Original Article
A quantitative analysis of European port
governance
P a t r i c k V e r h o e v e n a,b a n d T h o m a s V a n o u t r i v e a,c
d e p a r t m e n t o f T r a n s p o r t a n d R e g io n a l E c o n o m ic s , U n iv e r s ity of A n tw e rp ,
P r i n s s t r a a t 13, B -2 0 0 0 , A n tw e rp , B e lg iu m .
E -m a il: p a t r i c k .v e r h o e v e n @ e s p o .b e ; th o m a s .v a n o u t r iv e @ u a .a c .b e
bE u r o p e a n Sea P o rts O r g a n is a tio n , T re u re n b e r g 6, B -1 0 0 0 , B r u s s e ls , B e lg iu m ,
d e p a r t m e n t of G e o g ra p h y , G h e n t U n iv e rs ity , K r ijg s la a n 281 S8, B -9 0 0 0 ,
G h e n t, B e lg iu m .
Abstract
The ever-changing environm ent in w hich ports operate has p u t strong
pressure on the role of port authorities. The evolution of port governance has so far mainly
b een analysed in qualitative term s, through expert know ledge and case studies. This article
fills a research gap in providing a quantitative analysis of port governance in Europe, using
data from a m ajor survey, w hich the European Sea Ports Organisation carried out in 2010 to
prepare a new edition of its ‘Fact-Finding Report’. These reports have been m onitoring port
governance diversity since the 1970s. The 2010 survey w as based on a new conceptual
background, w hich takes into account the evolution of ports, as well as new perspectives
on the role of port authorities. This article provides a quantitative assessm ent of the survey
results, identifying elem ents th at m ay explain the governance diversity of European sea­
ports. This is done w ith the help of factor analysis. The results confirm the existence of
different types of port governance models in Europe, w hich to som e extent correspond to
the hypothetical typology according to w hich port authorities can be conservators, facil­
itators or entrepreneurs. Differences are m ainly geographically defined and the subdivision
in H anseatic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and new M ember State port authorities proves to be a
valuable one. In addition to this geographical explanation of diversity, the analysis also
detects different governance practices betw een small and large ports.
Maritime Economics & Logistics (2012)
14,
178-203. doi:10.1057/mel.2012.6
Keywords: port authorities; port governance; autonom y; port strategies; port
reform ; E uropean Union
© 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931 M aritim e Econom ics & Logistics
w w w .palgrave-journals.com /m el/
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
Introduction
It is a w ell-know n fact th at ports in Europe are diverse. G overnance is one of the
key elem ents th at determ ine this diversity. W hen using the term ‘port govern­
ance’, we can distinguish two levels: the governance of the port and the govern­
ance of the port authority. The form er corresponds to the w ide cluster of
econom ic, societal and public policy stakeholders th at relate to a port, w hereas
the latter concerns the internal firm level or ‘corporate governance’ of the port
authority (Brooks and Cullinane, 2007; De Langen, 2007). The term ‘port authority’
im plies a specific, th at is, public, form of port m anagem ent, b u t w e use it here
as the generic term for the body w ith statutory responsibilities th at m anages
a p o rt’s w ater an d land-side dom ain, regardless of its ow nership or legal form
(De M onie, 2004).
Port governance is a bro ad concept, w hich encom passes several dim en­
sions. Seven distinct groups of param eters can be used w hen analysing gov­
ernance practices: (i) devolution, (ii) corporate governance, (iii) operational
profile, (iv) functional autonom y, (v) functional pro-activeness, (vi) investm ent
responsibility and (vii) financial autonom y. Furtherm ore, governance practices
are not stable in tim e an d space. W hile in the past cargo-handling in E uropean
ports w as traditionally carried out by locally based com panies, horizontal and
vertical integration of cargo-handling com panies have resulted in a m arket
dom inated by global players. This evolution attracted the attention of both
policym akers and researchers w hich often refer to the declining influence of
port authorities, w hile global players gained bargaining pow er (Heaver et al,
2000; H eaver et al, 2001; Slack an d Frém ont, 2005; Olivier and Slack, 2006;
Jacobs and Haii, 2007; Vanelslander, 2011). As a response to this evolution,
several p ort authorities reposition them selves by adopting pro-active strategies
an d developing activities in other nodes in the logistic chain, outside the ow n
port perim eter. In addition to the changes in port governance over time, dif­
ferences across space exist. Suykens (1988; Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998)
identified three m ajor p ort governance traditions in Europe: the ‘H anseatic’
tradition of local, m ostly m unicipal, governance, w hich is dom inant in ports
around the Baltic an d N orth Sea; the ‘L atin’ tradition of central governance,
w hich reigns in France and countries around the M editerranean; and finally, the
‘Anglo-Saxon’ tradition of independent governance, w hich is characteristic of
ports in the United Kingdom an d Ireland. Finally, governance practices m ay
differ for other organisational reasons such as the size of the port and the port
authority (for exam ple, nu m b er of em ployees).
Despite the extensive literature on port governance (for an overview see, for
exam ple, Verhoeven, 2010 and Pallis et al, 2010), studies generally describe
general trends or lim it them selves to case studies. To our know ledge, there
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 179
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
exists no study w hich analyses port governance practices of a large n um ber of
ports in a system atic way. In the p resent article, w e analyse port governance in
Europe, using a rich database containing variables th at cover all aforem en­
tioned dim ensions of port governance. This inform ation w as collected by the
E uropean Sea Ports O rganisation (ESPO). This organisation, w hich represents
the com m on interests of E uropean port authorities, and its predecessor, the
Com m unity Port W orking Group, have been m onitoring the diversity in port
(authority) governance in Europe since the 1970s through a series of ‘FactFinding R eports’. T hroughout this period, the environm ent in w hich ports
operate has changed dram atically, putting strong and m ultiple pressures on the
role of port authorities. The Fact-Finding Reports w ere m ainly descriptive in
natu re and did not allow a profound quantitative analysis. In 2010, ESPO pre­
pared a new edition of the report through a m ajor survey am ong European port
authorities. The survey w as based on a new conceptual background th at takes
into account the evolution of ports, as w ell as new perspectives on the role of
port authorities. Concretely, the survey enquired about the objectives and
functions of port authorities, com pared institutional fram ew orks, and analysed
financial capabilities. This exercise yielded a rich database of observations and
variables, suitable for in-depth quantitative analysis.
In this article, we do not describe the actual findings of the survey, these can be
found in the Fact-Finding Report itself (Verhoeven, 2011). We focus instead on a
quantitative assessm ent of the principal elements that m ay explain the governance
diversity of European seaports. This is done with the help of factor analysis, a
commonly applied tool to explore data sets w ith m any variables, which are then
sum m arised into a limited num ber of unobserved factors.
The first tw o sections of the article introduce the conceptual background of
the survey an d the survey data. In the following sections, w e describe the
research m ethodology for the quantitative assessm ent and present the results of
the factor analysis. A concluding section discusses the m ain findings and sets
out issues th at require further research.
Conceptual Background
The 2010 edition of the ESPO Fact-Finding Report builds on the tradition of the
original reports, but it is based on a new conceptual background. This was
developed by Verhoeven (2010), taking into account the evolution of the port
concept, as well as new perspectives on the role of port authorities. The latter
are based on an extensive literature review, w hich revealed that, in recent tim es,
a renewed interest in the role of port authorities has emerged. This role has
come under severe and multiple pressures from stakeholders following im portant
180 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
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A quantitative analysis of European port governance
socio-econom ic changes in the port landscape. Scholars have issued various
recom m endations for a ‘renaissance’ of port authorities, revisiting the traditional
landlord, regulator and operator functions, and devising a com m unity m anager
function that is intrinsically linked to the changing nature of port communities and
stakeholders. In addition, scholars have also identified the scope of port authorities
as one that ought to extend their activities beyond the local port perimeter, at
regional or even at global level. Combining the functional profile and the geo­
graphical dim ension in a m atrix allows one to elaborate on the existential options
of port authorities in a hypothetical typology consisting of three basic types: the
‘conservator’, the ‘facilitator’ and the ‘entrepreneur’. The basic features of each
type are illustrated in Table 1.
A ‘conservator’ port authority concentrates on being a good housekeeper
an d essentially sticks to a rath er passive an d m echanistic im plem entation of the
three traditional port authority functions at local level. Because of this low-profile
attitude, conservator port authorities m ay ru n the highest risk of becom ing
extinct in the future. A ‘facilitator’ p ort authority profiles itself as a m ediator
and m atchm aker betw een econom ic and societal interests, hence the w ell-de­
veloped com m unity m anager function. Facilitator port authorities also look
beyond the port perim eter and try to engage in strategic regional partnerships. It
is the type of port authority, which so far seems to find m ost support in literature.
The ‘en trep ren eu r’ port authority com bines the m ain features of the facilitator
w ith a m ore outspoken com m ercial attitude as investor, service provider and
consultant on all three geographical levels (local, regional and global). Because
of this am bitious profile, it is also the type th at runs the highest risk of running
into problem s caused by conflicts betw een the various functional levels.
