Centre for Studies in Democratisation
CSD
Students' Working Paper Series
The democratic promise for development
versus the Asian authoritarian miracle:
Does regime type foster development?
George Lindley
georgelindley@live.ac.uk
Working Paper n. 3/ 2011
Centre for Studies in Democratisation
Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/csd/
The Centre for Studies in Democratisation (CSD) was established at
the University of Warwick in 1992 in response to a growing interest
in the study of democracy at a theoretical and empirical level.
Democratisation has become a central political theme and features
now prominently on the foreign policy agenda of western countries.
Members of CSD are seeking to understand why, how and when
democracies emerge, sustain or collapse. They also investigate the
reasons why democratisation can sometimes be problematic.
Do not hesitate to contact us for more information!
Renske Doorenspleet (Director):
Renske.Doorenspleet@warwick.ac.uk
Or visit our website:
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/csd/
Abstract
The relationship between democracy and development is one of the core
issues for political scientists, with a history of antithetical conclusions. The
promise of development and democracy is now further problematized by the
‘miraculous’ developmental success of East Asian and South-East Asian
authoritarian regimes. In this essay we compare the promises of democracy
for development and the reality of these leading authoritarian regimes,
linking the latters’ specific political environment to their hyper development.
To facilitate a meaningful analysis, the attributes of these regimes are
connected with development defined both as GDP growth and Human
Development (HD), before comparing and contrasting. The results of which
are that first of all, both regimes rely on intermediaries for development,
namely good governance, stability, property rights and successful choice of
policies. Each of these is guaranteed often differently by the polar regime
types. Secondly, we find that the respective consolidated regimes make a
difference for different possibility, stages and rates of development.
Accordingly, regime type does have an impact on development, but not as
straight forwardly as perhaps hoped. Regime type is just one integrated
component of the political environment that determines development.
Keywords: autocracy, democracy, development, East Asia, good
governance, GDP growth, Human Development, regime type, South-East
Asia.
The democratic promise for development versus the Asian
authoritarian miracle: Does regime type foster development?
George Lindley
INTRODUCTION
From the prediction of a ‘cruel dilemma’ (Bhagwati 2002) to that of a
‘virtuous circle’ (Bhalla 1997), the relationship between democracy and
development has been thoroughly expounded upon, both in theory and
empiricism. Development, like democracy, is a contentious term, with its
meaning having undergone certain revisions for some of these theorists. Are
we to take the traditional measurement of development; that of economic
growth as Gross Domestic Product (GDP)? This is the simplest way of
looking at development and most convenient for analysis and empiricism.
However, the apparent failure of the trickle-down effect of wealth to the
masses has led to a second and more recent conception of development;
Human Development (HD). This fashionable new way of thinking is the one
favoured by the UN which annually publishes the ‘Human Development
Index’ (HDI). While Amartya Sen equates HD as allowing individuals to
‘flourish as human beings’ (quoted in Tsai 2006:234), here we are going to
take a more palpable approach and consider it as the redistribution of
‘goods’ that the state produces collectively, specifically for our purposes;
income, education and healthcare (Tsai 2006)). Both of these conceptions of
development (HD and GDP growth) will be discussed here for two reasons.
First, they both have their prominence in the literature. Second, they explain
different trends. As established, development as GDP is potentially
1
misleading if the masses aren’t sharing the benefits, but then equally, HD
depends on the total amount of benefits there are available for the state to
redistribute. Increasing rates of HD can only be a short term trend and a
potentially disastrous one if overall economic growth isn’t there as
nourishment.
The basic premise that we will we be working with is the following, ‘How
authority is structured limits the range of economic policies that a regime
can adopt and implement.’ (Kohli 1986:155) Favourable economic policies
for induced development have been thoroughly analysed; openness to
competition, use of international market, successful land reforms, public
provision of incentives for investment, exportation and industrialization.
(Sen 1997:2) The idea is not however to hone this list of policies and
connect them to regime type, but to paint a picture of what developmental
environments emerge from given political environments in terms of what
kinds of policies and market conditions is the state likely to implement that
will ultimately lead to type and rate of development (or therein lack of).
