico della Mirandola, «Bruniana&Campanelliana», VI, 2000, pp. 351-379: 377.
108
Chap. LXXXIV (= Op., p. 1191r): «Sed dum pulchritudinem hic divinam memoro
commemorare fas est Franciscum Diacetum dilectissimum complatonicum nostrum de hac
ipsa pulchritudine quotidie multa pulcherrimaque scribentem. Quem sane virum ad Platonicam sapientiam natura geniusque formavisse videtur». See F. Cattani Diacceto, De Pulchro,
I, 9, a cura di S. Matton, Pisa 1986, pp. 74-75.
109
Ibid. (Op., p. 1191v): «Cum ens primum, tamquam ipsi simpliciter uni proximum, maxime unum sit, qualiscumque et quantacumque multitudo sit in eo, ad unam redigitur totius
formam. Forma quidem totalis in rebus, quae a diversis causis componuntur solumque aliunde dependent, partes eiusdem rei multas sequi solet. Sed in ente primo, quod ab unico generatur et quodammodo etiam ex se existit, forma totalis est necessario gemina. Prima quidem suam partium multitudinem antecedit, secunda vero sequitur, vel potius comitatur. Illa
quidem appellatur superessentialis unitas bonitasque, mundi illius intelligibilis apex, secunda vero pulchritudo, id est contextus quidam et ordo ac series idearum».
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The Pico-Ficino Controversy
so, Ficino reassesses, in the context of the Parmenides, a Neoplatonic position
he had already adopted in the De Amore and in the Platonic Theology, and that
Pico had explicitly rejected in his Commento.110
110
See Ficino, Platonic Theology, XI, 4 (ed. A llen-Hankins, III, pp. 266-269): «[…] pulchritudo ipsa pulchrorum omnium est mensura, quia per accessum ad pulchritudinem primam et recessum ab ipsa res sequentes magis minusve pulchrae existimantur. Et quod cadit
ab omni pulchritudine, ab omni cadit essentia et quod totam possidet pulchritudinem, totam
habet essentiam, quia prima essentia et prima pulchritudino sunt idem»; XII, 3 (ibid., IV, p.
38): «[…] sicut enim in ordine rerum bene esse in unione consistit, quoniam malum dissensione et divisione contingit, sic et super ordinem universi idem est unum ipsum atque bonum,
cuius splendor est pulchritudo, quae nihil est aliud quam multarum rationalis ordo formarum
in mente, anima, natura, materia inde refulgens. Supra quam pulchritudinem esse unum probant, quia illa composita sit»; De Amore, II, 2. Cf. Plotinus, Ennead, I, 6, 6 and V 5, 12; Proclus, Commentary on the First Alcibiades, 327, 21-330, 1, a passage translated by Ficino between
1486 and 1489 (Op., p. 927: «omne pulchrum naturaliter est bonum, omne turpe malum et vicissim»). As noted above, Pico explicitely rejects Ficino’s definition of beauty as an extrinsic
manifestion of God’s intrinsic Goddness, cf. Pico, Commento, II 3, ed. Garin, p. 489.
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