The conceptual fram ew ork is com pleted w ith the exploration of a num ber
of governance-related elem ents th at m ay influence the extent to w hich a port
authority will be a m ere conservator or will be able to take on facilitating and
entrepreneurial responsibilities. Four essential elem ents can be identified: two
form al and tw o inform al ones. The tw o form al elem ents consist of the legal and
statutory fram ew ork on the one h an d an d the financial capability (that is,
financial autonom y an d investm ent responsibility) on the other. The inform al
elem ents relate to the balance of pow er w ith governm ent and the m anagem ent
culture th at reigns w ithin the port authority. It should be noted th at these four
elem ents are strongly interrelated. The pow er balance w ith governm ent will
influence the legal and statutory fram ew ork, w hereas the financial capability of
the port authority will determ ine the room its m anagem ent has to m ake p ro ­
active and intelligent use of port governance tools w ithin a given structural
fram ew ork.
In the Introduction, w e presented seven distinct governance dim ensions:
(i) devolution, (ii) corporate governance, (iii) operational profile, (iv) functional
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
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Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 181
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
182 © 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Table 1: H y p o th e tic a l ty p o lo g y o f p o r t a u t h o r iti e s
Type
Conservator
F a cilita to r
Entrepreneur
Landlord
P assive re a l e s t a t e 'm a n a g e r':
• c o n tin u ity a n d m a in te n a n c e
• d e v e lo p m e n t m a in ly le f t t o o th e rs
( g o v e r n m e n t/p r iv a te se c to r)
• f in a n c ia l re v e n u e from re a l e s ta te
on 't a r i f f b asis
A ctiv e re a l e s t a t e 'b r o k e f :
• c o n tin u ity , m a in te n a n c e a n d
im p ro v e m e n t
• d e v e lo p m e n t b ro k er a n d c o - in v e s to r
• in c lu d e s u rb an a n d e n v ir o n m e n ta l re a l
e s t a t e b ro k erag e
• f in a n c ia l re v e n u e from r e a l e s t a t e on
co m m e rc ia l b a sis
M ed ia to r in c o m m e rc ia l B2B re la tio n s
b e tw e e n s e rv ic e p ro v id e rs a n d p o r t
cu s to m e rs
S tr a te g ic p a r tn e r s h ip s w ith in la n d p o rts , dry
p o rts a n d o th e r s e a p o r ts
R e g u la to r
P assive a p p lic a tio n a n d e n fo r c e m e n t o f rules
a n d re g u la tio n s m a in ly s e t by o th e r
a g e n c ie s
F in a n c ia l re v e n u e from re g u la to r ro le on
't a r i f f b a sis
A ctiv e a p p lic a tio n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t o f ru le s an d
re g u la tio n s th r o u g h c o -o p e r a tio n w ith lo c al,
re g io n a l a n d n a t io n a l re g u la to ry a g e n c ie s +
s e tt in g o f ow n ru le s a n d re g u la tio n s
P ro v id e a s s is ta n c e t o p o r t c o m m u n ity to
co m p ly w ith ru le s a n d r e g u la tio n s
F in a n c ia l re v e n u e from re g u la to r ro le on
't a r i f f b a s is w ith d if f e re n tia l ch a rg in g
o p tio n s fo r s u s ta in a b ility
A ctiv e re a l e s t a t e 'd e v e lo p e ri:
• c o n tin u ity , m a in te n a n c e a n d
im p ro v e m e n t
• d ir e c t in v e s to r
• in c lu d e s u rb an a n d e n v ir o n m e n ta l
re a l e s t a t e d e v e lo p m e n t
• f in a n c ia l re v e n u e fro m re a l e s ta te
on c o m m e rc ia l b asis
• f in a n c ia l re v e n u e fro m n o n -c o re
a c tiv itie s
D irect co m m e rc ia l B2B n e g o tia tio n s w ith
p o r t c u s to m e rs - a c tiv e p u r s u it o f m a rk e t
n ic h e s
D irect in v e s tm e n ts in in la n d p o rts , dry
p o rts a n d o th e r s e a p o r ts
Id e m f a c ilita to r + se llin g e x p e rtis e a n d to o ls
o u ts id e th e p o r t
F in a n c ia l re v e n u e from re g u la to r ro le on
co m m e rc ia l b asis
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Functional
dimension
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
M e c h a n is tic a p p lic a tio n o f c o n c e ss io n po licy
(lic e n s e - is s u in g w indow )
D ynam ic u se o f c o n c e ss io n po licy , in
c o m b in a tio n w ith r e a l e s t a t e b ro k er role
'L e a d e r in d is s a tis f a c tio n ' a s re g a rd s
p e rfo rm a n c e o f p riv a te p o r t serv ic es
pro v id e rs
P ro v id e se rv ic e s o f g e n e ra l e c o n o m ic
in t e r e s t a n d s p e c ia lis e d co m m e rc ia l serv ic es
C om m unity
m anager
N ot a c tiv e ly d e v e lo p e d
E co n o m ic d im e n sio n :
•
s o lv e h in te r la n d b o ttle n e c k s
•
p ro v id e tr a in in g a n d e d u c a tio n
•
p ro v id e IT se rv ic e s
•
p ro m o tio n a n d m a rk e tin g
•
lo b b y in g
S o c ie ta l d im e n s io n :
•
a c c o m m o d a te c o n flic tin g in te r e s ts
•
lo b b y in g
•
p r o m o te p o s itiv e e x te r n a litie s
Geographical
dim ension
Local
Local +
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Maritime Economics & Logistics
Source: V erhoeven (2 0 1 0 ).
Regional
D ynam ic u se o f c o n c e ss io n p o licy, in
c o m b in a tio n w ith re a l e s t a t e d e v e lo p m e n t
ro le
S h a re h o ld e r in p r iv a te p o r t se rv ic e
p ro v id e rs
P ro v id e s e rv ic e s o f g e n e ra l e c o n o m ic
in t e r e s t a n d co m m e rc ia l serv ic es
P ro v id e s e rv ic e s in o th e r p o rts
Id e m f a c ilita to r ty p e b u t e c o n o m ic d im e n sio n
w ith m o re d ir e c t co m m e rc ia l in v o lv e m e n t
Local +
Regional +
Global
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A quantitative analysis of European port governance
O p erato r
©
183
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
autonom y, (y) functional pro-activeness, (vi) investm ent responsibility and
(vii) financial autonom y. The m eaning of these dim ensions is explained below.
(i) The term ‘devolution’ is used here in the broad sense, to identify to w hich
extent port m anagem ent has been privatised, decentralised a n d /o r
corporatised.
(ii) There is a difference betw een being corporatised in form and actually
following principles of corporate governance that are custom ary in private
undertakings. On the basis of the survey, the latter can be assessed from
various perspectives, including the economic and non-economic objectives
port authorities have, their organisational structure (including the appoint­
m ent of top m anagem ent executives and the composition of supervisory
bodies), transparency through the use of public selection procedures to
contract out land to port operators, and corporate social responsibility (CSR)
policies and the use of corporate accounting principles.
(iii) The custom ary w ay to classify p ort authorities in operational term s is to
distinguish betw een ‘landlord ports’, ‘tool ports’ and ‘service ports’, depending
on whether, respectively, port authorities are not involved in (cargo-handling)
operations at all, operate superstructure and related services or provide full
operations in an integrated m anner.
(iv) Functional autonom y is analysed from the perspective of the landlord and
regulator function. The landlord function can be considered as the
principal function of contem porary port authorities. Im portant issues here
are land ow nership, as w ell as the ability and autonom y in contracting land
out to third parties. The regulator function is to a large extent perform ed by
the h arb o u r m aster’s office, w hich can be an integral part of the port
authority structure or a separate entity.
(v) Functional pro-activeness can be assessed at the level of the port authority’s
ow n port(s) and beyond. The ‘own port’ dimension covers pro-active
fulfilment of the traditional landlord and regulatory functions, as well as the
comm unity m anager one, which is pro-active by nature. The ‘external’
dim ension looks at how port authorities transpose their functions beyond
their ow n borders, including investm ent in hinterland networks, investm ent in
other ports, export of regulatory and other expertise and so on.
(vi) Investm ent responsibility concerns financial responsibility for the capital
investm ent, administration, operation and m aintenance of the capital assets
that constitute a port, including m aritim e access, terminal-related infrastruc­
ture, transport infrastructure w ithin the port area and transport infrastructure
outside the port area. Also, sources of port authorities’ operating income are
covered here, such as general port dues, land lease, services and public
funding.
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A quantitative analysis of European port governance
(vii) Financial autonom y concerns first of all the legal nature, calculation basis and
autonom y that apply to different categories of port authority income charges,
in particular general port dues. Financial autonom y of port authorities is also
analysed in term s of decision m aking regarding new investments in capital
assets, setting of wages, term s and service conditions of its ow n personnel and
the requirem ent to m eet certain financial targets.
T h e ESPO F a c t - F i n d i n g S u r v e y
Survey design
The 2010 Fact-Finding Report of ESPO is the first to be based on a Web-based survey
that was addressed directly to individual port authorities in Europe, rather than to
national port organisations, as was the case w ith previous editions. National port
organisations were, however, instrum ental in encouraging their members to
respond to the survey. The survey comprised 108 questions. Apart from a general
section profiling the port(s) controlled by the port authority, it consisted of three
m ain sections that were based on the conceptual framework described above: the
first enquired about the objectives and functions of the port authority (landlord,
regulator, operator, com m unity m anager); the second looked into the institutional
framework of the port authority (ownership, legal status and form, organisational
structure); and the final set of questions addressed the financial capability of the
port authority (financial responsibility, financial autonomy).