Political environment then, is seen here as a platform upon which
development is pursued. Accordingly, the political regime can only explain
part of development, and different regime types may explain different
elements of resulting development. For example, a certain regime type may
be the reason why the state seeks development, but may be found lacking in
facilitating it. Likewise, a given political environment may determine the
sought of development that is promoted.
The first part will be theoretical and will revolve around the arguments in
favour of democracy as the ideal political regime type for growth. In the
2
second part, we will analyse leading authoritarian states who have achieved
so called ‘economic miracles’. Of these, we will mainly be citing those in
East and South-East Asia; salient examples being, China, South Korea and
Indonesia (where their respective economic miracles have been attributed to
authoritarian regimes). We can then move on to a comparison and analysis
of development as GDP growth and development as HD for the two regime
types. By comparing the positive reasons for development in democracies
with the explanation of historic cases of authoritarian economic miracles, we
are taking a slightly different line of enquiry than the predominant one in the
literature, namely the contest between autocracy and democracy in terms of
development promise, both in theory and in empiricism. The purpose here is
to review the reasons themselves for development, above analysing generic
regime types. These reasons may be diverging but equally valid as
explanations for successful development. Sometimes reasons are the same
and rely on an intermediary to explain development. Some important
questions that will be investigated are: Why do certain authoritarian states
excel? How do these reasons contrast with those that say democracy is the
best political regime type for development? What do these reasons have in
common? How sturdy are the arguments championing democracy as the
ideal platform for development? What kind of development results from the
polar political environments?
Democracy as the ideal political environment for development
With democracy being purely a political system, it does not a priori have a
pretension to be a driver of development, as the ‘demos’ doesn’t have a say
3
in the economy nor in the family. (Bermeo 2009:23) Literature largely isn’t
congruent on the why democracy effects development and some reasons
follow contradicting logic. Each argument will be analysed for the type of
developmental benefit it proposes and the argument’s congruency.
Democracy overlaps with ‘good governance’. (Carbone 2009:124)
‘The current orthodoxy has it, democracy is the guarantor of good
governance and democratic good governance is what will produce
development’. (Leftwich 2000:147) While the two don’t equate, highly
prized notions of accountability, transparency, responsiveness, participation,
inclusivity, of the government are found in both concepts. (UNDP 1997:2-3)
These attributes are valued for development in different ways and there will
be greater discussion of them individually later in this section. The key point
to discuss here is that citizens can choose their leaders (in consolidated
democracies). In a democracy, if there is corruption (or an element of ‘bad
governance’) within the government, then the party simply won’t be reelected. The ability to remove a leader is possible without the overthrow of
the regime. Democracy then, has two clear qualities here over nondemocracies. First of all, governments are less likely to get away with
widespread corruption and thus less likely to try it. Secondly, a change in
government is an institutionalised recurrence; it has no effect on the
economy. (Przeworski et al. 2000:212) The opposite is the case for
autocracies, in which civilians (and/or the military) have to resort to drastic
action to oust the ruling elite, ‘divert(ing) resources and energies away from
production’1. (Przeworski et al. (2000:179) That being said, what does this
1
See Libya at the moment (April/May).
4
mean for policies? After all, as we have already seen, it is policies that are
important for development2. Przeworski and Limongi ask quite rightly, what
do people vote for; person or policy? What do leaders care about; a term in
office or the good of the country? (1993:59) There are no straight forward
answers to these questions. We can however draw the conclusion that while
in reality democracy promises to avoid (prolonged) disastrous governance, it
doesn’t guarantee the best selection of policies for development. This leads
us to the second key argument.
Democracies allocate resources better. This argument is based on the
premise that democracies efficiently spend and invest the resources it has. At
the heart of the matter is the benefit of widespread free information,
allowing for more informed economic decisions. (Przeworski et al.
2000:144) ‘Free press, electoral competition, association, preferences and
predictive endowments of individuals’ all are important pools of knowledge.
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997:165) Amartya Sen develops this argument
when he famously stated that there has never been a famine under
democratic rule. ‘Political and civil rights, says Sen, gives people the
opportunity to draw attention forcefully to general needs and to demand
appropriate public action.’ (1997:2) Leaders are warned (earlier) about lifethreatening disasters resulting from policies (or lack of) thanks to freedoms
such as speech and association (through protests, political pressure etc.)
averting preventable disasters. In his paper (1997:2) he applies this line of
thought to economic and social disasters as well as famine. Not just
responsiveness (part of good governance) here then is key, but the ability of
2
See also Leftwich (2000:133)
5
governments to respond as opposed to in other forms of regimes. This is a
direct link from democracy to the facilitation of development.
