Implications for regulation:
lessons from Biopesticides
Dr Justin Greaves, University of
Warwick
• This presentation is based on an article
of mine in Public Policy and
Administration, Volume 24, no 3, 2009
• The research project upon which this
article draws is funded by the Rural
Economy and Land Use Programme
Introduction
• Bureaucrats and regulators are typically
(and understandably) risk averse
• Their desire to avoid things going wrong
means they are not natural innovators
• Risk averseness does not create an
encouraging environment for regulatory
innovation – term almost a contradiction
Pesticides Safety Directorate
(PSD)
• We use the example of PSD’s work on
biopesticides to examine and develop
accounts of regulatory innovation
• PSD was an agency of the Department
of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(Defra)
• Around 200 staff – responsible for the
registration of agricultural pesticides
Important to note ...
• The Chemical Regulation Directorate
has now been created in the Health and
Safety Executive (HSE)
• Formed in April 2009 this integrates
PSD with responsibility for biocides
What are biopesticides?
• Biopesticides are mass produced
biologically based agents used for the
control of plant pests. They include:
- Living Organisms (natural enemies)
invertebrates, nematodes and micro-organisms
- Naturally Occurring substances
plant abstracts; Semiochemicals (eg: insect pheromones)
- Genes (USA)
Plant Incorporated Products
Why such a low take-up?
• Microbial biopesticides represent less
than 1% of the global market
• One explanation is ‘market failure’ – the
market is too small to provide
economies of scale and encourage
firms to enter
• The other explanation is that of
‘regulatory failure’
Bureucratic theory
• Systems of regulation may have
unintended consequences
• Bureaucratic theory points to a tendency
for mechanisms to replace goals, for
processes to become more important than
outcomes
• UK regulatory system developed
according to a chemical pesticide model a barrier to biopesticide commercialisation
What is regulatory innovation?
• Distinction between change and
innovation
• Innovation can be seen as ‘the
application of new solutions to old
problems, or new solutions to new (or
newly constructed) problems, but not
old solutions to old problems (Black
2005)
What is regulatory innovation? (2)
• Hall’s typology of policy change
1.1st order changes are changes to the
levels or settings of basic instruments (not
considered here innovation)
2.2nd order changes are changes in
technique, process or instrument
3.3rd order changes involve changes in the
goals and understandings of policy
(‘paradigm shifts’)
Policy networks
• Policy network theory suggests networks
good at managing incremental change
• Only tend to innovate in conditions of crisis
or exogenous shock
• Situation complicated by an
underperforming and incomplete policy
network (see Greaves and Grant article in
British Politics, 2010, vol 5, no 1)
How and why does regulatory
innovation occur?
• Black’s five worlds of regulatory
innovation
1.The individual
2.The organization
3.The state
4.The global polity
5.‘the world of the innovation’
Criticism of Black
• Academia criticized for lack of high
quality research on innovation in public
sector – ‘how was it done’
• Black’s ‘five worlds’ do not lend
themselves to practice, often no
identifiable tools for action
• Trying to cover every possible theory or
explanation – potentially little leverage
Warwick iCast
• Before we continue
here is a short video
clip on the project,
bringing out some of
the issues we are
discussing
The Biopesticides Scheme
• In June 2003 PSD launched a pilot
scheme to promote alternative control
measures
• Reduced registration fees, pre-submission
meetings.
• A permanent Biopesticides Scheme
launched in June 2006 – also introducing
the role of a Biopesticides ‘champion’
Other changes
• Change of ‘culture’ just as important
• An ‘internal reorientation’
• Pragmatism and rules ‘open to
interpretation’
• Use of published data rather than
expensive field trials where appropriate
• An acknowledgment different questions
may need to be asked about biologicals
But is this innovation?
• Reduction in fees 1st order policy change
• Much is 2nd order – pre-submission
meetings, biopesticides champion etc
• Change in ‘paradigm’? (Buffin)
• Unusual for a regulatory agency to
negotiate new policy spaces it which to
operate
• ‘Quite remarkable for a regulatory agency’
Contextual drivers
• The public are concerned about the
possible health effects of pesticide
residues on food
• This leads to action by retailers and
others
• Environmental concerns
• The problem of ‘resistance’
Exogenous pressures
• Defra was keen to encourage the wider
use of biopesticides
• Given slow progress, the institutions of the
core executive needed to intervene
• The Business Regulation Team (BRT) of
the Cabinet Office ‘leaned’ on PSD
• ‘Aims and Objectives’ agreed with
ministers in Spring 2003 included
developing and introducing alternatives
Endogenous pressures
• There was also an endogenous steer
from within PSD
• They were keen to discuss how the new
aim could be promoted
• Key individuals important in driving
through innovation
• ‘Horizontal’ working practices
Endogenous pressures (2)
• Those who work on biopesticides have
shown great enthusiasm for their work
• Desire to do a ‘better job’, career
building etc
• They see themselves as scientists first
and regulators second
• This results in a desire to learn, driving
innovation forward
A ‘champion’ organization
• The literature refers to ‘champions’ who
push through innovation
• But a gap in the literature when it comes to
‘champion organizations’
• Could a quasi-governmental organization,
an advocate of biopesticides, lead to
greater regulatory change?
• Consider BPPD of the EPA in US
Reform of institutional
structures
• Hampton Review on regulation reported in
April 2005
• Proposed streamlining – too many small
regulators
• Implication PSD should be merged into a
larger thematic regulator
• But could a smaller organisation be more
flexible and responsive?
• Could the initiative on biopesticides end up
being lost?
Conclusions and lessons (1)
• Fundamental tension between
expectations that regulators will be
consistent, predictable and impartial – yet
also innovative
• Consequences of making a mistake are
serious, esp where public/environmental
safety concerned
• But regulators must respond to changing
demands in society and retain trust of
politicians and stakeholders
Conclusions and lessons (2)
• In terms of animal health issues
1.Are there any lessons for the proposed
Animal Health Organization?
2.Should the regulation of plant and
animal diseases be in separate
compartments?
Please visit our website :
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/bi
opesticides
Acknowledgements:
Prof Wyn Grant
Prof Mark Tatchell
Dr David Chandler
Gillian Prince
(University of Warwick)