Response rate
The survey w as m ade available to all port authorities in the 22 m aritim e
M em ber States of the E uropean U nion and port authorities in four neighbouring
countries th at are represented in ESPO: Iceland, Norway, Croatia and Israel. The
survey was online from 1 April to 15 July 2010. One h u ndred and sixteen port
authorities from the 26 countries represented in ESPO responded. Together,
these 116 port authorities reported th at they m anage a total of 216 different
ports. The total freight volum e handled by these ports in 2008 am ounted to
2 770 803.000 tonnes (Eurostat data com pleted w ith national statistics for
Iceland an d Israel).
Figure 1 illustrates the response rate p er country, expressed in percentage of
the total volum e of cargo handled by all ports in each country.
The bottom line of the figure show s th at the total sam ple of ports that
responded to the survey handles 66.2 p er cent of the volum e of cargo handled
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
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Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 185
Verhoeven and V anoutrive
B elgium
B ú lg a ra
Cr,;..;; .3
C y p ru s ,
Denm ark
::::■n
F ir t la r d
F ran ce
Germ any
Ire la n d ,
N orw ay
P o la r d
Í-0-1.juä :
R o m an a
Sio von a
V
U n ite d K ingdom
,
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
■ % of total volume o f cargo handled
Figure 1: S u rv ey r e s p o n s e r a te s , e x p re s s e d in p e r c e n ta g e o f th e t o t a l v o lu m e o f c a rg o h a n d le d .
by th e total E uropean p o p u latio n of ports in 2008. The response rate w as very
high (75-100 p er cent) in Belgium , B ulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Germ any, Israel,
Latvia, L ithuania, M alta, the N etherlands, Poland, Portugal, R om ania and
Slovenia; it w as m ed iu m to high (50-74 per cent) in France, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Spain and the U nited Kingdom; it w as low to m edium (25-49 per cent) in
D enm ark, F inland an d Sw eden. The response rates of Greece and N orw ay
186 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
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A quantitative analysis of European port governance
w ere very low (less th a n 25 p er cent). It should be noted th at in countries w ith
low er response rates the ports th at replied do form a representative sam ple of
the governance diversity th at exists in these countries.
Research M ethodology
The research m ethodology w e used to assess the survey results consists of two
m ain steps. The first concerns the selection and clean-up of the data generated
by the survey, w hereas the second consists of the use of factor analysis, as data
reduction technique, to help revealing the underlying factors th at m ay explain
port governance diversity in Europe. As an interm ediate step, w e introduced a
series of dum m y variables to test the hypothesis th at regional characteristics
m ay constitute an im portant factor th at explains port governance diversity in
Europe.
Survey data and selection of variables
As m entioned above, the Fact-Finding Survey contained 108 questions. These
questions generated 269 individual variables. M ost of these variables are of
nom inal, th at is, categorical nature, containing several answ er categories. First,
w e m ade a selection of variables to m ake the data set m ore m anageable and,
notably, to obtain a w orkable ratio betw een the num ber of variables and the
n um b er of observations. Factor analysis requires th at there are m ore observa­
tions th a n variables. Variables th at generated no or only few observations were
deleted and the m ost pertinent variables w ere selected from different questions
th at w ere addressing sim ilar issues. In addition, som e variables w ere clustered
into new ones.
This resulted in a data set of 67 variables classified according to the
them atic groups th at w e described in the previous section: devolution, corpo­
rate governance, operational profile, functional autonom y, functional p ro ­
activeness w ithin the port auth o rity ’s ow n p o rt(s), functional pro-activeness
beyond the port auth o rity ’s ow n p o rt(s), investm ent and financial autonom y. In
addition, a ‘size’ group w as created, w hich includes variables related to the
volum es of total cargo, containers an d passengers handled in the port(s)
m anaged by the p ort authority, as well as the num ber of staff the port authority
em ploys (SZ_CARGO, SZ_CONTR, SZ_PASSG, SZ_STAFF).
The ‘devolution’ (DV) variables m easure to w hat extent responsibility for
port m anagem ent is transferred from central governm ent, through privatisation
(DV_PRIVA), decentralisation (DV_DECEN) and corporatisation (DG_CORPT).
An additional variable m easures w h eth er governance reform took place in 2000
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Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
or later (DG_REFYR). The ‘corporate governance’ (CG) variables m easure the
existence an d natu re of the port auth o rity ’s objectives and m ission statem ent
(CG_OBJEC, CG_PROFI, CG_VALUE and CG_MISSI), competences and composi­
tion of supervisory boards (CG_CEOAP, CG_BORPO, CG_BORSZ), use of public
selection procedures to contract land out (CG_SELEC), existence of CSR policy
(CG_CSRPO) and accounting practices (CG_ACSEP, CG_ACAUD, CG_ACPUB,
CG_ACANL). The ‘operational’ (OP) variables identify w hether the port authority
directly or indirectly provides operational services, including technical-nautical
services (OP_TECNA), ancillary services (OP_ANCIL), cargo-handling services
(OP_CARHA), passenger-handling services (OP_PAXHA) and transport services
(OP_TRANS). The ‘functional autonom y’ (FA) variables m easure to w hat extent
the port authority can autonom ously take m anagem ent decisions as regulator
(FA_ENTIT, FA_HMAST and FA_POUC) and landlord (FA_LANDO, FA_LANDP,
FA_LANDD). The ‘functional pro-activeness’ variables are split betw een those that
cover the port authority’s ow n port(s) (PO) and those that go beyond its own
port(s) (PB). The first group measures the degree in which the port authority
assum es a facilitating or entrepreneurial attitude in its different functions w ithin
the area of the port(s) it has directly under its supervision. This relates to its
function as landlord (PO_CLAUS, PO_URBAN) and regulator (PO_ENVIR, PO_
RULES, PCLSUSTA), as well as the economic (PO_BOTTL, POJMPLE, POJTSYS,
PO_PROMO, PO_TRAIN) and societal (PO_SOCIE) dim ension of its community
m anager function. The second group measures to w hat extent the port authority is
active beyond the port(s) it has directly under its supervision, in terms of relations
w ith other ports (PB_STRAP, PB_DINVE), export of regulatory expertise (PB_
REGEX), provision of operational services (PB_SERVI), investm ent in hinterland
networks (PB_HINTE) and provision of training (PB_TRAIN). The ‘investm ent’
(IR) variables look at the extent to which the port authority bears investment
responsibility for the m ain capital assets that constitute the port (IR_CAPAS) and
looks at its m ain sources of income (IR_INCOM, IR_PDUES, IR_LEASE, IR_SERVI,
IR_PUBFU). The last category seeks to m easure the financial autonom y (FI) of port
authorities through analysis of general port dues (FI_PRICE, FI_NEGOT, FI_PROMO,
FLCROSS, FLLEVEL, FI_COLLE, FI_BENEF) and other variables (FI_WAGES,
FLRESUL, FLTARGT).
Table 2 contains a full description of all variables, including the regional
dum m y variables th at are explained in the follow ing subsection.