Democratic rule ensures a fair and far-reaching redistribution of
resources. Fair and far-reaching goods redistribution in turn, also has a
positive causal stimulus for state-wide GDP growth. (Bermeo 2009:26)
While it is doubtless that the egalitarian spread of resources is a positive for
HD (especially if it is done through increased healthcare and education
spending), is it true that democracies commit to fair redistribution in the
same way it relieves absolute poverty? Most political economists would say
it is. (Carbone 2009:129) Their theory needs translating into two parts. First
of all, the poor (in healthcare, education as well as income) constitute an
undivided large/majority segment of the population that is below the median
standard of living. Then, governments respond to their voiced wishes in the
in the name of democracy/vote seeking. The first part is often true without
the second part resulting; inequality is rife within democracies. (Bermeo
2009:24) This is backed up by empirical investigations. (Mulé 1998:6-10,
Carbone 2009:129)) Many reasons have been suggested to explain this; the
poor itself is often divided over ethno-religious cleavages (Carbone
2009:131); the poor are disproportionately taxed; (Olson quoted in Tsai
2006:236), Democracy is about rights rather than redistribution (Bermeo
2009:28) etc.3 Whatever the case, the facts are clear; redistribution of
resources is tentatively done. Quite interestingly though, there is the
suggestion that inequality is mitigated in consolidated democracies. Carbone
3
See also Mulé (1998:10-19) who reviews even more alternative
explanations before suggesting her own.
6
calls this the ‘Political Kuznets curve’. (Carbone 2009:131)
Democratic rule provides a more stable environment for the economy.
This is justified through a number of ways, again related to good
governance. First of all, as we have already seen, leaders replace leaders in
democracies without having an affect on the economy. Second, and most
interestingly (as we’ll see later), is the premise that democracies guarantee
property rights. Defendants of this argument maintain that property stays in
the hands of the rightful owners by law and isn’t up for repartition. With this
guaranteed, investors are more likely to invest because profit margins and
contracts are protected and transparent. Of course it isn’t democracy that
ensures property rights, but rule of law. But it is this same intermediary that
is pursued in democracies in the name of securing constitutionalism, which
also secures property. (Beetham 1997:83-84) As Olson puts it,
‘(Democracies) have the extraordinary virtue that the same emphasis on
individual rights that is necessary to lasting democracy is also necessary for
secure rights to both property and enforcement of contracts’. (1993:574)
However, numerous theorists maintain that democracy does not necessarily
guarantee property and contract rights, (Addison discussing the findings of
Barro in Burnell 2002:46) (Przeworski and Limongi (1993:53)), for various
reasons. Beetham, for one, suggests that the elite of either the economic or
political sphere can make themselves exempt from the rule of law.(1997:84)
Thus the reader is inclined to interpret that the protection of property rights
is again a virtue of consolidated democracies, and not something that
democratization incidentally guarantees.
Property rights is an interesting argument because it is contradictory to the
7
popular claim that democracy acts to repartition the goods of society, the
claim analysed in the previous paragraph. So although the argument is that
property is safe from ruling despots, Przeworski and Limongi remind us that
it isn’t just the leaders who unfairly take what isn’t theirs. ‘Capitalist
property is threatened by organized workers, landlords’ property by landless
peasant’. (1993:53) It seems therefore we have to reject either this argument
for democracy favouring development or the one in the previous paragraph.
If one is correct, it is ipso facto the reason why the other is incorrect.
In conclusion to this part, we have one clear main reason why democracy
facilitates development and avoids disasters (the allocation of resources),
one reason to suggest that democracy promotes good governance, which in
turn promotes development and finally two more unproven reasons that
democracy facilitates HD or that democracy provides a necessary platform
for development through stability. We must remind the reader that two parts
constitute the ‘stability’ reason and not to dismiss the longevity of
democracies as a benefit for development, even if the ability to secure
property rights is inherently false.
The Asian miracles: Authoritarian development
Now we hope to account for the main political conditions that have
promoted, enabled and facilitated the phenomenal development of various
East and South-East Asian states, bearing in mind that the region under
question is more complex than perhaps is thought. It must be stressed that
there is no communal model of development by way of which all the success
8
stories have followed4. As a consequence, what we will discover in this
paragraph are four key characteristics that pertain to multiple authoritarian
case studies in East and South-East Asia, rather than a comprehensive set of
specific economic policies with a linear line drawn to Confucius
authoritarianism. Although distinguished here for point of comparison, these
characteristics overlap with each other (just like the characteristics in the
previous section did). Crucially for this essay, we will consider how likely
these characteristics are products of autocratic rule, and the specific
connection between political environment and resulting development.
State capacity. China, South Korea and Taiwan have particularly profited
from what is called high ‘state capacity’. (Low 2004:18) Linda Low defines
this as, ‘The government’s ability to get its job done, including mobilising
society, extract resources, steer development and legitimate regime’. (Low
2004:18) State capacity was hugely important to these states because
economic development was a mixture of state-led protectionism and market
based growth, which were structurally imposed by strong states. (Beeson
2004:31)) A crucial reform for development in South Korea, China, Japan
and Taiwan is that of land very early on. In creating a relatively equal
structure to society, growth induced by competition ensued. (Bhalla in
Hadenius 1997:212-213) Then, as the example of South Korea best shows5,
a boom in GDP lead to increased HD as a large majority of the population
4
For further clarity see Bradford (1986:119) who contrasts Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore and Hong Kong.
5
HD increase in South Korea between 1960 and 1992 made it one of the
most remarkable performers measured by UNDP (Mehrotra et al. 1998:264)
9
was able to equally and directly profit from the economic development.
Improved human resources in turn aided GDP growth by means of a virtuous
circle (as hypothesized in the previous section). (Mehrotra et al. in Low
2004:290-291) The link between state capacity and development here is
purely an autocratic one. Adrian Leftwich argues,
‘(For development), it is inevitable that non-consensual steps will have to be
taken, especially where a new developmentally committed regime comes to
power facing a legacy of immense inequality in wealth and opportunity
which requires urgent attention.’ (Leftwich 2005:693)
Hence GDP growth is facilitated by autocracy in that the latter doesn’t
respect the rights/opinions of the minorities. This doesn’t mean HD is
limited, in fact the opposite seems to be the case, the leader chooses to
pursue HD to legitimize the regime.
State autonomy. Unlike but not unrelated to state capacity, state autonomy is
the ability of a state to plan long-term development. (Deans in Low
2004:138) Where there is just one ruler or political party, long-term
developmental policies are safeguarded from being retracted or modified
throughout subsequent revisions of office. (Dent in Low 2004:81) Monoparty rule is not of course a condition exclusive to autocracies, it is however
more often than not the reality. For Taiwan this was the Kuomintang up to
2000, for South Korea it was rule under Park Chung-hee 1961-1979, for
China the Communist Party and for Indonesia this was rule under Suharto
1967-1998. This has allowed for GDP growth where contentious
developmental policies have been pursued. A further way autocracies have
an autonomous role to pursue development is through the emancipation from
10
the consumption-in-the-now demands from social forces. (Przeworski and
Limongi 1993:54-55) Indeed this has been the case for the hard saving and
investing countries where GDP growth has been made possible in China6,
Taiwan, and South Korea, (as well as Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore).
(Bhalla 1997:209) Autocracy here is useful in facilitating such extreme
development because leaders such as Park Chung-hee are able to suppress
demands for consumption forcing firms to invest. (Przeworski and Limongi
1997:164)
Political stability. As we have seen from the previous section on the merits
of democracy, political stability, albeit generated in a different way in
autocracies, is beneficial for development. Political stability is linked with
state capacity and autonomy by way in which they are all generated.
Capacity and autonomy are consolidated in a stable environment often by
the absence, or where once present, destruction of civil society. (Leftwich
2005:164) The latter mechanism was the case for Korea, Indonesia and
China. (Leftwich 2005:164) Secondly, a stable political situation was
secured in East Asia, despite autocrat rule and repression, by improving the
income and standards of living for the masses7. (United Nations 1995:102)
President Suharto of Indonesia, for example, improved infant mortality and
6
To get an idea of these phenomenal rates of investment, in 2005 China
was investing close to 50% of its GDP. (Huang 2008:172).