Introduction of regional dummy variables
As an interm ediate step, w e added five dum m y variables, in order to test the
hypothesis th at the region w here the port authority is located determ ines the
governance diversity of E uropean port authorities. These dum m y variables
188 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
Table 2: Port go v ern an ce variables
2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
189
D escription
Category
Type
SZ_ CARGO
Total volum e o f g o o d s h an d led by th e p o rts m an ag ed by th e p o rt au th o rity , in 2009, in to n s
Total volum e o f co n ta in e rs h an d led by th e p o rts m anaged by th e p o rt au th o rity , in 2009, in to n s
T otal n u m b er o f p a s se n g e rs h a n d le d by t h e p o rts m an a g e d by t h e p o rt a u th o rity , in 2 0 0 9
T otal s ta f f em p lo y e d by t h e p o rt a u th o rity , in FTE
P ort a u th o r ity is Located in t h e Flanse reg io n
P ort a u th o r ity is Located in t h e New Flanse reg io n
P ort a u th o r ity is Located in t h e A nglo-Saxon reg io n
P ort a u th o r ity is Located in t h e Latin reg io n
P ort a u th o r ity is Located in t h e New Latin reg io n
P ort a u th o r ity is p re d o m in a n tly p riv a tely o w n ed
P ort a u th o r ity is p re d o m in a n tly o w n ed a t Local Level
Size
Size
Size
Size
Region
Region
Region
Region
Region
D evolution
D evolution
C ontinuous
C ontinuous
C ontinuous
C ontinuous
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
P ort a u th o r ity h as c o rp o ra tis e d form
G o v ern an ce reform to o k p lac e in 2 0 0 0 o r Later
P ort a u th o r ity h as g e n e ra l fo rm al o b je c tiv e s
E conom ic o b je c tiv e p o rt a u th o r ity is m ax im isa tio n o f ow n p ro fit
E conom ic o b je c tiv e p o rt a u th o r ity is m ax im isa tio n o f a d d e d v alu e
P ort a u th o r ity h as a m issio n s ta te m e n t
S u pervisory b o d y p o rt a u th o r ity h a s e n d r e s p o n s ib ility t o a p p o in t CEO
S u pervisory b o d y p o rt a u th o r ity h a s s ig n if ic a n t n u m b er o f e le c te d p o litic ia n s
Num ber o f m em b ers in t h e su p e rv iso ry b o d y o f t h e p o r t a u th o rity
P ort a u th o r ity u se s p u b lic s e le c tio n p ro ce d u re to c o n tr a c t Land o u t
P ort a u th o r ity h as a CSR policy
P ort a u th o r ity m a in ta in s s e p a ra te f in a n c ia l a c c o u n ts
P ort a u th o r ity h as i ts f in a n c ia l a c c o u n ts a u d ite d by an e x te r n a l a u d ito r
P ort a u th o r ity p u b lis h e s its f in a n c ia l a c c o u n ts
P ort a u th o r ity h as a n i n te r n a l a n a ly tic a l a c c o u n tin g p ro cess
P ort a u th o r ity p ro v id es t e c h n ic a l- n a u tic a l se rv ic es
P ort a u th o r ity p ro v id es a n c illa ry se rv ic es
P ort a u th o r ity p ro v id es c a rg o -h a n d lin g serv ices
P ort a u th o r ity p ro v id es p a s se n g e r-h a n d lin g se rv ic es
P ort a u th o r ity p ro v id es tr a n s p o r t serv ices
P ort a u th o r ity is t h e o n ly e n tity w ith s ta tu to r y r e s p o n s ib ilitie s fo r t h e p o rt(s ) i t m an a g e s
Flarbour m a s te r is fully in te g r a te d in t h e p o rt a u th o rity
P ort a u th o r ity em p lo y s its ow n p o lice force
P ort a u th o r ity is t h e m ain o w n e r o f p o rt Land
P ort a u th o r ity is a b le t o s e ll p o rt Land
D evolution
D evolution
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
C o rp o rate g o v e rn a n c e
O p e ra tio n a l pro file
O p e ra tio n a l pro file
O p e ra tio n a l pro file
O p e ra tio n a l pro file
O p e ra tio n a l pro file
F u n c tio n a l a u to n o m y
F u n c tio n a l a u to n o m y
F u n c tio n a l a u to n o m y
F u n c tio n a l a u to n o m y
F u n c tio n a l a u to n o m y
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ateg o rical
C ontinuous
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
C ategorical
sz_ CONTR
sz_.PASSG
sz_ STAFF
RG._HANSE
RG._NWHAN
RG._ANGL0
RG._LATIN
RG._NWLAT
DV..PRIVA
DV._DECEN
DV._C0RPT
DV._REFYR
CG_.OBJ EC
CG_.PROFI
CG_.VALUE
CG_.MISSI
CG_.CEOAP
CG_.BORPO
CG_.BORSZ
CG_.SELEC
CG_.CSRPO
CG_.ACSEP
CG_.ACAUD
CG_.ACPUB
CG_.ACANL
OP._TECNA
OP._ANCIL
OP._CARHA
OP._PAXHA
OP._TRANS
FA_.ENTIT
FA_.HMAST
FA_.POLIC
FA_.LANDO
FA_.LANDS
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Code
190 © 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Table 2 co n tin u e d
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
Code
D escription
Category
FA._LANDP
FA._LANDD
PO _CLAUS
PO _URBAN
PO _ENVIR
PO _RULES
PO _SUSTA
PO _B0TTL
PO .IMPLE
PO _ITSYS
PO _PROMO
PO _TRAIN
PO _S0CIE
C o n trac tin g o f
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
Port a u th o r ity
PB _STRAP
PB _DINVE
PB _REGEX
PB _SERVI
PB _HINTE
PB _TRAIN
IR_.CAPAS
IR_.INCOM
IR_.PDUES
IR_.LEASE
IR_.SERVI
IR_.PUBFU
FI_ PRICE
FI_ NEGOT
FI_ PROMO
FI_ CROSS
FI_ LEVEL
FI_ COLLE
FI_ BENEF
FI_ IN VES
FI_ WAGES
FI_ RESUL
FI_ TARGT
Port a u th o r ity h a s s tr a te g ic p a rtn e rs h ip s w ith o th e r p o rts
Port a u th o r ity h a s d ire c t in v e s tm e n ts in o th e r p o rts
Port a u th o r ity e x p o rts re g u la to ry e x p e rtis e t o o th e r p o rts
Port a u th o r ity p ro v id e s o p e ra tio n a l s e rv ic es in o th e r p o rts
Port a u th o r ity in v e s ts in h in te rla n d n etw o rk s o u ts id e ow n p o rt
Port a u th o r ity p ro ce ss t r a i n in g /e d u c a tio n a l p ro g ram m es o u tsid e its own p o rt
D egree o f in v e s tm e n t re s p o n s ib ility p o rt a u th o r ity fo r t h e m ain c a p ita l a s s e ts t h a t c o n s titu te t h e p o rt
T o tal o p e ra tio n a l in co m e o f t h e p o rt a u th o rity , in 2 0 0 9 , in Euro
G en eral p o rt d u e s form h ig h e s t p e rc e n ta g e o f in co m e
Land Lease form s h ig h e s t p e rc e n ta g e o f in co m e
Serv ices form h ig h e s t p e rc e n ta g e o f in co m e
Public f u n d in g form s h ig h e s t p e rc e n ta g e o f in co m e
G en eral p o rt d u e s are c o m m ercial prices
G en eral p o rt d u e s are n e g o tia b le
Port a u th o r ity can g ive co m m e rc ia l p ro m o tio n s on g e n e ra l p o rt d u es
Port a u th o r ity can c ro ss-su b sid ie s b e tw e e n d iffe re n t so u rc e s o f in co m e
Port a u th o r ity a u to n o m o u s ly s e ts t h e Level o f g e n e ra l p o rt d u es
Port a u th o r ity a u to n o m o u s ly c o lle c ts g e n e ra l p o rt d u es
Port a u th o r ity is fin a l b e n e fic ia ry o f g e n e ra l p o rt d u es
Port a u th o r ity a u to n o m o u s ly d e c id e s o n p o r t in v e s tm e n ts
Port a u th o r ity s e ts w ag es, te rm s a n d c o n d itio n s o f serv ic e o f its ow n p e rs o n n e l
Port a u th o r ity d e c id e s a u to n o m o u s ly how t o a llo c a te t h e a n n u a l f in a n c ia l resu lt
Port a u th o r ity d o e s n o t hav e t o m e e t c e rta in f in a n c ia l t a r g e ts
p o rt Land t o th ir d p a rtie s is g o v e rn e d by p riv a te Law
is free to s e t d u ra tio n s o f Land u se c o n tra c ts
a c tiv e ly u ses p e rfo rm a n c e cla u se s in te r m in a l a g re e m e n ts
e n g a g e s in u rb an rea l e s ta te m a n a g e m e n t
e n g a g e s in e n v iro n m e n ta l Land m a n a g e m e n t
s e ts ow n re g u la tio n s t h a t go b ey o n d Legal req u irem e n ts
g e n e ra lly g o e s b e y o n d Legal req u ire m e n ts in a c tio n s to e n h a n c e s u s ta in a b ility
is Leader in so lv in g v a rio u s ty p e s o f b o ttle n e c k s
a s s is ts a n d f a c ilita te s p o rt co m m u n ity w ith im p le m e n ta tio n o f re g u la tio n s
ru n s IT sy ste m fo r t h e e n tire p o rt co m m u n ity
Leads t h e o v e ra ll p ro m o tio n a n d m ark e tin g o f t h e p o rt
p ro v id e s t r a in in g /e d u c a tio n a l p ro g ram m es fo r t h e p o r t c o m m u n ity
is Leader in v ario u s s o c ie ta l in te g r a tio n in itia tiv e s
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
F u n c tio n a l
Type
a u to n o m y
a u to n o m y
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
p ro -a c tiv e n e ss
F p ro -a c t b e y o n d own
F p ro -a c t b e y o n d ow n
F p ro -a c t b e y o n d own
F p ro -a c t b e y o n d own
F p ro -a c t b e y o n d own
F p ro -a c t b e y o n d own
In v e s tm e n t
In v e s tm e n t
In v e s tm e n t
In v e s tm e n t
In v e s tm e n t
In v e s tm e n t
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
F in an cial a u to n o m y
p o rt
p o rt
p o rt
p o rt
p o rt
p o rt
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ontinuous
C ontinuous
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
C ateg o rical
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
w ere based on the geographical typology th at w as developed by Suykens
(Suykens, 1988; Suykens and Van de Voorde, 1998). His typology, however,
does not take into account the fall of the iron curtain, w hich has brought a
n um b er of new ports around the Baltic Sea, the M editerranean and the Black
Sea in the com petitive arena. These w ere u n d er planned econom y regimes for
alm ost 50 years an d u n d erw en t varied liberalisation processes after the political
changeover. These ports can be brought together in tw o additional regions:
‘New H anse’, consisting of countries around the Baltic Sea; and ‘New Latin’,
consisting of countries in the East M editerranean and the Black Sea.