7
Note however, while income inequality was kept at low levels in South
Korea and Taiwan, it was exacerbated in Indonesia (and other South-East Asian countries
(Higgot and Nesadurai 2002:5-6)) leading to civil unrest in the 90’s. (Higgot and
Nesadurai 2002:10) (Leftwich 2000:136)
11
literacy rates while successfully combatting poverty8 (Higgot and Nesadurai
2002:10) ergo securing his legitimacy as a president. Autocracies then, need
to perceivably develop (GDP as well as HD) to guarantee the survival of the
mildly tyrannical regime, both of which are necessary conditions for
transformative development. Accordingly, stability is reliant on the elite
selecting the right policies; too many wrong policies, (such as the pursuit of
petrochemicals in South Korea and shipbuilding in Taiwan and China
(United Nations 1995:94)), again not only squanders development, but also
the regime and thus the venerated platform for development that we have
discussed.
Determined developmental elite. High state capacity and autonomy would be
meaningless, in fact dangerous, if the government wasn’t intent on pursuing
development for the masses over self-interested goals such as glory or
corruption. When under autocrat rule, the governments of South Korea and
Taiwan, then later in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia all were indeed
distinguished for actively pursuing development, (Low 2004:15-18)
(guaranteeing political stability.) Illustrious by what Mark Beeson calls
‘pilot agency’, or powerful bureaucrats with the sole purpose of planning
economic development. This was an invention of Japan9, and then replicated
in Taiwan and South Korea. (Beeson in Low 2004:30) Policies were
‘depoliticized’ and selected for their developmental attributes for economic
8
Between 1976 and 1996, poverty was reduced from 60% of the
population to less than 12% (Barbone et al. 2007:44)
9
Japan’s famous MITI: Ministry of International Trade and Industry
12
criteria. (Low 2004:12) Through state intervention, the market could be
steadily liberalised and steered towards advancing the industries that gave
the country its comparative advantage10 (Jomo in Low 2004:54) that was
needed to close the development gap with the first world. As well as the
shiny qualities of state autonomy and capacity, good governance, under the
guise of nationalism and regime legitimization, again is at work here as a
major determinant of development.11
To sum up, developmentally determined elite, enjoying high state capacity
and autonomy in a stable political environment, led to miraculous
development as GDP growth, as well as improvement in HD. In the high
stakes game of rapid development, well-meaning autocrats repressed society,
providing autonomy and capacity for the state. By way of virtuous circle,
repression was legitimized by palpable development. Autocratic rule thus
created an environment where HD was obligatory to secure the stability of
the regime and the survival of the rulers.
Comparison and analysis of democracy and the authoritarian miracles
Having listed the political qualities for development of both democracy and
leading autocracies, we must now compare the findings. Some additional
10
See steel industry in South Korea, Taiwan and China (United Nations
1995:95-96)
11
Liew claims that it was in fact good governance that led to Chinese
growth in the 1980’s and 1990’s and not regime type. (Cited in Polterovich and Popov
2007:75)
13
questions that are to be addressed in this final part include; are the reasons
for growth in polar regime types mutually exclusive? And; how important is
political environment for development? We will then draw together the key
developmental characteristics to make a series of conclusions.
One of the main contributions to the developmental success of the
authoritarian states analysed was that of state autonomy. Democracies, on
the other hand, promise just the opposite; they are attached to society and
responsive to its demands. (White 1998:13) Autonomy facilitated the rapid
development through contentious long-term planning, whereas solidarity in
democracy ensures the pressure to develop and the avoidance of policy
disasters. Hence, a change of government is presented as a strength of
democracies, and lack of governmental change is presented as a strength of
autocracies; the two are arguing past each other.
Nonetheless, Adrian Leftwich explains that the ruling elite in democracies
are prevented from implementing radical change, (as seen in the
authoritarian miracles), by being restrained in the name of respecting the
wishes of the parties who didn’t win the elections but still represent large
scathes of the population. (Leftwich 2005:696-699) If the winner of the
elections were allowed to ‘re-write the policy book’ perhaps in their favour,
then a large and powerless part of the population would feel that they have
lost too much in the electoral process, and revolt now that their interests are
threatened. Horizontal accountability, as a negative power of control on the
elite, prevents this from happening. Accordingly, it seems that while
democracy promotes development, it opposes miracle development.
However, this isn’t the case for all democracies; in homogenous mono-party
14
societies there is nothing to stop the legitimate elite from reforms if support
is nearly unanimous. (White 1998:20) A couple of useful examples to
consider are the astonishing developmental successes of Botswana and
Singapore; both democracies, which have both had the same parties in
power since 1966 and 1965 respectively. It seems then only a certain type of
liberal democracy favours extreme development, which isn’t possible in
states where multiple cleavages give rise to a plurality of parties.
So what does democracy buy in return for conservatism? As mentioned
before, the guarantee of the pursuit of development, through the
intermediary of good governance. Our case studies, however, ascertain that
autocracies enjoy this intermediary too; does this mean that they too enjoy
this guarantee? The fact that authoritarian states in this essay pursued
development is why they were chosen as case studies, they do however
misrepresent the reality of authoritarian states. To quote Surjit Bhalla, ‘For
every Confucian authoritarian success there are at least ten non-Confucian
authoritarian failures.’ (Bhalla 1997:214) Notwithstanding, our case studies
have enjoyed good governance through the necessity to develop to ensure
legitimacy of the regime (which is a key characteristic for stability).
Legitimacy has come from phenomenal development in East and South-East
Asia, in countries where rapid development was successful. Democracy on
the other hand can rely on other factors (such as adhering to the constitution
(Leftwich 2000:145)) to guarantee legitimacy which contributes to stability
where development can’t be (or inherently isn’t) rapid or generally palpable.
Moreover, improved chance of survival in democracies (Przeworski and
15
Limongi 1993:63) means steady and enduring development. If we take into
consideration our previous conclusion that democracies are self-limiting in
capacity and autonomy to develop rapidly, we have then, a crucial difference
between regime types: Democracies are more likely to provide a stable
platform on which development can be built and avoid policy disaster, but
they are also inherently less likely to facilitate development to the
miraculous degree that autocracies are able to.12
A further trend to point out between the two is that the advantages of regime
type only come from consolidated regimes and at different stages in
development. For democracy, first, good governance isn’t an inherent trait
and at times the elite still enjoy certain extra-constitutional privileges above
the rest of society. (Tsai 2006:262) Second, the benefits for development that
democracy promises through property rights and effective allocation of
resources through freedoms are annulled where the latter is in its infancy.
(Addison 2002:47-48) Third, any hope of generating equality through the
redistribution of resources is only possible when democracies are
consolidated. (Mulé 1998:6-10) Finally democracy, as a developmental
benefit in itself, (UNDP cited in Poltervich and Popov 2007:74), as ‘the
good life’, must be recurrently institutionalised into the ‘hearts and minds’
for the freedoms to be appreciated and valued. For autocracies, the regime
characteristics of stability and autonomy, which makes transformative
development possible, are only a reality themselves where power is
12
Przeworski in Hadenius draw a similar conclusion; democracies are ‘less
likely to go boom or bust’. (1997:166)
16
consolidated; where rule is accepted, stable and long-term.
In furthering this conclusion, it is pertinent for our comparison to connect
these consolidated regime types, and specifically their advantages, to their
respective stages of development. Rapid development of the autocracies in
our examples has only been through catch-up via industrialisation where the
comparative advantage of a country is wagered on and maximized by state
autonomy and capacity, using techniques and technology imported from the
developed world. (Bhalla 1997:202-203) (Kim and Park 2004:118)
However, quite interestingly, the advantages of democracy for development
carry further weight when the state is better developed. As well as securing
development politically, freedoms ensure better flow of information for
better political decisions in more developed, information rich and
complicated economy. (Przeworski et al. 2000:144) The advantages of
democracy are also needed for research and design, allocating human
resources where they are most suited, and generally for development on
unknown grounds.