In this way, w e can classify the port authorities in five regional groups:
• H anse (RG_HANSE): B elgium , D en m ark , F inland, G erm any, Iceland, the
N e th e rla n d s, N orw ay a n d Sw eden.
• New H anse (RG_NWHAN): Estonia, Latvia, L ithuania and Poland.
• Anglo-Saxon (RG_ANGLO): Ireland and the United Kingdom.
• Latin (RG_LATIN): Cyprus, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, M alta, Portugal and
Spain.
• New Latin (RG_NWLAT): Bulgaria, Croatia, Rom ania and Slovenia.
M ost port authorities participating in the survey are either to be found in
the H anse (38 per cent) or Latin (35 p er cent) region; third comes the AngloSaxon region (14 p er cen t). The tw o ‘n ew ’ regions contain relatively few port
authorities (New H anse 7 p er cent an d New Latin 6 per cent).
Factor analysis
After cleaning up the results of the survey and adding the regional dum m y
variables, the database still contained 72 variables. Applying a data reduction
technique m ay therefore help to reveal the relations betw een governance
practices of port authorities in Europe an d explain port governance diversity.
Factor analysis is com m only applied to explore data sets w ith m any variables,
w hich are th e n sum m arised into a lim ited num ber of unobserved factors. Doing
this, the analysis tries to keep the n u m b er of factors as low as possible while
m aintaining a m axim um of the inform ation, w hich is present in the original
data. For each factor, the factor loadings indicate to which extent they are corre­
lated w ith each variable. If the factor loadings of two variables show similarities,
these variables are related. On the basis of the resulting pattern, factors are often
labelled and accordingly, clusters of observations can be detected (Stevens, 2002).
Two problem s rem ain w h en analysing the ESPO database. First, a con­
siderable am ount of observations has m issing values for one or m ore variables.
Second, m ost variables are categorical in nature. Classical factor analysis,
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 191
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
however, assum es continuous an d norm ally distributed variables. Among
others, N isenbaum et al (2004) an d Vanoutrive et al (2010) applied binary
(categorical) factor analysis to get insight in questionnaires containing an
extensive list of binary yes/no questions. The software employed in these studies,
Mplus (Muthén and M uthén, 2006), allows one to carry out factor analyses with a
mix of both continuous and categorical variables. Furthermore, this package can
handle missing data w ithout omitting valuable information, as is the case with
standard list-wise or pair-wise deleting options in other software.
A lthough the chosen technique can handle m issing data, w e deleted 6 from
the 116 observations because these six port authorities did not provide data on
m ore th a n 40 p er cent of the variables. Furtherm ore, the categorical variables
w ere re-coded in b inary variables as this did not bring along an im portant loss
of inform ation, th at is, som e rare categories w ould not positively contribute to
an analysis of the m ain p atterns p resent in the data. Finally, w e attributed the
label ‘m issing’ for the cargo variable instead of a value of zero to ports, w hich
do not h andle any cargo at all. Given the lim ited n um ber of ports w ith only
passenger traffic, w e do not expect th at this affects the results in a m ajor way.
We estim ate tw o m odels, one w ith and one w ithout the regional dum m y
variables. These variables have a value of one if the port belongs to the Hanse,
New Hanse, Anglo-Saxon, Latin or New Latin region, respectively, and a value
of zero if not. As these dum m y variables are m utually exclusive, and to avoid
th at this pre-specified clustering influences the results and their interpretation,
w e will first look at the m odel w ithout these regional variables and use the
m odel w ith the regional variables to check our findings.
R es u lts of t h e Factor Ana lysis
Number of factors and factor loadings
As in standard factor analysis, the eigenvalues are used to select the n um ber of
factors. Figure 2 pictures the scree plot w hich shows the eigenvalues. The tw ists
in a scree plot indicate possible values for the num ber of factors.
The second criterion, taking the sam e num ber of factors as there are
eigenvalues larger th a n one, could not be applied as this w ould im ply a large
n u m b er of factors. The scree plot suggests a m odel w ith four or five factors.
After an exam ination of both m odels, w e prefer a m odel w ith four factors as the
results w ere easier to in terpret th a n those of the five-factor m odel. The results
(Varimax rotated) are given in Table 3. Factor loadings ^ 0 .4 are show n in bold
as these are considered m eaningful. Note th at values ^ 0 .3 are also large en­
ough to be im portant.
192 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
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A quantitative analysis of European p o rt governance
14
model
3©
?
1
2
a
4
5
6
r
3
9
10
E g e n v a lu e num ber
Figure 2: S c re e p lo t o f t h e m o d e ls w ith a n d w ith o u t r e g io n a l d u m m y v a ria b le s .
Note th at the presence of m issing an d binary data and the relatively lim ited
n um b er of observations, together w ith a rath er large n um ber of variables, can
explain the low values of test statistics indicated at the bottom of Table 3. In
addition to the fact th at the first 23 eigenvalues stay above 1, also the Root M ean
Square Error of A pproxim ation (RMSEA) stays above 0.1 even for a m odel w ith
ten factors, w hile a m oderately well-fitting m odel has an RMSEA < 0.10 (Gilbert
an d Meijer, 2006) or even RMSEA < 0 .0 8 (Stevens, 2002, p. 433) (num bers for
the m odel w ithout regional dum m y variables). A lthough fit statistics suggest
that the model does not perform well, m any factor loadings have values ^ 0 .4 and
we could detect patterns that correspond with the literature. As a consequence, we
did not try to im prove the m odel by om itting variables as this w ould im ply a
loss of inform ation.
In general, the results of the m odels w ith and w ithout region dum m y
variables are similar, w hich is a first indication th at this clustering of ports in
regions could also reflect differences in governance practices. This will be ex­
plored further in the next section, w hich discusses the results. Table 4 already
m arks the correspondence betw een the factors in both m odels.
Description of the factors
In this section, w e describe the four factors individually, looking first at the
factor in the m odel w ithout region dum m y variables and th en com paring it w ith
© 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
M aritim e Econom ics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 193
194
Table 3 : F a c to r lo a d in g s o f t h e 4 - f a c t o r m o d e ls w ith o u t re g io n d u m m y v a r ia b le s ( le f t) a n d w ith re g io n d u m m y v a r ia b le s ( r ig h t)
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
Variable
Factorl
Factor2
SZ_CARG0
SZ_PASSG
SZ_STAFF
IR_CAPAS
IR_INC0M
CG_B0RSZ
RG_HANSE
RG_NWHAN
RG_ANGL0
RG_LATIN
RG_NWLAT
DV_PRIVA
DV_DECEN
DV_C0RPT
DV_REFYR
CG_0BJ EC
CG_PR0FI
CG_VALUE
CG_MISSI
CG_CE0AP
CG_B0RP0
CG_SELEC
CG_CSRP0
CG_ACSEP
CG_ACAUD
CG_ACPUB
CG_ACANL
0P_TECNA
0P_ANCIL
0P_CARHA
0P_PAXHA
0P_TRANS
FA_ENTIT
FA_HMAST
FA_P0LIC
FA_LAND0
FA_LANDS
0 .1 4
- 0 .0 3
- 0 .0 4
0 .1 2
0 .1 3
0.54
Factor3
Factor4
Factorl
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
0.1 3
- 0 .0 7
0 .1 1
-0 .0 1
0 .0 6
0 .2 2
0 .0 8
- 0 .0 4
0 .1 4
0 .1 0
- 0 .1 2
- 0 .0 2
- 0 .2 4
- 0 .1 0
0 .3 0
- 0 .2 4
- 0 .1 4
0.1 0
0 .0 4
- 0 .2 6
- 0 .3 2
0.3 2
0.3 5
0.53
- 0 .0 6
0.2 1
0 .1 5
0.1 1
- 0 .2 7
0 .3 7
0 .0 2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.95
—
—
—
—
0 .2 6
0 .0 0
0.71
0 .2 3
-0.71
-0.52
0.43
-0.48
- 0 .3 9
- 0 .1 1
0 .0 9
-0.58
-0.49
0.54
0 .3 0
- 0 .2 2
-0.48
- 0 .1 1
0 .1 8
- 0 .3 3
- 0 .3 7
- 0 .3 4
0 .1 1
0 .3 5
-0.42
-0.73
0.45
-0.55
-0.48
- 0 .0 1
0.57
0 .0 2
0.80
0.3 1
0.45
- 0 .0 7
0 .2 1
0 .0 4
0 .2 1
- 0 .0 1
0 .3 6
- 0 .0 4
- 0 .2 4
0 .3 8
0.41
0 .2 2
- 0 .1 0
0.46
0.49
0.74
0.86
0.53
0.51
- 0 .0 9
0 .0 5
- 0 .2 3
0 .0 4
- 0 .3 1
- 0 .0 9
0 .0 4
0 .2 4
- 0 .0 6
- 0 .0 4
0.40
- 0 .2 6
- 0 .1 9
- 0 .0 4
- 0 .0 9
- 0 .2 2
0 .1 9
- 0 .3 7
0 .3 7
- 0 .0 2
- 0 .5 6
0 .1 0
-0.73
-0.68
-0.55
-0.49
-0.41
- 0 .2 1
- 0 .2 5
- 0 .2 2
- 0 .0 7
- 0 .1 1
0.40
0 .2 0
- 0 .1 2
- 0 .2 0
0.93
-0 .2 3
0.42
0.0 1
- 0 .1 8
0.4 1
-0 .2 4
-0.42
-0.58
- 0 .2 7
- 0 .1 0
0 .1 9
0 .0 2
0.0 3
0.0 3
0.3 3
- 0 .0 3
- 0 .2 6
0 .3 9
0 .0 2
0 .0 7
- 0 .4 0
- 0 .1 5
- 0 .0 5
-0 .0 3
- 0 .0 6
0.64
-0.82
- 0 .0 2
- 0 .1 8
-0.84
-0.54
- 0 .2 7
0 .3 8
- 0 .2 9
-0 .2 4
- 0 .0 2
-0.63
-0.71
0.55
0 .3 1
-0 .2 1
-0.45
- 0 .1 2
0 .2 2
-0 .3 1
-0.44
- 0 .1 9
0 .1 4
0 .3 2
-0.48
-0.76
0.47
-0.53
-0.48
0.67
0 .0 1
- 0 .1 3
0 .0 8
0 .3 2
0 .1 9
- 0 .0 1
- 0 .3 8
- 0 .2 2
- 0 .1 1
- 0 .3 0
0 .0 5
-0.41
0 .1 9
- 0 .1 0
-0.68
-0.51
-0.65
- 0 .0 1
- 0 .1 5
- 0 .3 7
- 0 .2 8
- 0 .2 3
- 0 .2 9
- 0 .3 4
- 0 .0 3
- 0 .1 8
0.42
- 0 .1 6
-0.88
0.21
- 0 .1 5
-0.92
-0.56
0.1 7
0.2 0
0.3 9
-0.66
0.2 5
0.2 5
-0 .0 1
0.42
0.1 7
- 0 .1 8
0.13
- 0 .1 7
- 0 .2 2
- 0 .0 4
-0.49
-0.68
- 0 .1 4
-0 .2 1
-0 .1 3
0.0 2
- 0 .1 8
- 0 .0 7
- 0 .1 8
- 0 .1 5
0 .0 5
0.65
0 .0 4
0.80
-0 .1 3
- 0 .1 0
0 .0 0
- 0 .2 8
0 .1 5
0 .0 3
- 0 .2 7
- 0 .1 8
0 .3 0
0 .1 0
0 .2 6
0 .0 4
0 .2 3
0 .3 3
0 .1 6
- 0 .2 5
0.53
0.42
0.81
0.88
0 .3 7
0.52
- 0 .1 9
- 0 .1 2
- 0 .2 0
- 0 .0 2
- 0 .3 8
- 0 .1 9
- 0 .0 7
0 .1 8
- 0 .1 0
-0 .1 3
2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
FA_LANDP
FA_LANDD
P0_CLAUS
POJJRBAN
P0_ENVIR
P0_RULES
P0_SUSTA
P0_B0TTL
- 0 .2 3
0.45
0.61
0 .2 3
- 0 .0 7
0.40
0 .3 4
0 .3 0
0 .2 5
0 .1 0
0.1 3
- 0 .3 2
0 .3 0
0 .0 8
0 .2 6
0 .3 3
0 .2 8
0 .1 8
0 .2 6
0.54
0.42
0 .0 6
0.1 1
0 .3 3
0.43
0.78
0.44
0.41
0 .2 0
0 .2 9
0 .0 6
0.63
0.52
- 0 .2 3
0 .2 2
- 0 .0 9
0 .3 0
-0.64
0 .0 5
- 0 .1 3
-0.82
-0.61
- 0 .3 5
- 0 .3 1
-0.59
- 0 .1 1
- 0 .0 8
0.66
- 0 .1 7
0 .3 2
0.43
- 0 .3 3
0.44
0 .0 7
-0.47
0 .1 2
0 .1 0
0 .0 7
0 .0 0
0 .2 7
- 0 .0 2
- 0 .1 1
- 0 .1 6
- 0 .0 8
- 0 .1 2
0 .1 6
- 0 .0 7
- 0 .1 8
- 0 .2 0
0 .0 9
- 0 .2 9
- 0 .3 2
-0.50
- 0 .1 3
- 0 .2 5
- 0 .3 6
- 0 .2 3
- 0 .2 9
- 0 .0 1
- 0 .0 8
- 0 .1 2
-0.45
- 0 .0 7
- 0 .1 9
0.0 1
- 0 .1 3
- 0 .0 5
0.1 1
- 0 .3 4
0 .0 5
-0.40
-0.43
-0.47
- 0 .1 1
0.1 1
0 .0 7
0 .0 5
- 0 .1 9
-0 .0 3
- 0 .1 0
- 0 .0 7
0 .2 0
- 0 .1 6
- 0 .1
- 0 .1 2
-0 .0 4
- 0 .2 8
- 0 .0 8
0 .0 0
0 .0 2
0.0 3
0 .1 9
- 0 .0 2
- 0 .3
-0 .2 3
0.80
0 .1 7
0.2 1
-0.44
- 0 .3 0
- 0 .1 7
- 0 .3 8
0.0 3
-0.48
0 .0 0
- 0 .3 0
0 .1 4
- 0 .0 6
0 .1 0
0.1 3
0.46
-0.58
- 0 .1 9
0.40
0.58
0 .1 7
0 .0 2
- 0 .2 4
- 0 .2 9
0 .0 6
0 .2 3
-0 .1 1
0 .3 4
0 .3 7
0 .2 3
0 .2 2
0 .0 7
0 .3 7
0 .1 9
-0.42
-0.51
-0.51
0.64
- 0 .2 9
- 0 .2 3
0 .3 6
0 .3 3
0 .0 2
0.60
0.47
-0 .2 4
0 .0 8
0 .1 3
0 .3 4
-0.58
- 0 .0 6
-0 .2 1
-0.79
-0.68
- 0 .3 8
-0 .2 3
-0.56
- 0 .0 5
-0 .0 1
- 0 .2 3
- 0 .2 5
- 0 .2 5
- 0 .3 7
-0.57
-0.43
- 0 .2 4
- 0 .1 6
- 0 .4 2
0 .0 8
- 0 .3 6
0 .2 2
0 .2 3
- 0 .2 8
- 0 .1 5
-0.44
-0.40
0 .0 4
- 0 .0 5
- 0 .2 2
0 .1 8
- 0 .1 5
0.49
- 0 .0 9
- 0 .2 4
0.0 6
0.1 0
0.0 5
-0 .0 3
0.0 9
- 0 .2 7
0.0 9
0.01
- 0 .0 6
0.0 2
0.2 7
0.3 7
0.1 9
0.1 6
- 0 .1 6
0.0 5
0.11
- 0 .0 4
0 .3 4
-0.54
-0.48
- 0 .0 2
0.3 5
0.01
- 0 .2 2
- 0 .0 7
0.1 8
-0.54
-0 .2 1
- 0 .3 6
0.0 5
0 .1 5
-0 .3 3
0 .2 6
0 .0 4
0 .2 9
0 .2 0
0 .1 4
0 .0 7
0 .2 0
0.52
0 .0 1
0 .0 0
0 .2 7
0 .1 2
0 .2 3
0.54
-0 .2 1
0 .3 1
0 .3 3
-0 .3 1
0 .3 2
0 .1 7
-0.44
0 .0 7
0 .0 2
- 0 .0 4
0 .0 0
0 .1 8
-0 .0 1
- 0 .1 4
- 0 .1 2
- 0 .1 0
0 .0 0
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
Notes: fa c to r Loadings a re Varim ax ro ta te d ; v a lu e s > 0 . 4 in b o ld ; RMSEA m o d e l w ith o u t reg io n d um m y v a ria b le s (Left): 0 .1 5 5 ; RMSEA m o d e l w ith reg io n dum m y
v a ria b le s (r ig h t): 0 .1 6 2 .
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
Maritime Economics & Logistics
PO JM PLE
P0_ITSYS
P0_PR0M 0
P0_TRAIN
P0_S0CIE
PB_STRAP
PB_DINVE
PB_REGEX
PB_SERVI
PB_HINTE
PB_TRAIN
IR_PDUES
IR_LEASE
IR_SERVI
IR_PUBFU
FI_PRICE
FI_PR0M 0
FI_CR0SS
FI_LEVEL
FI_C0LLE
FI_BENEF
FIJNVES
FI_WAGES
FI_RESUL
FI_TARGT
-0.58
195
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
Table 4: C o rre s p o n d e n c e b e tw e e n f a c to r s in m o d e ls w ith a n d w ith o u t d u m m y v a ria b le s
Model w ith o u t dum m y variables
Relationship
M odel w ith dum m y variables
F a c to r 1
F a c to r 2
F a c to r 3
+
+
+
F a c to r 1
F a c to r 4
F a c to r 2
F a c to r 4
-
F a c to r 3
the corresponding factor in the m odel w ith the dum m y variables. For each
factor, loadings higher th a n 0.3 are represented in individual tables. In each
table, variables w ith an estim ated residual variance low er or equal to 0.5 are
highlighted in bold. Estim ated residual variances indicate how m uch of each
variable is explained through the entire m odel, th at is, com prising all factors.