To highlight from the previous paragraph, we didn’t argue that different
regimes necessary favour different types of development (HD or GDP), only
that they facilitate growth at different stages. In terms of HD, both
democracy and the autocratic success stories alleviate absolute poverty and
ensure basic education and healthcare and a comparison of the degree to
which isn’t possible here. Despite these findings, no regime promises to
unequivocally reduce inequality. For the South-East Asian autocracies
inequality was exacerbated, even though for the East Asian autocracies,
17
specifically South Korea, almost incomparably reduced income inequality.
For democracies, even being responsive to the masses (and hindering stateled investment (Przworski et al. 2000:144) (Leftwich 2000:158)) doesn’t
necessarily guarantee equality. Income inequality is more likely a result of
the (often gradual) marketization of the economy that both regime types
pursue. What is noteworthy, however, is that where autocratic rule in South
Korea evened the playing field as part of the transformative beginning for of
long-term development (which wasn’t possible in democratic South Africa),
democracy (once consolidated) offers a possible solution to inequalities later
down the line of development if such policies are chosen. (Kohli 1986:160)
To sum up, where our two regime types overlap in their positive causal
relationship to development they rely on intermediaries such as good
governance and stability (sought through legitimacy), which they
guarantee/enable in different ways. Where democracy and our authoritarian
case studies divide is particularly state autonomy and how they earn
legitimacy, which results in varied state capacity, development promotion,
growth rates and disaster prevention, among other attributes. The positive
attributes of our consolidated authoritarian case studies suit them for initial
development whereas consolidated democracy can have a positive impact on
more developed states (who may increasingly define development
differently). Neither regime type reliably ensures more substantial HD
prospects than the other, (especially not for income equality).
Conclusion
18
In this essay we have seen that democracy and autocracy diverge in
promises for development. Generally, democracy seems to promote
development and prevents developmental disasters. Autocracies, on the
other hand, facilitate rapid and transformative development, where GDP
growth is an obsession and HD is an obligation. We have also seen how the
two regime types compare. This is exclusively through the intermediaries of
good governance, stability and property rights, successful choice of policies
(that often provides legitimacy) (not to mention economic factors, namely
market liberalisation). Both regimes claim to foster these intermediaries in
their respective environments and often do so in divergent ways. We are thus
left with little evidence that it is regime type per se is the key determinant of
HD or GDP growth13. Although it has a sizeable impact on the economic
environment, it is just one integrated component that leads to policy choice.
One tentative conclusion of this linkage has been that perhaps democracy is
more likely to foster good governance, but where good governance meets
state capacity and autonomy (which seems more likely to be found in
autocracy), growth (and sometimes HD) can increase all the more
dramatically.
There are however some problematic implications with this conclusion. First
of all, our analysis and conclusion of the developmental prospects of
autocracy and democracy are more accurately those of two more relatively
narrow sets of conditions; consolidated democracy and the Confucius
authoritarian developmental states of Asia (that for purposes here we can
13
Leftwich makes a similar conclusion in stating that it’s not regime type
that is important, but ‘kind and character’ of the state. (2000:133)
19
call consolidated autocracies). Advantages have been outlined from systems
where their respective attributes work, leaving substantial middle ground
where neither system takes root. We have also seen that the two can roughly
merge in the middle where democracies have just a single party, but the
applicability of such a system is also limited in reality. Secondly, and as an
extension to the question, we perhaps should be asking what regime type
better offers a prospect for sustainable development. Where rapid
development has been a possibility, one is left wondering whether the
‘miracle success’ should be as coveted as often is done in the literature. (We
are of course talking about development beyond raising HD to acceptable
levels and eliminating absolute poverty). For the benefit of the
environment14 and perhaps income equality15, is the miracle growth of East
and South-East Asia desirable and something to be replicated across the
world, especially when it doesn’t seem to promise guaranteed superior HD
compared to democracy? Perhaps then, from a global perspective, the fact
that democracies develop conservatively is not a vice after all, but a virtue.
14
See Higgott and Nesaduri on Thailand (2002:10-14) and Islam on China
(1980:315) for the devastating effects this ‘miraculous’ development has had on the
environment.
15
As well as the example in the text of Indonesia and South-East Asian
countries, see also the autocratic development and the high resultant GINI coefficient of
Brazil (Kohli 1986:158)
20
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