The annex gives the estim ated residual variances for all variables.
Factor 1 : Latin - H anseatic contrasts in autonom y an d pro-activeness
Table 5 illustrates that Factor 1 is generally characterised by positive loadings for
variables that relate to functional pro-activeness, both w ithin (PO) and beyond
(PB) the ow n port. Negative loadings exist for variables that relate to financial (FI)
and functional autonom y (FA), as well as devolution (DV). Variables on corporate
governance (CG) dem onstrate a mixed picture. Positive loading exists for the size
of the supervisory boards (CG_BORSZ), but a negative one on politicians being
significantly present in them (CG_BORPO). Negative loadings exist on profit
maximisation as the m ain economic objective (CG_PROFI) and the external audit
of financial accounts (CG_ACAUD). A positive loading appears for the use of public
selection procedures to land contracts (CG_SELEC). Although the factor loadings
are not high for operational variables (OP), they are generally negative (except for
transport services (OP_TRANS)).
In sum m ary, w e could say that, som ehow paradoxically, Factor 1 m atches
lim ited autonom y w ith a substantial degree of pro-activeness. If w e com pare
this picture w ith the m odel th at has regional variables included, w e find that
Factor 1 has a strongly positive loading for the Latin region (RG_LATIN) and a
strongly negative one for the H anse region (RG_HANSE).
Factor 2: Large corporately governed port authorities
Table 6 show s th at Factor 2 has positive loadings for size-related variables
(incom e (IR_INCOM), n u m b er of staff (SZ_STAFF) and volum e of cargo
(SZ_CARGO)). Positive loadings also exist for transparency-related variables in
the category of corporate governance (for example, w here it concerns financial
accounts (CG_ACSEP, CG_ACAUD, CG_ACPUB) and the use of public selection
196 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
Table 5 : L o a d in g s F a c to r 1 (w ith a n d w ith o u t d u m m y v a ria b le s )
Model w ith o u t region dum m y variables (F a cto r 1)
P o sitiv e f a c t o r
> 0 .7
PB_STRAP, CG_B0RSZ
lo a d in g
> 0 .6
> 0 .5
> 0 .4
> 0 .3
N e g a tiv e f a c t o r
lo a d in g
< —0 .8
< - 0 .7
PB_HINTE, POJJRBA N
CG_SELEC, PB_TRAIN
FA_P0LIC, P0_CLAUS, PB_DINVE, CG JJB JEC , P0_TRA IN, PB_REGEX,
P0_SUSTA
0P_TRANS, P0_B0TTL, P0_S0C IE
FI_LEVEL
FA_HMAST, DV_DECEN
FI_PRICE, FLC0LLE
< - 0 .6
< - 0 .5
< - 0 .4
FI_WAGES, CG_CE0AP, FA_LANDP, FA_LAND0, DV_REFYR
CG_B0RP0, FA_LANDS, CG_PR0FI, CG_ACAUD, FA_ENTIT
< - 0 .3
DV_C0RPT, 0P_ANCIL, FI_BENEF, 0P_CARHA, 0P_TECNA, F I J N VES
Model w ith region dum m y variables (F a cto r 1)
P o sitiv e f a c t o r
lo a d in g
> 0 .8
> 0 .6
> 0 .5
> 0 .4
> 0 .3
N e g a tiv e f a c t o r
lo a d in g
< - 0 .8
< - 0 .7
< - 0 .6
< - 0 .5
< - 0 .4
< - 0 .3
RG_LATIN
CG_B0RSZ, PB_STRAP, PB_HINTE
PO JJR B A N , CG_SELEC
FA_P0LIC, PBJRAIN
P 0 J L A U S , C G JJBJEC, P 0 J R A I N , P0_B0TTL, PB_DINVE, P0_SUSTA,
IR_PUBFU , PB_REGEX, 0 P J R A N S , C G J S R P 0
RG_HANSE, DV_DECEN
FIJEVEL, FA_HMAST, CG_B0RP0
FI_C0LLE, C G JE 0 A P
FI_PRICE, F A JA N DP, FIJVAGES, DV_REFYR, FA JA N D O
F A JN T IT , F A JA N D S , CG_ACAUD, 0P_ANCIL
FI_BENEF, 0PJECNA
N ote: V ariables w ith an e s tim a te d re s id u a l v a ria n c e < 0 . 5 0 a re in d ic a te d in b o ld .
procedures for contracting out land to third parties (CGJ3ELEC)). It furtherm ore
has positive loadings on functional pro-activeness, both w ithin (PO) and
beyond the ow n p ort (PB). W ithin the investm ent category, a positive loading is
present for land lease being the highest percentage of operational incom e
(IR_LEASE) an d a negative one for public funding being the highest percentage
(IR_PUBFU). A negative loading also appears for private ow nership of the port
authority (DV_PRIVA).
In sum m ary, Factor 2 com bines the size of the port authority w ith principles
of good corporate governance and functional pro-activeness. Com pared w ith
the corresponding Factor 4 in the m odel w ith regional dum m y variables, we
notice th at these do not appear in the list of significant variables. The regional
adherence does not therefore play a role.
Factor 3 : N ew European public conservators
It appears from Table 7 that Factor 3 shows predom inantly negative loadings,
especially for variables that relate to operational involvement in port services (OP),
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 197
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
Table 6: L o a d in g s: F a c to r 2 ( w ith o u t d u m m y v a r ia b le s ) a n d F a c to r 4 (w ith d u m m y v a ria b le s )
Model w ith o u t region dum m y variables (F a cto r 2 )
P o sitiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
> 0 .7
> 0 .6
> 0 .5
> 0 .4
SZ STAFF, P 0 ITSYS, SZ CARGO, CG ACPUB, CG ACANL
CG_CSRP0, CG_SELEC, IR_LEASE, P 0_S 0C IE , PB_TRAIN, CG_MISSI
> 0 .3
< - 0 .4
CG VALUE, P 0 RULES, PB HINTE
IR_PUBFU
0*1
V
O
N e g a tiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
CG_ACAUD, IRJNC0M
CG_ACSEP
PB REGEX
> 0 .8
IR_PDU ES, FA_LANDD, 0P_TRANS, DV_PRIVA
Model w ith region d um m y variables (F a cto r 4)
P o sitiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
CG_ACAUD, CG_ACSEP, IRJNC0M
SZ_STAFF
PB REGEX, CG SELEC, SZ CARGO, PO ITSYS, CG ACANL
> 0 .8
> 0 .6
> 0 .5
> 0 .4
> 0 .3
CG_ACPUB, CG_MISSI, PB_TRAIN, IR_LEASE, PB_HINTE, DV_C0RPT
< - 0 .4
0*1
V
O
N e g a tiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
CG CSRPO
IR_PUBFU
0P_TRANS, FA_LANDD, IR_PDUES
Note: V ariables w ith an e s tim a te d re s id u a l v a ria n c e < 0 . 5 0 a re in d ic a te d in b o ld .
Table 7: L o a d in g s: F a c to r 3 ( w ith o u t d u m m y v a r ia b le s ) a n d F a c to r 2 (w ith d u m m y v a ria b le s )
Model w ith o u t region dum m y variables (F a cto r 3 )
P o sitiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
> 0 .4
CG_0BJEC,
> 0 .3
N e g a tiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
< - 0 .7
DV_REFYR, IRJNC0M, CG_ACSEP
0P_TECNA
OP ANCIL
CG_ACPUB, 0P_CARHA
< - 0 .6
< - 0 .5
< - 0 .4
0*1
V
O
PO B0TTL, OP PAXHA, FI INVES, FI TARGT, PB SERVI, DV PRIVA,
FI COLLE, OP TRANS, FI CROSS
CG CSRPO, PO PROMO, FI PRICE, PO SUSTA, FI RESUL
Model w ith region d um m y variables (F a cto r 2 )
P o sitiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
N e g a tiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
> 0 .6
RG_NWLAT
> 0 .4
FI_TARGT
> 0 .3
< - 0 .6
< - 0 .5
< - 0 .4
< - 0 .3
DV REFYR, RG NWHAN (0 .2 9 9 )
CG_ACPUB, 0P_ANCIL
P 0_S0C IE , P0_SUSTA, 0P_TECNA, P0_B0TTL
FI CROSS, PB REGEX, PO RULES, PB TRAIN, CG CSRPO
FI COLLE, CG VALUE, OP PAXHA, PO TRAIN, IR LEASE, FA POLIC,
CG_B0RP0
Note: V ariables w ith an e s tim a te d re s id u a l v a ria n c e < 0 . 5 0 a re in d ic a te d in b o ld .
corporate governance (transparency) (CG), functional pro-activeness w ithin (PO)
and beyond the port (PB), as well as financial autonom y (FI). A negative loading
also exists for private ow nership of the p ort authority (DV_PRIVA), w hereas
a positive loading appears for the variable th at indicates w hether the port
authority obtained its present legal form in the last decade (DV_REFYR).
198 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
Factor 3 bears resem blance to the ‘co nservator’ type of port authority that
w as identified in Table 1. Com pared w ith the corresponding Factor 2 in the
m odel w ith regional dum m y variables, w e see a strong positive loading for the
New Latin region (RG_NWLAT) an d a m odest positive loading for the New
H anse region (RG_NWHAN).
Factor 4: Anglo-Saxon private entrepreneurs
Finally, Table 8 shows that Factor 4 has positive loadings for devolution variables
(DV), m ost strongly for privatisation (DV_PRIVA). It also has a strongly positive
loading for the variable that indicates that the provision of services forms the
highest percentage of income of the port authority (IR_SERVI). This corresponds
with the positive loading for the variables that indicate that the port
authority provides cargo-handling services (OP_CARHA) and has m aximization of
its ow n profit as an economic objective (CG_PROFI). The factor has negative
loadings on financial autonom y variables (FI). A negative loading appears on
politicians being significantly present in the supervisory board of the port authority
(CG_BORPO).
This factor has elem ents of the entrepreneurial type indicated in Table 1.
The negative loadings on financial autonom y (FI) seem paradoxical, however.
Factor 4 relates negatively to Factor 3 in the m odel w ith regional dum m y
variables. Taking this into account, it is obvious th at the Anglo-Saxon regional
variable (RG_ANGLO) plays a very im portant role.
Table 8: L o a d in g s: F a c to r 4 ( w ith o u t d u m m y v a ria b le s ) a n d F a c to r 3 (w ith d u m m y v a r ia b le s )
Model w ith o u t region dum m y variables (F a cto r 4 )
P o sitiv e f a c to r
> 0 .9
DV_PRIVA
lo a d in g
> 0 .8
IR SERVI
> 0 .4
DV C0RPT, CG PR0FI
> 0 .3
SZ_STAFF, 0P_CARHA, CG_ACANL
N e g a tiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
< - 0 .5
CG_B0RP0
< - 0 .4
FI_BENEF, FI_PR 0M 0, CG_MISSI
< - 0 .3
FA_ENTIT, FI_C0LLE, IR_PDUES, FI_CR0SS
Model w ith region dum m y variables (F a cto r 3 )
P o sitiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
> 0 .4
N e g a tiv e f a c to r
lo a d in g
< - 0 .9
> 0 .3
< - 0 .8
< - 0 .6
< - 0 .5
< - 0 .4
< - 0 .3
CG_B0RP0, RG_HANSE
CG_0BJEC, PB_STRAP, FI_PR 0M 0, CG_B0RSZ, IR_LEASE, IRJNC0M
DV_PRIVA
RG ANGLO
0P_CARHA, CG_PR0FI
DV C0RPT, IR SERVI, FI INVES
OP TECNA, FI PRICE
FI RESUL, IR CAPAS
Note: V ariables w ith an e s tim a te d re s id u a l v a ria n c e < 0 . 5 0 a re in d ic a te d in b o ld .
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 199
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
Conclusions and Research Agenda
T here exists a w ide range of studies, w hich discuss port governance in general
or focus on particular aspects. However, up until now, research on port gov­
ernance practices w as lim ited to case studies or rath er descriptive analyses. The
p resent study extends this research by analysing a large n u m ber of E uropean
port authorities (n = 110) in a quantitative m anner, using factor analysis. The
2010 ESPO Fact-Finding Survey proved to be a valuable source of inform ation to
explore differences in governance practices betw een E uropean ports.
The results confirm the existence of different types of port governance
in Europe, w hich to som e extent correspond w ith the hypothetical typology
according to w h ich p o rt au th o rities can be con serv ato rs, facilitators or
e n tre p re n eu rs. Differences are m ainly geographically defined and the su b ­
division in H anseatic, Latin, Anglo-Saxon and new M em ber State port au th o ­
rities proves to be a valuable one. Taking into account that, proportionally, m ost
port authorities in Europe belong to either the Hanse or Latin tradition, the
difference betw een them translates itself in a N orth-S outh duality w hich not
only involves sim ple ow nership differences, but also covers m any other gov­
ernance elements, especially functional and financial autonomy, which is typically
m ore lim ited in the south.
In addition to this geographical explanation of diversity, w e could also
detect differences in term s of governance practices betw een sm all and large
ports. The latter generally follow a m ore pro-active approach and score higher
on transparency-related variables.
The findings of our analysis invite m ore in-depth research. The principal
factors should be explored further to explain apparent paradoxes, such as the
lim ited functional and financial autonom y th at Latin port authorities seem to
com bine w ith a pro-active facilitator approach. The sam e goes for the o u t­
spoken entrepreneurial profile of Anglo-Saxon port authorities th at seem s to be
b o u n d by lim ited financial autonom y. This in-depth research will be done
through com parative case study analysis. The m ost pertinent variables can
furtherm ore be transform ed into perform ance indicators in order to keep track
of evolutions in port governance practices over time. Finally, the potentially
harm onising influence of EU law and policy on E uropean port governance
should be analysed (Verhoeven, 2009).
Acknowledgement
The authors w ish to th an k the in dependent review ers of this article and Pro­
fessor Dr Eddy Van de Voorde for review ing an earlier version.
200 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
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Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 201
Verhoeven and Vanoutrive
Appendix
Table A: E s tim a te d re s id u a l v a r ia n c e s
Variable
Model w ith o u t region d um m y variables
Model w ith region dum m y variables
E stim ated residual variance
E stim ated residual variance
SZ CARGO
SZ_PASSG
0 .6 3
0 .9 7
0 .7 0
0 .9 8
SZ STAFF
IR_CAPAS
0 .5 1
0 .8 7
0 .5 0
0 .8 4
IR INCOM
CG BORSZ
RG_HANSE
0 .1 9
0 .4 6
0 .2 5
0 .4 0
0 .1 4
RG NWHAN
RG ANGLO
RG_LATIN
—
—
0 .8 9
0 .0 7
0 .0 1
—
—
RG NWLAT
DV PRIVA
DV_DECEN
- 0 .2 0
0 .4 4
0 .4 6
0 .0 9
0 .2 2
DV CORPT
DV REFYR
CG_0BJEC
0 .5 7
0 .5 9
0 .5 8
0 .5 2
0 .5 5
0 .6 0
CG PROFI
CG_VALU E
0 .5 3
0 .7 7
0 .4 8
0 .6 9
CG MISSI
CG CEOAP
CG_BORPO
0 .6 5
0 .5 4
0 .3 6
0 .7 8
0 .5 7
0 .1 6
CG SELEC
CG CSRPO
CG_ACSEP
0 .4 6
0 .5 0
0 .2 8
0 .3 9
0 .5 3
0 .2 5
CG ACAUD
CG ACPUB
CG_ACANL
0 .0 4
0 .4 0
0 .5 9
- 0 .0 2
0 .3 4
0 .6 9
OP TECNA
OP_ANCIL
0 .3 5
0 .3 3
0 .3 7
0 .3 5
OP CARHA
OP PAXHA
OP_TRANS
0 .3 8
0 .7 5
0 .6 1
0 .4 3
0 .8 0
0 .6 6
FA ENTIT
FA HMAST
FA_POLIC
0 .6 2
0 .3 9
0 .6 9
0 .6 8
0 .3 0
0 .6 2
FA LANDO
FA LANDS
FA_LANDP
0 .6 8
0 .7 5
0 .6 2
0 .6 8
0 .7 0
0 .6 1
FA LANDD
PO CLAUS
PO_URBAN
0 .8 4
0 .6 8
0 .5 5
0 .8 0
0 .7 2
0 .5 7
PO ENVIR
PO_RULES
0 .8 7
0 .7 9
0 .8 6
0 .7 7
PO SUSTA
PO BOTTL
P O JM P L E
0 .6 5
0 .5 7
0 .8 0
0 .6 0
0 .5 3
0 .8 5
PO ITSYS
0 .5 7
0 .6 2
—
202 © 2012 M acmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203
A quantitative analysis of European port governance
T a b le A co ntin u e d
Variable
Model w ith o u t region d um m y variables
Model w ith region dum m y variables
E stim ated residual variance
E stim ated resid u a l variance
P 0 PROMO
P 0 TRAIN
P0_S0C IE
0 .8 5
0 .7 6
0 .5 4
0 .9 3
0 .7 3
0 .4 9
PB STRAP
PB DINVE
PB_REGEX
0 .3 5
0 .7 1
0 .3 9
0 .3 6
0 .7 3
0 .3 9
PB SERVI
PB HINTE
PB_TRAIN
0 .7 6
0 .4 7
0 .5 0
0 .8 8
0 .5 1
0 .4 9
IR PDUES
IR_LEASE
0 .7 5
0 .6 9
0 .8 4
0 .6 4
IR SERVI
IR PUBFU
FI_PRICE
0 .3 4
0 .6 5
0 .4 3
0 .6 1
0 .6 4
0 .3 5
FI PROMO
FI CROSS
FI_LEVEL
0 .7 9
0 .7 3
0 .2 9
0 .8 5
0 .7 6
0 .3 2
FI COLLE
FI BENEF
F IJN V E S
0 .2 2
0 .6 5
0 .6 6
0 .3 4
0 .8 2
0 .5 9
FI WAGES
FI RESUL
FI TARGT
0 .6 2
0 .8 8
0 .7 6
0 .6 0
0 .8 4
0 .7 6
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1479-2931
Maritime Economics & Logistics
Vol. 14, 2, 178-203 203